LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING MARCH 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020038-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 38
• Publication Date: March 25, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/16: CIA-RDP93B01478R000300020038-4
C )
SECRET
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 01590-86
25 March 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of .Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert D. Vickers
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
March 1986
1. The following items were discussed at the Intelligence
Community's Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 19 March 1986.
Chile
2. Barring some unforeseen change, military support for President
Pinochet is expected to remain relatively firm until the end of his
term. However, there is growing sentiment among the military against
supporting a Pinochet candidacy in 1989. Most of them do not want to
risk the institution's reputation--nor their individual reputations--for
such an unpopular cause.
With the end of summer vacation, demonstrations are expected
to increase in frequency and intensity.
Cardinal Fresno has lost some of his momentum, and groups
supporting the National Accord have been unable or unwilling
to coordinate their efforts in recent months.
Various leaders will be trying to unify and breathe new life
into the movement in the next few weeks.
? The radical right and the radical left may redirect
violence toward US commercial and diplomatic interests.
If the radical left increases its level of violence, it could lead to
the military's closing ranks in defense of President Pinochet and lead a
slowing down of the transition to democracy. At stake are passage of the
Electoral Registry and Political Parties Laws, now scheduled for later
this year.
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WARNING ISSUE: Are there any signs of waning military support for
President Pinochet in anticipation of a new round of protest
demonstrations and associated violence? Will increasing pressure on the
security forces lead to greater unification or divisiveness?
Costa Rica
3. President Monge's initiatives to stabilize the Costa Rican-
Nicaraguan border, including the bilateral border agreement with Managua,
reflect his perception that Costa Rica will have to live with Nicaragua
whether the United States stays interested in the region or not. Costa
Rica, however, wants only a cosmetic border inspection force while
Nicaragua wants a full-blown "peacekeeping" force. Honduras will come
under pressure -- especially from the Contadora and Contadora Support
Groups -- to sign a similar bilateral agreement with Nicaragua,
especially if US military aid to the Contras is not approved.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the border force will be able to
prevent the Nicaraguan insurgents from using Costa Rican territory. That
will continue to be dependent on the government of Costa Rica, which thus
far, has given no indication that it intends to crack down hard on the
Contras.
WARNING ISSUE: The bilateral border agreement between Nicaragua and
Costa Rica will allow the Sandinistas to focus future Contadora talks on
the issue as well as push efforts to conclude a similar agreement with
Honduras.
Jamaica
4. In recent months, Michael Manley, leader of the opposition, has
pursued a tactic of not pressing Prime Minister Seaga to hold new
elections soon. Instead, he has been trying to take advantage of
widespread dissatisfaction with the economy and Seaga's slow pace in
implementing painful reform measures to expand his own political base.
Seaga would like to delay national elections but might be forced to hold
them if upcoming local elections indicate that he does not have the votes
to ask Parliament for the necessary delay. Any election--particularly a
national election--has the potential for turning violent.
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WARNING ISSUE: Unless Seaga is able to rebuild his popularity over
the next year or so, he may well be forced to hold national elections
that he would lose.
ji
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
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