PROSPECTS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE PROLIFERATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T00451R000100010001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1988
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of Central Intelligence
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50-52 EXTRAS/CB ?
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Prospects for Ballistic
Missile Proliferation
National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views
of the Director of Central Intelligence
with the advice and assistance of the
US Intelligence Community.
NIE 4-88W
September 1988
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The following intelligence organizations participated
in the preparation of these Key Judgments:
The Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Intelligence Agency
The National Security Agency
The Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
also participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence,-Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurs.
The full text of this National Intelligence Estimate is being published
separately with regular distribution.
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Key?Judgments
By the year 2000, at least 15 developing co'untries will either have
produced or be able to build ballistic missiles that will contribute to
regional instability and could threaten the interests of the United States
and its allies. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, South Africa,
South Korea, Syria, and Taiwan.
More difficult to project are purchases or transfers of complete ballistic
missile systems
Even coun-
tries developing their own ballistic missiles will consider the purchases of
interim systems as a stopgap measure until they can field their own
missiles
At least initially, most of these countries will equip their ballistic missiles
with conventional warheads. However, we judge that many of these
proliferating ballistic missiles could be armed with improved conventional
munitions, chemical, or (in :the future) biological or nuclear warheads.
We judge that eventually will deploy nuclear-
armed ballistic missiles. Several other countries have advanced nuclear
programs and could produce nuclear warheads for ballistic missiles in five
to 10 years if a decision to do so were made today.
All of the ballistic missile programs of these 15 developing countries rely
on foreign technology to some degre
o South Korea and North Korea manufacture ballistic missiles based on
? foreign designs, and India has successfully test launched its own ballistic
missile. Programs in these countries would not be significantly affected
by reduced foreign assistance.
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? Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Taiwan, Iraq, and Pakistan have
relatively advanced industrial and technological infrastructures and
could build ballistic missiles within the next 10 years If they can obtain
foreign assistance in such key technological areas as guidance and
control.
? The other countries (Indonesia, Iran, Libya, and Syria) would require
additional and substantial foreign assistance if they were to build their
own missiles by the year 2000.
With regard to transfers of complete systems, the Soviet Union has been
the principal supplier of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Egypt,
Iraq, Libya, South Yemen, Syria, and Vietnam have all received the 300-
kilometer-range Soviet Scud B; Syria and North Yemen have also received
the more modern but shorter range SS-21. Moscow, however, has refrained
thus far from supplying longer range missiles:
? Only China has been willing to export longer range missiles, but we have
no indication it is planning to sell the CSS-2 IRBM,
o other countries. However, the Chinese are aggressively
marketing their SRBMs.
? The Condor 11/ Vector SRBM being developed for coproduction by
Argentina, Egypt, and Iraq and the Brazilian SS-300 SRBM could be
available for purchase in the early-to-middle 1990s. Argentina and Brazil
hope to market medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs)-1,000- to
3,000-kilometer range?by the year 2000.
Efforts to stem the flow of ballistic missile technology?such as the 1987
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) *?may slow the pace of
some programs and discourage countries whose missile programs are in
very early stages from further development efforts, but they are unlikely to
have a major impact on countries determined to build or acquire missiles:
? The MTCR has been unevenly implemented by the participating coun-
tries, with the result that some signatories have not controlled suppliers in
their own countries.
? Missile and space launch technology is already widespread, much of it
obtained from commercial suppliers and open sources.
* The MTCR has seven signatories: the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, West
Germany, France, Italy, and Japan
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? Many key components and technologies are multipurpose, making it
difficult to prove that-they are destined for military end use.
? Developing countries in many cases are pooling their resources, attempt-
ing to rectify their technological deficiencies through acquisitions from
each other. Most often the technologies were originally acquired from the
West. As these countries' 'technologies develop, these ties are likely to
expand.
? The MTCR does not include several key industrialized missile and
missile technology suppliers, particularly the Soviet Union, China,
Switzerland, and Austria; some of these countries have become havens
for firms seeking to evade MTCR restrictions.
? The unwillingness of suppliers to forgo this lucrative trade ?ortends
burgeoning growth in the high-technology arms market.
One key shortcoming in virtually all these missiles is accuracy, since
technologies associated with guidance and control systems and reentry
vehicles are the most complex. Stringent controls imposed on transfers of
these technologies would provide one of the few means by which the United
States and other MTCR signatories could impede further progress
China's growing role as a supplier of ballistic missiles will continue to
complicate matters. US ability to restrain Chinese missile sales will be
limited since Beijing is using arms sales to generate hard currency required
to buy Western technology and to pay for the modernization of the People's
Liberation Army. Furthermore, arms sales help China achieve political
objectives abroad
While the deployment of conventionally armed missiles in relatively small
numbers would not, in most cases, significantly alter the regional military
balance, missiles often have a disproportionate impact on the perceptions of
both political and military leaders, an important ingredient in the balance
itself. Missiles deployed with chemical, biological, or nuclear warheads,
however, are likely to have significant military impact. The regions of
greatest potential risk will continue to be the Middle East and South Asia.
The deployment of ballistic missiles in these regions will pose an additional
threat to US interests and will aggravate existing tensions. These weapons,
possibly armed with chemical and nuclear warheads, may very well be used
in future conflicts.
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We can expect that a growing ballistic missile threat will prompt world-
wide interest in anti-tactical-ballistic missiles (ATBMs). The Soviet SA-
12a could be available for export in small numbers now, although we judge
such exports unlikely in the near term. The United States is currently
involved in a cooperative development program with the Israelis. While
ATBMs are more difficult to develop than ballistic missiles, experience
suggests that it will be very difficult to control the spread of ATBM
technology.
As a result of ballistic missile proliferation, US assets abroad, including
permanent military bases, military forces temporarily deployed in or
transiting an area, and US Government civilian facilities, will be open to a
wider range of possible threats:
? During times of crisis, the presence of deployed missiles would raise the
stakes militarily and increase pressure on the United States to become
engaged.
? US nuclear forces designed to deter a large-scale nuclear war with the
Soviet Union may not be an effective deterrent against smaller, less risk-
averse nations. These developments will require the United States to
address a more varied, potentially nuclear and chemical, threat.
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