FIGURING OUT ARAFAT'S GAME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89T01156R000100100023-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: October 15, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/09: CIA-RDP89TO1156R000100100023-7
The Director of tra Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 505
SE KT
National Intelligence Council NIC 05117-85
15 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Graham E. Fuller
National Intelligence Officer for NESA
SUBJECT: Figuring Out Arafat's Game
1. Events of the past several weeks pose a particular challenge in
trying to assess what Arafat is up to. Whatever our hopes may have been,
it is now fairly clear that Arafat is determined to pursue a two-track
policy:
-- On the one hand, continue direct attacks against Israel; and
-- Continue exploration of peace options through Jordan's King
Hussein.
2. During the Spring we received strong indications that the 11
February Accord Arafat negotiated with Hussein was serious, and broadly
accepted within the PLO leadership. Since Spring, however, the peace
process has crept to a near halt. The PLO has not yet been able to bite
the bullet about announcing the acceptance of UN Resolution 242 and
Israel's right to exist. Much time has been consumed over the
desirability of a Murphy meeting with major Palestinian leaders in
Amman. A US arms deal for Jordan is far from certain yet. Continuing
spontaneous terrorism on the West Bank has hardened Israel's view of
negotiations. Israeli hardliners have sought to portray Arafat as the
implacable enemy and want to bomb PLO Headquarters in Jordan.
Given all of these events, Arafat seems to have decided that he
cannot afford to put all his eggs in the negotiations basket.
he has been under considerable pressure from hardliners around
him not to appear to be acting out of weakness. The
Syrian-supported radical PLO wing works to challenge Arafat's
credentials in "the struggle." Under these circumstances Arafat
has at least agreed to the continuation of the armed struggle
through various PLO elements--but possibly without his own close
personal involvement in these activities.
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3. It will be very difficult for us to establish clearly the degree
of Arafat's involvement in any number of operations including the Cyprus
murder of three Israelis and the recent ship hijacking. Whatever Arafat
may say about these incidents it is hard to avoid implicating him. Yet
it only does him limited good to deny the armed struggle when that is the
image he is trying to maintain.
4. The irony is that our Estimates have clearly pointed out the
prospects for terror and violence from Syria's side should the peace
process move forward. I would have antiic-irp-atte~d that these recent
incidents had their origin in Damascus. Unless these operations are very
clever indeed, however, we lack evidence of Syrian involvement.
-- We are in something of a no-win situation with terrorism.
Arafat may feel compelled to pursue the armed struggle until
such time as the peace process seems certain to work for im,
while the Syrians will embark on significant terrorism precisely
when the peace process in fact does seem to be working.
-- As terrorism continues, it will be hard for us to determine just
where it comes from and what its specific tactical motivation
is--anti-Israel, anti-Arafat, anti-peace, anti-US, etc.
Whatever the motivation, Arafat's insistence on maintaining even
an appearance of terrorist capability and keeping his armed
option open will render US contacts with him extremely
difficult, if not impossible. It will also play fully into the
hands of Israelis who are unwilling to deal with the PLO in any
form. Indeed, most Israelis will try to establish Arafat as the
author of almost any incident that takes place. One thing is
for sure, Arafat is not helping his cause under present
circumstances.
5. Arafat has his own severe limitations, however. He does not wish
to go back to the Syrians--the only real headquarters for a serious armed
struggle against Israel. An overt rejection of the present
Arafat-Hussein Accords will only lead to his expulsion from Jordan--a
move which would have very harmful consequences for Arafat. Whether or
not Jordan serves as a center for operations against Israel, his presence
there is highly symbolic. Arafat will probably sincerely attempt to keep
his peace options open as well while working through Jordan--hoping for
improved circumstances.
6. Even if Arafat should openly reject the Hussein-Arafat Accords
(very unlikely) and is expelled from Jordan, Hussein will not be able to
deal with Israel without the PLO. The West Bank is by definition
Palestine, and Hussein knows he has no mandate to negotiate on behalf of
the Palestinians.
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7. In sum, the outlook is rather bleak at present. Arafat will go
on trying to build a stronger consensus for a peace option, but will have
to deal with those in his own council who see no progress and wish to
maintain their own strength vis-a-vis Syria and Israel. Jordan will not
want the idea of the peace process to die definitively either. The
Israelis will hope to exclude the PLO from any negotiations as long as
possible. The same old dilemma exists: neither the Palestinians nor the
Israelis feel they can afford to recognize each other's existence.
Graham E. Fuller
3
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NIC 05117-85
15 October 1985
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Figuring Out Arafat's Game
NIC/NIO/NESA:GEFuller:jcn 15 Oct. 85
Distribution:
1 - DC I
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
-001` 1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - D/NESA
1 - C/NE/DDO
1 - SRP
~1 = DDI Registry
2 - NIO/NESA
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/09: CIA-RDP89T01156R000100100023-7