SOUTH EAST ASIA AND THE POWERS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP73-00475R000401900001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 19, 2013
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 1, 1965
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
TIM WAD771 RIATAIF
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 50-Yr 2013/12/19;i4CIA-RDP73-00475R000401900001-3
STAT London, England
APRIL 1965
C.
I.
South East Asia and the Powers
CORAL BELL
THE endemic troubles of South East Asia tend to induce a view of the
area as a sort of natural and inevitable Balkans, a congeries of small weak
peoples leaned on, or potentially leaned on, from every side by stronger
peoples, as well as plagued by local enmities and destabilizing minorities.
Recent events in Vietnam particularly reinforce this impression, for since
the U.S. air-strikes of February and the Russian visit to Hanoi, the trial of
strength and intentions between the outside Powers has overshadowed
the divisions, real as they are, between the Vietnamese of the North and
of the South. This is not to say that the final decision (if there is one within
the foreseeable future, and whether it is military or diplomatic) can ignore
the strength of particular currents of political feeling among the Viet- '
namese. But the prospects cannot be assessed without analysis of the
Powers' estimates of their own respective interests in Vietnam and in
South East Asia generally. One must add the wider context of South
East Asia to that of the particular crisis of South Vietnam, since that un-
happy small country is perhaps seen by all the Powers rather as a token,
or the hinge to a door, than as a vital interest in itself.
Looking at the area first as a set of problems facing Western policy-
makers, one may say that the issues reduce themselves?though one
could hardly say simply?to three categories: those of the containment of
Chinese power, those of the ambiguities and harassments of Indonesian
policy, and those of the uncertainties and weaknesses of the minor coun-
tries. There is not much point in trying to disentangle these three sets of
issues from each other, since it is precisely their intertwinedness that is
the distinguishing characteristic of the situation from the viewpoint of
Western policy. This is one of those situations where the whole is a good
deal more than the sum of the parts, and it is therefore positively mis-
leading to attempt to consider the problems of Laos and Cambodia or'
Borneo in isolation.
It is more difficult to assess the aspect that the situation wears from .?the
? other side of the hill', that is from the viewpoint of China and Russia. One.
might Venture an assumption that from Peking it may look much as Latin
America would look to Washington if the Monroe Doctrine had been',
shattered for a hundred years and the opportunity then seemed to be pre-'
, senting itself to restore the status quo ante. Before the West impinged on
South East Asia, Chinese ascendancy over the area was certainly as great
as U.S. ascendancy over Latin America in the palmiest days of the Mon-,
roe Doctrine, round about the time of the Roosevelt corollary, and equally
regarded as part of the natural order of history. Looking at the course of
Chinese diplomacy since China effectively re-entered the conversation
of the Great Powers, at the 1954 Geneva conference, one cannot but be
? struck by how steadily, and with how considerable a degree of success,
Mr Chou En-lai has worked to re-establish China's old sphere of
influence in this part of the world.. -/
Dr Bell is' Lecturer in International Politici in ,the i University of Sydn
author of Survey qf International4ffairs 054 (London,OX.P. for R.11.4.21?
front,StremO (London, Chant* & 'Windup, WO, an4' /Ad 'De1,
haiWapi 0,01101,10.u.p.? foe 1.1?L4A4,4g6.0.1q;tinU 1,1; ni r:141nJ ")ionia.). 41
Cont!nued
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release @ 50-Yr 2013/12/19: CIA-RDP73-00475R000401900001-3