RECENT MILITARY TRENDS AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90T00114R000700480001-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 28, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 31, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
DOC NO /i-,API /y1 -2-0O -
OIR _'
P$PD__~
Washington. D. C 20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
31 August 1987
RECENT MILITARY TRENDS AND SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
Summary
Improved insurgent weapons, logistics, and tactics probably have
led the Soviets to conclude that maintaining the current level of
stalemate will be an increasingly difficult but not unmanageable
task. The Soviets almost certainly are concerned about insurgent
successes, particularly the resistance's ability to withstand two
recent offensives, but probably feel it is premature to view these
operations as a turning point. Moscow is likely to react by
adjusting its tactics to counter new insurgent weaponry. Moreover,
as the military situation continues to be stalemated, the Soviets
will continue to focus on other approaches, trying to break Pakistani
resolve. The bombing and sabotage campaigns inside Pakistan, which
have focused attention on the government's Afghan policy, are likely
to continue. At the same time, Moscow may offer at the Geneva talks
a withdrawal timetable of a year or slightly less to capitalize on
Islamabad's uncertainties about continued US backing.. We believe,
however, that the survival of the Communist regime in Kabul and
cessation of aid to the resistance before withdrawal begins will
remain the bottom line of Soviet policy for the foreseeable future.
Mixed Military Results for Moscow
Increased combat activity by Soviet ground forces demonstrates that Moscow
recognizes the Afghan Army's inadequacies and is willing to commit its own
troops more widely when necessary. Afghan units showed little or no
improvement in their performance this year. They continue to be hampered by
widespread desertions, poor morale, inadequate training, and high casualties.
rnis memoranaum was prepared by (Command and Operations ch, 25X1
Theater Forces Division, Office of Sgviet Analysis and 25X1
Afghanistan Branch, South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian
Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief,
Theater Forces Division, Office of Soviet Analysis 0 or Chief South 25X1
Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis 25X1
NESA M# 87-20082
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--Soviet and Afghan air operations have been less effective this year. F-1 25X1
--The Soviets have relied extensive) on the artillery s stems
introduced last year In cases such as the recent fighting near Kabul,
the substantial firepower advantage of Soviet and Afghan regime forces
undercuts the insurgents' ability to defend less well-prepared
positions. Elsewhere, heavy artillery limits the scale of offensive
actions the resistance can initiate. Soviet reliance on artillery fire
support may increase to compensate for the diminished effectiveness of
Soviet airstrikes.
--The Soviets expanded dramaticall their use of Spetsnaz forces for
reconnaissance and supply interdiction 25X1
/ The threat of
interdiction may contribute to continued high
transportation costs and
rerouting of s,,
{ e
pp
s
The Soviets and Afghan regime also continue to apply pressure to Pakistan.
The well-publicized air and artillery strikes against insurgents and refugees
across the border in Pakistan that took place earlier this year have
diminished. Incidents of sabotage and subversion inside Pakistan and efforts
to play on unrest in the frontier provinces, however, have increased in
frequency and hnldnes
s
Improved Insurgent Performance
In several large battles this spring and summer, the resistance
demonstrated increasingly effective employment of new weapons systems, a
sharp increase in tactical cooperation among some groups inside Afghanistan,
and improved training and logistics. Guerrilla morale remains high.
--Insurgent acquisition of advanced surface-to-air missiles has increased
Soviet and Afghan air losses and degraded air operations. The
insurgents' ability to absorb and deploy the Stinger surface-to-air
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missile quickly and effectively also reflects the significant
improvements in training that have taken place over the past year.
--Battlefield cooperation among insurgent groups has grown significantly.
Political squabbling among insurgent leaders in Peshawar remains a
problem but does not appear to have affected combat performance.
--The insurgents' ability to sustain combat for relatively long periods of
time in several areas is, in our view an indication that their supply levels
are adequate. The opening of new routes through Iran has improved the
siuatii
i
on
n western Afghanistan. High transportation costs persist,
but most major groups are able to secure needed transportation assets. .,~"A
Soviet Perceptions and Options
Although we have little direct evidence about Soviet assessments of the
military situation in Afghanistan, we doubt that the Soviets would judge that
the war has taken a decisive turn for the worse. Moscow undoubtedly has
identified some negative developments this year and is openly distressed
about the impact of the Stinger. The Soviets probably believe they need to
adjust their tactics to cope with these developments. They are not likely to
alter the overall direction of their policy unless their tactical adaptations
fail to restore the status quo. In that case, additional measures, such as
modest troo
in
p
creases, might be employed.
The continued poor performance of the Afghan Army probably reinforces
Moscow's recognition that Soviet forces cannot be withdrawn soon if the PDPA
is to survive. The Soviets' inability to turn the Afghan Army into a capable
fighting force most likel
i
y
s a major frustration.
Moscow almost certainly is concerned about the insurgents' ability to
withstand two recent offensives but probably feels it is premature to view
these operations as a turning point.
--Moscow's evaluation of the insurgents' ability to defend their base
camps successfully at 'Ali Kheyl this summer, for example, is likely to
take into account the unique advantages the guerrillas had
--Moreover, Moscow probably calculates that the insurgents' ability to
survive attacks on well-fortified positions this year does not
demonstrate a comparable improvement in their capability to initiate
offensive actions.
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--Nonetheless, the Soviets may judge that they will have to plan more
carefully, commit additional resources, and employ more effective
tactics in future offensives. 25X1
Although the Soviet media provide no direct evidence about Soviet military
assessments, they recently have become more graphic about the human and
material costs of the war, indicating heightened leadership awareness of public
concerns. Continuing themes in the Soviet media--the necessity of the Soviet
commitment, the 'success' of national reconciliation, and imperialist
interference in Afghanistan--serve both to stiffen the Soviet public for
long-term involvement and to lay the groundwork for a possible political
settlement.
F_ I
25X1
As the military situation continues to be stalemated, the Soviets are
focusing more on factors beyond the battlefield. Their current diplomatic
campaign to build international support for the Kabul regime is part of a broad
effort to erode support for the resistance. The key to Soviet disengagement
efforts, however, is breaking Pakistani resolve. Cross-border air raids and
subversive activities have had some effect. The bombing and sabotage campaigns
raise doubts about the ability of Islamabad to protect its citizens, heighten
tensions with the refugee community, and could ultimately endanger Pakistan's
political stability. At the same time, Moscow must view positively the
potential impact of the nuclear issue on Pakistan-US relations. A Soviet offer
at Geneva to reduce the troop withdrawal timetable to a year or slightly less,
while holding firm on a prominent role for the PDPA, could be calculated to
take advantage of any uncertainties in Islamabad about Pakistan's relations
TTQ
with th
e
Any Soviet concerns about trends on the ground since early this year
apparently have not been reflected in significant shifts on the basic issues of
a political settlement--the survival of the PDPA and the cessation of aid to
the resistance before withdrawal begins. We believe that these will remain the
bottom line of Soviet policy for the foreseeable future, despite offers to
share power and continued signals of Moscow's interest in removing its troops.
Indeed, the Kabul regime's failure this year to improve its ability to defend
itself may limit Moscow's willingness to go beyond propaganda gestures in
refi
i
g f
n
n
urther the terms of withdrawal or of a coalition government.
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SUBJECT: Recent Military Trends and Soviet Perceptions of the War in
Afghanistan
NESA M 87-20082
Distribution
EXTERNAL
1 - The Honorable Michael H. Armacost (State)
1 - The Honorable Morton I. Abramowitz (State)
1 - D/DCI/DDCI Exec Staff
1 - DDI
1 - ADDI
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NI0/NESA
1 - NI0/USSR
1 - C/NESA/S0
1 - DC/NESA/S0
1 - D/SOVA
1 - C/NESA/S0/A
1 - C/TFD/RIG/SOVA
1 - C/SOVA/TWA/A
1 - C/DO
1 - C/PES
1 - CPAS/ILS
6 - CPAS/IMD/CB
1 - NID Staff
1 - PDB Staff
1 - C/PPS
2 - NESA/PPS
DDI/NESA/SO/A I(2 September 1987)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/28: CIA-RDP90TO0114R000700480001-9