ARGUMENT OF URGENCY OF AQUATONE COVERAGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP61S00750A000200090110-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 110
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP61S00750A000200090110-7
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Or WOENCY OFAQUATQNE CO
1. In a military sense, United States natienal security is dependent
in large measure on the security of the Continental United States from
nuclear devastation and the maintenance of a net capability to deliver
nuclear blows on the USSR. Recent Soviet achievements in ICBM and
earth satellite development indicate that the state of the art in missiles
is highly advanced in the USSR. AQUATONE coverage of Soviet missile
test ranges indicates that the present scope and future growth petentiel
of the Soviet missile program represents, in the words of the ?WC
Scientific Advisory Panel, an "Immediate and continuing peril" to United
States national security. National estimates of Soviet achievement of an
operational ICBM launch capibility of ten missiles ha* been advanced from
1960.1961 to rsid.1950 with a total capability of 500 ICBMs attainable by
the latter part of 1960
2. Until the ICM capsbility reaehes the *Usable portions
ed for 1960, it is presumed that long range heavy bombers and
in*i equipped with guided missile launchers would constitute the
ajor Soviet weapons systems for delivery of nuclear weapons against
the Continental United States. Evidence on Soviet heavy bomber production
and deployment has suggested that the USSR has devoted only a limited
effort in this field. This suggestion is not conclusive primarily because
of lack of intelligence coverage of sites such as aircraft, plants, and
certain bomber bases which if covered woad resolve uncertainties
regarding heavy bomber production. AltAseeciated question outstanding
is the possibility of a new generation of Soviet heavy bombers replacing
the BISON and BEAR. ( AQUATONE coverage of 1956 contributed to
firming up United States estimates of Soviet medium bomber strength,
but this vehicle has not been employed systematically as yet on outstanding
targets of heevy bomber intelligence significance.) It may also be pre.
inu:ned that Soviet submarines equipped with guided missiles will provide
delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons launched against the United States
not only until 1960 but also alter that as an auxiliary weapon to IC/Ohl
operations.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP61S00750A000200090110-7
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3. Photographic coverage by AQUATONE of the listed targets
has a good chance of revealing highly critical information relative to the
current operational status and deployment of Soviet IR Ws and 'CHM*.
Evidence from AQUATONE and CObilliT to date indicates the Soviets are
well advanced in short (75.300 NM), mid (650.950 NM), and long range
(3. 500,4.000 NM) missiles, Analysis by United States experts of these
data indicates that the Soviet guided missile program is probably such
thatt
a.
are oper
b.
and
sage rnissilos are
y deployed;
Wales are being provided for (Tor
c. IGBM missiles are
testing and.
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ps and
deployment;
mid or late stage of prototype
th come modification., could be used now operationally,
Analysis of data has also suggested that the Soviet IRM and ICH/4 program
is far enough along for operational bases to be either constructed, in the
case of the former, or under construction in the case of the latter.
4. It may be pertinent to point out her. that a recent study of the
Intelligence Advisory Committee Subcommittee concerned with as seaming
the problem of determining location of Soviet 'CHM sites has determined
that these sites are meet likely to be found while in the construction stage.
The Intelligence Advisory Committee Subcommittee also pointed out that the
likelihood of finding launch site* by means other than serial reconnitissance
is low to negligible. Socauss of our current knowledge of the Soviet guided
missile program derived principally from ACITIATONE and COMINT to date
along with our deductions from recent satellite launchings, it appears
imperative that on aggressive reconnaissance program be initiated to
determine the location of IRSM and ICHM launch .it.. as well as another
look with higher resolution camera at the research and development
establishment located at KAPUSTIN TAR and TTURA TAM,
S. With regard to guided missile launch sites, we cannot today
in advance of a detailed study now under way advise on th. specific targets
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP61500750A000200090110-7
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It s our strong b.Uef1 bowsvsr1 that coverage of the bigb.st priority
targets recommended in this paper (principally Areas lip 30 and 11)
would constitute most likely exploration of launch late.. Defter advice
on this question must await the conclusion of our study on guided missile
launch sifts*, both MAW and ICBM.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/03/20: CIA-RDP61500750A000200090110-7