TERRORISM WARNING AND FORECAST REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 7, 2013
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 25, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7 25X1
11, Hmir
The Director of Central Intelligence
WashinumD.C.20505
National Intelligence Council NIC 00847-87
25 February 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism
SUBJECT: Terrorism Warning and Forecast Report
Representatives of the Intelligence Community met on 20 February to
discuss the following issues: threat from the Somali National Movement; the
radical Palestinian Colonel Hawari Apparatus; implications of the Hammadi
arrests; and placement of FAA special security teams. Attached is my report.
Attachment:
As stated
harles E. Allen
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7 25X1
Warning Report ? Terrorism
Discussion Items
1. Threat posed by the Somali National Movement (SNM)
Because of the recent kidnaping of French medical relief personnel by SNM
rebels, we considered it advisable to assess the threat this group poses to US
interests in the region. This tribal rebel group, consisting of about
2,000-3,000 armed troops was formed about six years ago. It receives
extensive training, equipment, and support from the Ethiopian government and
operates from Ethiopian bases. It also receives extensive support from
sympathizers overseas. It normally conducts operations in small groups,
targeting Somali government security and political officials in the north.
Traditionally, the group has tended to stay away from foreign nationals
and to assure the US that its citizens would not be harmed. However, lack of
central SNM control over its field units means that Westerners, especially
those involved in relief operations in the northern refugee camps, will be at
some risk. That risk is judged moderate to low at the present time.
2. Colonel Hawari Apparatus
Community analysts provided an extensive review of the activities
attributed to the Hawari Apparatus. Despite reports of his house arrest,
Colonel Hawari's status appears not to have changed. CIA analysts believe
Hawari operations can be grouped into two distinct categories: anti?Syrian
operations (conducted primarily from his Baghdad office) and "May-15 type"
operations (anti?US activities conducted principally from his Tunis office).
Both categories of operations reflect Hawari's close ties with Iraq.
Retrospective analysis of anti?US terrorist activities indicates that Iraq may
have been involved in anti?US operations, conducted by Hawari operatives since
1984. The major question is: Is Hawari a contract operative for Iraq? Given
his close relationship with PLO leader Arafat, we speculate that Arafat knows
of and approves of Hawari operations. Because the PLO owes many debts to
Iraq, it is not unlikely that Hawari would be tasked by Arafat to conduct
operations on Iraq's behalf.
An INR analyst countered this hypothesis. While agreeing that Iraq
probably knew of Hawari's activities, he fails to see the evidence and motives
for Iraq to support these activities. He believes Arafat probably knew of and
may have authorized the anti?US operations, most likely to reingratiate
himself with PLO hardliners. Other INR analysts challenged this view.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7 25X1
I
The lessons to be drawn are that Iraq never shut down 15 May activities.
Using Hawari provided Iraq plausible denial. The US may have been deceived
into believing that Iraq was no longer sponsoring international terrorism,
leading us to remove it from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.
3. Implications of the Hammadi arrests. A CIA representative reviewed
Bonn's options on handling the Hammadi problem. Above all, we believe Bonn is
seeking to postpone any decision and buy time in which to attempt to secure
release of the German hostages in Beirut. Essentially, there are three
options:
o Extradite (not likely as long as hostages are held)
o Swap for hostages (not politically palatable in Germany or to the US)
o Hold and try in Germany (appears to be leading option)
Under the Hague Convention Germany can try Hammadi for the TWA 847 hijacking
or else they must extradite him to the US.
CIA and INR representatives next discussed the implications of the arrests
and threat of increased Hizballah terrorist activity in retaliation. They
agree that the Hammadi clan likely was responsible for kidnaping the German
hostages but they are probably now in the hands of Hizballah elements. Abd
al-Hadi Hammadi, brother of the two arrested in West Germany, is an Hizballah
security official. The kidnaping of the Beirut University College (BUC)
professors was probably in retaliation for US pressure on Germany for
extradition of Mohammad Hammadi.
The kidnapers' decision not to carry out the threatened execution was
probably a result of:
o fear of US military retaliation
o Hammadi losing control over the German hostages
o Syria or Iran's entre into the negotiations.
The security situation in Beirut is not favorable to the hostages. The
hostage takers/holders must look for ways to increase pressure on the West.
Likely options include:
o take more hostages
? hijack an aircraft -
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part-Sanitized Copy Approved forRelease2013/05/07 CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7 25X1
? ,t.L.Kt I
o undertake terrorist operations in West Germany or against German and
US targets abroad.
On the other hand, Hizballah may be in no hurry to resolve the hostage
problem. They are focused on survival in the Lebanese camps war which may
dampen planning for terrorist operations. On the whole, we believe the risk
of Hizballah retaliatory activities remains high.
4. FAA Special Security Teams Placement
In response to the threatened retaliation following the arrest of the
Hammadi brothers, the Federal Aviation Agency dispatched special security
teams to selected airports to bolster security for US carriers and to assure
that the airports are meeting ICAO standards. The airports at which these
teams are located are listed on the attached document. Also listed as
selected foreign airports frequently serviced by US carriers.
FAA intends to keep teams at foreign ports at least through the next
month. It solicits input from the Intelligence Community regarding the most
appropriate placement of these teams, based on the highest threat.
25X1
SECRET
im,Inecifiori in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07 CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
25X1
25X'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
?
Airports in Europe, Africa, Middle Fast, and South Asia Serviced by
Scheduled U.S. Air Carriers
Ansterdam Manchester
Athens Manila
Bangkok Milan
Berlin Moscow
Bombay Munich
Brussels Nairobi
Budapest Nice
Cairo Nbremburg
Copenhagen Oslo
Delhi Paris
Dubrovnik Prague
Dusseldorf Riyadh
Frankfurt Rane
Geneva Shannon
Glasgow Singapore
Hamburg Stockholm
Helsinki Stuttgart
Istanbul Tel Aviv
Karachi Vienna
Lisbon Warsaw
London Zagreb
Madrid Zurich
Airports with FAA Ground Security Assistance Teams
Athens
Bombay
Cairo
Delhi
Frankfurt
Madrid
Paris
Rame
FAA Intelligence Division: sru-II Ident 05556/488-7120
Mike Mtrse, 267-3099
Lee Boivin, 267-3104
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved ifor Release 2013/05/07 : CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7
Karen Morrissette
Stefanie Stauffer
Morgan Langston
Doug Everett
Mark Montevidoni
Morse. Mike
Angel Lugo
Bernie Karam
Gwendolyn Peterson
Kathy Henry
Leo Boivin
Deborah Tangren
Azedah Mercado
Edwin Cogswell
John Davidson
Jim McDonough
Pamela Dobson
Mark Randol
Michael Mazelski
Bill Meyers
Charles L. Allen
Matt Kormann
John Hemry
Maureen Steinhouse
Jeff Shumaker
Linnea Raine
Philip Kosnett
Alan Makovsky
Edward Kata
Ken Duncan
Cecilia Capestany
Rose McKinney
Participants
ANIO/CT
Justice
State
Customs
DEA
DEA
FAA
DIA/DE
NSA
Marines
Secret Service
Secret Service
Secret Service
FAA
FBI
FBI
FBI
Nuclear Regulatory
AFOSI
AFOSI
Army
Damy
Damy
Army INSCOM
Navy ATAC
Navy ATAC
Coas Guard ICC
Coast Guard ICC
Energy/DASI
State
State
State
INR/TNA
Army ITAC
Army ITAC
CTC/TAB
CTC/TAB
CTC/TAB
CIA/OIA
CIA/NPIC
ICS/HC
DO/EPS
FBIS
CTC/TAB
CIA/EURA
FBIS/WEB
5
STAT
STAT
STAT
SECRET/ STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/07: CIA-RDP91B00776R000300040026-7