PRELIMINARY VIEWS ON THE ARGENTINE NATIONAL ELECTIONS*

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 8, 2013
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: February 25, 1958
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
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CEN1-RA4 /11?ELLIGENCE AGENCY
25 February 1958
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR -OF bENTRAt INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: Preliminary Views on the Argentine National Elections*
1. Arturo Frondizi, candidate of the Intransigent Radical
Civic Union, appears to have won a landslide victory in last
Sunday's free elections. According to unofficial returns, he is
assured of about 319 of the 466 seats in the electoral college.
This far exceeds pre-election forecasts. Election returns for
the Chamber of Deputies and the provincial governors and legis-
latures are still incomplete, but it appears that the victory
of Frondizils followers was comparable in these offices.
The
provincial legislatures so elected will choose the national
senators not later than 31 March. The inauguration of the new
president is scheduled for I May.
2. The clear mandate for Frondizi coupled with the pro-
visional regime's long-standing determination to transfer power
to an elected government considerably reduces the likelihood of
* This memorandum has been discussed with OCT at the working
level.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
a coup despite the military's distrust of the left-wing Frondizi.
"Quedantista" elements -- 4 military and civilian minority de-
siring to prevent a return to constitutional normalcy -- believe
that the election of Frondizi is jtstification for a coup. How-
ever, they probably still lack the military support necessary for
such an effort; they would face opposition from the provisi6nal
regime, many parties, the press, and the public. Frondizi is likely
to have reassured the military of his good intentions, and the
majority of the military are probably disposed to "wait and see"
how he performs in office. On the other hand, should Frondizi
show a disposition to permit Peronistas or Communists to exercise
a major influence in his administration in return for their
electoral support, the military probably would attempt a coup --
either before or after the inauguration. A military venture against
a clear-cut resurgence of Peronism would enjoy at least some popular
support.
3. Even if there is no attempt to upset the results of the
election, the prospect is for a period of uncertainty and instability.
The new president will inherit a host of formidable economic and
political problems. The spectre of Peronist and even some
Communist influence will lead to unrest, and to plotting among
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totes.z
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0
conservative military military groups. At the same time, should Frondizi
be unable to mollify his conglomeration of extremist supporters,
he also will face troublesome subversive opposition. Despite any
pre-election understanding with Peronistas, we believe that
Frondizi as the next president will consider it politically in-
expedient to permit Peron or the Peronista organization to obtain
any position of power.
4. Frondizi is not considered particularly friendly toward
the US; he esiourao traditional Radical Party statist and iso-
lationist policies which inhibit foreign private investment in
oil and natural resources. However, his behavior in the presidency
will of necessity be condioned by the countryts deteriorating
economic situation, including the need for large-scale credits to
rehabilitate basic industries and to refinance the foreign debt.
FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES:
SHERMAN KENT
Assistant Director
National Estimates
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/07/08: CIA-RDP79R00904A000400020017-0