DCI TALKING POINTS SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 37-89 AFGHANISTAN: THE WAR IN PERSPECTIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP94T00885R000100230009-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 27, 2014
• Sequence Number: 9
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/27: CIA-RDP94T00885R000100230009-5 25X1
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DCI TALKING POINTS
SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE 37-89
Afghanistan: The War In Perspective
This Estimate updates SNIE 11/37-88: USSR: Withdrawal From
Afghanistan, published March 1988. The current Estimate assesses
developments in Afghanistan over the next 12 months. The Estimate
was initiated by the National Intelligence Officer for Near East and
South Asia in preparation for the US-Soviet Malta Summit in early
December.
o The Kabul regime is unpopular, factionalized and dependent
on Soviet support, but probably will remain in power over
the next 12 months.
o This war is best understood as an insurgency, not in any
sense a conventional conflict.
? Resistance infighting and the limited appeal of the Afghan
Interim Government will continue to prevent the resistance
from forging an effective political instrument.
o A unilateral US cutoff of support would alter the military
balance in favor of the regime and give it the upper hand
in dictating political arrangements. A mutual cutoff by
the US and USSR (negative symmetry) would ultimately be
more damaging to the regime.
? The Soviets will continue to search for a political
settlement while providing support to Kabul. Pakistan will
support the resistance regardless of the government seated
in Islamabad.
o The NIO will give you additional details.
BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR THE DCI'S USE ONLY
Intelligence Community Representatives completed coordination on
the captioned Estimate the evening of 17 November. Although
coordination was lengthy and intense, we anticipate no problems at
NFIB.
We had two dissenting CIA footnotes. One concerns the tendency
among some resistance commanders to reach local accommodations with
regime commanders--and, of course, the subsequent effect on the
conflict. Most analysts fear an increasing trend of
accommodations. CIA, in its footnote, believes accommodations are
inconsequential and may, in any event, be transitory. The second
footnote, in effect, claims the one-year time frame of the analysis
is moot since the more important results will likely occur beyond
the scope of this Estimate.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2014/03/27: CIA-RDP94T00885R000100230009-5