THE DCI AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRODUCTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020020-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: December 24, 1980
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93TO1132R000100020020-0
24 Dec 80
RL/HPF
THE DCI AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PRODUCTION
In 1947 the DCI's job was created primarily to "correlate and evaluate."
After a few false starts, this responsibility soon came to be seen
as one of presiding over production of national intelligence by a
"Community."
- National Intelligence is the intelligence needed for policy formu1,,-k;r=;'
by the President and the NSC. It should make use of all informi ioh
available to the USG from whatever agency, and should reflect the best
and most authoritative judgment that can be brought to bear. Wh` s
there are differences of judgment, these should be presented.
- The Community consists of the various intelligence agencies represented
on the NFIB, although this does not preclude the DCI from turning ese-
where for information and judgment.
There are now ten member agencies of NFIB, plus representatives of the. four
military services. The full members include minor players such as Treasury,
Commerce, and DEA. The Big Four of the NFIB, however, are CIA, DIA, t:.nd
NSA. The first three are the producers of finished intelligence assessments
(with some help from the services on military matters).
- CIA does political, economic military (on all national-level,questloi~s;
and scientific/technical. t*r ry M V J Ili V o I I 'et a+
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- DIA does military and scientific/technical.
- INR does political and some economic.
- NSA does its thing very well.
- Note that only CIA is free of departmental responsibilities and
pressures. It of course has to guard -- as do the other agen-i's ?
against possible analytic bias.
In a sense, the production of national-level intelligence is a competition
between analytic organizations, using the same body of shared inforrnati:;:.
- Competition works best in the military and weapons technology fielcs,
where CIA, DIA, and the services have strong resources.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93TO1132R000100020020-0
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It works OK in political intelligence, where not only INR but the
State Bureaux (and almost everyone else) can play.
Competitive analysis is poorest in economics and non-military science,
where CIA has more of a monopoly.
Competitive analysis is also furthered by the wide use of top-flight
outside consultants, on the part of CIA and other members of the
community.
Like all competitions, you've gotta have some rules for the community.
We do.
- All information must be shared.
Competitors must work to common TOR's, so consumers can judge the results.
Differing views must be presented in parallel, with supporting arguments,
so consumers can understand them.
As Chairman of NFIB and head of the Community, DCI is chief umpire and
primus inter pares.
But in the final analysis, the text of a national estimate is his views;
this sets the standard from which others dissent.
In other realms -- budget and tasking -- DCI has greater authority over the
community, but with respect to intelligence production, he has line authority
only over CIA/NFAC. DCI nonetheless usually has enough clout to accomplish
what needs to be done re production.
This authority is real and the system has worked for many years, to a
considerable extent because the dissent process provides a safety
valve not present in other DCI-Community relationships.
Since 1977, the system has been hampered, especially in military matters,
by personality clashes among principals and by fundamental differences of
view on non-substantive matters (APEX, net assessments).
Beyond such differences, which have varied over the years with different
issues and personalities, is the underlying problem of the uneveness of
the community's capabilities. In particular
-- The many constraints and vulnerabilities of DIA.
-- The small size and Departmental focus of INR.
-- Some continuing problems of fully integrating NSA's community
capabilities.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93TO1132R000100020020-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020020-0
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The mechanism the DCI uses to regulate national intelligence production is the
National Intelligence Council, or NIC.
-
Under DD/NFA, but not part of NFAC.
(See graphic)
-
Ecumenically manned
-
Successor to the old Office of National Estimates
Core of NIC are the NIOs (Enumerate from graphics). Each NIO has three
principal functions:
DCI's staff officer for all NSC matters.
Link between policy community and intelligence producers (and
sometimes collectors -- role of CTS needs better definition)
Producer of National Estimates -- both procedurally and substantively.
Other elements of NIC are:
NIOs at Large
Analytic Group (elite drafting staff)
Warning system
Academic relations
The primary expression of national intelligence is the community-coordinated NIE
Focuses all information and wisdom available to USG on question of
major importance at national level.
Can be massive (11-3/8) or very quick (SNIE)
'
: one year
s time or one
week. All-time record is two days.
Can be initiated anywhere in intelligence community or by policymakers.
Process (describe)
Strengths of NIEs
-- Allows all views to be heard and recorded, with checks against
policy preference and analytic bias.
-- Careful use of all the evidence available to the community.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020020-0
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-- The finest available talent consults, drafts, and weighs evidence
and judgments.
-- Yes, a few mis-estimates over the years, but a good record for
independent judgment.
- Problems NIEs face:
-- Time-consuming to bureaucratically produce.
-- No fully systematic link to policy process.
-- Question of impact on policymakers.
Present estimates program is especially focussed on items to support incoming
administration
- Community papers produced in 1980: a total of 43, varying from multi-
volumed 11-3/8 to 7 pp. one-week SNIE on Western European attitudes
toward USG. In 1979, a total of 37 papers.
Draft schedule for 1981, not yet coordinated within CIA and with
community. (See separate doc)
-- 40 priority papers
-- 26 additional papers, if resources permit
This schedule purposely leaves room for handling papers requested by
policymakers and/or generated by world crises.
Some "national intelligence" production by CIA which does not go the above
full coordination route with the community.
A few projects which are joint CIA-DIA, CIA-INR, etc.
A very large number of studies are prepared by the various offices of
CIA/NFAC, over and above current intelligence items. These studies
are "national intelligence" papers which are usually less broad in
scope than the NIEs and go more intensively into particular questions.
Examples (at hand):
-- OSWR study on Soviet capabilities to cram a very large number
of RV's into the SS-18.
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93TO1132R000100020020-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020020-0
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OPA study on implications for Western Europe of a Soviet
invasion of Poland
OPA (ORPA, Jan. 79) study on the politics of Soviet energy
decisionmaking
OGSR study on the USSR's 1980 crop shortfall
OER study on the economic cost to the USSR of intervening in
Poland
OER damage assessment re Iran-Iraq oil facilities
OSR study on Sov capabilities to conduct military operations
in the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa
NIC Memo on politics and OPEC oil policy
5
CONFIDENTIAL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/04: CIA-RDP93T01132R000100020020-0