LETTER TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FROM JAMES A. WILLIAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP86M00886R001800080017-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: March 15, 1984
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/19: CIA-RDP86M00886R001800080017-0
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DEFENSEELLIGENCE AGENCY
wAsg-v NGTON . D.C. 20301
Mr. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20305
Dear Mr. Casey:
this week:
15 March 1984
The followiAg items of intelligence are provided for your use
1. There is increasing evidence that insurgents of the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) support their operations in Guatemala (GT) by operating logistic
cells in the central and northern districts of Belize. This network of
cells funnels money, food, medicine and arms to the guerrillas in GT,
with some supplies going direct and others following a more circuitous
route through Mexico. Nigh Belizean Government officials are said to
be aware of the FAR network, and a few have been implicated in aiding
and abetting the guerrilla support operations or, at a minimum, acquies-
ing to it. Knowledge of FAR's cross-border activities might prompt
Guatemala to take a harder negotiating attitude vis-a-vis Belize or, in
the extreme, to mount armed incursions against its neighbor. Although
the Government of Belize is not threatened at this time, the potential
for trouble is considerable. Belize's failure thus far to shut down
the FAR network could be a result of official complicity or the govern-
ment's poor economic situation. It may also reflect the fact that the
government does not want to do anything to anger its potential supporters
in the approaching election. Whatever the implication, the long-suspected
existence of a FAR network in Belize appears to be a fact.
2. Initial analysis of the Piulgarian arms transfer at El Bluff-Rame indicates
the probable delivery of at least 20 P1-76 light amphibious tanks and 22
1-54/55 tanks. In addition, six BRDM-2 armored reconnaissance vehicles
may also have been delivered recently to El Tempesque, a frequent storage
point for new equipment and the home of a tank battalion. This is the
first indication of the P1-76 in Nicaragua.
The arms delivery at El Bluff-Rama, as well
as the possible helicopter transfer at Corinto, is consistent with pre-
vious procedures. The PT-76s will quite likely be used to form recon-
naissance elements in the Sandinistas armored and motorized infantry
brigades. Both activities add to the evidence of continuing Warsaw Pact
support for the government.
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3. Initial deliveries of the MI-9 airborne command post helicopter have
apparently been made to East German and Czechoslovak air force units.
Thus far in Soviet units one or two MI-9s have usually been
assigned to a divisional helicopter squadron or transport helicopter
regiment. This practice indicates some of the Basepohl helicopters
will be transferred or deployed to other East German units.
Z
JAMES A. WILLIAMS
Lieutenant General, US Army
Director
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/12/19: CIA-RDP86M00886R001800080017-0