AGENDA FOR MARCH 1986 LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020039-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: March 12, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020039-3
C:J SECRET STAT
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, CAMO
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: See Distribution
NIC 01316-86
12 March 1986
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Agenda for March 1986 Latin America
Warning and Forecast Meeting
1. The March 1986 Warning Meeting for Latin America will be held on
Wednesday, 19 March 1986, at 1015 hours in Room 7 E32, CIA Head-
quarters. Invited agencies and components should please keep their
representatives to a necessary minimum because of space limitations.
2. We intend to discuss the following countries/topics:
Chile, Costa Rica and Jamaica.
Chile
The National Accord for a transition to full democracy has bogged
down in recent weeks. This is primarily due to President Pinochet's
intransigence and the opposition's inability to agree on goals,
strategies and tactics. The Communist Party and the Revolutionary
Leftist Movement are delighted with Pinochet's hardline position since
they believe that polarization of the moderates will result. Cuba is
advocating a two-pronged strategy of maintaining pressure on Pinochet
through terrorism while urging their leftist allies to forge links with
moderate groups to position themselves to exploit the military regime's
"eventual downfall." Are there any signs of waning military support for
Pinochet? Will public protests increase in intensity as people return
from summer vacations and schools reopen? Can Cardinal Fresno regain the
initiative? Will the radical left and right redirect some of these
protests toward US diplomatic representatives? (DIA - 30 minutes)
Costa Rica
The 24 February borders discussions in Managua between
representatives of Nicaragua and Costa Rica revealed certain basic
differences in expectations. Nicaragua is reported to have been thinking
SECRET
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in terms of an armed military presence of 1,700 men on each side of the
border, whereas Costa Rica was thinking in terms of 10 civilians on each
side. Nevertheless, the talks, which were described as friendly, are to
be continued on 12 March. The impact, of course, was immediately felt
beyond the two principal countries. What has been the reaction of the
Core Four, the Contadora Group and the rest of Latin America? Are Arias'
comments largely rhetorical or does he actually intend to make policy
changes regarding the use of Costa Rican territory by the
anti-Sandinistas? Will Honduras be seriously tempted to follow Arias'
precedent? (STATE/INR - 30 minutes)
Jamaica
As Jamaica's economy continues to deteriorate, Michael Manley, leader
of the opposition, seems less inclined to press for an early election.
He appears to be perfectly content to let Prime Minister Seaga make the
unpopular economic decisions that are expected in the next few months.
Manley feels that the resultant popular resentment will work to his
advantage, at the polls as well as in the streets, if an announcement of
even more stringent austerity measures triggers widespread civil unrest.
Can Seaga weather another round of demonstrations, particularly if they
are more violent than those in 1985? Local radical leftist groups,
principally the Hot Steppers, add a potentially violent component to
Manley's strategy. Is he likely to use them to add to the violence and
will this work to his advantage? Can the Jamaican security forces cope
with widespread demonstrations if they turn violent? Is Manley inclined
to press for elections in the aftermath of rioting or is he more inclined
to let Seaga take the brunt of the adverse economy for a longer
period? (CIA/ALA - 30 minutes)
3. Please have your clearances passed
with your attendance plans no later than noon Tuesday,
18 March.
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
SECRET
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