COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTERS IN THE SOVIET UNION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP92B00181R000300270034-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 22, 2013
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: December 1, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B001818000300270034-2
the Soviet Union ~?E~~a
and Computers in
~;ommunications
S
The Soviet Union is moving
to an integrated nationwide
telephone system that AT&T at its
peak would have envied, and the
Soviets appear to be succeeding in
their ambitious plan. At the same
time, they are having serious problems
in developing computer systems at a
level comparable to those in the West.
By Dr. Ivan Selin
everal years ago, the Soviets decided to end the prolifera-
tion of special-use local and long distance communications
circuits, many of which were being developed indepen-
dently by various ministries and institutions. Instead, they
decided to develop a single, all-encompassing. centrally
planned and managed telecommunications system.
When completed, this system will make extensive use of
conventional cable, but most of the expansion will be
based on satellite communication channels for all-digital,
high data rate communications between cities and other
major nodes, supplemented by fiber optics within cities
and heavily built-up regions. The system will use major
digital, computer controlled switching centers and, for the
most part, will soften the distinction between military and
civilian circuits. A high degree of encryption and security
can be expected for a significant portion of the traffic.
Attempts will be made to standardize modulation tech-
niques and devices. Eastern Europe is expected to be
integrated fully into this system.
This is a massive project and a great consumer of
resources. It is possible, given the hard choices facing the
Soviet economy, that at some point Soviet planners will
stretch out funding of the telecommunications system. But
if they do not, progress to date suggests that it will be
completed before the turn of the century.
Current Soviet Telecommunications
The current Soviet transmission network consists of
cables carrying analog signals over long distances, heavily
supplemented by microwaves carrying less secure digi-
tized signals and by communications satellites. There is a
trend toward digitized signals on the copper cable as well.
Shorter haul communications also are primarily via copper
cable canying analog signals, but the systems make
generous use of fiber optic cables for high capacity, short
haul digital transmission. Soviet international communica-
tions rely heavily on microwave and communications
satellites.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B001818000300270034-2
 ~.
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/04/23 :CIA-RDP92B001818000300270034-2
The architecture of the Soviet civilian system follows
international standards. It has a single irnernational gate-
way at Moscow and a standard hierarchy consisting of
bleb level distracts, each of which connects to a number of
secondary centers, which are connected to many low level
centers. There appear io be about l~ district centers, each
of which is connected to the international gateway and to
all of the other distract centers by U-unk lines. Each
secondary center within a district is connected upward
only to its own district center and can communicate only
"~ith other centers within the distract.
Thus the Soviet telephone system is interconnected in a
mesh network. The telephone systems of the Eastern
European countries are integrated into this system, using
the same types of equipment, the same architecture and
basically the same numbering systems. The adherence io
international architectw-e and signaling standards is a key
feature of the Soviet system. It permits the Soviets to
upgrade their telephone network ~ is standard Western
commercial equipment.
Most telephone systems outside of the United States
use periodic pulse metering to monitor and determine
charges for toll calls. Although this is inexpensive. it does
not determine the called number. nor does it prixluce
records of individual calls.
.~ more costly system is called centralized automatic
mess~rge accounting (CAMA). CAMA identifies individual
calls, including the calling and called numbers. The Soviets
decided to invest in CAMA in the 1950x, perhaps to
achieve the level of accountability and counterintelligence
that CAMA provides.
The use of CAMA has a interestine side effect, relevant
to the military use of the civilian s~stertt. Since calling
subscribers are identified, they can be segregated into
classes. "I~his feature allows subscraber classes to be as-
si~~ned discrete priorities. In particular, it enables military
subscribers to be identified and given override privileges, a
Soviet prcreyuisite for joint military civilian use of a single
inte~~rnted tcleconuttuniartiuns neh~ork.
Military Implications
Nut much is known about how the Soviet rl9inisir}~ of
Defense uses the Ministry of Communications public
network, but an informed euess can be made based on
technology and defense requirement;.
The public network is well-depk?>~ed geographically to
meet military needs, The high level disU-ict centers use
relatively mtxicrn computer controlled elecU~onic technol-
ogy. The geo~~t~aphy of these centers lines up well with the
Soviet military districts and group: of forces and with
Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile (1CBM)complexes.
The automatic subscriber identification feature of the
CAMA accounting system allows high prioraty users to be
identified and facilitates military preemption of channels
when required.
These featw-es combine to make the first level of the
public network an appropriate vehicle for long-haul mili-
tan- communications rn the Soviet Union. The extensive
use of cable fur this network pre vents intercepts of
telecommunications traffic. The Ministry of Defense prob-
ably relics on the public network for long-haul nontactical
communications. This common network most likely is
supplemented by dedicated. survivable circuits for kmg-
haul tactical use (for example, control for ICBM launches)
and shore-haul military communications within a district
via dedicated military circuits.
So~~et "Trends and Prospects
This ovcrs~iew of Soviet telecommunications shows a
country with a clear idea of what it wishes to achieve in
telephony. The Soviet Union has made a number of basic
technical and managerial decisions consistent with its
objectives and has chosen a technical approach tak
advantage of its penchant for large prc~jecis of relativ
straightforward technology (brute force approach).
communications. While the underlying telecommuni
Lions network will be digital, obliterating distinctions
tween voice and data as far as transmission is concern
problems of local interconnections among processors
main to be solved. There is no provision for maintenan
and multiple access to common data bases, and protocti'
for computer-IO-computer communications are lacking,
1-he West has tried to set standards for local a
networks and for teleprocessing. The efforts failed, in p
because of the variety of users and applications to
served and in pare because of the high rate of change
these areas. Instead, the West has learned to rely
Soviet Union, with its rigidities; its propensity to centrali
development as well as decision making: its abhon~ence
the inefficiency of uncoordinated, competitive, small-team
research; and its tradition of ignoring the wishes of th
users.
In short, the Soviet Union probably will achieve its plai7
for an integrated, centralized, mostly digital telephon
network by the end of the century. However, it is rtiuctj
less likely to achieve the other, potentially aitical benefits
of such a network, either in distributed processing for
enterprises or in bringing computatianal and data capabili
tics to the many organizations and individuals who could
benefit by them.
Soviet Computers
Soviet telecommunications indicates that the Soviets do
well where they benefit from economics of scale and
cenualiz