ASSESSMENT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN ZAIRE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97S00289R000100170007-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 17, 1977
• Content Type: MEMO

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17 March 1977
Memorandum for: Mr. Thomas Thorne, INR
From: NIO/AF
Subject: Assessment of Developments in Zaire
1. Please find attached the assessment you re-
quested regarding short-term developments around the
Zaire problem. As you know, the paper is the product
of an informal working group composed of interested
experts from the NFIB agencies, but has not been coor-
dinated formally within any of the departments and
agencies nor by NFIB.
2. I know you will join me in thanking all the
participants in the working group for turning to with
a very short deadline and on very short notice. I hope
the effort proves helpful to the Department.
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MEMORANDUM 17 March 1977
ZAIRE: THE POLITICAL AND MILITARY SITUATION--
AN INTERAGENCY ASSESSMENT
I. The Military Situation
1. The invasion of Shaba Province has the ap-
pearance of a well-planned, professionally executed
operation. The intentions of the invading Katangans
appear to be, at a minimum, to enlist the support
of sympathetic inhabitants in Shaba Province in an
effort to occupy and sever a significant portion of
the region from Zairian control, or failing that,
to be in a position to carry on a prolonged insur-
gency. If the invaders reach Lubumbashi, the pro-
vincial capital, they would be in a good position
to set up a political organization and announce
secession.
2. A broader aim of the invaders may involve
a phased campaign to topple Mobutu. Information
received early this month indicates that the actual
Katanga attack plan involved a two-pronged attack
against Zaire by Katangan forces in northern as well
as eastern Angola. Details of this attack plan are
widely known in Kinshasa and Brussels, indicating
it has probably been developed over a long period.
The current thrust of the invasion in Shaba Province
appears to be following part of the reported attack
plan. Unconfirmed reporting indicates that some
activity may be taking place across the northern
Angolan border. Activity in this area could serve
as a secondary attack, designed to tie down Zairian
troops, or it could actually be a major route of
advance as outlined in the reported "attack plan."
Recent unusual military activity has been reported
at various locations in Angola: Texiera de Sousa,
Luso, Henrique de Carvalho, San Antonio do Zaire,
San Salvador. It is impossible to determine whether
this activity is related to possible action from
Angola against Zaire or is in preparation for ex-
pected new offensives against Angolan insurgents.
It could be both.
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3. The ex-Katangan gendarmes, based in Angola
for more than ten years, are a highly disciplined,
well trained fighting force which performed very
effectively on the side of the MPLA during the
Angolan war. The total force may number over 4,000
personnel, and includes older veterans as well as
younger personnel. These gendarmes have been trained
over the years by Belgian, Portuguese, and now Cuban
advisers. In Shaba Province there may be about 2,000
Katangan troops. These gendarmes appear to be well
equipped, and may be operating with Soviet-supplied
armored cars and multiple-tube rocket launchers.
White advisory personnel reportedly have been seen
with the Katangan troops in Shaba Province. We do
not know the extent of their logistical support;
so far, they seem well-supplied.
4. The effectiveness of the Zairian forces is
limited. Their chief shortcomings include marginal
leadership, lack of discipline, poor training, high
desertion rate, weak logistics and communications
capabilities, and corruption. The Zairian armed
forces are probably unable to operate above company
level as a cohesive military unit. Moreover, Zairian
forces are severely hampered by shortages of opera-
tional aircraft, petroleum, spare parts, ammunition,
and other basic military supplies. It is unlikely
that Zairian forces could offer significant resis-
tance to the attacking force, at least at the present
time.
5. Mobutu clearly intends to defend against the
invading force, not only to recover Zaire's territorial
integrity, but also to preserve his position as head
of state. However, he has to move carefully, con-
sidering the low level of effectiveness and loyalty
of his military forces. Furthermore, he must retain
a capability to defend the capital and areas of the
country other than Shaba. He will probably seek to
shore up the short-term capabilities of his forces
by requesting further assistance from Western sources;
unless he were to receive pilots or tactical ground
forces advisers, however, this assistance will not
be fully effective.
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II. Political Impact in Zaire
6. The attack in Shaba Province is likely at the
least to increase political uncertainty in Zaire.
Much will depend on how far and how fast the attacking
forces move. Shaba Province, with its rich mineral
deposits, is the heart of the country's economy.
Its loss would leave the country virtually bankrupt.
This, in turn, would almost certainly lead to in-
creased resentment and agitation against Mobutu.
Indeed, Mobutu's maladministration and the excesses
of his regime, particularly by the military, have al-
ready alienated numbers of Zairians. At the same time,
however, Mobutu has been adept, albeit ruthless, in
suppressing opposition and eliminating potential
challengers. We do not expect him to be overthrown
in the next month, unless there is an invasion of
the capital area, but the fall of Shaba would make
his position precarious.
7. As matters now stand, the attack is likely
to deepen countercurrents already present within the
country's elite. The precedent of the attack and
the government's apparent inability to counter it
have probably resulted in further loss of confidence
in Mobutu. But there is also a consciousness that
there is no very appealing alternative who would be
any more able than Mobutu to keep the country to-
gether and cope with its problems. There is a fear
that without Mobutu the country could be plunged into
total chaos. Finally, although there are no indica-
tions that the attack has had the galvanizing effect
of rallying the population to Mobutu, this could
emerge, at least in the short term, particularly if
the Zairian military were able to mount some ef-
fective counteraction.
8. Existing and potential opposition groups in
the provinces will no doubt be encouraged by the
precedent set by the Katangan move. We do not
know what contacts may exist between such groups and
the Katangans, but we expect that feelers will be
extended, if they have not already occurred. Over
the next month or so, however, it is unlikely that
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any other dissident or separatist groups will be more
than an irritant to the Zairian government, although
the threat of their becoming active might tie down
some of Zaire's military forces.
9. The key to the political situation is the
Zairian military. They are the ultimate arbiters of
power. Mobutu has long recognized this and has given
the military preferential treatment. Maintaining
their privileged status and perquisites is a prime
consideration among both officers and men. If they
felt that Mobutu was losing control of the situation
and that their position might be threatened in the
process, they might become inclined to move against
him. The situation has not yet reached this point
and probably will not in the immediate future. If
the military were to suffer major reversals, the
possibility of a military move against Mobutu would
increase.
10. Should Mobutu be ousted by the military,
he would probably be replaced by a collegium of
leaders, none of them outstanding figures. The
military would be the driving force in such a col-
legium, but there would also probably be a sprinkling
of civilian politicians and governmental technocrats.
Whatever the initial atmospherics surrounding their
taking control, such a group would have little prospect
of coping any more effectively than Mobutu has with
the country's problems.
III. Diplomatic Initiatives
11. Zairian diplomatic initiatives (or initiatives
by other friendly states) aimed at building support for
Kinshasa and a backlash against the Angolans will proba-
bly have mixed results in the short term. Mobutu has
a good many enemies and detractors in Africa who are
likely to react--at least initially--that he has gotten
what he deserved for meddling in Angola. Some of the
"progressive" regimes would probably be just as happy
to see Mobutu go down, or suffer a setback.
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12. Furthermore, many African capitals are proba-
bly not yet deeply engaged in the situation and are
waiting to see how events on the ground develop. In
the initial stages at least, those African countries
that would feel most strongly about the situation--
moderate governments who fear the Soviet-Cuban role
in Angola--are likely to be those that are least
influential in Luanda.
13. On balance, the impact of Zairian diplomatic
initiatives will probably be limited in the short term.
These initiatives might, however, lay the groundwork
for stronger diplomatic support in a longer time frame,
when the problem may have made a greater impact in Africa.
The Zairians have a good case to argue--anything smacking
of regional separatism and foreign intervention is
anathema to African governments, and many states
(probably including some that are not hostile to
Luanda) are uneasy about the Cuban potential.
14. In terms of possible influence in Luanda, key
African countries would include Nigeria and the front-
line countries. None of these are particularly friendly
to Mobutu but all (except possible Mozambique) are
leery of foreign intervention. Nigeria is sensitive
to its perceived responsibilities to exercise leader-
ship in Africa, is strongly opposed to secessionist
movements, probably has some influence with Neto,
and probably would be willing at some point to make
an effort to mediate between Mobutu and Neto. We
suspect, however, that Neto is not easily embarrassed,
and that it would take a good deal of pressure on him
to make him give up the Shaba enterprise. We believe
that Neto's purpose here is serious, and that he likely
has objectives beyond mere harassment of Mobutu.
15. US or other representations to the Soviet
Union and Cuba probably would not produce concrete
results. Both countries have resisted all pressures
to date concerning their role in Angola. It is doubt-
ful that Angola could continue to sponsor the in-
vasion of Zaire without Soviet and Cuban support.
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16. At present, the Western European countries
are taking a somewhat detached view of
situation.
The emergence of strong European support for Mobutu
would probably depend on the degree of US commitment
to Kinshasa and on our making it clear to the Europeans
that we regarded support of Zaire as an important
issue for ourselves as well as for the Western
countries.
17. This assessment reflects the preliminary views
of the Intelligence Community. It has been coordinated
at the working level but because of the pressure of
time, has not been reviewed by the NFIB principals.
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