IRAN/IRAQ: CHEMICAL ATTACKS ON CITIES?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90M00551R001901160120-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 12, 2013
• Sequence Number: 120
• Publication Date: May 4, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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BI-WEEKLY WARNING ISSUES
FOR THE DCI
4 May 1988
WARNING ISSUE
IRAN/IRAQ: Chemical Attacks on Cities?
SPECIAL WARNING TOPIC
EASTERN EUROPE: Rising Instability
Prepared by NIO/Warning and Staff
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WARNING ISSUE
IRAN/IRAQ: Chemical Attacks on Cities?
The NIO for Warning is con-
cerned over the possibility that either
Iran or Iraq will initiate chemical
attacks on the other's cities, and that
the victimized country will retaliate in
kind. Recent events suggest that the
likelihood of such attacks is growing.
Western diplomats and other personnel
could be at risk.
The extensive battlefield use of
chemical munitions and the muted world
response to the deaths of perhaps sev-
eral thousand Kurdish civilians in March
has reduced the prospective international
political cost of such attacks. The
increasingly mundane "war of the cities"
using ballistic missiles--now in ceasefire
after more than 200 total strikes--is
another indication that unrestricted
attacks on population centers can be
conducted with low political cost. Either
side could strike first. The animosity
levels on both sides, accompanied by
political struggles within Iran, particularly,
could lead to a decision to strike, prob-
ably with chemical bombs delivered by
aircraft. Both governments are already
preparing their people for chemical
attacks. First usage probably would be
justified as "retaliation" against previous
provocations.
SPECIAL WARNING TOPIC
EASTERN
EUROPE: Rising Instability
Eastern Europe is increasingly
unstable and warrants careful monitor-
ing. The following article looks at the
warning implications of this instability
regionally. In coming weeks, we will
examine individual countries, beginning
with Poland, in greater detail.
Eastern Europe, as evident by
ongoing large-scale strikes in Poland, lies
fitfully within the Soviet orbit; chronic
internal problems, exacerbated by Com-
munist party inertia, impending leadership
successions, and the unsettling calls for
reform coming from Gorbachev in Mos-
cow, suggest that the next few years will
be difficult for the Soviet Union's six
Warsaw Pact allies in Eastern Europe.
While conditions are different in each
country, economic troubles and popular
demands seem certain to increase
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throughout the region. There is real
potential for major unrest in Poland and
Romania, as well as generally growing
instability in Hungary, that soon could
require major US policy responses similar
to those during the Polish crisis of the
early 1980s.
The problems of the region are
manifold.
o The economies are in serious trou-
ble. Growth is slowing or negative.
Balance of payments deficits and
debt service difficulties threaten
most of the countries. Living stan-
dards are growing modestly at best.
In Romania, basic necessities are in
short supply. Austerity measures in
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Poland and Hungary are cutting
consumption. On top of domestic
troubles, Moscow is pressuring the
regimes to step up deliveries of high
quality goods to support party leader
Gorbachev's economic program, an
action that is eroding hard currency
export prospects and syphoning off
goods and services needed at home.
o Succession struggles may loom.
Only Poland's Jaruzelski and Czecho-
slovakia's Jakes are under 70. Hun-
gary's Kadar and Romania's Ceau-
sescu apparently have serious
ailments. East Germany's Honecker
and Zhivkov of Bulgaria--both over
75--periodically are rumored to be
on the verge of stepping down.
o Several of the Communist parties
are weak or divided. Hungary's is
losing members and coherence.
Ceausescu purposefully has kept his
party weak as part of his cult of per-
sonality. Poland's party has not
recovered fully from its near disinte-
gration in the early 1980s. Even East
Germany's orthodox party is beset
from within by younger members
who, heeding Gorbachev's calls for
democratization in the USSR, want
reform.
o The people want better lives. Pop-
ular demands for political liberaliza-
tion and higher living standards are
on the rise in much of Eastern
Europe just as the regimes' ability to
satisfy the demands appear too eco-
nomically costly and politically dan-
gerous.
o The governments are immobilized
on questions of reform. They
largely are waiting for the drama of
Gorbachev-versus-the-conservatives
to play out in Moscow before com-
mitting themselves to major policy
initiatives at home.
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Cumulatively, these pressures
will heighten popular unrest. There
will be increased anti-regime activ-
ism. Human rights, environmentalist,
church, and other groups are likely to
grow more assertive. None of these
developments will threaten immedi-
ately party rule or Soviet influence
directly, but collectively they weaken
regime authority, undermine eco-
nomic recovery, and lay the ground-
work for more serious challenges.
The NIOs for Warning and
Europe believe that the potential for
serious instability exists in at least
Poland and Romania within the next
two-to-three years. Significant
instability in Hungary is also possible.
The likelihood of system-wrenching
change is much less elsewhere.
In Poland, major new out-
breaks of anti-regime protest are
likely within two years. A recent
secret report to the party Politburo
warned that unrest could begin this
spring--a development that may be
beginning. Prominent opposition fig-
ures warn that a new wave of pro-
tests will be more violent than dur-
ing the Solidarity period. Regime
handling of the ongoing, economi-
cally-motivated strikes at steel mills
will determine largely whether the
strikes spread and the unrest is gen-
eralized.
We expect that the Polish
regime will be able to weather this
immediate problem, but the basic
complaints that sparked the strikes
will remain. The government has
failed to achieve national reconcilia-
tion, has little popular support, and
has been forced to impose severely
unpopular but economically sound
austerity measures. Moscow again
will be loathe to intervene directly; it
knows the deep antipathy of Poland's
38 million people for the Soviets,
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101' StUlit I
their historical willingness to fight
even for losing causes, and Poland's
strategic position on the lines of
communications to Soviet forces in
East Germany.
In Romania, continuing harsh
austerity, coupled with Ceausescu's
failing health, could produce serious
instability. His death or ouster would
trigger a power struggle and invite
East/West competition over the
post-Ceausescu leadership. A pro-
longed struggle or widespread vio-
lence could lead the Romanian mili-
tary to step in; in extremis, Moscow
could intervene militarily.
Unrest in Hungary would
come from a combination of much
lower living standards and dashed
hopes for political reform. A repeat
of 1956 is unlikely, but scattered
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strikes, sabotage, and demonstrations
are probable this year as austerity
measures cut purchasing power,
unemployment grows, and the party
fails to address popular concerns.
As the East European socie-
ties evolve, they will pose continuing
problems for Moscow and concerns
for Washington. The de-homogen-
ization of the empire, combined with
popular desires for variants of the
Soviets' own reforms, could unleash
calls for change that will be dis-
quieting for the leaderships. The
resulting divisions could also
strengthen Gorbachev's conservative
critics. A significant upheaval in
Eastern Europe would quickly spill
over into bilateral US/Soviet rela-
tions, affecting negatively such
issues as arms control.
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LOOKING AHEAD
in Panama of Cuban and Soviet advisors ...
arming
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arrivals
of Panamanian leftists now certain ... Cuba likely assessing Noriega's strengthened
position as opportunity to penetrate Panama.
Iran unlikely to be cowed by recent setbacks at hands of US forces in the Per-
sian Gulf ... mining operations probably continue ... Tehran almost certainly retains
contingency plans for attacks on US Navy ships, but is more likely to attack merchant
shipping in the Gulf and to engage in terrorism and political and military intimidation
against Gulf Arab states.
South Africa sending reinforcements to northern Namibia to face strong and
growing Cuban and Angolan forces in southwestern Angola ... Castro personally
directing operations ... rains now hampering mobility ... intentions of both sides still
unclear, but buildup suggests major battle may occur within a few weeks.
The spring thaw increases opportunities for Indian military confrontations with
Pakistan in disputed mountain border regions ... Pakistan may want to recover parts
of Siachen Glacier lost to India last year ... India reinforcing its positions on glacier ...
New Delhi's accusation that Islamabad is helping Sikh extremists enter Punjab also
likely to heighten border tension.
President Duarte's weak leadership in wake of his 20 March election setback has
created a power vacuum in El Salvador ... democratic process and US interests placed
in jeopardy by disarray in Duarte's Christian Democratic Party ... campaign for next
year's presidential election likely to be polarized as strength of rightist ARENA party
grows.
Vietnam occupying more Spratly Islands and reinforcing garrisons with marines
... China responding with warnings and its own military preparations ... uncompromis-
ing claims fueling hostility ... clash possible as both sides maneuver and bluff.
Soviet Communist Party conference in June will be major test of Gorbachev's
ability to reform the party, chart country's course ... could also be decisive battle with
"Second Secretary" Ligachev ... outcome not certain, but Gorbachev has the clear
advantage ... will also help set agenda for key plenum on nationality issues.
Political situation in flux in Chile as General Pinochet's "campaign" to stay in
power falters ... polls show Pinochet's popular support has peaked ... failure of this
year's plebiscite to keep junta candidate in charge would result in open presidential
election next year ... decision on plebiscite date could come soon.
A win by leftist, anti-military candidate Bucaram in Ecuador's presidential
election on Sunday could trigger a military coup ... armed forces divided on plan to
take power.
North and South Yemen maneuvering for control of disputed, oil-rich border
region ... border clash almost inevitable.
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TrID CCr?DCT
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