THE SOVIET BLOC (SURVEY 1950 AND 1951)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP83-00415R011100220007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Content Type: SS

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APPENDIX 1
The Soviet Bloc
Ivey 1950 and 1951)
r~ Soviet Bloc USSR
Rest of 3 uropea t
USSR
Item and Unit
1252-
195.0
Dov er Bla
1 22 1
-
Coal, million tons 552
100
264
48
287.5
52
290
Black coal 319
100
20.0
63
118.4
37
Brown, coal 233
100
64
27
169.1
73
Coke 4(
100
30
75
10.3
25
Crude oil 45
100
38
85
6.98
15
42 - 43
Liquid fuels and
lubricants .,.43
100
35.6
82
7.7
18
Synthetics 2.3
100
0.9
39
1.4
61
Electric power, bill.
rs 124
tt ho
l
100
90
73
34
27
104
u
owa
ki
Pig iron, mill. t. 24
100
19.5
81
4.37
19
22.2
Crude steel, " '35
100
27.1
78
7.93
22
31.1
*
Rolled. products," 27
100
22*)
81
5.38
19
25
)
Light metals, 1,000 tons 340
100
300**)
88
40
12
Motor vehicles***)
000 units 620
1
100
550
89
Ti
11
,
Tractors, 1,000 units 13'7
100
112
74
35
26
137
Sulphuric acid
1,000 tons 3,640
100
3, 000
82
64o
18
Synthetic rubber
86
14
288
1,000 279
100
240
39
Presumably includes both forged and pressed products..
of this, 270,000 tons are aluminum (200, 000 t. primary, 70,000 t. secondary)
and 30,000 tons are magnesium.
Includes motorcycles.
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AkePZ DIX 16
t o tbs a the 90#1 I octant Combat Units of the?ovi Air
h Tanks
Assault Gu G=s,, . 37mm 'and. up
Worm Peace
(Gu
100mm and up)
hanized Army
59,000
17i00O
924
1032
(336)
Infantry Army
65$000
52x000
543
240
1338
(432)
Armored Division
10
1400
7,700
254
21
168
,
(54)
Mechanized Division
14
,, 10 0
9,i 90
.208
65
280
.
(78)
Motorized Infantry Div. 10,800 8,500
52
34
237
(66)
Artillery Division
9,000- +)
810010- +) -
298
10,500
9,500
(~26)
Antiaircraft Division
2,400
11900
64
(48)
+) Depending upon their strengths and organization,
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Appendix 20
22&rati,onal Park
a.i. ting to
Type of
Ready to Uader Repair At Repair le Token to
Damaged
Lo Mo v'
r t a k '~ y rd Vtepai.r Yard Total LO. omcativ s TO
Remarks
Heichabahn
lou6motives
3,0?33
465
523
753
4,82
697
5,503
Coal-dust
locomotives
(38)
(7)
(13)
(17)
(75)
(-)
(75)
Colum
locomotives
315
12
31
12
370
-
370 Including
23 of type 01
86 sf 50
261 rx 52
370
Foreign
lacomatives
Narrow-gauge
locomotives 151
30 6
1,055 1,072
6 215 Including
17 for 60-cm go
147 " 75-cm
5 90-cm xa
46 xx 100-cm xa
215
tT
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;JI?PNAIX 21
Freight Csar Inventory
as of 15 November 1951
Type of Car
Number
Available
Number of Cars to be
'Returned by the USSR
by 31 December 1951..
Box cars
28,6140
5,830
Gondola.cars
49,350
9,060
Flat cars
13 ,73 0
~,20O
Tank cars
ZMW type
12,300
(2,363)
Refrigerator cars
790
"-
loo, 810
19,090
Foreign cars
8,700
890
113,510
19,980.
NOTE: Z,MW-type tank ears are tank cars for carryi3j: apgine fuel (benzine, benzene,
diesel oi1p petroleum).
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 COUNTRY
SUBJECT
DATE OF
INFO.
PLACE
ACQUIRED
SOURCE
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SECURITY INFORMATION
INFORMATION REPOR'T' REPORT NO.
CD NO.
DATE DISTR.
NO. OF PAGES
NO. OF ENCLS.
on= sum
SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.
AOSO
STC
FOP
OISTRIONT`ION
C?D
OADSO
STA
STD
FOB
FOR
FOS
FOM
FDi
COMM0
TNO
STO
FDM
FDT
TGS
0A0
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DESCRIPTIONOAND ESTIMATE OF. THE SIT.UATIQN; ;'WITHIN; ,THE EASTERN
BLOC. AT ::BEGINNING OF 1952
Evaluation of the .World Political Situation.
1. 1951 Developments
ji.. The Situation at the Beginning of 1952
III. Evaluation of the Situation
.Economic Status of the Eastern Bloc
I. Economic Development During 1950 and 1951
III Coal
III. Petroleum.
IV. Power Supply
V. Iron and Steel
VI. Motor Vehicles and Railroad Rolling J'took.
..i.VII. Tanks and Assault Guns
VIII. Air Armament
IX. Outlook and Evaluation
C. Evaluation of the Military Situation
I. Military Personnel Potential
II.. Army
III. Air Arm
IV. Navy
.V. Supply in at Germany
D. Transportation in East Germany
over wall Evaluation of the Situation
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U.ATION OF THE WORLD POLITI
I
SITUATION
1951 Developments.
1. In the f.,eidof "high policy", the year 1951:waspmarked: by the United Statep' attempt
to catch up with the political and, military advances ma4e by the: oviet Union in Europe
and. Asia'by reinforcing its own armed forces, by assisting in the ant of the
free countries of Europe (iu uding Turkey), by negotiatinga Japanese peace treaty,
and by concluding military security agreements with Japan, Australia, New 'Zealand, and
the Philippine Islands..
The USSR, on the other hand, tried to strengthen its position in Europe,, to lay the
consolidate its gains in the Far East. At the same time,, the TISSB took a1,..-
measures to thwart United States and West European efforts toward the creation of a
balance of power
At the beginning of 1951, the question of West Germany's participation inthe defense
measures of the West Occupied the -center of attention in Europe. The Soviet Union took
numerous diplomatic steps to:prevent German part,ioipation In notes..to the United
States, Great Britain, and France, it reproached these -catrieo. with violations, of
Slovakia; the satellite states bordering on Germany,
their agreements. Polandanal Cechy!
presented notes. to Holland, Belgium, and. D mark : in Which they expressed a .warning of
the danger of Germa:w!s recovery. Cit tg he'FOts'dam Agreems mt~, the U$. also i ist d
that a Four Power Conference be called--to deb!te the problem of eapy,
The Boviet representatives permitted they "preliminary conference to end in failure,
because the question of Germany's contribuiion -to-the defense effort lost much. of its
practical aspect during the first .six months, and the Russians believed they, were in
a position to avert imminent danger by resorting toother means7 especially by.influenc-
ing the peoples of western Europe by means of 'propaganda.
For this purpose the Soviet Union mobilized the We t. 'European Commsxnist Parties and the
international mass organizations e ntr lled . by them., such as the World ague o. , Trade
Unions, the World Peace Council, the Wtrld gigue of Democratic. Youth., the Interr*tional
Federation of Democratic Women, the Eurapean Iabo ? Union* etc. .. wo ld-wide collection
of signatures "for pea.ce`* was directed. -against the "remilitariZat.iOUof Germany and
against the "aggressi-`e" Atlantic Pact.?
The projected rearming of Germany was-countered countered by the East with the demand for a .rew
unified Germany. This' demand,, as expressed in Grrotewohl's letter of 30 November 1950,
has been given unremitting propaganda . support The East German regime tried to create
the impress ion that 'it wag seriously concerned .with reunifying .Germany on a democratic
basis. It maintained that the arming, of West Germany would make reunification in ossi'b1e
and that it contained the threat of a .fratricida.l war., This argument was refuted.,, howeve
by the ever -il. reas; , .adaptation of at Germany to. the Soviet orbit system;
in the satellite countries.,, the Soviet Union tried to.make its position more see by
means of extensive purges.. The moot. significant of thhessse was the arrest in November
1951 of Rudolf Alanskf, 4ecreetary-General of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party., whose
omnipotence ha4 been undisputed up to that time, and of .a large number of his followers.
The arrest of former Czech Foreign Minister dementia preceded this event by a few.
months.
These purges prove that, even among the ranks .of the Communist Parties themselves, there
is great. disappointment in, the system enforced by Moscow, Nevertheless, there are no
indications of a .threat .to the .rule of the Kremlin in the satellite countries, although
the Soviet leadership has reason to doubt the reliability of these countries.in the
event of war.
Some signs, particularly in Polaand, indicate that the - Soviet despots .are changing their
method of terror and a6mpaision to one -of persuasion and guidance., ssiace they realize'
that the satellites must not be merely forced,, but .also convinced.
In. , the Far East, the oviet anion tried to intensify its close political relations with
Red China. It extended economic and military aid to. the Chinese "volunteers" in the .
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Korean War, but avoided direct involvement in the conflict.. The impetus for the
initiation of armistice negotiations carne from the Soviet camp, At this time it is
not clear whether the USSR really wants to bring about an armistice, or whether it
.merely wants to gain time to supply Communist China with weapoup, ammunition, military
equipment, and economic goods; or to exert pressure toward the achievement of its
political aims.
The Soviet Union's position regarding the revitalization of Japan parallels its
antagonistic attitude toward the strengthening of West Germany. The Japanese peace
Treaty which was concluded in San Francisco was a serious political blow to the USSR.
The Soviet Union is also making every effort to appear to the peoples of Asia .and
Africa.as the champion-of their national liberty. It is trying its.utmostto create
difficulties for the western powers in Indohina1 Malaya, Burma, Indonesian the
Philippine Islands,, the Middle East, and North Africa. The USSR has warned the Arab
countries and Israel against. agreeing, to the proposal submitted by the three western
powers and Turkey for a joint Near East command. The -T1iBSR also expressed its sympathy
with Persia's action against-the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company and with Egypt's demand
for the cancellation of its 1936.agreement wi?th.Bngland concerning the Suez Canal Zone,
and. of the Agreement of 1899, which calls for the two countries' joint exercise of
government in the Sudan.
II
The 81 tuation at.they Beginning of l952
Although the armament program - is making progress, western Europe is not -yet in. a.
position to withstand an attack from the East
The United States is. reproaching some of the West: Eur?pean countries .with negligence
in the reinforcing of their armamentsand urges a speeding up . of the process.. These.
countries, on the -other hand;, are afraid that compliance with the defense tempo.asked .
for by the United States would result in economic repercussions, especially in .infla-
tion, with all attendant consequences, such as social unrest, radicalization. t
masa3es, etc. The problem of coordinating West European defense activities . has been
placed in the hands of United States Special Ambassador Averell Harriman,
The North Atlantic Trty Organization (NAM) was .considerably, stronger at the begiiug
of 1952 than it was .a year earlier. Appreciable progress has been made in the internal
organization of NATO, thanks to the energetic approach of General Eisenhower.* The
integration of Greece and Turkey into the W0 j and the lift i,ng of armament, restrict ions.
under the Italian Peace Treaty strengthen the position of the western powers in the
Mediterranean and in the Near East, Even beyond the Sphere of the NATO, this position
has been strengthened considerably. The US arms agreement with Yugoslavia, and the
material assistance rendered that country by, the United States., have made it .ate important
factor in the current defense plans of the western powers. The stability of this factor
is a matter of conjecture. The arming of Turkey is progressing satisfactorily,. A
military agreement between the United States and Spain is impending. United States
air bases in Morocco are .being reinforced . steadily,, and the newly created Libyan state
has assumed a mot insignificannt . importance as 'a Mediterranean base for the vestera
powers, as a .result ,of agreements with the US, Great Britain, anal France granting
these three powers the right to maintain bases in that country.
The Arab nationalism of the Middle and Near East countries. exploded.in eo ',licts with
the old colonial powers. The Soviet Union, .which supported .these actions -with
adroit propaganda, made use of the same tactics it .applied. in Southeast Asia to create
the impression that it is a.friend of these countries. Although the Moslem countries
are hardly fertile soil for communism, the .development of extreme nationalist groups,,,..,
into .various of which the M, well d.isguised,,.has apparently succeeded in penetrating.,.
has created a favorable situation. for the: eastern. bloc and a correspondingly. unfavorable
situation for the western powers. It.will take all the skill of Western diplomacy, and
a broad understanding ,of the problems -of the oriental countries .and peoples, to take
action, within the coz.finee of neutrality;o prevent the Near east.froze becoming
dominated by the eastern bloc, not j.st for the moment, but fora long. tiame, to come.
The significance .of this source of danger can hardly be overestimated.
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Attempts to unite western Europe have not progressed beyond the experimental stage,
Partial economic integration, such as the Schuman Plan (coal and steelj, and, the
achievements in connection with.setting up a European Army, with a view to bringing
about a political merger as well, have developed very slowly. Thus far it has been
impossible either to eliminate the political difficulties (formation of political
bodies for the control of the Army of Europe) or to create a substantial financial
basis [for unification'
In West Germany, the "Ohne-michBewegung" (Without=Me M6Vement) has slowed down;
however, as, the result of consistent propaganda; the Soviets have succeeded: in
creating a sympathetic reaction, among large circles of West Germans, to the thesis
that there are only two alternatives for Germany, namely, rearmament and the subsequent
threat of a civil war, or reunification. This fact is borne out, by Pastor Niemmller's-
trap to Moscow, former Chancellor Josef Wirth's trip to East Berlin, and the founding
of the Notgemeinschaft f.r den Fried. Eur~ (Emergency League for the Peace -of
Europe) by Heinemann, former edera]f~ Minister for Internal Affairs, and Helene Wessel,
former chairman of the Zentrum Party.
Meanwhile, the battle for eastern Asia continues to be waged with all weapons of
diplomacy, of political and economic pressure, of civil war, and of propaganda.
The military conflict in Korea almost.came to an end, because the opposing forces
reached a balance of power. Both sides showed interest in_an armistice, but it
is quite possible that they have only been sparring for time. United States efforts
to end the Korean War, or at any rate to localize it, are apparent. They requests
of Great Britain and France for increased US assistance for suppressing the Communists
in southeastern Asia (Indochina, Burma, Malaya) have been viewed by the United. States
with ascertain reserve, which is probably based on the desire to avoidanother "Korea",
if possible.
Evaluation of the Situation
1. The policy followed by the USSR since the end of the war has resulted in both sue esses
and failures. The satellite countries and China were Eton over to the eastern bloc;
Yugoslavia, originally won over, was lost again; Greece and Turkey could not be won
over; the blockade of Berlin proved a failure; and Korea.did not result in the dynamic
victory which had been anticipated.
Nevertheless, the Soviet Union's intensified political activity in the Far East
and in the Near East. has been responsible for many successful achievements, the frui
.which the Soviet Union hopes to reap in the future without much further effort.
L+1-range planning is likely to characterize Soviet .foreign policy. Much to the
surprise of the Soviet Union, doubt, the Korean entanglement has evoked the threat
of a third world wart The Soviet Union has learned its lesson, As a result of the
sober realization that its military potential, while adequate for attaining initial
successes, could not cope with the considerably superior economic and defense potential
of the Western world, it is likely that the Kremlin has restricted its aims and has
extended the time limit for achieving these aims.. In view of the foreign political
situation, it is highly improbable that the Soviet Union will launch _a .deliberate
offensive war in the near future, This opinion is supported by the following
observations and considerations:
The Soviet leadership and the Soviet mentality tendto give preference to
political methods, before resorting to military measures.
The Soviet leadership believes -- in accordance with Communist doctrine
time works in its favor and that) with the increasing recurrence of economic crises
(caused especial.y by defense efforts), capitalism is bound to destroy itself,.
The Soviet leadership, which has, a.firm grip on the satellites in time of peace,
must expect to encounter all sorts of difficulties in.these countries in the
event of a long war and possible Western military victories,
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In 1952, the Soviet Union will contixtue the "battle for time;$ which it.began to wage
in 1951, by undertaking 'p'eace Campaigns" to incite the population ,.of the cspiialist
countriest to revolt against their "warmongering" governments; by spreading hatred
of "outsiders," in the Asiatic creasy in order to close off these areas to tlae-West
to an increasing extent; by sowing :disunity Ong the countries-and eoples of the
West, in order to weaken the defensive powers of the Western all a=e lin the future
it .will exploit the UNO to achieve this end).
The Soviet Union will not hesitate to start or eu port operations of limited scope
designed to .split up the military potential of the West, provided ,it runs no risk
of conjuring up World War III.
2. The West,- in 1952, will continue its efforts toward a unified +a ope and toward.
strengthening the defense potential, Hereby provoking the Fast into employing
all. tricks of diplomacy and cold war in order to doom these efforts to failure .
According to all available evidence, it-is' doubtf"ti;.l whether the Soviet Union will
be .prepared, as early as 1952, to look upon 'the growing militar-y -defuse of the West
and. West Germany's participation in the European Army as a ,cos s..be.,li. The frequent
delays in Western plans and the presumably slow tempo of West opean armament .are
apt to indicate, even to the soberly calculating Stalin, that the USSR's fear of
attack by the Atlantic Pact. nat ions is unf ounded .
Critical situations, which might turn into serious threats to peace, could cow about
if the USSR were to effect.any xaeasure or measures which would be incompatible with
the prestige and authority-of the-western countries, particularly of the United States;
if Communist China were to extend active aid -to the rebels in Indochina; if develop-
ments in the Near East, and above all in Iran, were to take another unfavorable turn
for the West.
Any evaluation of the political situation, moreover, must take into account the
that the world situation may still be likened toa powder keg that could be exploded
by an unexpected spark which neither side would have wished, to setoff.
4. The wsstern -powers are well aware of these danger. It is pasaihle, therefore,
although it is not very probable,, that they will make another attempt, at top- level,
to negotiate a provisional political a mistice in the cold war between East and West.
Uowever, Moscow -would -hardly agree to a conference unless the- actual political a
military potential of the western powers were sunh. as to make the sanesa of a. m.i.litary
ak by the Soviet Union questionable at the outset? Kence the West .must not fail
to carry out, with all means available to it and at a, accelerated pace,, the policy.
expanding its power potential via-a-vis the eastern bloc,, not only in EU ope) brit
in. `As is as well,
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EC 1 C..,' F" TE .E : ERN 10,
I
E!tceaziomi c evel r sr sit - I iu i 14, Q and I R5 1
The development of the world economy in .. '1950 iwa s ebar ct :.zed by a sh aroa
in 1ndus~i? 1. production, wb.ieh showed. a gain off percOn over that .of ? 1919.
This increase was due chiefly to the great rise in production in the United gitatesx
the USSR, Great Britain, and West Germany. In, the United t :s the increase in
the output of industrial goods amounted to 20 percent, and , the t18t., 23 percent
thus, by the end of 1950, the UM I s industrial pro ductions ` s 73 percent higher than
in 1910In t h e .eastern bloc countries, l t h the exception .of - t h e U (but includ.,ing
Yugoslavia) , there was a, ,22 -percent rise in,"frith rial output The rate, of increase
in industrial production in Tthe 'entir'e Soviet bloc was about . equ..al to - the incre ge
rate in the United. States . in western 'Europe the ratesof expa l on,, were . particularly
high only in Great Britain and Ger anyj as far as the other countries 'Vere :concerned
western Europe lagged eons,i d erably behind the eastern bloc in. its rate , Qt industrial
expansion. However, in welts apean countries, agricuitw 4 produ tion recovered
more rapidly frc the effects of the war than was the case t the eastern
'uropean satellites, whose productive powers. were utilized in t b a y in ,ustx ializa
t ion program..
In 1950, the increase' in the-.:output. of raw" materials lagged beh the rise in the
production of finished goods.. throughout the .world epo ;o'y, includi .thy esstera bloc.
In 1951 the rate o p ciciuct3bn ' tease 3:n.'-the 3,ndustxial, phase: of the world aconomy
lagged somewhat behind that of '1950, Only a ,few fix es f ix steel action will he
mentioned as typica1! of the development during 1951, since an over . view of the
industrial production is. not yet available ? The relative rise in steel ,pro uctien
in 1.951 amounted to 9 percent In the 'United States; and, about 15 Pere t the US
and the satellites. The increase in the Fast was .achieved partially by arlx iapratent
in .the technical utili: anon.. of the available installations, and partially 1y ;putt?iug.
new installations into pperation
It has been determined: that there was a considerable relocation of in ustry fro?
West to East within the USSR durin.,:1950 and. 1951, Industrial centers;rere established
thereby established. in.,vario s parts of the country, which. would facilitste conducting
a war on several fronts.
1'ri caparison with the pre-war position, there has. been .a shexp decl .e in Eastern
dependence on thee -West . This. is.especially true. of heavy in .u:stry,' . f the machine
tool industry-, and, ii the field of raw materials, of copper, lead, And sulphur,
5 . Since the expiration 'of the last Five-year Plan aft 31 .December 195p,,. no new $ ive war ,
Plan for the U8$B has- become known. The reason may be; that the UDR intends to wait
until (around 1955Y).thesatellites .are on. the- sapw level,; so that. it wil1.then.be
able to issue plains which are applicable to the entire area of the .east. bloc.
6. A table of statistics. on the production of the .eastern bloc is given. _. ~A p :xndi t 1.
II
101 In 1951 about 290 million tons of coal were mined in the UB$R , a yield. -w
somewhat above the plan. figure.
Coal for the production of power is available in..adequate, quantities in. theUSSR.-
However, the supply of metallurgical coke muses eonsiderahle difficalties, because
the ore concentrating installations have not been sufficiently developed,,. Sisaca the
supply of metallurgical coke u atisfactory both damn itat:ively and. gualitat:ively,
the development -of the iron-producing industry xcgy be x oticeably retarded.
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Since mining output in the eastern distracts of the USSR had already bed to i
greatly during .the -war't' the share of the Donets Easin in the natal ctrl output
reduced from the pre-war figure of over 50-percent to about 37 percent in 1951.
The. . g output per worker - sharply reduced during the war * had not regained the
pre-war level "in 1950. This goal may possibly have been reached in 1951.
Nevertheless, the coal supply situation in the V is still critic?al; however, this
will not be prejudicial to industrial production, but will affect only the consumption
of the population which is already very low.
The coal output-of the European eastern-bloc countries, amounting to 31.0 - 320 million
tons., is approximately at the same ' level as that of the 116 . Qf th f total. the
proportion of coal for 'coking purposes as well as that of black coal, is in general,
small. Only Poland, and Czechoslovakia cover their own requirements for cokes ,coal
and coke, partially by Czech deliveries of coking coal to Polish coteries in. exchange
for ordinary black coal. before, Poland, with its coal surplus, assures the .eastern
bloc a strong( *position in regard to trade with.the western world* In 1951western
Europe was dependent upon goal imports involving about 36 million tone. of this total,
25 million. tons were supplied by the United. States, and almost 11 million. tons by
Poland ? Western. Europe plans to import 38 million tons of coal in 1952.y of which 28
million tons will be delivered by the United. Mates, and. 10 million tons by Poland.
In Hungary, Ruma,nia,, and East Gem, efforts are under way to solve the coke problem..
By equipping its Metallurgical Combine "West'! with low-shaft blast f X aces,, at
Germany has made a, decisive step in this direction. Inthese furnaces., bra.-coal
hard coke can be used to smelt pig iron instead of black*caal coke This,'ue process
would. revolutionise the production of pig iron.. Particularly the European..:e stern-
bloc countries, which are deficient in black coal, would benefit from It,, ;'However, it
is yet to be seen whether the furnaces, which were not put into operation until 1951,
will give satisfactory results
The total mining capacity in the eastern bloc i.s.adequate in the event. oaf wt
However,, 50 percent of the satellites,' coal output would be subject to uncertainty
because of the overload on transportation facilities in case of.war,.
Petroleum
1. After the war. the rise in petroleum output was slower than the increase in
yield and the production of iron. a stet. At present,, the petroleums out put, is shout
30 percent above the pre-war lev l# This slow development can he attribute d. ab fly
to the sharp reduction in the petroleum yield of the Caucasus region, and, to the fact
that output lagged very. considerably behind expectations in the Emba region and some-
what behind. in the Volga4lral region. However, as was made known at the end of 1951,
the Soviet leaders hope to be able to achieve a petroleum output of 6o million tons
annually, the goal designated by Stalin in 19)+6,, before 1960.
Despite the decrease in the petroleum output of the Caucasus region, the output of
that area still amounts to more than .50 percent of the total output. A further
increase in output is execte 3. in the Volga. -tfral. region.:
In 1950 the following petroleum derivatives were produtoodr
Aviation fuel
anda d gasol'
Diesel oil
Illuml- at:3 . oil
Gas oil and fuel oil
Lubricating oil
3.4 million tons
55 million tons
3.1 million tons
6.8 million tong
12.2 million tons
million taluo
Total 34,3 million tons
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To be added to these quantities are 4.7 million tons of derivatives produced in the
satellite countries and East Germany,, so that the USA has at its disposal mor than
39 million tons of petroleum derivatives, - 1951, about 43 to 44 million tong for
its own consumption.. The petroleum, deris which. remain in the satellites and. met(
Germany barely cover the demand which has been severely restricted. The goals of the
last Five Year Plan (including,stockpiling) could never have been fulfilled without
the deliveries from the satellite couxttries :and Fast Germany.
Whereas .the requirements of the.8ovi t Air Farce for high-grade aviation fuel during
World War II could be covered ohiy by deliveries from. the Western Allies,, it was
possible after the war to stockpile aviation fuel$ as- a resa.lt of an.. increase in
production. However,, the changa-vver by -the. soviet Air :' ar to jet-propelled aircraft
involves such a high consumption of fuel that s pply difficulties are bound to arise
during a long-term wary after the stockpiled. i uantitiss are used up,. An inores.se in
the petroleum output .and in the.' produ.ation of aviation fuel is, therefore, anurgen'
necessity.
Fuel Re ui.r meats .o the Soviet f4v Force
(Figures in thousands of tons)
Gasoline
Kerosene
Total
time require- 1,080 3,210 4,320
acute
Annual war-
time require-
merits
3,100 -3,700 5,200 - 6,900 8,300 - 10,600
In time of war, monthly consumption.,figures during the summer may be 325,000 -
40,000 tons. of gasoline and 735, 000 - 950, 000 tons of kerosene ;,.,during the winter,
215,000 - 277,000 tons of gasoline and 485,000 - 705,000 tons of kerosene.
Outside of the U ,, the results in the output of crude oil were particularly fa rorable
in . ustriaM In comparison with a 1950 yield of 1.5 million tons,, an output of about
2 million tone was. expected for 1951* Furthermore, new supply districts c in the Vien
Basin and Mar*ehfl& axe being counted on for 1952
As during the entire postwar period, the Rumanian oil output will probably rise
slowly; presumably about 6 million tons will be produced in 1951?
Czechoslovakia hopes to be able to ahieve twice its 1950 fuel output .by 1953
The plan provides for ' a crude-oil output of about 25 0, 000 tons, or a threfold
increase over the output of 1950, and a synthetic-fuel output of 375,,000 tons, or one and one half times that of 1950. However, a.quantity of 60Q,,000 tons ofderivatives
cannot cover the rising demand.,, since neehanization is increasing greatly,; particularly
in agriculture. It should be pointed out in this connection that they; Slovakian. crude
oils have a low gasoline co tent, and are more suitable for process. into .diesel
and lubricating oils p.
Si=c P a.7 . ink to produce twice its 1950 fuel output in 1955,, its crude-oil
yield is scheduled.. to be 3911.,000 tons instead 6f 1:80,000 tons. In. 1950 only one,
fourth of Polarod.'s requirements could be .covered by domestic output#. Even in 1955,
the domestic output will barely. exceed. 30 percent of Poland's total .epnsum otion..
A comparison of the petroleum consumption .figures of the U I and the ,eastern bloc with
.those the West leads to false conclusions, since economically unproductive consumpy
tion. in the East is at a minimum,#
The crude-oil output of the eastern bloc is inadequate for the conduct of a war of long
duration. Seizure of the ' Iranian oil would - except for the transp.cartatioa difficulties
solve the problem for the East..
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1III I I r-N VIII n r4_1
I I I H II II I1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 11n1 II__--_ 1
ITM_ 1_1 I I I I I I I I I I I I ]_--`I I 1', 1-1 1 Ll I
i 9 a r 5' 46' 748. 9' 50 51 1940 45 40 4F( 40 4 50 5h 19 M -t, ru ?t; -rw -r, :'- or-
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Poz?erSupply
1. The power supply of the USSR has considerably increased in recent rea oM The 1950
power output ,of 90 billion kilowatt hours exceeded the plan b abdut 10, percent,
and. in 1951 there was a .further increase of 15 percent), to l X kilowatt
hours. In recent years the capacity of the instalilaticna has increased, particularly
through reconstruction in the western regions- through the construction of loge-
scale power plants, and through advances in agricultural electric icatioa. In spite
of this, it is not clear whether the actual goal was attained,, namely,, to increase
the capacity (in kilowatts) by erecting so 'many new installations that the plants
would not continually have to operate at peak load, but .would have reserve capacity
at their disposal
The power supply of the Moscow - Upper Volga central industrial region, which.at pre4ent
is still :Inadequate, is to be guaranteed in the future by power deliveries from the
large Hu byshev power plant, which is still under construction. The realiation of
this project, expected in the course of the new few years, will mean that the group of
armament centers established.along the central Volga during the war will be organized
into a large-scale, coordinated production effort with regard to power supply also.
The two decisive industrial region, the Moscow - Upper Volga region and the Ural
region,. will thus be drawn closer together. The power networks of the two regions
each comprise one fourth of the total installed capacity in the t $ R ?.
2. Asin the USM., the power supply in the satellites is still relatively weak, However,
the differences from country to country are extremely great. The construction of
the power-plant network in the agrarian countries is to be accomplished within the
framework of very long-range plans.
In 1950 and 1951, considerable progress was made in Poland by the couatruction of a
power-fool network covering the entire country. Thus, in 195G, the industrial regions
of Upper Silesia. and _Z6d , and, in 1951, the regions of ZCd1 and. Warsaw were.connected
by high-tension lines. A large power plant to supply Upper ailesia isunder constru tion.
In East Germany
tru+etion of power-plant equipment probably lagged considerably
behind the plan targets in .1951.
Power production in the eastern bloc still constitutes., on the wholes an i aportant
'Point of weakness in the economic structure. The greatly expedited .cox.txuction cif
power plants is limited. by the resultant load on the sbaehine-building and electrical
industries..
V
Iron and pteel
The production of pig iron, steel, and rolled stock has risen considerably since the
war and is . now far 'ab ove the pre-war level.
30
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The eastern areas of the USSR (Urals and eastward.) have contributed most to the
increase in iron and steel production, Just as they have contributed most to
the increase in coal production. At, present the western areas account .for only
one half.of the total production (70 percent before the war). The greatest centers
of production now are the Ukraine and the Urals, with 70 - 80 percent of the total
production.
Civilian consumption (construction of homes and household equipment) is.negligible.
Therefore, as far as armaments-are concerned, USSR production must be considered
equivalent to almost twice the value of the same production in the West.
Because of the decrease in scrap reserves, the percentage increase in the production
of crude steel? and hence also of rolled stock, was probably lower in the USSR in.
1951 than in. 1950. Also in 1952 one may expect a slower tempo of production :Lnerease,y
unless there is a considerable increase in iron-ore deliveries. These deliveries
represent a serious bottleneck, because the expanding iron industry of the satellites
depends more and more on Soviet iron ore.
2. In 1951 the USSR produced about 31 million tons of crude steel; the European satellites
produced between 8.9 and. 9.6 million tons. Satellite production, which is expanding
constantly, benefited the USSR largely in the form of finished goods.
Pig-iron production in East Germany in 1951 depended almost.entirely on the Ma.titte,.
which produced 365,000 tons. The new metallurgical plants at Ffrstenberg and at Cale
were set in operation and together smelted 10,0063 tons. In 1952 the two plants
are expected to produce about as much as.the Maxh'Itte produced in 1951.
In 1951 East Germay revised its 5-Year Plan in regard to iron and steel. The original
plan of achieving the 1955 steel-production goal by using very great quantities.of ~ci' p
was given up; instead, it was decided to increase ore production. Even if ore production
should be increased as planned, East Germany would still have to rely on the import of
2 million tons of high-grade ores, most of which would have to came from the USSR.
There may be .difficulties in steel and rolled-stock supplies in the USSR at present
from the point of view of quality; quantitatively, however, supplies are adequate.
In other countries of the Soviet bloc, however, and above all in East Germany, supplies
are quite short.
A comparison between East and West shows that the West produced 154 million tons
(58,255,000 in western Europe. and. 95,500,000 in the US) while the eastern bloc produced
40 41 million tons. It must, however, be emphasized that since in the West
consumer goods still make up a large part of production, two tons. of steel in the West
.equal one ton in the East. This ratio will improve in favor of the West as war
production increases.
At the present level of iron and steel production, the eastern bloc can increase its
armament production to any level which appears necessary.
For map., see Appendix 2.
Motor Vehicles and Railroad Rolling Stpek
Motor vehicle construction has increased two and one half times over that of the
best prewar year (1938). Under the planned development it mays during the next few
years, reach an output three times that of 1938, namely 750,000 vehicles per year.
Trucks accounted for more than 85 percent of the total motor vehicle construction
(including motorcycles and motor bicycles). The planned output for 1950 of 430,000
trucks was apparently achieved. In the future, with increased production, one may
count on a yearly production of 5 00, 000 - 600,000 trucks.
The inventory of 2 million truck units planned for 1951 -- compared with 1 million
truck units in 1940 -- was presumably not reached. The postwar models, which in 1951
accounted for 60 percent of the inventory, show considerable improvement over the
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standard. types of t aeI war period.. In. comparison with the :consul table increase i '
ty (30 peeeent) and in motor e:rfto.ieucy (2 - 6 percent), fuel consumption
rose only slightly (20 percent ) By 'using .S iese 1 motors for the hevy trucks an
actual saving .of fuel was achieved.
Tractor production has increased considerably-over the prewar level, and motor
efficiency has been greatly .1Xriprrov"ed. Acpei"d: g .to tthe plan., 112,000 .trsctora were
built in 19501 it is planned. to increase roduction to 139.a.:00 O'units.
In. 1950 the inventory of tractors on farms was 550; 040 units; during the wary pro(tu
tiou of tractors. stopped completely, and those in service were subjected to. harder
wear. It is d.oubt:l rhetler the prewar invgrory figure was again reached by the
end of 1950. -
In the first postwar Years practically all the tractors built ,were put into farm
service. Recently, however, an increasing- proportion of the production has been
tuned over to other services (forestry) land -improVernent, and. highway construction)
Ii case of wa .r, tractors employed. in the latter ?services could be w1..thdrawn irn eh more
easily than those used on faxms
in 1000.units in 1000.units
50 I .,100
57 t.'. 74t J i ~ I
TRUCK PIRODUCTION
.After a slow. recovery from the e'ff'ect
output of 2,700?units in 1951 in the course of the next few years .an. inc:
41000 urxits, can be expe ted.
freight--car, producti had regained the pre-war level,
s 19)7
,
~
present it has ceed.ed that level more than two-fold. (about 145., o0C oars in 1950) .
One may assume that. this figure will increase to 2001000*.,
With. 1.1 illion units the freight-car park is now 30 percent larger than before
the war;; capacity haas incre "ed. by 50 percent? because )--ale cars now make up 40
percent of the total number of ears,, whereas in 1940 they made up only 25 percent
of the total.
(*Figures.are expressed in 2-axle units?
locomotive construction rf
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I 1
45 4 47 48"49 193 39'40 5 4b 4T 50'51
TRUCK PRODUCTION
TRACTOR PRODUCTION
3. Toe motor vehicle ' industry of the sai e.llit :.ec untrie _.. has relat3Orely
lower output than that of the 'USSR Only tractors are produced: in rather large
number to supply the necessary machinery for collectivized agriculture. The
wellv,developed motor vehicle industry of Czechoslovakia has adapted itself to
the Soviet production pattern by increasing truck production at the expense
of passenger-car output. Moreover, the Soviets insisted upon- a sharp increase
in freight-car production. In East Germany,, only repair work on locomotives
and freight care was carried out izp to 1949. 'Not until then? did new freight-
car constriction begin on a large scale.
VII.
l T 4e nufa,cture ;of ataral 4? d assault 'g? i reached . -t highest lev l 1-in
1944-45,. with 37y,500 units per year. Production .s.lawed. down after the end
of the war and dropped precipitately from mid-1916 on. Production for 1951
is estimated at 10,000 units (about 25 percent ofthe production at the exd
of the war). s
The modu(z'ti"an system was,. cbanged-affter.. the Oar. - The finishing of?'parts
-VMS distributed among a far larger number of supplier plants, and the final
assenthly was concentrated in a few plants (seven are known). With these manu-
facturing cells1 which can at the same time be regarded as basic production
centers for developing models and for training specialists., it would be possible
to set up the production of tanks and assault guns on a var 4 ue scale' on very
short notice. Most of the manufacture is centered in the Ural and Volga
Heavy tanks and, assault gms have displaced the medium types. The ratio between
tanks and assault guns cannot be determined. at this time (possibly 25 percent)
(sic). In l944, assault guns made up about 20 percent of the total; in 1947
.
about 15 percent.
On.ly+ : nprov d: m e1sq ' veIoped. _fr_,c'k .thee.. ty a 7ueeci in "the . are bee n:
manufactured. Their essential cbaracterietics are heavier front armor,
improved design and radio equipment' and increased fire power.
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On the basis of the high production during the last phaase.of the war and
the.period immediately after the war, the number of tanks and assault guns
on hand: can be estimated at 80,000 units. Of these, about 45,000 tanks and
assault guns were made during the last weeks of the war and are therefore
of limited use in comparison with the improved: types. However, 35,000 tanks
and assault guns are modern standard types.
The armament of existing organizations and training installations may amount
to about 29,000 tanks and assault guns. The satellite countries probably
have another 5,000 units, Accordingly, one can assume a total of about 40,000.
45,000-tanks and assault guns in the camps of the military districts and of
general headquarters.
The satellite countries play no decisive role in tank production,
VIII.
Air Armament
1. The Soviet postwar production of aircraft frames is shown in Appendix 3,
The USSR was able to make up its lag in the field of jet propulsion and jet
aircraft very quickly. Three factors were responsible for this;
a. The machine equipment of the reconstructed: plants has been modernized
as the result of deliveries made by the Allies during the war and of the
acquisition of equipment through plunder or dismantling.
b. The USSR is in a position to exploit not only German designs and produe
tion experience, but also German experts.
ain had delivered up-to-date jet engines.
E'igbter Aircraft
Speed
Tactical
Penetration Range
Armament Useful Load.
La-9
600 km/h
700 kin
4 x 23 mm
La-11
600 km/h
750 km
x 23 mm
La-17
1,000 l ./h
650 k
1 x 37 M
2x23mn
Yak-L5
700 kx /h
750 km
2 x 20 mm.
6 - 8 rockets
.9
750 km/h
300 km.
1 x 37 mm
2 x:
Mig-15
1,020 km/h
450 km
1 x 37 mm
2 x 23 mm.
Bombers
PE-2
370 km/h
500 km
2 x. 12.7 mm
1,800 kg
2 x 7.62 mm,
PE-8
330 km/h
11500 km.
2 X-, . 7.62 mm.
3, 000; kg
x. ?2 m
"l 2,7 mm
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Tactical
Speed
Pe: tration Range
Armame
Useful Load
450 m/h
800 kin
2x20 mm
27000 kg
3 x 12.7 amn.
450 km/h
3,300 km..
9 x 12.`x, nun
6,000
I1-4
i/h
700 km
1 x 12,E
I Y500 kg
2 x 7,62 nmi
Il-2TI
750 km/h
850 kin
2 x 23 mm:
27000
2' x 12.7;. m
(with supplementary
tanks)
Atta l~ Aircraft
330 km/h
275 I=
2x 23
I x 12.7imn
100 kg
2 7,62 mm
11-10
500 I:/h
300 kin:
2x23r m:
500 kg
1 x 12.7 rim
` "an:s rt Air
of t
2 x 7.62 I
230 km/h
900 kn
1 x 12.7 mm
2,225 kg
2 x 7.62 mtn.
11-12
330 /b.
750 k
37000 kg
11-18
425 km/h
1,1100
97000 kg
T.70
450 km/h
27500 IM
0100 kg
Yak-16
300 /h
500 k .
l
I .saenger
200 kg
DPS-34x6 7
ixslopMt
31/132 850 1cm/h ? 900 km ?
I1.-4T , 720 m/h ? 1,000 km 150 920 km/h T 1,500 km 7
2. The four phases of d.erelopmen? in aircraft production are M
2,1+00 kg 3
14,500 kg ?
a. From the end of the war to 1946 there was a gradual reduction of war
production until an industrial output of 187300 araref,pr year
was reached, without bringing production to a, full s ? till as was
done in other countries. Full employment was maintained In factories
by including the manufacture of consumer goods..
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~i ..
In large-scale prcductiom;
Aircraft models
Fighter aircraft
Attack aircraft
Light bombers
La-9
PE-B
Tu-2
In dev lopme..
Fighter airor
DFS- 16
Mig-9
YYkkl5
Tu-11
B twe n 1946 and the beginning of 1947 the air arz 'zt indust r wa i
again brought to full production. German. Plant capa ttY a d German
to haicians were dawn on. Without let-up in current prod action the
ind istr r xs converted to new moapls Production for 1947 'amounted. to
i7r7OQ aircraft.
production
Aircraft model :
Fighter aircraft
La-:
Attack aircraft
Light bombers
PL-2
Ta-2
1'I.4
bombers
Tu
aircraft
LT-2,
IL-12
-18
N-70
Productitn started on
let fighters g-9
Yak-l5
In development i
et fighters
Mg-15
Law17 ,
ototd
dot 'bom'bers 'P 131.1.!
(Built bri th6 model of `-281
ILA-
SIC;
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By the beginning of 1947 the contrersioia of plants was considered om-
peted, and the construction of protottpes and of new models iras
begun. Most plants worked in three a
Production in 1948 increased to 21,000 aircraft, because
added production: of prototypes of jet fighters. In 1949, despi
the added production of prototypes of sru.lti-engine jet bombers and
the start of mass production of jet fighters, production droppO4'to
18,500, because the large-scale production of traditional fighter
aircraft with reciprocating engines and of attack aircraft eamo, to
an end:.
in large-scale production:
Aircraft model
Jet fighters
Mig-9
Yak-15
gig-15
La-17
Transport aircraft
IL-12
iL-18
Yak-16
Tu-70
arge-sale production being terminated:
Fighter aircraft
Attack aircraft
La-l1
IL-10
Light bombers
P1 -2
in develop
,Tot fighter prototypes
Light bombers
Medium bombers
Tu-2
TL-2 (jet)
IL-4 (jet)
P-150
May 1949, the standard models bad been set. Large-scale productiprx
of new models, which are now being used by the military f+ r es, vas,
begun, and by 1951 the following yearly production was reached;
Seaplanes
1,000
Multi-engine bombers
(E-29 model)
boo
Light tactical bow
(jet-propelled)
1,000
fighees
1P-y500
Total
2 0,100
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16 -
large-scale production:
Aircraft model:
fighters
Light jet bombers
Medium bombers
Transport aircraft
In development
Jet fighters
Further development of supersonic fighters
Medium jet bombers P-150
T\e d'evelopment and production of high-performance aircraft is dependent. A
on the production of jet engines. At the end of the war, the USER was using
only reciprocating engines in its aircraft. In 19511, jet engines 'with capacities
of ,800 gv thrust were being mass-produced. Development of engines with
capacities of approximately 5,000 kg. thrust is nearly completed.
Outlook and Evaluation
Since 19.5,0' the ebonomic plans of the S rviet bloc have been'. even more
countries of the Soviet bloc are being industrialized and the capacities of
the more industrial countries are being expanded. in Lacc ianee= with current
five-year plans, forces the USSR to give these countries considerable aid and
to_forgo, to some degree; drawing upon these countries for goods. The 'SS
despite modern pl.n,t equipment, is still behind the other large industrial
nations,in productivity per worker in most industries. In the years 1953-55
the USSE will strive to increase its industrial output by using these `hidden
reserves"", even though this may result in overloading the plant equipment and
in disproportionately heavy wear and tear.
t nea t,~f ea USSRT jwiil sldkw,:dove:?'the, expans orx ac nits dry
count s, ,
industries in order to concentrate more on investing in the satellite
since it, expects, in the long run, to achieve a greater increase in the ind-dstria:
potential of the Soviet bloc in this W. Particularly in the preac :nant '
gricu1t is countries the USSR is attempting, through, large-scale farms. ,
ivert more labor to industry. Tractors, which are incaspensable for modern
1g. are to be produced in sufficient quantities during the
ive-year plans:. 'Without using forde at pret, the collectivization
of farms is to be cat out step by step (as far as possible, without creating
too many managerial or psychological difficulties). In East Germany col' ectivi-
zation bas at present been halted for political reasons The forms of ogllectiv,
eeconomy" vary from. "associations for co11ecti re working of fi l:cl.s' to out- ndi.out
kolkhozea. From its of experience with collectives, v ,eh lee to starvation
and mass ding, the USER advises proceeding cautiously, in general.. However,
the Soviet model is still being folloved In 195051 the arena of colle 'ire
farms were considerably increased In decor nee with the increhs d tempt
of collectivization, the original industrial goals set for the end of the
plans were raised eansid rably%
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It is still quite difficult to get the necessary labor for industry-'
Despite some caution, the tempo of industrialization is too fast for the
required labor force to keep up with it. In addition, it is impossible to
shift more labor from agriculture to industry in either such highly industrialized
areas as Czechoslovakia or such slightly industrialized areas as Hungary:
without reducing the already low agricultural output even more. 14 the next
few years, the lack of technicians and labor in general will .often..Wste the
fulfillment.of plan quotas difficult, if not impossible. The present .food
shortages will also increase. Nor will the industrial equipment be ready on
time or without difficulty. (See Appendices .laid 5.)
The foreign trade .of the satellites is dependent on the countries in the
Soviet bloc, particularly-the USSR. Building up the satellites' industry
without raw materials of their ovn.-ilxnre-ases their dependence on the USSR,
The USSR thus has considerable power to control the economy of its satellites.
However, during,this decisive and difficult phase of industrializing its
western front, the USSR-will be careful to steer clear of external political
disturbances.
The eeonomic condition of the Soviet bloc is at present not strong enough .
to carry on. a .world: war ,lasting several years. Rowever, if these countries
continue their present development, they will be strong enought by 1957-60.
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Evaluation of the Military Situation
Military Personnel Potential
At the beginning of 1952 the armed forces personnel potential, in terms of men of
draft age, i.e. between 18 and 1.9, totaled approximately 38 million men. With only
the most essential deferments for service in the defense industries, a mobilization
potential of 26 million men can be counted on. In view of the intensified manpower
requirements of the armament industry in the event of war, the Soviet leaders will
have to limit themselves to placing 12 million men under arms as the initial step
in a total mobilization to be carried out in three waves. (The total strength of
Soviet armed forces in May 19+5 was 10.8 million men.)
Army
The Soviet Army
s,. Total Strength and. Grouping of the Soviet.Ar-
Numerous first-hand indications from within the Soviet Union bear out the estimate
of the present total strength of the Soviet Army as 3.2 million men and 177 combat'
divisions, including 27 armored divisions, i-5 mechanized divisions, and. 12 cavalry
divisions. The supporting units are composed of 15 artillery and. 50 anti-aircraft
divisions. Units equaling the strength of 6 airborne divisions have probably
been formed from the airborne brigade and several of the airborne infantry divisioh
utilized in ground combat during World War II.
In the event of mobilization, the total number of combat divisions of the Army
could be raised to 350 (see Section C, I); i.e. the number of peace-time divisions
could be doubled. The number of mechanized units, which is particularly high
in the peace-time Army, could not be increased by so great a proportion as could
the number of infantry units, which have not been so much emphasized in the peace-
time Army. With 70,000 - 75 000 tanks and assault guns available? (29,000
utilized in peace-time units),the above-mentioned infantry units, too,"can be
given strong armored striking power.
This large number of organic tanks is the distinguishing feature of the Soviet
postwar divisions, which, although they have a relatively small personnel com-
plement, can bring an astonishing firepower to bear upon the enemy. This fact is
apparent from the attached, table (Appendix 6.), which contains figures on the
personnel strengths of the most important combat units.
The Ministry of War, which serves as the planning organ for the Army and Air
Force, and which includes the Soviet Army General Staff,. directs the Army 'units
within the 21 military districts and the four occupation areas. Army staffs
have been installed in the most important of these areas. The High Command for
Ground Forces, which is incorporated within the Ministry of War, is charged. with
training and inspection functions.
The distribution of the Army divisions is shown in Appendix 7'. The distribution
of the peace-time Army shows, in addition to a concentration of 20 percent of
the existing armored forces in East Germany, military concentrations in the most
important peripheral areas, such as the Baltic area and the White Russian,
Carpathian, and, Trans-Caucasus military districts. Of the eight mechanized
armies presumably in existence, four are stationed in Germany and one each in
the Baltic, the White Russian, the Trans-Caucasus, and the Trans Baikal-Amur
military districts. The creation of these strong points shows that the Soviet
dagger is pointed at western Europe, now as before.
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b The Occupation Forces of the Soviet Army in German-
A quick glance in retrospect at the development of the situation during 1951.
in East Germany, the largest and most transparent window in the Iron Curtain,
will serve to give a generally applicable picture of the activity as well as
the striking power of the Soviet Army in so far as personnel and materiel are
concerned, and will permit an insight into probable future developments.
With a complement of 320,000 men, i.e. 10 percent of the total Army strength,
the Soviet occupation troops in Germany, under Army General Chuikov, are the
Kremlin's most important concentration of troops and are those stationed closest
to western Europe. The positions of the two infantry and four mechanized: armies,
with their 22 subordinate combat divisions, are given in Appendix 8. The total
number of units has not changed since 1947. However, the two rear units,? the
3rd and 4th Guards Mechanized Armies, were expanded: between autumn 1949 and
autumn. 1950 from skeleton units containing only one third of the personnel
called for by their tables of organization to full-strength units. As a result
of this increase in strength, they were enabled to form organic antiaircraft
divisions.
As early as February of the 1951 training year, various units were sent on brief
assignments to the maneuver areas for range-firing drills. Marching drills
were undertaken in the vicinity of the posts. Individual training was carried
out in garrison until April. A small number of specialists were brought from
the Soviet Union at the beginning of February.
After 10 April 1951, the majority of the combat divisions left their winter
quarters for a stay of several months in the forest camps of the maneuver areaa.
The over-all picture showed a distribution of forces similar to that of the
previous year, except for the Letzlinger Heide area. The 7th Guards Tank Division
of the 3rd Guards Mechanized Army and the 10th Guards Tank Division of the 4th
Guards Mechanized Army were stationed in the vicinity of this former German
proving ground., now converted by the Soviets into a tank target range, a deviation
from the usual practice of stationing units of a single army there. In addition,
the two adjacent divisions of the 3rd Shock Army carried out maneuvers there. The
9th Guards Motorized Infantry Division in Schwerin and the three divisions of
the 2nd Guards Mechanized Army in Mecklenburg carried, out their seamiertraining
in the vicinity of their garrisons.
While platoon and company training was being carried out at the maneuver areas,
the engineer units of each army were concentrated,, from May on, along variou
sectors of the middle Elbe, for special training with heavy bridge-building
equipment. At the end of June or the beginning of July7 some 75,000 replacement
troops in the 1930 and 1931 age classes arrived, and after a short period of
basic training were sent, in August, to the maneuver areas, where the training
~%?,. .. t lion proportions. At the same time, some 40,000
men and non-commissioned, officers of the 1927 age classes who had had- previous
service were discharged. As a result of this replacement, the army units exceede
their planned peace-time strength (approximately 65 percent of the var-time
strength) by approximately 10-15 percent.
At the beginning of July, small units of the 39th Guards Motorized. Infantry
Division took part in airborne maneuvers between Dresden and. Altenburg, Except
for staff training exercises for.the commands of all six armies, which took place
in the Wittenberg-Delitzsch-Halberstadt area at the end of September, the troop
units remained in the maneuver areas until the beginning of October, having
begun training on a reinforced regimental scale at the end of August. The asseml
in turn, of artillery at Altengrabow, of antiaircraft units at Wustrow, and of
engineers in the Elbe area continued. during this same period.
The units began to move out of the maneuver areas approximately on 10 October.
Before moving to winter quarters, the majority of the units carried out large-
scab autumn maneuvers, They were divided into four maneuver areas ~ as follows
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Combat units of all three divisions of the lst Guards Mechanized Army were observe from 20 to 27 October engaged in an exercise covering the area from Osehatz
and Riess as far as the vicinity of Zeithain.
Units of all four divisions of the 8th Guards Army, supported by units of the
6th Artillery Division, Engineers, and."Group Transportation units,*.ytook part in
a river-crossing exercise during the period 20-28 October. During this exercise,
the reinforced `IXth Guards Motorized Infantry Corps, after assembling in the
Zerbst-Rosslau area, set up a bridgehead: south of the Elbe which was attacked,.
hemmed in, and destroyed by the reinforced XXVIIIth Guards Motorized Infantry
Corps from the Weissenfels-Merseburg area.
A similar problem was assigned for maneuvers of the 3rd Shock Army,, whose main
body crossed the Elbe to the east from the Letztinger Heide area and was then
attacked by the reinforced 7th Guard? Armored Division..
During this same period, 20-27 October, the nth Guard>MechanizedArmy staged a
final maneuver in the area southeast of Rathenow; the problem of this maneuver
was probably to engage and repulse an enemy coming from the west.
The combat units of the occupation troops in Germany returned to their winter
quarters at the beginning of November. Thereafter, the rotation of personnel,
which had been initiated at the beginning of October, was resumed on an expanded
scale. By the time the rotation operation was completed, 10 December 1951, 64
troops, trains bearing 77,000 recruits from the 1931 and 1932 age classes had
arrived westbound,, and 56 troop trains bearing approximately 68,000 discharged
men of the 1928 age class had departed for the east.
November and December were devoted to the maintenance of weapons and equipment
and to the assignment and basic training of the newly arrived personnel. The
relocation, about the middle of December, of the staff of the 3rd Guards Mechanizes
Army from Luckenwalde to the barracks at Wuensdorf/Zossen completed the transfer,
in 1951, of all army and corps staffs from requisitioned civilian buildings to
barracks. This gesture vis-h-vis the East German Government served the purpose
os isolating the personnel more completely, an action which was first noted in
Autumn 1951, when German personnel were replaced by Russian women.
A regrouping of units of the 8th Guards Army took place in Thuringia at the end
of November. In the course of this regrouping, the main body of the 39th Ouarda
Motorized Infantry Division was transferred to the Ohrdruf area, and troops of
the IIth Guards Motorized Infantry Corps were transferred from Gera and
Zeitz to Rudolstadt and Saalfeld.
It is known that during the winter, as in previous years, small individual units
were sent to target ranges for training in marksman:ship. .Intensive individual
training, special courses given by subordinate commanders.; and the maintenance
of equipment characterized the activity of the Soviet units in garrison at the
beginning of 19.52. In February, these units will presumably again engage in
small-scale exercises in the vicinity,of their stations.
a. Estimate.oof the Present Striking Power of the Soviet .A
With the inductions of the autumn of 1950,. the Soviet Army reached the peace
time induction level prescribed in the military service law. The wave of di
charges during summer 1951 marked the completion.of the transfer of men with
military service experience into the reserves. Because of the-large size of
those age classes (an average of 1,900,000 men each), 'the personnel potential
is now at a postwar high, both as to total number of men and as to age classifica-
tion and training status of the reserves. The decline in the size of the
draft-age groups, which began in 1952 and which will reach a low of 900,000
men in about 1963, will cause the personnel potential to decrease over a period of
15 years, so that it will be possible to maintain a peace-time army of the
present strength only by extending , the .period of military service. Without
advertising the fact, the Army has already inereased,,the period of service from
2 to 3 years.
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In so far as materiel is concerned, the Soviet Army is still being supplied with
weapons produced during the latter years of the war. The weapons developed
up to 1945 still makeup 80 percent of the standard weapons of the Arty, Tanks
and. antitank weapons form the mainstay of Soviet armament and have been constantly
improved in mobility and firepower. They equal in effectiveness and exceed in
numbers thosee of any modern opponent. Materiel s=hortages still exist with regard
to radar equipment and motor vehicles, although the supply of these two items
has been increased considerably in recent years.
The status of military training is excellent as the result of unusually strict
and intensive instruction:. Ha 'ever, because of the close adherence to centralized
planning which is peculiar to the Russians, there is bound to be a tendency to
s chemati sm.
The actual strength of all units stationed in the border areas of the Soviet
Union has reached 65-70 percent of war-time strength. In the zones of occupation
it has risen to 70-80 percent of war-time strength. The undermanned units
do not impede the immediate readiness for combat.
There are no obvious supply shortages, notwithstanding the fact that the extremely
sparing use of gasoline in peace-time may indicate that in the event of a long
conflict there would-be a shortage of this particular item.
Rigid. isolation from non-Soviet surroundings and unusually close surveillance
by political and state security organs have made desertion and resistance within
the Soviet Army practically impossible. Even in the event of a. war, internal
subversion is not apt td; occur unless the USSR were to sustain a decisive
defeat.
To summarize, it is apparent that after the induction of the latest contingents
of reerti';ts, approximately in the spring of 1952, the Soviet Armywill have
reached a postwar high in personnel strength, and that as the result of increased
mechanization during the past year, it is capable of:engagin in mobile combat
with considerable striking power, on short notice.
The armed. foroes facing western Europe in. Germany and in the western peripheral
military districts constitute an unusual concentration of armored forces which
could engage in initial penetration operations even if the relatively weak
infantry and artillery units were not reinforced.
The absence of any indications of preparation for war, the normal passage of
the training year, the normal status of supply facilities, the fact that units
are below war-time strength, and the discharge of the last group of combat
veterans during the sutra .er of 1951 all point to the 'probability that the Soviet
leaders are not planning to carry out offensive action in Burope in the immediate
future. Presumably the 1952 training year will be similar to the.previous year,
and it may be expected that in the most crucial border and occupation areas the
Soviet Army will be maintained in a state of readiness.for? armed attack, even
on short notice.
Satellite Armies
a. General;
The Soviet influence on all satellite armies was further increased during 1951,
although the system varied according to the political and national conditions
in the various countries. In Poland, for example, the top military posts have
been filled with Russians. af?' P olish extraction. No Soviet officers have been
incorporated into the Czech Army,; but a large number of troop units, and especial
the military schools, are controlled by Sovietofficers who serve as advisers.
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onsiderable progress has been made in the introduction of Soviet weapons and
equipment an& in' the standardization of the military organization and the replacement
system. Appendix 9 shows the distribution of the satellite army divisions.
b Poland
Since RokorssowskiTs appointment as Minister of Defense, the Soviet Union has
been much more liberal in its shipments of weapons. Tanks -of the T,34/85 and
JS 1-3 types, as well as assault guns-of the JSU 152 type, are appearing in greater
numbers in the Polish Army. The artillery utilizes all types of Soviet guns up
tt 152 mm. caliber. The engineers are utilizing the TEMP type of heavy bridge
.equipment. Mechanization has made additional progress, although the numerous
US vehicles hate not yet been completely replaced by Soviet types. At present,
Poland has at its disposal four or five motorized or mechanized divisions, and
10 or 11 ordinary infantry divisions. In addition, it has available army units
equivalent to five or six armored regiments and approximately 15 GI14 artillery
regiments. The total estimated strength of the Polish Army, which at present is
not in a position to enlist all men subject to the draft, is approximately 200,000
:men. The police forces -- the Internal Security and Border Patrol Corps -- are
organized and equipped along Soviet lines. Their strength is estimated at approxi-
mately 50,000 men. There are inexistence approximately 15 border guard brigades,
and there is one brigade or one regiment of the Internal Security Corps in each of
the 17 wojewod$twos .
Czechoslovakia:
The expansion of the Czech Army during the past year was hampered considerably by
personnel problems. A target- number of officers, including the commanders of two
military districts, were arrested or dismissed from the Army in connection with
the Clementis trial. As a result of the numerous purges, a.critical shortage of
active officers and nori-commissioned officers has manifested itself. Notwith-
standing this fact, considerable progress has been made in the expansion of the
Army.. The previously weak motorized units have been brought. up to strength anal
reorganized into four mechanized or armored divisions according to Soviet pattern.
Mechanization was also greatly improved in the remaining units, so that at present
it may be presumed that four of the nine remaining infantry divisions are fully
motorized. In addition there is an independent armored corps, and approximately
12 GHQ artillery brigades. The influx of Soviet weapons and tanks is continuing,,
so that it is likely that only a few of the formerly. numerous German and British
tanks still remain.
Control of the border was increased considerably. On the Bavarian border alone,
there are six border patrol brigades, totaling 12,000-15,000 men. In addition,
field fortifications, mine fields, and barbed-wire entanglements have been set
up along the border.
Since the draft age was lowered in the fall of 1950, an additional age class was
added, so that there are-now three age classes on active duty. The present
estimated Army strength.of 175,0.00 men cannot be increased appreciably, without
at least partial mobilization.
Hungary:
Hungary was the last of the satellites to begin building up a new army. Because
a new officer corps had been trained which hewed to the (Communist) line, the
Soviets considered the Hungarian Army more dependable than the armies of the
other satellite countries. The delivery of weapons was therefore begun early,
at the time the units were organized, and is being continued uninterruptedly..
In addition to several partially motorized infantry divisions, there are in
existence one armored division, one ,mechanized division, presumably two anti-
aircraft divisions, and various independent army units. Soviet supervision is
exercised by numerous advisory or liaison staffs. The combined strength of the
Army may be estimated at approximately 100,000;,: men, to which may be added some
501000 police troops. In Hungary, too, this total cannot be measurably
increased without mobilization.
e. Conditions in Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania are similar to those in the above-
mentioned countries. It.may be presumed that at presents Rumania has at her
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disposal 15 divisions comprising 175,000 men, that Bulgaria has 11 divisions
comprising 130,000 men, and that Albania has 3 divisions comprising approximately
35,000 men. In addition, these countries also have police troops, as have the
other eastern-bloc nations.
f. To summarize, it has been established that the armies of all the satellite
countries are still in process of expansion, despite the fact that the army
strengths laid down in the peace treaties: have been exceeded by a .considerable
margin. It may also be presumed that further developments: will tend less toward
increasing personnel strength than toward even closer emulation of the Soviet
pattern, especially in so far as training, organization, and, armament are concerned.
Even at their present stages of expansion, the satellite armies represent an
addition to Soviet military power of 800,040 men, 3,000 tanks and assault guns,
and approximately 2,000 heavy guns (artillery), although the combat value of the
units is far from equal to that of comparable Soviet units. As auxiliaries to the
Soviet Army, the satellite forces could successfully be assigned to secondary
operations and to security missions. However, they can hardly be expected to
display any penetrative power if assigned to independent offensive operations
outside their own borders, against a tough, modern opponent. There were no
indications of preparation for war in any of the satellite countries at the
beginning of 1952.
Air Arm
1. The Air Forces of the Soviet Union
a. Total Strength and. Organization
At the end of the war, the Soviet Air Arm demobilized only approximately 40
percent of its war-time units. Of the Air Force regiments in existence at
the end of the war, probably 600 are up to war-time strength and ready for
action.
The Soviets probably have approximately 24,500 front-line aircraft available
(see Appendix 10). These can be broken down approximately as follows: 14,000
fighter aircraft, including 10,000 jet fighters; 5,500 light and medium bombers,
including more than 1,000 jet bombers; 3,500 attack aircraft; and 1,500 reconnaissar
aircraft. The majority of these units, approximately 18,500 front-line aircraft,
are based within the European area of the Soviet Union (including the Soviet occupa=
tion areas). The 18,500 aircraft are broken down as follows:
Army Air Force - approximately 12,000 aircraft
LongRange Bomber Force - 1,500 aircraft
Air-Defense Force - 3, 000 aircraft
Naval Air Force -- 2,000 aircraft
More than 2,000 twin-engine and four-engine military transport aircraft are avallab
Organization and Conbat Efficiency
1) Organization
The Soviet Air Arm is not an independent component of the armed forces.
Nevertheless, it occupies the same relative position within the armed forces
as the Army. It comprises various forces, which vary greatly in their assign-
ments and uses.
The A;rmg Air Force serves primarily to support front-line ground operations
It comprises the bulk of the Air Arm, and its training status.and combat
efficiency are good. It consists of the following units: The 2kth, the 59
(formerly the 2nd), and the 4th Air Armies in the occupied areas;-nine
additional air armies based in the various military districts-of the
European portion of the Soviet Union; four air armies in the Far East.
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The Long Range Bomber Force. (ADD) is employed.as.a means of tactical
aerial warfare. The ADD is composed of eight corps with subordinate
regiments. In its present status it is not in a position to carry
out its intended mission,: which is based on'the US pattern. For some
time to comet therefore, it is, not likely that these units will be
employed for any operations other than tactical army support..
Air Defense Force (PV6) has been furthered by all possible means during
the ast few years. The PV0s fighter units, with approximately 3,000
jet fighters, rank second. in strength after the Army Air Force.
The antiaircraft artillery in the European sector of the Soviet Union
is -composed of four PV0 fronts (see Appendix IQ), which, together with
the adjoining military areas, form air defense areas. Other air defense
areas encompass the military areas in the interior of the European sector
of the Soviet Union.,
With the aid of up-to-date antiaircraft artillery (guided missiles), and.
a very extensive network of radar stations and airfields in the military
areas, the Soviet Air. fefense Force will be in a position to offer
effective resistance to tactical attack units, although it will be unable
to prevent breakthrough by high-speed formations., especially at night,
in view of the great size of the area.
The Naval Air Force, with approximately 2, 000 combat aircraft,. is in a
position to carry out coastal patrol and escort missions in Europe.
Attacks on naval, units by combined fighter, bomber., and attack units must
be expected. Judging by the present aircraft equipment, it is highly
improbable, that extensive operations will be carried. out,, with the excep_
tion of long-range reconnaissance. Special significance attaches to the
cooperation of the Naval Air Force with the submarine force.
The Parachute 'and kirborries units are estimated to have a minimum strength
of 1 divisions `ith a total. of more than . 150,000 men. These units are
organized in regiments. The training status for commitment within a heaty
weapons division may be evaluated-as satisfactory.
The. Soviet Air Force (24th Air. Ar in East Germa
1) The distribution of strength of the 2]tb Air Aa:M up to autumn 1951 was
essentially the same as during the second ha]:f of 1950'. At that time, the"
Soviet Air Force maintained the following operational units in East Germany
(see Appendix lJ,)
2 fighter corps with a total of 18 regiments,
with a total of 6 regiments
1 bomber corps with a total of 6 regiments
2 air reconnai
sanee regiments
1 air transport regiment
1 air transport squadron
At the beginning of October 1951, this fixed set-up was disrupted by a series
of changes which took place between then and. the end of 1951 .see Appendix 1).
The most important. of these changes was the transfer to the east of the flight
personnel of '50 percent of the fighter units, i.e., the personnel of nine
regiments Most of the aircraft of these units were left in East Germany.
Besides this disbanding of old fighter units;, two attack regiments were trans-
ferred, from the Berlin area to 'the area of the former- Province of Saxony, which
is closer to the front.
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Mid-November 19 1 marked the bgegi ing of the reorganization of replacement
units for the fighter regiments which had been disbanded in October. Initial
observations were made in. IC then and Finow,: and by mid-December all nine regime t
were reorganized, for the most part at the old sites.
The personnel :of these new units have had ex:tensiiie flight training, but
are now being retrained for 1'iIG-l5 jet fighters. Presumably all personnel
arrived from the USSR recently. This is certainly true in the ease of the
two new units' - tatioxoi in K the,?:,. At .the- end of December, these units had
not yet been completely equipped with personnel and materiel; their pilots
were still undergoing individual training,
The reason for the rotation of flight personnel is presumed to be as follows:
The outgoing personnel had been in Germany since the end df" `the war
and were exceptionally well trainee. It is in the interest of the
Soviets to employ these personnel elsewhere (as training, instrutors,
in critical defense zones, Korea?)", The new personnel are to gain
experience,, close to. the. front, in flying the mgst up-to-date aircraft,
under the special conditions prevailing in central Europe.
mid- ecember,, a few other,, less Important, shifts took place in.East
Germany.
For the distribution of units at the end, of Lecezber 1951,, see Appendix 13..
Equ.iument of the, 24th A3 ` Army
Fighters: IIG-15
Attack aircraft: IL-10
Bombers PE-2; TLS'-2; twin ng, e jet bombers
Reconnaissance aircraft: IL-2; IL-10; FE-2; TV-2; twin-engine jet.bombers
Transport aircraft: LI-2j IL-12; C-47.
Strength of the 24th Air Amity,
Number of Aircraft
Per Unit Total
6 Fighter division staffs
18 Fighter regiments
2 Bomber division staffs
6 Bomber regiments
2 Attack division staffs
6 Attack regiments
2 Reconnaissance regiments
38
2-
684
6
transport regiment
1 Air transport squadron
e the disbanding of '50.. pereeni
of only 980 - 1, 0001.. arsws;I
234
2 lk
56 336
o
36
1,374
I the ~,"i.ghter units in October 1951,
ve been ;fu.ly: ready '.for assignment.
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Traini status combat Value
Flight training, of the units consisted for the. most part. of joint exercises
tarried out by several regiments of the sane .brash of the service) under a
joint command which issued its orders through a radio installation on. the
ground These exercises, which were observed -more. frequently in the autumn:of
1951, sometimes in conjunction with Soviet Army exercises, were later abicl cted.
with the participation of various branches of the Air Arm. The control of
entire twits by means of ground -installed radio or radar no longer geed td`
offer any difficulty. Presumably, therefore, the units of the 214th Air AVW
are in a position to carry out theirmissions to the fullest ex cnt, bathe
event of a critical :situation. It maybe sss m d with reasonable certainty
that especially the nine fighter units 'which were not affected by changes. b;ra
equal in air combat efficiency to any Western.. opponent. The nine fighter
regiment, s which have been in the proaesa. of reorganization with. new personnel
since mid-November 1951, will not be e2Weeted to attain. ,this very atief t ary
training status and .combat .value until after completion of training with
regimental units and after the 1952 autumn maneuvers j, at the earliest
lda in at (rmarty, which has been in, progress
?fi
e
5) The expansion, of aix
1948, was continued in. 1951 with the constraction.of 2'500-mete' take-off
runways at five airfield-S. Of the 25 airfields with--.permanedt runways (t'
in 19+8) two have rtuaways at least 2,00.0 metes bang.
The radar system for picking . P enemy aircraft and f`or c -ntrolling SpViet
Air Arm. =its in. the a was expa e . in. 1951. T'h mpst nota'ble, achi.eveteeft`
' wao t qr, at ion o the rte s: r b It rf th .satins near other. '
one l and 3ege1 ?sue lt The exft x a .off" . av 3 t- t'ccupi i
Gexlorw io~ nod ,e rod a rol It may be est Cm9.t that radar equip$ ,
in the western part- of the Oprim ri Democratic .Rcpt b1ic ears. c over as.far . as. tie
,Touth..r, of the The, 33 keburg and 1 anau. 3i"? r positions of radar ins all..ati
see Appendix 15.
d. The soviet Air Arm. in the Satellite Countries
i) Besides the 214th Air Army in. East Germany, the Soviet AIV Arm at present has
at its disposal the following combat, elements in Soviet-occupied. Austria ate..
in the satellite countries (ee Appendix 16):
4th Air Army in Polish-occupied. Germany
59th Air Army in Soviet-occupied Austria and-in western E y
of the 5th (1) in mania
The fighting quality and training statue of the 14th and 59th Air AX"-'- *0
eoza are unfavorably with those 'of the 214th Air Army, because of. a shortage
of modern airc-.raft. Zguipment of the bomber unity with the ouG ed TI B-2
aircraft and the lack of modern let bombers preclude the carrying out of
extensive operations beyond the scope of tactical missi one o, The fighter
units, on the other hand, are being .equipped with an m tires , .number of
the fighter
and it is reasonably certain .that :at least 50.0f
XIG~lSs,
units have been re-equipped4. It is impossible to venture e a d anclus,ive
opinion regarding the fighting quality, and training status of those parts
of the 5th Air .Arm' whieh;..&re stationed in. Runiax H.owever,, it appears more
e erluipiaecl with jet aircraft
l
so
sly that.the fighter units -there e a
3) The units of the 14th and 59th Air Army are stationed' n ma y. on airfields
which were used by the German. air force during Wrrid War IT . In the 14th Air
Army area the runways.on airfields at which fighter units are stationed (A.rieg$
Ghlau, P ottaLi) .-hav'e been lengthened.. to about r00o meters. In, addition,
units have been expanded
G
vi
t
b
.
.o
e
y
airfields which,are not now, occupied
e iasily in. the following ssareas.z
Stoip dl ,nia,44arlenburg
Bydgos ZoZ-Tor
Warsaw B.adom- ,6d. '
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Although.no Soviet units are stationed in Czechoslovakia at present, it iay
be assumed that airfields are being expanded and newly constructed, a't..teast
partially under Soviet control, with a view to the possible cozmitment..or
units of the 4th Air Army. The areas in question are the ZateePlzet t"agu
region in Bohemia and the Brno-Prerov region in Moravia.
No conai etion or reconstruction of airfields has taken place in.the Bd
Zone of Austria, in view of the possible, evacuation of that area,, fdllowiz
the conclusion of a treaty. The Strasshof (Beutseh Wagram) airfield is an
exception. For the accommodation of units of the 59th Air .Army,,. in the event
of an evacuation of Austria, numerous airfields are now .being.const eted .
Hungary. The fact that 10 airfields "witl 2,,000-meter or 2,500-meter take-off
runways have already been constructed in Hungary would seem to indicate that
Hungary is to serve as an air base in the event of.an armed conflict involving
Yugoslavia. The same interpretation must be given to the expansion of air-
fields in Rumania and. Bulgaria.
it is obvious that,, since the expansion of airfields in East Germany is more
or less complete, similar expansion will now be carried out with aceer'a"td
speed farther back in the satellite areas, in order to create a belt . of
airfields between-the Baltic and the Black Sea which will be echeloned. in
depth and projected toward the West in a broad curve.
Air Armam. nt (See also Section:B/III)
1) Postwar elc pments and present status:
After the war, the Soviet,air armament industry, unlike that of other ntrie.s,
was not deactivated, reduced,, or converted to peace--time production* On
the contrary, its efficiency was increased, both quantitatively and qualitative-?
By exploiting every possi..bility, the Soviets succeeded in improving the qu*lity
of modern engines, fighter aircraft, and light taetica:1 bombers sO that they,
are now on a par with similar aircraft of the western powers, *hile quantitative-'
the USSR*s industrial output of this equipment exceeds that of the Vest
a) F i.ghter Aircraft
To begin with, the greatest stress was placed on the development ?a,
production of serviceable fighter aircraft. At present,, probably e t.h
two thirds of all fighter units are equipped with modern jet .fighters.
With a monthly output of 800.-1,000 jet fighters, conversion is proae6dfn
Lavochkin,, and. Yakovlev) is on a par, in every respect, with that of the
most up-to-date U.S. combat types.
Maximum-, , speed
approximately 1,000 km/h
Ceiling
11,000 - 15,, 000 m
Penetration range
450 km
Modern weapons
Sighting mechanisms
One 37-mm and two 23-mm cannon
Nightflying and blind,: flying instruments
All fighter units in East Germany.have been converted to MIG-15's
(See Appendix IT. )
at a rapid pace.
The performance of jet fighter aircraft (based on designs by. Mika
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Bombers:
The development of jet propelled. fighter aircraft was succeeded by tie
development of two-, four- and six-jet bombers. Apparently, the twin-
jet bombes are now being mass-produced. The bomber units in East any
are at present being converted to this type. The performance of this type
of bomber (see Appendix 1$) correspond Ls approximately to that of the Bri? it
Canberra, according to size and aerodynamic construction.
Useful load 2 tons
Maximum speed over 800 km/h
Tactical penetration range 850 km
There are-no indications that a new-type attack aircraft, equipped for
modern aerial warfare, has been developed. Attack units are .still equipped
with IL-10 type aircraft Observations made would indicate that, following
conversion of the fighter .nits, attack aircraft units, will be eq Lipped
with jet fighter aircraft similar to those of the fighter units (aid is
customary in the air forces of western countries)..
Performance of IL-10
maximum speed
350 km/h
Penetration range
270 km
Bomb load.
400 kg
Armament:
two 23-= cannon; two 7.52-a
machine guns; one 12.7-mm machine
Pt in ;*
the objective of the soviet air armament industry to improve the
3)
performance of the MIG-15,, to make available a light bomber with a more
extensive operating radius than that of the IL-2 jet bomber.now in user
and to fill the current gap between the medium and heavy bomber types
There can be no doubt that the $oviets will improve the performance of *he
fighter aircraft and that they will make every effort to penetrate the
sonic barrier. In view of the more powerful jet engines now avvai.7abie
production of-light bombers' with improved performance should be fairly
simple. Model P-150 will meet the specifications for medium-heavy bGmnbers.
This .type will be constructed as soon as the turbocjet engine for 5,,000-1 g.
thrust is -ready for mass production. No strategic bombers-, however, a
apt to be produced within the foreseeable future.
The Air Forces of the Satellite Countries
The total strength of the various satellite air forces is as follows;
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Hungary
Bulgaria
400 combat aircraft with 8, 00o men
350
100
250
180
10,000
41000
6, 000
5,200
b) The organization of -then Air Forces can be seen in Appendix 16,
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Combat Readiness and Combat Valiie
The air forces of the satellit cauxLtries are still in the development
stage. The politically condit.ioned,,rpersofnei policy and the charateri stie
distrust of the Soviet TJniono which is giving way very slowly, have had a
distinctly unfavorable influence upon this development.
For the most part, the satellite air forces are equipped with the omtmaa
standard Soviet types o With the exception of Czechoslovakia,, none of
the.s atellites has its own aircraft industry) and they are therefore
entirely' dependent upon the USSR.
The training of pilots is based essentially on the traditional pattern.
The first retraining of satellite air force personnel in modern jet
aircraft was carried out in the 1786R in 1919. Since 1951, some of this
retraining has been taking place at the following training centers outside
the U$SR
3 ersaw: Bernerowa (Poland)
Milovice (Czechoslovakia)
Iunmadaras (Hungary)
Bucharest-Pipera (Rumania)
It can probably be assumed that the active fighter units in the
satellites will gradually be equipped with jet.aircraft during 1952.
The accelerated expansion and construction of airfields is carried
out in close collaboration with the Soviet Union., which is thereby
creating,, for its own purposes, an aerial ground organization which
covers the area between the Soviet zonestof Cer.vany and Austria and
the western regions of the Soviet Union proper.
The present .combat value of the satellite air forces is limited to
patrol, and combat missions within the respective satellite countries.
In the event of a war with Yugoslavia, however, greater significance
may attach to the fighter waits, especially to those of the Balkan
countries.
Nov
1 The soviet Navy
a. Str. `en&th and L istr ibut ion.
At present the following modern or
in service;
odernized' units of the Soviet Navy are
Battleships
Cruisers
Baltic
I
4(13)**
c Ocean
2(2)
Black Sea
3:(2)
Pacific
2(2)
Total
11(9)
Destroyers
19(5)
100)
12(2)
18
59(10)
Torpedo boats
6
3
24
Laa'e submar ine s*
24
6
30
Medium .submarines
22
16
510
119
Small submarines
43
20
35
112
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.To this total mast be added p, lar*e number of submarines of all sizes which are
either in reserve or under .0.b 8t act ion,
( ) Ships under construction.
Harbor's and PjxZort Bases
The five possible, separate naval war theaters of the USA .:- the Baltic Sea,
the Arctic Ocean,, the Pacific Ocean,, the Black Sea, ahd the Caspian Sea - require
five largely independent shiprd and replacement :organizations.. The most important one is the IeniiZgrad..-Kira tadt z ll3pbui:id.ing :industry; it aceor nts for
about 50 percent of the -total USSR capacity- and takes .ease of the Baltic fleet and
the Arctic fleet. In Leningrad, alsor are the most productive submarine yards.
The shipyards of East Germany, especially the Neptun yard. in Rostock, are relarly
used for repair work.
The Arctic Ocean coastal region has developed its own. shipbuilding industry,
centered principally in the.ports of Murmansk and Melotovsk.
In Nikelaev, on the Black Sea, there is an independent .and productive iruiurrtry
for the construction of naval vessels which,. after elimintion of exteniiv ;
14 damage caused by the war, is once again operating at full capacity, In the ._,
harbor of Sevastopol there are newly erected extensive kepair^ it otallatians
and art e l
The center of warship construction in the Far at is Komsomolsk, the
importance of which, however! is reduced because of its location (some 1t00
kilometers up the Amur River) and because of ice drifts. and: ,the formation
of sandbanks in the river.
The Caspian Sea is Joined to the Baltic Sea and to the Arctic Ocean by the
network of inland waterways. Connection with the Black Sea is "'being achieved
with the construction of the Volga: Bon Canal. The Caspian Sea' is important
not. only because of its connection with Persia but also because, with itd
favorable conditions, it is ;used for development -and experimental projects,
particularly in regard to to edoee.and mines
Personnel
The personnel strength of the Soviet Navy can be estimated at 450,000 ?500,040 men 250,000 of whom are on naval vessels. Obtaining suitable per4ion l
causes difficulties.. Therefore, mach of the personnel of tkie Soviet merchant
marine is being utilized for the Navy.
Armament Eguiamet Nevelvpment of Types
In. regard to battleships It seems- that the USt is limiting herself to those.
modernized. shipsalr'eady on hand; the existence >of the new battleship SOVIET C
SO , an eed as being in the Baltic Sea, has o. far not been confirmed.
There are no aircraft carrierg, and apparently- there are none under construction.
Only a few seaplane tenders, of small value for,. fighting, have been reported.
Nothing has become known about equipping ships ..With rockets.
The modern heavy cruisers, the eonmtruction of which~hao..been .repeatedly noted,
belong to the. "Kirov" class. In the newer models the .:ms.i . battery of three turreti
with three 18-centimeter gds each has been Increased 'tai foui turrets w The
installations, for carrying_ a it ` t aboard have been gradually removed Anti-
p nt of the ships ,nadegaat6.. (The German
e ircraft armxa e t and radar eot
'
e-. oed Only as quarters
ships L ZSW, SE DIiTZ, an 2 FF.= appaenbiy 1a
for personnel*)
The situation con eerning ?the deeat oyes i,4. more fav arable,s ' Those destroyers .s.1.ready
at .hand during the war ham been modernized and made more `s irorthy..e The new types
have greater seaworthiness-.,',,,' 7 ' in r ass `xr nent they ca1i'. be. 'classified as "high-
sea destroyers
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Torpedo boats are clearly no longer being built. Their functions have been
transferred.in part to convoy vessels and in part to the motor torpedo boats,
which have greatly increased in number.
In regard to submarines, those types known fi?om the war, which are still avail-
able in large numbers, have been modernized, principally through installation
of snorkels, The installation of new radar equipment (S-Gergt--Asdic) has been
reported. It is doubtful whether the experiments with new power plants for
greater underwater speed (conducted with the help of many German experts) have
been successful. So far, it has not been possible to determine accurately whether
the Russians have other submarines than those which fell to them from the German
Navy. On the other hand, one may assume that advanced methods of submarine
construction are being applied everywhere, and so one may count on a fairly
rapid increase in the number of submarines. There have been numerous attempts
to make submarines safe from detection when submerged; the methods used are
those on which the Germans worked unsuccessfully during the war.
There has also been a great increase in the building of small boats. In general,
these boats are of s; basic type which is equipped as minesweeper, submarine
chaser,, or patrol boat.
C last artillery has in general remained on about the same level as at the end
of the war, or has been brought up.to that level. Some rocket-launching bases
have been added, particularly along the Baltic. The experimental station at
Peenemuende is not in operation.
During the first World War, the Russians were quite successful in the develop-
ment of mines, but today there is no evidence that they are doing any serious
work along this line. At present,: the West probably possesses a definite
superiority in this field.
e. Evaluation
The USSR is a continental power. Since, however, she would in any conflict
be obliged to fight sea powers, she has faced the necessity of having a strong
fleet. Her navy is being increased; its importance was emphasized by the forma-
tion in 1950 of an independent Ministry of the Navy.
The USSR must maintain sea strength in five widely separated theaters of operation.
To the defensive operations (coastal zone security and coastal defense) must
be added the offensive ones: attacks on the numerous and extensive sea lanes
of the western powers. It is striking that the strongest part of the fleet
is stationed in the Baltic. These forces are neutralized as long as the entrances
to the Baltic and the banish islands are in the opponent's hands. Either this
area must be won immediately at the beginning of the 'War, or the sea war must
be carried out from the start by offensive units (cruisers and submarines)
based in the Arctic Ocean. The Arctic' Ocean bases (so long as northern Norway
is not occupied by enemy troops) are more favorable because of their more
protected position, because of the open sea room, and because of the depth of
the waters.
The special importance which the USSR lays on. small craft in the Baltic indicates
that the intention is to rely on landing parties operating with small boats.
The great number of small fishing boats being built-in ast; Germany could be
pressed into service, too. The geographical position (Vf the Baltic is favorable
to landings which would threaten the flanks of hostile: coastal defense troops,
or to a surprise attack on the Danish islands.
The number of small craft in the other naval theaters io, inefficient for large-
scale landing operations.
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In any evaluation of the distribution of sea forces one must remember that a
certain shifting of forces 'between naval theaters is possible, only the Black
Sea is really isolated.. As long as Turkey was not a meex` of NATO, the Black
Sea fleet had no essential duties to perform. Now the Black Sea has assumed
real strategic importance, since the western powers can carry the war there.
Accordingly, important defensive duties now fall to the Black Sea fleet. The
offensive task of the Black Sea fleet is to get control of the Bosporus and the
Dardanelles so that the fleet can penetrate the Mediterranean Sea. There it
would be able to use Albania, with the Bay of Valona and the island of Saseno
as a base, without such bases the Soviets could not conduct a sustained war in
the Mediterranean. These bases would make it possible for the submarines of
the Black Sea fleet to attack the West.'s sea lanes to the Orient. Viewed as
a whole, the naval preparations of the USSR seem uncoordinated and to some extent
caught up in an outmoded concept of the existing situation. This is, in some
measure, the result of former naval policy, of the available bases, and of technic
limitations. However, many new plans and developments are recognizable which
will tend gradually to meliorate the existing weaknesses and to strengthen the
influence of the Soviet sea power in a war.
2. The Navies of the Satellite Countries
The navies of the Boviet satellites - Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Albania'- are
negligible in comparison with the Soviet Navy; they have practically no combat value.
Nevertheless, they do have some geographical importance and can be of some use to
the Soviet Navy as reserves, particularly from the point of view of personnel.
These navies are, more or less overtly,- under Soviet control, and there are a
number of Russian personnel even in the lower ranks. The bases are permanently or
temporarily used by Soviet units and are correspondingly equipped with Soviet
materiel.
The combat units consist of:
1 Destroyer 2 Motor torpedo-boats 15 Minesweepers
3 Submarines 12 Submarine chasers
In addition there are river boats on the Vistula, Oder, and Warrthe rivers,
The main base of the combat units is Gdynia, the main practice area the Bay
of Danzig. Other naval authorities are at Swinemtinde and Kolberg. A.Russian
"8` 4 ,~ .., .,to al strength, including coastal
defense units, is estimated at a minimum of 6,000 men. All necessary shore
installations are set up at Gdynia. The naval vessels use the Danzig..shiprard
and the Elbing shipyard; the latter is at present used mostly by submarines.
b. Rumania
The combat units consist of:
2 Destroyers
2 Torpedo boats
Several special craft
These units are united under one naval and coastal command; the main base is
Constantza. The craft stationed on the I ,nube seem to be under Soviet command.
According to the peace treaty, the total strength is 5,000 men.
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c. Bulgaria
The combat units consist of;.
1 Destroyer 2 Submarine c.basers 5 Motor torpedo-boats
5 Torpedo boats 12 Patrol boats
3 Submarines 12 Minesweepers
These units are formed into a Black Sea Fleet and an Ocean Division. There is
also a Danube River Fleet. The main bases are Varna, Burgas, and Ruse on the
Danube.' According to the peace treaty, the strength is 3,500 men. The Army
determines the commitment of these naval units in time of war. Special training
courses for officers, for submarines, and for torpedo ordnance are conducted
in the USSR,
d. Albania
Albania possesses a few insignificant naval. craft. However, the Bay of Vajona
and the island of Saseno at its entrance form a geographically favorable base
which is of paramount importance to the USSR for any possible operations in
the Mediterranean. On that account the USSR has become very much interested
in Albania -- particularly since the defection of Yugoslavia, The USSR is
continuing the work, begun by the Italians, of making Saseno into a naval base.
It is not possible to state positively that Soviet naval forces are stationed
there; however, Soviet merchant vessels call frequently at the port with con:-
struction material and supplies.
Supply in East Germany
The Soviet occupation forces draw their supplies extensively,,from the occupation
zone and do not consider themselves bound by the generally recognized principles
of international law.
Supplemental supplies from the USSR include only ammunition,- special equipment,
weapons, communications and engineering equipment, and tanks., including replacement
parts. The Soviet supply organization is purely military and is similar to that
of the Germans during the last war. (See Appendix'l?j, for supply depots.) In
. rip s :e: ~atus, the supply system has been relaxed, and is now
somhng 'between a peace-time and an emergency system. At present, the mobile
supply installations are utilizing permanent installations,
At the beginning of January 1952, the location, type, and size of approximately
325 Soviet supply installations were knownri About 100 of these are under special
guard, because they are group and army installations.
Concurrently with the release of German workers at,the end of 19511, a stricter
supply system was instituted. In addition, a decentralization of the large supply
depots was begun. New ammunition and fuel depots are being set.-Up according to
military standards; i.e., camouflage, protection against fragmentation., and accessi-
bility at all times are being stressed,
2. Status of the Various Supply Categories
Supplies are obtained exclusively from the. USSR;. and are,,,within.normal limits,
The depots are well filled, so that there is an adequate stockpile of ammunition
on hand.
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b. Weapons and Materiel
Supplies are obtaci ied from the USSR. There are n f gores available on the
production of weapons in-East Germany. The suppliep in the depots are scant
and presumably can meet only current needs . There Ts a fair-sized supply of
water-crossing equipment at'KKtsehendorf.
I
Fuel Situation
The,Soviet Army requires 30,000 35,000 cubic meters of fuel per month,. or
approximately the equivalent of 40 percent of the present monthly output of
the hydrog nation plants of East Germany. In contrast to the situation in
1950, current requirements are at present being covered almost completely
by the East German output.
With the exception of rnakhorka, tea.x and buckwheat, the required r ;ti one are
drawn entirely from East Germany. At the beginning of January there was a
stockpile on hand sufficient for 25 days.
e. Clothing
The troops are entirely supplied from Eas:t?~Germany.
f . Motor hi cles
There are approximately 60,000 Soviet motor vehicles in East Germany, including
those belonging to the Soviet Control Corm. ssion. A large number of these are
American vehicles (Studebaker, Ford) and captured. German vehicles. Consequently,
a certain percentage of these vehicles must be considered: antiquated and of
limited use only.
Tank Repairs
Tank replacements come from the USSR. There are adequate tank repair shops
in East Germany where general repairs can be made and where German spare parts
can be utilized.
The quantity of supplies In the known depots is insignificant. Med~ib.l care
must be described as, inadequate from the Western point of view.
3. Evaluation
The Soviet supply organization is ready,for action, and there Is a normal store
of supplies on hand. In the event of sudden. military action, there would be no
immediate supply problems.
So far as supplies are concerned, there was no evidence of preparations for an
offensive military action as of the beginning of 1952.
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D. Transportation in East Germany
1. General: An analysis pf 1951 reports indicates that the sovietization of the East
German railroad system: is making further progress. The old. German reliability
and workmanship has had to give way to Soviet methods based on improvisation and
to a striving for unconditional fulfillment, and if possible even overfulfillment,
of theoretically calculated quotas. As a result, noteworthy achievements have
been accomplished, which, however, are limited by"thy present material shortages
and which, furthermore, were made at the expense of quality.
As a result of Sovi,et?-dismantling of approximately T,000 kilometers` of track, the
railroad network of Bast Germany has become single-track with the exception`of five
lines, and as a result its capacity has decreased considerably. The reconstruction
of double-track lines, strongly propagandized, faces a shortage of rails, ties,.,
and fastenings, No shipments of rails are forthcoming from the USSR or the eastern-
bloc countries. Because of West - East trade restrictions, shipments from the German
Federal Republic or other western countries are no longer possible, or are possible
only by illegal means on avery small scale. As a result, reconstruction of double-
track lines in East Germany must be limited to short sectors carrying heavyy' traffic.
Even here the necessary material can be obtained only by further dismantling or
by exchange with other lines (exchanging heavy rails for lighter rails), a method
so wasteful that it could have developed only out of a serious emergency. The
following lines have been dismantled or converted to lighter rails:
Dismantled; Biamark - Peulingen, Salzwedei - Bergen, Schwerin "- Rehnax Schh'nberg -
P itenitz, Grevesm1hlen - Nl tzr Neubukow - Bastorf, Haldensleben - Letzlingen,
Bleicherode - Zwinge, Pretzin Gommern - Loburg, Karow - Ro gsen , Gr. E'reutz
Lehnin,- Sch8nefeld - Mittenwalde, Golpa - Burgkemnitz, Mosel - Ortmannedorf:, Wolkenste
k`nigswalde, Grantal - Deutschneudorf, Dresden - Fossendorf, Gros6dorf - Eoh;xastein,
Petersdorf - Silberberg, and other short lines near the westefu zonal border.
Converted to lighter rails; Hagenow - Zarrentin,'Ludwigslust - DDmitz, Stendal -
Salzwedel j, and.. Radibor - Weissenberg.
Appended map No. 1 shows the railroad networks as of the end of 1951. The following
changes, brought about by the reconstruction which followed the dismantling campaign,
are noteworthy,
a. The new construction of the Berlin outer freight belt, single-track to the
east and north (l hlheide Marzahn Karow - Basdorf - Oranienburg) and double-
track to the south (Gr. Beeren Mahlow Sch8nefeld Grifnau). It serves on
the one hand to ease the load on the Berlin rail center,, and on the other hand
to create a possibility of avoiding the sectors of Berlin which are occupied
by the western powers.
b. The expansion of the Lfwenberg eustadt/posse .- Rathenow line as a main. line
to create a serviceable northwest by-pass arroundBerlin.
c. The,reconstruction of the 2o'1lptririg,; dismantled lines . Pritzwalk. Meyendorf
and Schwaan - Rostock, to impro the.connection with Baltic ports, Z"ehaenick
Templin, to improve transportation facilities to the Soviet training ground
in Templin; and Frankfurt - K 1strin=Kietz",, . to establish a direct line between
these two border points.
d. The reconstruction of the second.. track on the..:+fo11oving lines; J terbog -
Bflzig, Belzig - Wiesenbur ,. Wittenberge G stgottb.erg and Frankfurt/Oder -
Guben. The latter do nstruction.,will. not be: completed until spring 1952, because
of the difficulty in procuring rails
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e . The new' construction of a second track on the Aue ? Schwarzenber`g -_ Joharzngeorgen-
staat line, to improve transportation conditions in ,the- uranium, mining region
f. The reconstruction of the important double-track ra.3lroad-.bri es aeress the
Oder at K stria and Frankfurt. These, projects havre,been started and.v l'l be
completed during 1952.
3. The locomotive park is old and in need of repair (of. Append;ix2O for break-dawn).
It has not been possible to ascertain whether new locomotiYes are t it g built.
Particular emphasis has been placed on the conversion of norial locomotives ,;to coal-
dust locomotives. This measure was made necessary by the almgst e o1 usiv ,+t e cif,.
brown-coal briquettes,. which can be shored for only a short time and have tat
thermal value. On 30 November 1951 there were 75 such L'ocomotives. 'However, only
38 were in operating condition, indicating that a fully satisfactory''desi i!1- ,s
not yet been achieved..
4. The freight-car park shows a picture similar to that of the locomotive, park (of.
Appendix In order to alleviate the shoxage of cars the US bas declared
itself ready to return 20,00.0, formmer German freight cars which' had. bp~,teken to,,
the Soviet U iion as. booty. In connection with this it has beeti,' fo and.. that the German Democratic Republic must pay 3,000 marks for each car; that almost all the .cars
are considerably damaged and can be put in operation only after. `e S s rex.r pairs;
and that the German freight ear, with it.. smaller load capacity,, is uneoOiampal
for the Soviet broad-gauge network., This project of returning cars beg.n during
the first,part of June 1951 and was to be completed by 31 De ember 1951.. The
cars were returned via the border points K stria Kietz,Frankfurt (Oder), and Guben.
5. The coal reserves play an important part in the appraieal..of.,railroad Qperat ons,
particularly during the winter. In comparison with the previous year .-vhen;ythe
Fast German. l:eichsbahn had over 4OO,000 tons of fuel at its disposal, on 26 December
1951 only the following amounts were on hand:
95,902 tons of blabk oal-
22)401 tons ofscrude brown coal
136,655 toxis of brown-coal briquettes-
1-,750 tons of, coke
821 tons of brown-coal; dust
Total 2.57,.529 tons
This corresponds to 11.5 days of- fuel eonsumptioa. In view of the small amount
of black coal (37 percent of the total-, reserve) and the low thermal value` of the
brown coal, the fuel situation for the .winter. must hbe described as poor.
6. The Soviets use German railroad cars,;;,;aerman. locomotives, and. German personnel
for the transit traffic through -Polan&.to supply the occupation authority in East
Germany. This contradicts international practice, according to--which Poland,, as
the transit country, would supply locomo i:ves..and pers1pn:nel, for which it would
be reimbursed. There are probably, two re0 for this. deviation, from established
practice:
It reduces eacpgn es, because the German servieea are considered to be reparations
and are therefore free.
b. There is a certain distrust . .' Poltah ser .c'eps'.:,
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For these purely,Soviet assignments the German, personnel and the German locomotives
are organized into columns of 25 - 30 brigades each. Each briga e consists of. a
locomotive and a dormitory car for eleven men.. (three engineers r , three firemen,, two
conductors, two trainmen, one car foreman) . At the end of 1951- there were six
active columns, four in Frankfurt/Oder,, one in Cottbus, and one in goyerswerda.
Besides these; the locomotives of six columns deactivated in autumn 1950 are'kept
cold in operating condition at various stations as reserve (cf. Appendix '29-)!
There is also the Soviet column No. 42, which,, with German passenger locomotives,
operates the daily Soviet passenger through-train between.Berlin. arrd,.BredtLitbvsk
and the two Soviet furlough trains between Frankfurt/Oder and.BrestLitbvak,?one
of which runs daaily the other three times a week. Altogether, 370 loco oti e's.
of the best and heaviest types in the German locomotive 'park ark being add or
these purposest
23 locomotives of type 01
86
261
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ti et 50
it ft 52.
Border traffic.: Only the East German border points Seheune (Stettin),'R strip Kietz,
Fra fort/Oiler, and Guben and the corresponding transit lines through BoZansd.habeen used for Soviet purposes. The following minimum numbers of daily ains have
been agreed upon by contract among the USSR, Poland, and the German De ttocr :tic
Republic;
Soheune
nstrin-Kietz
Frankfurt (Oder)
I train in each direction
6 trains
10 trains
8 trains
With the exception of Frankfurt (Oder), actual traffic in 1951 as below these
minimum` figures.
East German uranium ore shipments from the Aue area run via Frankfurt (Oder ) w
Brest-Litovsk exclusively. During the past four months they amounted tea"en average
of .8 trains per day (on the basis of 45 loaded boxcars per ti,a:T x)
Also in use for Soviet interests i the Bad Schandau boarder .rossig, `which is
used particularly for crude oil.. shipmexits from Zistersdorf (Austria)' viia Gzeeho-
slovakia to hydrogenation plants in East Germany. Inceased, oil traffic, amounting
to a daily average of 70 - 73 tank ears,. was 'rioted from, 20 November 1951. on ('still
noted on 30 December).
Soviet control: ores and influence on the East German Ne chsbabn are extremely strong
and far exceed the usual extent of suxerv'isiom by _an occupation rower six years
after the war. Attached to each Reichsbehn d:irectora:te Is a Soviet staff of 10 -
15 officers and numerous subordinates. 'T'hi's staff receives its orders from and
reports to the transportation- departmtxeht? of the Soviet `ontr l CCammtss n.. Almost
all j .measures affecting organization, construction, and taperation 'require
prior Soviet approval and their pfrp qe, and priority are primarily determined by
Soviet needs' Party loyalty to the` MI and thus to 'the Soviets, outweighs profession,
c-oxpetenee in appointments to executive poa tionb. This fact, and an extensive
system of keyhole-spying and informing on,, even the lower officials, clerical .employees
and laborers, ensure the development of the R ichs' hn ' .ecording to the - Seviet. concept
which in many cases is contrary to German_ iaterea+s
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9. Evaluation.
Compared with We tern stsnd:ardsy the railroad situation in East C many is poor.
However, contrary to frequent assertions in the western prey's,, -the rai1roa. s do
not by any means face imminent` llapse . In their present form they can carry on
another 5 - 10 years -without any substantial aid.
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39
E. Over-All Evaluation of the Situation.
1. The important objective of all evaluative work is to find. ah answer to the question
whether and when the Soviets will attack the West.
This question can be answered. with a certain degree of assurance only by one who
examines all aspects - politics, economics y the military situaation.,-together, and
obtains a total evaluation from judgments of these individual aspects.
At the same time the evaluator must attempt to put himself in tt ,position of the
Soviet leaders . so that, in addition to the facts. he can take into cons deration,
in so far as is possible, the imponderable elements of all types, of which those
in the psychological field are of considerable importance.
Such .an estimate of the situation - viewed from the Soviet standpoint and developed
in. accordance with t h e details given in Sections A to D i y 6ppear as follows
a. The political situation of the eastern bloc is, to a .l,arge,tent,. "'balanced:"r.
The political consolidation of the countries drawn into the 'bloc since the end
of the war has been essentially successful, but it is not yet mpl te. 'A war
would interrupt this consolidation process, `and. could even lead to a partial or
complete loss of the gains. Western hopes for a collapse' of the r4gime ' in
peae-time are unfounded.
The political structure of'the West is not uniform, the,'West has not yet succeeded
in concentrating its manifold nations and peoples into a`?united, forceful defense.
The minor successes achieved in this respect-do not constitute a serious threat
for the East in the near future.
The Soviets will therefore be better able to 'serve their -19t%1. - achievement
of world. Communism under the direction of Moscow at the present time by an
intensive continuation of the "Cold War" than by 'setting~sff a Third World
War. The results achieved so far in this direction are 'satisfactory (trouble
spots in the Far and Near Fast; strong Communist parties in wester~n? Europe",
only slow progress in the unification of the West), there is no cause to doubt
that in the future too, these "`successes'" can be continued and developed.
b. In contrast to the political situation of the eastern bloc, the e ono ic situation
must be judged as "" i' . al an dlt .
Mining and production exceed the requirements of 'a long-term Var in ,ny.rogi ans,
but are still completely inadequate in other regions.
The conversion of the satellite countries to the C t iMt ist "system.,,(`?tcalle tiviza-
tion of agriculture, industrialization) is still underway; this process cannot
be definitely completed until.1955 at the earliest. Only then will a 'Centralized
exploitation of all economic factors be possible. The oceurr'ence" of a war before
this time must lead to serious disruptions of the economic structure.
in terms of mining and production, the economic position of theWest is._good,
but it suffers just as is the case with the political structure of the West
from the diversity and lack of uniformity of the economic strums etur0y which lacks
a common leadership. Herein lie the weak points, which - according to Communist
dogma -,will one day result in capitalism" s ' destroying itself (perhaps even
without a Third World War)
e. The military position is characterized by the" overwhelming 'superiority of the
mobile armed forces of the eastern bloc.
However,, the most favorable time for the ' utiliza=tion of this superior strength
was lost-; with the putbreak of the war in NOrea because since- that the
West has ,seriously begun to rearm.
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The military situation of the West shows the same characteristics as the political
and economic structure: non-uniformity and the resultant weaknesses. Although
the rearmament of the West has been started, it probably will not develop into
a serious threat for the East within the next few years.
The over-all evaluation - seen from the Western point of view - is as follows:
a. The struggle for preponderant authority in the world is at present ""uad:etermined:"
The East, which did not attack Europe when it was practicaly defenseless - from
19+5 until today - will also, in all probability, not begin a war of aggression
in the near future, that is, not in 1952 and presumably also not in 1953. The
reasons for this prediction are that the preparation of the eastern bloc for a
war economy and itspaliti:caj development are not yet ready for an offensive war,
and that the Soviet leaders can better serve their ultimate objective of world
Communism at the present time by means of the Cold War. Only if the Soviet
leaders believe that they must forestall a possible Western attack, or that
they must take advantage of a very crucial weakness on the' part of the West
(which is highly improbable), will they take the offensive. Disregarding the
latter possibility, the East will continue, in the near future, to promote
consolidation and development in all fields within its territorial domain;
and, outside of its geographic boundaries, it will fight through the medium
of diplomacy and the Cold War to approach its goal of world Communism.
b. Two. factors elude speculative evaluation:
The world situation today resembles - as it will in the future a powder keg,
which could be exploded by a spark unforeseen and unintended by either side.
The characteristic feature of a dictatorship is the fact that in the final
analysis one man makes the decisions - even though he generally is accustomec
to rely on the advice of several members of his staff It is true that up to
the present time, Stalin has proved to be ,a calculator possessed, of sober,
unimpassioned judgment; despite this, emotion may one day conquer reason, and
thereby evoke unforeseeable developments.
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