CUBAN DILEMMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780010-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 17, 2013
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: May 4, 1961
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

ficr Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780010-2
CASPER , WYOMING
TRIBUNE?HERALD
EVENING 14,392
SUNDAY 17,526
MPt1 4 *1
offefr OR1ALS
Cuban Dilemma
,
? Two days into the post mortem on the Cuban
fiasco, Chairman .T. William Fulbright says the testi-
mony confiTs. his prior' conviction that "the opera-
tion as a' meil ?iyas a mistake" for which .the White
\xVonse,. the',
Department, the Central Intelli-
e State Department share "a col-
, ettivt.blame ???
A.,,;C?orninittec associate, Sen. Frank Church of
Idaho, 'is' it 1. "dual mistake" inasmuch as "Corn-
Munisdp: can ripl',be shot, down in Latin America; it
must 4. gown t and- this should be the object of
our policV'f. '
?
liFesid,t24pinnedy and his advisers may well be
coming arou such a conclusion..
While el" are still some abashed actionists
..,?i
around urgin mlitary intervention, that is the last
step the Unit States could take, lacking a ,Castro
move against the Guantanamo Naval Base. Even in
that event the ineaSures employed would be limited
to the needs Of .pase defense.
?? The U. S. can not .make a militay move against
Cuba. without stirring up the Latin American nations,
most of whose peoples are sympathetic in varying de-
grees toward Castro as a revolutionist and fail to see
him as a Communist puppet. Because of this, Latin
American governments feel themselves restrained to
act as circumstances otherwise dictate.
Moreover the highly critical reaction in Europe
to even the small Asistance this country gave the
Cuban rebels is forewarning enough of what would
be the situation 'in case of a direct move.
Nor can the IL S. logically support a talked-of
follow-up invasion by Cuban rebels. It is obvious now
that Castro has the military strength to repulse any-
thing short of a fulltscale landing operation backed
by air and sea support the rebels can't command.
So circumstances seem to *tate a policy of the
containment of Castro rather 'than his quick over-
throw. This means a 'greater effort to influence the
Latin American states to active resistance by arousing
their peoples to the dangers of the Castro doctrine;
and, of course, the only Nyay the peoples can be
aroused is to show them an alternate way to better
their condition.
_
Peoples who have known little freedom are not
much impressed by possible lo$s of it to Communism.
It appears now that if GaAkA is to be overthrown
it must be by subversion, and it is expected that the
Cuban rebels will becomt active along this line. This
would involve infiltration .by small groups and the
'building up of an underground to work methodically
to prepare Cuban publiC 'opinion for spontaneous
revolution. That, in fact, is the only way Cuba can
be redeemed, for after Castro, another government
must be established, and careful and intelligent pre-
paration must be made forg
s But even subversive acttaity is not the simple mat-
ter it once was in Cuba, farVistro obviously has gone
a long way in the employOnt of the mechanics of
s?Communism. He has creattet bigger military estab-
4ishment than Cuba eve K *earned, backed by an
armed militia. He has been systematically eliminating
as enemies Cubans who shthv any sign of leadership.
He apparently has a well-established spy system
that sets neighbor against neighbor. In any event, the
abortive landing was only hours old when tens of
thousands of Cubans had been rounded up and put
i;in confinement as possible participants in the counter-
:
I revolution.
In short, Cuba gives the appearance of a full-
blown police sraTersTijogied 'to the ConinnThisfitt-
: tern. that carries no direa _Areal to the .United
'States, but it is something to be sealed oif from Latin
America.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/05/17: CIA-RDP67-00318R000100780010-2