SOVIET ATTITUDE ON DISCUSSION OF VARIOUS INSTRUMENTS OF SURPRISE ATTACK
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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP79R00904A000400030015-1
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RIFPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
17
Document Creation Date:
December 23, 2016
Document Release Date:
June 13, 2013
Sequence Number:
15
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 22, 1958
Content Type:
MEMO
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2DA1TE:APR 1980 REVIEWER: 018645
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES
22 October 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR
SUBJECT: Soviet Attitude on Discussion of Various Instruments of
Surprise Attack
1. This memorandum deals with two questions: (a) What US means
of possible surprise attack are of greatest concern to the Soviet
leaders?; and (b) What Soviet means of possible surprise attack would
the Soviet delegation be most reluctant to discuss? These questions
are closely related to issues discussed in the 0/NE staff paper of
9 September "Probable Soviet Positions at a Technical Conference on
Measures to Avert Surprise Attack" and the latter should be read in
connection with the present memorandum.
2. The Soviets' willingness to discuss in detail various weapons
systems will probably depend on how they weigh the following five
considerations:
(a) genuine concern over the threat from any US system;
('3) extent to which a discussion of particular weapons systems
would require Soviet disclosure of secret information or of
weaknesses:
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(c) whether discussion of various weapons systems might give
the USSR clues as to US thinking on future weapons systems;
(d) potentiality for propaganda exploitation of the US position
at the conference and subsequently, and avoidance of matters
which the US could exploit in propaganda;
(e) relation to preferred Soviet surprise attack inspection
systems i.e., an effort to stack the deck toward the kind
of agreement they reA3ly want to achieve.
On the basis of these considerations, we make the following estimate of
the Soviet attitude toward discussion of various instruments of possible
surprise attack.
3. Long-Range Ground-Launched Missiles, The Soviet leaders probably
believe that they have an advantage in long-range missile development and
strength, and they will therefore be cautious about giving the US any
opportunity to single out neutralization or limitation on missiles. They
may, however, take a longer term view of the probable future US capability
in intermediate and intercontinental missiles. In any case, they will
probably agree to the discussion of control over missiles only if this
subject is tied to long-range bombers and bases. They will probably
expect us to raise the subject, and will seek to leave the initiative for
introduction of technical specifications to us, so as not to disclose
details of their own program which might assist us.
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4. Long.-Range Aviation. The Soviets will emphasize controls and
restrictions on long-range aviation in view of the heavy US reliance on
this arm, and their relative lesser reliance upon it. They will probably
stress the dangers of unintsntional triggering of war by a beserk pilots
by accidental dropping of a bomb on foreign territory, by misjudging as
an enemy act the accidental dropping of a bomb on one's own territory,
to a penetration of his airspace or mass flights "toward" an enemy's
territory, thus "compelling" that power to take countermeasures, etc.
These arguments mill be used to focus attention on limitations governing
foreign basing and overflight of other countries, flight near or toward
another power, and the like. They will also probably have an interest
in exploring purely technical inspection-control measures to assist them
in reaching a conclusion on what these would involve; the history of
their own past disarmament proposals has reflected an evident wavering
on this point, probably in part because they are uncertain just what it
would involve in terms of inspection activities.
5. Tactical Aviation. The Soviets will probably tie controls over
tactical aviation to zonal areas of inspection and limitation of forces.
In general, as in most other cases: they will probably argue that it is
not the tactical aviation or other system, but the nuclear munitions, which
make controls so necessary. Hence, they will probably stress nuclear-free
zones, especially in Central Europe: with control over tactical air (as
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well as ground) forces within such zones.
6. Ground Forces. The Soviet disarmament proposals of the last
three years, insofar as they have dealt with measures to avert surprise
attack, have stressed inspection of facilities for large-scale movement
of ground forces: railway junctions, large ports, and motor highways.
Tbis insistence will probably be maintained, even though it is a vulnerable
propaganda position to emphasize these to the exclusion of airfields
and missile sites. One reason is that it accords with the Soviet view
that large armies would be involved even in a general nuclear war. Also,
it is consistent with the Soviet political line on disarmament thus far,
that invasion across frontiers with large bodies of troops is a form
of surprise attack requiring controls and weapons limitations. This
stand supports their campaign for a nuclear-free, limited-forces, and
inspected area in CLntral Europe -- which we believe to be one of the
chief objectives of the Soviets in the forthcoming conference. Tho
Soviets will probably be sensitive to any revelation of their ground
force strength ana deployment, and they will therefore seek to avoid other
than technical inspection discussions.
7. Missile-launching Submarines, It is difficult to estimate the
Soviet position on this topic. They are believed to be developing a
capability in weapons of this type. Nhile this subject may not be
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introduced by them, they will presumably agree to discussions but try
to limit them to controls at naval bases, and perhaps to agreements on
non-navigation in certain areas near the other sidets territory.
8. Other Naval Forces. It would be logical for the Soviets to seek
controls over aircraft carriers, since they have none and we do. Again,
suggested controls would probably take the form of limitations on deploy-
ment, and non-carrying of nuclear weapons to prevent such accidents as those
discussed in connection with long-range aviation. They might advance
the idea of similar limitations for other conventional or missile-launching
surface vessels.
9, Earth Satellite Vehicles, It is possible that the Soviets will
advance a new proposal for control over space vehicles overflying other
countries in a formulation which would not limit missile test or other
firings over home territory. There is no certainty of the Soviet estimate
of the value to them of reconnaissance satellites, but there is evidence
of their concern over US planned and possible use of such vehicles for
reconnaissance and for bombardment. Aside from the fact that such a proposal
would be good propaganda, if implemented it would deny the US future
improvement in intelligence. On the other hand, while the Soviets would
presumably gain much less from a reconnaissance vehicle, they would probably
wish to avoid giving the US an opportunity to raise the possibility of a
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UN or internationally?run disarmament inspection satellite. Moreover,
at present they are probably willing to contemplate only limited zones
of inspection in Central Europe and possibly in the Far East. While
some forms of inspection, such as aerial overflight, can be either
universal or limited to special danger (or "pilot") zones, and might
there fore be acceptable to the Soviets for discussion, an inspection
system using satellite vehicles covering very broad areas might be
considered to place pressure on them toward more comprehensive controls
than they presently intend.
10. Other Means of Surprise Attaok. As we have noted, the Soviets
are likely to attempt to place particular stress on nuclear munitions
and warheads of r117 kind as the principal danger in surprise attack.
This will not, however, provide a basis for ma conference discussion
as the Soviets are aware.
11. While it is not likely that the Soviets will raise the question
of intelligence and warning systems -- surely a key matter in detecting
surprise -- it cannot be excluded that they may do so.
Should they
raise questions of electronic and other specialized collection techniquess
they probably have materials which would support a new popular campaign
against forms of activity previously little known to world publics. Also,
in recent internal propaganda, the Soviets have raised the issues of
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alleged US interest in clandestine entry of small nu3lear weapons,
US use of balloons for reconnaissance $ and foreign a bt ache contacts with
the civilian population for espionage purposes. One or more of thes0
subjects might be raised: the last indicated perhaps in terms of defining
severe limits on the role and movement of inspectors for any disarmament
agreement,
FOR THE BOARD OF NA.TION411, ESTIMATES
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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9 September 1958
PROBABLE SOVIET POSITIONS AT A TECHNICAL
CONFERENCE ON MEASURES TO AVERT SURPRISE ATTACK
I. GENERAL- CONSIDERATIONS
1* The Soviet approach to a technical conference on averting
possibilities of surprise attack would, of course, reflect the general
Soviet position on disarmament** It would reflect the broad aim of
enhancing Soviet security, both by reducing the likelihood of nuclear
war, and by moving toward limitations on the most threatening aspects
of Western military power. The negotiations at the conference of
experts on nuclear test controls have shown that the Soviets may be
willing to entertain certain military limitations for themselves and
accept some inspection controls if they judge that from an agreement
they will obtain a net gain to their security*
2. Four general Soviet diplomatic aims could be served in experts'
talks: (a) keeping alive the disarmament issue, in a forum in which
the appearance of Soviet initiative can be maximized; (b) preparing
..11101?1111MISMBITIIIIIIMMI 1???=erall????
* See SNIE 11-6-58' The Soviet Attitude Toward Disarmament, 24 June
1958, SECRET; especially the Conclusions and the Appendix, paras.
12-17 and 21-24.
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a specific issue generating pressure for a Summit meeting (perhaps
along with the nuclear test issue); (c) possible start of a "rolling
stone" effect which, again along with the nuclear test issue, may lead
to sufficient popular pressure on Western governments to make them
more pliable on some disarmament issues; and (d) a further step to
tie "surprise attack" prevention measures ultimately to a ban on
nuclear weapons, and in the interim to lesser geographical limitations
and other inhibitions on use of nuclear weapons.
3. Measures to avert surprise attack are by their nature so
encompassing as in effect to embrace the entire disarmament field.
Inspection (observation) is insufficient to provide wholly adequate
safeguards, at least in respect to certain weapons systems; limitations
on numbers and deployment of at least some weapons almost certainly
would become involved. The Soviets will have recognized the difficulty
of keeping these issues within a technical framework, as well as the
inherent tendency of the subject to lead to proposals for a more
comprehehsive system of control than they are now prepared to contemplate.
Probably no reliable forecast of their conduct in these talks can be
inferred from their relatively businesslike approach to the nuclear test
talks. In the latter the subject was narrow and was related to an
objective they had long pursued, limitations on nuclear weapons. More?
over, there was no disclosure of military information involved, nor of
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any significant information on detection techniques not already
know to the other side. Discussion of methods of insuring against
surprise attack will open bp the yhole range of disarmament questions
proper, including disclosure of military information. When this
happens the Soviets will probably try to limit discussion to disarm-
ament measures they have pushed in the past. It is possible that in
anticipation of this outcome they will unter the talks with the frank
intention to give them a political turn from the outset, or will at
some stage provoke a breakdown in a propaganda context favorable to
themselves.
4. The Soviet approach will be framed within a number of
important constraints: (a) as is evident from. various Soviet statements
and behavior, they do not now have confidence that any form or extent
of iAspection would assure prevention of surprise attack, nor have they
deciaed that such a result would be in their interest; (b) the deeply
ingrained aversion to inspection activities by foreigners in the USSR,
while perhaps modified, has not been dispelled; (c) the Soviets would be
reluctant to lose the relative advantage they now possess in terms of
military information about the potential enemy; (d) the Soviets are
not prepared to neutralize such military advantages as they might
believe they now have (e.g., in the long-range missile and s-tellite
Vehicle field). Within these limits, the Soviets retain a considerable
latitude for diplomatic and technical discussions.
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II. LIKELY SOVIET PROPOSALS AND POSITIONS
Areas of Observation and Control
5. These constraints, as well as the record of past Soviet
proposals, indicate that the Soviet delegation would be likely to stress.
a zonal approach to a control system, and would try to avoid discussion
of any comprehensive system applicable to the whole of Soviet and US
territory, In particular, as already forecast in Khrushchevis note of
July 2$ 1558, they will almost certainly revive their proposal for
a 16001m, zone of inspection and control in Central Europe. This
proposal will probably constitute their initial negotiating position,
to which they may add other zones and features as the needs of the
negotiation require, For example, their proposal for a zone covering
equal areas of the eastern USSR and the Western US might be advanced
again if the US presented its proposal for an Arctic zone. But they
will probably not be willing to widen zones of inspection beyond what
they have already proposed, except under pressure, and perhaps not
then.
6. In response to the US position that the experts discuss zones
for "illustrative purposes only, but without prejudging in anyway the
boundaries within which such measures would be applied," the Soviets
will probably argue that the requirements for various zones would be
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different and that the most convenient and suitable "illustrative"
zone would be that covered by their proposal for Central Europe. They
might calculate that if and when an inspection system covering that
area had been agreed by the experts, the West would be in a weak
position to refuse its acceptance at a later political negotiation.
They will recall that they enjoyed some propaganda success in Western
Europe in 1957 with their exploitation of the disengagement theme;
consideration of a European zone ties in readily with this.
7, To objections that a Central European zone would provide
no assurances against the most likely form of surprise attack, to e.,
the use of long-range missiles and aircraft, the Soviets would probably
argue the following advantages: (a) reduction of tensions in an area
where major combat forces of the two sides are deployed and where there
is always the possibility of accidental encounters; (b) the system
would be easiest for both sides to install in this area and that there-
fore it is the most suitable as a pilot zone to test procedures and
techniques; and, (c) other zones involve technical questions or raise
issues of confidence which cannot be resolved at this time. To sustain
this line of argument they would rely heavily on the implication that
they were showing themselves willing to take the first practical steps
whereas the Western Powers insistence upon a broader and impractical
system really meant that they wanted no progress at all.
. 5 .
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8. Previous Soviet proposals for a zone in Central Europe have
included provisions for a reduction of forces in the area and limit-
ations on the weapons which can be stationed there. In perticulars
they will attempt to obtain a prohibition on stationing of nuclear
weapons in the area -- not only to effect a retraction of US power and
to prevent West German acquisition of such weapons, but also to support
the argument that if inspection were extended to cover the US and the
USSR it should be accompanied by a general ban on nuclear weapons.
9. In generals the Soviet approach is likely to insist that
assurance against surprise attack is inseparable from the reduction of
forces and the elimination of certain weapons. They will probably
take the view that no system can be effective if it is limited to
observation of the forces presently or prospectively in being. Khrushchevls
letter of 2 July states that control measures should be "combined with
definite disarmament stops." But the Soviets are likely to stand on
the force reduction proposals they have previously made. They will also
against press a ban on the use of nuclear weapons as the most essential
steps and will insist on US withdrawal from overseas bases as a necessary
part of any comprehensive system.
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Objects of Inspection
10. The point of departure for the Soviet position will probably
be their old proposals listing railway annotions, big_ ports, and motor
highways as the primary objects of inspection. This is consonant with
their insistence on a zone in Central Europe and with their belief)
or pretended belief) that the form of surprise attack against which
assurance is needed is invasion across frontiers with large bodies of
troops.
U. The Soviets' position on the inclusion of airfields has been
contradictory. In general) in the past year) they have expressed
a willingness to include these only at a later stage in disarmament (some?
times specified as after a ban on nuclear weapons). In his October 1957
interview with Roston ) Khrushchev justified the removal of airfields from
the list of obsurvation posts because "it is useless to create control
posts to watch obsolete aircraft." This is at variance with later
proposals (and other comments by Khrushchev) which have stated that
airfields could be inspected but only at a later stage, presumably
because they are more) rather than less important than) for example)
rail junctions. The note of 2 July contains no reference to airfield.
Probably the Soviet position will be th:t those can be included only
after a trial system of other objects have been shown to be effective)
confidence has been established) and then only in conjunction with
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force reductions and a nuclear weapons ban. There is nothing in their
previous positions to prevent their entering a discussion of the purely
technical question of the airfield as an object of inspection, however,
and they will probably consent to do this at some stage.
12. The Soviets doubtless assume that the US may raise the question
of control over long-range missile sites. Here again they will probably
argue that these could be included only at a final stage when confidence
in the system is fully established. They will also insist that these can
be considered only in conjuction with US overseas airbases and naval
forces. They might argue that the nature of these weapons is such that
mere observation and inspection cannot prevent their use for surprise
attack. More im-ortantly, they would probably counter that the crucial
problem was not the delivery system but the nuclear warheads, and thus
link the problem of missiles to their demand for the abolition of the
nuclear weapons as such.
Means and Methods of Inspection
13. It is unlikely that the Soviets will enter the talks with any
fully developed proposals regarding the techniques, moans, and methods to
be employed. They probe-ay do not yet believe that the prospects for
such a system coming into existence are very real, and have probably not
decided that the whole alteration of the military-political strategic
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picture which would result from a comprehensive and effective system would
be in their interest. With respeot to technical details thisrefore they
will prefer to play a waiting game, seeking a maximum disclosure of US
ideas in order to obtain a clearer picture of what concessions would be
involved in any system applied withih the USSR, In pushing for consider.-
ation of a zone in Europe, however, they may have some specific proposals
to offer with respect to objects and methods of conbrol there.
14. By the note of July 2 they are committed to "aerial surveys in
areas that are of major importance from the viewpoint of preventing a
surprise attack." They have also previously agreed to "some" aerial
inspection within their proposed European zone. They will probably not
initiate proposals for a wider application of this technique and will seek
to limit its consideration as much as possible. Insofar as their opposition
is supported by purely technical arguments, they may argue (a) that aerial
inspection is ineffective alone and ha only a marginal usefulness as a
supplement to ground Observation; (b) that processing of aerial photos
over extensive areas is too large and slow a task to be practical; and
(c) that the cost of aerial inspection would be prohibitive.
15. The Soviet position will also be concerned to minimize as much
as possible the need for mobility on the part of ground observers. They
will probably argue for the adequacy of fixed posts, but will not oppose
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the principle of mobility outright. They will seek to keep any fermata
on this subject as vague and limiting as possible.
16. With respect to communications, numbers and kinds of personnel,
and other technical questions the Soviets are unlikely to make any
extensive proposals of their own. They will be interested primarily in
probing US thinking, and in limiting the scale of the Dropsols intro-
duced for discussion.
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