THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R01012A014100010007-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 30, 2013
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: September 22, 1959
• Content Type: NIE

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NIE 53-59 ADVCON
22 September 1959
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN
NOTE: This is an advance copy of the conclusions of this estimate
as approved by the United States Intelligence Board. The
complete text will be circulated within five days of this
issuance.
? Internal political situation:
short and long term outlooks
? Economic situation and outlook
? International position
Central Intelligence Agency
SQRET
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Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
The following intelligence organizations participated in the
preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency
and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of
State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD
on 22 September 1959. Concurring were The Director of In-
telligence and Research., Department of State; the Assistant
Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the
Director of Naval Intelligence; the Assistant Chief of Staff,
Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, The Joint
Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special
Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency.
The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB
and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
22 September 1959
SUBJECT: NIE 53-59: THE OUTLOOK FOR AFGHANISTAN
THE PROBLEM
To estimate probable developments in Afghanistan's inter-
nal affairs and international position over the next few year8.0
CONCLUSIONS
1. The prospect for political stability in Afghanistan
is relatively good for the next few years. The royal family
enjoys the support of the armed forces and its position appears
secure. Prime Minister Daud will probably continue to exert
a major influence in the country. (Paras 8-10, 13, 15-17)
2. Over the longer term, some major change in the pres-
ent political situation seems inevitable as the armed forces
become .conscious of their growing power, and as they and the
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N?.*7 kt,o)
literate;urban element are affected by Communist and other
foreign influences. (Paras. 18-19)
3. Modernization of Afghanistan's armed forces and the
improvement of its primitive economy are being achieved at the
cost of considerable dependence on the Communist Bloc. For the
foreseeable future, Afghanistan will be almost entirely depen-
dent on the USSR for support of its armed forces. The Soviets
are also in a position to use their extensive trade relation-
ships with the Afghans to put heavy economic pressure on the
country. If the USSR were to cut off this aid and trade,
Afghanistan would have difficulty even now extricating itself
under its own power, and its chances of being able to do so
will decrease as time passes. The Afghans could avoid severe
economic hardship or capitulation to Soviet demands only if
the West undertook to help meet their modest import and export
requirements. (Paras. 121 20-29)
4. The USSR will almost certainly attempt gradually to
tighten its grip on Afghanistan but will exercise care to avoid
provoking a crisis. Any move to take over control of the coun-
try would raise problems for broader Soviet strategy. Nonethe-
less, the Soviets would probably go to considerable lengths to
protect their position if it were directly challenged by the
West. (Paras. 37-38)
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5 Afghanistan's neutrality seems likely to take on an
increasingly pro-Soviet tone. Because of their pique at the
US and reluctance to antagonize the USSR, the Afghans will prob
ably continue to support the Soviet position on issues which
they do not believe to be of direct interest to Afghanistan.
We believe, however that Daud and his associates still con-
sider the preservation of their country's independence to be
the primary objective of their polity and that for some time
to Come at least they would resist any Soviet effort to infringe,
on their sovereignty. (Para. 36)
6. In View of the increased hostility between Pakistan
and Afghanistan since the advent of the new military regime in
Karachi, settlement of the Pushtoonistan dispute or any major
improvement in relations between the two countries is improbable
over the next few years. Sporadic violence in the border area
is possible but is unlikely to lead to large-scale hostilities
or to closure of the border. (Paras. 31-32)
7. The Afghan regime resents US support for Pakistan and
considers the US aid program in Afghanistan to be limited and
slow-moving. However, it will continue to welcome ties with
the US as a counter to expanding relations with the Bloc and
probably hopes that the US would bail Afghanistan out if the
Soviet Union began to apply economic pressure. (Paras. 39,-41)
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