CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R001301420040-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: August 1, 1987
• Content Type: NIE

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Director of
Central
Intelligence
: Prospects for
Democratic Transition
_tiional Intelligence Estimate
M randum to Holders
ret
NIE 94-85
August 1987
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS,
EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS
N I E 94-85
CHILE: PROSPECTS FOR
DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Information available as of 14 August 1987 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum to
Holders, which was approved by the National
Foreign Intelligence Board on 25 August 1987.
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
The Setting ........................................................................................ 7
Pinochet-Working the System ....................................................... 7
Political Maneuvering ................................................................... 7
Stimulating the Economy ............................................................. 9
The Democratic Opposition ............................................................. 11
Lost Opportunity .......................................................................... 11
Regaining Momentum .................................................................. 11
The Military ...................................................................................... 14
Attitudes Toward the Transition ................................................. 14
The Letelier Murder ..................................................................... 15
Threat From the Radical Left ......................................................... 16
The Potential for Leftist Violence ............................................... 16
Looking Ahead .................................................................................. 16
An Uncertain Outcome ................................................................ 16
Less Likely Alternatives ............................................................... 18
Implications for the United States ................................................... 19
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SCOPE NOTE
The prospects for a smooth transition from military to civilian rule
in Chile were last assessed in NIE 94-85, dated December 1985. While
the essential judgments of that Estimate have held, the likelihood of
their remaining valid through the 1989 democratic transition period-
the time frame of the Estimate-needs further analysis, particularly in
view of some important subsequent developments in Chile:
- The Intelligence Community, for example, projected a "better-
than-even" chance that provisions in the 1980 Constitution
calling for a national plebiscite on one candidate selected by the
military would be modified to permit open presidential elec-
tions. The possibility of open elections now appears less likely.
- The military-estimated in 1985 to be firmly behind the
constitutional transition process-is divided over whether Pino-
chet should be allowed to succeed himself. The Intelligence
Community occasionally has differed over the military and the
Junta's position on this issue and Pinochet's ability to manipu-
late them to his benefit.
- The democratic opposition, which was relatively united in 1985
over the need for constitutional reform and direct elections, is
still formulating its response to various new elements of the
transition process.
- Finally, the Intelligence Community correctly projected in-
creased leftist violence, but the massive arms cache discovered
last year and the nearly successful attempt on Pinochet's life
suggest we need to reevaluate the leftist threat to the transition
process
The Memorandum to Holders will update the relative strengths of
key actors, reexamine significant variables, and discuss new factors in
the Chilean political equation, and then reassess the most likely
outcome and alternative scenarios as the plebiscite approaches. It will
also assess their implications for US policy interests and the regime's
vulnerability to outside pressure
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Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that President Pinochet is determined to remain in
office beyond March 1989 despite his low popularity, opposition from
non-Army members of the four-man Junta, and mounting unease in the
armed forces. Whether he is likely to be successful in achieving this ob-
jective remains uncertain. Pinochet has all but formally announced that
he intends to run for reelection in the single candidate presidential
plebiscite that must be held at least one month before his term ends in
March 1989. He probably believes he can secure the plebiscite nomina-
tion by adroitly manipulating his Junta critics and portraying himself to
conservative sectors and the armed forces as the only alternative to
chaos.
Pinochet already is campaigning throughout the country, promis-
ing to provide more jobs and low-cost housing and publicizing the new
political parties and voter registration laws enacted earlier this year.
These statutes may benefit him because they make it difficult for the
poor to register, and most opposition parties may not muster enough
signatures to qualify for legal status. Meanwhile, the government is
funding a hitherto minor rightist party that Pinochet probably intends
to use as a campaign vehicle. His economic performance over the last 18
months has been a political plus, and he may be contemplating
expansionist economic policies next year to boost his popularity with the
middle and lower classes. In our view, however, these efforts will
neither significantly amplify Pinochet's popular support nor erase
military doubts about his chances of winning an honest plebiscite.
We believe the moderate opposition parties-which made little
headway in antiregime efforts over the past year-are adopting a more
realistic strategy and regaining some momentum, but whether they can
effectively challenge Pinochet remains in doubt. Their leaders acknowl-
edge that they must unite, promote the recently announced free
election and voter registration drives, and demonstrate that they have a
viable alternative candidate to continued rule by Pinochet. The main
opposition group, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), has replaced
their longtime President-who is anathema to the military-with a
respected moderate willing to try to gain the trust of the armed forces.
In our view, the moderate opposition's strongest card is the free
election campaign, which is attracting support from most democratic
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parties, the Catholic Church, organized labor, and professional organi-
zations. The moderates think their key test is to register at least 5 million
out a total of about 8.3 million voters by early 1988 so that Pinochet re-
alizes there is too much popular opposition to risk being nominated as
the plebiscite candidate. As a last resort, the moderates say they will
mobilize for a massive "no" vote if Pinochet obtains the nomination.
Some Junta members also may try to keep Pinochet from scheduling a
plebiscite until at least 6 million voters are registered.
For its part, the far left, led by the well-organized Communist
Party of Chile, continues to promote terrorism to harass the government
and forestall a transition, but it is no closer to its goal of launching an
all-out insurgency and is increasingly isolated politically. Nonetheless,
we believe that the Communists-with substantial assistance from the
Soviet Bloc-plan to conduct a higher level of terrorism and other
violent actions over the next year and a half in an effort to further po-
larize the country.
We believe there is growing disquiet in the armed forces over
Pinochet's reelection plans, and he appears to be less confident about
how to control the military than in the past. Pinochet's relations with
the non-Army members of the Junta have deteriorated in recent months
as they have openly opposed his reelection bid and announced that they
prefer a civilian candidate. In our view, however, Pinochet's most
serious threat is erosion of his Army support. Disquiet is mounting
over his efforts to retain power,
particularly because of concern over his low popularity. Also working
against Pinochet is concern over his potential culpability in the still
unresolved Letelier murder case.
We see two most likely scenarios for determining Chile's presiden-
tial succession:
- Pinochet becomes the plebiscite nominee.
- The military and moderate leaders support a military or civilian
consensus plebiscite candidate.
Nevertheless, no clear pattern has emerged as to which of the two
succession formulas will be followed, and we do not expect this situation
to clarify until mid-1988. Other scenarios are possible-the military and
the moderate opposition might still adopt a direct election formula, but
this is unlikely because of time constraints. In addition, Pinochet himself
could call for direct elections and run against several opposition
candidates, or he might try to get the Junta to select a stand-in to run in
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the plebiscite-but we believe Pinochet is leery of these options because
they are riskier than taking his chances on a plebiscite. Finally, there is
a chance that the Communists might succeed in a second assassination
attempt against Pinochet. We judge, however, that Communist leaders
are giving priority to a long-range strategy of attempting to mount an
all-out insurgency in the early 1990s should Pinochet perpetuate himself
in power.
We believe that Pinochet probably could not win a clear majority
in an honest plebiscite, and therefore he probably will try to manipulate
the results if he is the candidate. This would probably provoke an
outcry from the opposition, further erode his standing with the military,
and perhaps precipitate a confrontation with senior officers from all the
services. Moreover, it would, in our view, sharply diminish prospects for
long-term stability in Chile by providing new opportunities for extrem-
ists and further isolating Santiago internationally.
Pinochet's persistence in trying to perpetuate himself in power is
likely to jeopardize US interests in promoting a full and stable
democratic transition in Chile:
- In our view, Pinochet is likely to respond minimally to external
pressures on political and human rights matters and is only
slightly more vulnerable to threats of economic sanctions and
cutbacks in foreign lending or debt reschedulings. We judge he
will not agree to step down at the end of his term in response to
foreign pressure of any kind.
- Other key actors, however, are more susceptible to outside
pressures. Military officers are increasingly worried about their
country's international pariah status and the likelihood that the
military's image will suffer permanent damage if Pinochet
remains in power. Furthermore, the moderate opposition will
benefit from concerted efforts by foreign capitals to encourage a
full democratic transition and from offers of technical expertise
on election mechanics.
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DISCUSSION
The Setting
1. During the year and a half since the publication
of NIE 94-85: Chile: Prospects for Democratic Tran-
sition, the political impasse in Chile has remained
basically unchanged in several key aspects. President
Pinochet is still determined to retain power beyond
the end of his term in March 1989, his personal
popularity is low, and unease persists in the armed
forces regarding his intentions. The democratic oppo-
sition, although united on the need for constitutional
reform and direct presidential elections, has not de-
vised a sound strategy to persuade the military, much
less Pinochet, to negotiate a transition to civilian rule.
The far left, led by the well-organized Communist
Party of Chile (PCCh), continues to promote terrorism
to harass the government and forestall a transition, but
it is no closer to its goal of launching an all-out
insurgency. Finally, despite an upturn in the economy-
which achieved an overall growth rate of 5.7 percent
in 1986-many Chileans, including most of the lower
and much of the middle class, have benefited only
marginally from this growth and, judging by public
opinion polls, hold the government's economic policies
responsible.
2. In other respects, however, the political scene has
undergone important changes. The most dramatic
developments were the discovery by the security
forces last August of some 70 metric tons of arms
supplied by Cuba to the PCCh's terrorist affiliate, the
Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front (FPMR), and the
FPMR's almost successful assassination attempt against
Pinochet in September. The military and several
conservative groups quickly rallied behind Pinochet,
who responded to the assassination attempt by reim-
posing the state of siege and cracking down on the
moderate opposition. He also reiterated his determina-
tion not to change "one word" of the Constitution-
including its provisions allowing him to run for reelec-
Pinochet's plans to retain power, including fears that
Pinochet would be defeated in a plebiscite, thereby
damaging the armed forces' image
3. In recent months, however, Pinochet has stolen a
march on the moderate opposition by promulgating
various "liberalization" measures, including an elec-
toral registration statute and a restrictive law permit-
ting non-Marxist political parties to acquire legal
status. While stopping short of formalizing his candi-
dacy for the plebiscite nomination, he has stepped up
his presidential campaign by barnstorming throughout
the country and promising more jobs and public
spending on social programs. Pinochet suffered an
unexpected setback in February, however, because of
the revelations by a Chilean Army major that senior
government officials planned the assassination of for-
mer Chilean Foreign Minister Letelier in Washington
in 1976, and his stonewalling on the case may jeopar-
dize his standing with the Army officer corps.
4. Meanwhile, the moderate opposition remains
divided over how to respond to Pinochet's recent
initiatives but has gained greater credibility since mid-
1986 by persistently denouncing Communist violence
and refusing to cooperate with the PCCh and other far
left groups in antiregime activities. In short, the
Chilean political scene remains as complex as ever,
and political activity is bound to accelerate as the time
approaches-by the end of 1988 at the latest-for a
final decision on whether Pinochet will be nominated
for the presidential plebiscite or another formula will
be used to select the next chief of state (see inset). 125X1
Pinochet-Working the System
Political Maneuvering
5. We believe that Pinochet wants to remain in
power indefinitely, even though there is mounting
opposition across the political spectrum to his reelec-
tion and military restlessness on this score. This is
demonstrated by the fundamental aspects of Pino-
chet's character-such as his notion that only he can
"save" Chile from Communism and the disreputable
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The Constitution: Important Dates and Provisions
As the end of Pinochet's term approaches, Chileans members from the Air Force, Navy, and Carabineros
are focusing on the constitutional timetable for selecting (national police) command their respective services and
a plebiscite candidate, holding congressional elections, are legally PXemnted om automatic removal by the
and, possibly, scheduling direct presidential elections. President.)
Interest is also evident in the junta's precise legislative
and constitutional powers and its role in nominating the
plebiscite candidate, picking a replacement for Pino-
chet if he dies or becomes incapacitated, and filling
vacancies on the junta.
Pinochet's current term of of- 11 March 1981-11 March 1989
fice
Deadline for designation of
candidate for presidential
plebiscite
By 11 December 1988, that
is, at least 90 days prior to 11
March 1989
Dates of next presidential
term, assuming plebiscite
candidate receives a major-
ity of popular vote
Within 30-60 days following
designation of the candidate
11 March 1989-11 March
1997
Terms of office of the com- 11 March 1989-11 March
manders in chief of the 1997
armed forces as of the end
of the current presidential
period
Deadline for President to 11 December 1989
schedule congressional elec-
tions
Date of congressional elec- Within 30-45 days of presi-
tions dential convocation
Deadline for calling direct 11 December 1989
presidential elections-which
become necessary if plebi-
scite candidate does not re-
ceive a majority of popular
vote
dent eight-year term
Key Provisions
Under the Constitution of 1980, President Pinochet
serves as Commander in Chief of the Army and holds
the title of Captain General of the armed forces. He is
represented on the military Junta by the next ranking
Army General, whom he can replace at will. The Junta
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The Constitution restricts the legislative and constitu-
tional powers of the Junta in relation to the presidency.
For instance, its legislative role is circumscribed by the
executive's sole authority to initiate legislation on most
subjects. This reduces the junta to reviewing, amending,
and-occasionally-rejecting proposals from the execu-
tive. The Junta's effectiveness is further constrained by
the provision that its votes on legislation must be
unanimous, which allows Pinochet, through the Army
representative, to veto modifications. Junta members,
however, have periodically employed the unanimity
requirement to block the enactment of bills unless
Pinochet accepted substantial modifications. The Jun-
ta's constitutional powers are also governed by the
unanimity requirement. The Junta can initiate amend-
ments to the Constitution, but such proposals must be
approved in a national plebiscite, which only the
President can convoke. Nevertheless, several times dur-
ing the past year the non-Army junta representatives
have called publicly for a constitutional amendment to
permit direct presidential elections before 1989.
Picking a New President. The Constitution specifies
that, if Pinochet dies or is incapacitated, the junta
selects his replacement by unanimous vote. If after 48
hours the junta cannot reach a unanimous decision, the
National Security Council-which includes the four
Junta members, the presidents of the Supreme Court
and of the Council of State, and the Comptroller
General-must choose the president by an absolute
majority. The Constitution implies-but does not state
specifically-that the new chief executive must either
be a Junta member or a senior line officer from one of
the services. In all probability the Army would ensure
that either its Junta representative or another senior
Army general would be the new president.
The provisions governing the nomination of the
candidate for the presidential plebiscite are identical,
except that Pinochet himself-rather than the Army
representative on the junta-is entitled to vote in the
matter. The Constitution also specifies that if the four
Commanders in Chief cannot agree, the National Secu-
rity Council, chaired by Pinochet, chooses. In practice,
it is likely that, because of the military's strong desire to
maintain an image-of unity, the high command would
resist having the decision referred to the Council.=
realizes that the issue of his
Pinochet himself
resolved in the junta, where he currently faces open
opposition from at least two of its non-Army members.
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How Junta Vacancies are Filled. Under the Constitu-
tion, Pinochet needs the unanimous approval of the remain-
ing junta members to designate a replacement for a member
who resigns, and theoretically even the resignation of a non-
Army member must be approved by the other members. If
Pinochet removes the Army representative on the junta, he
is legally bound to replace him with the next highest ranking
active-duty Army general, although in practice he could
easily retire this officer and select another general. More-
over, the non-Army junta members almost certainly would
not object to Pinochet's manipulation of the Army's hierar-
chy to place a favorite on the junta because they would
politicians whose ineptitude ushered in the chaos of
the Allende era, his concern about his own and his
family's personal safety if he left power, and the fact
that he has deliberately not groomed a successor. In
addition, we have no credible reporting that Pinochet
has seriously considered stepping aside, or that his
failure so far to formalize his plebiscite candidacy
derives from anything more than his custom of con-
cealing his intentions until the appropriate moment-
in this case, probably when he believes he has over-
come objections within the Junta and among senior
Army officers to his remaining in office
6. In our view, Pinochet probably expects to outma-
neuver his opponents, anticipating that by adeptly
manipulating the junta, increasing government spend-
ing, cajoling conservative sectors, and appealing to
military unity-he can portray himself as indispens-
able and ensure his nomination as the plebiscite
candidate. Nevertheless, he probably is less confident
of his ability to steamroll his critics than in the past,
given the degree of public opposition to his continuing
in office, his failure to silence dissent from the Junta
and senior Army officers, and the aggrieved and often
vitriolic tone of many of his political statements.
Consequently, Pinochet is cloaking his strategy in the
legitimacy he claims to derive from the Constitution of
1980-adopted by popular vote but forced on him by
senior military officers anxious for a basic charter
spelling out the mechanism and timetable by which
Chile would return to civilian rule. Pinochet repeated-
ly asserts he is fulfilling his constitutional obligation to
implement a stable, "protected" democracy and over
the past two years has approved laws governing
electoral tribunals, voter registration, and legalization
of non-Marxist political parties needed to hold a
plebiscite.
7. In practice, the highly restrictive voter registra-
tion and political parties' laws benefit Pinochet as he
prepares for a plebiscite. Prospective voters must go
consider this to be his prerogative as Army commander
in chief. Pinochet has little legal authority to influence
general officer assignments or retirements in the three
other services, although he can choose a nominee from
among the five most senior active-duty generals or
admirals in the respective service to succeed an outgo-
ing Junta member. Nevertheless, when the Carabinero
commander, General Mendoza, resigned from the Junta
in 1985, Pinochet bowed to pressure from the Carabinero
hierarchy to replace him with the next ranking officer,
General Stange.
through a cumbersome and, for the poor, expensive
process to register. Nevertheless, 1.6 million voters
have signed up since the law went into effect in
January 1987, which may result in about 5 million of
the estimated 8.3 million electorate registering by
early 1988. There is widespread speculation in Chile
that Pinochet may advance the plebiscite to 11 Sep-
tember 1988, in part to capitalize on a reduced
electorate that, weighted more heavily toward the
upper and middle classes, presumably would favor his
candidacy. Similarly, very few political parties are
likely to muster the required 35,000 signatures to
comply with the new party law since many members
fear that signing public lists could cost them their jobs
or subject them to other harassment. Leaders of Chile's
largest party, the Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
have stated that even they would have great difficulty
in obtaining 35,000 signatures and note that even prior
to 1973 PDC membership was not that large, although
the party usually garnered over a third of the popular
vote.
8. Meanwhile, the regime is trying to generate
popular support for Pinochet's plebiscite candidacy
via the National Advance Party (AN), which is funded
from government coffers and managed by one of
Pinochet's top Army aides. The AN is pushing to sign
up party members; the government has ordered may-
ors to "persuade" municipal workers to join AN, and
thugs have visited teachers to coerce them into the
party. Consequently, this formerly minuscule radical
rightist group probably will quickly obtain enough
signatures to qualify for legal status and become
Pinochet's main campaign vehicle.
Stimulating the Economy
9. We judge that Pinochet also intends to manipu-
late the government bureaucracy and increase spend-
ing for social projects to build momentum for his
reelection campaign. He already is trying to enhance
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his image through populist programs, promising to
create 50,000 new jobs per month in labor-intensive
public works projects, increase pension payments, and
improve job protection for teachers and civil servants.
The government also has announced it will increase by
25 percent the number of subsidized housing starts for
the poor this year, which probably is designed to
solidify the political sympathy for Pinochet evident
(see inset).
10. Nevertheless, we expect these and other eco-
nomic initiatives to have relatively little impact on
Pinochet's overall popularity. Opposition politicians
can easily demonstrate that Pinochet's promise on new
jobs-which in June was scaled back to 20,000 a
month-is unrealistic, that the government actually
The Economy and Politics
Chile's economic growth reached 5.7 percent in 1986
and surged in early 1987. The regime's export promo-
tion program expanded economic activity while slowing
the inflation rate, increasing real wages, and reducing
unemployment. The economy grew so fast during the
first quarter of 1987, however, that the authorities
became concerned about high levels of consumption
and imports. With investment at historically low levels,
limited productive capacity created bottlenecks to
growth and pushed price increases out of line with the
13 percent goal for this year. Sharp increases in imports
shrank the trade deficit and threatened to jeopardize
projected foreign exchange balances. In March, Finance
Minister Buchi applied a contractionary monetary poli-
cy that dampened expansionary spending and slowed
the economy. We believe that these adjustments will
enable Santiago to achieve most of its 1987 IMF
projections while assuring a growth around the 5 per-
cent level.
Opinion polls indicate that, notwithstanding the regi-
me's relatively successful economic management, the
public remains highly dissatisfied with its standard of
living and views the economy as the country's principal
problem. Although the export policy has created a
boom in fruit and vegetable producing zones and has
probably enhanced Pinochet's prestige in these areas,
we judge this rural constituency to be too small to have
a significant impact on the President's overall populari-
ty. Prosperity has not penetrated the more populous
and politically influential middle class and slum sectors
of the main urban areas, which remain bastions of anti-
Pinochet sentiment.
We believe that Finance Minister Buchi has thus far
successfully lobbied against broad-based pump priming
to improve the President's image and generate support
for his reelection. He has argued-in our view cogent-
ly-that expansionary policies would almost certainly
unleash high inflation that could set off a backlash even
among conservative groups such as the business commu-
nity. Moreover, such policies would quickly run Chile
afoul of its international creditors, thus jeopardizing the
government's painstakingly fashioned export program.
Pinochet, however, is using more limited economic
programs as a part of his campaign. He recently
announced a plan to create 50,000-later scaled back-
additional public works jobs, increase pension pay-
ments, and improve job protection for teachers and civil
servants. Santiago also plans to increase subsidized
housing starts by 25 percent this year. The housing
program is hi hl visible and closely identified with
Pinochet an has won
him some political loyalty among the poor in recent
years.
Given Santiago's current commitment to a reduced
fiscal deficit in 1987, the government will have to offset
new spending programs with cuts elsewhere or with
revenue increases. Monetary policy is also likely to
remain generally restrictive. Buchi
characterized Pinochet as very
cautious about programs that might destroy the govern-
ment's image of fiscal responsibility. He also indicated
that he thought the expanded housing program could be
financed without generating fiscal problems.
cause no lasting damage to the economy.
Should Pinochet gamble and decide to initiate stron-
ger expansionary programs, however, we would not
expect to see any movement before early 1988. Such a
strategy, in our view, would become more likely if
economic growth falls to near 3 percent by that time.
Chile's recent commercial bank and official creditor
reschedulings, which cover 1987-88, do not include new
loans, thus reducing pressure on Santiago to maintain
strict compliance with the IMF targets. Moreover, the
current IMF three-year Extended Fund Facility ends in
August of 1988, leaving the country temporarily with-
out IMF constraints and offering a window of opportu-
nity. However, Finance Minister Buchi has promised
Paris Club creditors and commercial banks that Chile
will attempt to institute a follow-on Fund program. The
US Embassy believes that expansionary policies could
make themselves felt in the economy in as little as one
quarter. Therefore, Pinochet might attempt to give the
economy a timely boost that would have effect prior to
the plebiscite but still be sufficiently short-term so as to
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Chile:
Selected Economic Indicators,
1983-873
1983 84 85 86 87 0 1983 84 85 86 87
Share of GDP
Percent
1983 84 85 86 87 0 1983 84 85 86 87
Reserves c
Million US $
1983 84 85 86 87 -12 1983 84 85 86 87
Data for 1986 are estimated and 1987 are projected.
December over December.
Data for December.
lowered pension payments a few months ago, and that
9,000 teachers have been fired so far this year under
the regime's education reform program. Pinochet also
might try to pump up the economy in the months
before the plebiscite, but even a broadly based expan-
sion probably would not generate much support for
the President, especially among the middle and lower
classes
The Democratic Opposition
Lost Opportunity
11. In most respects, 1986 was a wasted year for the
moderate political opposition (see inset). It failed to
persuade the government and the armed forces to
accept the National Accord as a basis to negotiate a
transition to civilian rule and suspended plans for
protests and a national strike after the arms cache
discoveries and the assassination attempt against Pino-
chet. Moreover, moderate leaders have made only
halting advances in 1987. They vacillated over their
response to the electoral registration and political
parties' laws, torn between rejecting them as essential-
ly undemocratic measures serving Pinochet's purposes
or taking advantage of the modest opening they
afforded to legalize the parties and publicize the need
for massive voter registration and free elections. The
PDC was virtually paralyzed for months due to inter-
nal disputes over the election of a new party director-
ate and over how to respond to Pinochet's latest
initiative Several 25X1
moderate leaders openly acknowledged their frustra-
tion over this disarray and voiced misgivings about
whether their parties could unite to challenge Pino-
chet's reelection bid and offer the general public-and
especially the military-a viable alternative to the
current regime.
Regaining Momentum
12. Despite the moderate opposition's lackluster
performance in recent months, we believe that its
leaders are becoming more realistic about their politi-
cal options. They know that time is running out for
them and that they must quickly resolve the differ-
ences among their parties, conduct a vigorous cam-
paign in support of restoring democratic government,
and convince the armed forces that Pinochet should
not be nominated for the plebiscite. One striking
example of this greater realism is that former PDC
President Gabriel Valdes, who probably is more mis-
trusted by the military than any other non-Marxist
politician, has been shunted aside. The PDC has
elected a new directorate headed by Patricio Aylwin,
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The Moderate Political Opposition Parties
All political parties have been technically illegal in
Chile since the military government came to power in
1973. Nevertheless, several dozen moderate parties and
factions continued to function more or less openly.
Following the emergence of a mass opposition move-
ment in 1983, the government became somewhat more
tolerant of the activities of moderate opposition
groups-although not of Marxist parties-but continued
to restrict their access to the media, their efforts to stage
rallies and other public events, and their attempts to
organize labor, professional guilds, student groups, and
other key sectors. The moderate parties have formed
several alliances or coalitions in the past few years,
including:
- The Democratic Alliance. A broad coalition of
seven parties stretching from the moderate right to
the center left founded in 1983. It is dominated by
the centrist Christian Democratic Party (PDC),
generally regarded as the country's largest. The
Alliance's chairmanship rotates every six months
among the parties. One of its key members, the
Nunez faction of the Socialist Party, withdrew in
early 1987, thereby weakening the Alliance's ap-
peal to the moderate left.
- The National Accord. An agreement signed by
11 mainstream parties in August 1985 at the
instigation of the Catholic Church's primate, Car-
dinal Fresno. It articulates a comprehensive series
of moderate proposals for a transition to demo-
cratic government. Two conservative and two
leftist parties signed it, along with the original
members of the Alliance. The Accord has been
quiescent in recent months.
- The National Civic Assembly. A loose grouping
of 18 leading professional, labor, academic, and
social groups formed in April 1986. The PDC
played the key role in its creation, in response to
demands from nonparty sectors for a greater voice
in organized opposition activities. The Assembly
has been largely inactive in recent months.
- The Party of National Renovation (PARENA).
Established in January 1987 through the fusion of
two moderate right and one far right parties.
Several of its key members were formerly closely
identified with the Pinochet government and at
one time apparently favored the President's re-
election in 1989. PARENA President Ricardo Ri-
vadeneira and other leaders of the new grouping,
however, have publicly endorsed the free election
campaign headed by Sergio Molina and have
talked with members of the Junta on the selection
of a consensus civilian candidate to replace Pino-
chet.
In March 1987, the government promulgated a long-
awaited law to legalize non-Marxist political parties-
one of the so-called organic laws that under the Consti-
tution of 1980 must be in place before the presidential
plebiscite is held. Under this cumbersome and very
restrictive measure, parties may acquire temporary
legal status by presenting a list with signatures of 100
members. The parties are required, however, to sign up
approximately 35,000 members, spread over eight of
the country's 12 regions, within the next seven months
to become fully legalized. These enrollment lists will be
part of a public registry-which, in our view, is likely to
dissuade many potential signers, who fear that public
identification with an opposition party will invite repri-
sals or harassment from the government. The new law
gives the government strict control over the parties'
internal organization and finances and allows it to
sanction or dissolve them with relative ease; deputies
and senators elected in the future under the parties'
labels will not be responsible to party directorates for
their legislative actions; officials of labor unions and
professional associations, as well as members of the
armed forces, are barred from participating in any
party; and the parties' limited access to the media will
be strictly regulated by the government.
As of late June, eight parties, mostly from the right-
of-center, had begun the initial steps to acquire legal
status. Most PDC leaders favor at least submitting the
100-member list to indicate technical compliance with
the law. Several other centrist and left-of-center parties
appear to be waiting until after the PDC acts before
announcing their intentions, but even if most of the
moderate opposition opts to seek legalization, very few
parties-perhaps no more than two or three-are likely
to sign up the requisite 35,000 members.
a respected, noncontroversial old-guard party chief-
tain who believes the opposition must gain the trust of
the military. He harbors no national political aspira-
tions-Valdes, by contrast, sees himself as a contender
in future direct presidential elections-and says that
his primary goal is to convince the armed forces that
they must prevent Pinochet from succeeding himself,
even if that means accepting an interim military
regime and postponing direct elections. The PDC is
now proceeding to register as a party, and Aylwin
wants to quickly reassert its leadership over the mod-
erate opposition, which, he emphasizes, must not get
bogged down in debilitating personal and political
squabbles.
13. Most PDC leaders now say that a consensus
conservative replacement-civilian or military-for
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Pinochet would be an acceptable alternative to a
competitive election provided the new President
pledges to carry out a genuine political transition. This
would involve modifying the Constitution to provide
for free presidential, congressional, and local elections,
perhaps within three years. We believe that these
changes in PDC leadership and orientation will some-
what improve the party's image among senior military
officers and undercut Pinochet's efforts to denigrate
the Christian Democrats
14. In our view, the moderate opposition's most
important initiative to date is the campaign for com-
petitive elections that was launched by a blue-ribbon
council of prominent citizens in March. The cam-
paign's coordinator, Sergio Molina, who has strong ties
to the Catholic Church and is well regarded by senior
military officers, is assembling a staff, raising funds,
and establishing a national apparatus to promote
constitutional reform and grassroots voter registration.
Most moderate opposition parties advocate free elec-
tions. In May, the main moderate opposition coalition
formed a committee headed by Valdes to push the
free elections drive, and
this group's activities will effectively complement
military government, an attitude Pinochet reinforces
by constantly disparaging the political process. In
addition, Pinochet's determination to be the candidate
for the presidential plebiscite, the public's perception
that no clear alternative to him has emerged, and the
military's apparent lack of interest in reforming the
Constitution contribute to a defeatist attitude among
many Chileans. Consequently, moderate opposition
leaders realize that their major challenge in the
months ahead is to develop a credible grassroots
organization, promote the voter registration drive, and
generate sustained popular participation in the cam-
paign for competitive elections. They also have decid-
ed that to make headway in any of these areas they
must avoid potentially violent antigovernment demon-
strations and other provocative actions, and in recent
months have disavowed the leftists' calls for popular
protests. As a result, all recent protests have failed.
17. The moderates believe that the litmus test of
their campaign will be the voter registration drive.
They calculate that if at least 5 million voters sign up
by early 1988, military leaders will be impressed by
the strength of public support for competitive elections
those of Molina's council.
15. The participation of the Catholic Church, orga-
nized labor, students, and professional associations in
the free election campaign almost certainly will inten-
sify in the coming months. Several liberal Catholic
bishops have lent their authority to the initiative, but
more conservative members of the hierarchy so far
have held back. In mid-June the Episcopal Conference
issued a forceful statement calling on Chileans to
register to vote while stopping short of endorsing the
opposition's call for direct presidential elections rather
than a plebiscite. We believe this reflects the Church's
reluctance to commit its prestige to the free election
campaign until there is a coherent, united effort by
the moderate opposition. Leaders of the two main
labor confederations are touring the provinces to
in tandem with Molina's free election council. Student
groups and the traditionally influential guilds of doc-
tors, architects, engineers, and teachers are all commit-
ted to democratic change but are not yet actively
promoting the free election campaign, although repre-
sentatives from several of these entities belong to
Molina's council.
16. Nevertheless, the moderates' campaign faces
serious obstacles. For instance, it will be difficult to
overcome the public apathy fostered by 14 years of
and less inclined to see Pinochet nominated as plebes- 25X1
cite candidate. They also assert that even if Pinochet is
nominated, the opposition can still mobilize to de-
nounce vote fraud or organize for a massive "no" vote
against Pinochet. Finally, the non-Army members of
the Junta are also concerned about the need to hold a
legitimate plebiscite. For instance, General Matthei
and Admiral Merino say they intend to oppose any
effort by Pinochet to schedule the plebiscite before at
least 6 million voters are registered. They reportedly
believe that a surge in voter registration might con-
vince the Army that Pinochet is likely to lose the
plebiscite vote without the advantage of a low voter
turnout.
18. At present, Pinochet has very little organized
support from civilian groups, although the business
community, some conservative intellectual and upper-
class sectors, and banking and media interests that are
in debt to the government are not openly opposing his
chet suffered his worst setback on the far right when
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conservative Jaime Guzman, one of the original civil-
ian ideologues identified with the military regime,
fused his party with the new moderate rightwing
grouping, PARENA, last January.
The Military
Attitudes Toward the Transition
19. Disquiet is growing in all four Chilean services
over Pinochet's plans to retain power after 1989. Many
in the military would like to see the status quo
maintained following the constitutionally mandated
transition to begin in 1989, including having Pinochet
at the helm. However, a sizable number of military
officers, including many flag rank and the non-Army
members of the junta, believe that a secure transition
can and should be made without Pinochet in the
presidency. Pinochet clearly recognizes that he needs
to deal with this problem, but, in contrast to previous
years when he skillfully manipulated the officer corps,
his recent actions have become more defensive and, on
balance, probably less effective. He has met often with
groups of officers from all the services in recent
months to explain his intentions and court their sup-
20. We believe that military attitudes about Pino-
chet and the role of the armed forces are increasingly
conditioned by the realization that he is not popular
with most Chileans, that the country is experiencing a
serious political impasse, and that military unity could
be jeopardized if Pinochet attempts to ram his nomi-
nation through the Junta. Many officers are troubled
by the incongruity between their oath to uphold the
Constitution of 1980-which calls for a transition to
civilian rule beginning by 1989-and Pinochet's asser-
tions that he must retain power for another eight years
to fulfill the mission the military undertook in 1973.
Moreover, many officers feel that, notwithstanding
Pinochet's aspirations, the days of military rule in
Chile are numbered, and that they must consider how
they personally will fare under a civilian government.
21. The Army and Navy formed a joint commission
in May 1987 to assess social and political trends in
Chile and enable the armed forces high command to
plan for an expected transition period. The high
command's main concern is reportedly to preserve the
"social and professional" role of the armed forces
under an eventual democratic government, and the
commission is showing special interest in the opinions
of opposition figures and Catholic Church officials.
This development may lead to discussions between
military officers and moderate opposition leaders on
the parameters of an eventual transition accord. In any
event, the heightened military awareness that impor-
tant political decisions must be taken in the coming
months will hinder Pinochet's efforts to manipulate
the officer corps and may make it increasingly diffi-
cult for him to use heavyhanded measures to gain the
plebiscite nomination.
22. The most ominous problem Pinochet faces is the
apparent erosion of his support within the Army, his
main power base. In late 1986 he ordered wholesale
retirements and reassignments of senior Army officers
and replaced the Army representative on the military
Junta for the second time in a year in order to
strengthen his control over the officer corps. These
actions, however, evoked unusual levels of grumbling
among Army officers. There is also growing unease
among Army officers of all ranks concerning Pino-
chet's plans to run for reelection. Many are worried
that Pinochet is so unpopular that he probably would
23. Officers are leaving the military due to poor
pay, unhappiness over having to perform crowd con-
trol duties and other police activities, and anxiety
about their future under civilian rule. Resignations in
the middle grades of the Army are worrying the Army
leadership and the government. Resignations at the
lieutenant level, for example, have been so numerous
that a complete class of Army Academy officers was
graduated one year early to fill gaps in the service.
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24. Many junior officers also resent the high-level
pressure they are receiving to support Pinochet in the
plebiscite.
Inaddition, many senior
Army generals have indicated they will oppose Pino-
chet's staying on as Army commander if he receives
the nomination. Nevertheless, despite these and other
persuasive indicators of discontent in the Army re-
garding Pinochet's actions, we have not yet seen signs
that Army officers are planning to confront him
directly.
25. The other major hurdle that Pinochet must
overcome is the Junta's objections-especially those of
Generals Matthei and Stange-to nominating him for
the plebiscite. He has repeatedly failed to stop these
two commanders from criticizing his candidacy pub-
licly and from holding talks with moderate opposition
leaders. In an interview in late May, Admiral Merino-
going further than any Junta member to date-
doubted that Pinochet would even seek the nomina-
tion and added that the Junta should pick a center
right civilian candidate. Matthei and Stange publicly
endorsed Merino's stand, and Stange added that he
hopes that Carabinero personnel will not vote in the
plebiscite because their main duty is to defend the
public order rather than try to influence the outcome
26. Matthei, Stange, and Merino have reiterated to
other moderate opposition leaders that they oppose
Pinochet's reelection and prefer competitive elections
in 1989. They say they would even agree to Pinochet's
running in such an election provided he resigns as
Army commander in chief. These Junta members
have emphasized, however, that because Pinochet can
block the constitutional reform necessary for open
elections and the moderates remain divided, they will
use their power to designate the plebiscite candidate as
leverage both with Pinochet and the opposition. Their
main tactic will be to convince all key civilian and
military actors that Pinochet's designation as plebiscite
candidate would be a disaster, but that the plebiscite
could be a legitimate way to choose the next president
if the candidate selected enjoys broad public support.
They have asked the moderates to support this strategy
and suggested that they should develop a responsible
transition formula that includes guarantees for the
armed forces-particularly related to human rights
issues-the exclusion of far leftist groups, and assur-
ances regarding public order and economic policies.
27. Whatever difficulties Pinochet may be experi-
encing with the military, he continues to exude confi-
dence about his candidacy, his relationship with his
comrades-in-arms, and the intimate knowledge of the
military mind he has acquired in over 50 years in
uniform. He probably perceives that his authority over
the Army is virtually absolute, and that traditional
discipline and respect for hierarchy guarantee that the
senior service will not derail his plans to remain in
power beyond 1989. In fact, he has ordered that Army
officers and their families register quickly to vote.
With regard to the three other services, he probably
realizes that he has less of a free hand but still expects
to prevail over their commanders in chief, either by
intimidating them into accepting his nomination or
replacing them with others who will. Nevertheless, he
is keeping a careful watch on sentiment among all
officers. For instance, in early May he met with large
groups of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers to
announce that he is running because it is necessary for
him to continue to build and strengthen Chilean
"democracy." Subsequently, several senior Army offi-
cers publicly endorsed Pinochet's candidacy. On bal-
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ance, Pinochet probably believes that whatever the 25X1
reservations about his plans, no group of officers will 25X1
confront him or engage in coup plotting.F 25X1
28. Also working against Pinochet is the still unre-
solved murder of a Chilean exile opponent named
Letelier in Washington in 1976. The revelations con-
cerning the case-made by Army Maj. Armando
Fernandez Larios, who traveled to Washington in
February 1987 to plead guilty as an accessory in the
murder-caused an uproar that has yet to dissipate in
Chile. The armed forces reacted with shock, and
senior Army 25X1
officers have pressed Pinochet to take effective steps to
clear up the case and exonerate the Army. For
instance, in March the Army Vice Commander, Gen-
eral Sinclair, headed a delegation of senior Army
officers that urged the President to force retired
General Contreras and Colonel Espinoza, the former
high-level intelligence officers implicated by Fernan-
dez, to testify on the case in Chilean or US courts. We
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believe that the Letelier scandal is also damaging
Pinochet's overall standing with Army officers. We
believe that concern about the case is undermining
support for him among field-grade officers and that
Fernandez's revelations have caused many to doubt
privately Pinochet's denial of culpability in the Lete-
lier murder
dented size of the Cuban arms arsenal-probably
supplied to the FPMR in accordance with an under-
standing between the Castro government and the
PCCh-indicates, in our view, that both Havana and
Chilean Communist leaders had concluded that condi-
tions in Chile were ripe for a sharp escalation of
violence against the Pinochet regime and the Chilean
armed forces as a prelude to an all-out insurgency (see
inset). The nearly successful attack by the FPMR
against Pinochet suggests that some Communist lead-
ers believed that the PCCh could gain political stature
and weather the anticipated severe security service
t h a t believe, however, the armed forces regarding the Letelier case has not
reached the point of threatening Pinochet's authority.
In our view, however, the case still has the potential of
becoming a major crisis if Pinochet overreacts and
follows through with harsh measures against Contreras
or others involved in the affair.
30. The Communists are the main subversive force
in Chile, and they remain committed to a long-term
strategy of promoting an insurrection to topple Pino-
chet and establish a Sandinista-type government under
PCCh control. They do not want an orderly transition
of power to civilian rule but prefer to see Pinochet
obtain the plebiscite nomination, especially since this
is likely to generate discord within the armed forces
and further polarize the country. Prior to mid-1986
the Communists apparently were content to build up
their clandestine apparatus and promote an escalating
campaign of terrorism and violent protests while
waiting until at least the end of Pinochet's term in
1989 to begin an insurrection. We believe the party
calculated that Pinochet's insistence on retaining pow-
er would so antagonize popular opinion and discredit
moderate opposition groups that the latter would
endorse the Communists' advocacy of armed struggle
as the only way to oust Pinochet.
31. Nevertheless, the discovery of the arms caches
and the assassination attempt against Pinochet in
August-September 1986 suggest that some elements of
the PCCh and its terrorist affiliate, the FPMR, wanted
to speed up the insurrection timetable. The unprece-
reprisals by killing the President.
32. The arms caches and the failed assassination
attempt, in our judgment, have put the Communists
on the defensive. Polls indicate that the public repudi-
ates terrorism and Communist-led protests, and the
moderate opposition parties are avoiding cooperation
with the PCCh. Moreover, bombings by the FPMR
have declined markedly over the last year, and the
Communists apparently do not intend to stage major
anti-Pinochet protests anytime soon. Instead, they are
emphasizing the PCCh's political tactics and trying to
cultivate the moderate opposition while playing down
the military option even to the party rank and file.
Consequently, we believe that Communist leaders
have reverted to their longer range strategy and
probably realize that they have little chance to launch
an insurrection unless Pinochet holds onto power well
beyond the end of his current term
33. We believe that the PCCh plans to conduct a
higher level of terrorism and other violent actions over
the next year and a half. Pinochet almost certainly will
use any upsurge in Communist-sponsored violence to
buttress his reelection campaign by claiming that
continued military government is the country's only
safe alternative. But unless the PCCh conducts a series
of very dramatic actions-perhaps including the mur-
der of senior military officers-we doubt that Pino-
chet will gain any lasting advantage from raising the
specter of Communist violence, especially if the mod-
erates continue to eschew cooperation with the party
and criticize its tactics.
Looking Ahead
An Uncertain Outcome
34. We believe that Chile's presidential succession
is likely to evolve in one of two major directions
between now and late 1988:
- Pinochet may become the plebiscite candidate.
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Capabilities and Foreign Ties of Chilean Far Left Groups
In September 1980, the Communist Party of Chile
(PCCh), the largest and best organized far left group in
the country, announced that it would seek to overthrow
the Pinochet regime by violent means. Over the past
four years the PCCh has enlarged its clandestine wing,
built up its military apparatus and trained several
hundred members abroad, strengthened security prac-
tices, and broadened the Party's appeal to the urban
poor. As of early 1987, the total PCCh card-carrying
membership had grown to 37,000, and we believe that
the Party's youth wing probably numbers about 20,000.
Moreover, in December 1983 the PCCh supported the
creation of the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front
(FPMR)-which has since become Chile's main terrorist
group-and for the past two years the Party has sought
to bring the FPMR fully under its control. Although we
know relatively little about the structure and leadership
of the FPMR, we believe that it has grown in member-
ship from only a few dozen militants at its inception to
1,500 to 2,000 at present. The FPMR has carried out
over 2,500 terrorist bombings since late 1983 and
mounted the assassination attempt against Pinochet in
September 1986.
Several other far left groups advocate violence to
overthrow Pinochet, but none approaches the FPMR in
size or frequency of terrorist actions. The Front has
supplanted the pro-Cuban Movement of the Revolu-
tionary Left (MIR)-the foremost terrorist group in the
country until the early 1980s-whose military cadre
was decimated by the security services in late 1983.
There appears to be only minimal coordination on
terrorist plans or actions between the FPMR and other
far left groups, although most of them belong to the
Communist-led Popular Democratic Movement (MDP)
coalition, which itself was folded into the new United
Left (IU) alliance in mid une
The
MDP was also a useful vehicle for the PCCh's campaign
to convince moderate opposition groups that it re-
mained a potent political force and should participate
in their efforts to foster a peaceful transition to civilian
rule.
We believe that the PCCh is heavily dependent
financially on the Soviet Union. However, there is no
- The military and moderate opposition leaders
may agree on a consensus military or civilian
plebiscite candidate.
In our view, however, the interplay of key political
actors and forces remains in such a state of flux that no
clear pattern has emerged as to which of the first two
reliable information on how much funding the party
obtains from Moscow or other Communist capitals. We
believe that the FPMR also receives the bulk of its
funding from the Soviets, either through the PCCh or
directly, although there is little substantive reporting on
this matter. The Cuban arms supplies discovered in
1986 were the largest but only the latest of several
shipments received by the PCCh and the FPMR over
the past three to four years from Cuba and, we believe,
other Communist countries. An organization in Ha-
vana-dubbed the Chilean Committee-reportedly
oversees a fund that disburses some $500,000 per year
to promote radical leftist political activities in Chile.
The Committee is composed of exiles from the PCCh,
the MIR, the Christian Left, Almeyda Socialists, and the
small La Chispa Socialist faction. The primary contrib-
utors are Soviet Bloc embassies. In addition, Havana
reportedly has increased its financial support to the
Christian Left in recent months.
Moscow has been heavily involved in forming the
PCCh's strategy for many years, and it provided a
haven for top exiled party leaders for much of the post-
Allende period. Similarly, Cuba has long been the
ideological mentor of the MIR, which has always
depended primarily on Havana for the bulk of its
funding and other material aid. A variety of reports
indicate a marked increase in the number of Chilean
far leftists receiving military or related training abroad
during the past two years. For instance, most members
of the PCCh's internal military front reportedly have
been trained in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe,
while FPMR members were trained primarily in Cuba
and Nicaragua. Reporting suggests that there is close
coordination among Moscow, Havana, East European
capitals, and occasionally such countries as Algeria, on
the number of trainees and the type of instruction
provided to PCCh, and other far left cadre. Large
numbers of Chilean subversives-perhaps as many as
1,500-have completed advanced training abroad and
returned to the PCCh, FPMR, and MIR since 1984.
Trainees returning from the Soviet Union are said to
believe that they have a higher degree of military
expertise than members of the Chilean armed forces. In
fact, members of the FPMR assassination team that
tried to kill Pinochet, who almost certainly were trained
abroad, demonstrated h' h level of military compe-
tence in the attack.
outcomes is likely to prevail. Moreover, we do not
expect this situation to be clarified until mid-1988,
although the pace of political activity will accelerate
considerably and public interest concerning the suc-
cession is likely to increase in the coming months.
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35. The groups favoring each of the succession
scenarios must overcome major hurdles. Pinochet in
particular must contend with a variety of obstacles,
including:
- At least three members of the Junta do not favor
his candidacy, and he risks sparking dissension in
the military if he arbitrarily shunts them aside in
his determination to obtain the nomination.
- His popularity is low-15 to 20 percent by most
polls-and he no longer can count on the support
of reputable organized conservative political
groups.
- There is considerable unease in the military over
his reelection plans, and even some senior and
middle-grade Army officers doubt that he could
win an honest plebiscite and worry about the
consequences of a fraudulent election.
- External pressures on him to step aside in 1989
have increased, and military leaders realize that,
even if Pinochet wins a majority of the plebiscite
vote, Chile's international isolation will persist.
- The Letelier case reverberations have placed
Pinochet on the defensive with political conser-
vatives and fellow officers concerned about the
Army's image, which detracts from his national-
istic appeals against US "interference."
- His advanced age, irascible temperament, and
the public's skepticism about his intentions lessen
Pinochet's chances of performing effectively in a
political campaign that is focusing more and
more on the merits of continued authoritarian
rule versus a return to civilian government.
36. Nevertheless, Pinochet has several advantages
over his opponents:
- Time is on his side, mainly because of the
moderate opposition's inability to date to portray
itself as a viable alternative and a certain sense of
public fatalism that, no matter what the moder-
ates try, Pinochet will have his way.
- The Junta members who oppose his nomination
are playing a high-stakes game and may be
forced to back down to preserve armed forces
unity, especially if the Army officer corps rallies
behind Pinochet, the moderates fail to unite and
show sufficient political resolve, and there is a
resurgence of leftist terrorism and violence.
Military officers are not prone to coup plotting,
and distrust of politicians and concern about the
military's status under a future civilian govern-
ment run high.
- Pinochet has considerable influence over the
mass media, and his control of television is
particularly strong.
- Sound economic management and moderately
high-growth levels in 1986-87 detract from the
opposition's ability to criticize Pinochet effec-
tively in this area
37. The strengths and weaknesses of Pinochet's
opponents are essentially the obverse of his in most
respects, but there is the added factor that moderate
opposition leaders realize that they are in a "do or die"
situation, with only about a year to demonstrate to the
military and to the general public that they represent
a viable alternative to Pinochet. If they fail, they face
an indefinite prolongation of military rule, dissipation
of public support, and the danger of being supplanted
by a reenergized far left intent on destabilizing the
country. Pinochet's Junta critics and others in the
military who are anxious about his plans also know
that before late 1988 they must either forge an
agreement with the moderate opposition on a formula
for a return to civilian rule or acquiesce in Pinochet's
nomination and possible reelection. The result of this
probably would be increased political instability, inter-
national condemnation, and serious damage to the
military's image.
Less Likely Alternatives.
38. We recognize that there are several other con-
ceivable outcomes to Chile's political crisis. There is
some possibility that the military and moderate oppo-
sition would adopt a direct elections formula, but time
constraints make this unlikely. Pinochet himself could
unilaterally decide to step down, announce that the
Junta is free to choose a plebiscite candidate or amend
the Constitution to permit an open election, and resign
as commander in chief of the Army by March 1989.
We believe this scenario is also unlikely. We believe
Pinochet would agree to step down only as a last, face-
saving resort and only if confronted by a nearly united
officer corps determined to keep him from running
for reelection.
39. There are a number of other formulations
regarding possible last-minute tactical shifts by Pino-
chet if he concludes that he cannot get the plebiscite
nomination, that he could not win the plebiscite, or
that he must show some flexibility in the face of
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mounting military unease about his candidacy. Pino-
chet is said to be considering, among other stratagems:
- Dropping the plebiscite and agreeing to run in a
free election against candidates representing a
divided moderate opposition.
- Bowing to the Junta's demands that he not run in
the plebiscite while maneuvering to have a
stand-in selected and expecting to control the
country for another eight years as commander in
chief of the Army.
plebiscite, as dictated by the Constitution
40. In our view, it is unlikely that Pinochet is
seriously considering any of these ideas because he is
astute enough to know that they are all risky and that
none would ensure that he retains power. Finally, we
recognize that Pinochet could persuade the Army's
hierarchy to support an unconstitutional extension of
his presidency if the Junta blocked his renomination.
Under these circumstances, Pinochet might dismiss the
Junta, declare the Constitution in abeyance, and rule
by decree and with the sole support of the Army for
an indefinite period. This, in our view, would also be
an improbable and exceedingly risky course of action
that would generate an unprecedented ill feeling
between the Army and the other services and probably
spur groups of senior officers to begin plotting actively
to remove Pinochet by force.
41. There is also the ever-present possibility that the
Communists and their terrorist affiliate might succeed
in a second assassination attempt against Pinochet. We
judge, however, that even though the PCCh has
authorized the FPMR to plan a second attempt,
Communist leaders are reluctant to try again to kill
Pinochet. They know he now has better security, they
fear the certain crackdown by the security forces, and
they continue to believe that their best chance to
achieve power is at the head of a successful insurgen-
cy. Party leader Luis Corvalan
favors this strategy,
and he has almost certainly vetted it with Moscow,
whose advice and instructions he and other top party
leaders have followed for years. Meanwhile, Havana
will replenish the arms
caches lost last year when the PCCh and FPMR
improve their security practices and establish new,
safer delivery routes. We believe that the Communists
would most likely use these new arms supplies to
prepare for an eventual insurgency rather than for any
immediate and direct military challenge to the Chil-
ean armed forces.
42. Whether Pinochet's efforts to retain the presi-
dency will be successful remains uncertain. What
form the outcome will take probably will be unclear
for at least another year:
- We believe there is a possibility that Pinochet
will gain the Junta's nomination for the plebiscite
by keeping the moderate opposition off balance
and incapable of portraying itself as a viable
alternative. In our view, however, even if Pino-
chet prevails, he will not solidify his position
prior to mid-1988. Moreover, we believe it is
unlikely that Pinochet could win a clear majority
in a fraud-free plebiscite, even if only about half
of the eligible electorate is registered and he
engages in pork-barreling and economic pump
priming to enhance his public image.
- Therefore, Pinochet's prime chance of "winning"
the plebiscite would be by manipulating the re-
sults, which we believe would provoke an outcry
from the opposition and the media and further
erode his standing with the military. It also almost
certainly would precipitate a direct confrontation
with senior officers from all the services that could
jeopardize his tenure in office.
Implications for the United States
43. Pinochet's persistence in trying to perpetuate
himself in power is likely to jeopardize US interests in
promoting a full and stable democratic transition in
Chile. Nonetheless, we believe that Pinochet is suscep-
tible only to a limited extent to external pressures
calling for improvements in his political human rights
and labor policies, and he is somewhat more vulnera-
ble to threats of economic sanctions and cutbacks in
foreign loans or in debt reschedulings. He is not willing
to accede to foreign pressures-no matter how
strong-to the extent of agreeing to step aside at the
end of his term, but he is likely to follow his usual
tactic of trying to deflect such pressures with face-
saving and partial reforms:
- For instance, the measures he has authorized in
recent months permitting the return of several
hundred political exiles and the closing down of
the National Intelligence Center's political pris-
oner detention centers suggest that he is sensitive
to foreign criticism and wants to add some
substance to his oft-repeated assertion that he is
adhering to a "liberalization" timetable laid out
in the Constitution.
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- Several times in recent years, moreover, Pinochet
and his advisers have shown considerable sensi-
tivity to threatened negative votes on multilateral
loans to Chile. For example, Pinochet lifted the
state of siege at Washington's urging in 1985 to
obtain approval of a major financial rescue pack-
age. Even in such instances, however, he has not
made major political concessions that could un-
dercut his efforts to retain power.
Chile are
likely to benefit Politically
from continuing manifestations of concern for Chile's
future by the United States and other democratic
governments:
officers are worrie
about Chile's international pariah status, worsen-
ing relations with Washington, and the prospects
of permanent damage to the military image if a
transition to civilian rule is put off indefinitely.
Therefore, they may be susceptible to assurances
that relations with Washington and other major
capitals would improve significantly if Pinochet
stepped down at the end of his term, especially if
this implied better overall military-to-military
ties and the lifting of restrictions on military sales
and other exchanges. In addition, Chilean Army
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officers continue to be concerned about the
revelations of Major Fernandez on the Letelier
case and its potential for damaging the reputa-
tion of the Chilean Army.
The moderate opposition also would benefit if
Washington and other important capitals contin-
ue to encourage a democratic outcome in Chile.
For example, Chilean opposition leaders believe
that they will gain from a comprehensive cam-
paign of public statements supporting the free
election drive and periodic demarches to the
regime and to key components such as the
military, economic policymakers, and business
and conservative sectors regarding Pinochet's
policies. They also want more direct help, such as
with technical expertise on election mechanics
and related steps. The moderates have cautioned,
however, that all outside assistance must be
extended in ways that do not connote interfer-
ence-such as expressing preference for a partic-
ular consensus candidate' for the plebiscite or
direct elections-since Pinochet would exploit
them on nationalistic grounds. Neither the mod-
erates nor the military are likely to be influenced
by suggestions from abroad that Chile inevitably
will follow the example of the Philippines, South
Korea, or even of several South American neigh-
bors. For his part, Pinochet would portray any
such suggestions as open interference in Chilean
affairs.
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