SOVIET MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND MILITARY SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91T00498R000600120002-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/05: CIA-RDP91T00498R000600120002-2
Director of
Central
Intelligence
s
Soviet Management of Technology and
Military Systems Development
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
NI IIM 87-10018
December 1987
c 0839
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Warning Notice
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(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
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Contractor/ Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
ORCON- Dissemination and Extraction of Information
Controlled by Originator
This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
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NI I I M 87-10018
SOVIET MANAGEMENT OF TECHNOLOGY AND
MILITARY SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT~~
Information available as of 23 July 1987 was used
in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved
for publication by the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Board.
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CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................................
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .......................................................................... 1
DISCUSSION .................................................................................... 7
Overview ........................................................................................... 7
Overview of the Soviet Military Acquisition Process ..................... 7
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Soviet military research and development capabilities and prac-
tices can produce systems competitive with both existing and future US
military systems, even though they lag the West in many important
technologies. The way the Soviets conduct R&D poses multiple threats
for long-range US weapon and technology planning, despite the gains in
system performance the United States expects to make by applying
technologies in which we lead the USSR:
- The Soviets have established a large, varied infrastructure that
provides the foundation for the frequent, evolutionary improve-
ments to operational military systems and has produced steadily
improved military capabilities in the field. We are confident
that this will continue at least through the end of the century.
- Military requirements drive Soviet research and development
activities to a large extent.
- Within the last decade, we have noted the introduction of
several new management approaches to technology develop-
ment that seek to further integrate research, design, and
production of systems to reduce longstanding problems in
transitioning from technology development to production in the
Soviet Union.
proved systems.
Soviet leaders recognize that technology plays a major role in
determining the USSR's future military weapon and space capabilities.
We now know that Soviet planners are well informed about the status of
technology in development and are likely to specify the best available
technology when they generate design requirements for new or im-
ployed.
- The Soviets have a well-organized planning and acquisition
system for weapons and space development programs. They
minimize the cost and risk of new systems development by
using an approach that incorporates proven technologies.
- To offset the cost growth inherent in developing and produc-
ing more technologically complex weapons, the Soviets plan to
increase productivity in their defense industry. As costs and
capabilities rise, we see a trend toward reducing the quantities
of advanced technology military systems produced and de-
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Key New Insight-Soviet Technology "Maturity"
We believe a key analytical advance is our new insight to the status a technology must
achieve before the Soviets select it for incorporation into military system designs. The new
insight changes many previous judgments. We now believe we can and must carefully
differentiate between Soviet military-related or sponsored technology developments and
military system developments. The status of Soviet technical advances can provide better
insights as to when technology developments can affect Soviet military system performance
capabilities that will threaten the United States or US military systems
We believe that after a technical phenomenology has been proved in a laboratory the So-
viets will prove its technical feasibility through testing, and prove its producibility before
applying it to new or improved products. When a technology is intended for a military
product the military will conduct further testing to demonstrate feasibility. When the
technology and the system application are new and unique, a system concept feasibility
demonstrator may also be built and tested. Such feasibility testing is likely to occur at a mil-
itary test range.
Soviet design standards now call for technology to be proved feasible before application
to preliminary designs for choosing a model to build in the full-scale engineering phase of
this acquisition cycle. Before proceeding to system development the technology must be
proved producible by the successful establishment of pilot production. Technologies
achieving pilot production are deemed "mature" by the Soviets and military system
development on normal schedules can follow.
There are alternative views that hold that the Soviets have other criteria that must be
considered to assess when microelectronics and laser technologies are or were selected by
designers for incorporation in specific weapon systems
The Soviets conduct feasibility tests of new military technology
before they decide to use the technology to develop a military weapon
system. Many feasibility tests of large system-like items have in the past
been misidentified as prototypes for system development programs. We
expect continuing problems in analyzing Soviet activities in cases where
feasibility tests cannot be distinguished from system prototype tests.
Soviet leadership supports a large and stable base for conducting
R&D that provides for continued improvement of military systems.
They have allocated a steady high level of R&D funding over long
periods.
To develop the large numbers of military programs the Soviets
have chosen to pursue per decade as technology becomes increasingly
complex, they have been steadily increasing the resources they allocate
to military R&D. Estimated manpower devoted to RDT & E has about
doubled since 1965. We estimate the physical growth in facilities at
1,500 organizations associated with military RDT&E increased from
1965-84 at an average rate of about 3 percent per year.
Our improved capability to characterize Soviet programs indicates
to us that the Soviets have undertaken a greater number of defense
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the 1980s is about 20 percent more than those in the 1970s.
programs than we previously believed. They conduct at least 5,000
research programs and have over 300 military products in production
per year. They also conduct about 350 military weapon, space, and
support system development programs per decade for new and im-
proved equipment. The number of Soviet military research projects in
ment-primarily in the directed energy area.
The Soviets have sustained a high and steady rate of systems
development for the last 30 years despite fluctuations in Western
military programs and budgets, arms control, and internal economic
problems. We believe over the long term their large research effort will
provide Soviet designers and military planners with more flexibility,
when required, to go beyond evolutionary upgrades in meeting opera-
tional shortfalls, new threats, and taking new mission area initiatives.
The Soviet leadership has made decisions to reallocate or change
emphasis in weapon system and technology development areas that
they believe will provide them with political advantages or opportuni-
ties in the future. For example, the Soviets made decisions in the mid-
1970s to reemphasize bomber and strategic cruise missile development
and to expand their space program. Decisions to support the larger
cruise missile and space programs coincided with cutbacks in their
ICBM and SAM programs. Moreover, they assigned ABM and early
warning radar system managers to direct new technology develop-
The development time for Soviet military systems is not reduced
by implementing what the United States would consider a "crash"
program. When the Soviets describe a program as "accelerated," their
that would reach the field sooner than anticipated.
The Soviets use a schedule-dominant management approach for
military systems development. We do not expect them to change their
schedule-dominant approach. This management approach, similar to
that used by US corporations for the development of large commercial
systems, is one in which meeting a predetermined delivery date takes
precedence over changing the system's design during development.
Normal Soviet development time for major new military systems
averages 12 to 15 years; major system improvements or conversions
average eight to 10 years; and minor system improvements or conver-
sions average five to seven years. These average development times
have not changed since the late 1950s. Using this management approach
to military system development the Soviets complete a high percentage
of programs-in excess of 90 percent. We are concerned, however, that
an observed key technology transfer or advance could allow an earlier
program start than otherwise possible for a high-performance system
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aim is to hold to the normal schedule even when a project is difficult or
complex. When a Soviet program is described as "priority," that should
be interpreted to mean that it is allowed first call on resources rather
than to speed up the program. The Soviets have used their conservative
approach in selecting technology for use in a new military system
development since the late 1960s.
The Soviets have placed a high priority on improving their weak
production base and have had some success in increasing their pace of
technology through:
- Since the 1960s, the Soviets have managed the development of
certain critical military high technologies using a goal-oriented
approach that has many characteristics of a weapons program,
but in fact precedes weaponization.
- The Soviets often use a "follower" research strategy, which
usually results in lower technology development risks but
sometimes stifles indigenous research. They regularly plan the
use of inputs from their technology transfer acquisition program
to supplement their indigenous military technology develop-
ment efforts. This allows them to truncate indigenous military
research when targeted Western technology is acquired. As a
result they are often able to incorporate technology into a
weapon system development program, shortly after the United
States achieves full production. The Soviets, however, take
longer to achieve full production.
- Large amounts of Western military technical and programmatic
data available early to Soviet planners allow them to design-to-
market as a way of competing. Using this approach they begin
similar or offsetting programs about the same time as the United
States enters the engineering phase of development, whereas US
planners usually receive comparable information on Soviet
systems late in the engineering phase. Design-to-market is a
common competitive technique used in the US commercial
sector.
Another part of the improved Soviet management of defense
planning has been to establish a national program to forecast technologi-
cal developments that are closely tied to their major military mission ar-
eas. The forecasts project 20 to 30 years ahead and guide current
planning of technology development in an attempt to ensure that
technologies applicable to military requirements are not overlooked.
Centrally managed, goal-oriented technology development pro-
grams guide Soviet efforts from the emerging scientific concept through
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weapon system that uses the technology.
feasibility demonstration to system development. In emerging scientific
areas, like high-energy lasers and particle beams, computers, and
production technologies (robotics and advanced machine tools), it takes
the Soviets 10 to 25 years to develop the technology for weapons
applications and another 10 to 15 years to develop and produce the
Technologies the Soviets have chosen for development using their
goal-oriented management style will provide them with potential future
opportunities. In the mid-to-late 1960s they organized a wide-ranging
directed energy research program. And in the 1980s the Soviets have
begun new research programs to develop technology for industrial
lasers, optical supercomputers, and advanced kinetic energy systems.
We do not know how long it will take the Soviets to accomplish their
technology goals in all these areas, but for the most part the technical
maturity to allow system development is still years away. The major
military advantages that could emerge from most of these investments
will most likely not be available for Soviet leadership to exploit until af-
ter the turn of the century. We believe the Soviet management practices
that have recently served them well, goal-oriented programs, and the
follower strategy have a downside to them. In the USSR's centralized
economic system, goal-oriented research tends to be narrow and
overdirected and leads to a lack of commitment to basic science,
essential for innovation. The continued use of a follower strategy-like
technology transfer-tends to impede indigenous development.
provide capabilities new to the Soviets
The major portion of Soviet systems which are deployed in the
1990s and early 2000s will involve evolutionary improvements in the
types of systems now in service. A small portion of the new systems will
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