IMPLICATIONS OF THE COLLAPSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ZAIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100170006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 17, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP97SO0289R000100170006-5
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D. C 20505
SUBJECT: Implications of the Collapse of the Government
of Zaire
1. Reports of the existence of a plan to overthrow
President Mobutu, behind the current attack on southern
Zaire from Angola by ex-Katangan gendarmes, together with
the evident inability of the Zaire government to organ-
ize its defenses in a timely and effective way, have led
me to consider what the implications of the attainment
of such objectives might be for the US. It is too early
to state with any certainty whether Mobutu will fall,
but the possibility is sufficiently strong, in the
view of the Embassy and of Washington observers, that
I feel the following pote,tial consequences should be
brought to your attention.
2. Mobutu's overthrow would be followed by turmoil
in Zaire itself, with various factions and provincial
regimes scrambling for pieces of the Zaire army and
beseeching support from the US, the Soviets, and the
Chinese. Although pro-Western factions would emerge,
they would be hard pressed to establish their authority
throughout the country, unless they obtained strong US
or Western European support and foreign personnel to give
confidence to their military arms. There would be
danger for foreign citizens in Zaire in this situation,
and possibly calls for foreign intervention as a result.
3. Radical groups would have the advantages of Shaba
(the old Katanga) as a domestic support base and both near-
by Angola and the Congo as actively helpful neighbors.
We could expect Cubans to be invited to assist in stabiliz-
ing the situation.
4. After an initial phase of disorder, and assuming
a radical regime came to power, a regional realignment of
forces would emerge, with Angola as the principal imme-
diate regional beneficiary. Angola's northern insurgency
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problems would be solved, although UNITA would not be im-
mediately affected in the south; the Benguela railway
ultimately could be reopened; and a more secure base
formed for the training of guerrilla forces for Namibia
and if necessary, for Rhodesia.
5. If the pattern of other African countries holds,
however, even a radical new government would try to main-
tain its key export markets for raw materials. While we
doubt, therefore, that the supply of minerals from Shaba
to Western Europe and the US would be interrupted for
long, at least by design, a radical regime could "threaten"
the supply in such a way that it would appear that the
West was faced with serious losses despite the clear
economic interest of a new government. The US imports
close to 75 percent of its cobalt requirements--the
mineral is used in the production of high-temperature
alloys--from Zaire either directly or indirectly through
Belgium, but the US does not depend on Zaire for other
materials.
6. The shift of Zaire into partnership with Angola
would also impact on the southern African problem. Prime
Minister Vorster would see a Red tide advancing. While
Vorster's reactions are not possible to judge precisely,
we think he might well take this development as a signal
that he had to stiffen his resistance to making conces-
sions to majority rule in Namibia, and possibly in Rho-
desia as well. Zambia, which currently plays a relatively
moderating role in the southern Africa problem, would
feel isolated and threatened, and forced to make an ac-
commodation with the more militant elements. Black mili-
tants throughout the region would feel strengthened.
7. Mobutu has long been identified throughout Africa
and the Third World as a US client, presiding over a piece
of highly strategic geography; his downfall could not
fail to be perceived as a major "loss" for the US in
Africa and especially if he had a radical successor,
a potential if not actual "gain" for the USSR, Cuba, and
the radical socialist club in Africa. The more conserva-
tive African leaders would press the US for greater evi-
dence of support for them.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP97SO0289R000100170006-5
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8. My officers cannot immediately judge the psy-
chological effect on the international financial community
of a radical regime which might repudiate or call for
new renegotiation of Zaire's foreign debt, the bulk of
which is owed to European banks and contractors.
Direct US private investment has an estimated
book value of $200 million. This would not necessarily
be lost, but it would be subject to a lengthy period of
political uncertainty, the consequences of which might
be minor but which are not really calculable. Certainly
default or a long period of renegotiation would not
help the present climate in which it is claimed that
Western credit institutions are overextended in the
Third World.
STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/01 : CIA-RDP97SO0289R000100170006-5