SOVIET PRESSURE ON FINLAND

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
S
Document Page Count: 
3
Document Creation Date: 
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 13, 2013
Sequence Number: 
16
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 17, 1958
Content Type: 
MEMO
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0.pdf127.09 KB
Body: 
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0 66f aOCU?`.FwR'T FAO. - - `~' Ra CFA Fzk; , F RFCe - ----.~? FiLC.U Se eYFbe CLASS, CFkws Ej 70 - TS S C NEXT DATE: AUTH: Ffl ,TS-2 QF- REVIEWER: 018645 C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES 17 October 1958 1. The formation in late August of the Fagerholn government in Finland, the most conservative and nationalist in coloration of any since 1945, has evidently created considerable distress in Moscow. Judging froze Soviet broadcasts and the Finnish Conunist press, the Soviet leadership believes that the new goverm.ent, because of its political complexion, night atterT., t to lead Finland into closer relations with the West. In particular, the USSR r. y be concerned over Finland's application for substantial loans from western sources to be used for uodernization of the econoty and over Finnish consideration of membership in the OEEC. 2. In addition to critical press conent, the USSR has expressed its annoyance at the situation in Finland by recalling its ambassador without observation of the usual amenities. It has also stalled on talks to arrange for future trade.and on the - Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0 -- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0 implementation of other econoac natters worked out with the previous Finnish governuent. The Finnish goverment.. with its eye on current loan negotiations with the West, tends to nagnify the extent of Soviet pressure. 3. The Finnish econor.iy could be severely disrupted by Soviet econouic pressure, since approximately 30 per cent of Finnish foreign trade is conducted with the Bloc. The economy is already in difficulty: nearly 30,000 persons are out of work and by next Merch the figure may reach 100,000, out of a labor force 2 million strong. This unemployment is a reflection of the fact that the competitive position of Finnish products in Western markets has deteriorated. If the USSR chose to break off economic relations with Finland it. could greatly aggravate the present difficult situation. 4. It is possible that the USSR is now prepared to apply heavy pressure on Finland in an effort to reduce its ties with the West and to bring it closer to the Soviet orbit. Such an objective would be consistent with the tougher line which Moscow has been taking in the European satellites, and with the greater confidence and aggressiveness which the Soviet leadership has recently displayed. 5. However, the Soviet leadership must be well aware how stubborn and deter: .ned the Finns can be once they are aroused. Moscow Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0 Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0 probably believes that the Fagerhoim government would not hesitate, in case economic sanctions were applied, to seek direct assistance frog. -the West. Furthermore., a Soviet-Finnish quarrel of serious proportions would adversely affect Soviet prestige among neutralist and uncommitted peoples. 6. Thus., we expect a continuation for some time of the present level of harassment. By these means the USSR will hope to deter the Finns from any drift toward closer association with Western Europe. 7. If the Fagerholrn government should collapse because of the unsatisfactory economic situation and Soviet harassment.* Finland would face a serious parliamentary crisis. The Couuunists have largest single bloc of deputies in the parliament and have made r...uch capital of the worsening economic situation. It would be difficult to form a new government without the participation of the Co,:n,unista. FOR TIIE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES: SIfERNA N ED, NT Assistant Director National Estimates (j4- Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/06/13: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030016-0