S. AFRICA: MILITANT ROOTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020052-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 52
• Publication Date: July 23, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020052-4
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE WNITOR
23 July 1985
pect
S. Africa: militant n*ts
"
By Robert S. Jaster
I N recent weeks South African combat troops were once again
hunting down SWAPO guerrillas inside Angola: the first
such cross-border strikes since Pretoria withdrew its
occupying forces from southern Angola in April. This latest ac-
tion was only one of several aggressive moves by the Botha gov-
ernment recently. In mid-June, South African commandos at-
tacked suspected African National Congress targets in
Botswana's capital, Gaberone. A few weeks earlier a South Afri-
can demolition team was caught attempting to blow up a US-
owned oil installation in Angola's far northern province, 800
miles above the Namibian border.
These actions are a slap at the Reagan administration, which
has been trying to prod Mr. Botha into a less belligerent stance
toward its neighbors. Coming at a time of growing US congres-
sional clamor for sanctions against Pretoria, South Africa's lat-
est salvos leave the policy of "constructive engagement" dead in
the water. Why antagonize the United States? Why now?
The resurgence of South African militancy reflects concerns
far more vital than the state of relations with the US. The driv-
ing issues are rooted in South African domestic politics. Most
important, the government must demonstrate that it is tough in
the face of outside provocation, particularly guerrilla activities.
Neutralizing the guerrilla threat commands the highest priority
of the Botha administration. Its strategy must be seen to be
working. This becomes even more important in times of internal
political upheaval, like that which has been going on in South
Africa's black townships for almost a year. President Botha has
come under continuing fire from right-wing parties for his politi-
cal reforms at home; he cannot afford to be seen as "soft" toward
black opposition at home or guerrilla attacks from outside.
South African whites held high hopes that the 1984 security
accord with Mozambique would put an end to ANC sabotage in-
side South Africa, and that the cease-fire with Angola last year
would cripple South-West Africa People's Organization
(SWAPO) operations in Namibia. Yet attacks by both have con-
tinued. The longer they go unchecked, the greater the impact on
white morale, and the louder the message to South African
blacks that guerrilla warfare offers an effective weapon against
the apartheid regime. The government does not want to see this
proposition win broad acceptance.
ence the launching of highly visible strikes against sus-
ed guerrillas in neighboring states: proof the government is
doing something" about the guerrilla attacks. South Africa has
also struck at the economic and political infrastructure of nearby
states, thereby raising the costs of playing host to guerrillas.
And if this means sacrificing the goodwill of the Reagan admin-
istration, it is a price that must be paid. In any event, Botha
probably feels he has gained about all he can from constructive
engagement: His string has run out, along with US patience.
Bureaucratic politics, too, has played a role, as cleavages be-
tween the military and the Foreign Office have spilled over into
South Africa's regional policy. Confident of its capabilities and
eager to demonstrate its prowess, the military has consistently
pursued a hard policy line. It has opposed concessions on
Namibia, and has urged hard-hitting strikes against guerrilla
sanctuary states. Its leaders have promoted the image of South
Africa as a regional superpower that must not be afraid to use its
military muscle. In this it has usually won the support of Presi-
dent Botha (described by his own staff as a "superhawk") over
Foreign Office reservations.
The Nkomati nonaggression pact with Mozambique was thus
a victory for the Foreign Office, which has long favored detente
with neighbor states under a loose constellation grouped arount'
South Africa. But the military had trained and directed Renamo,
a group of Mozambican "contras," for five years. It was reluc-
tant to cut them loose, and was opposed to the peace accord. The
military later turned a blind eye when elements within the de-
fense force continued to support Renamo operations against Mo-
zambique in the months after the Nkomati pact.
The most recent acts of aggression are thus no fluke, no mo-
mentary lapse into militancy.
Rather, they represent a return to the pattern of the past six
years: a pattern of direct and heavy military response to actions
by SWAPO and the ANC. That pattern was suspended for a
time in hopes the accords with Angola and Mozambique - to
which South Africa agreed under US prodding - would relieve
guerrilla attacks. Since they have failed to do so, the military op-
tion has resumed, and the chances for regional detente dimmed.
Robert S. Jaster, a writer and lecturer on southern Ahi-
can politics an security for London's International Insti-
tute for Strategic Studies, is the author of a forthcoming
book on South Africa's policy in Namibia.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/18: CIA-RDP91-00587R000100020052-4