LEAKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903760003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 68
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: August 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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21 August 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Ambassador Peter H. Dailey
FROM: DCI
SUBJECT: Leaks
After Labor Day we will have to address the leak problem and I would
appreciate your getting up to speed so you can provide advice.
I am sending you copies of two talks I made--one to the American Society
of Newspaper Editors and the other to the American Jewish Committee. Also
attached is an interview I gave to the WASHINGTON JOURNALISM REVIEW.
I'd appreciate your critiquing a draft on intelligence and the media
which was put together here for a comprehensive article which the WASHINGTONIAN
has agreed to publish. I think it is important as a basis for a campaign
to interest the Congress in this issue in the next session. We should get
this kind of information out during the fall months. I find this draft
falling in the tone and not quite as good as that of my two talks on this
subject. I do think this statement needs to be longer and stronger. Still,
it can use some reorganization and editorial polish.
Also attached are a letter that George Lauder wrote to USA TODAY, a
roundup of the issue in a NATIONAL JOURNAL article, and a copy of an op-ed
piece by Ben Bradlee in the WASHINGTON POST.
William J. Casey
Attachments
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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE THE
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF NEWSPAPER EDITORS
WEDNESDAY, 9 APRIL 1986
J. W. MARRIOTT HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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GOOD AFTERNOON. IT IS A PRIVILEGE AND A PLEASURE FOR ME
TO BE WITH YOU TODAY TO DISCUSS NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE MEDIA.
NATIONAL SECURITY HAS MANY DIMENSIONS BUT I WILL FOCUS ON ONE
ELEMENT -- INTELLIGENCE -- WHICH IMPACTS MILITARY FORCES AND
WEAPONS ACQUISITION, TERRORISM AND REGIONAL CONFLICTS, DIPLOMACY
AND ARMS CONTROL, AND VIRTUALLY EVERY OTHER ASPECT OF OUR
FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES.
THE WORK OF THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS MUCH
LIKE YOURS. WE BOTH WORK AT THE COLLECTION AND PROPER
PRESENTATION OF ACCURATE INFORMATION THAT LEADS TO INFORMED
JUDGMENTS. OUR OFFICERS OVERSEAS, LIKE YOUR CORRESPONDENTS,
WORK DAY AND NIGHT TO OBTAIN VITAL INFORMATION. LIKE MANY
SKILLED JOURNALISTS, CIA ANALYSTS SPEND HOURS PORING OVER
REPORTS FROM MANY DIFFERENT SOURCES IN ORDER TO PRESENT FACTS
IN THE CONTEXT OF BROADER EVENTS AND ISSUES.
NEITHER YOU NOR THE CIA CAN DO ITS JOB WITHOUT HAVING
SOURCES AND METHODS OF COLLECTING INFORMATION WHICH OFTEN
MUST REMAIN UNIDENTIFIED TO THE PUBLIC. I AM REQUIRED BY
LAW TO PROTECT THE SOURCES AND METHODS BY WHICH WE COLLECT
INTELLIGENCE. THIS IS A SERIOUS RESPONSIBILITY AND ONE I DU
NOT TAKE LIGHTLY. YOU IN JOURNALISM TAKE JUST AS SERIOUSLY
THE CONFIDENTIALITY AND PROTECTION OF YOUR SOURCES.
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OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT OVER
MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP
METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES
AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS AND
VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP
EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS
AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS, AND
TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS. GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE CRITICAL
TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF EFFECTIVE
ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY OF AND LIBERTY OF OUR CITIZENS.
SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO HOW AND THROUGH WHOM WE
COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.
WE MUST CLASSIFY AND RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION
ABOUT HOW AND WHERE WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS
AND ASSESSMENTS BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL
OR COMPROMISE OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN
AN EFFORT TO ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PUBLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR
ADVERSARIES ON A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES,
THEIR RESEARCHERS, AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS A
DAY TO UNCOVER AND USE AGAINST US.
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IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING
INTELLIGENCE -- OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SECURITY
SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC CAPABILITIES, THE
INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS -- HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY
THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
STORIES IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA HAVE SHOWN,
SOMETIMES IN GREAT DETAIL, HOW TO COUNTER CAPABILITIES IN
WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MANY YEARS OF
CREATIVE TALENT AND EFFORT. THIS, TIME AND TIME AGAIN, HAS
ENABLED THOSE HOSTILE TO US TO ABORT HUGE INVESTMENTS, TO
CONCEAL AND OTHERWISE DENY US INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR
DEFENSE, AND TO DEPRIVE US OF THE ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR
CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. LEAKERS ARE COSTING THE
TAXPAYERS MILLIONS AND EVEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS -- AND, MORE
IMPORTANT, PUTTING AMERICANS ABROAD AS WELL AS OUR COUNTRY
ITSELF AT RISK.
APART FROM OUR NEED TO PROTECT OUR SOURCES AND METHODS,
WE DO NOT WISH TO LIMIT YOU IN ANY WAY FROM GETTING THE
INFORMATION THE PUBLIC NEEDS AND SHOULD HAVE. I BELIEVE WE
ARE ALL WORKING TOWARD THE SAME GOAL -- MAINTAINING THE BEST
AND MOST FREE COUNTRY IN THE WORLD. WE FULLY SUPPORT AND ADMIRE
YOUR COMMITMENT TO INFORM THE PUBLIC AND THE DEDICATION AND
INGENUITY WITH WHICH YOU MEET THAT COMMITMENT.
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BUT I DO BELIEVE WE ALL HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES WE MUST
BALANCE. IT'S A VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE TO
STRIKE. I THINK MRS. KATHARINE GRAHAM GOT IT RIGHT IN A
VERY THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH SHE MADE ON TERRORISM
AND THE MEDIA AT THE GUILDHALL IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER.
SHE TOLD HOW A TELEVISION NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD
OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE READING THE MESSAGES OF
PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.
SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED.
THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS
AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.
MRS. GRAHAM WENT ON TO SAY: "THIS KIND OF RESULT, ALBEIT
UNINTENTIONAL, POINTS UP THE NECESSITY FOR FULL COOPERATION
WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES.
WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE
ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND
WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE
THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO
ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE
MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR
NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE
AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE THOSE
CONSEQUENCES."
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I SUBMIT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY WITH THE SAME FORCE TO
COSTLY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AS THEY DO TO TARGETS THREATENED
BY TERRORISM.
I HAVE WITNESSED ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT AND JUDGMENT BY
JOURNALISTS. I HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY
OF YOU TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION
OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR
TO TREA1 OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE
PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES. THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE
AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. WE ARE ALWAYS
READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.
I HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF
PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF LEAKS IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE
INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO
KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE
LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL
OBLIGATION FEDERAL WORKERS HAVE TO PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENTRUSTED. WE HAVE INCREASED
OUR EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS TRUST. WE ARE
STUDYING WHETHER NEW LAWS ARE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL
EMPLOYEES WHO DECIDE ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION.
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WHEN OUR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS REACH THE MEDIA,
WHETHER AUTHORIZED OR NOT, WE ARE FREQUENTLY ASKED TO PRODUCE
THE EVIDENCE WHICH SUPPORTS OUR JUDGMENTS. SOMETIMES WE CAN,
BUT MUCH MORE OFTEN WE CANNOT WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING OUR SOURCES
OR TEACHING OUR ADVERSARIES HOW TO DENY US NEEDED INFORMATION
IN THE FUTURE.
IF WE CAN'T REVEAL OUR EVIDENCE OR DISCLOSE OUR SOURCES,
WHY SHOULD THE POLICYMAKERS OR THE PUBLIC TRUST INTELLIGENCE
ASSESSMENTS? OUR PRIMARY CREDIBILITY COMES FROM THE ACCURACY
AND RELIABILITY OF OUR PAST ASSESSMENTS AND FROM THE CONTINUED
DEDICATION OF THE PEOPLE AND THE INTEGRITY OF THE PROCESS BY
WHICH THEY ARE PRODUCED. OUR INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS ARE THE
WORK OF CAREER PROFESSIONALS BASED ON INFORMATION FROM A WIDE
VARIETY OF SOURCES AND THE MOST SOPHISTICATED AND ADVANCED
INTELLIGENCE TECHNOLOGY WHICH EXISTS IN THE WORLD -- PHOTOGRAPHY,
SPACE SATELLITES, ELECTRONICS, ACOUSTICS, COMMUNICATIONS COLLECTORS,
SEISMIC AND OTHER SENSORS.
OUR NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES ARE THE RESULT OF
LONG HOURS OF PREPARATION AND DEBATE BY ANALYSTS FROM THE
DIA, CIA, NSA, ARMY, NAVY, MARINES, AND AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE
AND OTHER COMPONENTS OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THEIR
WORK IS REVIEWED BY THE CHIEFS OF EACH OF THESE COMPONENTS
SITTING AS THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD AND CHARGED
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WITH SEEING THAT THE RELEVANT INFORMATION AND JUDGMENTS HELD
BY THEIR ORGANIZATIONS ARE AVAILABLE. AS THE BOARD'S CHAIRMAN,
I SEE THAT ANY SUBSTANTIATED DISSENTING OR ALTERNATIVE VIEW IS
REFLECTED SO THAT POLICYMAKERS HAVE THE BENEFIT OF THE FULL
RANGE OF OPINION IN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.
IN A WORLD WHERE THE SOVIET BLOC SPENDS LAVISHLY ON NEW
WEAPONS AND WORKS AGGRESSIVELY TO EXPAND ITS CONTROL AND
INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF FREE NATIONS AND WHERE SOVEREIGN
STATES, LIKE LIBYA, USE TERRORISM AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN
POLICY, IT IS INCREASINGLY ESSENTIAL THAT THE PUBLIC LEARN
WHAT SORTS OF CHALLENGES HIS GOVERNMENT IS FACING.
WE MAKE EXTRAORDINARY EFFORTS TO RESPOND TO REQUESTS
FROM BOTH THE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES TO SANITIZE
OR DECLASSIFY INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION AND ASSESSMENTS IN
ORDER TO MAKE THEM AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC. PERHAPS THE BEST
EXAMPLE OF THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE
PUBLIC DEBATE ON IMPORTANT ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY HAS
BEEN DIA'S ANNUAL PUBLICATION, SOVIET MILITARY POWER, WHICH IS
CLOSELY COORDINATED BY CIA. LAST SUMMER THE COMMUNITY AT THE
REQUEST OF THE WHITE HOUSE AND CONGRESS SANITIZED AND PRESENTED
IN OPEN TESTIMONY OUR ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCES.
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MORE FREQUENTLY, HOWEVER, CIA MATERIAL IS DECLASSIFIED FOR
USE IN OTHER GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS, SUCH AS STATE'S WHITE
PAPERS ON TERRORISM AND TWO PUBLICATIONS DISTRIBUTED BY THE
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS ON SOVIET ACQUISITION
OF WESTERN TECHNOLOGY. WHENEVER INTELLIGENCE IS USED AS THE
SOURCE FOR UNCLASSIFIED PUBLICATIONS, IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE
STAY WITHIN THE EVIDENCE TO MAINTAIN OUR INTEGRITY AND TO
PROTECT THE POLICYMAKER.
THIS ORDERLY AND CAUTIOUS APPROACH TO THE PUBLIC USE OF
INTELLIGENCE IS GUIDED BY THE HIGHEST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES
AND INVOLVES THE CLOSE PARTICIPATION OF INTELLIGENCE PROFESSIONALS.
WHEN WE PROMISE OUR SOURCES CONFIDENTIALITY, WE IN MANY CASES
LITERALLY HOLD THEIR LIVES IN OUR HANDS. AS WE RESPECT THE
RIGHT OF THE PRESS TO GATHER AND PUBLISH NEWS AND APPLAUD YOUR
EXPOSURE OF WASTE, CORRUPTION, AND OTHER MISCONDUCT, I HOPE
YOU WILL RESPECT OUR RIGHT AND DUTY TO KEEP THE NATION'S
LEGITIMATE SECRETS. AMONG THE THOUSANDS OF EDITORIALS ABOUT
THE FAILINGS AND SHORTCOMINGS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, I CAN
RECALL FEW, IF ANY, THAT TOOK A PUBLIC SERVANT TO TASK FOR
REVEALING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. YET CLASSIFIED LEAKS ARE AT
LEAST AS DAMAGING AS THE COST OVERRUNS, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST,
AND OTHER TYPES OF MALFEASANCE SO PROPERLY CRITICIZED BY THE
PRESS.
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WE ARE EAGER TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING AND CLOSER
COOPERATION BETWEEN YOU IN THE WORKING PRESS, WHO PERFORM SUCH
A VITAL FUNCTION IN OUR SOCIETY, AND THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY,
WHICH PLAYS AN ESSENTIAL ROLE IN PROTECTING THIS NATION.
AMERICA NEEDS A FREE, VIGOROUS PRESS AND IT NEEDS A SUPERIOR
INTELLIGENCE SERVICE. WE ARE BOTH SERVING OUR COUNTRY IN VITAL
AND FUNDAMENTAL MATTERS.
THANK YOU.
*****************
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REMARKS OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
BEFORE
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE
THURSDAY, 15 MAY 1986
J. W. MARRIOTT HOTEL
WASHINGTON, D. C.
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LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, IT'S A GREAT PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE
SPEAKING BEFORE THE BOTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF
THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE. THIS AFTERNOON 1 HAVE BEEN
ASKED TO SPEAK TO THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM--A
SCOURGE THAT INCREASINGLY IS BEGINNING TO DOMINATE OUR LIVES
AND TIMES. BUT BEFORE 1 BEGIN, LET ME SAY THAT IT IS A SPECIAL
PRIVILEGE TO APPEAR BEFORE A GROUP THAT HAS DONE SO MUCH ITSELF
TO FIGHT THIS EPIDEMIC OF VIOLENCE. I KNOW THAT RABBI TANENBAUM
AND THE AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE HAVE BEEN AT THE FOREFRONT
OF THE EFFORT TO MOBILIZE A BROAD NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY IN THIS
COUNTRY IN SUPPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATION. LET ME TELL YOU
THAT THOSE OF US INSIDE GOVERNMENT NEED YOUR HELP AND APPRECIATE
YOUR EFFORTS. TERRORISM IS A CANCER THAT IS SPREADING. IN 1983
WE RECORDED ABOUT 500 INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS; LAST
YEAR THE NUMBER ROSE TO ABOUT 800. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS
FRIENDS AND ALLIES CONTINUE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS. THE
NUMBER OF PERSONS KILLED OR INJURED IN 1985 EXCEEDED 2,200--MORE
THAN ANY OTHER YEAR, MORE EVEN THAN THE TERRIBLE TOLL IN 1983
WHEN THE US AND FRENCH CONTINGENTS OF THE PEACEKEEPING FORCE
IN LEBANON WERE BOMBED. THE RISING CASUALTY RATE REFLECTS
THE INCREASED USE OF LARGE BOMBS -BY TERRORISTS AS WELL AS
GREATER WILLINGNESS TO HARM INNOCENT BYSTANDERS THROUGH
INDISCRIMINATE ATTACKS.
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THE CAPABILITY OF THE TERRORIST TO KILL, MAIM, KIDNAP,
AND TORTURE HIS VICTIMS HAS BEEN ENORMOUSLY ENHANCED BY STATE
SPONSORSHIP. LIBYA, SYRIA, AND IRAN USE TERRORISM AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF FOREIGN POLICY. THEY HIRE AND SUPPORT ESTABLISHED
TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, OF WHICH THERE ARE MANY AROUND THE WORLD.
THESE COUNTRIES MAKE THEIR OFFICIALS, THEIR EMBASSIES, THEIR
DIPLOMATIC POUCHES, THEIR COMMUNICATIONS CHANNELS, AND THEIR
TERRITORY AS SAFEHAVEN FOR THESE CRIMINALS AVAILABLE TO PLAN,
DIRECT AND EXECUTE BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS, KIDNAPPINGS AND
OTHER TERRORIST OPERATIONS.
THEY HAVE OPERATED LARGELY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND IN EUROPE.
TODAY THEY ARE NOW SPREADING THEIR WINGS INTO THIS HEMISPHERE.
THE THREAT TO US FACILITIES, PERSONNEL, AND INTERESTS IS
PARTICULARLY HIGH IN COLOMBIA, ECUADOR, AND PERU WHERE STRONGLY
ANTI-US TERRORIST GROUPS ARE ACTIVE.
THE LINK BETWEEN LIBYAN- AND CUBAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM
AND NICARAGUAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM IS LARGE AND GROWING LARGER.
FOR SOME YEARS, THE LIBYANS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING THE SANDINISTA
GOVERNMENT IN NICARAGUA WITH SOMETHING LIKE $100 MILLION DOLLARS
A YEAR. YOU'LL REMEMBER HOW NICARAGUAN-SUPPORTED INSURGENTS IN
EL SALVADOR KILLED OUR MARINES AT A CAFE IN THE CAPITAL OF THAT
COUNTRY.
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WE NOW SEE NICARAGUA TRAINING YOUNG MEN FOR VIOLENCE AND
SUBVERSION, SENDING THEM INTO SOUTH AMERICA--INTO COLOMBIA
FOR THE ATTACK ON THE PALACE OF JUSTICE IN BOGOTA AND AS FAR
SOUTH AS CHILE. YOUNG MEN FROM LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES ARE
BEING SENT TO LIBYA FOR TRAINING IN THE TERRORIST CAMPS THERE
AND THEN BROUGHT BACK TO BE PLANTED AMONG THE POPULATION IN
CENTRAL AMERICA, IN VENEZUELA, IN ECUADOR. IF THE SANDINISTA
REGIME CONSOLIDATES ITSELF, WE CAN EXPECT MANAGUA TO BECOME THE
BEIRUT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
THERE IS A SOVIET CONNECTION AND SUPPORT FOR ALL THIS.
WHILE SOME REFER TO THAT CONNECTION AS SHADOWY, IT SEEMS VERY
REAL TO ME. THE STATES I HAVE JUST MENTIONED ARE NOT NECESSARILY
CLOSE ALLIES TO MOSCOW, BUT THEY SHARE A FUNDAMENTAL HOSTILITY
TO THE WEST. THE SOVIETS, WHO HOLD NO MORAL OBJECTIONS TO THE
USE OF TERRORISM AND SEE MUCH OF THE UNREST IT CREATES AS
ULTIMATELY BENEFICIAL TO THEIR FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES, DO
NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO BLOCK TERRORISM
OR TO JOIN IN MULTILATERAL EFFORTS TO COMBAT IT. IN BACKING
REVOLUTIONARY CAUSES AGAINST ESTABLISHED GOVERNMENTS, IT IS
LARGELY A MATTER OF INDIFFERENCE TO THE SOVIETS WHETHER TERRORIST
TACTICS ARE USED AS LONG AS THE GROUPS THAT COMMIT THESE ACTS
ATTACK NON-SOVIET OR NON-BLOC TARGETS. AND SOVIET SUPPORT FOR
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM COMES PACKAGED IN A VARIETY OF WAYS
RANGING FROM DIRECT TRAINING OF TERRORIST PERSONNEL TO POLITICAL
BACKING AND FUNDING FOR STATES ACTIVELY ENGAGED IN SPONSORING
TERRORISM.
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THE EAST EUROPEANS, ALMOST CERTAINLY WITH SOVIET KNOWLEDGE
AND SUPPORT, PROVIDE SAFEHAVEN, TRANSIT PRIVILEGES AND MOVEMENT
OF WEAPONS BOMBS FOR TERRORISTS. BULGARIA'S STATE TRADING
ORGANIZATION KINTEX--WHICH IS ESSENTIALLY A STATE SMUGGLING
OPERATION--AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S COMPARABLE ORGANIZATION OMNIPOL
ARE AMONG THE MOST PROMINENT COMPANIES WHOSE WEAPONS EVENTUALLY
HAVE APPEARED IN TERRORIST HANDS.
LET ME NOW TURN TO THE PROBLEMS US INTELLIGENCE ANALYSTS
AND COUNTERTERRORISM POLICYMAKERS AS THEY SEEK TO TACKLE THE
PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. YOU'VE ALL HEARD AN
ENDLESS STREAM OF COMMENTARY CALLING FOR A MUCH GREATER
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT AGAINST TERRORISM. I COULDN'T AGREE MORE.
BUT IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO KNOW THAT WE HAVE MADE A
REMARKABLE AMOUNT OF PROGRESS OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS.
IN ORDER TO PREVENT TERRORIST PLANS OR DISRUPT THEIR
ACTIVITIES, WE NEED INFORMATION ABOUT THEM. BUT THE VERY
NATURE OF TERRORIST GROUPS AND THEIR ACTIVITIES MAKES THIS
TASK EXTREMELY COMPLICATED. TERRORIST GROUPS ARE VERY SMALL,
MAKING PENETRATION A VERY DIFFICULT TASK FOR POLICE OR
INTELLIGENCE AGENTS. MOREOVER, THE OPERATING LIFE OF ANY
SINGLE GROUP OF TERRORISTS IS OFTEN NO MORE THAN A FEW YEARS.
LIKEWISE, TYPICAL TERRORIST LEADERS HAVE A RELATIVELY SHORT
BUSINESS LIFE.
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SO HOW DO WE GO ABOUT IT? FIRST, WE ARE ACQUIRING AS
MUCH INFORMATION AS WE CAN ABOUT TERRORIST GROUPS INCLUDING
MODUS OPERANDI, ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, PERSONNEL SUPPORT,
FINANCIAL AND COMMUNICATIONS ARRANGEMENTS, AND THEIR
RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER GROUPS OR STATE SPONSORS. MUCH OF
THIS IS JUST HARD RESEARCH, COMPILING A LARGE DATA BASE AND
ATTEMPTING TO FILL IN THE GAPS. IT IS NOT VERY GLAMOROUS AND
PEOPLE WHO DO IT DO NOT CAPTURE THE HEADLINES. BUT IT IS THE
FOUNDATION UPON WHICH THE US COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORT RESTS.
CONTINUING COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ENABLES US TO IMPROVE OUR
ABILITY TO DETECT TRENDS IN TERRORISM OPERATIONS, UPGRADE SECURITY
IN AREAS MOST LIKELY AT RISK, AND DETERMINE VULNERABILITIES OF
TERRORIST GROUPS. WE HAVE PUT IN PLACE A SYSTEM OF RAPID
COMMUNICATIONS TO GATHER ASSESSMENTS, HAVE REPORTS TESTED BY
EXPERTS THROUGHOUT OUR GOVERNMENT, AND PASS CONCLUSIONS AND
WARNINGS QUICKLY TO THE POINT OF THE THREAT.
ACTION BASED ON OUR INTELLIGENCE, ALONG WITH THAT OF
OTHER FRIENDLY COUNTRIES INCLUDING MODERATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS,
HAS BEEN TAKEN TO PREVENT A GREAT MANY PLANNED TERRORIST ATTACKS
AROUND THE WORLD. THE RATE OF EFFECTIVE WARNING IS INCREASING,
RISING TO 26 DURING THE MONTH OF APRIL THIS YEAR.
SOMETIMES WE FALL JUST HEARTBREAKINGLY SHORT OF SUCCESS
AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE BERLIN NIGHTCLUB BOMBING LAST MONTH.
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You HAVE HEARD THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT OUTLINING THE EVIDENCE
FOR THE LIBYAN COMPLICITY IN THE BERLIN BOMBING. WE ALSO
HAVE COMPELLING EVIDENCE OF LIBYAN INVOLVEMENT IN ATTEMPTS
TO ATTACK OTHER US TARGETS, SEVERAL OF WHICH WERE DESIGNED TO
CAUSE MAXIMUM CASUALTIES SIMILAR TO THE BERLIN BOMBING.
-- FRANCE EXPELLED TWO MEMBERS OF THE LIBYAN PEOPLE'S
BUREAU IN PARIS FOR THEIR INVOLVEMENT IN A PLANNED ATTACK ON
VISA APPLICANTS WAITING IN LINE AT THE US EMBASSY.
-- FRANCE SUBSEQUENTLY EXPELLED TWO DISGRUNTLED FATAH
FORCE 17 MEMBERS RECRUITED BY LIBYA TO CONDUCT ANOTHER OPERATION
AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN PARIS.
-- IN EARLY APRIL A LIBYAN-INSPIRED PLOT TO ATTACK
THE US EMBASSY IN BEIRUT WAS ABORTED WHEN THE 107 MM ROCKET
EXPLODED ON LAUNCH.
-- TURKISH POLICE IN LATE MARCH ARRESTED TWO TUNISIANS
IN ISTANBUL WHO CLAIMED THEY WERE PLANNING ON BEHALF OF THE
LIBYANS TO USE EXPLOSIVES AGAINST A US TARGET IN TURKEY; THE
OPERATION WAS PLANNED TO INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES.
ALL IN ALL, NEARLY 50 LIBYAN DIPLOMATS HAVE BEEN EXPELLED
RECENTLY FROM SPAIN, ITALY, FRANCE AND WEST GERMANY. IN FACT,
SO FAR THIS YEAR WE HAVE REPORTS OF WELL OVER 35 LIBYAN-
ASSOCIATED THREATS, INCLUDING SURVEILLANCE OF PLANNED ATTACKS.
AGAINST US PERSONNEL AND FACILITIES IN EUROPE, AFRICA AND ASIA.
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TOGETHER WITH THE INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES OF
FRIENDLY COUNTRIES, WE HAVE DEVELOPED A WORLDWIDE COUNTER-
TERRORIST NETWORK WHICH FUNCTIONS THROUGH INTELLIGENCE
EXCHANGES, TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT AND JOINT OPERATIONS.
THE TERRORISTS ARE EVERYWHERE, MOVING SILENTLY ACROSS BORDERS
AND STRIKING WITH AS MUCH STEALTH AND SURPRISE AS THEY CAN
MANAGE. THIS APPARATUS MUST BE ABLE TO FOLLOW THEM, PASS WORD
ON THEIR MOVEMENTS, PICK THEM UP OR ABORT THEIR PLANS, OR
OTHERWISE DEFEND AGAINST THEM.
WE HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY EFFECTIVE IN THIS AND OUR
CAPABILITIES ARE IMPROVING. I TAKE THIS OCCASION TO FURTHER
A NECESSARY DIALOGUE ON HOW WE CAN OVERCOME WHAT I CONSIDER
THE GREATEST SINGLE IMPEDIMENT TO PROTECTING OUR INTERESTS AND
OUR CITIZENS FROM THE SCOURGE OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.
IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF ACQUIRING
INTELLIGENCE--OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH OTHER SECURITY
SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC CAPABILITIES, THE
INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS--HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY
THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
IN RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS, A FLOOD OF INFORMATION AND
MISINFORMATION HAS APPEARED IN PRINT AND ON THE AIR WAVES.
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YOU'VE ALL SEEN IT. BEFORE THE PRESIDENT SPOKE TO OUR PEOPLE
AND TOLD THEM ABOUT THE CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THAT WE HAD ABOUT
LIBYAN DIRECTION OF THE ATTACK ON ALLIED SOLDIERS IN THE BERLIN
NIGHTCLUB, MAJOR NEWSPAPERS AND NEWS MAGAZINES PUBLISHED THAT
LIBYAN COMMUNICATIONS WERE BEING READ. THE LIBYANS STOPPED
USING THOSE COMMUNICATIONS AND THIS IS BOUND TO PUT OTHER
PEACEFUL CITIZENS IN JEOPARDY. THIS IS A SEVERE PROBLEM WE
MUST ADDRESS IF OUR FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM IS TO SUCCEED.
THIS IS A DELICATE AND CRITICAL PROBLEM, AND I WANT TO
BE VERY CAREFUL AND PRECISE IN ADDRESSING IT. LET ME FIRST
SAY THAT I YIELD TO NO ONE IN MY RESPECT FOR THE MEDIA AND THE
PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR IT AND FOR THEIR FUNCTION IN OUR SOCIETY.
IT HAS BEEN MY OWN PERSONAL ACTIVITY IN NEWSPAPERS, BOOKS,
MAGAZINES AND ELECTRONIC BROADCASTING THAT HAS GIVEN ME THE CAPITAL
TO RUN A PERSONAL DEFICIT FOR MORE THAN TEN YEARS IN ORDER TO
SERVE OUR COUNTRY. I RESPECT THE DILIGENCE AND INGENUITY OF
THE WORKING PRESS IN GATHERING AND PUBLISHING NEWS AND APPLAUD
ITS EXPOSURE OF WASTE, INEFFICIENCY, CORRUPTION AND OTHER
MISCONDUCT. IN SHORT, I SPEAK FROM 30 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE AS
A FRIEND, PARTICIPANT AND SUPPORTER OF THE MEDIA.
I HAVE TWO POINTS THAT I FEEL I MUST MAKE AT THIS TIME
IN ORDER TO DISCHARGE THE OBLIGATION SPECIFICALLY PLACED ON
ME BY THE LAW OF OUR LAND TO PROTECT INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND
METHODS.
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PUT VERY SIMPLY, THEY ARE FIRST THAT THE MEDIA LIKE
EVERYONE ELSE MUST ADHERE TO THE LAW. SECOND, ALL OF US HAVE
RESPONSIBILITIES TO BALANCE IN CARRYING OUT ITS MISSION.
IN THE FACE OF THE NEW DANGEROUS THREATS THAT WE FACE FROM
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NOW IS THE TIME TO MUTUALLY ADDRESS
THOSE RESPONSIBILITIES TOGETHER IN A SERIOUS AND MEASURED WAY.
CONGRESS, SHORTLY AFTER IT ESTABLISHED THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY TO GATHER SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE, IN 1950 ENACTED A LAW
WHICH PROHIBITS THE PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS
INTELLIGENCE. THERE HAS BEEN WIDESPREAD VIOLATION OF THAT
LAW OVER RECENT WEEKS AND MONTHS. MUCH DAMAGE HAS BEEN DONE.
KAY GRAHAM, THE PUBLISHER OF THE WASHINGTON POST, IN A RECENT
VERY THOUGHTFUL AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH CITED THE KIND OF
DAMAGE WHICH WE HAVE SUSTAINED. SHE TOLD HOW A TELEVISION
NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE
READING THE MESSAGES OF PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE
U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT. SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE,
THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED- THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE
THE TERRORIST LEADERS AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION
ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.
WHERE THERE ALREADY HAS BEEN PUBLIC DISCLOSURE ABOUT
COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, THE -LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED BUT
THE MILK HAS BEEN SPILLED- I WOULD NOT, THEREFORE, AT THIS
TIME FAVOR ACTION FOR THESE PAST OFFENSES- BUT I STRONGLY
BELIEVE THAT IF WE ARE TO PROTECT OUR SECURITY AS A NATION
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AND THE SAFETY OF OUR CITIZENS IN THIS AGE OF INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND INTERCONTINENTAL MISSILES, THE LAW NOW ON THE
BOOKS TO PROTECT A VERY NARROW SEGMENT OF INFORMATION, THAT
DEALING WITH COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, MUST NOW BE ENFORCED.
THERE ARE OTHER LARGE AREAS OF INFORMATION ABOUT OUR
INTELLIGENCE, OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND OUR RELATIONSHIPS
WITH OTHER NATIONS WHICH CAN AND FREQUENTLY SHOULD BE
PUBLISHED WITHOUT VIOLATING ANY LAW. BUT THERE ARE SITUATIONS
IN WHICH MANY OF US BELIEVE THERE IS A RESPONSIBILITY, BEFORE
RUSHING INTO PRINT OR ONTO THE AIR WAVES, TO WEIGH AND CONSIDER
THE DANGER TO LIFE AND LIMB OF OUR CITIZENS AND OTHERS AND TO
THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AND THE REPUTATION FOR RELIABILITY
OF OUR NATION.
THE TEMPTATION TO GO BEYOND THE FACTS AND PIECE TOGETHER
AND STRETCH FRAGMENTS OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A
PUBLISHABLE STORY AND SOMETIMES IN ORDER TO SENSATIONALIZE IS
A DANGEROUS THING. IT CAN AND HAS COST LIVES. IT CAN WRONGLY
IMPAIR REPUTATIONS AND DISRUPT RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL TO OUR
NATIONAL INTEREST. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WITH A TRUE STORY.
DURING 1985, A WELL-KNOWN REPORTER CALLED THE INFORMATION
OFFICER AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND TOLD HIM HE HAD
A STORY THAT WE HAD HELPED THE SECURITY SERVICE OF A FRIENDLY
NATION STAGE A CAR BOMBING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF A TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY TO A LARGE
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NUMBER OF RESIDENTS AND PASSERS-BY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. OUR
OFFICER TOLD THE REPORTER THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECT
AND THAT THE CIA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AND NO INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT
OR INDIRECT, IN THE ATTACK. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE CHARGED
US INVOLVEMENT, HE MIGHT WIND UP WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS. THE
STORY WAS RUN IN HIS NEWSPAPER. IT GOT AROUND THE WORLD AND
CREATED A FALSE IMPRESSION OF US INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING.
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED
THE MATTER AND CONCLUDED THAT "NO COMPLICITY OF DIRECT OR
INDIRECT INVOLVEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT To THE
MARCH 8 BOMBING IN BEIRUT." BUT THIS CAME TOO LATE! A MONTH
AFTER THE MISLEADING STORY WAS PUBLISHED TO THE WORLD, TERRORISTS
HIJACKED A TWA PLANE AND ITS 153 PASSENGERS AND TOOK THEM TO
BEIRUT. WHEN THE HIJACKERS SHOT AND KILLED AN AMERICAN SERVICEMAN,
THEY CLAIMED IT To BE IN RETALIATION FOR THE BOMBING IN BEIRUT
IN WHICH THE REPORTER HAD INVOLVED THE CIA AFTER THE CIA's
SPOKESMAN HAD DENIED TO HIM ANY INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT OR INDIRECT,
IN THE BOMBING.
IN PUTTING THIS STORY TOGETHER, THE REPORTERS HAD TALKS
WITH OFFICIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MEMBERS AND STAFFERS
OF THE CONGRESS ABOUT COLLATERAL MATTERS INCLUDING OUR LONG-TERM
PRACTICE OF PROVIDING TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
SECURITY SERVICES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR
CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM.
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THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE GOES BACK MANY YEARS. WE ARE DOING
MORE OF THIS TO COPE WITH TODAY'S INTENSIFIED TERRORIST THREAT.
THIS DOES NOT MAKE US RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
THE REPORTER JUSTIFIED PUBLISHING THEIR STORY BY TAKING
THE VIEW THAT THIS LONGSTANDING TRAINING SOMEHOW MADE US
RESPONSIBLE FOR A PARTICULAR ACTION OF THE ORGANIZATION EVEN
THOUGH WE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACTION AND NO CONTACT WITH
THOSE WHO CARRIED IT OUT.
THIS IS A TRAGIC STORY. THERE IS ENOUGH BLAME FOR EVERYONE
INVOLVED TO SHARE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TALKED MORE THAN THE
RULES PERMIT ON CLASSIFIED MATTERS. THE REPORTERS IGNORED
ACCURATE INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY WERE CAREFULLY, CLEARLY,
AND HONESTLY PROVIDED. THEY STRETCHED THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SCRAPS OF INFORMATION THEY GATHERED. WE AT THE CIA EITHER
DID NOT HAVE TIME OR WERE NOT FAST ENOUGH IN BRINGING THE
MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AT THE NEWSPAPER.
WE ALL MUST DO BETTER. THIS IS A DANGEROUS AND UNPREDICTABLE
WORLD IN WHICH ALL OF US MUST MOVE WITH CAUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY.
CERTAINLY ANY RESPONSIBLE PERSON WOULD WANT TO EXERCISE SPECIAL
CARE TO AVOID SETTING IN MOTION THIS KIND OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
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As WE SEE IT, MRS. GRAHAM STATED CORRECTLY THE RESPONSIBILITY
OF THE MEDIA IN SUCH MATTERS IN HER RECENT TALK. SHE CALLED
FOR "...FULL COOPERATION WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA
AND THE AUTHORITIES. WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY
SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES
WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE
RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE
ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD
NOT BE AIRED. [THE MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER
HUMAN LIFE OR NATIONAL SECURITY- WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE
WITH THE AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD
HAVE THOSE CONSEQUENCES."
WE HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY REPORTERS
AND EDITORS TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION
OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR
TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC
NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES.
THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND TO
CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. WE ARE ALWAYS READY AND
AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.
I HASTEN TO ADD, HOWEVER, THAT THE FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE
AND THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING THESE TYPES OF LEAKS
IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT ITSELF.
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THE INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE
OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS DAMAGING
TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS, THE PRESIDENT
HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL OBLIGATION FEDERAL WORKERS HAVE TO
PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY ARE ENTRUSTED.
WE HAVE INCREASED AND MUST INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO UNCOVER
THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS TRUST. WE ARE STUDYING PROCEDURES AND
POSSIBLY NEW LAWS NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO
DECIDE ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
IN CONCLUSION, I WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASIZE THAT ALL OF US
HAVE A VERY SERIOUS CHALLENGE IN COPING WITH A RAPIDLY GROWING
TERRORIST THREAT. WE ARE EAGER TO DEVELOP BETTER UNDERSTANDING
AND CLOSER COOPERATION WITH ORGANIZATIONS LIKE YOURS AND OTHERS
IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR WHO CAN MAKE A CONTRIBUTION TO DEVELOPING
POLICIES AND EDUCATING OUR PEOPLE ABOUT THIS DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT.
I PARTICULARLY APPLAUD AND ENCOURAGE THE INTEREST AND
EFFORTS OF MY GOOD FRIEND RABBI TANENBAUM AND OF THIS ORGANIZATION
TO IMPLEMENT THE PUBLIC EDUCATION ASPECTS OF VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S
TASK FORCE REPORT ON COMBATTING TERRORISM.
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ARTICLE APPEARED
- ON PAGE 14.
WASHINGTON JOURNALISM REVIEW
JULY 1986
National Security
And the Press
An Interview with
CIA Chief William Casey
The Pelton spy trial has triggered the
harshest confrontation between the govern-
ment and the press since the publication of
the Pentagon Papers. In an interview with
WJR Editor Katherine Winton Evans, Wil-
liam Casey, director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency, gives the administration's
side of the conflict over national security
and the press.
WJR: Mr. Casey, what worries you most
about the American press?
CASEY: I worry about the propensity of
the American press to publish classified
information, which destroys and jeopar-
dizes intelligence sources and methods.
As director of Central Intelligence, I am
obligated under the National Security Act
to protect those sources and methods.
WJR: What do you mean by a "propensity
on the part of the press to publish classi-
fied information"?
CASEY: There's been a vast divulging of
sensitive information at an unprecedented
tempo in recent months. We've seen it
destroy our ability to follow terrorists in
specific instances. We've seen very impor-
tant capabilities to understand and follow
Soviet military plans and the development
of their weapons jeopardized and dimin-
ished. It seems to be happening more fre-
quently, more quickly and at an increas-
ing tempo and is doing more damage
than we can tolerate.
WJR: Do you think there's a changing at-
titude or standard in the press about what
constitutes a threat to national security?
CASEY: I think there's not a very good
general understanding of why we need to
protect the intelligence sources and meth-
ods that are the basis of our national se-
curity. I am trying to correct that situa-
tion. All of us in the intelligence
community have an obligation to sensitize
the people in the media to this problem.
We believe that fundamentally we all have
the interests of our nation at heart. No-
body wants to hurt our national security,
nobody wants to impair our intelligence
capabilities, but we may not have done as
good a job as we might have in sensitizing
the media to the damage that is being
done to our sources and methods. We're
just now trying to do it in a more system-
atic and aggressive way.
WJR: Quiet diplomacy has been the tradi-
tional way for directors of the CIA to deal
with the press on sensitive information.
Do you regret that you chose a noisy con-
frontation with the press when you an-
nounced, for example, that you were ask-
ing the Justice Department to consider
prosecuting news organizations for inter-
cept disclosures and when you threatened
to prosecute the Washington Post if it pub-
lished details of the Pelton case?
CASEY: I was not alone in that. Many of
us thought it was necessary to warn the
media and ask the Justice Department to
consider applying to the Washington Post
the 1950 law prohibiting intercept disclo-
sures. We do not see how, in fairness to
the media, or in the discharge of our own
LV
obligations, we could permit the media to
violate the law, which flatly prohibits the
publication of communications intelli-
gence, without apprising them that they
were doing so and putting them on no-
tice. That's what I did. I told people who
were about to publish things that I
thought they ought to know that if they
published that kind of stuff they would be
in violation of a flat prohibition the Con-
gress has enacted. I don't think I threat-
ened. I said I'm not threatening, but I
think I ought to tell you you have this
problem. I and others have notified and
will continue to notify the Justice Depart-
ment that it should look into this violation
of law, or apparent violation of law. I
don't think I was all that noisy. It was a
private warning. It was the press that pub-
licized my warning and made it public.
WJR: Why get tough now? NBC's Jim
Polk reported on the operation Pelton re-
vealed to the Soviets back in November
and the New York Times wrote about the
operation years ago. Why didn't you react
then?
CASEY: I can't answer that. I wasn't here
years ago when the New York Times wrote
about it. There's always a weighing, a bal-
ancing of equities. Sometimes you take ac-
tion and you in effect bring more atten-
tion to the matter. But we have all agreed
that the tempo and number of unau-
thorized disclosures over the last several
months has been such that we've found it
necessary to deal with the problem more
actively, more aggressively and to use all
had
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the legal authorities we have to deter fur-
ther damage to our national security and
our intelligence capabilities.
WJR: Why did you react so strongly and
publicly over the press reporting of the
operations Pelton revealed to the Soviets
when the Soviets obviously already knew
about them?
"It's just intellectually
shallow to say that we
can publish anything
because the Soviets
know about it. The
media neither have the
capability nor the
authority to make that
determination ."
CASEY: How do the media know what
the Soviets know about intelligence opera-
tions? How do they know how much the
Soviets know? How do they know at what
level he received attention? How do they
know what this will tell other countries?
It's just intellectually shallow to say that
we can publish anything because the Sovi-
ets know about it. The media neither have
the capability nor the authority to make
that determination, particularly when
there are statutes that prohibit publica-
tion.
WJR: How are news organizations and re-
porters to know what is and what is not
damaging to the national security?
CASEY: We must have closer cooperation
and closer understanding about that. I
think they know that publishing certain
information can jeopardize lives and can
jeopardize capabilities. There is a fairly
wide understanding of that. We should
work to make the media's understanding
wider and deeper and fuller. And clearly
the media?as all other citizens?are re-
sponsible for knowing the law of the land.
WJR: You seem to be looking for a way
for news organizations, reporters and
broadcasters to practice self-censorship,
but how can they do that? You're not sug-
gesting putting a CIA official in every
newsroom?
CASEY: Of course not. That's a silly sug-
gestion.
WJR: How will they know where the line
is?
CASEY: They have a responsibility. Peo-
ple ought to know their responsibilities.
People ought to know when they're near
the line. We'd like to have them discuss
the matter with us when they think they
may be close to that line. You can't do
much more than that. I'm gratified when
the media have brought potentially dam-
JULY 1981i
aging stories to our attention that were
questionable and we've discussed them.
Sometimes the press has decided that the
information was not that important to
publish because the likely damage out-
weighed the worth of getting the informa-
tion out. In other instances, the media,
reporters and others, have been willing to
mitigate the damage by taking out par-
ticularly sensitive details that weren't nec-
essary to the conveying of the broad
story. We're always available to help on
that. Anybody who is uncertain or has
questions, all they have to do is pick up
the phone and call here. [Director of
Public Affairs] George Lauder will try to
help them work it out.
WJR: Did the Washington Post behave in a
responsible way after you asked them not
to reveal the details of what Pelton had
given the Soviets, and they trimmed their
story?
CASEY: Well, the Washington Post cer-
tainly considered the whole matter in a
very responsible way. I'm not really going
to comment on whether some of the
things that they published were not au-
thorized to be released in the Pelton trial
or whether they should have been pub-
lished or whether they shouldn't have
been published. I think on the whole the
.conduct of the Washington Post was re-
sponsible.
WJR: On CBS' "Face the Nation" on
June 1, Bob Woodward of the Post said,
"We're going to cover intelligence. We're
going to write about it and the adminis-
tration is not going to like where we draw
the line." Mr. Casey, can reporters draw
the line themselves?
CASEY: Some of them can. Some of them
understand quite well and are rather care-
ful. There are some who are in a rush to
publish and are not particularly sensitive
to national security and intelligence ca-
pabilities considerations.
WJR: Can you give me some examples?
CASEY: No, I'm not going to name
names.
WJR: Who should be the final judge of
what is the national security? The admin-
istration, the press or the courts?
CASEY: It depends on the circumstances.
If there is a law or a statute, as there is
a ?
with respect to communications intelli-
gence, the courts would be the ultimate
determiners. As to what the requirements
of national security are, the elected gov-
ernment has the authority under the Con-
stitution to protect the national security.
And they need to make the judgment as
to what it requires to maintain that secu-
rity. It's a free country; the press may not
always agree with the government. We
recognize that. But the press has a
responsibility and the press has a stake in
the national security and that, we think,
should cause them to proceed cautiously
and carefully, to hear our point of view
and to arrive at measured decisions as to
what is appropriate and what is not ap-
propriate for publication.
WJR: When you deal with the media, do
you find a difference between television
executives and newspaper editors in their
understanding of, and sensitivity to, na-
tional security considerations?
CASEY: When you deal with a newspaper
editor, you usually have more time to
think about the situation. When you deal
with a broadcast person, the deadline
sometimes makes it difficult to give the
matter adequate consideration. On the
other hand, there are occasions when
broadcast people will hold back and de-
vote the time to thinking about the intelli-
gence equities and understanding our
concerns. We'd like that to happen more
frequently.
WJR: Has coverage of the Pelton trial
been responsible on the whole, do you
think?
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"There are quite a few
bits of sensitive
information that have
appeared in certain
reporting about the
Pelton trial that did
not come out of the
court proceedings.
We are concerned
about that."
CASEY: I think coverage of the Pelton
trial has been responsible on the whole.
We do know, however, that there are
quite a few bits of sensitive information
that have appeared in certain reporting
about the Pelton trial that did not come
out of the court proceedings, or were not
authorized to be released in the Pelton
trial. We are concerned about that.
WJR: Critics are saying that the adminis-
tration is going after the press to divert
attention from the disarray of our intelli-
gence operations, meaning spies on the
payroll and secrets walking out the door.
How do you answer that criticism?
CASEY: I simply say that is not true.
We're concerned about protecting our
intelligence capabilities. We caught a lot
of spies. That's the work of the intelli-
gence community?like the FBI and oth-
ers. So we have no great apology. It's too
bad we have had these spies and it's too
bad we didn't catch them earlier, but
we've had quite a good degree of success
at catching people who are passing along
information to other governments.
WJR: Could you give me just A couple of
examples of when the press has endan-
gered national security?
CASEY: When I do that, I simply tell the
world, including our adversaries, more
than I want to tell them about our intelli-
gence priorities and capabilities. But I can
say that it's well and widely known that we
lost access to terrorist communications in
recent months by virtue of press report-
ing of communications intelligence, which
probably is in violation of a federal stat-
ute.
WJR: Are you talking about the Libyan
intercept?
CASEY: Information about communica-
tions that might have alerted us to the
bombings of the embassy and the Marine
barracks in Beirut appeared in the press
and those communications disappeared.
The same thing happened to our knowl-
edge of Libyan communications that
alerted us to Libyan-planned attacks on
Western installations.
WJR: But the communication between
Libya and its bureau in East Germany,
President Reagan talked about himself.
CASEY: President Reagan did not talk
about it first. When he talked about it, he
did so very carefully. He disclosed no
sources. In the second place, one reason
he was able to talk about it at all was that
some explicit information had appeared
in the media two weeks earlier. It was at
that time that the communications were
turned off. Get that distinction very
clearly, because everybody's talking about
President Reagan. That information was
previously disclosed by the media before
President Reagan talked about it.
WJR: Is the administration?or are you?
intending to intimidate the press but not
to prosecute? Is your threat to prosecute
serious?
CASEY: We're all obligated to enforce
the laws. I think everybody takes that seri-
ously. And if those laws are violated to
the detriment of our national security,
we're obligated to enforce the law. There
are judgments to be made. Sometimes we
don't prosecute because the damage
might be too serious. You want to get a
case you are going to win. That's a deci-
sion that the Justice Department will have
to make. But everybody feels the same
obligation to apply and enforce the laws.
WJR: Do you think your frontal approach
with the press has worked?
CASEY: I think I've gotten the attention
of the press on this problem. I think
that's a good thing. You're going to help
me get more attention. The public has to
understand that this is a problem. It has
to be a sober, careful presentation of the
problem. You call it a frontal approach. I
can't get people's attention if I keep
quiet. The leaders of the intelligence com-
munity believe we have an obligation to
make the problem an issue and to explain
what harm can result from loose handling
of classified information, how it can dam-
age our national security, our defense and
the protection of our citizens against ter-
rorism. If I just kept quiet, I wouldn't be
doing my job.
WJR: Are there too many secrets? Would
declassifying less important intelligence
material make it easier to secure the rest?
CASEY: I think so. That's something we
ought to work at. Don't think I'm blaming
this whole problem on the media. The
media is one element. We must have
greater discipline within the government.
People have to feel less free to talk, they
have to realize that there is a penalty for
violating their obligation to maintain the
secrecy of classified information. We
should work to make sure that the in-
formation that is classified really has to be
classified. We can reduce the body of clas-
sified information, but that can't be done
overnight and will take time. One of the
considerations that is likely to be applied
in enforcing the law is how sensitive and
how critical the violation is. How damag-
ing is it to our national security and to
our intelligence capabilities? So in all
s.
these things I support focusing on the
really damaging and critical disclosures.
WJR: Mr. Casey, if a government official
who leaks a damaging secret to the Sovi-
ets is a traitor, what is a government offi-
cial who leaks a damaging secret to a re-
porter?
CASEY: Well, he's certainly violated the
trust that has been placed in him. He's
violated his obligation as a federal em-
ployee. There are restrictions against dis-
closure of classified information and peo-
ple who violate that obligation should be
disciplined in some way. There are occa-
sions where extenuating circumstances ex-
ist. Sometimes the violation results in a
reprimand, sometimes it's a suspension,
sometimes it's a firing. If the leak is. delib-
erate, there may be prosecution. As there
has been in one case?Samuel Loring
Morison, the Navy intelligence officer.
WJR: If a government official leaks a
damaging secret to a reporter and the re-
porter prints it, which one is the more
guilty?
CASEY: Well, I don't think I want to
weigh that. They both violated either an
obligation or a responsibility. The govern-
ment employee has a more immediate ob-
ligation; the reporter has a responsibility
which he may or may not recognize.
WJR: Are the recent firings of officials at
the Pentagon and the State Department
for allegedly leaking to reporters, and
your "get tough" approach all part of a
big, overall administration plan to crack
down on the press?
"Foreign powers have
clearly been able to
benefit greatly from
sensitive, secret
information they've
been able to pick up in
the world and the
American media."
CASEY: No. It's not part of any effort to
crack down on the press. We have no de-
sire to crack down on the press. I believe
in the press. I applaud the work of the
press in exposing inefficiency, corruption,
all kinds of other waste. I also applaud
the media for raising policy questions re-
lated to national security. It is essential
that those questions be raised in a man-
ner which doesn't violate the classification
of material that is secret, that doesn't
damage either our national security or
our intelligence capabilities. The press has
to be able to understand the distinction
between providing the public information
they need to carry out the self-governing
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process, to understand what's happening
in the world, and protecting that narrow
segment of information which can be
damaging to our national security. When
Congress made the mere publication of
information about communications intelli-
gence a federal crime, they said, this ap-
plies only to a very narrow segment of
information which is at once critical and
vulnerable. That was very carefully done
and there is a history behind it. During
World War H, we were able to read the
communications between the German
command and its field commanders, and
between Tokyo and its field commanders.
One little whisper that we were able to
read that and they would have turned it
off. We would have lost that capability.
We would have lost a lot of additional
lives and the war would have lasted a lot
longer. With that background, and be-
cause of the special vulnerability and sen-
sitivity of communications intelligence,
there is a statute that bars publication of
such information. The statute hasn't been
waived just because it hasn't been applied
very actively. It has been used in a num-
ber of espionage cases. Also, Justice
White said very clearly, in the Pentagon
Papers case, that this statute applies to
newspapers publishing information about
communications intelligence and he
would have no difficulty in supporting its
use. So it is a very serious law.
WJR: But in 35 years, this is the first time
it's been used against the press.
CASEY: It hasn't been used.
WJR: The spectre of using it has been
raised.
CASEY: We told the press that they had
better worry about it. If we hadn't done
that, we wouldn't be doing our duty.
WJR: Isn't the real problem of leaks?
from administration officials to report-
ers?the officials who leak the stories, not
the reporters to whom they leak?
CASEY: Well, that is debatable. Certainly,
the primary problem comes from the peo-
ple in the government who leak the sto-
ries, and who violate their obligation to
protect classified information. When
somebody violates that obligation, when
they hand out what might be said to be
stolen goods, there is certainly some onus
on the person receiving those goods. We
should not close our eyes to that.
WJR: How do you feel about the use of
lie-detector tests within the government
to plug leaks?
CASEY: In order to plug leaks, as you put
it, you have to investigate a situation
where there is damage by disclosure of
classified information. In the course of
investigating, the polygraph is a tool we
use. It's an effective tool. It is used
throughout the government, on occasion,
and I think it will continue to be used.
WJR: How do you and Secretary [of
State] Shultz differ on the use of lie-de-
tector tests of government officials?
CASEY: I don't think we differ as much
as it is generally perceived. I don't want
to speak for him. Neither one of us is in
JULY 1986
favor of widespread use of the polygraph.
We both are willing to have the polygraph
used to make the investigative process
more effective when that appears to be
appropriate to those who are conducting
the investigation. FBI, Justice or whoever.
WJR: Would you submit to one?
CASEY: Oh, I do. In CIA and NSA, ev-
erybody has a polygraph before they
come in. I don't think that would be prac-
tical government-wide. Nobody's ever rec-
ommended that. Although some of the
media's discussion of polygraphs appears
to assume that. That's another one of
those misperceptions. I took the poly-
graph when I came to the CIA. I knew
that everybody else took it, so I ought to
take it.
WJR: Do you think more legislation is
needed to safeguard national security in-
formation?
CASEY: I think it should be carefully con-
sidered.
WJR: What kind?
CASEY: A lot of people believe that the
espionage laws are outdated, are no
longer adequate to meet the requirements
of protecting sensitive information, be-
cause the key prohibition is on directly
passing information to a foreign power.
Today the intelligence community sees
much more information going to foreign
powers by the leakage of sensitive in-
formation and the immediate broadcast
of that information to the world. That's
the fastest way to get it to a foreign
power. Those foreign powers have clearly
been able to benefit greatly from sensi-
tive, secret information they've been able
to pick up in the world and the American
media.
WJR: What kind of new law would you
recommend?
CASEY: Well, that's under discussion and
study. I'm not recommending any particu-
lar law at this time. There is quite a bit of
interest in the Congress in what kind of
legislative steps are called for to protect
our national security or intelligence ca-
pability more strongly. I suppose the law
would apply to the misuse of classified
information.
WJR: The misuse by the press?
CASEY: The misuse by anybody of classi-
fied information. And how far that goes
or how it's applied within the government
or outside the government, I don't have a
LESLIE CASHEN
judgment on that.
WJR: You're talking about a leak of classi-
fied information by somebody in the gov-
ernment to a member of the press who
prints it.
CASEY: To anybody.
WJR: Those laws are being considered
now by you in the government?
CASEY: It's always under consideration.
People on the Hill are always talking
about it. Just where that process stands, I
don't want to comment on that.
WJR: Can you sum up your overall con-
cerns?
CASEY: There is just too much informa-
tion that hostile countries can get from
the American press. Sometimes by acci-
dent, sometimes because people violate
their obligation, sometimes because re-
porters are assiduous and creative and
put a lot of information together. We
need to get a better control over that
whole process. The way to get better con-
trol is to tighten up within the govern-
ment and have a mutual acceptance of
responsibility between the media and the
government. Many people in the press are
concerned and recognize that they have a
responsibility too. They have as much in-
terest as we do, certainly, in the security
of the country, and the capability of our
intelligence organizations to deal with an
increasingly dangerous and complicated
world. I am encouraged by the willingness
among many in the media to face the
problem, to understand it, to cooperate
and to deal with it. I'm hopeful that will
gradually develop and improve. ?
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INTELLIGENCE AND THE MEDIA
THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE FACED TODAY WITH A MOST SERIOUS
THREAT TO THE NATION'S SECURITY. IT IS REAL, CURRENT AND
GROWING. THERE IS A CONTINUING HEMORRHAGE OF LEAKS OF HIGHLY
SENSITIVE, CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO THE WORLD MEDIA, THE
PUBLICATION OF WHICH HAS CAUSED GREAT DAMAGE TO OUR ABILITY
TO COLLECT INTELLIGENCE CONCERNING THE INTENTIONS, PLANS AND
ACTIVITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES-BE THEY SOVIETS, TERRORISTS
OR DRUG DEALERS. I BELIEVE IT IS VITAL FOR THE PUBLIC TO
UNDERSTAND WHAT IS GOING ON, WHY IT IS HAPPENING, AND WHAT
NEEDS TO BE DONE ABOUT IT.
WE LEARNED THE HARD WAY THAT INTELLIGENCE IS THE NATION'S
FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE FROM THE JAPANESE SURPRISE ATTACK ON
PEARL HARBOR. WE COULD HAVE PROTECTED OUR SHIPS. IF WE LEARN
THAT THE SOVIET UNION OR SOME OTHER ADVERSARY IS PLANNING SUCH
A SURPRISE IN THE FUTURE, WE CAN MOVE TO FORESTALL IT. IF WE
CAN IDENTIFY INFORMATION IDENTIFYING HOSTILE SPIES IN OUR
MIDST STEALING OUR SECRETS, WE CAN NEUTRALIZE THEM. IT IS THE
SAME WITH TERRORISTS, DRUG CZARS, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AND THE OTHER GREAT CHALLENGES THIS NATION IS FACING FROM ABROAD.
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THE NATION'S INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, WHICH I HEAD,
COLLECTS INFORMATION ON SUCH MATTERS THROUGH AGENTS, THROUGH
A VARIETY OF ADVANCED TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS, AND THROUGH THE
COOPERATIVE EFFORTS OF OUR ALLIES. IF THE DETAILS OF HOW WE
COLLECT INTELLIGENCE THROUGH THESE MEANS IS PUBLICIZED OR CAN
BE DEDUCED THROUGH THE INFORMATION THESE SOURCES PROVIDE, THE
AGENTS WILL BE ARRESTED AND PERHAPS EXECUTED, OUR ADVERSARIES
WILL TAKE STEPS TO NEUTRALIZE OUR TECHNICAL COLLECTION
CAPABILITIES, AND OUR ALLIES WILL LOSE CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY
TO PROTECT INFORMATION THEY NOW SHARE AND WILL DENY IT TO US.
LEAKING SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION IS NOTHING
NEW. AS A MATTER OF FACT, ONE OF THE FIRST LEAKERS IN U.S.
HISTORY WAS NONE OTHER THAN THE POPULAR PATRIOT AND WRITER,
THOMAS PAINE. WITHOUT FINANCIAL AND MILITARY ASSISTANCE FROM
FRANCE, GEORGE WASHINGTON'S TINY ARMY, DOWN TO SOME 3,000 MEN
IN 1777, WOULD NOT, A FEW YEARS LATER, HAVE PUSHED THE BRITISH
ARMY, THEN THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE WORLD, OFF THE AMERICAN
CONTINENT. IN PLANNING AND PROVIDING THIS ASSISTANCE, THE
FRENCH TOOK GREAT PAINS TO KEEP IT COVERT. THEY WORRIED THAT
THE BRITISH WOULD HARM FRENCH INTERESTS IF FRENCH AID TO THE
AMERICAN REBELS SHOULD BECOME KNOWN. IN SEEKING THE APPROVAL
OF THE KING TO HELP THE AMERICAN RESISTANCE, THE FRENCH FOREIGN
MINISTER SAID: "IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THIS TRANSACTION NOT BE
DISCOVERED, OR AT LEAST IMPUTED TO THE GOVERNMENT." WHEN
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PAINE WAS FOUND TO HAVE PUBLICLY REVEALED FRANCE'S SECRET AID
TO OUR REVOLUTION, HE WAS DISMISSED FROM HIS JOB AS THE SECRETARY
TO THE COMMITTEE CHARGED WITH FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND WAS PUBLICLY
REBUKED BY A REVOLUTION OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS.
THE VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE AND NEED FOR SECRECY HAS BEEN
RECOGNIZED FROM THE EARLIEST MOMENTS OF OUR REPUBLIC. GEORGE
WASHINGTON PUT IT WELL IN 1777: "THE NECESSITY OF PROCURING
GOOD INTELLIGENCE, IS APPARENT AND NEED NOT BE FURTHER URGED.
ALL THAT REMAINS FOR ME TO ADD IS, THAT YOU KEEP THE WHOLE
MATTER AS SECRET AS POSSIBLE. FOR UPON SECRECY, SUCCESS DEPENDS
IN MOST ENTERPRISES OF THE KIND, AND FOR WANT OF IT, THEY ARE
GENERALLY DEFEATED."
SOME TWO HUNDRED YEARS LATER, WE HAVE LOST THE SENSE OF
URGENCY IN DENYING OUR ADVERSARIES THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE OUR
OWN SENSITIVE INFORMATION AGAINST US. TODAY TERRORIST GROUPS
PREY ON INNOCENT AMERICANS TRAVELING ABROAD AND SEEK WAYS TO
SPREAD THEIR SENSELESS VIOLENCE TO OUR SHORES. THE SOVIET UNION
CONTINUES TO BUILD ITS MILITARY STRENGTH AND THE PROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS INCREASES THE RISK OF AN INTERNATIONAL
CONFLICT THAT MIGHT DESTROY OUR PLANET. ILLEGAL DRUGS ARE
SMUGGLED INTO THE U.S. IN UNPRECEDENTED AMOUNTS.
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OUR COUNTRY HAS INVESTED TIME, EFFORT, AND TALENT OVER
MANY YEARS AND SPENT MANY BILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO DEVELOP
METHODS OF COLLECTING THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO ASSESS MISSILES
AND OTHER WEAPONS AIMED AT US, TO DETERMINE THE INTENTIONS AND
VULNERABILITIES OF OUR ADVERSARIES SO THAT WE CAN DEVELOP
EFFECTIVE DEFENSES AND COUNTERMEASURES, TO PROTECT OUR CITIZENS
AND INSTALLATIONS AROUND THE WORLD FROM TERRORIST ATTACKS,
AND TO ASSIST OUR DIPLOMATS. GOOD INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE
CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY, INCLUDING OUR HOPES OF
EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL AND THE SAFETY AND LIBERTY OF OUR
CITIZENS. SECRECY AND CONFIDENTIALITY AS TO HOW AND THROUGH
WHOM WE COLLECT INFORMATION IS ESSENTIAL TO OUR EFFECTIVENESS.
NOT SO MANY YEARS AGO, TECHNICAL COLLECTION PROGRAMS WERE
PLANNED AND EXECUTED IN SECRECY. THE INTELLIGENCE WE GATHERED
WAS ACCURATE, TIMELY AND HIGHLY RELIABLE. THE COUNTRIES ON
WHICH WE COLLECTED INTELLIGENCE TRIED TO LEARN OF OUR COLLECTION
SYSTEMS AND THEIR CAPABILITIES THROUGH ESPIONAGE OR PAINSTAKING
SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS. TODAY, THROUGH MEDIA REVELATIONS THEY
LEARN OF SYSTEMS THAT ARE STILL ON THE DRAWING BOARDS AND WHICH
WILL NOT BECOME OPERATIONAL FOR SEVERAL YEARS. THEY HAVE
LITERALLY YEARS OF LEAD TIME TO FIND WAYS TO DEFEAT COLLECTION
SYSTEMS COSTING BILLIONS OF DOLLARS ON WHICH WE COUNT TO GUIDE
OUR PLANNING FOR THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NEXT
DECADE OR MORE.
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WE MUST CLASSIFY AND RESTRICT THE CIRCULATION OF INFORMATION
ABOUT HOW AND WHERE WE COLLECT INTELLIGENCE AND OF THE REPORTS
AND ASSESSMENTS BASED ON THAT INTELLIGENCE IF THEY MIGHT REVEAL
OR COMPROMISE OUR SOURCES OR METHODS. THE KGB AND OTHER HOSTILE
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES SPEND BILLIONS OF DOLLARS EACH YEAR IN
AN EFFORT TO ACQUIRE THIS INFORMATION. AND THE UNAUTHORIZED
PUBLICATION OF THIS RESTRICTED INFORMATION HANDS TO OUR
ADVERSARIES ON A SILVER PLATTER INFORMATION THAT THEIR SPIES,
THEIR RESEARCHERS, AND THEIR SATELLITES ARE WORKING 24 HOURS
A DAY TO UNCOVER AND USE AGAINST US.
IN RECENT YEARS, PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION
BY THE MEDIA HAS DESTROYED OR SERIOUSLY DAMAGED INTELLIGENCE
SOURCES OF THE HIGHEST VALUE. EVERY METHOD WE HAVE OF
ACQUIRING INTELLIGENCE -- OUR AGENTS, OUR RELATIONSHIPS WITH
OTHER SECURITY SERVICES, OUR PHOTOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC
CAPABILITIES, THE INFORMATION WE GET FROM COMMUNICATIONS --
HAS BEEN DAMAGED BY THE PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.
STORIES IN BOTH THE PRINT AND ELECTRONIC MEDIA HAVE SHOWN,
SOMETIMES IN GREAT DETAIL, HOW TO COUNTER CAPABILITIES IN
WHICH WE HAVE INVESTED BILLIONS OF DOLLARS AND MANY YEARS OF
CREATIVE TALENT AND EFFORT. THIS, TIME AND TIME AGAIN, HAS
ENABLED THOSE HOSTILE TO US TO ABORT HUGE INVESTMENTS, TO
CONCEAL AND OTHERWISE DENY US INFORMATION CRITICAL TO OUR
DEFENSE, AND TO DEPRIVE US OF THE ABILITY TO PROTECT OUR
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CITIZENS FROM TERRORIST ATTACK. LEAKERS ARE COSTING THE
TAXPAYERS MILLIONS AND EVEN BILLIONS OF DOLLARS -- AND, MORE
IMPORTANT, PUTTING AMERICANS ABROAD AS WELL AS OUR COUNTRY
ITSELF AT RISK.
WE HAVE REACHED THE POINT WHERE WE MUST ADDRESS THE
RISK TO OUR FUNDAMENTAL SECURITY. THE WAY TO BEGIN IS TO
LAY OUT WHAT IS HAPPENING IN AN UNVARNISHED WAY. IT IS
DIFFICULT TO DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC DAMAGE TO THIS NATION'S
ABILITY TO PROTECT ITSELF WITHOUT CONFIRMING THE ACCURACY
OF INFORMATION WHICH HAS BEEN DELIVERED THROUGH THE MEDIA
AND REMOVING ANY DOUBTS THAT MIGHT REMAIN IN THE MINDS OF
THE KGB OR THE TERRORISTS. I CAN SAY THAT SOME OF OUR
SOURCES HAVE NOT BEEN HEARD FROM AFTER THEIR INFORMATION HAS
BEEN PUBLISHED IN THE U.S. PRESS. . OTHERS HAVE DECIDED THAT
COOPERATING WITH US IS TOO RISKY. LEADERS AND INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES OF OUR CLOSEST ALLIES HAVE TOLD US THAT IF WE CAN'T
TIGHTEN UP, THEY WILL HAVE TO PULL BACK ON COOPERATION WITH
US BECAUSE THEY HAVE HAD ENOUGH OF READING THE INFORMATION
THEY PROVIDE IN THE U.S. MEDIA.
WE HAVE LOST THE TECHNICAL CAPABILITY TO MONITOR TERRORIST
PLANS AND ACTIVITIES AGAINST U.S. CITIZENS ABROAD. LET ME
CITE TWO EXAMPLES.
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-- IN 1983, WHILE OUR MARINES WERE GUARDING THE
AIRPORT IN BEIRUT, A JOURNALIST REPORTED THAT U.S. INTELLIGENCE
HAD INTERCEPTED A SERIES OF CABLES SENT FROM TEHRAN TO DAMASCUS
WHICH DISCLOSED USEFUL INFORMATION ON IRANIAN TERRORIST PLANS
IN LEBANON, INCLUDING ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. FORCES
AND INSTALLATIONS IN THAT COUNTRY. WITHIN DAYS OF THIS
REVELATION, THE IRANIANS HAD REACTED TO THIS LEAK AND HAD
DEPRIVED US OF THIS VITAL SOURCE OF INTELLIGENCE.
-- MORE RECENTLY A MAJOR NEWS MAGAZINE, AND THEN
LATER TWO NETWORKS AND SOME LEADING NEWSPAPERS, DIVULGED THAT
WE HAD BEEN ABLE TO READ LIBYAN COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO
THE BOMBING OF THE DISCO IN BERLIN IN WHICH TWO AMERICANS
AND OTHER LOST THEIR LIVES. AS A RESULT, WE QUICKLY LOST A
COUNTERTERRORIST CAPABILITY. WHEN TWO WEEKS LATER THE PRESIDENT
DISCLOSED THE EVIDENCE WE HAD OF LIBYAN COMPLICITY IN THE
BOMBING, THE MEDIA HAD ALREADY BLOWN OUR SOURCE AND THE
PRESIDENT'S STATEMENTS WERE CAREFULLY DRAFTED NOT TO FURTHER
JEOPARDIZE OUR SOURCES OF INFORMATION.
THE TIME HAS COME FOR THIS NATION TO REGAIN CONTROL OF
OUR NATIONAL SECRETS AND TO STOP WASTING THEM IN CHEAP EXPOSES.
WE MUST TIGHTEN DISCIPLINE AMONG U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
WHO USE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. WE MUST DEVELOP COOPERATION
BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE GOVERNMENT ON STORIES WHICH PUT
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS AT RISK. WE MUST ESTABLISH
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THAT RESTRICTIONS ON THE MISUSE OF SENSITIVE AND PROPERLY
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CANNOT BE VIOLATED WITH IMPUNITY. WE
MUST ENFORCE AND PERHAPS TIGHTEN LAWS CONGRESS HAS ENACTED TO
PROTECT CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY OF PREVENTING DAMAGE FROM LEAKS
IS TO INCREASE DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT. THE
INABILITY TO CONTROL SENSITIVE INFORMATION IS DESTRUCTIVE
OF THE MORALE OF PEOPLE WHO DO KEEP SECRETS, AS WELL AS
DAMAGING TO OUR SECURITY. DURING THE LAST SEVERAL YEARS,
THE PRESIDENT HAS EMPHASIZED THE SPECIAL OBLIGATION FEDERAL
WORKERS HAVE TO PROTECT THE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH WHICH
THEY ARE ENTRUSTED. EFFORTS TO UNCOVER THOSE WHO VIOLATE THIS
TRUST NEED TO BE STRENGTHENED. WE MUST DETERMINE WHETHER NEW
LAWS ARE NEEDED TO DEAL WITH FEDERAL EMPLOYEES WHO DECIDE
ON THEIR OWN TO DISCLOSE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
THE GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, MILITARY OFFICER OR CONTRACTOR
EMPLOYEE WHO HAS BEEN CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
IS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING THE SECRETS HE IS GIVEN. THERE IS
NO ROOM FOR DOUBT ABOUT THIS. EACH PERSON WHO IS CLEARED
MUST SIGN A NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT WHICH SPELLS OUT HIS OR
HER RESPONSIBILITIES IN SIGNIFICANT DETAIL. THOSE WHO ARE
APPROVED FOR ACCESS TO SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS ARE
GIVEN DETAILED BRIEFINGS ABOUT THE SENSITIVITIES WHICH MUST BE
PROTECTED AND SIGN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR EACH SUCH PROGRAM.
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WHEN THESE INDIVIDUALS DISCUSS CLASSIFIED INFORMATION WITH
UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS, THERE IS LITTLE LIKELIHOOD THAT THEY
DO NUT UNDERSTAND WHAT THEY ARE DOING. WHEN THEY PROVIDE
COPIES OF CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO PERSONS NOT CLEARED TO
RECEIVE THEM, THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT THEY KNOW THEY
ARE VIOLATING THE TRUST PLACED IN THEM BY THEIR NATION.
STILL, WE HAVE ALLOWED AN ATMOSPHERE TO DEVELOP WHERE MANY
BELIEVE THERE IS LITTLE RISK AND NO PENALTY FOR VIOLATING
THE OBLIGATION TO MAINTAIN THE SECRECY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
IT MAY BE THAT TOO MUCH INFORMATION IS CLASSIFIED.
WE SHOULD WORK TO MAKE SURE THAT THE INFORMATION THAT IS
CLASSIFIED REALLY HAS TO BE CLASSIFIED. WE CAN REDUCE THE
BODY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, BUT THAT CAN'T BE DONE
OVERNIGHT AND WILL TAKE TIME. THE AMOUNT OF CLASSIFIED MATERIAL
THAT EXISTS IS IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THOSE
ENTRUSTED WITH IT MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS. INDIVIDUALS HAVE
ACCESS TO RELATIVELY LIMITED AMOUNTS OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.
FROM THOSE LIMITED AMOUNTS, SOME FEW CLEARED PERSONS DIVULGE
INFORMATION THAT IS SPECIFICALLY OR IN THE AGGREGATE DAMAGING
TO OUR INTELLIGENCE PROGRAMS OR OTHER NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS.
IT WOULD NOT MATTER WHETHER THESE INDIVIDUALS HAD ONE CLASSIFIED
DOCUMENT OR A VAULT FULL OF THEM, THEY WOULD, IF IT SUITED
THEIR PURPOSES, LEAK THEM TO THE PRESS. STILL, IN ACTING
AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES WE SHOULD FOCUS ON REALLY
DAMAGING AND CRITICAL DISCLOSURES.
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WHAT MAKES GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS BETRAY THEIR TRUST BY
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION? SOME DO
IT FOR SELF-SERVING PURPOSES. SOME FIND THAT BY PROVIDING
THE REPORTER WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THEY CAN OBTAIN
FAVORABLE PUBLICITY FOR PROGRAMS THEY FAVOR, GET BAD PRESS
FOR PROGRAMS THEY OPPOSE, MAKE THEMSELVES LOOK GOOD IN THE
MEDIA, OR SETTLE A SCORE WITH AN ADVERSARY.
LEAKING SENSITIVE NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION, USUALLY
ANONYMOUSLY, HAS BECOME A WAY OF LIFE IN BOTH THE EXECUTIVE
AND LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES OF OUR GOVERNMENT. IT IS WORSE NOW
THAN EVER BEFORE IN OUR HISTORY AND THE DAMAGE THE LEAKERS
HAVE DONE IS PROPORTIONATELY GREATER.
THE LEAKERS CAN BE GENERALLY CATEGORIZED AS FOLLOWS:
-- THE POLICY ADVOCATE WHO SEEKS TO INFLUENCE
POLICY OR PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF POLICY BY SELECTIVELY PROVIDING
THE MEDIA WITH INFORMATION THAT HE THINKS SUPPORTS HIS OR HIS
LEADERS' OBJECTIVES.
-- THE OPPOSITIONIST WHO IS OPPOSED TO SOME POLICY
OR ACTIVELY SEEKS TO NEGATE IT BY PUBLICIZING IT AND BY
GAINING ADHERENTS TO HIS POINT OF VIEW THROUGH THE PUBLICITY.
-- THE SELF-PROMOTER WHO SEEKS A GOOD PRESS BY DOING
FAVORS FOR THE MEDIA.
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-- THE EGO-BUILDER WHO ENHANCES HIS SENSE OF SELF-
IMPORTANCE BY SHOWING HE IS "IN THE KNOW" OR A MEMBER OF THE
"INNER CIRCLE."
-- THE REVENGE-SEEKER WHO WANTS TO "GET EVEN" WITH
AN ORGANIZATION OR INDIVIDUAL FOR SOME REAL OR IMAGINED SLIGHT
OR WRONG.
-- THE NAIVE OFFICIAL WHO WANTS TO BE HELPFUL TO A
REPORTER AND "SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT."
WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT, THE EFFORT TO STOP AND PENALIZE THE
UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE HAS BEEN
WEAK AND FRAGMENTED. IT NEEDS TO BE TIGHTENED UP AND SPEEDED
UP, AND PUBLICATION OF UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES SHOULD BE
IDENTIFIED AS THEY APPEAR. INVESTIGATIONS SHOULD BE SWIFT
AND THOROUGH. DISCIPLINARY ACTION SHOULD BE APPROPRIATE TO
THE VIOLATION AND KNOWN TO OTHERS IN ORDER TO DETER THEM FROM
SIMILAR VIOLATIONS, WITTING OR UNWITTING.
LEAKERS ARE ONLY ONE SIDE OF THE EQUATION. THE MEDIA
WHICH ACTIVELY CULTIVATES AND EXPLOITS THEM IS THE OTHER.
WHILE SOME CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IS CONVEYED BY LEAKERS TO
JOURNALISTS THROUGH ANONYMOUS PHONE CALLS AND THE USE OF
INTERMEDIARIES AND THROUGH LEAVING BROWN BAGS OF SENSITIVE
MATERIAL ON JOURNALISTS' DOORSTEPS, REPORTERS ALSO AGGRESSIVELY
SEEK OUT THOSE WHO WILL PROVIDE CLASSIFIED INFORMATION THEY
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CAN PUBLISH OR BROADCAST. THE MEDIA HAS RESPUNSIBILITIES, TOO,
AND MANY IN THE MEDIA RECOGNIZE THAT THEY MUST EXERCISE CARE
TO AVOID DAMAGING OUR NATIONAL SECURITY OR THE LIVES OF
INNOCENT PEOPLE. THE TASK IS TO STRIKE A VERY DELICATE AND
DIFFICULT BALANCE BETWEEN THIS OBLIGATION AND THE OBLIGATION
OF THE MEDIA TO PROVIDE THE PUBLIC THE INFORMATION IT NEEDS
FOR SELF-GOVERNMENT. THE DEDICATION AND INGENUITY WITH WHICH
THE MEDIA AND JOURNALISTS MEET THAT COMMITMENT IS TO BE CHERISHED,
ADMIRED AND SUPPORTED. THE MEDIA MUST RECOGNIZE THAT ONCE THE
INFORMATION IS PUBLISHED OR BROADCAST, IT IS IN THE HANDS OF
OUR ADVERSARIES, AND THE DAMAGE IS DONE. FORMER PRESIDENT
HARRY TRUMAN PUT IT WELL IN A 1951 PRESS CONFERENCE:
"WHETHER IT BE TREASON OR NOT, IT DOES THE U.S.
JUST AS MUCH HARM FOR THOSE MILITARY (AND
NATIONAL SECURITY) SECRETS TO BE MADE KNOWN TO
POTENTIAL ENEMIES THROUGH OPEN PUBLICATION AS
IT DOES FOR MILITARY (AND NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE)
SECRETS TO BE GIVEN TO AN ENEMY THROUGH THE
CLANDESTINE OPERATION OF SPIES."
HOW TO DRAW THIS VERY DELICATE AND DIFFICULT BALANCE?
I THINK MRS. KATHARINE GRAHAM GOT IT RIGHT IN A VERY THOUGHTFUL
AND CONSTRUCTIVE SPEECH SHE MADE ON TERRORISM AND THE MEDIA
AT THE GUILDHALL IN LONDON LAST DECEMBER.
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-"E TOLD HOW A TELEVISION NETWORK AND A COLUMNIST HAD
OBTAINED INFORMATION THAT WE WERE READING THE MESSAGES OF
PEOPLE ARRANGING THE BOMBING OF THE U.S. EMBASSY IN BEIRUT.
SHORTLY AFTER THIS PUBLIC DISCLOSURE, THAT TRAFFIC STOPPED.
THIS UNDERMINED OUR EFFORTS TO CAPTURE THE TERRORIST LEADERS
AND ELIMINATED A SOURCE OF INFORMATION ABOUT FUTURE ATTACKS.
MRS. GRAHAM WENT ON TO SAY: "THIS KIND OF RESULT, ALBEIT
UNINTENTIONAL, POINTS UP THE NECESSITY FOR FULL COOPERATION
WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES.
WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE
ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND
WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT. AND WHILE RESERVING THE RIGHT TO MAKE
THE FINAL DECISION OURSELVES, WE ARE ANXIOUS TO LISTEN TO
ARGUMENTS ABOUT WHY INFORMATION SHOULD NOT BE AIRED. [THE
MEDIA] WANT TO DO NOTHING THAT WOULD ENDANGER HUMAN LIFE OR
NATIONAL SECURITY. WE ARE WILLING TO COOPERATE WITH THE
AUTHORITIES IN WITHHOLDING INFORMATION THAT COULD HAVE THOSE
CONSEQUENCES."
I SUBMIT THESE PRINCIPLES APPLY WITH THE SAME FORCE TO
COSTLY INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES AS THEY DO TO TARGETS THREATENED
BY TERRORISM.
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I HAVE WITNESSED ADMIRABLE RESTRAINT AND JUDGMENT BY
JOURNALISTS. I HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED BY THE READINESS OF MANY
OF YOU TO CAREFULLY CONSIDER SOMETIMES WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION
OF INFORMATION WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR
TO TREAT OR PRESENT A STORY IN A MANNER WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC
NEED, YET MINIMIZES POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES.
THE TRICK IS TO RECOGNIZE THE POTENTIAL FOR DAMAGE AND TO
CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
ALWAYS SHOULD BE READY AND AVAILABLE ON SHORT NOTICE TO HELP
ON THAT.
IT IS CLEAR THAT ALL REPORTERS DON'T JUST WAIT FOR
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO COME THEIR WAY. SOME OF THEM
ACTIVELY SEEK IT, DEVELOPING SOURCES JUST AS A CIA OR KGB
OFFICER WOULD-DETERMINE WHO KNOWS THE INFORMATION YOU WANT,
BECOME ACQUAINTED WITH THE SOURCE, FIND OUT WHAT MOTIVATES
THE SOURCE AND LET IT BE KNOWN THAT YOU CAN BE HELPFUL (IN
EXCHANGE FOR THE SOURCE'S COOPERATION, OF COURSE). OFTEN
THE SOURCE FINDS THAT BY PROVIDING HIS FRIEND THE REPORTER
WITH CLASSIFIED INFORMATION HE CAN OBTAIN FAVORABLE PUBLICITY
FOR PROGRAMS HE FAVORS, GET BAD PRESS FOR PROGRAMS HE OPPOSES,
MAKE HIMSELF LOOK GOOD IN THE MEDIA, SETTLE A SCORE WITH AN
ADVERSARY, OR SIMPLY BASK IN THE REFLECTED GLORY OF THE MEDIA
STAR WITH WHOM HE'S COOPERATING. OF ALL THE TYPES OF LEAKS
ON THE WASHINGTON SCENE (POLICY LEAKS, TRIAL BALLOON LEAKS,
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ANIMUS LEAKS, GOODWILL LEAKS, ETC.) THE EGO LEAK PROBABLY IS
THE MOST PREVALENT. IN WASHINGTON, KNOWLEDGE IS POWER, BUT
NOBODY KNOWS HOW POWERFUL YOU ARE UNLESS YOU TELL HOW MUCH
YOU KNOW.
BY PLAYING UP TO THOSE WHO HAVE A NEED FOR THIS KIND OF
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PRESS, JOURNALISTS PANDER TO PEOPLE
WHOSE ACTIONS ARE SOMETIMES FAR MORE DAMAGING THAN WASTE,
FRAUD AND CORRUPTION. IN THE THOUSANDS OF COLUMN INCHES DEVOTED
TO EDITORIALS CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT ABUSES AND INEFFICIENCIES,
ONLY A FEW HAVE EVER CALLED TO TASK THOSE WHO BETRAY CLASSIFIED
INFORMATION TO THE MEDIA. THERE IS A DOUBLE STANDARD AT WORK
HERE, WHICH SAYS A VIOLATION OF TRUST THAT BENEFITS THE MEDIA
IS NOT AS SERIOUS AS ONE WHICH DOES NOT.
FREQUENTLY, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS ARE DUPED INTO REVEALING
INFORMATION THAT THEY WOULD NEVER DREAM OF DIVULGING TO A
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER. FORMER WASHINGTON POST REPORTER
SCOTT ARMSTRONG HAS SAID THAT THE "VAST MAJORITY OF THE
INFORMATION THAT MAKES ITS WAY TO THE NEWSPAPER...COMES FROM
MULTIPLE SOURCES...FROM CAREER BUREAUCRATS. IT COMES FROM
THOSE PEOPLE WHO THEMSELVES WOULD NOT INITIATE A STORY OR
A LEAK BUT WHO WILL, WHEN FACED WITH A SIGNIFICANT DISCLOSURE...
CORRECT THE INFORMATION...WILL SAY 'THAT'S REALLY NOT QUITE
RIGHT. IT REALLY HAPPENED THIS WAY.'"
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-wE MEDIA MUST ALSO ACCEPT THAT THE GOVERNMENT AS AN
INSTITUTION HAS A RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SECURITY OF THIS
NATION. IT CANNOT PRESS THE GOVERNMENT TO RELEASE AS MUCH
INFORMATION AS POSSIBLE AND EVEN ENCOURAGE LEAKERS AND THEN
ABSOLVE ITSELF WHEN INTELLIGENCE SOURCES ARE DAMAGED, U.S.
DIPLOMACY IS HAMSTRUNG, OR THE LIVES OF INNOCENT U.S. CITIZENS
LOST. IT CANNOT CRY THAT LEAKERS ARE THE ONES WHO SHOULD BE
PROSECUTED, THEN LAMENT THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS THREATENED
WHEN WE TAKE ACTION TO INHIBIT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE LEAKERS.
THE PRESS CANNOT HAVE IT BOTH WAYS.
EVEN WITH THE STRICTEST DISCIPLINE INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT
SOME WILL STILL VIOLATE THEIR TRUST AND INATTENTION OR
CARELESSNESS WILL RESULT IN THE DISCLOSURE OF DAMAGING
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. THE GOVERNMENT AND THE MEDIA MUST
WORK TOGETHER TO ENSURE THAT SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS ARE NOT PUBLISHED. AT THE VERY LEAST, THE MEDIA
SHOULD CEASE SEEKING SECRETS AS AN END IN ITSELF OR AS A
SUBSTITUTE FOR DISCOVERING WRONGDOING AND SHOULD EXERCISE
CAREFUL JUDGMENT IN PRINTING LEAKED INFORMATION.
I HAVE OVER THE PAST FEW MONTHS IN SPEECHES AND INTERVIEWS
APPEALED FOR COOPERATION AND HAVE BEEN GRATIFIED THAT MANY
JOURNALISTS TAKE MY PLEA SERIOUSLY. I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE
POST OWNER KATHARINE GRAHAM'S CALL FOR "FULL COOPERATION
WHEREVER POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE MEDIA AND THE AUTHORITIES."
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WHEN THE MEDIA OBTAINS ESPECIALLY SENSITIVE INFORMATION, WE
ARE WILLING TO TELL THE AUTHORITIES WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND
WHAT WE PLAN TO REPORT."
A GOOD MANY REPORTERS AND EDITORS HAVE BEEN WILLING TO
CAREFULLY CONSIDER WITHHOLDING PUBLICATION OF INFORMATION
WHICH COULD JEOPARDIZE NATIONAL INTERESTS OR TO PRESENT A
STORY IN A WAY WHICH MEETS THE PUBLIC NEED, YET MINIMIZES
POTENTIAL DAMAGE AND TO CONSULT ON HOW IT MIGHT BE MINIMIZED.
GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN SHOULD ALWAYS BE READY AND AVAILABLE ON
SHORT NOTICE TO HELP ON THAT.
SOME JOURNALISTS DON'T UNDERSTAND, DON'T CARE, OR TURN
THEIR HEADS ABOUT THE DAMAGE THEIR STORIES MAY INFLICT ON OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY. MAJOR NEWS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE FORMED TEAMS
OF REPORTERS INTO "INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS" FOR THE PURPOSE OF
ACQUIRING SENSITIVE DATA. THIS PROCESS HAS NOTHING AT ALL TO
DO WITH FRAUD OR ABUSE OR ILLEGALITIES OR IMPROPRIETIES OF
SOME TYPE. THE OBJECTIVE IS THE ACQUISITION AND PUBLICATION
OF SECRET DATA FOR COMPETITIVE AND PERSONAL ADVANTAGE. ONE
PRESTIGIOUS NEWSPAPER RECENTLY ESTABLISHED AN "INVESTIGATIVE
GROUP" TO COLLECT AND PUBLISH INFORMATION ON NATIONAL SECURITY
BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN EMBARRASSED BY ANOTHER NEWSPAPER'S INVES-
TIGATIVE UNIT WHICH KEPT COMING UP WITH SCOOPS.
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THIS CREATES A SPECIAL PROBLEM FOR THOSE OF US CHARGED
WITH PROTECTING SENSITIVE INFORMATION. WE ARE PREPARED TO
DISCUSS OUR POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SOMETIMES ON THE RECORD,
MORE OFTEN ON BACKGROUND, ALWAYS EXCLUDING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION,
SOMETIMES INSISTING ON THE RIGHT OF APPROVAL OF QUOTATIONS OR
PRE-PUBLICATION REVIEW TO ASSURE THAT NO SENSITIVE DISCLOSURES
CAPABLE OF JEOPARDIZING SOURCES HAVE INADVERTENTLY BEEN MADE.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE INVESTIGATIVE TEAM SWEEPING THROUGH POLICY
AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES HAS REQUIRED GREATER CAUTION. WE
FIND SOME REPORTERS USING BACKGROUND DISCUSSIONS ON POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES BEING USED TO FALSELY CLAIM OR IMPLY TO OTHER
POTENTIAL SOURCES THAT IT IS ALL RIGHT TO DISCUSS SENSITIVE
MATTERS BECAUSE SOMEONE ELSE HAS ALREADY OPENED THE DOOR.
STILL, WE ARE READY TO CONSIDER SPECIFIC QUESTIONS OR POINTS
IN AN EFFORT TO HELP, TO THE EXTENT WE CAN, AVOID ERROR OR
DAMAGE.
MANY TRICKS OF THE TRADE ARE USED IN ELICITING SENSITIVE
INFORMATION. CAREER GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS WHO WOULD NOT DREAM
OF DIVULGING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION TO A FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OR DELIBERATELY INITIATE A LEAK SOMETIMES WILL FALL
PREY TO A REPORTER WHO MAY SUGGEST TRUTHFULLY OR FALSELY THAT
HE IS WORKING ON A BOOK, ARTICLE OR BROADCAST ABOUT SOME
INCIDENT OR PROGRAM. WHEN THE REPORTER SUGGESTS THAT HE JUST
WISHES TO HAVE THE BACKGROUND TO BETTER "UNDERSTAND" WHAT IS
HAPPENING, IN THE SPIRIT OF MISGUIDED HELPFULNESS THE OFFICIAL
WILL RESPOND WITH VERY SENSITIVE INFORMATION.
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REPORTERS ALSO MAY SUGGEST THAT THEY HAVE "THE STORY" OR
A PART OF IT FROM OTHER SOURCES AND ARE MERELY SEEKING
CONFIRMATION OR A MORE AUTHORITATIVE VERSION. BELIEVING THIS,
THE OFFICIAL RESPONDS WITH DATA THE REPORTER DID NOT KNOW AND
TO WHICH HE IS NOT ENTITLED.
JOURNALISTS ALSO 'FLOAT" INTERESTING AND INTENTIONALLY
FALSE STORIES SO THAT OFFICIALS WILL RISE TO THE BAIT AND
RESPOND, "NO, IT IS NOT THAT WAY. LET ME TELL YOU WHAT THE
SITUATION REALLY IS."
CITING ALLEGED APPROVAL FROM THE TARGET OFFICIAL'S
SUPERIOR TO DISCUSS CLASSIFIED SUBJECTS OR TO OBTAIN A "FEW
FACTS," THE REPORTER MAY GAIN FROM THE MISLEAD OFFICIALS WHAT
HE WANTS. OTHER NEWSMEN ATTEMPT TO HIDE THEIR JOURNALIST
AFFILIATION AND REFER TO THEMSELVES AS RESEARCHERS OR AUTHORS
COLLECTING INFORMATION.
PRESSURE TO COME UP WITH SENSATIONAL STORIES HAS LED TO
UNQUESTIONINGLY ACCEPTING THE OUTRAGEOUS CLAIMS OF THOSE WHO
SEEK TO EXPLOIT THE SECRECY OF INTELLIGENCE TO COVER THEIR
OWN ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES. ABC IN 1984 PROFILED HAWAII CON MAN
RONALD REWALD--THEN UNDER A 100-COUNT INDICTMENT FOR FRAUD
AND PERJURY--GIVING CREDENCE TO HIS FALSE CLAIMS THAT HE WAS
COMMITTING ILLEGAL ACTS FOR THE CIA AND TO ANOTHER MAN WHO
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CLAIMED HE HAD BEEN HIRED BY THE CIA TO KILL REWALD. THE STORY
WAS SENSATIONAL BUT ABSOLUTELY FALSE AND A DISSERVICE TO U.S.
CITIZENS WHO ARE NOT AWARE OF THE LAWS AND CONTROLS GOVERNING
THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICES.
THE TEMPTATION TO GO BEYOND THE FACTS AND PIECE TOGETHER
AND STRETCH FRAGMENTS OF INFORMATION IN ORDER TO MAKE A
PUBLISHABLE STORY AND SOMETIMES IN ORDER TO SENSATIONALIZE
IS A DANGEROUS THING. IT CAN AND HAS COST LIVES. IT CAN
WRONGLY IMPAIR REPUTATIONS AND DISRUPT RELATIONSHIPS CRITICAL
TO OUR NATIONAL INTEREST. LET ME ILLUSTRATE WITH A TRUE STORY.
DURING 1985, A WELL-KNOWN REPORTER CALLED THE INFORMATION
OFFICER AT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY AND TOLD HIM HE HAD
A STORY THAT WE HAD HELPED THE SECURITY SERVICE OF A FRIENDLY
NATION STAGE A CAR BOMBING OF THE HEADQUARTERS OF A TERRORIST
ORGANIZATION WHICH HAD RESULTED IN DEATH OR INJURY TO A LARGE
NUMBER OF RESIDENTS AND PASSERS-BY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD. OUR
OFFICER TOLD THE REPORTER THAT HIS INFORMATION WAS INCORRECT
AND THAT THE CIA HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF AND NO INVOLVEMENT, DIRECT
OR INDIRECT, IN THE ATTACK. HE WAS ALSO TOLD THAT IF HE CHARGED
U.S. INVOLVEMENT, HE MIGHT WIND UP WITH BLOOD ON HIS HANDS.
THE STORY WAS RUN IN HIS NEWSPAPER. IT GOT AROUND THE WORLD
AND CREATED A FALSE IMPRESSION OF U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE BOMBING.
THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATED
THE MATTER AND CONCLUDED THAT "NO COMPLICITY OF DIRECT OR INDIRECT
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"KIVOLVEMENT CAN BE ESTABLISHED WITH RESPECT TO THE MARCH 8
BOMBING IN BEIRUT." BUT THIS CAME TOO LATE! A MONTH AFTER
THE MISLEADING STORY WAS PUBLISHED TO THE WORLD, TERRORISTS
HIJACKED A TWA PLANE AND ITS 153 PASSENGERS AND TOOK THEM TO
BEIRUT. WHEN THE HIJACKERS SHUT AND KILLED AN AMERICAN
SERVICEMAN, THEY CLAIMED IT TO BE IN RETALIATION FOR THE
BOMBING IN BEIRUT IN WHICH THE REPORTER HAD INVOLVED THE CIA
AFTER THE CIA'S SPOKESMAN HAD DENIED TO HIM ANY INVOLVEMENT,
DIRECT OR INDIRECT, IN THE BOMBING.
IN PUTTING THIS STORY TOGETHER, THE REPORTERS HAD TALKS
WITH OFFICIALS IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND MEMBERS AND STAFFERS
OF THE CONGRESS ABOUT COLLATERAL MATTERS INCLUDING OUR LONG-TERM
PRACTICE OF PROVIDING TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO THE
SECURITY SERVICES OF OTHER COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO IMPROVE OUR
CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION ON COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND COUNTER-
TERRORISM. THIS KIND OF ASSISTANCE GOES BACK MANY YEARS. WE
ARE DOING MORE OF THIS TO COPE WITH TODAY'S INTENSIFIED TERRORIST
THREAT. THIS DOES NOT MAKE US RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONSEQUENCES
OF LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
THIS IS A TRAGIC STORY. THERE IS ENOUGH BLAME FOR EVERYONE
INVOLVED TO SHARE. GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS TALKED MORE THAN THE
RULES PERMIT ON CLASSIFIED MATTERS. THE REPORTERS IGNORED
ACCURATE INFORMATION WITH WHICH THEY WERE CAREFULLY, CLEARLY,
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AND HONESTLY PROVIDED. THEY STRETCHED THE IMPLICATIONS OF
SCRAPS OF INFORMATION THEY GATHERED. WE AT THE CIA EITHER
DID NOT HAVE TIME OR WERE NOT FAST ENOUGH IN BRINGING THE
MATTER TO THE ATTENTION OF MANAGEMENT AT THE NEWSPAPER.
WE ALL MUST DO BETTER. THIS IS A DANGEROUS AND
UNPREDICTABLE WORLD IN WHICH ALL OF US MUST MOVE WITH
CAUTION AND RESPONSIBILITY. CERTAINLY ANY RESPONSIBLE PERSON
WOULD WANT TO EXERCISE SPECIAL CARE TO AVOID SETTING IN MOTION
THIS KIND OF SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.
BEN BRADLEE, IN AN OP-ED PIECE IN THE WASHINGTON POST
OF 8 JUNE 1986 SAID: "WE DO CONSULT WITH THE GOVERNMENT
REGULARLY ABOUT SENSITIVE STORIES AND WE DO WITHHOLD STORIES
FOR NATIONAL SECURITY REASONS, FAR MORE THAN THE PUBLIC MIGHT
THINK. THE POST HAS WITHHELD INFORMATION FROM MORE THAN A
DOZEN STORIES SO FAR THIS YEAR FOR THESE REASONS." HE THEN
WENT ON TO SAY: "WE DON'T ALLOW THE GOVERNMENT--OR ANYONE ELSE--
TO DECIDE WHAT WE SHOULD PRINT. THAT IS OUR JOB."
HE'S RIGHT. IT'S THE PUBLISHER'S RIGHT TO DETERMINE WHAT
TO PRINT. NO ONE CAN TELL HIM WHAT HE MUST PRINT. BUT THE
MEDIA, LIKE EVERYBODY ELSE, MUST ADHERE TO THE LAW AND CONGRESS
HAS SPECIFIED INFORMATION WHICH MAY NOT BE PUBLISHED.
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THE MEDIA OFTEN CITES THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION
AND "THE PUBLIC'S RIGHT TO KNOW" TO MAKE THE POINT THAT THERE
SHOULD BE NO RESTRAINT ON WHAT THE MEDIA CAN PRINT OR BROADCAST
AND THAT IT SHOULD BE THE SOLE JUDGE OF WHAT SHOULD OR SHOULD
NOT BE PRINTED ON NATIONAL SECURITY MATTERS. MOST OF US KNOW
THE FIRST AMENDMENT STATES ONLY THAT CONGRESS SHALL MAKE NO
LAW ABRIDGING FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND, AS THE LATE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE POTTER STEWART COMMENTED A FEW YEARS AGO, NOWHERE
IN THE CONSTITUTION CAN ONE FIND ANYTHING ABOUT "THE PEOPLE'S
RIGHT TO KNOW."
THE SUPREME COURT HAS CONSISTENTLY VIEWED FIRST AMENDMENT
ISSUES DIFFERENTLY WHEN THEY ARE IN THE CONTEXT OF NATIONAL
SECURITY RATHER THAN WHEN THEY ARE IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OR OTHER
DOMESTIC SETTINGS. IT HAS ALSO ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONSTITUTION'S
EMPHASIS ON THE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT IN THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ARENA, PARTICULARLY WHEN INTELLIGENCE EQUITIES ARE INVOLVED.
IN THE LANDMARK FIRST AMENDMENT CASE, NEAR V. MINNESOTA,
THE SUPREME COURT IN 1931 STRUCK DOWN A STATE LAW PROSCRIBING
PUBLICATION OF DEFAMATORY NEWSPAPERS, BUT TOOK GREAT CARE TO
MAKE CLEAR THAT THE FIRST AMENDMENT WAS NOT ABSOLUTE AND THAT
"THE PROTECTION EVEN AS TO PREVIOUS RESTRAINT IS NOT ABSOLUTELY
UNLIMITED."
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THE COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE STATUTE WAS PASSED
SHORTLY AFTER WORLD WAR II TO PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS INTEL-
LIGENCE OPERATIONS OR DIRECT INFORMATION ABOUT U.S. CODES
AND CIPHERS FROM BEING "KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY" PUBLISHED
OR IN ANY OTHER WAY MADE AVAILABLE TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON.
CONGRESS CAREFULLY LIMITED THE APPLICATION OF THIS PROHIBITION
TO INFORMATION ABOUT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE WHICH IT
CALLED "A SMALL DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER, A CATEGORY
WHICH IS BOTH VITAL AND VULNERABLE TO ALMOST A UNIQUE DEGREE."
THEY CLEARLY REGARDED COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE AS ONE OF
OUR BEST CHANCES TO LEARN ABOUT THE OTHER NATION'S MILITARY
PLANS AND WARNINGS OF MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST US. IT WOULD
BE DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY CONTINUED FAILURE TO USE A STATUTE
PUT ON THE BOOKS TO PROTECT COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE.
JUSTICE BYRON WHITE WROTE IN HIS CONCURRING OPINION ON
THE CONTROVERSIAL PENTAGON PAPERS CASE IN 1971 THAT THE STATUTE
"IN PRECISE LANGUAGE, PROSCRIBES KNOWING AND WILLFUL PUBLICATTON
OF ANY CLASSIFIED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SYSTEMS OR COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OF THE UNITED
STATES AS WELL AS ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM COMMUNICATION
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS...NEWSPAPERS ARE PRESUMABLY NOW ON
FULL NOTICE OF THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES AND MUST FACE
THE CONSEQUENCES IF THEY PUBLISH."
214
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OUR LEGAL SYSTEM HAS CLEARLY RECOGNIZED THAT WITHOUT THE
SECRECY NEEDED TO MAINTAIN OUR NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, WE MAY
NOT HAVE FREEDOM OF SPEECH OR THE OTHER FREEDOMS WE ALL ENJOY.
THE COURT WROTE IN 1963 IN KENNEDY V. MENDOZA-MARTINEZ THAT
"WHILE THE CONSTITUTION PROTECTS AGAINST INVASION OF INDIVIDUAL
RIGHTS, IT IS NOT A SUICIDE PACT." WE CAN HAVE BOTH A FREE
PRESS AND NATIONAL SECURITY, BUT WITHOUT NATIONAL SECURITY
WE WILL LOSE OUR FREEDOM.
25
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PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Mr. John Seigenthaler
Editor, Editorial Page
USA TODAY
1000 Wilson Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22209
Dear Mr. Seigenthaler:
WASHINGTON. 0. C. 20505
21 April 1986
USA TODAY's 11 April editorial "Too Many Secrets Are Real
Security Risk" is disappointing. It dismisses the President and
Director Casey's concerns that the disclosure and publication of
sensitive information seriously damages the nation's ability to
protect its citizens. It also blithely insists that only
information provided by this country's traitors to the nation's
adversaries is harmful, while the sensitive U.S. national security
information the KGB and its cohorts read in the U.S. press is
considered to be not damaging. Curious reasoning indeed: The
problem is as President Truman put it in a 1951 press conference:
"Whether it be treason or not, it does the U.S. just as much harm
for those military (and national intelligence) secrets to be made
known to potential enemies' through open publication as it does for
military (and national intelligence) secrets to be given to an enemy
through the clandestine operation of spies."
Make no mistake about it, intelligence comes from real people
around the world who risk their lives to provide information of
benefit to the U.S. and the free world. Intelligence also comes
from our allies and from sophisticated technical systems that cost
billions of dollars to develop and maintain. Director Casey is
charged by law with protecting the identities of these people, the
information our allies provide, and the capabilities of our
sensitive and expensive technical systems. In most cases that means
that the information provided by these sources must be classified,
since its publication will enable our adversaries to identify and
destroy these assets. In rare instances when source-identifying
data can be eliminated or the President deems that it is in the
national security interest, intelligence can be officially released
and published.
It is unfortunate that USA TODAY cannot differentiate between
the very serious damage done to the nation's security through the
publication of leaked sensitive intelligence and the need for the
American public to possess as much information as possible to make
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Mr. John Seigenthaler
-2- 21 April 1986
informed judgments about the conduct of the government's business.
Both concerns are real, different, but clearly not mutually
exclusive. There can be freedom of the press and a sensitivity by
the press to the need to protect military, diplomatic and
intelligence activities that defend this nation. The nation can have
both freedom and security, but without security it will have no
freedom.
While it is obviously desirable for the press to seek out,
publish and criticize malfeasance or nonfeasance on the part of
individuals or government entities, it is injurious to the nation's
interest for the press to attempt deliberately to ferret out and
expose the sources and methods used in intelligence collection. It
is equally damaging to publish such information provided by leakers
without attempting to determine the degree of damage that will result
from such exposure.
USA TODAY and many of the press put the blame for the hemorrhage
of secrets on the leakers, but the press itself caters to such
leakers, encourages their purposes and then absolves itself from the
damage that results to the nation's security from its actions. In
short, the press often carelessly tosses about the verbal hand
grenades that a leaker hands it. When they explode, killing people
and inflicting great damage, the press shrugs and says in effect,
well, it's a free country. It seems to those of us in the U.S.
national security agencies who are endeavoring to protect this
nation's security and thereby its freedoms, including the very
freedom the press enjoys, that the press cannot have it both ways.
The press is outraged when hostile spies are uncovered in the U.S.,
but happily conveys equally harmful information to our adversaries by
printing very damaging leaks. Why aren't the leakers who have
betrayed our government's trust condemned by the press at least to
the same extent that it chastizes those who spend thousands of
dollars for costly aircraft toilet seats? It seems to us there is a
good deal of media hypocrisy in all this.
Director Casey asked that the press of this nation work with CIA
and the other national security organizations in protecting this
nation's legitimate secrets. Some organizations and individual
journalists already do. I strongly encourage the other members of
the press to do so too. After all, CIA protects this nation,
including all of you in the press. By damaging our capabilities you
damage yourself. Let us work together as much as we can for the good
of our country.
Sincerely,
George V. Lauder
Director, Public Affairs
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B6- 1575
12 April 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Public Affairs
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Leaks
1. I ran into Kay Graham at dinner last night. She thought
our presentation on leaks went very well with the editors. She
pointed out that Simons and I were really talking about different
things, he about tearing down secrecy which covers up corruption
and mismanagement and I about secrecy to protect lives and vital
interests. In the discussion,that wasn't brought out as clearly
as it might have been. The two of us talked past each other.
2. In this editorial in USA TODAY they decry overclassification
in which there is probably room for improvement. They also again try
to turn the whole issue on being entitled "to know what our federal
government is doing just as we deserve to know how much the school
board will pay teachers or whether the city council will raise taxes."
That's true, but has nothing to do with protecting lives and national
interests.
3. It seems to me we should get a coherent response drafted
and use it to respond to editorial comment like this.
William J. Casey
Attachment:
Page 10A, 11 April 1986 USA TODAY
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ARTICLE APPEAREDA
ON FACE
USA TODAY
11 April 1986
OPINION
The Debate:
THE USA'S SECRETS
Today's debate includes our opinion that too many secrets
and spies, not leaks or aggressive reporting, are the real
threat to our national security, an opposing view from
Rhode Island, other views from Illinois, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia, and voices from across the USA.
Too many secrets
are real security risk
"The White House," President Reagan says, "is the leaki-
est place I've ever been in."
The president wasn't talking about the White House roof.
In his speech to newspaper editors this week, he deplored a
leak most editors love ? the disclosure of information. He
said it's such a serious problem that planning for U.S. opera-
tions off Libya was limited to a "few people."
CIA Director William Casey went further. He said the
publication of secrets has destroyed intelligence sources
and cost taxpayers "millions and even billions of dollars."
Leaks are nothing new. After all, George Washington
leaked the news that the British would surrender at York-
town to a Philadelphia newspaper.
Today, it's no secret that our government keeps far too
many secrets. There are nearly 20 million government re-
cords that are classified, and 4 million government employ-
ees have clearances to see classified information.
It's ludicrous to think 40 people can keep a secret. How
can 4 million? If they were seeing it for the first time, some
bureaucrats would classiiy the Constitution.
Consider some of the "secrets" the media have reported
through the years:
? A report that the space shuttle carried a spy satellite.
The Pentagon complained about the leak, but an Air Force
official said later little was reported that was not already
public information.
IN The Watergate scandal. Without leaks, the public
would never have known the extent of White House involve-
ment in the burglary and the subsequent cover-up.
? The publication of the Pentagon Papers. The govern-
ment claimed printing the leaked details of how we got into
the Vietnam War would endanger U.S. lives. Courts dis-
agreed, and the knowledge we gained may have saved lives
later.
Instead of harming us, most disclosures help us better un-
derstand what government is up to. We are entitled to know
what our federal government is doing, just as we deserve to
know how much the school board will pay teachers or
whether the city council will raise taxes.
There are those who cry that journalists are unpatriotic.
They claim reporters Would sacrifice national security for a
hot story. That's nonsense. Journalists frequently withhold
sensitive information if it would be dangerous or irresponsi-
ble to reveal it. Even CIA Director Casey admits that.
The real disclosures that have damaged our national se-
curity have not come from the media. No, those disclosures
came from quislings and traitors ? the Johnny Walkers
and the other spies ? who sold secrets to the Soviets.
Sure, sometimes leaks embarrass public servants. And
they've caused a bureaucratic flap or two. Because we live
In freedom, not under the thumb of a totalitarian state, our
democracy is massy. And to a great degree, our freedom
depends on how much we know about our government.
Yes, the White House leaks. But it would be a mistake to
fix it.
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kiZrtio
4.r. ?AGE NATIONAL JOURNAL
12 July 1986
Muzzling the Media
The Administration's attempts to reduce the flow &Information in the name of
national security raises fundamental questions about the role of a free press.
game and indicated a shift by the Admin-
istration" in the zealousness with which it
pursues government employees and jour-
nalists who disclose unauthorized con-
fidential material.
"This Administration is possibly the
most restrictive in recent memory in
terms of the free dissemination of in-
formation," said Jane E. Kirtley, execu-
tive director of he Reporters Committee
for Freedom of the Press.
She said the committee has compiled a
list of 73 actions the Administration has
taken that have had a "serious impact"
on freedom of the press, "ranging from
efforts to eviscerate the Freedom of In-
formation Act to Casey's threats to prose-
cute news organizations?and that's only
the stuff we know about, contrasted to
what we don't know."
Others, however take a more tem-
pered view. Former CIA director Wil-
liam E. Colby said: "All Administrations
go through the agony of this problem:
President Kennedy did. and I imagine
George Washington did.... Casey is sim-
ply trying to get people to pull up their
socks by pointing out there are laws in
this area and that these laws are very
clear. He has a legal obligation to call
attertsion to possible violations."
Casey, who enjoys a comfortable per-
sonal relationship with Reagan and is
generally recognized to be the most politi-
cally oriented of
recent CIA direc-
tors, has publicly
asserted that the
American press
fails to fully com-
prehend and ap-
preciate the need
to protect U.S.
I ntelligence From the beginning, the Administra-
sources, capabili- lion has consistently taken measures to
ties and methods. regulate the flow of government informa-
(See box. p. 1718.)
tion. These included steps to:
"I am trying to ? prohibit an unspecified number of writ-
correct that situs- ers, artists and political figures, including
tion," he declared prominent Canadian nature writer Farley
in an interview in Mowat and the widow of 'tomer Chilean
the July Washing- president Salvador Allende, from enter-
ton Journalism ing the United States under the 1952
Review. "All of us McCarran-Walter Act because of their
in the intelligence views and associations.
community have ? require all government employees and
an obligation to contractors who have or seek high-level
sensitize the peo-
ple. in the media to this problem.
BY DOM BONAFEDE
ne of the singular anomalies of the
contemporary political scene is that
Ronald Reagan. universally hailed as the
"Great Communicator." presides over an
Administration that from all appearances
is intent on stemming the free flow of
information and muzzling the national
news media.
Interested observers. including con-
stitutional lawyers, scholars, prominent
journalists and public-interest advocates,
widely agree that the Reagan Adminis-
tration, generally under the cloak of na-
tional security, has taken an unprecedent-
edly narrow view of 1st Amendment
rights involving free speech and an unfet-
tered press.
Floyd Abrams. a noted 1st Amendment
expert and a partner in the New York law
ritt of Cahill Gordon & Reindel,
tained that during the past three years, the
Administration has
taken "a more di-
rect, vocal and far
more visible public
position in the ex-
treme overbreadth
of its definition of
national security
and its under-
evaluation of con-
stitutional values."
Allan Adler.
counsel for the
American Civil
Liberties Union
(ACLU), con-
tended that "this
Administration
has far surpassed
any previous Ad-
ministration in
demonstrating its
disdain for the
public's right to
know what it is doing." Adler added:
"Three decades ago, the Communist
threat was the avenue to restrict the 1st
Amendment and freedom of speech.
Now, we're seeing that tdcrorism and
national security are being used the same
way...
Adler said that the "public threat" by
CIA director William J. Casey to bring
criminal charges against news organiza-
tions that purportedly violate certain na-
tional security laws "clearly changed the
... We're just now trying to do it in a
more systematic and aggressive way."
Casey's critics, however, argue that he
seems more interested in systematically
and aggressively imposing control over the
press than in striking a mutually accept-
able balance- between press and govern-
ment. They have a sense that he misunder-
stands their conflicting roles, with the
press conditioned to challenge authority
and act as a buffer to extraconstitutional
or questionable activities on the part of the
government, whose ambition is to get its
- message out and put its best face forward
publicly. Inevitably, the two institutions
often clash in pursuit of their goals.
While Casey has thrust himself into
the forefront of the controversy, he is, in
effect, a creature of the President and is
presumably acting if not with the Admin-
istration's endorsement, then at least with
its acquiescence. In large measure, he has
become a personal symbol of an Adminis-
tration that either out of distrust or insti-
tutional caution, has cultivated an arm's-
length relationship with the news media
and has artfully sought to impose tighter
managerial control over government in-
formation, or, when conditions are favor-
able, to circumvent the press entirely.
Thus, a confluence of issues is brought
into play, including free speech guaran-
tees under the 1st Amendment, the
press's role and responsibility, the need to
assure the nation's security, the occa-
sional conflict between civil liberties and
ideology, the adversary relationship be-
tween press and government and, perhaps
most important, the people's right to
know as a basic element in the shaping of
official policy in a democratic society.
GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN
Codiatei
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security clearance, including political ap-
pointees but not elected officials, to sub-
mit to lie detector tests. The apparent
purpose of the polygraphs is to trace leaks
of information to the press and guard
against infiltration by spies.
? expand, as the result of an executive
order that Reagan signed, the discretion
of federal agencies to classify information
for an indefinite period. The order further
allows the withholding of information
that merely relates to national security or
foreign affairs and provides au-
thority to reclassify information
already in the public domain.
? mandate that all government
officials with access to high-
level classified information sign
statements that require them for
the rest of their lives to submit
for official, pre-publication re-
view all articles and books they
write for public consumption. A
book by former CIA director
Stansfield Turner. Secrecy and
Democracy, the CIA in Transi-
tion, was delayed 18 months
before being cleared by censors
who insisted on almost 100 dele-
tions on'security grounds.
? ? impose a news blackout dur-
ing the October 1983 invasion
of Grenada and threaten to
shoot any U.S. reporters who
tried to reach the island on their own.
Coverage of the initial stages of the as-
sault was selectively provided by the De-
fense Department's own news service.
Later. Defense Secretary Caspar W.
Weinberger and then-White House chief
of staff James A. Baker III announced
that the Administration had the right to
exclude the news media from future mili-
tary operations if it wished to do so.
? seek to broaden existing exemptions in
the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
to include the CIA's "operational files."
U.S. Secret Service records and the in-
vestigatory files of the Securities and
Exchange Commission. The CIA ac-
knowledges that it takes an average of
14.5 months for the agency to respond to
an FOIA request.
In other actions. the CIA took the
unprecedented step of filing a complaint
with the Federal Communications Com-
mission charging that ABC News had
"engaged in deliberate news distortion"
in broadcasts about the alleged connec-
tion between the agency and an Hawaii
investment banker then under indictment
for fraud. And in recent months, two
high-level government employees, one
from State and the other from Defense,
were fired on suspicion of leaking in-
formation to the press.
While previous Administrations en-
gaged in some similar actions, none was
as blatant and intimidating in its efforts
to manage, if not control, the news?with
the notable exception of the Nixon Ad-
ministration in the Watergate cover-up,
the secret bombing of Cambodia and the
attempts to block release of the Pentagon
Papers that detailed the genesis of the
Vietnam war.
SETTING THE PATTERN
The most highly publicized and con-
tentious incident involving the press and
government centered on Casey's disclo-
sure in May that he and other Adminis-
tration officials had discussed the pos-
sibility of prosecuting five news
organizations for publishing information
about U.S. intelligence-gathering opera-
tions, particularly the ability of the Na-
tional Security,? Agency (NSA) to inter-
cept and decode messages of other
nations. The CIA director indicated that
the news organizations had violated a
section of the Espionage Act that was -
enacted in 1950 but has never been ap-
plied. Casey, in his warning, identified
The Washington Post, The New York
Times, The Washington Times,
Newsweek and Time magazine.
Shortly afterward. Casey and Lt. Gen.
William E. Odom, the NSA director.
"cautioned" reporters "against specula-
tion and reporting details beyond the in-
formation actually released" at the espio-
nage trial of accused Soviet spy Ronald
W. Pelton in Baltimore.
Although Casey soon moderated his
firm warning, he had made his point.
Then, in late June, he warned two jour-
nalist-authors. Bob Woodward of The
Wa.thington Post and Seymour M. Hersh
of Th New York Times, as well as their
publishers, that they could be violating
the law if books each is writing contained
secret "communications intelligence."
Woodward is writing a book on Casey
and the CIA and Hersh is working on a
book due to be released in late summer or
early fall on the downing of the South
Korean passenger jet by the Soviets in
1983.
Clearly, a pattern had been set, with
Casey the chief antagonist.
"This Administration has gone top-se-
cret crazy," said Kirtley of the reporters'
committee. "The longer an Administra-
tion is in office, they have a tendency to
take a proprietary interest in information:
they shall decide what the public should
know."
Attorney Abrams said that "Casey's
threats at the very least are an attempt to
pressure if not muscle the press into silence
in areas he believes should not be dis-
cussed. He.wants to let them know if they
publish 61.? broadcast things he does not
believe should be, they'll be in trouble."
Syndicated columnist Jack Anderson,
famous for his investigative expos? con:
ceded that the Administration's series of
actions "affect me a little. It scares me,
also, to have an Administration conduct-
ing wholesale lie detector tests and eaves-
dropping on their own people. It occurs at
? the highest level because they're frus-
trated."
Anderson suggested that Casey's
"threats" have already had a "chilling
effect" on the news media. He specifi-
cally referred to a June 8 article in The
Washington Post in which Benjamin C.
Bradlee. the newspaper's executive edi-
tor, emphasized that neither the govern-
ment nor anyone else is allowed "to de-
cide what we should print" while
acknowledging that his newspaper regu-
larly consulted with the government
"about sensitive stories, and we do with-
hold stories for national security reasons.
far more than the public might think. The
Post has withheld information from more
than a dozen stories so far this year for
these reasons."
Anderson's view of Bradlee's article
suggested to him that the newspaper "has
been chilled a little. I don't mean they are
not doing their job: they are. But they are
examining procedures much more closely
and being more cautious than before
Casey's threat."
Los .-ingeles Times Washington bu-
reau chief Jack Nelson said that the news
media have generally been passive in re-
butting Administration efforts to con-
strict the free flow of information. "Cer-
tainly. there has not been any strong
editorial outcry, maybe with some papers
but not many." he said. "Why? For the
same reason that people like the Presi-
dent but oppose his policies. The econ-
omy is not bad, there is little inflation,
people are fairly happy. That feeling per-
meates the news media."
On the perennial question of govern-
ment over-classification. Richard K.
Betts, a Brookings Institution
intelligence specialist and former
staff member of the National Se-
curity Council and Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, con-
tended that it is not done "out of
malevolence or to hide things
from people because it would be
embarrassing"?an impression
widely held among critics. In-
stead, he said. "there is a ten-
dency when in doubt to err on the
side of caution. Sometimes the
classification is handled by low-
level people who don't know any
better. Also, it is being done at so
many different places."
Betts suggested that perhaps a
"special court" working with
Congress might be established to
deal with go ernment classifica-
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tion. "I don't know how it would
work; it would probably be
swamped." he said. "But it might
reduce some of the abuses and
take the burden off the press."
Nleanwhile. Weinberger, writ-
ing last October in Defensei85. a
Pentagon publication, stated that
the role of the news media in
society had to be weighed against
competing national security re-
quirements?that depending on
national priorities, one constitutional
right sometimes superseded another con-
stitutional right. "Freedom of the press
has never been universally defined." he
said. "We are still debating those 13
simple words written two centuries ago?
'Congress shall make no law. .. . abridg-
ing freedom of speech or of the press'?
with regard to what the founding fathers
meant by them and how they apply to-
day."
Weinberger argued that while the
press is protected by the 1st Amendment,
"such protection cannot diminish the
other legitimate functions of good govern-
ment," including "the equally legitimate
traclition of the government's need for
secrecy. especially in national defense."
But, he added, "unfortunately, some
reporters and their editors do not agree.
Some act as if they are in an appropriate
position to decide for themselves whether
information that we have classified
should actually be protected."
In so saying, Weinberger articulated
the Administration's position, while
pointing up the uneasy balance between
two legitimate and vital interests.
THE MORISON AFFAIR
For the past year or so, a rash of
espionage cases has become a steady
news diet, including those involving re-
tired Navy communications specialist
Jerry Alfred Whitworth. former CIA
agent Edward Lee Howard. former NSA
intelligence official Pelton and ex-Navy
chief warrant officer John A. Walker. All
involved government employees who had
access to top-secret intelligence and who
were charged with selling out to the Sovi-
ets. Although spiced with drama and
intrigue, each of the cases from a con-
stitutional standpoint were mostly cut
and dried.
Ironically, the most significant and
complicated case was the least publi-
cized?that of Navy intelligence analyst
Samuel Loring Morison. A Vietnam vet-
eran. grandson of naval historian Samuel
Eliot Morison and a 10-year employee of
the Naval Intelligence Support Service,
he was accused of taking three KH-I I
satellite photographs labeled "secret" of
a Black Sea shipyard where a new, nu-
clear-powered Soviet aircraft carrier was
under construction and mailing them to
the British magazine Jane's Defence
Weekly, for whom he moonlighted, a fact
known to his Navy superiors.
For leaking the classified photos to the
press. Morison was charged with theft of
government property and espionage. It
marked only the second time -since the
Espionage Act was enacted in 1917 that
the law was used to prosecute someone
for leaking classified information to the
press rather than to foreign agents. The
earlier case, dismissed by the Supreme
Court, involved the prosecution of Daniel
Ellsberg and Anthony Russo for
releasing the Pentagon Papers.
In effect, said David Wise,
who frequently writes on espio-
nage and CIA matters, "the Ad-
ministotion has sought to marry
the classification system to the
espionage laws."
The ACLU's Adler said that
"the Administration's efforts-
come into sharp focus with the
Morison case; they do not distin-
guish between government em-
ployees who leak information to
the press and those who engage in
espionage. They equate leaking
with espionage."
Last October, Morison was
convicted and is currently free on
bond pending appeal.
The Morison affair, Adler said,
"represented a clear turning
point for the Administration.
They decided to go ahead and try
their luck in court. It was a calcu-
lated gamble. Their first step was
to secure a conviction. When that
' proved successful, an embold-
ened Casey went one step further
and applied more pressure on the
press itself."
Wise similarly saw the Admin-
istration's strategy behind the
Morison case as a two-part process?"to
intimidate officials for unauthorized
leaks at one end and intimidate reporters
at the other end."
Adler said he was convinced that the
Administration went beyond the intent of
the Espionage Act in prosecuting Mon-
son for leaking information to the press.
"Casey," he said. "did a magnificent job
of salesmanship."
During the Morison trial, government
prosecutors stressed the undeniable, that
he had willfully transmitted photographs
and documents related to national de-
fense to someone not entitled to receive
them. The critical question of whether
the transmitted material could cause
damage or kijury to the United States or
be of potential advantage to a foreign
power?a central issue in espionage
cases?was never passed upon.
A key witness for the defense was Ro-
land S. Inlow, a retired, 28-year CIA
veteran who formerly directed the agen-
cy's operations dealing with photographic
satellite reconnaissance.
In his testimony, Inlow said that based
on his professional and technical experi-
- ence, the disclosure of the three satellite
photographs in Jane's would not cause
damage or injury to the security of the
United States.
In a lengthy account featured in "First
Principles." published by the ACLU's
Center for National Security Studies,
Inlow wrote, "Morison clearly had com-
mitted a misdeed; but what he did was
not 'espionage.' "
Inlow testified during the Morison trial
that the Soviets had earlier acquired a
KH-I I technical manual and that "the
photographs, as printed in Jane's, would
have revealed no technical characteristics
about the imaging satellite that the So-
viet Union did not already know about in
detail.... The potential for damage from
the disclosure of these three photographs
was zero.-
He suggested in his written account
that the government had decided to
"make an example" of Morison. He
added that "the guilty verdict in the
Morison trial, if upheld on appeal, would
establish precedents in more than one
direction. It clearly offers apsecedent for
indicting persons who leak information
under many types of circumstances."
SECRETS AND RIGHTS
Spelling out the differences between
the press and government, a Washington
Post reader wrote in a July 1 letter to the
editor: "The intelligence community
serves the governmental consumer, em-
ploys mostly clandestine sources and pro-
tects those sources by means of a legally
sanctioned classification system. The in-
formation itself is protected largely be-
cause it can reveal sources.
"The press, on the other hand, serves
the public at large (including those same
governmental consumers), employs
mostly open sources and, while it protects
the sources, serves the wider audience by
printing the information."
In essence, the press-government issue
revolves around the demand to reconcile
national security requirements with con-
stitutional rights.
Casey has asserted that the way to
accomplish this is "to tighten up within
the government."
Wise interprets that as a move toward
the British Official Secrets Act, which
imposes strict limitations on the ability of
the press to divulge national intelligence
information.
The Brookings Institution's Betts ques-
tions the absoluteness of the media's con-
stitutional rights. "I'm not sure the press
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should be exempt from these questions
any more than other institutions," he
said. While acknowledging the difficulty
involved, he suggested that "there ought
to be some other check on the discrction
of the press other than the press itself."
Contributing to the dilemma is the
climatic condition that prevails between
the press and this Administration, under-
scored in Secretary of State George P
Shultz's comment following the media
criticism of the Grenada invasion: "It
seems as though the reporters are always
against us, ... always seeking to report
something that's going to screw these
things up."
Central to the Administration's cam-
paign to contain national intelligence in-
formation are its efforts to plug leaks by
reducing the. number of officials with
access to classified documents and impos-
ing stricter security curbs on military and
civilian employees who handle secret
codes and cryptographic devices.
In former CIA director Colby's view,
"the leakage problem has gotten More
serious. The general problem is the lack
of standards and discipline in society.
There are whistle-blowers and inquiring
reporters.... There is a contempt for se-
curity."
Albert R. Hunt, Washington bureau
chief of The Wall Street Journal, how-
ever, offered a different view. Adminis-
tration officials, he said, typically will
"draw a distinction between good and
bad leaks. Good leaks are those which
help and support their policies: bad leaks
are those which don't put them in a good
light."
Joseph F. Laitin, a former assistant
public affairs secretary at Defense and
Treasury and now the ombudsman at The
Washington Post, said, "While Casey
threatens The Post and other newspa-
pers, he should look within the Adminis-
tration for leaks."
James R. Schlesinger, the former De-
fense Secretary who briefly served as
CIA director in 1973, said: "The problem
of leakage is generally a problem of the
executive branch. I think the press is
generally responsible."
Casey, nonetheless, insists he will not
retreat from his hard-line position and
will seek to prosecute anyone, including
members of the press, whom he believes
has violated laws covering secret commu-
nications intelligence.
Adler, meanwhile, expressed doubt
that Reagan would want to go down in
history "as the first President since the
Alien and Sedition Actlertry to prosecute
a news organization.... The decision to
prosecute The Post or any of the other
newspapers will have to come from the
top."
The anomaly, Abrams said, "is not so
much Reagan as the 'Great Communi-
cator' but that of an Administration that
wants to get government off the backs of
people in the economic sphere but is
unwilling to take a position like that in the
area of 1st Amendment rights.'
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When Casey's at the Bat
Despite a lifetime on the cut-
ting edge?as a World War II
agent in the Office of Strategic
Services, as a Wall Street ven-
ture capitalist who became a
multimillionaire, as chairman
of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), as Ronald
Reagan's 1980 campaign chair-
man and finally as CIA direc-
tor?William J. Casey has re-
mained an enigma.
An unimposing, slightly rum-
pled man, he does not carry his
73 years lightly. His glowering
gaze through thick glasses and
his tendency to mumble as he
speaks, as though he is conspir-
ing aloud to himself, serve to
obscure rather than reveal. Im-
patient and intimidating. Casey
could easily be cast as a
worldly, autocratic bishop addressing one of his rustic parishioners.
While he can be courtly among his peers, he is not one to stand on
ceremony at other times. Albert R. Hunt. Washington bureau chief of The
Wall Street Journal. recalled: "I met him at a party one time; he came over
and in dark tones asked me if we had ever violated the Agents Identity Act. I
told him no."
The puzzling question within the Washington press corps these days is
whether Casey is sincere in his threat to prosecute the news media should
they disclose classified information that bears on national security or is
simply trying to chill the media into paralysis.
"Whether he is bluffing or not, I'm not sure." Hunt said. "But you have to
take Casey seriously."
According to syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, "Casey sincerely
believes the public and press ought not be shown the secrets of government
and that the government oit&ht to operate in the dark. Obviously, you can be
more effective operating in the dark?but the cust is too high in terms of
freedom and the people's right to know.... I think it is his nature. He
behaved the same way during the Nixon Administration when he was SEC
chairman. He went to elaborate lengths to put documents into safe keeping
so they couldn't be subpoenaed.... He's a security nut; he believes only
those in power should know what's going on.... But I don't think they are
going to prosecute any newspaper."
Joseph F. Laitin, a former assistant public affairs secretary at the Defense
and Treasury Departments and now the ombudsman at The Washington
Post. said: "Casey's threat was part bombast and part showboat, with a
menacing backdrop to it. He was testing the waters. If it had caught on
publicly, the way [former Vice President] Spiro Agnew's attack on the press
did (in 19691, there would have been real trouble. But the American public
was too smart to buy it."
It is unclear whether Casey is a maverick motivated by personal convic-
tions and prejudices or is acting as a stalking horse for an Administration that
wants to see how far it can go in challenging the news media.
"Part of it is ideology," said 1st Amendment legal expert Floyd Abrams of
Casey's duel with the press. "He genuinely believes it is wrong and dangerous
for the press to say these things [about classified intelligence] and displays a
marked insensitivity to 1st Amendment rights. It is still too early to say if the
Justice Department and the White House fully support him. To the degree
that he is the point man for the attack on the press, or is doing it on his own,
the Administration is content to\tes.him take the lead."
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Ar'.""Pf IPPEAREir
WASHINGTON POST
8 June 1986
The Post and Pelton:
How The Press Looks
At National Security
By Benjamin C. Bradlee
NATIONAL SECURITY means pro-
tection or defense of the country
against attack, sedition, espionage,
or other forms of hostile interference.
It isn't a complicated concept.
It isn't just hard to be against national se-
curity; it's inconceivable.
And yet, why is the director of Central In-
telligence trying to get various news organ-
izations indicted for the treasonous disclo-
sure of information classified in the interest
of national security? Why does the director
of the National Security Agency threaten to
prosecute news organizations if they publish
information he feels threatens the national
security? What does the assistant to the
president for national security affairs have
in mind when he joins the battle with such
relish?
Why is the president of the United States
himself so concerned that he calls the chair-
man of the board of this newspaper and asks
that information be withheld in the interests
of national security? .
What's all the fuss about? Do these men
really think the people who run this news-
paper would betray their country? What re-
porter and what editor could betray this
trust, and look their owner in the eye?
It sounds so simple, but it isn't.
The Washington Post has been at the
center of some stormy national security de-
bates in the last 20 years. One of those de-
bates?the Pentagon Papers?went all the
way to the Supreme Court in 1971 before it
was resolved, in favor of the press.
The most recent, and the most anguish-
ing, of these debates surrounds the story we
published late last month about the Ronald
Pelton spy case, after eight months of inter-
nal discussion and six months of conversa-
tions with the highest government officials.
As usual, outsiders seem both fascinated
and mystified by how this newspaper han-
dles this kind of story.
The Pelton case illustrates two important
points about how The Post deals with na-
tional security issues:
a First, we do consult with the government
regularly about sensitive stories and we do
Benjamin C. Bradlee is the twenties editor
of The Washington Part
withhold stories for national security rea-
sons, far more often than the public might
think. The Post has withheld information
from more than a dozen stories so far this
year for these reasons.
? Second, we don't allow the govern-
ment?or anyone else?to decide what we
should print. That is our job, and doing it re-
sponsibly is what a free press is all about.
Trouble starts when people try to
sweep a lot of garbage under the rug
of national security. Even some very
highly placed people.
Like President Richard Nixon in 1969,
when he described a New York Times ex-
clusive report on the secret bombing of
Cambodia as an egregious example of na-
tional security violation.
That's right out of Kafka, when you think
about it. The Cambodians certainly knew
they were being bombed, and since only the
United States was then flying bombing mis-
sions in Indochina, they certainly knew who
was bombing them. If ihe Cambodians
knew, the Vietcong knew. And if the Viet-
cong knew, their Soviet allies knew imme-
diately. So whit was all Marabout? Well. the
American people didn't know and, in fact
they had been told we would not bomb Cam-
bodia.
Here, national security was used to cover
up a national embarrassment: The president
had lied to the American people and to the
world. But the New York Times story, by
reporter William Beecher, was used by the
White House to justify creation of the infa-
mous Plumbers unit, ostensibly to plug the
leak that produced this dreadful violation of
national security.
This led us to Watergate, of .course. Is
there anyone now alive and kicking in to-
day's national security debate who remem-
bers Nixon looking the world in its televi-
sion eye and telling us he couldn't tell the
world the truth about Watergate because
national security was involved?
The worst lie of all.
All of this is not to say that there is no
such thing as a legitimate claim of national
security. Of course there is. Ever since
World War II, a standard example of what
not to publish for reasons of national secu-
rity has been the sailing times of troopships
leaving American harbors for foreign battle.
But the world doesn't work that way any-
more. Another good rule for when not to
publish involves the risk of American lives
(though that one has been used in cases
where the risk was all but impossible to
conceive). In any case, this newspaper does
keep information out of print for reasons of
national security. I can't give you a list
without violating the national-security in-
terest that led me to withhold publication.
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the next Discovery space shuttle mission
In addition to stories that are withheld
for reasons of national security, there
are some dose calls?stories that are
eventually run, after long discussions where
opposing views are vigorously defended.
Such a story appeared in The Washington
Post on Feb. 18, 1977, under the headline
"CIA Paid Millions to Jordan's King Hus-
sein; and under reporter Bob Woodward's
byline. Mains of dollars of "walking around
aware (as distinct from economic or mil-
itary aid) had been paid to the king by the
CIA under the codeword project name "No
Beef:
Jimmy Carter had been president less
than a month. He agreed to see Woodward
and me, after we sought White House re-
adies to the story before publication. The
president totally disarmed us by admitting
the story was true. He said that the pay-
ments had been stopped, and then stunned
us by saying that he had known nothing
about it until The Post had sought White
Ham reaction, despite multiple briefings
during the preceding months by Secretary
of State Henry Kissinger and CIA Director
George Bush. The president never asked
that the story not be printed, although he
made dear he hoped it would not. He told
us that the story, if printed, would make the
progress be hoped for in the Middle East
harder to achieve.
The argument over whether to print or
not to print was spirited, to understate it.
Some of us felt that the national interest
would beet be served if the world knew that
the CIA had a king on its payroll, and that
neither the outgoing CIA director nor the
outgoing secretary of state felt that fact
was important enough to share with the
new president Others felt that anything
that might make resolution of the problems
of the Middle East more difficult was not
worth the candle of publishing.
There are no absolutes in such discus-
sions. Rightness or wrongness lies in the
eye of the beholder. Our decision was to
publish. Hussein is still king. Bush is the
%ace president. Carter is the former pres-
ident.
IJoder President Reagan, there was
only one major point of tension about
national security between the White
House and this newspaper during the first
term. It is hard to say whether this period
of comparative detente was the result of the
presence in the White House of James Bak-
er as chief of staff and David Gergen as di-
rector of communications, both now labor-
ing in different vineyards, or the absence of
Washington Post interest in national secu-
rity matters. The latter seems unlikely.
The one incident occurred in the waning
days?December 1984?of the first term
and involved Secretary of Defense Caspar
Weinberger. The story stemmed from an
extraordinary briefing at the Pentagon by
lik Force Brig. Gen. Richard F. Abel about
carrying an intelligence satellite. "Specu-
lation" by news organizations on military as-
pects of the mission would result in a De-
false Department investigation, Abel said.
Reporter Walter Pincus was asked casu-
ally by one of his editors, "What the hell is
in that satellite, anyway?' He said he would
"make a few calls" to find out. Two days and
time telephone calls later, a story appeared
under his and Mary Thoniton's bylines, de-
scribing in general terms its signals-intel-
ligence mission.
On that same morning. Weinberger was
en Mute to a CNN early morning talk show
jaterview, where he intended to push the
Defense Department budget, which was al-
ready under a certain amount of attack from
the Congress. He was interrupted by CBS
reporter Reid Collins and asked if The
Post's story "gave aid and comfort to the
enemy' (an odd question, it seemed then
and now). Weinberger replied that the story
did just that, and the fat was in the fire.
The Post issued a statement saying that
there was nothing in the Pincus-Thornton
story that had not appeared in bits and
pieces somewhere else. But the damage
was done. More than 4,000 letters to the
editor were received. Some of the letters
contained threats of bodily harm, even
death.
The story would die there, a minor, if
scarring skirmish in the battle over national
security, were it not for a lecture given at
Emory University a few days later by Gen-
eral Abel. The general was asked if The
Post had violated national security by pub-
lishing. He replied that The Post's story
contained little or no information not on the
public record. No Post reporter was present
at the lecture, but a student called the pa-
per to report both the question and the an-
swer. We smelled a hoax, and asked to lis-
ten to a tape. We listened. He said it. We
still wanted confirmation from General
Abel, and finally got it at 9 p.m., when he
returned to his home from Atlanta.
Some time in September 1985, reporter
Woodward came into my office, shut
the door, and in almost a whisper laid
out an amazing top-secret American intel-
ligence capability that emerged in bits and
pieces eight months later in the trial of Ron-
ald Pelton. Woodward described in great
detail bow the communication intercept had
worked, where the communications were
intercepted, every detail except Pelton's
name.
Woodward didn't have Pelton's name be-
cause no American knew for sure at that
point that a man named Pelton had sold this
intelligence gold mine to the Russians five
years earlier. That didn't start to surface
until well after Vitaly Yurchenko defected
last year and fingered Pelton. Yurchenko
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had been Pe!ton's first KGB contact, the
man who had arranged for Pelton to spill
the beans. Pelton was arrested last Nov. 24.
But without knowledge of Pelton, back
last September, The Washington Post had
no knowledge that every detail of our story
was already known to the Russians. We
thought we had the highest national secu-
rity secret any of us had ever heard. There
was never a thought given to publishing any
of this information.
At one of our weekly breakfasts, I told
publisher Donald E. Graham about the sto-
ry, and about my concern that while the ad-
ministration was beating the press upside
the head for run-of-the-mill leaks, truly im-
portant national-security information was
floating around town. I wondered out loud
to him about trying to get an appointment
with President Reiman to inform him of our
information and our concern. We scrapped
the idea on the grounds that it would inev-
itably appear to be self-serving and grand-
standing.
About that time I did run into the national
security adviser, Vice Adm. John Poindex-
ter, at a dinner party, and asked him for an
appointment to discuss the same subject.
We did meet, and he suggested I talk to Lt.
Gen. William Odom, the head of the Nation-
al Security Agency. General Odom and I
first met at his downtown Washington office
in the shadow of the Executive Office Budd-
ing on Dec. 5, 1985. Poet managing editor
Leonard Downie and two members of
Odom's staff also were present. We told the
NSA chief the detailed information we had,
information we said that the Russians now
had as a result of PeIton's treason:We said
we felt extremely uncomfortable with this
information, but we had it, the Russians had
it, and we asked why it should be kept from
the American people.
General Odom shook his head in dismay.
He said the information was still extremely
sensitive. We didn't know exactly what the
Russians knew, he said. It was hoped, he
said, that Pelton would plead guilty, avoid-
ing any public discussion of the evidence
against him. He looked us in the eye and
told us that any story about this case would
gravely threaten the national security of the
United States.
We were to hear that claim many, many
times in the next five months, as we tried to
frame a story that would tell the American
people what the Russians already knew, and
only what the Russians already knew.
We were determined not to violate
the legitimate security of the na-
tion, but we were equally deter-
mined not to be browbeaten by the admin-
istration, which has from time to time ap-
peared to relish press-bashing, into not pub-
lishing something that our enemies already
knew.
The weapons of any administration in this
kind of a battle are formidable: presidents,
admirals, generals, CIA directors telling
you that publication would endanger the na-
tion and the lives of some of its fighters, and
ultimately threatening to prosecute you for
violating the law.
These are red lights that a newspaper
goes through only with a deliberate lack of
speed.
The weapons of the press in this kind of
battle are generally the reporters them-
selves and their facts, the First Amendment
and common sense.
These are the green lights that make de-
mocracy the greatest form of government
yet devised.
From the first session with General
Odom on December 5 to a final session with
CIA Director Casey in the bar of the Uni-
versity Club on Friday afternoon May 2, the
issue was joined. There were at least three
meetings between Odom and one or more
editors of The Post. At least four rneedngs
with Casey. One with Poindexter. One with
FBI Director William Webster. (One after-
noon Webster and Casey asked to see me
urgently, and walked through the city room
into my office surrounded by bodyguard',
while more than 150 reporters and editors
watched in astonishment. The subject was
national security, but the area was Central
America, not the Soviet Union.)
At each of these meetings, different ver-
sions of the Pelton ,tory were discussed
with the government officials. In some
cases different versions of a written story
were shown to them, something this news-
paper rarely does in advance of publication.
Each time, the officials invoked national se-
curity. Each time, the editors felt that na-
tional security was not involved, but were
not 1,000 percent convinced that the So-
viets knew every single detail of The Post's
story, and publication was delayed.
(On one occasion on Feb. :.'.0. 1986.
aboard Air Force One, a copy of tho Intest
version of The Post's story was passed
around between Poindexter, Weinberger.
Secretary of State Shultz and White House
Chief of Staff Donald Regan, according to
reliable sources. These high officials talked
about how important it was to keep this ver-
sion of the story out of the paper, and they
felt it would not be published.)
In February, at an editors' conference in
Florida, Washington Post editors held a
seminar on national security and the
press. Former CIA director Richard Helms
was present to give us the perspective of an
old intelligence hand. Later in a discussion
with only four editors, Helms was told the
story and asked what were the chances that
the Russians did not know the whole story.
He felt the chances were slim. He felt spe-
cifically that Gorbachev himself might not
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know, but he would certainly know if the
Post4ublrshed the story and his reaction as
Av leader was hard to predict, and po-
tentially volatile. Helms gave no advice.
In April. former NSA director Admiral
Bobby Inman met with an editor of The
Post to discuss the story in great detail. He,
too, felt it was unlikely the Russians were
unaware of anything in the Post's story, but
on balance argued against publishing.
On May 1, 1986, over breakfast, General
Odom was shown the penultimate version of
the story. For the first time, he mentioned
that he and others were looking to the pos-
sibility of using 18 United states Coda 798
to prosecute anyone who published the Pei-
ton story. This law provides for a maximum
punishment of 10 years in jail and a $10.000
fine for anyone who publishes." . . any clas-
sified information . . . concerning . . . the
use . . . of any device . . . for communica-
tion intelligence purposes . . . ."
This newspaper's lawyers reported that
while the government would surely argue
that the story was a technical violation of
that statute, the fact that the Russians
knew the specific classified information
made the government's argument more
tenuous.
On Friday, May 2, CIA director Casey
called me from his car telephone. He said he
had heard we were going to run the story
on the next Sunday and he wanted to talk.
He suggested the bar of the University
Club. Downie and I met him there at 4 p.m.
He was shown the story, read it slowly,
tossed it aside and said, "There's no way
you can run that story without endangering
the national security." He then said he
didn't mean to threaten anyone, but he
would have to consider recommending pros-
ecution of the newspaper if we published
the story. "We've already got five absolute-
ly cold violations" of 18 USC 798 against
The Washington Post and four other news
organizations, Casey said.
Nine days later President Reagan, just
back from the Japan summit, called Kath-
arine Graham, chairman of the board of The
Washington Post Company, to impress upon
her his views that publication of The Post's
story would endanger national security.
That was the last red light. The Post
withheld the story one more time, and
started working immediately on a version of
the story that removed all the "wiring di-
:sgram" details of the intelligence system, all
the details that might be prohibited by the
statute.
As a courtesy to the president, in light of
his call to Mrs. Graham, White House press
secretary Larry Speakes was informed on
Tuesday night, May 27, that The Post was
going to run its story without the wiring di-
agram details the next day, unread by any
government official.
And it appeared next morning under the
bylines of Bob Woodward and Patrick Tyler.
Casey responded that day by saying that
!he CIA was studying the story to see
whether it should be referred to the Justice
Department for prosecution. And there the
matter lay, until a few days later in the mid-
dle of the Pelton trial, Casey and Odom is-
sued a joint statement warning the press
against speculating about the Pekoe evi-
dence, and implicitly threatening plum-
tion if they did.
Warnings against speculation are the fab-
ric of a Pravda editor's life. They are anath-
emas in a free society, and they were
greeted as such by the American press on
this occasion.
Pelton was convicted last Thursday, after
seven days of testimony ii a Baltimore
courtroom, where the government laid out
more information in a public forum about its
most secret intelligence gathering capabil-
ities than at any time since World War II.
(Some of the testimony produced informa-
tion that was not in the original Post arti-
cle.)
The role of a newspaper in a free so-
ciety is what is at issue here. Govern-
ments prefer a press that makes their
job easier, a press that allows them to pro-
ceed with minimum public accountability, a
press that accepts their version of events
with minimum questioning, a press that can
be led to the greenest pastures of history by
persuasion and manipulation.
In moments of stress between govern-
ment and the press?and these moments
have come and gone since Thomas Jeffer-
son?the government looks for ways to
control the press, to eliminate or to mini-
mize the press as an obstacle in the imple-
mentation of policy, or the solution of prob-
lems.
In these moments, especially, the press
must continue its mission of publishing in-
formation that it?and it alone?deter-
mines to be in the public interest, in a use-
ful, timely and responsible manner?serv-
ing society, not government.
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