WHY DIDN'T CIA DETECT REVOLT?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP74-00297R000700930002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: July 25, 1958
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT . r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/03: CIA-RDP74-00297R000700930002-4
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Why Didn't CIA.
Detect Revoltr.'.
By REMBE1IT JAMES
This thould mean more effective' at-
forts to get i>tttormptlon, cad 4atbtesa
does
(Military Editor, Copley News Service)
If the Baghdad army revolt and change
of regime In Iraq had found the United
States without a Central Intel)
Agencx the shock would bave been
enough to create one. .
' But the U. S. has had such an agent
for a decade. What does. we sad'
about the CIA in view of the success
the Baghdad plotters. in
keeping their secret until
the last explosive moment?
Several things can be
said. For one, the exact
plan an= to- hive been
carried in the heed of only
one man, an Iraqi army
brigadier named Abdul
.Karim Qastm, the new
premier This would make wassst
any detection extremely u>raa
ditticult, no. matter how good the ktteU-
gence service:
It could also be pointed out that not
?.r,u did the CIA fail apparently to get.an
advance line on the plot, so did all the
other intelligence agencies,. Including
King Faisal's Iraqi government regime,
along with the Turks, the Iranians and the
? British.
But when all the favorable things' are
pointed out, including the fact, that the
CIA did predict in a generall way that
some revolt was likely in Iraq, the fact
remains that eonnething more is needed.
It is a certainty that all this is metre
evident to the intelligence agencies them-
selves, than to anybody outside, and'that
demands for a tightening up already haw
gone down the chain of command in the
CIA, as well as in the intelligence serv-
ices of other Involved nations.
It also should mesa, hnprovepthnt. in
!valuating and using Information that Bf- ;-
:.. teUigence agents gather, sometimes at
the.tisk bf death.
The classic complaint it
ktteid~ra
:'Santa and the most. common reaspe they
quit their Jobs,- 4* tl t Iatvnaatloe they
gather is ignored, or Poorly evaluated by
those above them who -should mate
I- .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/05/03: CIA-RDP74-00297R000700930002-4