TEN-METER RESOLUTION ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R001701640033-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: August 24, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/04/03: CIA-RDP92B00181 R001701640033-6
DRAFT:JAB:24Aug87
cmx5/270/115
TEN-METER RESOLUTION ISSUE
A. IDENTIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ISSUE
Current national space policy includes a 10-meter resolution limit as a
baseline for commercial imaging satellites. NSDD-42, issued on 4 July 1982,
spells out this constraint in the following words:
Civil Earth-imaging from space, at resolutions at or better than ten
meters, will be permitted under controls and when such needs are justified
and assessed in relation to civil benefits, national security, and foreign
policy." 0
An interagency group under D/ICS/COMIREX aegis has examined the changes in
the worldwide scene relative to civil remote sensing from space since the
10-meter baseline was established and concluded that the rationale for the
10-meter rule is no longer valid. In fact, the retention of this obsolete
figure is now counter-productive to the national space policy objective of
maintaining US technological leadership. Therefore the 10-meter constraint
should be relaxed, or preferably completely eliminated. F-1
Background
The 10-meter rule as national policy dates back to 1978; prior to that
time it had been 20 meters. The 10-meter figure was established after
considering various contemporary foreign relations, technological, and other
national security concerns and factors, the highlights of which can be
summarized as follows.
A major foreign relations consideration was to allay the concerns of
foreign countries about the unrestricted dissemination of high resolution US
LANDSAT satellite imagery that would reveal details of their territory
important to their economy or national security. In international forums
these concerns were resulting in efforts to impose restrictions on the LANDSAT
program operations. Among the less developed countries economic concerns were
the dominant factors. It was feared that the US LANDSAT system would permit
the United States and other major developed countries to unilaterally collect
and unfairly exploit information about their minerals and other resources. The
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries were concerned about the threat
that unrestricted dissemination of high resolution satellite imagery would
pose to the secrecy surrounding their military forces. They reluctantly
accepted the capabilities of the US classified reconnaissance satellite
program as long as its products were not declassified and openly distributed;
however, they were concerned about other countries getting similar information
from unclassified satellites. In 1977 the Soviet Union position was that only
civil satellite imagery poorer than 50 meters should be disseminated without
restrictions. Better resolution imagery would require the consent of the
imaged country before being released to any other country.
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The 10-meter limit also provided considerable technological latitude for
improving the resolution of the US unclassified civil satellite program. At
that time the US LANDSAT program, with its 80-meter sensor, had a monopoly in
providing the world with unclassified satellite imagery. To maintain the
undisputed US technological lead in civil imaging systems from space, national
space policy provided ample room for resolution increases. A 10-meter
resolution was estimated to be around the level where significant intelligence
about military installations and deployments would begin to surface.
Current Situation
The national space policy considerations, objectives, and concerns
relevant to civil satellite imaging summarized above have been overtaken by
events. The following points characterize the current situation.
o The ability to build and launch satellite systems that image the
earth from space is no longer the exclusive domain of the United
States and the Soviet Union. A number of foreign countries have
operated or are planning to operate their own imaging systems.
o Both the existing 30-meter LANDSAT and the 10- and 20-meter French
SPOT capabilities are based upon older technology. Technology
available to all interested foreign countries permits development of
imaging systems from space with resolutions considerably better than
10 meters. Further improvements in imaging capabilities by French,
Japanese, Canadian, and European Space Agency systems are planned for
the near future. These improvements will include better spatial
resolution for photo systems and lower resolution day-night
all-weather radar capabilities.
o The fact of higher-resolution imaging from space is now accepted
worldwide. Foreign reactions to satellite imaging at higher
resolutions have been tested by the 30-meter LANDSAT resolution since
1984 and the 10- and 20-meter resolutions of the French SPOT system
since 1986. Despite the high visibility that the imagery from these
systems have achieved, which included major Soviet installations that
have never been seen in unclasssified media, no significant negative
reactions have surfaced.
o The USSR has just announced its own program to sell 6-meter
resolution satellite photographs of individual countries. The Soviet
program may become a primary source for worldwide sales of good
quality satellite photographic coverage, earning them foreign
currency, prestige, and additional influence in many countries, and
in addition, developing bilateral relationship t could facilitate
Soviet collection of basic intelligence data.
Q
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o As satellite imaging systems have become more sophisticated, the
ability of nations to protect important military and economic
security information from satellite systems has inevitably declined.
This trend is less disadvantageous to open societies such as the US
where national security thresholds are inevitably low, while working
to the detriment of closed societies, such as the USSR, where
national security thresholds are high.
o Applying the 10-meter constraint to any US licensee of a private
sector satellite imaging system would make the US system unable to
compete effectively against the aggressive foreign competition. Thus
this constraint would be counter-productive to the US national space
policy objective of maintaining (or more accurately, attempting to
regain some) technological leadership in space remote sensing
matters.
The 10-meter limit was never conceived as a hard and fast barrier. It.was
a limit judged to be reasonable at a particular point in time. In formulating
NSDD-42, it was specifically recognized that changing circumstances could make
it necessary to revise this 10-meter criterion, as the following text
indicates:
"Civil remote sensing system constraints on spatial resolution,
timeliness, spectral resolution, substantive content, or other appropriate
parameters will be periodically reviewed to fete mine when policy
constraints should be revised or imposed."
The D/ICS-COMIREX-sponsored interagency group has reviewed the current
situation and recommends revision, or preferably elimination, of the 10-meter
constraint.
B. ALTERNATIVE POLICY OPTIONS
Four policy options are available. The arguments for and against each of
these options are outlined below. None of these options have any direct
budget impacts.
Option A: Retaining the present language of the NSDD-42 provision.
PRO :
o Current policy does not restrict development of systems with better
than 10-meter resolution.
o Provides a specific figure that facilitates the approval or rejection
of licenses. Provides an intelligence supported baseline. The
criterion could not be deemed capricious because it is a long
standing Presidential policy.
o National policymakers maintain maximum control. Decision-making on
potential exceptions remains at the National Security Council level.
SECRET
0
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o The 10-meter criterion has been completely overcome by events on the
international scene of civil satellite imaging. At the very least,
the 10-meter criterion needs to be lowered.
option B: Dropping the 10-meter spatial limit to a specific lower figure
such as 5 or 3 meters.
PRO:
o Provides a specific figure that facilitates the approval or rejection
of licenses.
o National policymakers maintain maximum control. Decision-making on
potential exceptions'remains at the National Security Council level.
CON:
o Technology is changing so rapidly that any resolution figure is
arbitrary, difficult to obtain consensus on, and will probably become
obsolete quickly.
o A resolution limit that is fixed at too poor a resolution level would
CON:
tend to hinder potential US operators from being competitive with
foreian systems.
OPTION C: Adopting a "sliding rule" approach whereby the permitted
resolution would be relaxed to a level competitive with foreign
civil satellite imaging systems.
PROS:
o From a national security viewpoint the 10 meter level represents a
particularly pertinent threshold for beginning to detect deployments
of major military combat forces. Whether that level is breached
specifically at 8, 6, or 4 meters is not as significant except for
being able to differentiate specific categories of military
equipment, e.g., one type of tank, artillery piece, or aircraft from
another.
Q
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o Permits US operators to be competitive with foreign operators because
adjustments on the resolution figure will invariably be in direction
of better resolution.
o More flexible than Options A or B in that it would not require
continuing evaluation at the National Security Council level.
o Would probably be practical and reasonable for several years.
CONS:
0 Would require additional effort on part of licensing authority to
monitor and assess the details of evolving technology, most of which
are not significant from an overall national and international
perspective.
OPTION D: Complete elimination of any spatial resolution.
PRO:
o +laximizes potential for achieving national space policy objective of
demonstrating US technological excellence. The context of an
unclassified civil satellite remote sensing program is especially
desirable for maximum impact on world opinion.
o Provides maximum flexibility and opportunity for US potential
operators to compete with foreign operated systems. Superior US
systems will probably result in US retaining greater share of
value-added activities, to the benefit of US economy.
o Resolution will be determined by market mechanism. Cost-benefit
ratio considerations will tend to limit actual resolution -- probably
to the 3 to 5 meter range.
o Completely eliminates any need for establishing
administrative/bureaucratic mechanism to evaluate evolving technology.
o Given the ongoing increasingly extensive operations of foreign
unclassified systems such as SPOT and classified systems such as the
Soviet satellites, national security concerns about US and Allied
military forces and installations will need to be protected by
concealment measures rather than by unilateral constraints on only US
operated systems
o Ad hoc restraints/constraints on timeliness of imagery collection and
timeliness of disseminating data are more critical than constraints
on resolution.
CONS
o Surrenders all control with reference to resolution limits.
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SECRET (S,)
C. RECOMMENDED LANGUAGE:
Option D. Language to replace VII. b. and c. of INTER-SECTOR
RESPONSIBILITIES Section as follows:
Civil Earth-imaging from space, at resolutions competitive or superior
to foreign-operated civil systems, will be encouraged. Constraints on
substantive content, geographic areas, or other appropriate parameters will be
minimized. The imposition of such constraints will e the decision of
the Secretary of Defense or the Secretary of State.
ALSO THE ABOVE REVISED PROVISION SHOULD BE MOVED FROM THE "INTER-SECTOR
RESPONSIBILITIES" SECTION TO THE "CIVIL SPACE POLICY" SECTION.
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