'THE SINS OF THE FATHERS'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903800003-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 88
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 12, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

o
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'CURRENTS
'The sins of the fathers'
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres pays homage January
27 at memorial to World War II Holocaust victims at
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Peres became the first
Israeli head of government to visit Berlin, assuring young
NOTES OF THE WEEK
Spy-spooked
on the Potomac
^ Official Washington loves nothing so
much as a spy story-and in late Janu-
ary there surfaced a new one to chew
on, a story that U.S. government
spokesmen called fiction and U.SNervs
& World Report and the New York
Times called fact. A miniwar of denials
and confirmations ensued-
January 25: The news media receive
the February 3 issue of U.S.News, which
reports that the U.S. helicoptered a
high-level Soviet intelligence agent out
of East Germany last spring, hid him at
a U.S. hasc to prevent the upstaging of
the Geneva .summit and then brought
the defector to America in late Novem-
ber. The story says the CIA wants to
keep secret the defection of a fifth top
Soviet-bloc spy in 1935. The defector
17) TJl IT73 13K ']
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? 11r'U tlt1/ lYj It?1-111] '~Uy
, 'tt1;Lt11 11'f1 Ai iK'11
X11.+1;{/ 17"'Ihn July I11A7tr3
' f 3-wu
1r5 1Q'y7T JCL\Y III-L,( -rjZ
Germans: "The Bible tells us not to charge children with the
sins of the fathers. They should riot be accused because they
did not do it and they would not have wanted it to happen."
Photo by Agence France Presse
wants it that way, the CIA is under fire
for mishandling defectors and "another
Yurchenko" is feared. KG13 Col. Vitaly
Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year,
then redefected.
January 26: The Sunday New York
Times says on its front page that sources
in Congress confirm the U.S.Neres ac-
count and that the defector "may be the
[]lost valuable... in recent years." News
agencies say unnamed CIA officials
scoffed at the r rt.
January 27: 'The New York Times
quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mitter: "I have been told by the CIA t
that no such defector exists. If you asked
nre whether I believe that, I would say,
in light of [CIA Director William Ca-
sey's] public statement of reluctance to
follow the procedures of versight, then
I will have no comment At the White
I Iouse. Larry Speakes s: s accounts of a
fifth defector are "baseless." Asked
whether he denies all or part of the
story, he replies. ''The whole story. '
January 28: The .Vey York Times
says again that its "congressional
sources confirm the reports" of the de-
fection. The Wasluttgton Post quotes a
spokesman for U.SNewtws: "We reported
the story from multiple sources over
several weeks. Based on the reputations
and numbers of these sources, we be-
lieve our story is correct. We were
warned by more than one of our
sources that we could expect denials
from the CIA and possibly other gov-
ernment agencies.''
The Washington Tune's quotes Sena-
tor Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelli-
'ence Committee member: "Where
there's smoke, there's }ire.. . There's
been too many leaks ;1114 hcr::'s anoth-
er." lie says the defector accounts are
correct. The senator later h~::ts this
to U.S,Veuus, which did not interview
him for its original article. :vs to the
denials, he declares: "Of, course they're
denying it. What did you expect them
to do'?" The same afternoon. the White
House again denies [lie >trorY ^
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF
PROGRAM CBS Morning News STATION WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D:C.
Senator Leahy/Achille Laura's Hijacking
MARIA SHRIVER: Well, the so-called hijacking of the
hijackers was the subject of overnight briefings for certain
members of Congress, including Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking
Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Leahy's joining
us right now in our Washington bureau.
Can you bring us up to date? Exactly what were you told
last evening about the hijacking?
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, we were kept informed as
we went along everything that was happening. I don't think many
of us got much sleep last night because of the phone calls. But
for once, at least, the calls were all positive.
This is a case where we had a lot of things that if they
all work right, we get the result we did. They all worked right.
And it's a major triumph for the United States.
SHRIVER: What were you told about what went into this
decision, how it was brought about?
SENATOR LEAHY: We knew that when Mr. Mubarak went on
the news yesterday morning and said that the hijackers had left
Egypt, we knew that wasn't so. And it was a case where we knew
they were in Egypt. Intelligence was very, very good. When they
left, we knew that and were able to send the planes out to
intercept the hijackers' plane -- no small feat, in and of itself
-- and locating the plane, and then in requiring it to land in
Italy.
It's a case where here we are the most powerful nation
in the world and we've been frustrated by hijackers and by
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terrorists because often we didn't know where they were or how to.
reach them or who to bring our military power to bear on. And
this was a case where our intelligence was superb, worked very,
very well, and allowed the United States to use the options
available to it as a superpower.
SHRIVER: What do you think the reaction of your
colleagues will be to the decision by President Reagan and the
Pentagon?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, it should be a positive one, and
it shouldn't be any kind of a partisan thing. I think this is a
case where I would hope there will not be dissenting voices in
the Congress. I hope that we say very clearly that the American
people support the President on this, because you want to send a
signal to future hijackers or future terrorists that we will find
them. We'll look for them, we'll identify them, and we'll go
after them and we'll bring them to justice. And that's exactly
what's happening in this case.
And that is the only way we are going to put any kind of
a dent in terrorism. And I support the President's action very,
very strongly.
SHRIVER: Okay. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy, for
joining us this morning to bring us up to date on this story.
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RADIO N REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815
[phone]
PROGRAM
The Today Show
STATION
W R C- T V
NBC Network
DATE
October 11, 1985
7:00 A.M.
oTY
Washington, D.C.
Senator Leahy/Achille Laura's Hijacking
BRYANT GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy is the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He has
been critical in the past of America's ability to gather
intelligence information in the Mideast. He's joined us this
morning from our bureau in Washington.
Are you a satisfied Senator this morning?
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: I'm a very happy Senator this
morning. I didn't mind the calls half the night or the very,
very early briefing over at the CIA this morning. This is a case
of success.
I've said, in fact, in interviews with you before that
if we're going to use the vast power that this country has to go
after terrorists, we've got to have far better intelligence and
information than we've had. This is a case where the
intelligence worked, worked very, very well, even to the extent
of knowing when the Egyptian President said that the hijackers
had left, we knew they hadn't. We knew they were-in Egypt. And
we were able to track them and follow them all the way through.
It was a superb use of intelligence and connecting it up with our
military assets.
GUMBEL: If all that's correct, aren't you a little bit
bothered that the Egyptians lied to us?
SENATOR LEAHY: I'm extremely bothered that they did. I
can't guess what their reasons might have been. I think that
has to be a demonstration that the United States is going to be
in a position to make its own judgment on what people tell us,
and not have to take anything on faith.
OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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GUMBEL: Well, what do we do, then, in reaction t.o what
the Egyptians did? I mean certainly in this case I think you'd
have to agree they did not act in a manner befitting a strong
ally.
SENATOR LEAHY: No. And I think that there's going to
be some real strains as a result of this. They will of course be
angry at us for forcing their airplane down. I think our
reactions would be, "Don't even talk to us about that. If you've
got hijackers, especially those who've murdered an American,
you're harboring them, you're just going to have to assume that
we're going to come and go after them."
And I think that message has to go to virtually every
country, that we want people who have attacked Americans to be
brought to justice, wherever it might be. And if it's necessary,
we'll go and get them.
GUMBEL: In this case, brought to justice may mean
Italian justice. Is that fine by you?
SENATOR LEAHY: I don't have a problem with that because
I think that the Italian courts work very well, and it was an
Italian-flag ship. But I think eventually I want to see them
extradited back here to the United States and tried also in a
U.S. court. The Italians have a perfect right to try them, and
should and can. But eventually I want to seem them tried here in
the United States.
GUMBEL: What would be served by that?
SENATOR LEAHY: I think it serves to demonstrate to the
world that the United States will watch out for its interests,
wherever it might be, and that eventually people will be brought
to justice here.
GUMBEL: Whether or not they ever do make it to these
shores, is there any move afoot to have these hijackers
interrogated by American officials? Is that important to you?
SENATOR LEAHY: It's very important to us. And there
are things that will be done very soon. We're going to make sure
that we have people who were witnesses positively identify these
people, make sure that there hasn't been any switch, that we have
the right people.
GUMBEL: To the best of your knowledge -- I mean it
seems fairly certain what kind of fate awaits the four hijackers.
What about the other two PLO officials who were on board? What's
going to happen to them?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, we're going to have to look at
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whether we have cases that can be brought against them, either as
accessories or otherwise.
I think the most important thing, though, is that we've
demonstrated that our intelligence is getting better and that we
know who these people are and where they are, and it really is
not going to do them any good to seek safe harbor in any country.
We'll go after them.
GUMBEL: As we talk about how strongly the U.S. reacted,
you were in on the CIA briefings on this, as you noted at the top
of this interview. Were we prepared to shoot that craft down if
they had ignored our signals to land?
SENATOR LEAHY: I agree with Secretary Shultz that
that's something that we can not and should not go into. I think
that it leaves our options open. And quite frankly, I'd just
soon have, if there are going to be- future terrorists or
hijackers, that they now know exactly what our options are.
GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy, you look like a happy
man this morning.
SENATOR LEAHY: I'm very happy, and I'm very proud of
the President in this case.
GUMBEL: Thank you very much, sir.
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,4E%i YORK T1.'ES
rail lht_c Kr I LARLU 11 October 1985
0}J P4GE
In the last few weeks the C.I.A. An intelligence official said tho
Coce o, C.I.A.s decision to the matter
Q 1FTC[AS cunt William Kotopish. to a new job internally rather than report it to the
SiVi'
at a level of equivalent seniority, but an F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
official said the move had been planned "If you reported every fantasy that
p[D ~011LL FR I~ people have, you'd have everyone
'for some time" and was not related to
i under surveillance."
'the Howard case.
T ,nS Mr. Howard worked for the agency. Law Bari C.I.A. Moves In U.S.
OF from 1981 to 1953. Hwas told of Bassi- Tate C.I.A would not say w;.ether it
0 `YJ (~{1
SPY CASE tied American intelligence operatiool undertook any form of inquiry after
in Moscow o.e?C.ausc Ent agency was Mr. ii,. zti tviu 6,c -,U C.I.A. em-
The jollowi? icle is based on re- plug to assfSn him there, officials ( ployees he had considered becoming a
porting by Stephen phen Engelbei?g and Joei have said. . Soviet spy. But Federal ,law and a
Brinkley and was written by fir. Brink- ; According Ina criminal complaint oa Presidential executive order prohibit
ley. file in Federal District Court in?Albu the agency from taking any steps it,
so-d4 w The t?~ Yott r side the United States to L?ivestigate
qucrque. Mr. Howard fold two posses cases of espionage.
WASHINGTON. Oct. 10 - The Cen- current employees of the intelligence Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-:
trai?Inteliige)Cc Agency faileddto notify I: agency a year ago last month that be, sands of people who retire from Ctov-
the Feder l Bureau of Investigation , had "spent hours in the vicinity of the ernment or industry each year after
after it leatnod more than a year ago 11 Soviet- Embassy eying to deride bolding positions that gave them aGi
that Edward L. Howard was corsidc1 whether to enter the embassy and dis- cess to classified materials. More than
ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern-1 close classified information. 4.3 million people in government and
me +
meat officials said- today. An F.B.I. affidavit says the torten, industry associated with government
now clearances to use classified
sation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four
According to court records, Mr. Haw- days before that, the Government con- information.
and told. two agency employees in Sep, tends. Mr. Howard gave his.infortna- Askod what procedures the Central
tember 1964 that he was thinking of tis- tion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aim- Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
closing classified information to the tria. former employees who have knowl-
George Lauder, a C.I.A. sokesman, edge of classified programs. Mr. Laud-
Soviet Union. the agency spokesman. said: ' We
said today that as a result of that con- er, fiery sPo
Soviet Defector Was the Key t( versation "action was taken" within haven't got, any procedu-res. Once a
The bureau has sole responsibility it the agency "and it seemed to be rca- person leaves here, he is John Q. Citi.
for domestic espionage investigations sonable action at the time." He would Z. just like you and me. We don't
s
and, under Federal lsa, the intelli- not say what the action was, although keep a string ore them. It's strictly an
B I. tz:a sett .1
Bence agency and all other Govern- an official said the agency kept in con- o
ment agencies are supposed to report tact with Mr. Howard after his conver- Dave Durrnberger? the Minnesota
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is sation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed, Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the ate Intelligetce Committee, said his
time. panel would also examine the problem
-
presented by militar} oftiec3 who re
C. al agency to ea, rYout sur"eilla rte or
ma-
within the United Stag . 'A Few Blatant Casoc' tire with knowledge of classified ma-
to sac potential spies. - The Senate and House intelligence terials.
to stop t
hie. Hoa-ard, 33 Years old, a fo=e-. committees are investigating the hen- tiiost people with security clearances
officer who is nos d1Lng of the Howard case. A key issue in work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
intelligence agency the study, committee members said. Deco nment. L. Britt Snider, director
a fugitive, has been Ghared with cspto- will be how, the C.I.A. and other ages- of unterintcllrie-nce and security
rsge. accused of giving Soviet officials - ties deal with employees who leave
details of Ame can Intelligence opera- Government service with detailed, policy. said: "~/c don't have any ju ric?-
tiorzs in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive diction of any kind over fo=e: eta-
prog arras plovers. whether or not they had clear-
called the disclosures serious and dam-
aging ? - , Another element of the investiga. antes. It's strictly the F.B.I.?
At the F it l., %'r. Parr:cr std. "We
? tions will be several recent espionage
'Bad Mllstske,? Senator Says cases in which Government officials are not concerned about -1.-er:ca5
don't .
Federal officials said the C.I.A. tole failed to heed warning signs that a cur- who have had cle:tr antes. -;.-e
about Mr. Fiow?are rent look at :h? e ;,vp le unl`?5s w _? detect an
,.-.~ F.B.I. nothing or , .o rr cr employee was planning i. d.1du.'tl involved in espior'_se."
t fter the bureau began an invests- to spy or was spying, committee men
~a:1on this fall based on informatioc~ b- r75 said. kx?Intclliy;cnce Chief's Moves
i om a So iet defector. ultaly Yur?I "si'e've had a few blatant cases Senator Leahy said: "1 G.~n't t`tink
c`enko, w'ho hsd been a senior offic'aiiwhere we just didn't follow through, arvone cxprxts the F.3.1. to maintain
of :1>e Y..G.B., the Scvict intelllgenccleven with alarm bells going off," said surveillance on the several .`.undyed
I Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo- thousand ; eople who leave the Govern-
a TTse bureau began surveillance of!cmt of Oklahoma. chairman of the meat each year with 4 cur v clear-
Mr. Howard last month. but he sllppcd Fimse committee's Subcommittee on &-tces. list inert are cer a_. number
posi-
Oversigt:t and Evaluator. of p epic to c ~tre tc'.} se:
out of his home a: night and is bclievedf In the Howard case. a senior F.D.I. tors. a handful of them. t".a: -C ought
to have fled the country. offlc:al said Mr. Howard's conversa- to Co more
Frewa d "ter-.
Senator Pat-icy J. Leahy, the Ver- 'tion with the two C.I.A. officers would I Mr. Leah,: said Mr.
me it Dc oeat who Is vice ch-r-ima:. have beer sufficient to went an in- Uunly would have been one of these"
o the Select Committee on In:eili. vcatigadon_ because he held highly sersS'ive infor-
smtcsc'Gfolloaf?
Bete. said today: "if the C.I.A_ did goer " yA-n 'time we fict information that; nation and was urine C!
ive the F.B.I. adequate Lnfo mat'oo someone has considered such an act.i Lng a polyg aph scar slat:o that. Lodl-
a w?e would take some action." Bald Phil-' U.~ Gang use and petty t`~every. a >rt.
January 27:\Thc :Verv York Times
quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy
(D-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Conn-
mittec: "I have been told by the CIA t
that no such defector exists. If you asked
me whether I believe that, I would say,
in light of [CIA Director William Ca-
sev?sj public statement of reluctance to
follow the procedures o1Z, versi;ht, then
I will have no comment," At the White
I louse, Larry Speakes s: accounts of 'a
fifth defector are "baseless." Asked
whether he denies all or part of the
stony. he replies, '.The whole story..'
January 28: The Verv York Times
says again that its "congressional
sources confirm the reports" of the de-
fection. The Washington Post quotes a
spokesman for U.S.:Ve rvs: "We reported
the story from multiple sources over
several weeks. Based on the reputations
and numbers of these sources, we be-
lieve our story- is correct. We were
warned by more than one of our
sources that We could expect denials
from the CIA and possibly other gov-
ernment agencies."
The Washington tunes' quotes Sena-
tor Chic llecht (R-Ncv.), an intelli-
1ence Committee member: "Where
there's smoke, there's fire.... .hhere's
been too many leaks and here's anoth-
er." fie says the detector accounts are
correct. The senator Liter repeats this
to U.S.Nelvs, which clid not interview
him for its original article. As to the
denials, he declares: "Of' course they're
denying it. What did you expect them
to do?" The same afternoon, the White
House again dcmucs rite story. ^
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ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE _I -11~c
OFFICIALS SAY C.11.
DID NOT TELL F.B.I.
OF SPY CASE MOVES
The following-t6riele is based on re-
porting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel
Brinkley and was written by tiir. Brink-
ley.
WASHINGTON. Oct. 10 - The Cen- current employees of the intelligence
tral?Intellige ere Agency failed to notify I: agency a year ago last month that he
the Federal Bureau of Investigation had "spent hours in the vicinity of the
after it learned more than a year ago Soviet Embassy trying to dedde
that Edward L. Howard was cortside:'- whether to enter the embassy and dic-
ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern- close classified information.
went officials said today. An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver-
According as held Sept. 24, 1984. Four
to court reco cis, fir. How-I cati on w
days before that; the Government con-
ard told. two agency employees in Sep- tends, Mr. Howard gave his. inforiiia-
tember 1964 that he was thinking of dis Lion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus-
Closing classified information to the tria.
Soviet Union. George Lauder a C.I.A. ~P_Okesmnn,
Defector Was the Key said today that as a result of that coo-
Soviet versation "action was taken" within
The bureau has sole responsibility the agency "and it seemed to be red-
for domestic espionage investigations +I. sonable action at the time." He would
and, under Federal law, the intelli- not say what the action was, although
gence agency and all other Govern- an tact offi Howaage agency kept in ncmi-
ment agencies are supposed to report
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is sation with the two C.I.A. operatives.
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed- Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the
out surveillance or time.
erel agency to Ca ry 'A Few Blatant Casoe'
other actions within the United Statue The Senate and House intelligence
to stop potentials committees are investigating the han-
Mr. Howard. 33 years old, a former
intelligence agency officer who is now the g f the coward ca mem. key ri _said,
a fugitive, has been charged with espio will be how the C.I.A. and other ages-
r.age, accused of giving Soviet officials 'ties deal with employees who leave
details of American intelligence opera- Government service with detailed,
tions in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive
called the disclosures serious and dam- programs.
aging. . Another element of the investiga-
Bad 4tlstske,' Senator Says tions will be several recent espionage
cases in which Government officials
F _,eral officials said the C.I.A. wld failed to heed warning signs that a cur-
F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard malt or former employee was planning
after the bureau began an investi- to spy or was spying. committee mem-
ea:ion tills fall based on informatioc bens said.
from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yur-1 "We've had a few blatant cases
c :enko. who had been a senior offici2ll where we just didn't follow through.
of the K.G.B., the Soviet Intelligenceeven with alarm bells going off," said
I Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo-
agency. I t of Oklahoma, chairman of the
The bureau began surveillance of crat
Mfr. Howard last month, but he slipped House committee's Subcommittee on
Oversight and Evaluaton.
out of his home at night a ~d is be lieved l In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I.
to have fled the Gauntry. official said Mr. Howard's conversa-
Senator pat-rick J. Leahy, the Ver- ition with the two C.I.A. officers would
mont DernoC: at who is vice el'air?rnan
o t'e Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not
give the F.B.I. adequate L?ifozmat:m
about this person. that's a bad in;stake.
It shows very, very serfow problems
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11 October 1985
In the last few weeks the C.I.A. An intelligence official said the
transferred the chief of its office of se- C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
to a new job internally rather than report it to the
i
h
K
s
otop
curity, William
, at a level of equivalent seniority, but an F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
official said the move had been planned If you reported every fantasy that
"for some time" and was not related to people have, you'd have everyone
i under surveillance."
the Howard cast.
Mr. Howard worked for the agency Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.
from 1931 to 1933. H+was told of classi-? The C.I.A would not say whether it
fled American intelligence operations I undertook any form of inquiry after
in Moscow oecausc inc agency wan ii M . nv.~nlu ivid line ..+'u C.I.A. em-
planning to assign him there, officials
have said. -
According to a criminal complaint on
file in Federal District Court in-Albu-
querque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two
Soviet spy. But Federal -law and a
Presidential executive order prohibit
the agency from taking any steps in-
side the United States to investigate
possible cases of espionage.
Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-'
sands of people who retire from Gov-
ernment or industry each year after .
holding positions that gave them ac-i
cess to classified materials. More than
4.3 million people in government and
industry associated with g nmovernment
now have clearances to use classified
information.
Asked what procedures the Central
Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
former employees who have knowl-
edge of classified programs. Laud-
er, the agency spokesman, said: "We
haven't gote any procedures. Once a
person leaves here, he is John Q. CIti
zen, just like you and me. We don't
keep a string err them. It's strictly an
F.B.I. nfatter. "
Dave Durenberger. the Minnesota
Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee, said his
panel would also examine the problem
presented by military officers who re-
tire with knowledge of classified ma-
terials.
Most people with security clearances
work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
Department. L. Britt Snider, director
of counterintelldence and security
policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
diction of any kind over for ye: em-
ployees. whether or not they had clear-
ances. it's strictly the F.B.I."
At the F.B.I.. Mr. Parker sad. "We
are not concerned about America
who have had clearances. . e don't
look at :here people urIt-ss we detect an
individual involved in espionage."
Ex-intelllgence Chief's Moves
Senator Leahy said: "1 don't think
anyone e_tpc'cti the F.B.I. to maintain
surveillance on the several hundred
thousand people who leave the Govern-
ment each year with sinter r' cleaf-
ances. But there are a certain number
of people in ettreme?y secs ye post-
tiors. a handful of them. tt?.a: we ought
to do more with."
Mr. Leahy said Mr. How'srd "ter-.
1
have been suffident to warrant an sir-
ta.tnly would have been one of urwc
vcstigation. ? because he held highly sensitive infor-
"Anytime we get information that; mation and was being dlsmissedfolloaf-
someone has considered such an act,i ing a polygraph etamiatiot that todi-
we would take some action," said Phil-; ca ed drug use and petty' `Jevery, sit`ip A. Parker, deputy assistant directorl cordl to Federal officials.
of the bureau's intelligence division.
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When Adm. Starsfield M. Tuner
was Director of Corral LiteLigence in
the Carter Administration. he d*
missed, transferred or forced to retire
,nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who heap
highly sensitive positions.
In an inters iew? this week, he said
that others in the agency had warned.
him that "we ran the risk of some of
them selling their information to the
other side" He said he had disagreed
when it was sug? ested that some
?ther iots? and piii,
snout.; %c o~ ~=~ . .
ceeded with his original plari9.
But he said of Mr. Howard: "1 don't
think my rule should be totally rigid--I'
this guy had just been briefed. I'd s.y
Vet's stick him in the Dominican Repub-
lic or someplace like that for a couple
of years, until the information isn't
valuable anymore." Senator Leahy said: "We may need
some sort of turkey farm for some of-
these former employees. Make theiri
translate cables or something like that
:for a couple of years."
Admiral Turner said he thought
C.I.A. officers ought to be required t4
agree when they are hired that "foa
three years or so- after they leave, thel};
will be subject to the same rules of in.
trusion as applied when they were iq
government. Make them come back for
random polygraph examinations. ThCi;
would give them one more thing to
worn about before they turn." " .
A c.I.A. official said "it's co add.
able" that that idea ould work_ ing that finding solutions to the wpro~
le, "is certainly something L
thinking about now'.'
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ARTICLE APB"' RED
nu PACE I x
NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985
S Charge Spurs Questions
About Procedures of C.LA.
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
sr . .l w Tb. t4- Yet Ttma
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 - Members
of the Senate and House intelligence
committees say espionage allegations
against it former Central Intelligence
Agency officer raise serious questions
about the agency's procedures for deal-
ing with disgruntled employees.
The legislators say their committees
are conducting a detailed examination
of the career of Edward L. Howard, a
former officer of the agency who, ac-
cording to Administration officials,
was identified by a defector as having
sold the Soviet Union highly secret in-
focmatioa.
Mr. Howard was forced to resign
from the C.I.A. in 1963: the agency was
dissatisfied with his answers in a poly-
graph, or lie detector, examination
that was apparently unrelated to espio-
nage charges. Officials have said they
suspect it was a desire for revenge that
led Mr. Howard, who is believed to
have fled the country, to provide se-
crets to the Soviet Union.
"The C.I.A. has good security proce-
dures but they're not perfect and
they're going to have to get better,"
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who is the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said in an interview. "They're
going to have to figure out what to do
with a disgruntled or potentially dis-
gruntled employee who has a lot of
knowledge because that's where a lot of
breaches have occurred in the past."
C.I.A. Briefs Committees
Representative Dave McCurdy of
Oklahoma, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on oversight and Evalua-
tion of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, said: "I thLntk there are a lot of
questions yet to be answered. I'm not
sure anyone's comfortable with what
we've seen so far.'.
In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy
would not discuss the specifics of the
Howard case but said that he and some
other members of the committee had
be,cn briefed by the C.I.A. Members of
the Senate committee have had similar
briefings by the agency.
According to members of the two
committees and their aides, the panels!
are concerned about a broad range of
issues stemming from the agency's
handling of Mr. Howard, who was
within the C.I.A.'s three-year proba-
tion period when he was asked to re-
sign.
Qusstlotss Raised With C.I.A_
Among the questions the two com-
mittees are raising with the agency are
these :
q Why was Mr. Howard, a junior offi-
cial, given access to such sensitive ma-
terial at an early stage in his career?
q Why did the agency choose to dis-
miss him while the information he had
learned in training for a posting to Mos-
cow was still of value?
9 What steps were taken to keep
track of Mr. Howard's movements
after he left the C.I.A.. both in this
country and abroad, where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has charged
that he met with Soviet intelligence
agents?
(Was there sufficient coordination
between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the
other major Federal agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence work?
Administration officials say Mr.
Howard was identified as an agent of
the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko,
a senior official in the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency. He defected
to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the
officials have said, is undergoing ex=
tersive questioning at an undisclosed
location in the United States:
? Trip to Austria In '84
Mr. Howard, who is now 3.3 years old,
was employed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from January 1981 to
June 1983, according to an F.B.I. af-
fidavit filed in Federal District Court in
New Mexico. The document charged
that he traveled to Austria in 1984
where he made contact with agent of
the K.G.B. and was paid money for
"classified information relating to U.S.
intelligence sources and methods."
Intelligence sources say that the in-
formation involved related to Amer-
ican operations in Moscow. They have
said Mr. Howard was trained for a post
in Russia that would have involved
managing agents or other means of in-
telligence collection.
Intelligence sources say. however.
that he was not sent to Moscow and was
instead asked to leave the agency after
the polygraph test suggested use of ilie-
'oat Trues and petty theft of Govern-
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD
AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYL
AND 20815
(301) 656-406
8
PROGRAM
The Today Show
STATION
WRC-TV
NBC Network
DATE
October 11, 1985
7:00 A.M.
CITY
Washington, D.C.
Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking
BRYANT GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy is the ranking
Democrat on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He has
been critical in the past of America's ability to gather
intelligence information in the Mideast. He's joined us this
morning from our bureau in Washington.
Are you a satisfied Senator this morning?
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: I'm a very happy Senator this
morning. I didn't mind the calls half the night or the very,
very early briefing over at the CIA this morning. This is a case
of success.
I've said, in fact, in interviews with you before that
if we're going to use the vast power that this country has to go
after terrorists, we've got to have far better intelligence and
information than we've had. This is a case where the
intelligence worked, worked very, very well, even to the extent
of knowing when the Egyptian President said that the hijackers
had left, we knew they hadn't. We knew they were in Egypt. And
we were able to track them and follow them all the way through.
It was a superb use of intelligence and connecting it up with our
military assets.
GUMBEL: If all that's correct, aren't you a little bit
bothered that the Egyptians lied to us?
SENATOR LEAHY: I'm extremely bothered that they did. I
can't guess what their reasons might have been. I think that
has to be a demonstration that the United States is going to be
in a position to make its own judgment on what people tell us,
and not have to take anything on faith.
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GUMBEL: Well, what do we do, then, in reaction to what
the Egyptians did? I mean certainly in this case I think you'd
have to agree they did not act in a manner befitting a strong
ally.
SENATOR LEAHY: No. And I think that there's going to
be some real strains as a result of this. They will of course be
angry at us for forcing their airplane down. I think our
reactions would be, "Don't even talk to us about that. If you've
got hijackers, especially those who've murdered an American,
you're harboring them, you're just going to have to assume that
we're going to come and go after them."
And I think that message has to go to virtually every
country, that we want people who have attacked Americans to be
brought to justice, wherever it might be. And if it's necessary,
we'll go and get them.
GUMBEL: In this case, brought to justice may mean
Italian justice. Is that fine by you?
SENATOR LEAHY: I don't have a problem with that because
I think that the Italian courts work very well, and it was an
Italian-flag ship. But I think eventually I want to see them
extradited back here to the United States and tried also in a
U.S. court. The Italians have a perfect right to try them, and
should and can. But eventually I want to seem them tried here in
the United States.
GUMBEL: What would be served by that?
SENATOR LEAHY: I think it serves to demonstrate to the
world that the United States will watch out for its interests,
wherever it might be, and that eventually people will be brought
to justice here.
GUMBEL: Whether or not they ever do make it to these
shores, is there any move afoot to have these hijackers
interrogated by American officials? Is that important to you?
SENATOR LEAHY: It's very important to us. And there
are things that will be done very soon. We're going to make sure
that we have people who were witnesses positively identify these
people, make sure that there hasn't been any switch, that we have
the right people.
GUMBEL: To the best of your knowledge -- I mean it
seems fairly certain what kind of fate awaits the four hijackers.
What about the other two PLO officials who were on board? What's
going to happen to them?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, we're going to have to look at
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whether we have cases that can be brought against them, either as
accessories or otherwise.
I think the most important thing, though, is that we've
demonstrated that our intelligence is getting better and that we
know who these people are and where they are, and it really is
not going to do them any good to seek safe harbor in any country.
We'll go after them.
GUMBEL: As we talk about how strongly the U.S. reacted,
you were in on the CIA briefings on this, as you noted at the top
of this interview. Were we prepared to shoot that craft down if
they had ignored our signals to land?
SENATOR LEAHY: I agree with Secretary Shultz that
that's something that we can not and should not go into. I think
that it leaves our options open. And quite frankly, I'd just
soon have, if there are going to be- future terrorists or
hijackers, that they now know exactly what our options are.
GUMBEL: Senator Patrick Leahy, you look like a happy
man this morning.
SENATOR LEAHY: I'm very happy, and I'm very proud of
the President in this case.
GUMBEL: Thank you very much, sir.
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RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM CBS Morning News STA11ON WDVM-TV
CBS Network
DATE October 11, 1985 7:00 A.M. CITY Washington, D.C.
Senator Leahy/Achille Lauro's Hijacking
MARIA SHRIVER: Well, the so-called hijacking of the
hijackers was the subject of overnight briefings for certain
members of Congress, including Senator Patrick Leahy, the ranking
Democrat on the Intelligence Committee. Senator Leahy's joining
us right now in our Washington bureau.
Can you bring us up to date? Exactly what were you told
last evening about the hijacking?
SENATOR PATRICK LEAHY: Well, we were kept informed as
we went along everything that was happening. I don't think many
of us got much sleep last night because of the phone calls. But
for once, at least, the calls were all positive.
This is a case where we had a lot of things that if they
all work right, we get the result we did. They all worked right.
And it's a major triumph for the United States.
SHRIVER: What were you told about what went into this
decision, how it was brought about?
SENATOR LEAHY: We knew that when Mr. Mubarak went on
the news yesterday morning and said that the hijackers had left
Egypt, we knew that wasn't so. And it was a case where we knew
they were in Egypt. Intelligence was very, very good. When they
left, we knew that and were able to send the planes out to
intercept the hijackers' plane -- no small feat, in and of itself
-- and locating the plane, and then in requiring it to land in
Italy.
It's a case where here we are the most powerful nation
in the world and we've been frustrated by hijackers and by
OFFICES IN. WASHINGTON D.C. ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
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T
terrorists because often we didn't know where they were or how to
reach them or who to bring our military power to bear on. And
this was a case where our intelligence was superb, worked very,
very well, and allowed the United States to use the options
available to it as a superpower.
SHRIVER: What do you think the reaction of your
colleagues will be to the decision by President Reagan and the
Pentagon?
SENATOR LEAHY: Well, it should be a positive one, and
it shouldn't be any kind of a partisan thing. I think this is a
case where I would hope there will not be dissenting voices in
the Congress. I hope that we say very clearly that the American
people support the President on this, because you want to send a
signal to future hijackers or future terrorists that we will find
them. We'll look for them, we'll identify them, and we'll go
after them and we'll bring them to justice. And that's exactly
what's happening in this case.
And that is the only way we are going to put any kind of
a dent in terrorism. And I support the President's action very,
very strongly.
SHRIVER: Okay. Thank you very much, Senator Leahy, for
joining us this morning to bring us up to date on this story.
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FPrFA"ED
xroeCE f!c.-_
OFFICIALS SAY
DID NOT TELL F.B.I.
OF SPY CASE MOVES
The followingarticle is nosed on re-
porting by Stephen Engetberg and Joel
Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brink-
ley.
11 October 1985
In the last few weeks the C.I.A. An intelligence official said the
transferred the chief of its office of se. C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
curity, William Kotopish, to a new job internally rather than report it to the
at a level of equivalent seniority, but an F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
official said the move had been planned "I1 you reported every fantasy that
for some time" and was not related to people have, you'd have everyone
under surveillance."
Mr. Howard worked for the agency
from 1981 to 1983. He was told of classi-
fled American intelligence operations
in MOSCOW oecau We agency was
planning to assign him there, officials
have said. -
According to a criminal complaint on
file in Federal District Court in Albu-
so.a.t to Tn. New Yat Ttm? querque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The Ce:n current employees of the intelligence
tral?Intelligence Agency failed to notify agency a year ago last month that he
the Federal Bureau of Investigation had "spent hours in the vicinity of the
after it learned more than a year ago i{ Soviet Embassy trying to decide
that Edward L. Howard was consider- whether to enter the embassy and dis-
ing becoming a Soviet Spy, Govern- close classified information."
mint officials said today. An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver-
According to court records, Mr. How-' sation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four
days before that; the Government con-
ard told two agency employees in Sep- tends, Mr. Howard gave his. inforr a-
tember 1964 that he was thinking of dis-
closing classified information to the
Soviet Union.
Soviet Defector Was the Key
The bureau has sole responsibility
for domestic espionage investigations
and, under Federal law, the intelli-
gence agency and all other Govern-
ment agencies are supposed to report
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed-
eral agency to carry out surveillance or
other actions within the United States
to stop potential spies.
Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former
a fugitive, has been charged with espto will be how the C.I.A. and other assn
Wage, accused of giving Soviet officials ties deal with employees who leave
details of American intelligence opera- Government service with detailed,
tions in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive
called the disclosures serious and dam- programs.
aging , - Another element of the investiga-
Bad Mistake,' Senator Says lions will be several recent espionage
cases in which Government officials
Federal officials said the C.I.A. told failed to heed warning signs that a cur-
F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard rent or former employee was planning
t:l after the bureau began an investi- to spy or was spying, committee mem-
gatton this fall based on informatioelhers said.
from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Ytr-
chenko, who had been a senior official
of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligence
agThe bureau began surveillance of
Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped
out of his home at night and is believed
to have fled the country.
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Ver-
mont Democrat who is vice chairman
of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not
give the F.B.I. adequate information'.
about this person, that's a bad mistake.
It shows very, very serious problems
within the C.I.A."
tion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus-
tria.
Geo e Laude a C.I.A. ~kesman~
said t ay that as a result of that con-
versation "action was taken" within
the agency "and it seemed to be rea-
sonable action at the time." He would
not say what the action was, although
an official said the agency kept in con-
tact with Mr. Howard after his conver-
sation with the two C.I.A. operatives.
Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the
time.
'A Few Blatant Cases'
The Senate and House intelligence
committees are investigating the han-
dling of the Howard case. A key issue in
where we just didn't follow through,
even with alarm bells going off," said
Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo-
crat of Oklahoma, chairman of the
House committee's Subcommittee on
Oversight and Evaluaton.
In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I.
Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.
The C.I.A would not say whether it
undertook any form of inquiry after
Ali. n,waru Lu1' we -wo C.I.A. em-'
ployees he had considered becoming a
Soviet spy. But Federal .law and a
Presidential executive order prohibit
the agency from taking any steps in-
side the United States to investigate
possible cases of espionage.
Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-
sands of people who retire from Gov-
ernment or industry each year after
holding positions that gave them ac-,
ceas to classified materials. More than
4.3 million people in government and
industry associated with government
now have clearances to use classified
information.
Asked what procedures the Central
Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
former employees who have knowl-
edge of classified programs, Mr. Laud-
er, the agency spokesman, said: "We
haven't got4 any procedures. Once a
person leaves here, he is John Q. Citi-
zen, just like you and me. We don't
keep a string ott them. It's strictly an
F.B.I. hatter. "
Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota
Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee, said his
panel would also examine the problem
presented by military officers who re-
tire with knowledge of classified ma-
terials.
Most people with security clearances
work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
Department, L. Britt Snider, director
of counterintellgience and security
policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
diction of any kind over former ertl-
plovees, whether or not they had clear-
ances. It's strictly the F.B.I."
At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said. "We
are not concerned about A.rner-,Ca_I~S
who have had clearances. We don't
look at these people unless we detect an
individual involved in espionage."
Ex-intelligence Chief's Moves
Senator Leahy said: "I don't think
anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain
surveillance on the several hundred
thousand people who leave the Govern-
ment each year with securitclear-
ances. But there are a certain-numb-4r
of people in extremely sensitive posi-
tions, a handful of them, that we ought
official said Mr. Howard's conversa- to do more with."
tion with the two C.I.A. officers would Mr. Leahv said Mr. Howard "cer-
have been sufficient to warrant an in-1 manly. would have been one of those"
vestlgation. because he held highly sensitive infor-
"Anytime we get information that ; mation and was being dismissedfollovf-
someone has considered such an act, ing a polygraph examination that indi-
we would take some action." said Phil called dreg use and petty thievery, aC-
lip A. Parker, deputy assistant directors ccrdfrQ to Federal officials.
of the bureau's intelligence division.
Continued
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When Adm. Stanfield M. erne
was Director of Central intelligence in
the Carter Administration, he di-4-
missed, transferred or forced to retire
nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who hela.
highly sensitive positions.
In an interview t1iig week, he saJ4
had warned.
that others in the agency
him that "we ran the risk of some of
them selling their information to the
other side-" He said he had disagreed
when it was suggested that some
,,.hem oohs, and p-
Sll~ui: :R. o:':
ceeded with his original plans.
But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't
think my rule should be totally rigid.-It
this guy had just been briefed, I'd s$y
let's stick him in the Dominican Repul
lic or someplace like that for a couplo
of years, until the information isn't
valuable anymore-"
Senator Leahy said: "We may need
some sort of turkey farm for some et.
these former employees. Make thern
that
translate cables or something like '!for a couple of years."
Admiral Turner said he though
C.I.A. officers ought to be required t4
'agree when they are hired that "for
three years or so after they leave, tN*y
will be subject to the same rules of In..
trusion as applied when they were 19
government. Make them come back for
random polygraph examinations. Th4f;
would give them one more thing to
worry about before they turn."
A C,.i.A. official said "it's conceiv'
able" that that idea would work, add.
ing that finding solutions to the probJ,
lem "is certainly something we're
thinking about now.'
A
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ARTICLE APP1~: 1PED
nNPACE /\I
NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985
Charge Spurs Questions
Spy
About Procedures of C.Q.A.
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
S,..cial to TM 16. Yet Tlma
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 - Members
of the Senate and House intelligence
committees say espionage allegations
against a former Central Intelligence
Agency officer raise serious questions
about the agency's procedures for deal-
ing with disgruntled employees.
The legislators say their committees
are conducting a detailed examination
of the career of Edward L. Howard, a
former officer of the agency who, as
cording to Administration officials,
was identified by a defector as having
sold the Soviet Union highly secret in-
formation.
Mr. Howard was forced to resign
from the C.I.A. In 1983; the agency was
dissatisfied with his answers in a poly-
graph, or lie detector, examination
that was apparently unrelated to espio-
nage charges. Officials have said they
suspect it was a desire for revenge that
led Mr. Howard, who is believed to
have fled the country, to provide se-
crets to the Soviet Union.
"The C.I.A. has good security proce-
dures but they're not perfect and
they're going to have to get better,"
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who is the vice chairman of
the senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said in an interview. "They're
going to have to figure out what to do
with a disgruntled or potentially dis-
gruntled employee who has a lot of
knowledge because that's where a lot of
breaches have occurred in the past."
C.I.A. Briefs Committees
Representative Dave McCurdy of
Oklahoma, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Evalua-
tion of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, said: "I think there are a lot of
questions yet to be answered. I'm not
Sure anyone's comfortable with what
we've seen so far."
In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy
would not discuss the specifics of the
Howard case but said that he and some
other members of the committee had
been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of
the Senate committee have had similar
briefings by the agency.
According to members of the two
committees and their aides, the panels
are concerned about a broad range of
issues stemming from the agency's
handling of Mr. Howard, who was
within the C.I.A.'s three-year proba-
tion period when he was asked to re-
sign.
Questions Raised With C.I.A.
Among the questions the two com-
mittees are raising with the agency are
these:
9Why was Mr. Howard, a junior offi-
cial, given access to such sensitive ma-
terial at an early stage in his career?
q Why did the agency choose to dis-
miss him while the information he had
learned in training for a posting to Mos-
cow was still of value?
9What steps were taken to keep
track of Mr. Howard's movements
after he left the C.I.A., both in this
country and abroad, where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has charged
that he met with Soviet intelligence
agents?
9Was there sufficient coordination
between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the
other major Federal agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence work?
Administration officials say Mr.
Howard was identified as an agent of
the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko,
a senior official in the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency. He defected
to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the
officials have said, is undergoing ex-
tensive questioning at an undisclosed
location in the United States:
? Trip to Austria in '84
Mr. Howard, who is now 3.3 years old,
was employed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from January 1981 to
June 1983, according to an F.B.I. af-
fidavit filed in Federal District Court in
New Mexico. The document charged
that he traveled to Austria in 1984
where he made contact with agent of
the K.G.B. and was paid money for
"classified information relating to U.S.
intelligence sources and methods."
Intelligence sources say that the in-
formation involved related to Amer-
ican operations in Moscow. They have
said Mr. Howard was trained for a post
in Russia that would have involved
managing agents or other means of in-
telligence collection.
Intelligence sources say, however,
that he was not sent to Moscow and was
instead asked to leave the agency after
the polygraph test suggested use of ille-
gal drugs and petty theft of Govern-
ment funds.
Mr. Howard, who had been working
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STAT
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. 4i, , 11. 121
THE CIA IN TRANSITION
WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1986
New Era of Mistrust
1Role
By David B. Ottaway
and Patrick E. Tyler
Wasbingtan Pat saf Writers
Ten years ago today, 72 senators
voted to assert a stronger role for
Congress in. overseeing the vast
.U.S. intelligence apparatus in the
'wake of painful disclosures, scandals
and abuses at the Central Intelli
`gence Agency and the collection of
secretive federal agencies known as
the U.S. intelligence "community."
The hope was to end an era of
suspicion, to narrow the number of
congressional committees that had
jurisdiction over the intelligence
budget, to cut down on leaks of clas-
sified information and to. set up a
strong, permanent monitoring body
to restore integrity and confidence
in America's intelligence-gathering
capabilities.
But after a decade, a new era of
mistrust has dawned.
The Reagan administration is
virtually at war with the two com-
mittees that were established to
oversee the U.S. intelligence arm.
Each side has accused the other of
endangering the nation's most sen-
sitive intelligence systems and jeop-
ardizing covert operations in the
Third World through unauthorized
leaks to the news media.
Sen. David F. Durenberger (R-
Minn.), chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, said in
an interview for this article that "a
lot of those people [in the admin-
istration] don't want oversight." He
charged that the administration has
"screwed up" its covert attempt to
change the Marxist government in
Nicaragua and that every one' of the
CIA's covert paramilitary opera-
tions "is a problem."
In addition, Durenberger as-
serted that special interest groups
and "right-wing senators" have been
driving the administration's secret
diplomacy in Afghanistan and An-
gola; that Secretary of State
George P. Shultz has allowed him-
self to be intimidated by these
groups while CIA Director William
J. Casey has shown a hypersensi-
tivity to criticism. Durenberger said
his own well-publicized marital
troubles have been spotlighted by
conservative Reagan supporters as
ameans of attacking his credibility
as Senate oversight chairman.
The feud has grown so acrimo-
nious that administration officials
are suggesting it could soon endan-
ger the future of the oversight pro-
cess. Already, some top officials are
charging that oversight is out of
control. A few have suggested pri-
vately that the House and Senate
intelligence panels be abolished and
their responsibilities consolidated in
one tightly controlled joint commit-
tee.
President Reagan, in a classified
letter to Durenberger, warned a
few months ago that the oversight
process was seriously "at risk" and
blamed Congress for a hemorrhage
of national security data to the news
media.
The Senate oversight leadership
in turn has charged that the Reagan
administration has systematically
disclosed highly classified intelli-
gence information to influence pub-
lic debate and to bully Congress
into supporting its overseas adven-
tures.
At the core of the dispute are the
fj deeper divisions between Con-
gcess and the White House over
what has emerged as a key feature
of the administration's foreign pol-
icy-the so-called Reagan Doc-
trine, which by nature is carried out
behind a cloak of secrecy provided
by the CIA.
The doctrine has never been de-
fined by Reagan personally and its
outline has been most extensively
shaped by the conservative cadres
that seek to frame the Reagan for-
eign policy agenda. But if Reagan
has not embraced its name, he has
embraced its cause: the support of
Third World anticommunist guer-
rilla forces-"freedom fighters"-
in their quest to roll back Soviet
influence and dismantle Marxist
regimes.
In the past five years under the
Reagan Doctrine, the United States
has fielded and supplied more para-
military forces against Soviet sur-
rogates in the Third World than at
any time since the Vietnam war.
CIA paramilitary experts-run guns,
train guerrillas, outfit them with
communications equipment and
ftovide them with battlefield intel-
!fl ence. As the fighting has steadily
escalated in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Nicaragua and now Angola, ques-
tions in Congress have grown
steadily louder.
The president is now seeking
$100 million in new aid for counter-
revolutionary, or contra, guerrillas
in Nicaragua. The CIA is involved in
operations to destabilize Libyan
leader Muammar Qaddafi and in
low-level support to antigovern-
ment paramilitary forces in Ethio-
pia, according to intelligence
sources.
The administration's attack on
oversight, according to congres-
sional leaders, must be weighed
against the phenomenal budgetary
support the congressional oversight
committees have marshalled for the
intelligence community. The intel-
ligence budget of about $10 billion
in 1979 has more than doubled to
$24 billion this year and is projected
to triple by 1990. This support has
allowed the Carter and Reagan ad-
ministrations to rapidly build up the
most sophisticated, high-technology
intelligence apparatus in the world.
Still, the frustrations are deep
and bitter in this "partnership,"
largely because the intelligence
buildup has restored a formidable
and lethal capability in the CIA's
directorate of operations to mount
covert paramilitary operations over
which Congress has little control. It
was inevitable, according to some
senators, that once the CIA had this
capability, it would find new "oppor-
tunities" to justify using its most
controversial instrument.
The president is required to send
only a secret notification to the in-
telligence oversight committees
that such operations are under way.
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Congressional leaders have com-
plained that there is no opportunity
to debate these sensitive and dan-
gerous adventures, though they
may involve significant commit-
ments of U.S. prestige and military
resources and may involve equally
significant risks whose conse-
quences are borne by all Ameri-
cans.
As House intelligence oversight
Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.)
lamented recently, the CIA's covert
operations in support of President
Reagan's "freedom fighters" are
among the most important foreign
policy issues before Congress-
"and I can't talk about them!"
A decade ago, when intelligence
oversight began in earnest, CIA
covert operations were largely in
disrepute. CIA paramilitary experts
were disparaged as the "knuckle
draggers" of the agency and. there
was a consensus to pump massive
resources into high-technology spy
systems.
Former senator Birch Bayh (D-
Ind.), who chaired the Senate com-
mittee during the Carter adminis-
tration, said in an interview that the
oversight process was founded on a
healthy mistrust between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches.
"The reservations about over-
sight in the Carter administration
were based on a sincere concern
about security: Can 17 U.S. sena-
tors keep a secret? We found out
they could. The present reserva-
tion," Bayh continued, "is a sort of
arrogant attitude that it's just none
of your damned business, as if the
Senate were a foreign body."
It is not clear where the seeds of
the new mistrust were sown. It may
have been in the jungles of Nicara-
gua, where a rogue commander of
CIA-backed forces got out of con-
trol; or in the Nicaraguan port of
Corinto, where CIA contract agents
mined the harbor without clear con-
gressional notification; or in Beirut,
where a team dispatched by CIA-
backed Lebanese security forces
killed-without CIA authoriza-
tion-75 people with a car bomb.
But the effect of the frequent
eruptions over the management and
oversight of CIA covert operations
has grown to the point where Rea-
gan and his national security affairs
advisers are hinting at the need to
dismantle the decade-old oversight
system that took shape in Senate
Resolution 400.
That resolution passed 72 to 22
on May 19, 1976, reducing the
number of Senate committees with
jurisdiction over the intelligence
community from four to one, with
15 regular members. Ford admin-
istration officials and conservatives
-in Congress hoped that by limiting
oversight to two committees, the
risk of leaks of classified informa-
tion from Congress would be sharp-
ly reduced.
A year later, the House,merged
the oversight function of four com-
mittees into a single panel of 17
members.
Recriminations between .' the
oversight panels and successive ad'
ministrations have characterized
the relationship from the beginning.
During the debates over the Pan-
ama Canal treaties and the SALT II
strategic arms negotiations with
the Soviet Union, Bayh said, a se-
ries of disclosures of highly classi-
fied information infuriated the in-
telligence community.
Bayh said it appeared to. him at
the time that rival groups in the
Pentagon, State Department and
White House were behind most of
these disclosures, although a group
of Senate aides, who referred to
themselves as the "Madison
Group," were reputed to have
waged a disclosure campaign to
block the SALT II treaty.
? Interviews with congressional
leaders in both parties suggest that
the current attack on the oversight
process cannot be explained simply
by the recurring recriminations
over national security leaks.
Instead, many of these leaders
said they believe the attacks stem
from the frustration of Reagan's
senior advisers, who have been un-
successful in winning broad support
for their rapidly expanding program
of covert paramilitary operations
around the world.
Reagan, Shultz and Casey all
complain that the Republican-con-
trolled Senate intelligence commit-
tee has not supported Reagan's se-
cret diplomacy.
"It is my considered judgment,"
said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.),
vice chairman of the oversight com-
mittee, "that the new reliance on
covert military action as a normal
instrument of foreign policy-even
as a substitute for foreign policy-
has strained the current. oversight
process to the breaking point."
Speaking to former intelligence
officers recently, Leahy said the
Reagan Doctrine of covert action in
the Third World poses a basic ques-
tion:
"Can a democracy like the United
States engage in large-scale, so-
called 'covert paramilitary opera-
tions,' using our intelligence agen-
cies as instruments in waging proxy
wars against the Soviet Union or-its
clients?'
Leahy and other congressional
leaders said they believe the Rea-
gan administration is orchestrating
a campaign to dismantle congres-
sional oversight or at least to se-
verely limit the authority of the
House and Senate panels.
Durenberger agrees and said he
thinks the real issue is the admin-
istration's controversial secret di-
plomacy: "Nicaragua, we screwed
up," he said, adding, "Every one of
these [covert paramilitary involve-
ments] is a problem."
"There is no question," he said,
"that the administration is having a
hell of a time driving the policy in
Angola or in Afghanistan." In An-
gola, he_ asserted, policy is "being
driven by little meetings of right-
wing senators with the secretary of
state. [They are] telling him what
he's supposed to. do and if he
doesn't, they are going to bring
[Angolan rebel leader] Jonas
Savimbi over here in order to con-
duct a crusade."
The senator was referring to pri-
vate discussions in early March be-
tween Shultz and a group of conser-
vative senators led by Majority
Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).
The group insisted that Shultz and
Casey send sophisticated U.S.
Stinger antiaircraft missiles to
Savimbi. Within a week of these
discussions, Reagan gave secret
authorization to send them.
In Afghanistan, "Nobody likes the
way [Rep.] Charlie Wilson [D-Tex.]
was running policy," Durenberger
said, referring to Wilson's leading
role-as an influential House mem-
ber who does not sit on the intel-
ligence panel-in advocating bud-
get increases to fund opposition to
Soviet invasion forces.
Durenberger said he feels that
his loyal opposition to Reagan ad-
ministration policy has drawn for
him a series of calculated personal
attacks-from Casey and particu-
larly from the right wing of the Re-
publican Party.
For example, last November, af-
ter Durenberger had criticized
some aspects of Casey's direction of
the agency, Casey fired off a public
letter accusing Durenberger of "the
repeated compromise of sensitive
intelligence sources and methods"
and of conducting oversight in an
"off-the-cuff' manner.
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4.
"It is time to acknowledge that
the process has gone seriously
awry," Casey concluded.
Durenberger refers to that dis-
pute as the "Casey-(expletive)-on-
Durenberger days," and attributes
Casey's outburst to his sensitivity
to criticism. "Bill Casey can't con-
trol his temper very long. He's Irish
by nature and all that sort of thing."
The chairman said he has since
tried to repair the damaged rela-
tionship, but still believes the ad-
ministration, and particularly its
supporters in the right wing, are
out to discredit him. After criticiz-
ing the CIA's latest Angolan cam-
paign, Durenberger was blasted as
a "rogue chairman" in right-wing
columns.
"This is the way you operate,"
the senator said. "You take Duren-
berger's personal life to the clean-
ers in The Washington Times as a
way to reverse Angola policy. It's
endemic in this administration to do
a certain amount of that."
Still, Durenberger's style of run-
ning the committee and his well-
publicized marital problems have
prompted concern among his col-
leagues that the committee's cred-
ibility has suffered and left the
oversight process more vulnerable
to administration attacks.
One committee insider said the
first priority of Sens. William S.
Cohen (R-Maine) and David L.
Boren (D-Okla.), who are scheduled
to take over the committee next
January, will be reestablishing the
prestige of the panel within the-
Senate. "The consensus view is that
Durenberger has seriously eroded
the committee's credibility," the
source said.
Durenberger detects the outline
of an administration plan to gut the
oversight process from recent com-
ments by administration loyalists
such as Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.),
a member of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
"Henry Hyde doesn't want over-
sight," Durenberger said. "Henry
Hyde wants a situation in which a
few buddies in the community are
informed and that takes care of
Congress and the public."
"They want to destroy the two
committees," Durenberger said.
The administration, he said, would
prefer a joint House-Senate com-
mittee with members firmly under
the control of a chairman faithful to
the White House and sympathetic
to the CIA.
Congressional oversight in the
past year has pointed up serious
flaws in the CIA's management of
U.S. intelligence capabilities and
the handling of defectors. Repub-
lican and Democratic senators have
pounced on the case of KGB Col.
Vitaly Yurchenko, who decided to
return to the Soviet Union after
three months of intense debriefing
by a CIA team.
The agency has been forced to
admit that it bungled the Yurchenko
affair and made a public mea culpa
during the confirmation hearing of
CIA Deputy Director Robert M.
Gates last month.
The Senate panel is conducting a
major personnel study this summer
and the imposition of committee
staffers poring through intelligence
agency , personnel files is likely to
add to the oversight friction.
Most of the warfare between the
CIA and its oversight committees,
however, is limited to a small por-
tion of overall intelligence activi-
ties.
Leahy, a vocal opponent to co-
vert warfare against Nicaragua,
said recently that he and Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) agreed 99 per-
cent of the time.on intelligence mat-
ters. Goldwater was the crusty con-
servative who chaired the commit-
tee for four years and once said in-
telligence oversight was none of the
Senate's business.
But many members agree that.
the large issues of budgetary sup-
port, strategic planning for intelli-
gence systems of the future and the
improvement of basic intelligence
gathering have broad bipartisan
support on the committees.
"I've been there almost seven
years," Leahy said, "and in all that
time I've never seen any senator,
Republican or Democrat, who was
not interested in having the best in-
telligence services in the world."
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THE CIA IN TRANSITION
WASHINGTON POST
19 May 1986
New Era of Mistrust
MarkSX-vWess' Role
Ottawsy
and David B.
nd Tyler
warW*= %d.%W
Ten years ago today, 72 senators
voted to asst a stronger role for
Congress ig'. overseeing the vast
U.S. intethg apparatus in the
1~rakoe of psiinlld dlidoau, scandals
an. abuses at the Cedttrsl Intelli*.
'gene Agency and the cclection of
secretive federal agencies known as
the U.& intelligence "community."
The hope was to end an era of
suspicion, to narrow the number of
congressional committees that had
jurisdiction over the intelligence
budget, to cut down on leaks of clas-
sified information and to. set up a
strong, permanent monitoring body
to restore integrity and confidence
in America's intelligence-gathering
capabilities.
But after a decade, a new era of
mistrust has dawned.
The Reagan administration is
virtually at war with the two com-
mittees that were established to
oversee the U.S. intelligence arm.
Each side has accused the other of
endangering the nation's most sen-
sitive intelligence systems and jeop-
ardizing covert operations in the
Third World through unauthorized
leaks to the news media.
Sen. David F.' Durenberger (R-
Minn.), chairman of the Select
Committee on Intelligence, said in
an interview for this article that "a
lot of those people [in the admin-
istration] don't want oversight." He
charged that the administration has
"screwed up" its covert attempt to
change the Marxist government in
Nicaragua and that every one' of the
CIA's covert paramilitary opera-
tions "is a problem."
In addition, Durenberger as-
serted that special interest groups
and "right-wing senators" have been
driving the administration's secret
diplomacy in Afghanistan and An-
gola; that Secretary of State
George P. Shultz has allowed him-
self to be intimidated by these
groups while CIA Director William
J. Casey has shown a hypersensi-
tivity to criticism. Durenberger said
his own well-publicized marital
troubles have been spotlighted by
c-servative Reagan supporters as
a'means of attacking his credibility,
as Senate oversight chairman.
The feud has grown so acrimo-
nious that administration officials
are suggesting it could soon endan-
ger the future of the oversight pro-
cess. Already, some top officials are
charging that oversight is out of
control. A few have suggested pri-
vately that the House and Senate
intelligence panels be abolished and
their responsibilities consolidated in
one tightly controlled joint commit-
tee.
President Reagan, in a classified
letter to Durenberger, warned a
few months ago that the oversight
process was seriously "at risk" and
blamed Congress for a hemorrhage
of national security data to the news
media.
The Senate oversight leadership
in turn has charged that the Reagan
administration has systematically
disclosed highly classified intelli-
gence information to influence pub-
lic debate and to bully Congress
into supporting its overseas adven-
tures.
At the core of the dispute are the
f Jr deeper divisions between Con-
gLiess and the White House over
what has emerged as a key feature
of the administration's foreign pol-
icy-the so-called Reagan Doc-
trine, which by nature is carried out
behind a cloak of secrecy provided
by the CIA.
The doctrine has never been de-
fined by Reagan personally and its
outline has been most extensively
shaped by the conservative cadres
that seek to frame the Reagan for-
eign policy agenda. But if Reagan
has not embraced its name, he has
embraced its cause: the support of
Third World anticommunist guer-
rilla forces-"freedom fighters"-
in their quest to roll back Soviet
influence and dismantle Marxist
regimes.
In the past five years under the
Reagan Doctrine, the United States
has fielded and supplied more para-
military forces against Soviet sur-
rogates in the Third World than at
any time since the Vietnam war.
CIA paramilitary experts-run guns,
train guerrillas, outfit them with
communications equipment and
*ovide them with battlefield intel-
! ence. As the fighting has steadily
escalated in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Nicaragua and now Angola, ques-
tions in Congress have grown
steadily louder.
The president is now seeking
$100 million in new aid for counter-
revolutionary, or contra, guerrillas
in Nicaragua. The CIA is involved in
operations to destabilize Libyan
leader Muammar Qaddafi and in
low-level support to antigovern-
ment paramilitary forces in Ethio-
pia, according to intelligence
sources.
The administration's attack on
oversight, according to congres-
sional leaders, must be weighed
against the phenomenal budgetary
support the congressional oversight
committees have marshalled for the
intelligence community. The intel-
ligence budget of about $10 billion
in 1979 has more than doubled to
$24 billion this year and is projected
to triple by 1990. This support has
allowed the Carter and Reagan ad-
ministrations to rapidly build up the
most sophisticated, high-technology
intelligence apparatus in the world.
Still, the frustrations are deep
and bitter in this "partnership,"
largely because the intelligence
buildup has restored a formidable
and lethal capability in the CIA's
directorate of operations to mount
covert paramilitary operations over
which Congress has little control. It
was inevitable, according to some
senators, that once the CIA had this
capability, it would find new "oppor-
tunities" to justify using its most
controversial instrument.
The president is required to send
only a secret notification to the in-
telligence oversight committees
that such operations are under way.
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Congressional leaders have com-
plained that there is no opportunity
to debate these sensitive and dan-
gerous adventures, though they
may involve significant commit-
ments of U.S. prestige and military
resources and may involve equally
significant risks whose conse-
quences are borne by all Ameri-
cans.
As House intelligence oversight
Chairman Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.)
lamented recently, the CIA's covert
operations in support of President
Reagan's "freedom fighters" are
among the most important foreign
policy issues before Congress-
"and I can't talk about them!"
A decade ago, when intelligence
oversight began in earnest, CIA
covert operations were largely in
disrepute. CIA paramilitary experts
were disparaged as the "knuckle
draggers" of the agency and. there
was a consensus to pump massive
resources into high-technology spy
systems.
Former senator Birch Bayh (D-
Ind.), who chaired the Senate com-
mittee during the Carter adminis-
tration, said in an interview that the
oversight process was founded on a
healthy mistrust between the ex-
ecutive and legislative branches.
"The reservations about over-
sight in the Carter administration
were based on a sincere concern
about security: Can 17 U.S. sena-
tors keep a secret? We found out
they could. The present reserva-
tion," Bayh continued, "is a sort of
arrogant attitude that it's just none
of your damned business, as if the
Senate were a foreign body."
It is not clear where the seeds of
the new mistrust were sown. It may
have been in the jungles of Nicara-
gua, where a rogue commander of
CIA-backed forces got out of con-
trol; or in the Nicaraguan port of
Corinto, where CIA contract agents
mined the harbor without clear con-
gressional notification; or in Beirut,
where a team dispatched by CIA-
backed Lebanese security forces
killed-without CIA authoriza-
tion-75 people with a car bomb.
But the effect of the frequent
eruptions over the management and
oversight of CIA covert operations
has grown to the point where Rea-
gan and his national security affairs
advisers are hinting at the need to
dismantle the decade-old oversight
system that took shape in Senate
Resolution 400.
That resolution passed 72 to 22
on May 19, 1976, reducing the
number of Senate committees with
jurisdiction over the intelligence
community from four to one, with
15 regular members. Ford admin-
istration officials and conservatives
? in Congress hoped that by limiting
oversight to two committees, the
risk of leaks of classified informa-
tion from Congress would be sharp-
ly reduced.
A year later, the House ? merged
the oversight function of four com-
mittees into a single panel of 17
members.
Recriminations between . ? the
oversight panels and successive ads
ministrations have characterized
the relationship from the beginning.
During the debates over the Pan-
ama Canal treaties and the SALT II
strategic arms negotiations with
the Soviet Union, Bayh said, a se-
ries of disclosures of highly classi-
fied information infuriated the in-
telligence community.
Bayh said it appeared to him at
the time that rival groups in the
Pentagon, State Department and
White House were behind most of
these disclosures, although a group
of Senate aides, who referred to
themselves as the "Madison
Group," were reputed to have
waged a disclosure campaign to
block the SALT II treaty.
. Interviews with congressional
leaders in both parties suggest that
the current attack on the oversight
process cannot be explained simply
by the recurring recriminations
over national security leaks.
Instead, many of these leaders
said they believe the attacks stem
from the frustration of Reagan's
senior advisers, who have been un-
successful in winning broad support
for their rapidly expanding program
of covert paramilitary operations
around the world.
Reagan, Shultz and Casey all
complain that the Republican-con-
trolled Senate intelligence commit-
tee has not supported Reagan's se-
cret diplomacy.
"It is my considered judgment,"
said Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.),
vice chairman of the oversight com-
mittee, "that the new reliance on
covert military action as a normal
instrument of foreign policy-even
as a substitute for foreign policy-
has strained the current, oversight
process to the breaking point."
Speaking to former intelligence
officers recently, Leahy said the
Reagan Doctrine of covert action in
the Third World poses a basic ques-
tion:
. "Can a democracy like the United
States engage in large-scale, so-
called 'covert paramilitary opera-
tions,' using our intelligence agen-
cies as instruments in waging proxy
wars against the Soviet Union or-its
clients?"
Leahy and other congressional
leaders said they believe the Rea-
gan administration is orchestrating
a campaign to dismantle congres-
sional oversight or at least to se-
verely limit the authority of the
House and Senate panels.
Durenberger agrees and said he
thinks the real issue is the admin-
istration's controversial secret di-
plomacy: "Nicaragua, we screwed
up," he said, adding, "Every one of
these [covert paramilitary involve-
ments] is a problem."
"There is no question," he said,
"that the administration is having a
hell of a time driving the policy in
Angola or in Afghanistan." In An-
gola, he. asserted, policy is "being
driven by little meetings of right-
wing senators with the secretary of
state. [They are] telling him what
hers supposed to. do and if he
doesn't, they are going to bring
[Angolan rebel leader] Jonas
Savimbi over here in order to con-
duct a crusade.."
The senator was referring to pri-
vate discussions in early March be-
tween Shultz and a group of conser-
vative senators led by Majority
Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).
The group insisted that Shultz and
Casey send sophisticated U.S.
Stinger antiaircraft missiles to
Savimbi. Within a week of these
discussions, Reagan gave secret
authorization to send them.
In Afghanistan, "Nobody likes the
way [Rep.] Charlie Wilson [D-Tex.]
was running policy," Durenberger
said, referring to Wilson's leading
role-as an influential House mem-
ber who does not sit on the intel-
ligence panel-in advocating bud-
get increases to fund opposition to
Soviet invasion forces.
Durenberger said he feels that
his loyal opposition to Reagan ad-
ministration policy has drawn for
,him a series of calculated personal
attacks-from Casey and particu-
larly from the right wing of the Re-
publican Party.
For example, last November, af-
ter Durenberger had criticized
some aspects of Casey's direction of
the agency, Casey fired off a public
letter accusing Durenberger of "the
repeated compromise of sensitive
intelligence sources and methods"
and of conducting oversight in an
"off-the-cuff' manner.
%X.
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"It is time to acknowledge that
the process has gone seriously
awry," Casey concluded.
Durenberger refers to that dis-
pute as the Casey-(expletive)-on-
Durenberger days," and attributes
Casey's outburst to his sensitivity
to criticism. "Bill Casey can't con-
trol his temper very long. He's Irish
by nature and all that sort of thing."
The chairman said he has since
tried to repair the damaged rela-
tionship, but still believes the ad-
ministration, and particularly its
supporters in the right wing, are
out to discredit him. After criticiz-
ing the CIA's latest Angolan cam-
paign, Durenberger was blasted as
a "rogue chairman" in right-wing
columns.
"This is the way you operate,"
the senator said. ,you take Duren-
berger's personal life to the clean-
ers in The Washington Times as a
way to reverse Angola policy. It's
endemic in this administration to do
a certain amount of that."
Still, Durenberger's style of run-
ning the committee and his well-
publicized marital problems have
prompted concern among his col-
leagues that the committee's cred-
ibility has suffered and left the
oversight process more vulnerable
to administration attacks.
One committee insider said the
first priority of Sens. William S.
Cohen (R-Maine) and David L.
Boren (D-Okla.), who are scheduled
to take over the committee next
January, will be reestablishing the
prestige of the panel within the
Senate. "The consensus view is that
Durenberger has seriously eroded
the committee's credibility," the
source said.
Durenberger detects the outline
of an administration plan to gut the
oversight process from recent com-
ments by administration loyalists
such as Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.),
a member of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence.
"Henry Hyde doesn't want over-
sight," Durenberger said. "Henry
Hyde wants a situation in which a
few buddies in the community are
informed and that takes care of
Congress and the public."
"They want to destroy the two
committees," Durenberger said.
The administration, he said, would
prefer a joint House-Senate com-
mittee with members firmly under
the control of a chairman faithful to
the White House and sympathetic
to the CIA.
Congressional oversight in the
past year has pointed up serious
flaws in the CIA's management of
U.S. intelligence capabilities and
the handling of defectors. Repub-
lican and Democratic senators have
pounced on the case of KGB Col.
Vitaly Yurchenko, who decided to
return to the Soviet Union after
three months of intense debriefing
by a CIA team.
The agency has been forced to
admit that it bungled the Yurchenko
affair and made a public mea culpa
during the confirmation hearing of
CIA Deputy Director Robert M.
Gates last month.
The Senate panel is conducting a
major personnel study this summer
and the imposition of committee
staffers poring through intelligence
agency 'personnel files is likely to
add to the oversight friction.
Most of the warfare between the
CIA and its oversight committees,
however, is limited to a small por-
tion of overall intelligence activi-
ties.
Leahy, a vocal opponent to co-
vert warfare against Nicaragua,
said recently that he and Sen. Barry
Goldwater (R-Ariz.) agreed 99 per-
cent of the time on intelligence mat-
ters. Goldwater was the crusty con-
servative who chaired the commit-
tee for four years and once said in-
telligence oversight was none of the
Senate's business.
But many members agree that
the large issues of budgetary sup-
port, strategic planning for intelli-
gence systems of the future and the
improvement of basic intelligence
gathering have broad bipartisan
support on the committees.
"I've been there almost seven
years," Leahy said, "and in all that
time I've never seen any senator,
Republican or Democrat, who was
not interested in having the best in-
telligence services in the world."
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Journal of the Association of Former Intelligence Officers
LEAHY SLAMS ADMINISTRATION ON LEAKS;
URGES GREATER COMPLIANCE ON OVERSIGHT
By Harris Greene
Speaking before an attentive audience of more than
400 members at AFIO's April 21 luncheon at the Offic-
ers Club, Fort Myer, Virginia, Senator Patrick Leahy
(D/VT), vice-chairman of the Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence (SSCI) made a spirited attack on "key
Intelligence Community leaders" who fail to work coop-
eratively with the two congressional committees.
A situation has resulted, he said, of "somewhat
strained, and unnecessarily so" relations between these
Committees and "elements of the Intelligence Commun-
ity." He did not name names, but was unmistakably
referring to personalities such as CIA director William
Casey. Senator Leahy, who took pains to repeat that he
understood and sympathized with the problems of U.S.
intelligence, pointed out that "well over 90 percent" of
the time, the SSCI has voted unanimously to support
intelligence community initiatives, thus smoothing the
way for full Senate support of specific intelligence pro-
jects and programs.
The problem arises, he said, from "growing dis-
agreement over the (Reagan) administration's clear
determination to make ever greater use of covert para-
military operations as part of what is now being called
the 'Reagan doctrine.'" There are areas, he stated, in
which CIA should definitely be involved, "but not a sub-
stitute for U.S. foreign policy."
Leahy lauded the Congress for reducing intelligence
oversight committees in 1976 from eight committees to
two, one in the Senate and the other in the House of
Representatives. That system, in his view, is working
well. It was made law by the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1980, which formalized the requirement that the
oversight committees are to be kept fully and currently
informed of all intelligence programs, including "signifi-
cantly anticipated intelligence activities." He outlined
three serious problems in the oversight process:
- who is responsible for leaks, and the significance
of the "leak" problem;
- timeliness of notification by the Intelligence Com-
munity of significant intelligence activities;
- covert action programs, especially covert paramili-
tary programs.
Senator Leahy objected strongly to those who blame
Senator Leahy
the Congress, without justification he insisted, for
allegedly leaking sensitive intelligence information to
the press. "Far too often," he said, "in the last year or so,
we on the (SSCI) have learned first of significant intelli-
gence matters from the press, followed quickly by a
breathless call from the legistlative liaison Officers at
CIA, DIA or elsewhere, trying to head off our (SSCI)
angry reaction." He has heard a large number of com-
plaints "from both sides of the aisle" in the Senate
about such executive branch leaks.
Leahy jocularly suggested that the New York Times
and Washington Post be classified each morning and
sent to his committee as briefing papers in order to get
information on intelligence activities quickly, "and also
get a good crossword puzzle to work on at the same
time." As a result of executive branch leaks, he said, the
protection of having only two congressional committees,
one in each house, protecting important security infor-
mation, is eroding. Other congressional committees are
beginning to express more interest in intelligence pro-
jects. He bluntly accused "parts of the Intelligence
Community" of going directly to these other congres-
sional committees "in an effort to circumvent opposition
in the (Senate) Intelligence Committee." Leahy unhesi-
tantly placed primary blame for leaks on the White
(continued on page 2)
1
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Let's Get Serious About Pamphlets
In 1982, the AFIO Board approved a project to pro-
duce a series of pamphlets to provide material for
seminars at the college level. The Intelligence Profes-
sional Series resulted and, after a very slow start, pro-
duced three pamphlets.
Number One in the series, The Clandestine Ser-
vice of the Central Intelligence Agency, by Hans
Moses, published in 1983, while initially opposed by
many in the CIA, has turned out to be a recruiting vehi-
cle for them. In fact, due to the purchase made by the
CIA, it is the only financially successful one of the series.
Number Two, National Security and The First
Amendment, by John Warner, published in 1984, turns
out to be the least called for because of its very special-
ized audience, but the one most nearly fitting the origi-
nal concept. It is a true scholarly paper in every sense of
the word-thoroughly researched and fully documented.
Number Three, The KGB, An Instrument of Soviet
Power, by Thomas Polgar, also published in 1984,
achieved its goal of informing the reader about the
nature and operational activities of the KGB, but, like our
first pamphlet, addressed a subject difficult to document
in the academic sense.
Since then, we have not published and, indeed,
have no manuscripts in work. We have prospects for
one on secrecy and another on warning intelligence, but
they are still only concepts. I believe there have been
some prepared and submitted, one particularly on
Science and Technology, but they have somehow got-
ten lost in the shuffle. This is unfortunate, and should
not happen.
Nonetheless, the facts are that as of this time we
are without a future program. So, let's get serious about
the issue.
The concept was to produce two scholarly papers
each year. Each would be about ten thousand words in
length and treat a unique intelligence subject. Papers
would be fully researched and documented - no war
stories and recollections here.
In addition to the paper, each pamphlet would con-
tain a seminar outline and a suggested reading list.
These would complete what a teacher needs to develop
a three hour, college level seminar.
So far, our subject matter has been a bit limited
-the KGB, the law, and the clandestine service. There
are a number of subjects which could be covered by this
concept. Many of our members are experts in a particu-
lar aspect of intelligence activity which needs to be
presented. Many have long wished for an opportunity to
expound on their own concepts of an aspect of intelli-
gence in which they have been involved over the years.
In retirement, many of us could, and should, take a long
objective look at our own conceptions of our life's work,
do some in-depth research, then produce a definitive
short work on the subject.
Faced with the requirements to produce a convinc-
ing, scholarly work on a pet subject could well result in
some changes in attitudes but, surely, would produce
pamphlets which would serve our purposes in educa-
tion and contribute to developing our profession.
The Executive Committee will present a number of
fresh ideas to the full Board in April about revitalizing
this effort. The ideas to be presented to the Board include:
? Establish firm policies for the program to regularize
how manuscripts are to be solicited, accepted
or rejected, published, and disseminated (perhaps an
editorial board?);
? Provide guidelines on subject matter, documentation,
and format;
? Offer substantial honoraria to authors, recognizing
that it takes time and money to do the kind of
research we are expecting; and
? Develop a prize program to attract scholars, students,
and AFIO members with, again, substantial stipends
attached to the recognition.
Of course, members who wish to donate talent, as
we have in the past, will still be the most welcome.
Perhaps, if we decide to offer honoraria, we will have a
basis of certifying tax deductions for donated work, if
"tax simplification" will allow in the future.
In the mean time, those of you who have a yen to
present a case about an aspect of the intelligence pro-
fession which could be used in educating college stu-
dents (and others) of our work, take pen in hand and
produce. If you have previously submitted a paper or
idea and have heard nothing, resubmit. We will respond
immediately to recognize your submission.
We are interested in your reactions to these ideas.
Please let the Executive Committee hear from you.
-Capt Richard W. Bates (USN-Ret)
Leahy (continued from page 1)
House and intelligence agencies. "I believe," he averred,
"nearly all leaks of sensitive information come from the
Executive Branch. This tendency to conduct policy debate
or advance political interests through leaking classified
information existed in the Ford and Carter administra-
tion. But in my nearly 12 years in Congress, I have never
seen it on the scale practiced by government officials
under the present (Reagan) administration. This is not a
partisan viewpoint but a fact."
He sought to explain why this situation exists. "The
many leaks about recent espionage and defection cases
appear to stem primarily from jockeying among intelli-
gence and law enforcement officials trying to protect
their reputations in the face of public outrage over pos-
sible mishandling (of a case). Who can leak first is the
current criterion (of the executive agencies involved)."
He also blamed critics of congressional oversight for
attacking the oversight committees on leaks to the
press, and the executive branch for the public expres-
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New Life Members
Notes from National
Mr. Kenneth K. ADDICOTT
Carmel, California
Mr. Ben F. ALBITZ
Potomac, Maryland
Major George L. COLBY, USAF(Ret.)
St. Cloud, Florida
Mr. Richard Turner CORSA
Walnut Creek, California
Mr. Charles M. COSNER
Springfield, Virginia
CAPT John Q. EDWARDS, USN(Ret.)
Norfolk, Virginia
Mr. Vasia C. GMIRKIN
Sedona, Arizona
Mr. John J. GRAHAM
Rochester, New York
Mrs. Anne Mary INGRAHAM
Alexandria, Virginia
Major Paul G. JONES, USAF(Ret.)
Springfield, Virginia
Mrs. Mary L. Green MADIGAN
Tallahassee, Florida
Mr. Eugene P. MONDANI
Colorado Springs, Colorado
LtCol Alden C. PETERSON, USAF(Ret.)
Camp Spring, Maryland
Mr. Henry N. SCHLADT
Colorado Springs, Colorado
Mr. Edward J. SCHOENWETTER
Mount Dora, Florida
Colonel Landgrave T. SMITH, Jr. USAF(Ret.)
Oakton, Virginia
Mr. Michael F. SPEERS
Weston, Vermont
Honora F. THOMPSON
Washington, D.C.
COL G.R. (Russell) WILEY, USAR
San Francisco, California
Mr. Ernest J. ZELLMER
Satellite Beach, Florida
We certainly appreciate the response from our
members in converting to Life Membership. Since our
fiscal year began on September 1, 1985, we have
received a total of fifty-five conversions and new life
members. This number equals the total for twelve
months of the previous fiscal year. We are very pleased
at this response and wish to remind those who might
consider converting to life membership that it can be
done on the installment plan so long as the full amount
of $250.00 is paid in twelve months. Since AFIO is a tax
exempt organization under IRS 501(c) 3, the dues are
deductible as a charitable deduction on your federal tax
return. Life memberships make nice birthday presents)
We are all pleased that the inflation rate has
remained low; however, you should understand that the
US Postal Service raised the rates for 3rd Class mail
31 % on March 1, 1986. This has been quite a financial
burden to absorb. Since we must continue to use 3rd
Class, we again ask our members to keep us posted on
their current mailing address to ensure receipt of AFIO
publications. The Postal Service will not forward 3rd
Class mail.
For those chapters whose members have the oppor-
tunity to provide speakers to organizations which are
able to pay honorariums we would like to offer a sugges-
tion. If the sponsor wishes to take a tax deduction for the
honorarium, they may make the check payable to AFIO.
AFIO would then pay that amount to the chapter. This
came to our attention when I was asked to speak again
at the Brookings Institution's Seminar at Williamsburg,
Virginia and they were very generous and sent a
$400.00 check payable to AFIO as an honorarium.
We would again like to remind our members that
we do have very nice lapel pins which we will be glad to
mail to you if you send us $5.00. Lest there be some
confusion between AFIO and other organizations, AFIO's
annual dues of $25.00 are paid for twelve months. You
do receive a notice from Headquarters when your dues
are payable. This does not apply to life members who
only pay the $250.00 one time.
Things are beginning to take shape for the AFIO
1986 Convention in Orlando, Florida on October 17 and
18, 1986. We have made arrangements with Piedmont
Airlines to provide special air fares and we will be send-
ing more information with the next issue of Periscope.
WHOOPS!
In the last issue of Periscope, the proofreader's eye was not as
sharp as usual. We assure readers it was carelessness, not a Freudian
slip, that referred in the first sentence on page 14 to the "Soviet Select
Committee on Intelligence." And, if the Committee was not slighted
enough, numbered paragraph (1) of the quotation from Sen. Dave
Durenburger should refer to the "Intelligence Community, " not the
"Intelligence Committee," which provides impartial information and
analysis and in certain circumstances serves as the instrument of US
policy in the conduct of special activities (covert action). Finally, in the
caption to the picture of the former DCI's and DDCI's who were guests
at the CIA Headquarters expansion, of course-as many readers
reminded us-former DCIs Richard Helms and William E. Colby well
deserve the distinction of "Honorable."
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Intelligence Issues
Task Force Urges Intelligence
Efforts to Combat Terrorism
"Success in combatting terrorism," states a recent report of
the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, "is
predicated on the availability of timely and accurate intelligence."
One approach to assuring timely information in thwarting terror-
ists, the report states, involves "conventional human and techni-
cal intelligence capabilities that penetrate terrorist groups and
their support systems, including a sponsoring state's activities."
The Task Force, chaired by Vice President George Bush,
released an unclassified version of its report in February. The
public report also stresses the importance of police investigative
efforts: "Collecting tactical police intelligence aids in monitoring
terrorists' activities and may be crucial to tracking subnational
groups or small terrorist bands. The national intelligence effort
relies heavily on collection and liaison arrangements that exist
with many foreign governments. This effort must be augmented
with the results of investigative police work and law enforcement
liaison arrangements, which are currently being expanded."
Continued the report, "Long-term intelligence programs to
combat terrorism involve collection and analysis that address
regional history, culture, religion, politics, psychology, security
conditions, law enforcement and diplomatic relationships. The
requirement for accurate analysis applies both to long-term threat
assessments and to support incident management. All terrorism-
related intelligence collection and analysis must be directed
toward production and dissemination of clear, concise and accu-
rate threat warnings and assessments to decision-makers in time
for them to take necessary action."
Among the Task force's many recommendations, an intelligence
agenda is proposed which:
? Would establish a Consolidated Intelligence Center on Terror-
ism.."Intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination play a pivotal
role in combatting terrorism. Currently, while several federal depart-
ments and agencies process intelligence within their own facilities,
there is no consolidated center that collects and analyzes all-source
information from those agencies participating in anti-terrorist activi-
ties. The addition of such a central facility would improve our capability
to understand and anticipate future terrorist threats, support national
crisis management and provide a common database readily accessible
to individual agencies. Potentially, this center could be the focus for
developing a cadre of interagency intelligence analysts specializing in
the subject of terrorism."
? Would increase collection of human intelligence. "U.S. intelli-
gence gathered by technical means is adequate and pursued approp-
riately. At the same time, there is clear need for certain information
that can only be gained by individuals. An increase in human intelli-
gence gathering is essential to penetrate terrorist groups and their
support systems."
? Would exchange intelligence between governments. "The
national intelligence effort relies heavily on collection and liaison
arrangements that exist with many friendly governments." Such
exchanges with like-minded nations and international law enforce-
ment organizations have been highly useful and should be expanded
to support our own intelligence efforts."
Included in the recommendations is a proposal to form a Joint
Committee on Intelligence: "Procedures that the Executive Branch
must follow to keep the Select Intelligence Committees informed of
intelligence need streamlining. Adoption of a Joint Resolution intro-
duced last year by Congressman Hyde would create a Joint Committee
on Intelligence. This Resolution would reduce the number of people
who have access to sensitive information and provide a single secure
repository of classified material. The Department of Justice should
lead an Administration effort to secure passage of the Hyde proposal."
Other recommendations include establishing incentives (rewards,
immunity from prosecution, U.S. citizenship) for those who provide
information about terrorists' identity or location; close loopholes in the
Freedom of Information Act which have permitted members of terror-
ist groups to identify FBI informants, frustrate federal investigation and
tie up government resources in responding to FOIA requests; establish
a full-time NSC position, with support staff, to strengthen coordination
of the national program; close extradition loopholes; impose sanctions
against governments which offer safehaven for terrorists or as caches
PERISCOPE is published quarterly by the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers, McLean Office Building,
6723 Whittier Ave., Suite 303A, McLean, VA 22101.
Phone[phone].
Officers of AFIO are:
LG Eugene F. Tighe, Jr ................... President
Dr. Walter L. Pforzheimer ............ Vice President
Robert J. Novak ......................... Treasurer
Charlotta P. Engrav ...................... Secretary
John K. Greaney ................. Executive Director
Edward F. Sayle ............... Editor of PERISCOPE
Purpose
AFIO was organized in 1975 by former intelligence
personnel from the Federal military and civilian intelli-
gence and security agencies. Its purpose is to promote
public understanding of, and support for, a strong and
responsible national intelligence establishment.
AFIO believes that effective intelligence is the
nation's first line of defense against surprise from
abroad, subversion at home and possibly dangerous
miscalculation by our national leaders in the conduct of
foreign and defense policy. AFIO therefore holds that
reliable intelligence is essential to the cause of peace.
In pursuing its objectives, AFIO
? Works closely with appropriate committees of the
Congress regarding legislation affecting the intel-
ligence agencies, responds to congressional re-
quests for its views and information on intelligence
matters, and is frequently called upon to testify on
specific legislative proposals.
? Through its network of local chapters across the
nation, provides speakers for discussion of national
security issues before civic, academic and profes-
sional groups.
? Promotes educational programs explaining the
role and importance of intelligence.
? Provides participants for network and local TV
and radio programs on national security issues.
? Is frequently consulted by scholars, authors, jour-
nalists and TV producers on intelligence matters.
? Monitors media treatment of intelligence and
security issues and, where inaccuracies and dis-
tortions occur, attempts to set the record straight.
? Distributes to its members a quarterly publication
with news, views and book reviews relating to
intelligence, and a quarterly digest of current
news commentary.
for their material; evaluate and strengthen airport, port and diplomatic
mission security; make murder of US citizens outside the country a
federal crime; establish a death penalty for hostage murders; prohibit
mercenary training camps in the United States; and determine if it
should be made illegal for individuals and companies to enrich terror-
ist coffers by paying ransom for return of kidnapped employees or
stolen property.
[Public Report of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terror-
ism, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1986. May be
purchased from the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C.
20402.1
Editor's Note: We are pleased to report that AFIO's Tom Polgar
served as a consultant to the Vice President's Task Force.
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On the Intelligence Bookshelf ...
Editor's Note: In late 1985, an important book deal-
ing with the development of US Naval Intelligence from
the 1920's through World War II, particularly the secret
war of the ether, was published. In his memoirs, the late
RADM Edwin T. Layton has, at last, permitted those of
the intelligence profession to look with public pride at
the unsung heroes in language, mathmatics, crypto-
graphy and intelligence whose vital contributions often
must be overlooked because of the need for continuing
protection of certain sources and methods. Because of
the significance of RADM Layton's work, the following
review is being published concurrently by Periscope and
the Naval Intelligence Quarterly, a classified Naval
Reserve publication. AFIO wishes to thank RADM Wil-
liam Studeman, USN, the Director of Naval Intelligence,
and CAPT Stephen S. Roberts, USNR, Editor-in-Chief of
the Naval Intelligence Quarterly, for their cooperation in
making this concurrent publication possible. Our partic-
ular appreciation to LT David A. Rosenberg USNR, a
distinguished intelligence historian and lecturer, who
wrote the review.
Breaking the Secrets
LAYTON, Edwin T. Layton, RADM, USN (Ret), with
CAPT Roger Pineau, USNR (Ret) and John Costello. And
I Was There.' Pearl Harbor and Midway-Breaking the
Secrets. New York: William Morrow, 1985. 596 pp.
When dealing with intelligence organizations, history is elusive.
Conducted out of necessity in great secrecy, intelligence activities, be
they covert military operations, clandestine intelligence gathering, or
classified military analysis, are generally difficult to reconstruct pub-
licly because of the sensitivity of sources and methods. Yet intelligence
professionals need to know history-not only that of foreign intelli-
gence operations as backgroud for analysis, but also the history of
their own nation's intelligence organizations. Such history is important
for the establishment and maintenance of traditions and organiza-
tional espirit. It provides valuable contrasts between intelligence work
in the past and intelligence today, occasionally recalling approaches
and insights that time had eroded. Such history can even guard
against mistakes in assessment and analysis by providing a firm base
from which to judge whether misleading "mirror-imaging" of enemies
is based not just on erroneous assumptions about foreign nations'
actions, but on a faulty understanding of our own nation's past actions
as well. Finally, such history can warn against practices which in the
past have undermined the effectiveness of intelligence activities and
exposed the nation to peril, and which could do so again.
Quality intelligence history may be rare, but occasionally a book
will appear that fills the bill. And / Was There is such a book. RADM
Edwin T. Layton's memoir is the most revealing account published to
date of the major events, trends, and personalities in the development
of United States naval intelligence from the 1920s through World War
II. The book not only offers valuable insights into the intelligence pro-
cess itself, particularly codebreaking and communications intelligence,
but also describes the broader context of decisions and decision mak-
ers at the highest levels of the Navy and the nation from December
1940 to the Guadalcanal campaign in the fall of 1942. Much of this
story has been told before, in books such as CAPT W, J.
Holmes' Double Edged Secrets (1979), and Ronald Lewin's The Amer-
ican Magic (1982), but Layton's book is not mere repetition. His unique
vantage point as the Pacific Fleet intelligence officer from 1940 to
1945, combined with the diligent research of his collaborators, has
resulted in a combination memoir and history that weaves a rich
tapestry of narrative and detail. Although the thoroughness of the
authors makes it difficult to read this book quickly, naval intelligence
personnel seeking to understand the roots of their craft will find a
careful reading both personally satisfying and professionally rewarding.
Edwin Layton graduated from the Naval Academy in 1924, and,
after five years of sea duty, entered into intelligence work as a Japa-
nese language officer in training in Japan in 1929. In 1932-1933, he
was assistant naval attache in Beijing, then returned to sea duty until
1936, when he was assigned as officer in charge of the Japanese
translation section of the cryptanalytic section of the office of naval
communications. From 1937 to 1939, he was assistant naval attache
in Tokyo. Following a year commanding a destroyer-minesweeper, he
reported on 7 December 1940 as the first fleet intelligence officer on
the staff of ADM J.O. Richardson, Cammander in Chief, U.S. Fleet. He
stayed in to serve ADM Husband Kimmel in a similar capacity, and
subsequently Pacific Fleet Commander ADM Chester E. Nimitz from
1941 through 1946. It was Nimitz who told Layton in the fall of 1942
that "as my intelligence officer you are more valuable to me than any
division of cruisers." Layton continued his career as a naval intelli-
gence professional after the war, and in 1948 founded the Naval
Intelligence School. As a flag officer, he served as assistant director for
intelligence for the Joint Chiefs of Staff and assistant chief of staff for
intelligence to Commander in Chief Pacific until his retirement in
1959. At the time of his death in 1984, Layton had completed most of
the first draft of this memoir through the Battle of Midway. The
manuscript was completed, at the request of Mrs. Layton, by CAPT
Roger Pineau, a World War II Japanese language intelligence officer
and assistant to Samuel Eliot Morison on the 15-volume History of
U.S. Naval Operations in World War //, and John Costello, a former
BBC producer who has written a number of books on World War 11.
both of whom had been assisting Layton with his reaserch.
Layton's intention in writing this book was to set the record
straight as to why American intelligence failed to provide warning of
the impending attack on Pearl Harbor. Frustrated by the books pub-
lished from the 1940s through the 1970s about the Pearl Harbor
attack, which charged his boss, Admiral Kimmel, with negligence,
Layton nevertheless continued to abide by his oath of secrecy until, in
the 1980s, the National Security Agency began declassifying relevant
original source materials. Using newly declassified histories, direc-
tives, and the actual intercepted and decrypted Japanese diplomatic
and naval messages, Layton was able to begin reconstructing a
detailed, unclassified record of American intelligence activities before
and after the Pearl Harbor attack. With the assistance of Pineau and
Costello, he tracked down and incorporated into his own reminiscen-
ces thousands of pages of documents being released by the U.S.,
British, Australian and Dutch governments relating to the 1940-1942
period, as well as the official Japanese account of the Pacific War,
which Layton himself had worked at translating.
Since And / Was There is essentially Edwin Layton's memoir, it
begins with his own experience and perspectives, but expands to fill in
information which then-Lieutenant Commander Layton had no access
to at the time of Pearl Harbor. The result is not just a personal reminis-
cence, but a broad chronicle of the events leading up to the attack on
Pearl Harbor, and the subsequent first year of the Pacific War. Readers
who are not familiar with the debate surrounding who was responsi-
ble for America being taken by surprise at Pearl Harbor will find the
book a useful, up to date, if not entirely objective, introduction to the
major points of controversy. Specific events and military stategy,
including U.S.-British relations, President Roosevelt's relationship
with Prime Minister Churchill, and, thanks to the language expertise of
Layton and Pineau, Japanese plans and decisions leading to war as
well.
One particularly interesting contribution is the discussion and
analysis of the shift in U.S. Pacific strategy in the fall of 1941 away
from long held plans to leave U.S. forces in the Philippines on their
own to defend against the Japanese in the event of war. Following
agreement with the British at the Argentia, Newfoundland, summit
between Roosevelt and Churchill, the top leadership of the War and
Navy Departments decided to extend the U.S. defensive perimeter
through the Philippines as a deterent to Japanese southern expan-
sion, emphasizing the use of long range strategic bombers not only to
defend the Philippines, but to launch an offensive against Japan itself
if the necessary buildup of planes and material could be achieved in
time. Other historians in recent years have discussed this strategic
shift, but Layton and company make clear an important point: when
the decision was made in Washington to revise Pacific strategy, Admi-
ral Kimmel, the Pacific Fleet Commander, was not adequately informed
of the change, a significant oversight which clearly did not contribute
to fleet readiness to implement national strategy.
(continued on page 6)
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Breaking Secrets ...
At the heart of Layton's story is the nature of the intelligence
collection, analysis and dissemination process within the U.S. Govern-
ment and particularly the Navy Department. Layton and his coauthors
flesh out the details of the history of Navy radio intelligence from the
1920s onward, utilizing memory and declassified Top Secret Ultra
histories to provide as explicit and precise an understanding of U.S.
codebreaking processes and capabilities as is ever likely to be published.
The array of codes available to the Japanese, the changes those codes
underwent, U.S. capabilities to intercept and decrypt messages, and
the fate of these decryptions are all described.
The most revealing part of Layton's story relates to the intrade-
partmental conflicts over the control and dissemination of radio intelli-
gence, initially between the Office of Naval Communications and the
Office of Naval Intelligence, and then between RADM R.K. Turner's
war plans division and ONI. Allocation of code breaking assignments
among stations in Washington, the Philippines, and Pearl Harbor left
commander Joseph Rochefort's codebreakers in Hawaii boxed in,
working at decrypting the extremely difficult Japanese Navy flag offic-
ers' code and conducting less than complete traffic analysis. The all
important work of attacking the JN-25B navy operations code was
assigned to others, despite the fact that the Navy's best cryptanalysts
were at Pearl Harbor, and were in a better position to exploit the
results of any breakthrough. Simultaneously, Rochefort, Layton and
Kimmel were denied access by Turner to most daily code breaking
results, including "Magic" decrypts of the Japanese diplomatic code,
the JN-25B code, and J-19 code keys used by the Japanese Consulate
at Pearl Harbor. "Magic" and consular code decryptions in September
and October 1941 indicating a Japanese focus on Pearl Harbor were
not sent to Kimmel. The Pacific Fleet was consistently cut off, as a
result of fears of security leaks, from vital intelligence that would have
alerted Pearl to the growing possibility of a Japanese attack on Hawaii.
The period from Pearl Harbor through the Battle of Midway was
also fraught with internecine wrangling between Washington and
Hawaii. Layton details the role radio intelligence played in planning the
initial Pacific Fleet offensive operations, including the way operational
task force commanders used or ignored intelligence information. The
struggle to convince Washington's intelligence establishment and
Admiral Ernest J. King of what Admiral Nimitz had become convinced,
namely that Japan was going to move eastward against Midway in
June 1942, is laid bare in heretofore undisclosed detail. The story of
political squabbles and technical subterfuge during this critical period
is frustrating but valuable reading, and provides strong warnings
about the dangers of putting personalities and personal rivalries ahead
of intelligence professionalism. Layton pays particular attention to
Joseph Rochefort's role in making possible the Midway battle, and the
subsequent shake-up of his command, including Rochefort's own
ignominious transfer to lesser duties and reorganization of the Navy's
radio intelligence effort under CAPT Joseph Redman at the Office of
Naval Communications. This story has been told before, but Layton
provides clear evidence that Rochefort's transfer was the result of a
personal vendetta on the part of jealous Washington rivals.
And l Was There is by no means detached history. Layton is intent
on discrediting those who scapegoated Admiral Kimmel and neutral-
ized Joseph Rochefort. Pineau and Costello have an equally strong
commitment to refuting charges made by the late Gordon Prange,
General MacArthur's former official historian, in his best selling At
Dawn We Slept, which they believe to be unsound and lacking in
scholarly integrity. Although it is necessary to keep these biases in
mind, they do not diminish the contribution made by this book. And l
Was There is fascinating reading for anyone with an interest in naval
intelligence, and presents much new and valuable information.
In addition, this book offers important warnings for naval intelli-
gence personnel. Two in particular stand out:
- It is difficult enough under the best of circumstances to get
good intelligence accepted and relied on by operational commanders.
Internecine bureaucratic strife and personal rivalry among intelligence
officers only serves to undermine credibility and diminish the pros-
pects that intelligence will be properly and fully utilized.
- Intelligence only has value if put in the right hands. Denying
pertinent intelligence to on-scene commanders because of excessive
security consciousness or political considerations is a recipe for poten-
tial disaster.
Naval intelligence professionals know these problems well, but it
never hurts to be graphically reminded of the costs of failure to heed
such warnings. And / Was There is an excellent vehicle for reviewing
these timeless tenets. It is certainly better to study them by reliving the
mistakes of the past, than by repeating the same mistakes in the
future.
[LT David A. Rosenberg USNR, is on the faculty of the Strategy
Department, US Naval War College, Newport, RI, He holds a PhD from
the University of Chicago, and writes extensively on strategy and long-
range planning. Presently he is working on a biography of ADM
Arleigh Burke.]
On Her Majesty's
Secret Service
Andrew, Christopher Her Majesty's Secret Service: The
Making of the British Intelligence Community. New
York: Elisabeth Sifton Books/Viking, 1986. xviii +619
pages. $25.00
Christopher Andrew, a professional British historian, has written
a superb book which should become a classic of its rare genre: a
serious study of secret Intelligence services in that most secretive of
democratic Western States: Great Britain. Praise is due for virtually
every apsect of this substantial but not heavy tome: in writing style,
organization, coverage, objectivity of analysis and judgement and in
the study of available sources in a manner which is exhaustive.
One important virtue of this often entertaining, but true, work is
that it will benefit both the general reader and the specialist, those
who may or may not have served in intelligence. As a writer, Andrew
possesses an admirably clear and economical style; more, he has a
mischievous but balanced sense of humor, knows a good story and
has an eye for comic moments. As a scholar of intelligence studies of
the Western powers, especially Britain and France, Andrew has paid
his dues in many government archives, from Kew and London to Paris
and Washington, D.C. and has mastered key portions of the In-
telligence-related documents open to the public in archives such as
the Public Record Office, etc. He has another advantage as a student
of this field; he is a senior scholar of French (and British) imperial
studies of modern times and has studied French diplomatic (and secret
intelligence) history of the period since 1860. Such a background
forms a fortunate asset for students of intelligence, since one of the
major sources of the growth of intelligence activities in modern
nation-states in the West is precisely in overseas imperial activities,
including colonial rule, and in the increasingly complex world of for-
eign diplomacy.
For the serious American reader, this book is important for at
least three reasons: one, the subject of British intelligence is signifi-
cant on its own, for its own reasons of both achievements and failures
during the period of most detailed analysis, 1860-1960; two, British
intelligence services have had an important, and sometimes, lasting,
impact and influence on U.S. intelligence during the years, 1914-
1950; three, the fact that British intelligence services have had an
influence on the intelligence services of scores of other nations in the
Commonwealth, the former British Empire, and in other international
organizations. British intelligence structures, methods and "doctrine,"
to some extent, have at one time or another been adopted and adapted
by the intelligence services in nations as diverse as Iraq, Ghana, India,
and island states of the Caribbean. Moreover, both active and retired
British intelligence officers in other countries, including, say, South
Africa some time ago, have done influential "consulting work on the
side". Despite the formal disappearance of the British Empire and the
waning of British power in the world, the "sun has never set" (finally)
on the enduring, if sometimes ephemeral, influence of "The British
Secret Service."
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Secret Service ...
The reader may well wonder, with the notorious scarcity of relia-
ble sources on the subject of secret intelligence, how did the author
manage to put together more than 600 pages of material? The author
is frank in explaining his difficulties in doing so, from the first sentence
which is succinctly candid: "Whitehall has done what it can to dis-
courage serious study of the making of the British intelligence com-
munity," (xv) He notes with wry amusement that while the Government
has released to public archives some intelligence records of World
War II, it has refused to release similar documents on pre-1917 history
on "the dotty grounds that intelligence gathering before the war must
remain more secret that during the war." Even so, Andrew was able to
consult documents in some number since some were not "weeded"
out of all files but only out of some. The government and private papers
consulted included: archives at Birmingham University; Churchill Col-
lege Archives Centre, Cambridge University (UK); House of Lords
Records Office; Intelligence Corps Museum, Ashford, Kent (UK); India
Office Library and Records, London; Imperial War Museum, London;
Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, London;
National Archives, Washington, D.C.; National Maritime Museum,
Greenwich (UK); and, finally, and most important: Public Record
Office, Kew. His study of published memoirs, newspapers and journals
and other printed sources is equally thorough and careful.
The book focuses mainly on the history of British secret intelli-
gence services (mainly MI-6 and MI-5) and less on armed services
intelligence, though, as he admits, the lines between the two are
sometimes blurred. He favors, as well, the analysis of stategic, rather
than tactical intelligence and most detail is in the period, 1890-1945.
For students of pre-World War II intelligence studies, it is delightful to
note that there is much material on the period, 1900 to 1930-an
often neglected era-a period in which Andrew is a specialist on this
and other topics, with World War I as a kind of centerpiece. Ten of the
fifteen chapters, in fact, cover 1890-1929 or nearly 338 out or 506
pages of text.
Andrew, Fellow and Senior Tutor in History at Corpus Christi Col-
lege, Cambridge University (UK), clearly shows that the history of intel-
ligence services' work can no longer be as neglected as it has been in
the past. It is, a "missing dimension" of political and diplomatic history,
as well as of military history, but the author demonstrates that if one
uses resourcefulness and diligence, something cogent can be recon-
structed. His discussion of communications intelligence in World War
I's Room 40, of the Division of Naval Intelligence, is masterful; at that
time Britain began a systematic interception of other governments'
communications. He might have added that such interception did not
begin in 1914, but can be traced to several cases of British intercep-
tion of telegraphic communications of Boer soldiers and diplomats
during the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) in South Africa, a fact care-
fully kept secret until late in World War II.
His Majesty's Secret Service may not discuss much military tacti-
cal intelligence during the two World Wars and later, but its discussion
of high level strategic intelligence, including gathering of information,
analysis, inter-service thinking and connections, and basic facts of
operations is brilliant and thorough. While several, earlier books on
British Intelligence have been published by Nigel West,* they have
been too much of a kind of British intelligence social register, with
some reasonably accurate anecdotes, but no secure documentation or
confirmation of same. Andrew's work is full of material on wartime
and peacetime analysis and operations; his biographical portraits of
the leading, sometimes bizarre, secret service personalities are full,
witty and definitive. Here there are unforgettable portraits of the lives
of Admiral Reginald Hall (head of Naval Intelligence, WWI), Valentine
Vivian (no. 2 in MI-6 in World War II), Maxwell Knight (no. 2 in MI-5
before 1945), Sir Stewart Menzies, and the first officer to be known as
"C", Sir Mansfield Cumming, head of MI-6,1909-1923. One wonders
where he obtained some of his biographical material, for some of the
facts appear to have come from unusual interviews, not documents,
The thumbnail sketch of Colonel (later Sir) Claude Dansey wartime
assistant chief of SIS (MI-6), World War II, who has been described by
another Cambridge historian, Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper (Lord Dacre) as
'"an utter shit, corrupt, incompetent, but with a certain low cunning,"
is enthralling. Dansey was an important player in the British secret
wars between the wars and to 1945. His background and his influ-
ence on methods of recruitment in these services-he opposed
recruiting university-trained officers, on principal-suggest that vital
but neglected aspects of this history are the personal makeup of the
leadership and psychology of intelligence work.
"Dansey had a notably disturbed late Victorian childhood which he
managed to conceal from his SIS colleagues. After being taken
away from Wellington College because of trouble with the drains
which led to the death of two boys from suspected diphtheria, he
was sent to a school in Belgium where he was seduced by Oscar
Wilde's first male lover, Robert Ross." (p. 357)
After reading Andrew's spare but pithy biographies of the
leaders of British secret service, this reviewer had some un-
answered questions in mind, Even in the context of the time and
the British class system, how did some of these character ever get
recruited? Or, as important, how did they last? And, with these
confirmed real life facts of the business (hard acts to follow, even in
non-fiction), not a little espionage fiction, and some of its charac-
ters, suddenly appears dull. With his multi-faceted approach to the
material, Andrew has demonstrated that in the history of British
intelligence, as in other really creative analyses of history, the truth
is more interesting than fiction and life appears to imitate art.
Besides the striking personal portraits of the decision-makers
in and near Whitehall, Andrew is also especially adept at clarifying
the way the British government interacted with intelligence at sev-
eral levels over historic epochs. While there is no 'simplified' chart
of "power flows" and "decision-making patterns" in the complex
British intelligence system, 1914-1945, Andrew's text lays out
admirably the major aspects of this process and its evolution. At
the beginning of the book, the reader will find very helpful the
author's complete list of abbreviations/acronyms.
The volume ends with a cogent analysis of Winston Church-
hill's relationship with secret intelligence in the 1930s and during
World War II as Prime Minister. Churchill was relatively unique in
his grasp of the importance of secret intelligence, if not always
correct in his interpretation and use of it. Finally, Andrew in the
"Epilogue: War and Peace" (Chapter 15) again shows that his
judgments are based on realism, logic and confirmed knowledge,
for the most part. When the author must speculate, the reader is
informed. He is not guilty of "the infallibility/omnipotence" trap
concerning intellegence in war. As he states in the first sentence
of this last chapter: "Intelligence did not decide the outcome of the
war (WWII). (p. 487). There follows a brief discussion of some
major features of intelligence developments in Britain during the
1950s and 1960s. Consideration of the present situation and a
glimpse at the need for future reforms of British Intelligence are
not forgotten in the few remaining pages. It is in this material on
the need for reform in the current British intelligence community
which will be of most immediate, if not to say ironic, interest to
many of us who are now concerned about the status of and the
problems surrounding the U.S. intelligence community.
Andrew believes that the performance of the British intelli-
gence community today could be improved if the Government
faced honestly the need to cease its support for two highly ques-
tionable (pre-World War II) constitutional principles: "that intelli-
gence is undiscussable in the public and that parliment surrenders
all its powers in intelligence matters to the executive." (p. 500). He
argues convincingly that, apart from the complex constitutional
issues, these "twin intelligence principles," long accepted as arti-
cles of faith by British administrations to this day, actually result in
neither efficient administration nor in good security. Various intel-
ligence 'scandals' from the Blunt case, to the Falklands war, to the
Prime case, have again raised these issues and the debate over
needed reforms continues unabated.
To strengthen his argument on reform needs, the author picks
the post-1974 Intelligence oversight system in the United States as
a reform model; he proposes that Britain establish a select commit-
tee for intelligence oversight in parliament, an idea still resisted by
the Thatcher government. He believes that such an oversight
mechanism is needed and would work effectively with due security
precautions. While he allows for distinct differences between the
two political/government systems, despite long-standing intelli-
gence community links and cooperation, he does not take into
account the fact that the fledging American intelligence oversight
system in Congress is still controversial, has undergone some
serious strains in recent years, and is the subject of an ongoing
debate in the media, the White House and the Congress, not to
mention the Intelligence Community itself, concerning its ultimate
effectiveness. In short, Professor Andrew's use of an American
model in oversight may be both premature and not altogether con-
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Domestic Intelligence ...
vincing. The American model, in this case, is still in a state of flux.
Recent discussions in Congress, for example, about creating a
Joint Select Committee on Intelligence are only beginning.
Lessons on this aspect of the complex topic may be that,
whatever political similarities and ideological affinities among
friendly states, when it comes to the functioning of intelligence
systems within governments, reform ideas and models do not
necessarily "travel" and that national psycholgical or even cultural
differences are reflected also in how intelligence organizations
function.
In conclusion, this magisterial work will render obsolete, and
in significant ways inaccurate and incomplete, some standard
American analyses of British intelligence in recent times. The
chapter on "British Intelligence," (chapt. 8) in Harry Howe Ran-
som's otherwise respectable study, The Intelligence Establishment
(1970), is woefully inadequate, for example, (after Andrew's work).
An important aspect of Andrew's study is to lay bare not a few
failures and problems in this system. Ransom's judgment, even in
1969, that Britain's Secret Service "unlike the CIA, has not
become a foreign policy boomerang often returning to embarrass
and injure the government" (p. 203) was flawed, if only taking into
account pre-1939 weaknesses and the Philby-Burgess-Maclean
defections of 1951-1963. In short, His Majesty's Secret Service
will revise our views of this system's mixed record and sets a
stunning example of profound scholarship, pleasantly presented,
and clear-headed thinking. This reviewer looks forward to other
works from the pen of Dr. Andrew on other aspects of this increas-
ingly important field.
"See Nigel West, M/5 (1981) and M16 (1983) and his more analyti-
cal, Unreliable Witness. Espionage Myths of the Second World
War (1984).
(Professor Douglas L. Wheeler is Professor of Modern History, Uni-
versity of New Hampshire, Durham. He is a Research Associate,
Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, and 1984-85
was Richard Welch Fellow, CFIA.)
Domestic Intelligence
Godson, Roy (Ed) Intelligence Requirements for the
1980's: Domestic Intelligence. Lexington, Mass. Lexing-
ton Books, 1985. 282 pages. $ 14.95
Dr. Roy Godson, Associate Professor of Government at George-
town University and consultant to the National Security Council and
the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, has demostrated
unique skills in both the academic and intelligence disciplines in pre-
senting the results of a two-day conference on a challenging subject.
Between Part I, raising the question of what domestic security is, and
the final chapter covering domestic intelligence requirements, this
work makes several interesting pit stops: constitutional restraints; col-
lection and organization of information; laws and guidelines; and the
Federal loyalty-security program, the flaws of which have been so
graphically highlighted by the rash of espionage cases exposed in the
past year.
This is the sixth of a seven-volume series that Dr. Godson has
edited on the intelligence requirements of this decade, but none is
more open to questions and debate than the topic treated in the cur-
rent volume: Domestic Intelligence.
Frank R. Barnett, president of the National Stategic Information
Center, in the Preface to this volume prologizes what may be expected
in the ensuing chapters: "In both theory and practice, even the most
democratic state must provide for domestic security, but doing so
requires thinking seriously about a legion of thorny questions ...(H)ow
shall provisions for domestic security be balanced against guarantees
of individual liberties? ... Specifically how individual freedoms and
rights shall be limited in order to preserve the freedom of the entire
political community is the most sensitive issue a free country can
raise."
The experts who convened for two days under the Consortium's
sponsorship constituted, indeed, an ecumenical body: academics,
researchers, media representatives, current and former senior intelli-
gence officers, White House and congressional intelligence special-
ists, and officials in state and local safety programs.
From the reporting of in-depth discussion of this challenging and
tantalizing subject, it is apparent that just as there are no atheists in
life-boats-there were no non-believers in First Amendment rights on
this trip. There was direct and tacit acknowledgment of the need to
respect individual rights while resolving societal rights. The only ob-
vious disagreement, predictably, was the degree of protection to be
accorded.
A proposed definition of domestic intelligence was "information
useful to controlling political crime" ("controlling" to include not only
apprehension and prosecution but also preventive action). Some
insisted, however, as Dr. Godson points out in his introduction, "(T)he
heart of the internal security problem may lie less in the activities of
extremists working beyond or on the fringes of the law, and more with
those of leading members of society who, by example, legitimize coop-
eration with foreign adversaries."
The general feeling was that investigation of "subversion" should
not be predicated on a criminal basis and that such activity is not
constitutionally protected against inquiry either by the Government or
by private individuals. However, the climate which developed in both
the bureaucracy and the judiciary indicates that while the criminal
standard may not be the law of the land, it might as well be.
There was some criticism of, and little support for, the perceived
neglect of the FBI in collecting and analyzing domestic intelligence
information. Some interesting opinions were injected as to who,
rather than the FBI, should have the authority to monitor individuals
involved in domestic subversion and politically-motivated violence.
Two congressional staffers, while having differing views as to
where the authority should rest, agreed it should be outside the
Executive branch. One contended that while examination and investi-
gation of "bad political thought" should be undertaken, its "robust
political debunking" is the duty of the private sector-business, labor,
universities and political parties. The other argued that under the
Insurrections Clause of Article I of the Constitution, it is Congress
which has the power to respond to insurrections, and that the body, as
the primary branch of the national government, has the authority to
monitor such individuals.
Somewhat surprisingly, no one raised the question whether-if
Congress did, indeed, have this authority-it had relinquished it in the
1970's when both Houses abolished internal security committees
originally formed to hold hearings on such matters for legislative pur-
poses and for enlightening the private sector as to threats, real and
potential. Some conference participants emphasized there is a need
for a process to keep the private sector informed in this regard.
There was little disagreement among participants as to the need
for revisions of the Freedon of Information Act, the Privacy Act of
1974, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, the latter of importance in
protecting investigators against personal liability for acts perfomed in
good faith while carrying out their duties. There was also considerable
criticism of restraints on intelligence collection imposed by the "Guide-
lines for Domestic Security Investigations" issued in 1976 by former
Attorney General Edward Levi.
As noted by Dr. Godson in his introduction, the Levi Guidelines
were being reviewed even as the Consortium's conference was in
progress and several months later (March, 1983) revised guidelines
were issued. Dr. Godson observes that, based on the discussion pre-
sented in his book, the revisions are far from adequate.
In Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Domestic Intelli-
gence, the same high standards set previously in the intelligence ser-
ies are maintained. The Consortium has brought together a cross
section of opinions and arguments voiced by a well-informed group of
intelligence exponents, each of whom, or perhaps more realistically
each group of whom, expounds from its own platform of experiences.
In collating their views in this one document and offering a well-
reasoned introduction, Dr. Godson has provided a thesaurus having
(continued on page 9)
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In Memoriam
Col. Albert A. ARNHYM, USAF(Ret.)
San Diego, California
David A. Phillips (and AFIO)
Win Retraction in
Challenge-Aided Suit
David Atlee Phillips, founder of AFIO, has won a full
retraction and financial award in the out-of-court set-
tlement of his malicious libel suit against a group which
claimed publicly that Phillips had been involved in the
1976 assassination of former Chilean diplomat Orlando
Letelier, and had used the alias of "Maurice Bishop."
the alleged CIA case officer for Lee Harvey Oswald. In
winning the case, Phillips was afforded financial assist-
ance by Challenge Inc., an intelligence officer's legal
action fund based in Bethesda, Md.
The suit had its origins in a press conference given
by Donald Freed, Fred Simon Landis, William F. Pepper
and John Cummings on June 25, 1980, in Washington.
The invited media audience was told that Phillips had
headed a conspiracy to cover up the facts concerning
the assassination of Letelier, and that Phillips and other
ex-intelligence officers were accused of a number of
crimes. It was stated further that the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers (AFIO), a non-profit organi-
zation of ex-intelligence men and women from all intel-
ligence services, was involved as an institution in the
crimes attributed to Phillips! The allegations were made
orally and in printed material distributed at the press
conference.
In October 1980, Death in Washington, a non-
fiction book co-authored by Freed and Landis, with an
introduction by Pepper, repeated and elaborated on the
charges against Phillips, other former intelligence offic-
ers and AFIO. Not content with the earlier charges, the
authors claimed that after Phillips' retirement from CIA
he had engaged in a few other crimes, to wit: obstruc-
tion of justice, accessory before the fact of murder, con-
spiracy to defame, and acting as an unregistered foreign
agent. The authors captioned a photograph of Phillips
with "The Other Lee Harvey Oswald."
In the retraction, Freed and Landis withdrew all the
allegations they had made against Phillips, and assured
that they had no intention of charging or suggesting that
Phillips had played any role in the assassination of Lete-
lier, that he was an accessory before or after fact of that
murder, or that he had any connection with Lee Harvey
Oswald. They told the court that they regret that any
such statements had found their way into the press
conference or into their book. Joining them in expres-
sion of regrets was Lawrence Hill & Co. Publishers, Inc.,
who has actually published the defamatory charges. As
for the other charges made by the authors, Freed and
Landis said that because of Phillips' long career with CIA
and the secrecy requirements imposed by CIA (and en-
forced by the courts) it "made it difficult" for them to
secure the necessary evidence for their defense against
Phillips' counter-charges of malicious libel.
Missing from the retraction and settlement was co-
defendent William F. Pepper, who disappeared some
five years ago, and of whose whereabouts Freed and
Landis claim no knowledge.
Mr. Earl Blake COX
Chevy Chase, Maryland
CWO John A. DeNINO, USN(Ret.)
San Diego, California
LtCol Robert W. FULLER, III
McLean, Virginia
Dr. Joseph F. HOSEY
Silver Spring, Maryland
Mr. Benton S. LOWE
Belleair Bluffs, Florida
LTC Benjamin M. MURRAY, USAR(Ret.)
Lynchburg, Virginia
SSCI Chairman Defends
Covert Action Legitimacy
Senator Dave Durenberger, Chairman of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, had challenged an academic who des-
cribed CIA activities as running the gamut from legitimate political
analyses "to clearly illegitimate covert operations."
Replying to the "blithe assertion," Sen. Durenberger noted: "Pro-
fessor Kelman's reference appears to be to covert action operations
(more properly called 'special activities') which are in fact undertaken
pursuant to Presidential findings required by statute and executive
order (22 U.S.C. 2422 and section 3.1 of Executive Order 12333), and
which are notified to the Legislative Branch under the Congressional
oversight provisions in title V of the National Security Act (50 U.S.C.
413). The Congress, moreover, annually authorizes and appropriates
funds for our nations's intelligence activities, including special
activities."
Durenberger observed that "Everyone is entitled to oppose any or
all intelligence activities. The fact that Professor Kelman may not like
certain kinds of operations does not, however, make them illegitimate."
In another press statement, however, Sen. Durenberger was not
as enthusiastic about the intelligence process. According to the Phila-
delphia Inquirer, the intelligence committee chairman has said he
places little stock in any of the intelligence issuing from Central Amer-
ica. "I'm never satisfied with the intelligence I get," he was quoted. "I
don't trust our own agencies."
Domestic Intelligence . .. (continued from page 8)
appeal to all concerned with protection of our country against internal
threats. It is of particular value to the movers and shakers responsible
for the necessary reforms in the nation's domestic intelligence program.
As noted by one participant, considering the legislative responsi-
bility placed on senior national security officials to advise the President
with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military poli-
cies, these officials "ought to be able to understand the relationship
between domestic terrorists and international groups or between
domestic political groups and foreign sponsors." This understanding is
in direct proportion to the amount and integrity of the intelligence
provided to them.
W. Raymond Wannall
(W. Raymond Wannall, former Assistant Director, FBI (Intelli-
gence Division), is a member of AFIO's Board of Directors and has
served as the board's chairman.)
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CHAPTER ACTIVITIES
Arizona Chapter. The chapter held a luncheon on
Saturday, January 11th, at the Ramada Inn in Tucson.
Eighteen participants were privileged to hear Col. Ed
Moore, commander of the Aerospace Maintenance and
Regeneration Center, Davis Monthan AFB, describe the
mission and functions of his organization.
New officers elected by the chapter are: Ed Barley,
president; Jack Masterson and Bob Moy, vice-presidents;
and Bob Nugent, secretary-treasurer.
The chapter met at Sierra Vista for a luncheon on
Saturday, March 1st. The speaker was Col. Miles Kara
of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School. He
spoke of the world-wide responsibility of the School and
the new emphasis the U.S. Army is giving the intelli-
gence discipline. There was a turnout of 27 persons,
with three becoming new members of the Arizona
Chapter. A short business meeting followed.
California
San Diego Chapter. It was a beautiful night aboard
the good ship Berkeley for the chapter's Christmas party.
Along with the Air Force Association, everyone seemed
to have had a great time. Don Perry did his usual fabu-
lous auctioneering job, assisted by his wife Yvonne and
Helen Echols. Charlie Chaucer entertained with his
music and song. Jeff Terzich and his companion Sharon
were bartenders extraordinaire. The Top Hat Caterers
left no one hungry. Special thanks are due those who
made it all possible: Grace Learnard for her part in buy-
ing, assisting and in decorating the ballroom; Elizabeth
Allison for decorating the boat; and Bill Long and Mike
Leaman their special donations.
In late January, Barbara Lowersion represented the
chapter at the rededication of the "Freedom Tree,"
located outside the War Memorial Building. To meet the
chapter's obligation to educate all segments of society, it
plans to establish a speakers' bureau. Although mem-
bers such as Lee Echols, Don Perry, Keith Young and Ed
Learnard have spoken to diverse groups, the chapter is
looking for additional members to carry the word abroad.
Seventy persons, representing the chapter and the
Air Force Association, gave a standing ovation to Charles
W. Wiley, of Accuracy in Media, who addressed the
chapter's January meeting.
Wiley, a veteran journalist, explained that some
elements of the media are no longer interested in being
objective, preferring to engage in advocacy and adver-
sarial, opinionated writing. Such reporters, he said,
inject their own bias into what they write to the point
that the truth in their stories is completely distorted.
Often, Wiley explained, those reporters find no problem
with providing our nation's adversaries with information
that should be held secret.
As one example, the speaker cited a January 31st
article on the front page of the Los Angeles Times. Head-
lined "CIA to Help Angola Rebels, Congress Reportedly
Told," the article went on to say, "The Reagan Adminis-
tration has formally notified Congress that it intends to
give covert CIA aid to Angolan rebles ... congressional
sources said today. A secret 'finding' on covert support
was delivered to the House and Senate intelligence
committees last month."
It is ludicrous, said Wiley, to claim that the aid we
intend to give the Angolan anti-communists can be
"covert" now the secret has been compromised by arti-
cles such as this. There is little doubt that there is collu-
sion between anti-Administration members of Congress
and anti-Reagan members of the news media, destroy-
ing our nation's capability to perform covert actions.
The speaker insisted that every sovereign nation
must have the ability to keep its intentions secret from
adversaries, and recalled a letter written by George
Washington on July 26, 1777:
"The necessity of procuring good Intelligence is
apparent & need not be further urged-All that remains
for me to add is, that you keep the whole matter as
secret as possible. For upon Secrecy, Success depends
in Most Enterprizes of the kind, and for want of it, they
are generally defeated, however well planned & promis-
ing a favourable issue."*
Wiley recalled also, that on November 9, 1775, the
Continental Congress adopted its own oath of secrecy,
one more stringent than the oaths of secrecy it would
require of others in sensitive employment:
"RESOLVED: That every member of this Congress
considers himself under the ties of virtue, honour and
love of his country, not to divulge, directly or indirectly,
any matter or thing agitated or debated in Congress,
before the same shall have been determined, without
the leave of Congress; nor any matter or thing deter-
mined in Congress, which a majority of the Congress
shall order to be kept secret. And that if any member
shall violate this agreement, he shall be expelled this
Congress, and deemed an enemy to the liberties of
America, and liable to be treated as such, and that every
member signify his consent to this agreement by sign-
ing the same."**
It is very doubtful that such an oath could pass in
today's Congress, the speaker noted: There are too
many Congressmen whose interests are not necessarily
in the best interests of the nation. The media, he said,
would scream bloody murder and the ACLU would file a
suit if such an oath were even suggested. He reminded
the audience that the nation's founding fathers knew
such an oath for congressman was necessary, but, then,
"they were a different breed than those who purportedly
serve this nation today."
[*Original in the Pforzheimer Collection of Intelligence Literature,
cited in Intelligence in the War of Independence, Washington: Central
Intelligence Agency, 1976. **Ibid, citing the Secret Journals of Con-
gress, 1775. Copies of the publication, which was written by this
journal's editor, may be obtained by writing: Public Affairs, Central
Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. 20505, or by calling (703) 351 -
7676 or [phone]. Reprints of the text are also available from
the Nathan Hale Institute, 422 First Street, S.E., Suite 208A, Washing-
ton, D.C. 20003; [phone].]
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San Francisco Bay Area Chapter. The chapter met
January 8th in the Commandant's Room of the Marine
Memorial Club, San Francisco. Following a no-host
cocktail hour, President Roger McCarthy called the
meeting to order and led members and guests in the
Pledge of Allegiance. He thanked the nominating com-
mittee and its chairman, Al Buckelew, for the proposed
slate of candidates for the coming year. On motion from
the floor, those nominated by the committee were
elected and administered the oath of office. McCarthy
also expressed regrets that Col. Ed Rudka had with-
drawn as chairman of the program committee.
Bill Green, the new president, introduced Col. Rudka
as chairman of the evening's program. Col. Rudka
detailed the accomplishments of the evening's speaker,
an outstanding scientist and physicist, Dr. William B.
Shuler. Dr. Shuler serves currently as Deputy Director
for Military Applications, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
Dr. Shuler spoke of the need for, and the potential
which may be accomplished by, President Reagan's
proposed Strategic Defense Initiative. He feels it is
essential that the nation focus on defense and that we
understand the threat which makes such defense mea-
sures imperative. He mentioned the expanding number
of nations with nuclear capability, noting that further
escalation in nuclear weapons and the making of more
warheads is no longer a satisfactory solution.
He stated unequivocally that the defenses available
to the Soviet Union far exceed anything the United
States has developed. Dr. Shuler pointed out that, even
if one of our nuclear equipped missiles were to be
launched accidentally, we have no provisions to destroy
it should the on-board safety devices malfunction. Soviet
scientists, he said, are much more advanced in their
research than is our scientific community. Some Soviet
scientists who reported research in these fields a number
of years ago, the speaker noted, have ceased publishing.
He is convinced this is because of Soviet use of their
discoveries, rather than because they have ceased to
work in these fields.
Dr. Shuler believes the Soviets have an intense SDI
program which probably leads ours, and he urged the
release of more information by our government regard-
ing Soviet research and achievements in the area. He
explained that scientific changes and breakthroughs
have now made defense against nuclear attack feasible.
With the new weapons being studied, such as laser,
particle beams, etc., it is possible that if nuclear wea-
pons were fired by the Soviets at the United States
across the North Pole, the majority could be destroyed
as they left their launch sites. The balance could be put
out of commission during the post-boost and midcourse
phases. To attempt to destroy them during the "re-
entry" phase of their trajectory would be most difficult
and the least effective.
The speaker acknowledged that a "leakproof"
defense is not possible, but pointed out that even a less-
than-perfect defense has great utility in reducing the
risks and consequenses of nuclear war. For defense to
be acceptable, he said, it must meet three criteria: it
must work; it must be survivable; and it must be cost
effective. In the absence of the "cost" motivation favor-
ing defense, there will be a further proliferation of
nuclear weapons, which would argue against such a
program. But, Dr. Shuler believes, SDI can achieve all
three criteria.
Dr. Shuler's talk was accompanied by slides and a
brief motion picture illustrating the present state of pre-
paredness and the advance which science is making
possible. He described the spinoff of benefits for civilian
use which he anticipates will grow from the research
and development program which the President has pro-
posed, especially in the field of engery. He pointed out
that SDI as proposed by the President is "non-nuclear,"
but the Soviets do not have that same constraint. Thus,
the nuclear option available to them provides more and
different opportunities for their scientific research.
The argument that SDI will "militarize" space, Dr.
Shuler said, is fallacious since space is already militar-
ized. What we need, he urged, is to gain the advantage
and to do so defensively. It is too early, however, to think
now in terms of eliminating our offensive weapons. He
urged those present to accept and support the research
program for the Strategic Defense Initiative-a goal
which may not be accomplished before the end of this
century. In the near term, the SDI is what its name
implies, an initiative to conduct research as to the feasi-
bility of instituting development programs along any of
several technological routes. The cost during the five
years or so it will take to conduct such a research initia-
tive is estimated to be only two or three percent of the
total defense budget.
A question and answer period followed Dr. Shuler's
talk.
During 1985, chapter members Buckelew, Mc-
Carthy and Quesada addressed a wide range of Bay
area organizations, including the World Affairs Council,
Commonwealth Club, "Great Decisions," Rotary Clubs,
Optimist International, Navy League, Special Forces
Reserve, Kiwanis Clubs, retired officers organizations,
businessmen's clubs and organizations, Decade Club,
Republican Womens Clubs and Chambers of Commerce.
Each of the named speakers averaged at least one pres-
entation a month. In addition, classes and lectures were
given at Golden State University and San Jose State.
Topics included national and international terrorism, the
role of intelligance in formulating foreign policy, over-
views of CIA and the KGB, problems in Central and Latin
America, and the threat of Soviet Active Measures and
their exploitation of the media.
The February meeting was opened with the Pledge
of Allegiance, led by chapter president Bill Green. He
invited those in attendance who are not yet members of
AFIO to join, and encouraged members to attend meet-
ings regularly. Awards were presented for varying
accomplishments, such as coming the greatest distance
to attend, for most regular attendance, etc.
Program chairman Ed Rudka greeted the chapter's
Soviet guests with a brief salutation in Russian, and
then introduced the speaker, Vladimir Lomovtsev, Dep-
uty Consul General, Consulate of the USSR, San Fran-
cisco. Lomovtsev a member of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, is a graduate of the University of Mos-
cow. During WWII he fought with the Red Army, and
was wounded at the Dnieper River crossing when the
Red Army pushed back the invading German forces.
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Vice Consul Lomovtsev spoke of the complicated
and uneasy world in which we live, where the danger of
further buildup of nuclear weapons persists. He pointed
out that the development of nuclear armament has
changed everything in the world except our way of
thinking. The traditional way of securing national
security-deterring aggression by threats of greater
force-needs to be changed in the nuclear age, he said,
and an alternative approach must be found.
He said it is the contention of his government that
war is not inevitable, and that there is no international
dispute which cannot be settled by negotiation. The
danger of nuclear catastrophe is a common enemy of
both the US and the USSR, he warned. Our two nations,
he proposed, must assume responsibility for a build-up
of mutual trust, noting that his government wants a
suitable relationship with the U.S. which respects each
other's interests and the development of the greatest
possible trust.
The General Secretary of the Soviet Central Com-
mitee of the Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, in
discussing Soviet-American relations, has stressed that
the USSR has no enmity toward the United States, the
speaker said, adding that the Soviet Union has made
many proposals to control and prevent the nuclear arms
race. He noted that his country has now declared a uni-
lateral moratorium on testing of nuclear weapons. Since
it is necessary to perform tests of new weapons, he said,
if there is no testing, there can be no new weapons. He
insisted that the USSR would never be the first to use
nuclear weapons.
Lomovtsev said his government is reluctant to
spend more and more money on the arms buildup when
there is economic reason to use the money for other
purposes, suggesting that the US has other constructive
needs for the money poured into armaments. The world,
he said, is at a crossroads and must not fail to avert
nuclear catastrophe. The only way to do this, the
speaker said, is to freeze nuclear arsenals and reduce
existing stockpiles. Neither side, he reminded, could or
would reduce armaments while the other side is
increasing its arsenal, and, certainly, there is no need for
more nuclear weapons.
In discussing the Strategic Defense Initiative under
study by the United States, Lomovtsev pointed out that
the Soviets do not consider it a research program.
Instead, he indicated, it is an ever more dangerous part
of the arms race. Although the speaker acknowledged
that advocates of SDI say their hope is that the program
will provide a shield against nuclear weapons, he views
it as "militarizing space." Accusations that the USSR
has already done such research, he emphasized, are not
true.
Lomovtsev pointed out that it takes trust to get
agreement, but that agreement is also the best way to
get trust. He referred to the step-by-step process of rid-
ding the earth of nuclear weapons proposed recently by
Secretary Gorbachev. Under this proposal, within five to
eight years the USSR and the US would reduce by one-
half those nuclear weapons capable of reaching each
other's territory. This would include elimination of
intermediate-range missiles, both ballistic and cruise, in
the European zones, thus ridding the European conti-
nent of nuclear weapons. In addition, he stated, under
Col. Charles D. Gray (USMC-Ret), President of the
Satellite Chapter, presents Chapter plaque to guest
speaker Raymond Wannall.
the proposal the two powers would stop all nuclear
explosions and call on other nations to join in such a
moratorium.
The second stage of the proposal would start no
later that 1990 and last five to seven years, the speaker
explained. In that phase, other nuclear powers would
begin to engage in nuclear disarmament, beginning
with a freeze on such weapons and implementing
agreement not to have them in the territories of other
countries. Lomovtsev discussed further provisions of the
proposal, adding that under the terms of the proposal
nuclear weapons would be eliminated by 1995. The
Soviets, he assured the audience, would be agreeable to
verification of the destruction or elimination of such
weapons by national technical means, on-site inspec-
tion and other verification measures.
Instead of wasting the next ten to fifteen years in
developing new weapons in space which have the
claimed goal of making nuclear arms useless, he asked
if it would not be more sensible to start eliminating
those weapons, eventually reducing them to zero. To
continue the space race, he insisted, will cost humanity
too dearly. What the US envisions as a "space shield,"
he noted, can be turned into a "space sword," and the
nation which possesses it may be unable to resist the
temptation to use it.
The speaker summarized the Gorbachev proposal:
a freeze as the first stage, followed by a fifty percent
reduction, and total elimination of nuclear weapons by
all nations as the final stage. He closed by asking for a
reasonable approach by both the USSR and the US,
stressing that we must prevent the arms race in space
and terminate it on earth.
A brief question and answer session followed Lomovt-
sev's presentation, following which the meeting was
adjourned.
Editor's Note: The Soviet negotiating posture does not appear to
be as conciliatory as presented by the speaker. Summing up the latest
round of MBFR talks which ended in mid-March, Kenneth L. Adelman,
Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, noted:
"Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev raised substantial hopes around
the world with his Jan. 15 statement, "Nuclear Disarmament by the
Year 2000" .. .
"NATO representatives who composed the Western delegations
at the MBFR negotiations drew hopes from Mr. Gorbachev's specific
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reference to the need for 'reasonable verification' ... At face value this
pronouncement forecasts a significant shift in the Soviet Union's
decades-long minimalist approach to verification. For years the Soviets
have advanced verification ideas that sounded good, but in reality had
no teeth and were empty of substantive detail. Western negotiators
knew from experience that Mr. Gorbachev's words need to be mea-
sured against actual arms control proposals advanced by the Soviets
and their allies.
"Unfortunately, when it came time for the Soviets to translate Mr.
Gorbachev's words into concrete proposals, Allied negotiators were
deeply disappointed. An Eastern proposal presented in Vienna on Feb.
20 is quite literally a collection of old, tired Eastern positions repack-
aged in a draft agreement that fails to move substantively on any of the
issues that divide the sides in MBFR. Thus, on the first opportunity to
demonstrate the fresh arms control approach signaled by Mr. Gorba-
chev on Jan. 15, the Soviets have failed utterly. The Eastern proposal
in Vienna can only cast doubt on the Soviet's newly proclaimed flexibil-
ity on the verification issue. Sad to say, Moscow seems no more
willing to accept effective verification now than in the past ... The
East's proposal on on-site inspection is crippled by giving the country
to be inspected the right to veto any inspection requests it does not
consider 'legitimate' .. .
"in all these efforts, the need for effective verification measures is
clear. Thus, the Soviet refusal in Vienna to consider 'reasonable verifi-
cation,' as Mr. Gorbachev put it, does not present a hopeful sign for
the other negotiations ... The most recent Eastern proposal in Vienna,
unfortunately, calls into doubt, again, Moscow's public stance on East-
West arms control and raises serious questions about the Soviet
government's real objectives not only in Vienna, but in Geneva and
Stockholm as well."
Southwest Florida Chapter. Col. William T. Hor-
naday of Bonita Springs was elected chapter president
at its January 15th meeting. Others elected to serve as
officers and members of the executive committee are:
Herman O. Bly. Dr. Michael Hansinger, Otto F. Otepka,
Col. Donald H. Randell and Robert L. Thomson.
The chapter's 1986 activities got off to a great start
with a presentation by W. Raymond Wannall at its Feb-
ruary 28th meeting held at the Whiskey Creek Country
Club, Fort Myers. Wannall, a member of AFIO's board of
directors and former Assistant Director of the FBI, gave
an excellent and informative talk on international terror-
ism. More that 100 persons attending the special lun-
cheon to hear Wannall speak, including chapter mem-
bers, members of the S.W. Florida chapter of the Society
of Former Agents of the FBI, Military Order of the World
Wars and the Eagle Foundation.
While Wannall was in Fort Myers, it was arranged
for him to make a guest appearance on a popular talk
show on radio station WSOR-FM, using a remote tele-
phone hookup from the residence of Herman O. Bly. For
an hour on February 28th, he answered pertinent ques-
tions on international terrorism posed by station director
William Simon. An hour later, Wannall appeared along
with General and Mrs. James Dozier in a discussion of
international terrorism held at the Edison Community
College auditorium; more that 140 attended the program.
The chapter reports that the three appearances by
Mr. Wannall gave widespread publicity to S.W. Florida
Chapter's activities in regard to national security matters.
Suncoast Chapter. The chapter continues to forge
ahead in membership recruiting and a series of out-
standing programs. Membership as of mid-March stands
at 71, with additional membership anticipated by the
group's April meeting.
President Ray Saint-Germain has expressed the
chapter's gratitude to the base commander of MacDill
AFB for permitting meetings to be held at the base offic-
ers' club "The membership is also fortunate that the
officers of the US Central Command and the US Readi-
ness Command, along with the base intelligence and
security components, have been supporters of AFIO and
are frequent guests at our chapter meetings," Saint-
Germain said.
Robert W. Butler, Special Agent in Charge of the
Tampa Division of the FBI was guest speaker at the
chapter's December 3rd meeting. He brought the chap-
ter up to date on some of the more current activities and
priorities of the FBI, both regionally and nationally.
During the business portion of the meeting the mem-
bership approved several changes in chapter by-laws,
bringing them into concert with national by-laws. It was
also agreed to raise chapter dues. "The spirit, camarad-
erie and dedication of the chapter members contributed
immeasurably to the success of the meeting," the chap-
ter president said.
The February 18th meeting featured Michael Pow-
ers, Resident Agent in Charge of the Tampa office of the
US Drug Enforcement Administration. Powers, a vete-
ran of the US Marine Corps, CIA and DEA, provided an
outstanding update on the current problems being faced
by DEA, particularly in Florida-a key introduction point
for narcotics smuggled from abroad. The speaker
acknowledged that narcotics interdiction is a monumen-
tal task and that no real end to the problem is clearly in
sight. Yet, said Powers, the job of the DEA would be
absolutely impossible without the splendid cooperation
of state and local law enforcement.
During the business meeting it was announced
that chapter secretary-treasurer Bradley T. Skeels is
recovering "swimmingly" from his recent hip replace-
ment surgery. The chapter's nominating committee,
chaired by CWO Ann M. McDonough (USA-Ret.), was
charged with presenting a slate of officers for considera-
tion by the membership at the April 22nd meeting.
Chapter president Saint-Germain reminds AFIO
members from other areas of the US not to forget there
is an AFIO chapter in the west central Florida area. The
chapter extends an open invitation to all visiting AFIO
members to attend its meetings, which are held on an
established basis. For further information contact Roy B.
Mager, Jr. 711 Flamingo Drive, Apollo Beach, FL 33570,
[phone], or Bradley T. Skeels, 473 Kumquat
Lane, Port Richey, FL 33568, [phone].
Western Montana Chapter. When the snows come,
usually from November through March, the chapter
does not schedule formal meetings. But, comes the
Spring, they make up for it. Walt Sedoff, a charter
member of the chapter, is slated to be the speaker at its
April 4th meeting at the Missoula Country Club. AFIO
members from Idaho have been invited to the meeting
and will be asked to be guests of the chapter at future
meetings until they are able to form their own chapter.
Also on that day, the losing membership team will host
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the winning team to lunch. (to date, it is reported that Bo
Foster's "Black Team" has a big lead over the "Grey
Team" captained by Bob Ripley.)
In other activities, the Bitter Root Valley high schools
are anticipating another lecture this year by Walt Sedoff,
who always packs them in and draws many queries on
intelligence. He reports that the kids, usually juniors and
seniors, are eager listeners and are sharp with their
questions. Proof of his popularity is that school adminis-
trators call early in the year to ensure Walt's availability.
Dick Grant, the chapter president, is also a popular guest
speaker. In January, for example, he gave a presentation
to the Bitter Root Rotary Club, offering a pot-pourri on
intelligence-an explanation of the intelligence cycle,
the need for intelligence, the mission of AFIO-supported
by charts and photos taken all over the world.
Derek A. Lee Chapter. Derek Lee passed away
last Spring. His untimely death created a tremendous
void within the chapter. Under the direction of William
Hood and the chapter's board of directors, Donald Milton
reports, "we have been able to regroup and it looks like
we are in good shape for 1986."
The chapter, formerly the Greater New York City
chapter, has been renamed in honor of Derek Lee. The
chapter's dedication reads:
"Derek Armitage Lee was born in Englewood, NJ,
November 16, 1911. His mother was an American; his
father was the second-generation head of an English
fabric firm, Arthur H. Lee and Sons. He was educated at
Ridley College (Ontario) and at Dartmouth. At twenty-
one he joined the family firm.
"In 1940, Derek sailed for England to volunteer for
military service, only to be refused by the British army,
navy, and marines. To gain entry into the British military,
Derek went right to the top: Winston Churchill. Arriving
at No. 10 Downing Street without an appointment, he
failed to gain an audience with the prime minister, but
got action nonetheless by explaining to an assistant that
his status was exactly the same as Churchill. Both has
an American mother and an English father. The parallel
worked, and within three days Derek was a seaman in
the Royal Navy. By 1943, he was in command of a
destroyer.
"Shortly thereafter, at the request of Generals "Hap"
Arnold and "Wild Bill" Donovan, Derek was loaned to
the Office of Strategic Services. He spent the next two
and a half years behind enemy lines on thirty-two mis-
sions, particulary in Burma, Indo-China and Malaya. At
one point, he was simultaneously in the service of the
Royal Navy, the British 14th Army, the Indian 15th
Corps and the US Army. Behind Japanese line in
Malaya, Derek came down with malnutrition-hence
the walking stick which became so much a part of his
image, was hospitalized at war's end and not released
until 1946.
"Derek Lee wore a Third Dan degree, black belt, in
judo. He instructed such groups as the Ulster Police
Force and the Chicago Police homiside squad in its use,
and in later years taught judo to the boys of the United
Neighborhood Houses.
"When his father died in 1949, Derek took control
of Arthur H. Lee and Sons, and continued the firm's
steady expansion. The company bought Jofa, Incorpo-
rated in 1964. In his three decades as head of the com-
pany that became known as Lee-Jofa, Derek Lee was an
articulate spokesman for the textile industry. He also
rose to the presidency of the British-American Chamber
of Commerce. In 1973, in recognition of his work,
Queen Elizabeth appointed Lee a Commander (of the
Order) of the British Empire."
The chapter plans to hold three meetings in 1986,
starting off with a presentation by General William
Westmoreland early in the year. The second meeting,
April 14th, will feature the Hon. Vernon Walters, US
ambassador to the UN and former deputy director of
CIA. In November, Admiral Bobby Ray Inman will share
his thoughts with the chapter.
Greeting W. Raymond Wannall (center), guest speaker before the Southwest Florida Chapter, are
Herman 0. Bly, master of ceremonies, and Col. Donald Randell, former chapter president.
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Notes from Here and There
Donations
Herman 0. Bly, of the Southwest Florida chapter,
has been awarded the Certificate of Excellence in the
catagory of published works by the Freedoms Founda-
tion of Valley Forge, Pa. The award, determined by a
national awards jury chaired by Hon. Edwin J. Peterson,
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Oregon, was
given for Bly's series of newspaper articles in the Lee
Constitution, Ft. Myers, Fl. Reprints of the articles may
be ordered from the publication (See page 8, Winter
issue of Periscope).
David Atlee Phillips, according to Arlington (Va.)
librarian Jane T. Larsen, gave "one of the most popular
workshops we've ever had," when he spoke on "Careers
in Intelligence" February 6th. Says Larsen, "that the
subject of intelligence careers is popular was evidenced
not only by the large, responsive audience, who kept the
speaker for an hour after his presentation, but by the
number of calls we got afterward. People who missed
the program wanted to know when they could see it on
TV." (The presentation was video-taped and is slated for
repeat showings on Arlington's library channel, cable
channel 31.) Summed up Larsen: "Workshops like this,
plus Mr. Phillips' splendid book, Careers in Secret Oper-
ations," should give AFIO's education program a great
boost."
Pick Up The Phone;
Support Intel Week
AFIO has voiced its support for a congressional
resolution to designate June 1 through June 7 as
"National Intelligence Community Week." A sim-
ilar attempt gained Senate passage last year, but
failed in the House of Representatives.
This year's effort appears to be doing well in
the Senate, But procedures are more difficult in
the House. For example, more co-sponsors are
needed to discharge such a resolution from the
Post Office and Civil Service Committee for a floor
vote.
Members who support this move are encour-
aged to write or call their congressional represen-
tatives, or their home district offices, as soon as
possible and ask them to co-sponsor the resolution
(officially known as H.J. Resolution 527). In addi-
tion, members may wish to write or call Rep. Lee
Hamilton (D-Ind) and Rep. Bob Stump (R-Ariz), the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence,
respectively, commend them for their sponsorship
of the measure, and urge them to push it along.
[Rep. Lee E. Hamilton, 2187 Rayburn Bldg., Wash-
ington, D.C. 20515, phone [phone]; Rep. Bob
Stump, 211 CHOB, Washington, D.C. 20515,
phone [phone].]
The following members have generously contributed an
amount equal to or exceeding one year's annual dues.
Mr. Ralph A. de VORE
Kingwood, Texas
COL James H. DRUM, USA(Ret.)
Washington, D.C.
Mr. Joe Wilson ELLIOTT
Los Angeles, California
Mr. Mike S. GONAKIS
Euclid, Ohio
CDR Ned V. HARRELL
Sun City, California
Mr. William H. HOFFMAN
Fort Pierce, Florida
Mr. James R. McCALL
Hamilton, Montana
Mr. Hayden B. PEAKE
Alexandria, Virginia
Col Herbert J. "Buck" ROGERS, USAF(Ret.)
San Antonio, Texas
Mr. Anthony R. SPADARO
Arlington, Virginia
Mr. Michie F. TILLEY
Greenville, Texas
USAF E&E Reunion
Set for May
Members of the Air Force Escape and Evasion Society will
host more than forty former members of the European underground
organizations at their annual meeting at the Terrace Garden Inn,
Atlanta, Georgia, May 21st through the 24th.
The courageous men and women of the resistance will come to
Atlanta from Holland, Belgium and France to be with the men who
they risked their lives to hide from the Nazi occupiers of their coun-
tries. Many of these freedom fighters will be seeing for the first time
since the war, the airmen they sheltered. More than twenty members
of the Royal Air Force Escaping Society, and its Canadian counterpart,
will be in attendance.
American airmen who were shot down over enemy-occupied
Europe and evaded capture or escaped from capture are invited to join
the reunion. Further information can be obtained by writing: Ralph K.
Patton, President, Air Forces Escape and Evasion Society, 720 Valley-
view Road, Pittsburgh, PA 15243; [phone].
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Leahy (continued from page 2)
sion of irritation at congressional "meddling." But the
"leak problem", he said, masked a more fundamental
problem which strains relations between SSCI and the
Administration, which is "... growing disagreement over
the Administration's clear determination to make ever
greater use of covert paramilitary operations as part of
what is now being called the 'Reagan doctrine.' In
essence, this is a strategy of seeking to undermine
Communist regimes through insurgency whenever pos-
sible." Large-scale "covert" paramilitary programs, he
urged, "must be debated openly in Congress, with
recorded votes, so that members of both Houses can be
held accountable by the American people." He urged
that the U.S. government not return to the pre-1976 era
of eight separate congressional committees, each look-
ing into intelligence activities on an overlapping and
highly insecure manner, or to an even earlier system of
powerful Senate chairman "with an I-don't-want-to-
know" attitude about oversight of intelligence programs
present or planned.
Answering questions from the floor, Leahy rejected
the concept of a single joint Senate-House intelligence
oversight committee, instead of the present two. Con-
trary to its legend of keeping secrets, he said, the former
joint congressional committee on atomic energy actually
leaked one of the major secrets in its possession: that of
the U.S. possession of the hydrogen bomb. He also
noted that if a specific covert action policy fails and the
Congress has not supported it, CIA will "catch it" for
carrying out such an action as a substitute for U.S. for-
eign policy. "We are different from the Soviet Union," he
responded to another question, "which uses covert
action as part of their foreign policy."
Senator Leahy had some bitter words for President
Reagan's leaking of intelligence sources and methods
"to make his points publicly concerning Libyan terrorists
responsibility." The vast percentage of the American
population, he said, believes the President, and that he
did not have to reveal precise sources and methods to
document his case against the Libyans. Continued reve-
lation of sources and methods, he went on, will ruin the
intelligence community. "Oversight," he concluded, is
here to stay and the best thing for the American people
is that congressional oversight works. For it to succeed,
"the intelligence community can come and discuss dis-
puted points with the SSCI. Better that than return to
the old days."
AFIO SUMMER
LUNCHEON
Monday, June 9, 1986
Officers' Club, Ft. Myer, Virginia
From the President's Desk
The months of 1986 roll on and intelligence - good
intelligence - becomes even more important to the for-
eign policy process of the United States - its use creep-
ing into the everyday vernacular of America, her Allies
and enemies. Sigint played the key role in laying the
Berlin terrorist act directly at Qaddafi's doorstep; daily
reports of new Soviet missile accomplishments are
commonplace in the media; Secretary Weinberger dis-
tributes the 5th edition of DIA's "Soviet Military Power"
(must reading for AFIO-ers-available at all government
bookstores). The United States takes good intelligence
for granted. We must assume it stays healthier than that
of any other country. It will take great wisdom on the
part of everyone in the Administration and on the part of
every member of Congress to resist cutting the intelli-
gence budget as though it is just like every other part of
the governmental apparatus. The President's National
Foreign Intelligence budget must be fenced - protected
- assured. Let your congressmen know how you feel
on this issue - Gramm-Rudman-Hollings notwith-
standing.
A.F.I.O. applauds the long and magnificent career
and service of John McMahon as he departs CIA for
long-deserved alternatives. Thank you John on behalf of
all your intelligence family and welcome to A.F.I.O.
I enjoyed a social get together with AFIO-ers in
Honolulu this past week. Great to see the likes of Rocky
Triantafellu, Orlando Epp and Lloyd Vesey.
Hope all of you are making plans to join us in
Orlando, Florida for the big convention in October.
Should be the best ever with sufficient drawing cards
there to attract everyone. See you there!!
On 11-12 June 1986 NMIA is co-sponsoring, in
conjunction with OSD and DIA, an unclassified sympo-
sium on "Intelligence Education and Training for the
Year 2000". The symposium will be held at the National
Defense University, Fort McNair, Washington, D.C.; con-
tact Roy Jonkers at 354-1565 for further details.
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ARTICLE APPEARED YORK T 1/
11 October 1985
ON PAGE
In t he last few weeks the C.I.A. An intelligence official said the
V CILA transferred the chief of its office of se, C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
OFFICIALS SAY curity, William Kotopish, to a new Job internally rather than report it to the
ata level of equivalent seniority. but an F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
official said the move had b"If you reported everfantasy that
DID N O T T E L L F1B.L "for some time" and was not related to people have, you'd have everyone
under surveillance."
'the Howard csse.
O F LJS Mr. Howard worked for the agency Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.
from 1981 to 1983. H.was told of clash-The C.I.A would not say whether it
tied American intelligence operations undertook any form of inquiry after
O F SPY CASE
M
in Moscow pecause Lne agency wad MI. n'iwnitl wit Ujc .' U C.I.A. em-
The following -article is based on reanning to assign him there, officials Ployees he had considered becoming a
porting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel Planning I Soviet spy. But Federal ,law and a
Mr. B rink
rinkley and was written by have said.
B According to a criminal complaint on presidential executive order prohibit
ley file in Federal District Court in Albu- the agency from taking any steps in-
y~ m ~, N?' Y?[t r'=?' uerue, N.M., Mr. Howard told two side the United States to investigate
~ q q possfbk cases of espionage.
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The Cen current employees of the intelligence Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-
t7 l-Intelligence Agency failed to notify agency a year ago last month that he, sands of people who retire from Gov-
the Federal Bureau of Investigation I had "spent hours in the vicinity of the ernment or industry each year after
after it learned more than a year ago II Soviet Embassy trying to deride holding positions that gave them ac-;
that Edward L. Howard was consider-Q whether to enter the embassy and dis- cess to classified materials. More than
Ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern- I close classified information." 4.3 million people in government and
ment officials said today. - An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver- industry associated with government
ration was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four now have clearances to use classified
According to court records, Mr. How-' days before that; the Government coo- ~rmation.
and told two agency employees in Sep tends, W. Howard gave his.inform.a- Asked what procedures the Central
tember 1984 that he was thinking of dis- JLion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus. Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
closing classified information to the tria. former employees who have knowl-
soviet Union. George Lauder, a C.I.A. Mkesrnan,, edge of classified programs, Mr. Laud-
said today that as a result of that con- er, the agency spokesman, said: "We
Soviet Defector Was the Key versation "action was taken" within haven't got4 any procedures. Once a
The bureau has sole responsibility the agency "and it seemed to be rea- person leaves here, he is John Q. Citi,
for domestic espionage investigations sonable action at the time." He would zees, just like you and me. We don't
and, under Federal law, the intelli- not say what the action was, although keep a string Ott them. It's strictly an
and all other Govern- an official said the agency kept in con- F.B.I. natter. "
genre agency tact with Mr. Howard after his conver- Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota
agencies
he F.B.I. tot . it is is sation with the two C.I.A. operatives. Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
report sus ed
meat fed espionage to the supposed
J~ Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the ate Intelligence Committee, said his
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed- time. panel would also examine the problem
eral agency to carry out surveillance or
'A Few Blatant Cosec' presented by military officers who re-
with knowledge of classified ma-
other actions within the United Stater The Senate and House intelligence terials.
to stop potential spies-
Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former committees are investigating the han- Most people with security clearances
intelligence agency officer who is now dung of the Howard case. A key issue in work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
the study, committee members said, Department. L. Britt Snider, director
a fugitive, has been charged w ith espio will be how the C.I.A. and other agen- of onterintellRience and security
Wage accused of giving Soviet officials cies deal with employees who leave
details of American intelligence opera- Government service with detailed, policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
tions in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive diction of any kind over former era-
called the disclosures serious and dam- programs. ployees. whether or not they had clear-
aging. . . Another element of the investiga- antes. It's strictly the F.B.I."
'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says ' tions will be several recent espionage At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said. "We
cases in which Government officials are not concerned about A.?nerica,s
Federal officials said the C.I.A. told failed to heed warning signs that a cur- who have had clearances. '- a don't .
;!~c F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard rent or former employee was planning look at these people unless we detect an
u.::'. after the bureau began an invests- to spy or was spying, committee men- individual involved in espionage."
garlon this fall based on information hers said. Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves
from a Soviet defector. Vitaly Yur- "We've had a few blatant cases Senator Leahy said: "I don't think
chenko, who had been a senior official where we just didn't follow through, anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain
of the K.G.B.. the Soviet intelligence even with alarm bells going off," said surveillance on the several hundred
agency. I Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo- thousand people who leave the Govera-
crat of Oklahoma, chairman of the
The bureau began surveillance of meat each year with secuny clear-
Mr. Howard last month. but he slipped House committee's Subcommittee on ances. But there are a certain number
Oversight and Evaluaton. of people in extremely sensitive post-
out of his home at night and is believed In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I. tions, a handful of the. that we ought
to have fled the country. official said Mr. Howard's conversa- to do more with."
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Ver- tion with the two C.I.A. officers would Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "car-.
month Democrat who is vice chairman have been sufficient to warrant an in-1 taurly would have been one of those"
of the Select Committee on Inteili- vestigation because he held highly sensitive infor-
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did pot "Anytime we get information that; mation and was being dismissedfollovf-
someone has considered such an act, i tog a Polygraph examination that indi-
ormaatim .
give the F.B.I. adequate inf
about this person. that's a bad mistake. we would take some action," said Phil- cared drug use and petty t-'ievery. acr
It shows very. very serious problems lip A. Parker. deputy assistant director carding, to Federal officials.
of the bureau's intelligence division.
I within the C.I.A." .
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When Adm. Stanfield M. Turn
was Director of Central Intelligence in
the Carter Administration, he di$-
missed, transferred or forced to retire
nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held .
highly sensitive positions.
In an interview this week, he said
that others in the agency had warned.
him that "we ran the risk of some of
them selling their information to the
other side." He said he had disagreed
when it was suggested that some
"Ih' hobs. and pit.
ceeded with his original plans.
But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't
think my rule should be totally rigid.-It
this guy had just been briefed, I'd a4 y
1 let's stick him in the Dominican Repub'
lic or someplace like that for a couple
of years, until the information Isn't
valuable anymore."
Senator Leahy said: "We may need
some sort of turkey farm for some ot?
these former employees. Make thetri
translate cables or something like that
for a couple of years."
Admiral Turner said he thought
C.I.A. officers ought to be required. L4
'agree when they are hired that "fon
three years or so after they leave, thd}!
1 will be subject to the same rules of in*
trusion as applied when they were 14
government. Make them come back ton
random polygraph examinations. ThA(
would give them one more thing to
worry about before they turn." '
A C.I.A. official said "it's canceivJ,
able" that that idea would work, add,
ing that finding solutions to the prob-,
lem "is certainly something we re
thinking about now.'
A
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ARTICLE AP?c RED
nu PACE }'\l _
NE'W YORK TIMES
8 October 1985
Spy Charge Spurs Questions
bout Procedures of C.I.A.
A
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
m Tb. t+.- Yort Times .
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 - Members
of the Senate and House intelligence
committees say espionage allegations
against a former Central Intelligence
Agency officer raise serious questions
about the agency's procedures for deal-
ing with disgruntled employees.
The legislators say their committees
are conducting a detailed examination
of the career of Edward L. Howard, a
former officer of the agency who, ac-
cording to Administration officials.
was identified by a defector as having
sold the Soviet Union highly secret In-
formation.
Mr. Howard was forced to resign
from the C.I.A. in 1963: the agency was
dissatisfied with his answers in a poly-
graph, or lie detector, examination
that was apparently unrelated to espio-
nage charges. Officials have said they
suspect it was a desire for revenge that
led Mr. Howard, who is believed to
have fled the country, to provide se-
crets to the Soviet Union.
"Tbe C.I.A. has good security proce-
dures but they're not perfect and
they're going to have to get better,"
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who is the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said in an interview. "They're
going to have to figure out what to do
with a disgruntled or potentially dis-
gruntled employee who has a lot of
knowledge because that's where a lot of
breaches have occurred in the past."
C.I.A. Briefs Cammitteem
Representative Dave McCu dy' of
Oklahoma, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Evalua-
tion of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, said: "I think there are a lot of
questions yet to be answered. I'm not
sure anyone's comfortable with what
we've seen 50 far."
In an interview today, Mr. !McCurdy
would not discuss the specifics of the
Howard case but said that he and some
other members of the committee had
been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of
the Senate committee have had similar
briefings by the agency.
According to members of the two
committees and their aides, the panels
are concerned about a broad range of
issues stemming from the agency's
handling of Mr. Howard, who was
within the C.I.A.'s three-year proba-
tion period when he was asked to re-
sign.
Questions Raised With C.I.A.
Among the questions the two com-
mittees are raising with the agency are
these :
gWhy was Mr. Howard, a junior offi-
cial, given access to such sensitive ma-
terial at an early stage in his career?
q Why did the agency choose to dis-
miss him while the information he had
learned in training for a posting to Mos-
cow was still of value?
q What steps were taken to keep
track of Mr. Howard's movements
after he left the C.I.A., both in this
country and abroad, where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has charged
that he met with Soviet intelligence
agents?
gWas there sufficient coordination'
between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the
other major Federal agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence work?
Administration officials say Mr.
Howard was identified as an agent of
the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko.
a senior official in the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency. He defected
to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the
officials have said, is undergoing ex-
tensive questioning at an undisclosed
location in the United States.
? Trip to Austria In '84
Mr. Howard, who is now 3.3 years old,
was employed by the Central intelli-
gence Agency from January 1981 to
June 1983, according to an F.B.I. af-
fidavit filed in Federal District Court in
New Mexico. The document charged
that he traveled to Austria in 1984
where he made contact with agent of
the K.G.B. and was paid money for
"classified information relating to U.S.
intelligence sources and methods."
Intelligence sources say that the in-
formation involved related to Amer-
ican operations in Moscow. They have
said Mr. Howard was trained for a post
in Russia that would have involved
managing agents or other means of in-
telligence collection.
Intelligence sources say, however,
that he was not sent to Moscow and was
instead asked to leave the agency after
the polygraph test suggested use of ille-
gal drugs and petty theft of Govern-
e-.. A.-A.
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ARTICLE IrGRFO
ON PAGE -Fe
OFFICIALS SAY ClIs
DID NOT TELL F.B.I.
OF SPYCASEMOV"
The Jbllowing-t tiele is based on re-
porting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel
Brinkley and was written by Mr. Brink-
ley.
9pedd 0 T3s Ns Yat T%
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The Cenr-
tral4ntelligwce Agency failed-to notify
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
after it learned more than a year ago
that Edward L. Howard was consider-
ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern-
ment officials said- today. .
According to court records, Mr. How-
alyd told. two agency employees in Sep
tember 1984 that he was thinking of dis-.
closing classified information to the
Soviet Union.
Soviet Defector Was the Key
NEW YORK TIMES
11 October 1985
In the last few weeks the C.I.A.
transferred the chief of its office of so
curity, William Kotopish, to a new job
ata level of equivalent seniority, but an
official said the move had been planned
"for some time" and was not related to
the Howard case.
Mr. Howard worked for the agency
from 1881 to 1989. Hewas told of classi
fled American intelligence Operations
in Moscow because the agency was
planning to assign him there, officials
have said.
According oo a criminal compWnt an
file in Federal District Court In, Alba
querque, N.M., Mr. Howard'told two
current employees of the intelligence
agency a year ago last month that he
had "spent hours in the vicinity of this
Soviet Embassy trying to decide
whether to enter the embassy and dls-
dose classified information.".
An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver-
sation was held Sept. Z4, 1984. Four
days before that{ the Government an-
tends, Mr. Howard gave his.hnfornia-.
tion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus-
tria.
90311 Lauder, a C.I.A. snokesma-
said today that as a result of that Coo-
ver?sation "action was taken" within
? The bureau has sole responsibility 1I the agency "and it seemed to be rea-
for domestic espionage investigattions sonable action at the time." He would
and, under Federal law, the tnteili- not say what the action was, although
in con-
gence agency and all other Govern- an official said the kept
ment agencies are supposed to report tact with Mr. Howard
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is sation with the two C.I.A. operatives.
Illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed- Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the
oral agency to carry out surveillance or time.
other actions within the United States I ? 'A Few Blatant Casa'
to stop potential spies. The Senate and House intelligence
Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former committees are investigating the ban-
intelligence agency officer who is now dling of the Howard are. A key issue in members a fugitive, has been charged with espies wthe ill be study, committee.A. and other age how this C.I
nage, accused of giving Soviet officials des deal with employees who leave
details of American intelligence opera- Government service with detailed,
Lions in Moscow. Federal officials have classified knowledge about sensitive
called the disclosures serious and dam-
aging.
'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says
Another element of the i vestiga-
tione will be several recent espionage
Federal officials said the C.I.A. told! I failed to heed warning signs that a cur-
the F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard rent or former employee was planning
until after the bureau began an invests- to spy or was spying, committee mem-
gation this fall based on Information hers said.
from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yur- "We've had a few blatant cases
chenko, who had been a senior official where we just didn't follow through,
of the K.G.B., the Soviet irate even with alarm bells ing off," said
Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo.
Itybureau began surveillance of crat of Oklahoma, chairman of the
Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped House committee's Subcommittee on
out of his home at night and is believed Oversight and Evaluaton.
have fled the cons In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I.
to may. official said Mr. Howard's conversa-
Senator Patridt.J. Leahy, the Ver- ~ tion with the two C.I.A. officers would
mont Democrat who Is vice chairman have been sufficient to warrant an in-
of the Select Committee on Intellf- vestigatiaL
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not "Anytime we get information that
give the F.B.I. adequate Informatins someone has considered such an act,
about this person, that's a bad mistake, we would take some action," said Phil-
director
It shown- very, very serious problems lip A. Parker, deputy assistant
within the C.I.A." of the bureau's intelligence division.
An intelligence official said the
C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
Internally rather than report it to the
F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
"If you reported every fantasy that
people have, you'd have everyone
under
Law Bars C.I.A. Moves In U.S.
The C.I.A would not say whether It
undertook any form of inquiry after
Mr. Howard told the two C.I.A. em-
ployees he had considered becoming a
Soviet spy. But Federal Jaw and a
Presidenttiyal executive order prohibit
the the Umtf ed S toxin mitigate
poeslbie cases of espionage.
Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-
sands of people who retire from Gov-
ernment or Industry each year after
holding positions that gave them ac-
cess to classified materials. More than
4.3 million people in government and
Industry associated with government
now have clearances to use classified
information.
Asked what procedures the Central
Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
former employees who have knowl-
ethee of IM spoke ~ema'r. I Mr. s Laud-
off, haven't 8 any procedures. Once a
person leaves hare, he Is John Q. Citi..
zen, just ? like you and me. We don't
keep a string an them. It's strictly an
F.B.I. rdatter. "
Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota
Republican who is chairman of the Sea
Me Intelligence Committee, said his
panel would also examine the problem
presented by military officers who re-
tire with knowledge of classified ma-
terials.
Mat people with security clearances
work for the Pentagon At the Defense
Department, L. Britt Snider, director
of counterinteilgience and security
policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
diction of any kind over former em-
ployees, whether or not they had clear-
ances. It's strictly the F.B.I."
At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We
are not concerned about Americaes
who have had clearances. We don't .
look at these people unless we detect en
individual involved in espionage."
Ex-Intelligence Chiefs Moves
Senator Leahy said: "I don't think
anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain
surveillance on the several hundred
thousand people who leave the Govern-
ment each year with security clear-
ances. But there are a certain number
of people in extremely sensitive posi-
tions, a handful of them, that we ought
to do more with."
Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "cer-
?tainly would have been one of thosp"
because he held highly sensitive infor-
mation and was being dismissedfoll"-
leg a polygraph examination that indi-
cated drug use and petty thievery, 4 4-
cerdl to Federal officials.
Continued
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ashDireco ar of Central Idnt ~lgncit
1
was
the Carter Administration d'
missed, transferred or forced to retire
nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who held
highly sensitive positions.
In an interview this week, he SW
had warned.
that others in the agency
him that "we ran the risk of some bf
them selling their information' to the
other side." Be said he~dliaar
sme
when it was suggested
should be given other jobs, and p
ceeded with his original plans.
But he said of Mr. Howard: "I don't
think my rule should he just been briefed, ed, I d sty
this guy
let's stick him in the Dominican Repub`
lic or someplace like that for a couplE
of years, until the information isn't
valuable anymore."
Senator Leahy said: "We may nee4
some sort of turkey farm for game of
these former employees. Make thess
translate cables or something like that
for a couple of years."
Admiral 'honer said ' he
eq~
C.I.A. officers ought to be:
agree when they are hired that "fox
three years or so after they leave, thgy,
will be subject to the same rules of in?
trusion as applied when they were 14
government. Make them come back for
bons T144
random polygraph a
would give them one more thing to
to ~ worry about before they turn.
A r,.I.A. official said "it's conceivable" that that idea would work, add'
ing that finding solutions to the prc
lem "is certainly something wem
thinking about now." :
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ARTICLE APPURED
ON PAGE I I ) . .
NEW YORK TIMES
8 October 1985
Spy Charge Spurs Questions
About Procedures of C.I.A.
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
$pdil to no Ns York Tim"
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 - Members
of the Senate and Howe intelligence
committees say esple~nake allegations
against a former Central intelligence
ons
Agency officer
procserious edures for deal-
about the agency's raise
ing with disgruntled employees.
The legislators say their committees
are a detailed examinationof the 'career of Edward L. Howard, a
former officer of the agency who, ac-
cording to Administration officials,
was ideotlf ed by a detector as having
sold the Soviet Union highly secret in-
formation.
Mr. Howard was forced to resign
from the C.I.A. in I913; the agency was
dissatisfied with his answers in a poly-
graph, or He detector, examination
that was apparently unrelated to espio-
nags charges. Officials have said they
suspect it was a desire for revenge that
led Mr. Howard, who is believed to
have fled the country, to provide se-
crete to the Soviet Union.
"The C.I.A. has good security proce-
dures but they're not perfect and
they're going to have to get better,"
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who Is the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on InteW-
gence, said in an interview. "They're
going to have to figure out what to do
with a disgruntled or potentially dis-
gnmtlsd employee who has a lot of
knowledge because that's where a lot of
breaches have occurred in the past."
C.I.A. Briefs Committees
Representative Dave McCurdy of
Oklahoma, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on Oversight and Evalua-
tion of the House Intel Commit-
tee, said: "I think there are a lot of
questions yet to be answered. I'm not
sure anyone's comfortable with what
we've seen so far."
In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy
would not discuss the specifics of the
Howard case but said that be and some
other members of the committee had
been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of
the Senate committee have had similar
briefings by the agency.
According to members of the two
committees and their aides, the panels
are concerned about a broad range of
Issues stemming from the agency's
handling of Mr. Howard, who was
within the C.I.A.'s three-year proba-
tion period when he was asked to re-
sign.
Questions Raised With C.I.A.
Among the questions the two com-
mittees are raising with the agency are
these:
Why was Mr. Howard, a junior offi-
cial, given access to such sensitive ma-
terial at an early stage in his career?
gWhy did the agency choose to dis-
miss him while the information he had
learned in training for a posting to Mos-
cow was still of value?
'What steps were taken to keep
track of Mr. Howard's movements
after he left the C.I.A., both in this
country and abroad, where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has charged
that he met with Soviet intelligence
agents?
Was there sufficient coordination'
between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the
other major Federal agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence work?
Administration officials say Mr.
Howard was identified as an agent of
the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko,
a senior official in the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency. He defected
to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the
officials have said, is undergoing ex-
tensive questioning at an undisclosed
location in the United States.
? Trip to Austria in '84
Mr. Howard, who is now 33 years old,
was employed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from January 1981 to
June 1983, according to an F.B.I. af-
fidavit filed in Federal District Court in
New Mexico. The document charged
that he traveled to Austria in 1984
where he made contact with agent of
the K.G.B. and was paid money for
"classified information relating to U.S.
Intelligence sources and methods."
Intelligence sources say that the in-
formation involved related to Amer-
ican operations in Moscow. They have
said Mr. Howard was trained for a post
in Russia that would have involved
managing agents or other means of in-
telligence collection.
Intelligence sources say, however,
that he was not sent to Moscow and was
Instead asked to leave the agency after
the polygraph test suggested use of ille-
gal drugs and petty theft of Govern-
ment funds.
Mr. Howard, who had been working
for the New Mexico Legislature, disap-
peared last month alter the F.B.I.
questioned him. He is being sought on a
tu4tlve warrant
ow/
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ARTICLE APPEA &EO
ON PAGE _I_
OFFICIALS SAY CIIIAS
NOT TELL F1BiDID OF SPY CASE MOVES
The following .rtiele is cased on re-
porting by Stephen Engelberg and Joel
Brinkleyand was written by Mr. Brink-
ley.
Spa=W to The New Yoct rimes
WASHINGTON, Oct. 10 - The Cen-
tral-Intelligence Agency failed to notify
the Federal Bureau of Investigation
after it learned more than a year ago
that Edward L. Howard was consider-
ing becoming a Soviet spy, Govern-
ment officials said today.
According to court records, Mr. How-
and told two agency employees in Sep-
tember 1984 that he was thinking of dis-
closing classified information to the
Soviet Union.
Soviet Defector Was the Key
. The bureau has sole responsibility
for domestic espionage investigations
and, under Federal law, the intelli-
gence agency and all other Govern-
ment agencies are supposed to report
suspected espionage to the F.B.I. It is
illegal for the C.I.A. or any other Fed-
eral agency to carry out surveillance or
other actions within the United State!c
to stop potential spies.
Mr. Howard, 33 years old, a former
intelligence agency officer who is now
a fugitive, has been charged with espio-
nage, accused of giving Soviet officials
details of American intelligence opera-
tions in Moscow. Federal officials have
called the disclosures serious and dam-
aging.
'Bad Mistake,' Senator Says
YORK T MES
11 October 1985
In the last few weeks the C.I.A.
transferred the chief of its office of se,
curity, William Kotopish, to a new job
at a level of equivalent seniority, but an
official said the move had been planned
"for some time" and was not related to
the Howard case.
Mr. Howard worked for the agency
from 1981 to 1953. H. was told of classt-
fied American intelligence operations
in Moscow oecause the agency was
planning to assign him there, officials
have said. -
According to a criminal complaint on
file in Federal District Court in Albu-
querque, N.M., Mr. Howard told two
current employees of the intelligence
agency a year ago last month that he
had "spent hours in the vicinity of the
Soviet Embassy trying to decide
whether to enter the embassy and dis-
close classified information."
An F.B.I. affidavit says the conver-
sation was held Sept. 24, 1984. Four
days before that, the Government coo-
tends, Mr. Howard gave his.infornia-
tion to Soviet officials in St. Anton, Aus-
tria.
George Lauder,_a C.I.A. spokesman
?I said today that as a result of that coo-
tl versation "action was taken" within
the agency "and it seemed to be rea-
sonable action at the time." He would
not say what the action was, although
an official said the agency kept in con-
tact with Mr. Howard after his conver-
sation with the two C.I.A. operatives.
Mr. Howard lived in New Mexico at the
time.
'A Few Blatant Cases'
The Senate and House intelligence
committees are investigating the han-
dling of the Howard case. A key issue in
the study, committee members said,
will be how the C.I.A. and other agen-
cies deal with employees who leave
Government service with detailed,
classified knowledge about sensitive
programs.
Another element of the investiga-
tions will be several recent espionage
cases in which Government officials
failed to heed warning signs that a cur-
rent or former employee was planning
to spy or was spying, committee mem-
An intelligence official said the
C.I.A.'s decision to handle the matter
internally rather than report it to the
F.B.I. was "a judgment call," adding,
"If you reported every famasy that
people have, you'd have everyone
under surveillance."
Law Bars C.I.A. Moves in U.S.
The C.I.A would not say whether it
undertook any form of inquiry after
MT. nu*?aiu Lulu flit -Vu C.I.A. em-
ployees he had considered becoming a
Soviet spy. But Federal .law and a
Presidential executive order prohibit
the agency from taking any steps in-
side the United States to investigate
possible cases of espionage.
Mr. Howard was one of tens of thou-
sands of people who retire from Gov-
ernment or industry each year after
holding positions that gave them ac-;
cess to classified materials. More than
4.3 million people in government and
industry associated with government
now have clearances to use classified
information.
Asked what procedures the Central
Intelligence Agency uses to monitor
former employees who have knowl-
edge of classified programs, Mr. Laud-
er, the agency spokesman, said: "We
haven't got4 any procedures. Once a
person leaves here, he is John Q. Citi.,
zen, just like you and me. We don't
keep a string ors them. It's strictly an
F.B.I. rrfatter. "
Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota
Republican who is chairman of the Sen-
ate Intelligence Committee, said his
panel would also examine the problem
presented by military officers who re-
tire with knowledge of classified ma-
terials.
Most people with security clearances
work for the Pentagon. At the Defense
Department, L. Britt Snider, director
of counterintelluience and security
policy, said: "We don't have any juris-
diction of any kind over former erti-
plovees, whether or not they had clear-
ances. It's strictly the F.B.I."
At the F.B.I., Mr. Parker said, "We
are not concerned about America> s
who have had clearances. We don't .
look at these people unless we detect t.n
individual involved in espionage."
Ex-Intelligence Chief's Moves
Senator Leahy said: "1 don't think
anyone expects the F.B.I. to maintain
surveillance on the several hundred
thousand people who leave the Govera-
Federal officials said the C.I.A. told
i-at F.B.I. nothing about Mr. Howard
u ::1 after the bureau began an investi-
from a Soviet defector, Vitaly Yur-i "We've had a few blatant cases
chenko, who had been a senior official; where we just didn't follow through,
of the K.G.B., the Soviet intelligences even with alarm bells going off," said
agency, I, Representative Dave McCurdy, Demo-
The bureau began surveillance of crat of Oklahoma, chairman of the
Mr. Howard last month, but he slipped House committee's Subcommittee on
out of his home at night and is believed Oversight and Evaluator.
In the Howard case, a senior F.B.I.
to have fled the country. official said Mr. Howard's conversa-
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Ver- Lion with the two C.I.A. officers would
mont Democrat who is vice chairman have been sufficient to warrant an in-
of the Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said today: "If the C.I.A. did not
give the F.H.I. adequate information
about this person, that's a bad mistake.
It shows very, very serious problems i
wits n the C.I.A."
ment each year with security clear-
ances. But there are a certain number
of people in extremely sensitive posi-
tions, a handful of them, that we ought
to do more with."
Mr. Leahy said Mr. Howard "Car-.
tainly would have been one of those"
vestigation. 1 because he held highly sensitive infor-
"Anytime we get information that l mation and was being dismissedfollavt-
someone has considered such an act, J ing a polygraph examination that indi-
we would take some action," said Phil- cated drug use and petty thievery, a4-
lip A. Parker, deputy assistant dir?ectorI onrdingl to Federal officials.
of the bureau's intelligence division.
Continued
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When Adm. Stanfield M. Turnek
was Director of Central intelligence in
the Carter Administration, he di$-
missed, trans ferred or forced to retire
nearly 200 C.I.A. officers who hela
highly sensitive positions. week, he sa!4
In an interview thienchad warned.
that others in the agency
him that "we ran the risk of some of
them selling their information to the
l other side-" He said he had disagreed
when it was suggested that some
U 'M ether- lobs, and pi
JnUW ~+~= 6?
ceeded with his original plans.
But he said of W. Howard: "I don't
think my rule should be totally rigid.-It
this guy had just been briefed, I'd s..y
let's stick him in the Dominican RepubL
lic or someplace like that for a couplA
of years. until the information isn't
valuable anymore."
Senator Leahy said: "We may need
some sort of turkey farm for some o~?
these former employees. Mt
translate cables or something like
.for a couple of years."
Admiral Turner said he thought
C.I.A. officers ought to be required T4
agree when they are hired that "for
three years or so after they leave, thmY,
will be subject to the same rules of in.
trusion as applied when they were 19
government. Make them come back for
random polygraph examinations. Th*i
would give them one more thing tO
worry about before they turn."
A C.I.A. official said "it's conceivi
able" that that idea would work, add,
ing that finding solutions to the prob
lem "is certainly something we c
thinking about now."
A
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ARTICLE APP: "?ED
ONPAGE1A,
NEW YORK TIMES
3 October 1985
Spy Chae Spurs Questions
About Procedures of C.I.A.
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
tn.dal m T`~ M.. Yat Tim"
WASHINGTON, Oct. 7 - Members
of the Senate and He intelligence
committees say espionage allegations
against a former Central Intelligence
Agency officer raise serious questions
about the agency's procedures for deal-
ing with disgruntled employees.
The legislators say their committees
are conducting a detailed examination
of the career of Edward L. Howard, a
former officer of the agency who, ac-
cording to Administration officials,
was identified by a defector as having
sold the Soviet Union highly secret in-
formatioa-
Mr. Howard was forced to resign
from the C.I.A. in 1983; the agency was
dissatisfied with his answers in a poly-
graph, or lie detector, examination
that was apparently unrelated to espio-
nage charges. Officials have said they
suspect it was a desire for revenge that
led Mr. Howard, who is believed to
have fled the country, to provide se-
cre.ts to the Soviet Union.
"The C.I.A. has good security proce-
dures but they're not perfect and
they're going to have to get better,"
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who Is the vice chairman of
the Senate Select Committee on Intelli-
gence, said in an interview. "They're
going to have to figure out what to do
with a disgruntled or potentially dis-
gruntled employee who has a lot of
knowledge because that's where a lot of
breaches have occurred in the past."
C.I.A. Briefs Committees
Representative Dave McCurdy of
Oklahoma, the chairman of the Sub-
committee on oversight and Evalua-
tion of the House Intelligence Commit-
tee, said: "I think there are a lot of
questions yet to be answered. I'm not
sure anyone's comfortable with what
we've seen so far."
In an interview today, Mr. McCurdy
would not discuss the specifics of the
Howard case but said that he and some
other members of the committee had
been briefed by the C.I.A. Members of
the Senate committee have had similar
briefings by the agency.
According to members of the two
committees and their aides, the panels
are concerned about a broad range of
issues stemming from the agency's
handling of Mr. Howard, who was
within the C.I.A.'s three-year proba-
tion period when he was asked to re-
sign.
Questions Raised With C.I.A.
Among the questions the two com-
mittees are raising with the agency are
these :
gwhy was Mr. Howard, a junior offi-
cial, given access to such sensitive ma-
terial at an early stage in his career?
g why did the agency choose to dis-
miss him while the information he had
learned in training for a posting to Mos-
cow was still of value?
g What steps were taken to keep
track of Mr. Howard's movements
after he left the C.I.A., both in this
country and abroad, where the Federal
Bureau of Investigation has charged
that he met with Soviet intelligence
agents?
9Was there sufficient coordination
between the C.I.A. and the F.B.I., the
other major Federal agency responsi-
ble for counterintelligence work?
Administration officials say Mr.
Howard was identified as an agent of
the Soviet Union by Vitaly Yurchenko,
a senior official in the K.G.B., the
Soviet intelligence agency. He defected
to the West in July. Mr. Yurchenko, the
officials have said, is undergoing ex-
tensive questioning at an undisclosed
location in the United States:
? Trip to Austria In '84
Mr. Howard, who is now 33 years old,
was employed by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency from January 1981 to
June 1983, according to an F.B.I. af-
fidavit filed in Federal District Courtin
New Mexico. The document charged
that he traveled to Austria in 1984
where he made contact with agent of
the K.G.B. and was paid money for
"classified information relating to U.S.
intelligence sources and methods."
Intelligence sources say that the in-
formation Involved related to Amer-
ican operations in Moscow. They have
said Mr. Howard was trained for a post
in Russia that would have involved
managing agents or other means of in-
telligence collection.
Intelligence sources say, however,
that he was not sent to Moscow and was
instead asked to leave the agency after
the polygraph test suggested use of ille-
gal drugs and petty theft of Govern-
ment funds.
Mr. Howard, who had been working
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'The sins of the fathers'
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres pays homage January
27 at memorial to World War II Holocaust victims at
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Peres became the first
Israeli head of government to visit Berlin, assuring young
NOTES OF THE WEEK
Spy-spooked
on the Potomac
^ Official Washington loves nothing so
much as a spy story-and in late Janu-
ary there surfaced a new one to chew
on, a story that U.S. government
spokesmen called fiction and U.S.News
& World Report and the New York
Times called fact. A miniwar of denials
and confirmations ensued-
January 25: The news media receive
the February 3 issue of U.S.News, which
reports that the U.S. helicoptered a
high-level Soviet intelligence agent out
of East Germany last spring, hid him at
a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of
the Geneva summit and then brought
the defector to America in late Novem-
ber. The story says the CIA wants to
keep secret the defection of a fifth top
Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector
Vin
. i p'nin rK
Germans: "The Bible tells us not to charge children with the
sins of the fathers. They should not be accused because they
did not do it and they would not have wanted it to happen."
Photo by Agence France Presse
wants it that way, the CIA is under fire
for mishandling defectors and "another
Yurchenko" is feared. KGB Col. Vitaly
Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year,
then redefected.
January 26: The Sunday New York
Times says on its front page that sources
in Congress confirm the U.S.News ac-
count and that the defector "may be the
most valuable ... in recent years." News
agencies say unnamed CIA officials
scoffed at the r rt.
January 27: .The New York Times
quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy
.(I)-Vt.) of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee: "I have been told by the CIA
that no such defector exists. If you asked
me whether I believe that, I would say,
in light of [CIA Director William Ca-
sey's] public statement of reluctance to
follow the procedures o versight, then
I will have no comment." At the White
House, Larry Speakes say% accounts of a
fifth defector are "baseless." Asked
whether he denies all or part of the
story, he replies, "The whole story.
January 28: The New York Times
says again that its "congressional
sources confirm the reports" of the de-
fection. The Washington Post quotes a
spokesman for U.S.News: "We reported
the story from multiple sources over
several weeks. Based on the reputations
and numbers of these sources, we be-
lieve our story is correct. We were
warned by more than one of our
sources that we could expect denials
from the CIA and possibly other gov-
ernment agencies."
The Washington Times quotes Sena-
or Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelli-
ence Committee member: "Where
t ere 's smoke, there's fire.... There's
been too many leaks and here's anoth-
er." He says the defector accounts are
correct. The senator later repeats this
to U.S.News, which did not interview
him for its original article. As to the
denials, he declares: "Of course they're
denying it. What did you expect them
to do?" The same afternoon, the White
House again denies the story. ^
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'The sins of the fathers'
Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres pays homage January Germans: "The Bible tells us not to charge children with the
27 at memorial to World War II Holocaust victims at sins of the fathers. They should not be accused because they
Bergen-Belsen concentration camp. Peres became the first did not do it and they would not have wanted it to happen."
Israeli head of government to visit Berlin, assuring young Photo by Agence France Presse
NOTES OF THE WEEK
Spy-spooked
on the Potomac
^ Official Washington loves nothing so
much as a spy story-and in late Janu-
ary there surfaced a new one to chew
on, a story that U.S. government
spokesmen called fiction and U.S.News
T -World Report and the New- York
Times called fact. A miniwar of denials
and confirmations ensued-
January 25: The news media receive
the February 3 issue of U.S.News, which
reports that the U.S. helicoptered a
high-level Soviet intelligence agent out
of East Germany last spring, hid him at
a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of
the Geneva summit and then brought
the defector to America in late Novem-
ber. The story says the CIA wants to
keep secret the defection of a fifth top
Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector
wants it that way, the CIA is under fire
for mishandling defectors and "another
Yurchenko" is feared. KGB Col. Vitaly
Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year,
then redefected.
January 26: The Sunday New, York
Times says on its front page that sources
in Congress confirm the U.S.News ac-
count and that the defector "may be the
most valuable ... in recent years." News
agencies say unnamed CIA officials
scoffed at the r rt.
January 27: T~he New York Times
quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy
I=Vt,) of the Senate Intelligence Com-
"mittee: "I have- been, told by the CIA
that no such defector exists. If you asked
me whether I believe that, I would say,
in light of [CIA Director William Ca-
sey's] public statement of reluctance to
follow the procedures o versight, then
I will have no comment." At the White
House, Larry Speakers accounts of a
fifth defector are "baseless." Asked
whether he denies all or part of the
story, he replies, "The whole story."
January 28: The New York Times
says again that its "congressional
sources confirm the reports" of the de-
fection. The Washington Post quotes a
spokesman for U.S.News: "We reported
the story from multiple sources over
several weeks. Based on the reputations
and numbers of these sources, we be-
lieve our story is correct. We were
warned by more than one of our
sources that we could expect denials
from the CIA and possibly other gov-
ernment agencies."
The Washington Times quotes Sena-
or Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelli-
ence Committee member: "Where
t' ere's smoke, there's fire.... There's
been too many leaks and here's anoth-
er." He says the defector accounts are
correct. The senator later repeats this
to U.S.News, which did not interview
him for its original article. As to the
denials, he declares: "Of course they're
denying it. What did you expect them
to do?" The same afternoon, the White
House again denies the story. ^
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WASHINGTON POST
17 November 1985
The CIA and Its Critics
Last week, it was reported that Sen. Dave
Durenberger had criticized the Central
Intelligence Agency and its director, William
Casey. Mr. Casey responded with an open
letter to the senator. We asked the senator
for his reaction. We print it below, along
with the text of the Casey letter.
Dave Durenberger
The Public
Must Know
That It Works
Careful reflection on the content of CIA Director William
Casey's open letter to me as chairman of the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee raises a very troubling issue for the Amer-
ican people. Casey's clear message is that, independent of the
factual accuracy or inaccuracy of the Post article [Nov. 141
concerning my comments on the CIA, public criticism of the
performance of the CIA compromises sources, damages mo-
rale and undermines our overall intelligence capability.
In Casey's view, the cost of public discussion is simply too
high, and therefore the public has no right to know how effec-
tively the CIA does its job as part of the oversight process.
Quite the contrary, he feels that oversight must be confined
to discussion between the intelligence Committee and the di-
rector behind the closed doors of our hearing room. Other-
wise, we are told, there is repeated compromise of sources
and methods.
Clearly, we all oppose the irresponsible use of one's knowl-
edge of intelligence. Disclosure of certain facts can reveal the
source of those facts. Careful, formal procedures must be fol-
lowed in disclosing classified information. Discussion of any
intelligence matters for political support or personal publicity
is irresponsible. The Intelligence Committee is the first to
condemn such public discussions, whether they occur in Con-
gress or in the administration.
But public discussion of intelligence does not necessarily
mean disclosure of sensitive sources and methods.
There is no question that all public officials-in Congress
as well as in the executive branch-who are provided sensi-
tive intelligence bear a heavy burden. Their public state-
ments on any foreign policy, economic or national security
issue about which they have special knowledge must be deli-
cately constructed to protect that information.
But this is not to say that those who have this information
cannot or should not speak out on these issues. Intelligence is
no exception. it is a subject of public knowledge and public
discussion. Those of us who are part of that process can, and
should, speak openly on the subject of intelligence, as Casey
did recently in Time magazine on terrorism and intelligence,
without compromising security.
The real issue with Casey is not that there were public
statements, but that those statements were reported as criti-
cal. Casey would not have written that letter if the headline
had been "CIA. Casey Praised by Hill Chairman." Public
praise of the operations or analytical product evokes no public
condemnation or charges of compromising sources and meth-
ods.
In short, the head of the U.S. intelligence community does
not feel that the intelligence agencies should be accountable
to the American people. It is exactly this attitude that has led
to the past abuses and resulted in the institution of the over-
sight process within Congress. Whether Casey likes it or not,
the public does hold the CIA accountable and the public must
know the oversight process works.
It is encouraging to hear that Casey is pleased with the in-
telligence product and is satisfied with his long-range plan-
ning process. We on the Intelligence Committee have had
many good things to say both publicly and privately on both of
these subjects. Nevertheless, we also have concerns in both
areas-concerns that are not the result of "off-the cuff," un-
substantiated conclusions. They are concerns based on four
months of testimony before our committee by the policy
makers and military officers who use national intelligence.
Intelligence is not an end in itself whose usefulness is based
on self-evaluation. The ultimate judgment must rest with
those who use the product. National intelligence is a service
organization, and the director should welcome constructive
comments designed to improve that service.
The intelligence agencies are also accountable for the con-
duct of their operation,. They cannot simply invoke "sources
and methods" to make Congress remain silent in the face of
extensive public di.,rn,sion-often fueled by executive
branch disclo,ures-ut allegations of mismanagement, a, in
both the Edward Lee Howard and Vitaly \urchenko cases. It
the American people are to know that the oversight process
is working, they must be kept informed. Indeed, when one
stifles the disclosure of things that can safely be said in pub-
lic, the result is often an outpouring of leaks that are infinitely
more damaging to U.S. intelligence than is a bit of criticism.
Although the Intelligence Committee does much in com-
plete secrecy, we also speak publicly. We do it when neces-
sary. When we do, we are careful in our statements,
measured in our criticism, generous in our praise, protective
of sensitive information but mindful of our responsibility to
the American people. We intend to continue this policy.
The writer, a Republican senator from Minnesota, is chairman of
4110. -? 4040
VI/
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WASHINGTON POST
A[
16 November 1985
Leahy Joins Durenberger in Criticizing CIA
By David B. Ottaway
Washington Poet Stiff Writer
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (Vt.), rank-
ing Democrat on the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, accused
the Central Intelligence Agency
yesterday of "yearning to go back to
the good old days" when Congress
had no oversight of CIA covert op-
erations and the United States had
made "some of the most colossal
failures, intelligence failures, ever."
Leahy's comments were the lat-
est salvo in an acerbic exchange
this week between Senate intelli-
gence committee leaders and CIA
Director William J. Casey.
On Wednesday, Sen. David F.
Durenberger (R-Minn.) criticized
Casey for not providing the CIA
with a "sense of direction."
Casey, in turn, accused Duren-
berger on Thursday of conducting
intelligence oversight in an "off the
cuff" manner that had involved "re-
peated compromise of sensitive in-
telligence sources and methods."
The unusual public acrimony re-
flects a crisis of confidence between
the Reagan administration and the
Congress over who is to blame for a
recent spate of unauthorized intel-
ligence disclosures.
It also has raised the thorny is-
sue-which has surfaced in at least
the past three administrations-of
the media's responsibility toward
the public and government in re-
porting on delicate, often divisive
intelligence and foreign policy mat-
ters in the administration. "I hear
people yearning to go back to the
good old days," Leahy said at a
news briefing yesterday. "Well, the
good old days are the Bay of Pigs
and Salvador Allende and Patrice
Lumumba and a lot of other fail-
ures."
Leahy told a news briefing that
he was not accusing the CIA of
"wanting to pull another Bay of
Pigs," the aborted U.S.-backed in-
vasion of Cuba in 1961, but he said
that "when you had no congression-
al oversight" the agency had be-
come embroiled in such adventures
as attempts to poison Cuban leader
Fidel Castro, the bloody coup
against leftist Chilean president Al-
lende in 1973 and the support of
murder plots against Lumumba, a
leftist premier of what is now Zaire
assassinated in 1961.
Leahy yesterday also supported
Durenberger's charges that the
administration was guilty of "selec-
tive leaking." The Vermont Dem-
ocrat said the Reagan administra-
tion was "the worst ever" compared
with those of presidents Gerald R.
Ford or Jimmy Carter. He added
that "there are a whole lot" of U.S.
secrets that members of the intel-
ligence committee learned of "first
in thA press."
The debate seems likely to per-
sist, partly because of increasing
CIA activity around the world under
the Reagan administration and part-
ly because Congress is sharply di-
vided, though not strictly along par-
ty lines, on the issue of its oversight
role of intelligence operations and
the making of foreign policy.
The public exchanges this week
have highlighted the sharp differ-
gnces of opinion. Durenberger has
laid he wants to change "the defin-
ttion at. oversight" of intelligence
Many administration officials
were furious at a Nov. 3 front-page
article in The Washington Post
about the CIA plan to help Libya's
neighbors or opponents topple Qad-
dafi; President Reagan has ordered
an investigation of the disclosure.
Hamilton said he regards it "as a
very serious leak of a different mag-
nitude than the others."
Several senior U.S. officials have
questioned the wisdom of The
Post's decision to publish the arti-
cle, a decision that they say has
compromised U.S. diplomacy and
seriously embarrassed the opposi-
tion to Qaddafi and its Arab back-
ers.
In response to the article, Egypt
and Algeria-two neighboring
states at odds with Qaddafi-have
said they will have nothing to do
with any CIA "plot" against another
Arab leader. The National Front for
the Salvation of Libya, the main
Libyan group within the badly frag-
mented Libyan opposition, said in a
statement from London that the ar-
ticle was 'liable to discredit and un-
dermine the genuine Libyan
strength and preempt any national
action that might be carried out
against Qaddafi."
Leonard Downie Jr., managing
editor of The Washington Post, in
defending the newspaper's decision
to publish the article, said the CIA
plan was being "widely and hotly de-
bated" inside the agency and be-
tween the CIA and the congression-
al committees responsible for over-
sight of such operations.
The debate was "significant,"
Downie said, and "the whole ques-
tion of what kinds of covert oper-
ations the CIA should engage in is
one suitable for public scrutiny."
Critics of the plan, he said, were
even questioning whether the op-
eration was "legal" because it might
have ended in the assassination of
Qaddafi, who has long been accused
of supporting international terror-
ism. A longstanding executive order
signed by Reagan forbids the CIA
or any other U.S. agency front di-
rect or indirect involvement in any
assassination plan.
operations and to "open that pro-
cess up a little bit more so it isn't
just their. [the administration'sl mis-
takes that become a problem."
Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.),
chairman of the House Permanent
Select Committee on Intelligence,
said he endorsed Durenberger's
idea of a larger public debate on
general intelligence policy but was
leery of open discussions of oper-
ations that risk "damage being done
to our interests."
The two most recent examples of
the confidence crisis have been re-
porting on the short-lived defection
of the Soviet KGB official, Vitaly
Yurchenko, and an administration
decision to authorize a CIA plan to
seek to undermine the regime of
Libyan leader Col. Muammar Qad-
dafi.
rentittued
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Downie said The Post article had
disclosed no precise details of what
the CIA was planning to do, "which
we should not and did not do." He
also said that the reporter involved,
Bob Woodward, interviewed a num-
ber of knowledgeable government
sources in reporting the article and
that neither before nor after pub-
lication had any of them called to
suggest that disclosure of the plan
might endanger national security or
U.S. fives.
Qaddafi has used the article to
rally renewed support at home and
in the Arab world for his embattled
regime, picturing himself as a tar-
get of "the great American Satan,"
as one U.S. analyst put it.
The analyst was highly critical of
any CIA anti-Qaddafi plan relying on
Libyan opposition figures, descgib-
ing them as "nobodies, klutzes and
incompetents" lacking internal sup-
port.
In the Yurchenko situation, the
defector, who returned to Moscow
earlier this month after three
months in CIA custody, has said
that information leaked to the press
about his defection had upset him
and some observers have suggested
that it may have affected his think-
ing about remaining in the United
States.
Durenberger told a group of re-
porters Wednesday that he felt the
CIA probably should have said less
about Yurchenko, although he also
acknowledged that the CIA feels
the same way about members of his
committee.
In discussing the administration's
"selective leaking" of secrets, Du-
renberger added, "All of you know
that with regard to Central America
in particular they have leaked clas-
sified information about arms flow
at various times." This was appar-
ently a reference to Soviet and
Cuban arms shipments to the San-
dinista government in Nicaragua.
Ironically, many of the disclo-
sures about Yurchenko's defec-
tion-the fact that he had defected,
his alleged ranking as No. 5 in the
KGB, and his alleged role in trig-
gering other defections-were
printed in the Italian press a month
or more before they surfaced in the
United States.
As early as Aug. 8, the state-run
Italian radio reported Yurchenko's
disappearance in Rome and prob-
able defection.
By Aug. 31, it was a front-page
article in Corriere della Sera con-
taining many of the details, assump-
tions and speculation about who he
was that were to appear later in the
American press.
Corriere, in its Sept. 1 edition,
identified Yurchenko in a front-page
article as "the No. 5 in the KGB," a
sensational bit of news that took the
U.S. media more than three weeks
to report on the basis of "leaked" in-
formation here.
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ARTICLE A
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
16 November 1985
Intelligence: The Times Are Touchy
By STEPHEN ENGELBERG
Special to The Now York Times
WASHINGTON, Nov. 15 - The
relationship between the Central In-
telligence Agency and its Congres-
sional oversight committees has
been, at best, a marriage of conven-
ience, a clash of cultures never far
from rancorous discord.
Intelligence officers view their suc-
cesses and failures as matters of
great secrecy, some of which must be
hidden "from inception to eternity."
Members of Congress, tending to-
ward spirited public debate, are in-
clined to point out mistakes, some-
times none too gently, when a Gov-
ernment agency errs.
Congress sees itself as an open ad-
vocate of the people and a watchdog
over agencies that spend the people's
tax money. The C.I.A., by contrast,
believes that Congress has gone be-
yond its oversight role and has begun
exposing agency secrets to further
political ends.
Both sides confirm that under the
Reagan Administration, relations be-
tween Capitol Hill and the intelli-
gence agencies have become so tense
that the Administration has at times
declined to undertake covert opera-
tions because Congressional disclo-
sure was viewed as a virtual certain-
Casey's Open Letter
The inherent contradictions bound
up by Congressional oversight burst
into the open Thursday night when
William J. Casey, the Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, said in an open let-
ter that the process had gone "seri-
ously yMCasey, Congressional over-
sight has become characterized by
"off the cuff" comments that damage
morale and disclose intelligence
sources.
"It is time to acknowledge," Mr.
Casey wrote, "that the process has
gone seriously awry." He added: "If
the oversight process is to work at all,
it cannot do so on the front pages of
American newspapers."
Senator Patrick Leahy, the deputy
chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence, called the
Casey letter "unfortunate" and said
today that it had inflamed an already
delicate situation.
"On the one hand, you have the
C.I.A. rejecting oversight," Mr.
Leahy said. "And the Congress is say-
ing, 'We'll get Casey for these com-
ments., "
Elected officials, to function as ad-
vocates for the public, say they must
be permitted wide access to the inner
workings of a secret agency that has
been guilty of abuses. To Mr. Leahy,
there is no support for a return to the
..good old days" when, he said, the
C.I.A., acting under little oversight,
Sypna/Dis/o Golmerg
William J.
Casey
The New York Times
Senator Patrick
Leahy
became involved in such failed opera-
tions as the Bay of Pigs invasion.
The issue was heightened this year
when the leadership of the Senate in-
telligence committee changed, with
Senator Dave Durenberger, Republi-
can of Minnesota, replacing Senator
Barry Goldwater as chairman, and
Senator Leahy, Democrat of Ver-
mont, replacing Senator Daniel Pat-
rick Moynihan as deputy chairman.
From the beginning, both Senators
Durenberger and Leahy said they fa-
vored greater public discussion of in-
telligence issues.
Accordingly, the committee staff
has a press officer who responds to in-
quiries from journalists, and Mr.
Durenberger and Mr. Leahy are fre-
The oversight
process cannot
work `on the front
pages of American
newspapers.'
William J. Casey
quently available for interviews and
have discussed a wide range of intelli-
gence issues. Indeed, Mr. Casey said
his letter was prompted by public
comments from Mr. Durenberger re-
garding the agency's performance.
By contrast, the Democrat-con-
trolled House intelligence committee
has been less public.
Its chairman, Representative Lee
H. Hamilton of Indiana rarely criti-
cizes the agency's performance in his
press interviews.
According to members of the com-
mittee, Mr. Hamilton prefers to work
out differences with the C.I.A. in pri-
vate.
The committee staff seldom re-
sponds to even routine inquiries from
the press. In one instance, top com-
mittee aides refused to return calls
asking whether the committee had
The New York Tff~
Senator Dave
Durenberger
received a secret briefing on an intel-
ligence case.
Nevertheless, this year's ferment
in the intelligence world has provided
the Senators with plenty of grist for
their preference for public debate.
For example, members of Con-
gress have strenuously questioned
the cases of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, the
reputed senior K.G.B. officer who re-
portedly had defected to the West,
and of Edward Lee Howard, a former
C.I.A. officer who Mr. Yurchenko
said had given the Russians impor-
tant information about American in-
telligence gathering in Moscow.
Congressional criticism of the re-
port about Mr. Howard had barely
subsided when Mr. Yurchenko an-
nounced that he wanted to return to
the Soviet Union. Members of Con-
gress were immediately critical of
the C.I.A.'s dealings with Mr. Yur-
chenko. Some viewed him as a Soviet
plant who fooled the agency, and
others said he was emotionally over-
wrought and had changed his mind,
perhaps because of mistakes by his
handlers in the agency.
In another spy case, both House and
Senate members have criticized
Navy security procedures involving
John A Walker Jr. And both Congress
and the Administration are trying to
learn who disclosed that the C.I.A.
had a plan to undermine the Libyan
leader, Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi,
and that both intelligence committees
had expressed reservations about it.
A Requirement to Inform
Under laws passed in the 1970's
after Congressional investigations of
C.I.A. abuses, the Administration
must inform Congress of any signifi-
cant anticipated intelligence activity.
In a speech several months ago,
Mr. Durenberger said the Reagan Ad-
ministration had in several instances
chosen not to initiate a covert action
that was otherwise deemed to be ap-
propriate because it could not trust
Congress to keep it secret.
Indeed, he said, a lesser option was
chosen. And Administration officials
confirmed this assessment.
"The Administration," he told the
Johns Hopkins School of Advanced In-
ternational Studies, "may prefer to
do the wrong thing in secret, rather
than doing the right thing in public."
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^rpr~ WASHINGTON POST
k: L 15 November 1985
Casey Accuses Durenberger
Of Cmpromising.CIA
Among Durenberger's chief crit-
h
d
By Patrick E. Tyler
and David B. Ottaway
Washington Post Staff Writers
CIA Director William J. Casey
issued a public letter last night at-
tacking the chairman of the Senate
Select Committee on intelligence
for conducting intelligence over-
sight "off the cuff" in a manner that
has resulted in the "repeated com-
promise of sensitive intelligence
sources and methods."
The letter, addressed to Sen. Da-
vid F. Durenberger (R-Minn.), said,
"It is time to acknowledge that the
[oversight] process has gone seri-
ously awry" and accused Durenber-
ger of undercutting the morale of
CIA officers around the world.
"What are they to think when the
chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mittee offhandedly, publicly and in-
accurately disparages their work?"
Casey asked.
Casey's letter referred to a re-
port in yesterday's Washington
Post in which Durenberger was
quoted as charging that the CIA
lacked "a sense of d' and an
adequate knowledge o long-range
trends in the Soviet U n.
"I can only wondeV" Casey said,
at the contrast bet~iveen what you
say to us privately aild what you say
t? the news media."
In response to Casey's letter, Du-
renberger said last night, "An issue
4%as been created where now ex-
ists. I continue to fully support Di-
rector Casey and the intelliet[ ec
community, both privately and pub-
licly, and I'm confident that we can
continue working toward our long-
range goals, to achieve both effec-
tive congressional oversight and a
comprehensive national intelligence
,strategy."
-' At a meeting with reporters
Wednesday, Durenberger both
praised and criticized Casey and the
CIA in extended remarks. Though
there was no discussion of the sen-
sitive sources and methods Casey
complained of, Casey has contended
that the "the Hill leaks everything"
about sensitive and covert intelli-
gence operations proposed or un-
derway.
ers Ip
icisms of the agency s lea
was an allegation that CIA analysts
"aren't being told what it is we need
Ito know] about the Soviet Union."
He also criticized the agency's as-
sessment of the South African sit-
uation, saying there was a "vacuum"
of independent information and that
the agency was relying too heavily
on State Department views.
Durenberger claimed the intel-
ligence process prevented CIA an-
alysts from "look[ing] five years
down the road" or taking into ac-
count brewing problems such as
Shiite fundamentalism in the Middle
East and political deterioration in
the Philippines.
Casey called these criticisms of
the agency he has headed for five
years "tragically wrong."
"Your remarks betray a lack of
familiarity with the many intelli-
gence studies in the [committee's]
vault," Casey said.
The CIA chief added, "The intel-
ligence community has produced an
enormous number of long-range
studies over the last six years or
more and where we have been far
out in front."
Earlier in the day, Durenberger,
in a letter and a meeting with wire
service reporters, sought to clarify
his Wednesday remarks, which had
included an off-hand prediction that
support for Casey among senators
on the committee would divide 8 to
7 if put to a vote.
"1 think Bill is as good a DCI [di-
rector of central intelligence] as
we've had in a long time, and that
forgives a whole lot of things by
saying that," Durenberger said to
reporters Wednesday, adding, "It
"Public discussion
of sensitive
information ... is
always damaging.,,
-CIA Director William J. Casey
would be an 8-to-7 vote on the com-
mittee if I put it to a vote."
The committee consists of eight
Republicans and seven Democrats.
In Durenberger's clarifying letter
yesterday, he said, "Our committee
has no plans for such a vote nor, to
my knowledge, are we split on any
issue strictly along party lines."
Durenberger was incorrectly
quoted in The Washington Post
Wednesday as saying that he would
recommend "legislation" downgrad-
ing Casey's job. Durenberger actu-
ally said he would consider a "rec-
ommendation" that restricted
Casey to professional intelligence
work with no policy formulation
role.
"I did not state that the Intelli-
gence Committee is considering
recommending legislation which
would substantially downgrade the
CIA director's role. Our committee
is not considering such legislation,"
Durenberger said.
Casey, noting that Durenberger
had made attempts to clarify his
remarks during the day, said last
night, "That's not the point."
"Public discussion of sensitive
information and views revealed in a
closed session of an oversight com-
mittee is always damaging and in-
advisable," Casey said. "As we have
discussed many times, if the over-
sight process is to work at all, it
cannot do so on the front pages of
American newspapers. The cost in
compromise of sources, damaged
morale and the effect on our overall
capabilities is simply too high."
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STAT
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W TVM
27 January 1986
awma
,, L kerDeclrna ~
To Confirm Reports
Of K. K.G.B. Defector
By PHILIP SHENON
SPICW to no New Yatt TI
WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 - The vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee declined to comment today a on threp" e X that. h high-ranking official
. defected to United States and was living hem
under an assumed name.
Congressional souttes said Saturday
that the K.G.B. official tied last Yew
and was providing Ameicaw
inteiik
gence officers with valuable bd~a,
Lion about the K.G.B., the Soviet intelli.
gence laand 30CUrity agency
wmaker. Sefttoj Patrick J.
Leahy, Democrat of Vermont , said that
the Central Intelligence Agency had
told him that there was no such Soviet
official. But Mr. Leahy would not com-
ment when asked if he has learned of
the defector from others.
A Congressional source today con,
firmed reports that the defector had
fled the Soviet Union last year.
But Mr. Leahy said in an interview
today: "I have been told by the C.I.A.
that no such defector exists. If you
asked me whether I believe that, I
would say, in light of Mr. Casey's Pub-
lic statement of reluctance to follow the,
procedures of oversight, then I will
have no comment."
Congressional Oversight
He was referring to William J.
Casey, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, who has been involved in a pub.
lic battle with the Senate Intelligence
Committee over Congressional over-
sight of the C.I.A.
Lawmakers have complained that
the agency has failed to inform them
important information about in-
telligence letter activities.
In a to the committee last
November, Mr. Casey charged that
oversight of intelligence agencies -had .
gone seriously awry." The letter a~-
peared to have been prompted ply
and amounting criticism of the agency
ko, a Sovhandling iet intelligence Vitaly aS. Yumbeli.
gent who m
turned to Moscow after deter to the
West last year.
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\a.~ELLIGf~
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.
[phone]
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
30 January 1986
Attached is the Leahy item you requested.
George Lauder
STAT
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NEW YORK TIMES
ARTICLE APPS 1'--i) 27 January 1986 '1' V
ON PAGE
Lawmaker Declines
To Confirm Reports
Of K.G.B. Defector
By PHILIP SHENON
Spdal to lb New York TIMM
WASHINGTON, Jan. 26 - The vice
chairman of the Senate Intelligence
Committee declined to comment today
on reports that a high-ranking official
of the K.G.B. had defected to the-
United States and was living hem
under an assumed name.
Congressional soufia said Saturday
that the K.G.B. official fled last yew
and was providing Americans haul
gene officers with valuable Informa.
tion about the K.G. B., the Soviet intelli-
gence and security agency
The lawmaker, Senator Patrick J.
Leahy, Democrat of Vermont, said that
the Central Intelligence Agency had
told him that there was no such Soviet
official. But Mr. Leahy would not com-
ment when asked if he has learned of
the defector from others.
A Congressional source today con-
firmed reports that the defector had
fled the Soviet Union last year.
But Mr. Leahy said in an interview
today: "I have been told by the C.I.A.
that no such defector exists. If you
asked me whether I believe that, I
would say, in light of Mr. Casey's pub-
lic statement of reluctance to follow thr
procedures of oversight, then I will
have no comment." -
Congressional Oversight
He was referring to William J.
Casey, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence, who has been involved in a pub-
lic battle with the Senate Intelligence
Committee over Congressional over-
sight of the C.I.A.
Lawmakers have complained that
the agency has failed to inform them
fully of important information about in-
telligence activities.
In a letter to the committee last
November, Mr. Casey. charged that
oversight of intelligence agencies "had
gone seriously awry." The letter ap-
peared to have been prompted partly
by mounting criticism of the agency
and its handling of Vitaly S. Yurchsn?
ko, a Soviet intelligence agent who re.
turned to Moscow after defecting to the
West last year. -
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