LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY: A STATUS REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T00498R000700080002-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Director of Top Secret
Central
Intelligence
CASTER FILE COPY
'CH ''. 1
I EI O
A Status Report
Libyan Terrorist Activity:
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NI 11A 87-10
April l 987
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N1 I I A 87-10004C
LIBYAN TERRORIST ACTIVITY:
A STATUS REPORT
Information available as of 22 March 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Assessment.
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SCOPE NOTE
of current Libyan activities.
This Interagency Intelligence Assessment provides an overview of
Libyan terrorist activities between September 1986 and late March
1987, with emphasis on the last two months. The paper focuses on the
primary targets for Libyan terrorism, Qadhafi's motivations, and the
current capabilities of Libyan terrorist networks. The assessment also
addresses, but not in depth, Libya's relationship with Syria and Iran on
terrorism issues. It principally is intended to provide a concise overview
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 KEY JUDGMENTS
Libyan terrorist activity-primarily planning and positioning of
assets-has resumed in recent months, traceable in the short term to real
or perceived pressures from the Libyan exile opposition, supported by
allegations in the international media of US plots against Qadhafi and
by the US and French support for the Habre regime in Chad. Although
intelligence on Libyan terrorism is traditionally fragmentary, some
reports of recent Libyan operational activities-probably terrorist relat-
ed-have been confirmed
In the short term, we believe the Libyan threat can be encapsulat-
ed as follows:
- Increased discontent at home, coupled with increasing rumors
that exiles are plotting to overthrow him, have induced Qadhafi
to focus terrorist activity on the Libyan opposition abroad.
- Nevertheless, Libyan intelligence officers have been preparing
plans against French targets worldwide, and, to a lesser extent,
US targets.
- Qadhafi is likely to activate his anti-French plans in response to
his defeat in Chad.
- Although Qadhafi's desire to avenge the US 15 April 1986
airstrike on Libya could persuade him to support attacks on US
and British interests, even in the absence of increased Western
pressure, he is more likely to lash out if pressured.
- In Latin America and Africa, Qadhafi is continuing efforts to
enlist radical and leftist groups to attack US and French
interests.
- Libya is most likely to try to draw on the resources and talents
of client groups to conduct anti-Western-especially anti-US-
terrorist operations abroad.
- Qadhafi's eagerness to pursue sustained terrorist action far
exceeds his capabilities to do so. Libyan terrorist operatives are
limited in number and relatively unprofessional. There is,
however, a small cadre of competent operatives who can draw
on a number of Libyan assets broad to support their operations.
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While the airstrike last year has made Qadhafi analyze his tactics
more carefully, we believe he remains committed to the use of
terrorism as an instrument of policy and is unlikely to abandon it.
Lacking the military ability to confront enemies such as the United
States and France openly, Qadhafi will continue to justify terrorism as
an alternate form of warfare.
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