LATIN AMERICA WARNING AND FORECAST MEETING MAY 1987

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300060007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: May 26, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
NIC 02247-87
National Intelligence Council 26 May 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VIA: National Intelligence Officer for Warning
FROM: Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
National Intelligence Officer for Latin America
SUBJECT: Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting
May 1987
1. The following items were discussed at the Latin;America.Warning
and Forecast Meeting on 20 May 1987.
2. Suriname
The transition in Suriname remains on track, but elections next
November are unlikely to diminish Bouterse's influence in any new
government. The constitution--which provides for new national
elections--will almost certainly be approved in September.' In the coming
months Bouterse will position himself to undercut efforts by the three
major traditional parties to elect an independent president, but whether
Bouterse will run or back a stalking horse candidate remains uncertain.
If Bouterse cannot legally elect a reliable president, the likelihood of
a coup will increase. Meanwhile, Bouterse continues to look for
diplomatic support to bolster his regime, and plans a trip to the US to
make his case here.
The insurgency remains stalemated, although the insurgents
gained an important infusion of cash and weapons recently. Lloyds-of
London paid the rebels a $200,000 reward for the return of a hijacked
aircraft and he insurgents have obtained some
heavy weapon
Warning Issue: The transition process can still be derailed if the
insurgency expands and Bouterse decides to use the increased fighting to
justify delaying elections. A more successful insurgency could also
prompt disgruntled military officers to move against Bouterse, especially
if they perceive him as an ineffective leader who is losing control of
the situation.
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
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3. Nicaragua
The Sandinistas' operation in the northern portion of the Bocay
Valley was successful in terms of demonstrating their troop mobility and
seizing their objective, but it probably will have little impact on
insurgent operations over the lon term. The Sandinistas suffered heavy
casualties Meanwhile, there are indications
that the fighting is straining regime resources. Managua has had to call
up reserve units to sustain a higher level of operations, and the
desertion rate in some hotly contested areas is over 30 percent.
President Ortega has stated, however, that despite the
potential acquisition of F-5s by Honduras, Nicaragua has no immediate
plans to get MIGs.
Nicaragua's economic outlook also appears grim. Regime investment
levels are likely to decline this year, and there is virtually no
likelihood of foreign investment beyond Soviet and Bloc aid. Capital
stock is eroding and skilled managers continue to flee Nicaragua. The
Soviets apparently have convinced the Sandinistas to loosen some economic
restrictions to encourage production and undercut the black market, but a
major reversal of past policies is unlikely.
Warning Issue: The Sandinistas may mount additional operations in
the Bocay Valley to keep the insurgents off balance--airborne incursions
into Honduras cannot be ruled out. Such attacks will be difficult to
predict, given the decline of special intelligence. Deteriorating
economic conditions will likely prompt further antiregime
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
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4. Brazil
President Sarney continues to be under heavy political pressure from
both inside and outside his own political party
The Constituent Assembly is moving
quickly on key issues such as the length of the presidential term and is
taking advantage of Sarney's weakened position to strengthen its hand
against the Executive Branch during the constitutional drafting process.
For example, the assembly increased congressional oversight of the
national budget and the management of the external debt. Anti-Sarney
sentiments within the military are not deep, but the President enjoys
little real support among the services. The commanders--loath to assume
control of the government during an economic crisis--are unlikely to
intervene directly, but remain willing to move against him by pressuring
congress should the economic situation deteriorate sharply.
Warning Issue: The most likely outcome is a foreshortened term for
Sarney--either four or five years instead of the mandated six-year
tenure. Pressure to remove him from office before elections will
increase if he appears physically or mentally incapable of running the
government. A series of deadlines relating to the debt and trade issues
this summer will put further strains on Sarney.
Robert D. Vickers, Jr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6
? SECRE
Participating in the NI0/Latin America Warning Meeting of
20 May 1987 were representatives of the following agencies:
DIA: DI0/DIA
DIA/DE3
DIA/DB3C1
DIA/OA-5
JSI-4B
National Security Agency
Department-of State/INR
Department of the Army
US Marines
CIA Participants:
ALA
OG I
OIA
LDA
OIR
DO/ LA
DO/CATF
DO/EPS
NI 0/W
NPIC
FBIS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/19: CIA-RDP91 B00776R000300060007-6