POLICY ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES AND ON DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B01034R000500060014-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: November 10, 1982
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
DEPARTMENT OF'.THE -ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON. DC 20310
10 NOV 1982
ME 4ORM DUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN. DCI SECURITY COM NITTEE
SUBJECT: Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments
offer the following comments:
Pursuant to your Memorandum, same subject, 28 October 1982, we reviewed the
paper prepared by UDIS regarding national policy on damage assessments and
We do not feel a new national policy is necessary. As a component of the
Defense Department our opinion is their implementation of Executive Order 12356
and ISOO Directive Number 1 regarding damage assessment is adequate. . We agree
that a full damage assessment should be conducted in the situations depicted by
UDIS (e.g., loss of classified military or specialized intelligence eugipaent,
jeopardy of a technical collection system or human source, loss of a diplomatic
pouch-or penetration of a secure facility). The designation of-permanent;
special teams to review assessments for quality control purposes is inappro-
priate for the military departments but may be appropriate for smaller agencies.
The items mentioned by UDIS to be checked by-special teams (e.g., counter-
measure recommendations, security/counterintelligence reviews, audits, inspec-
tions, etc.) in. their review of damage assessments could be accomplished by
making them mandatory issues in the governing regulations of each agency.
s
d b d1 -
l
FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF Fc.R INTELLIGENCE/
cussed for clarification.
ase as merit as g
information" for inclusion in the base data which will be available to all
agencies, albeit in a controlled manner, is questionable and should be dis-
a z
National guidance mandating the sharing of damage assessments shoa
couraged. -We favor instead the selective sharing of such information using
the newsletter method of the Air Force to synopsize those cases considered.to
have community applicability and interest. The establishment of a broad data
b h a dia nostic tool; however, the requirement to submit "all
DONALD P, PRESS
Colonel, GS
.Director of Counterintelligence
Mr. Bjorkman/77520
Typed by R. Brashears
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
REftY TO ~
.L
AT7H OF: INS
.DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADOUARTERS AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
WASHINGTON DC 20330
10 Nov 1982
SUEI..tECT Policy on Unauthorized Disclosures and on Damage Assessments
(Your Memo, SECOM-D-344, 28 Oct 82)
Chairman
DCI Security Committee
1. We have carefully reviewed the UDIS paper on national policy
on damage assessments and offer the following comments on the is-
sues addressed in Part II: .
a. Investigative Triggers: Concur that a full damage as-
sessment should be required unless the agency head (or appropri-
ate program manager) or designee expressly determines that this
is not necessary.
b. Improved Quality Control: Within the Air Force (and DOD,
to our )Gowledge) we believe there are sufficient checks and
balances to ensure the timeliness and quality of damagement
assessments. Any expansion of this mechanism,,to include the
suggested designation of damage assessment individuals or teams,
could not be supported without DOD approval and increased.re-
sources.
C.'' Assessment Implementation: Concur that the chain of
command should be responsible for implementing corrective or
remedial measures. Within the Air Force (and most DOD elements)
the sheer number of incidents make it virtually impossible for
the establishment of any central "tickler" or other "review
system." We believe that assessment implementation should best
be left to chain of command, Inspector General, or similar ac-
tivities.
a. Sharing of Information: Concur, as written. The publica-
tion of SECOM or ISOO newletters, similar to our "INS-IGHT" would
be a relatively inexpensive method of sharing summaries of in-
vestigations and related actions on cases involving significant
compromises.
e. Data Base: The establishment of a data base on unauthor-
ized disclosures would undoubtedly serve a'useful purpose. How-
ever, such a base would be expensive to collect and maintain and
involve jurisdictional problem areas. For example, within the
Air Force, I could provide data relative to SCI incidents, but
the inclusion of data relative to collateral incidents would re-
quire DOD approval and extensive coordination/approval with
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
 STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/15: CIA-RDP87BO1034R000500060014-0