NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP01M00147R000100130005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: January 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

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NATIONAL
SECURITY
STRATEGY
OF THE
UNITED STATES
THE WHITE HOUSE
JANUARY 1988
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Contents
Preface ... iv
1. Historical Dimensions of U.S.
National Security Strategy ... 1
II. Fundamentals of U.S. National
Security Strategy ... 3
THE FRAMEWORK-VALUES, INTERESTS, AND
NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES ... 3
Ill. Power, Policy and Strategy ... 7
ELEMENTS OF U.S. NATIONAL POWER ... 7
A PERIOD OF TRANSITION ... 8
U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLICY ... 9
Policies to Move America Forward ... 9
Informational Support to Diplomatic Power ... 10
U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY ... 11
International Economic Policy ... 11
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY ... 13
A Policy of Deterrence ... 13
Maintaining Strategic Deterrence ... 14
Maintaining Conventional Deterrence ... 18
Maintaining a National Mobilization Base ... 21
SUPPORTING POLICIES ... 22
U.S. National Space Policy ... 22
U.S. Intelligence Policy ... 23
IV. Integrating Elements of Power into
National Security Strategy ... 25
STRATEGY FOR THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN
EUROPE ... 26
STRATEGY FOR WESTERN EUROPE AND
NATO ...27
STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH
ASIA... 29
STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC ... 30
STRATEGY FOR AFRICA ... 32
STRATEGY FOR LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT ... 34
V. Executing the Strategy ... 37
RESOURCE SUPPORT ... 37
BIPARTISAN COOPERATION ... 40
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Preface
This statement of America's National Security Strategy
builds on my initial report to the Congress and the
American people last year. In the twelve months since,
the strategy outlined in that first report has served the
nation well in protecting our interests and advancing
our security objectives around the world.
In last year's report I noted that, at the outset of this
Administration, I had set forth four broad objectives
that underpinned our National Security Strategy. They
were:
? First, to restore our nation's military strength after a
period of decline in which the Soviet Union
overtook us in many critical categories of military
power;
? Second, to restore our nation's economic strength
and reinvigorate the world economic system;
? Third, to restore the nation's international prestige
as a world leader; and
? Fourth, to restore pride among all Americans and
carry our message to the world that individuals and
not governments should control their economic,
spiritual and political destinies.
Our National Security Strategy continues to be aimed
at reinforcing the gains we have achieved in each of
these areas, while employing all the elements of our
national power-political, economic and military-in a
coordinated way to advance the full range of national
security interests outlined elsewhere in this report.
The fundamentals of our strategy change little from
year to year; our interests and objectives are derived
from enduring values. Much of the discussion in this
report therefore parallels that of last year, with changes
as necessary to reflect significant developments in the
interim. These include:
? Our persistence and adherence to principle have
borne fruit in the historic agreement to eliminate
intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF)-the first of
the nuclear era to achieve meaningful reductions in
U.S. and Soviet arsenals. This treaty is a victory for
the Atlantic Alliance as well, reflecting the firmness
that all allies showed. We have also made further
progress toward a START agreement that could cut
U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms by 50
percent.
? Our SDI program is making great progress, moving
us toward the prospect of a safer world-one which
depends for its security on strategic defense, rather
than on the threat of mutual nuclear retaliation.
? In the Persian Gulf we have augmented our
traditional military presence to prevent Iran from
interfering with U.S.-flag shipping and to support
our diplomatic efforts to bring an end to the tragic
Iran-Iraq war. Our allies' contributions to the safe
navigation of the Gulf by non-belligerent shipping
are welcomed, and underline the importance which
the Free World ascribes to this strategically and
economically pivotal region of the world.
? Critical imbalances remain in the international
economy which could portend problems ahead
unless they are addressed in a forthright and
effective manner by the governments of the
industrialized nations. The major world economies,
including our own, are sound and can provide the
basis for continued growth and prosperity, provided
we and our partners deal with important fiscal,
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trade and budgetary issues in sensible and
cooperative ways.
? In the Soviet Union we hear talk of "new thinking"
and of basic changes in Soviet policies at home
and abroad. We will welcome real changes, but we
have yet to see any slackening of the growth of
Soviet military power, or abandonment of expan-
sionist aspirations. As we work to find areas for fur-
ther cooperation, we will continue to judge the
Soviets by their actions, rather than their words, and
to found our National Security Strategy on a
realistic view of Soviet aims and capabilities.
? On many continents, efforts by the Soviet Union
and its clients to impose or maintain Leninist
regimes by force of arms are meeting increasing
resistance. In Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, and
Cambodia, anti-Communist insurgencies are raising
the cost of aggression and offering hope of just
political solutions. Our strong support for Freedom
Fighters, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua, is a vital
insurance policy for peace with freedom. We are
encouraging the broader democratic trend in the
world-from Latin America to the Philippines, to the
Republic of Korea.
? At home, however, the reluctance on the part of the
Congress to provide the financial resources
necessary to support our National Security Strategy
is a cause for rising concern. Our assessment of
risks to important U.S. interests has increased, and
some of the recent gains in redressing the military
and geopolitical balance are in jeopardy. The im-
plications of this adverse trend, now in its third
year, are discussed in more detail in the final
chapter of this report.
I forward this report with the confidence that it will
help the Congress and the American people better
understand our National Security Strategy and con-
tribute to the consensus needed to enable us to fulfill
our responsibilities as leader of the world's
democracies.
As I said in last year's report, we must never forget
that freedom is never really free; it is the most costly
thing in the world. And freedom is never paid for in a
lump sum. Installments come due in every generation.
All any of us can do is offer the generations that
follow a chance for freedom. In the final analysis, this
is the assurance that our National Security Strategy
seeks to provide. I commend its reading to all
Americans.
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1. Historical Dimensions of
U.S. National Security Strategy
This is my second report to the Congress on our
National Security Strategy. Its focus is on how the
principal elements of national power-diplomatic and
informational, economic and military-can be
employed to support our national interests and pro-
mote the objectives of peace, security, and freedom. It
analyzes the major political, economic, and military
threats to our interests, and discusses the strategies
that we believe most appropriate to respond to those
threats and to help shape the future in accordance
with our positive goals and ideals. It also discusses
some of the dilemmas, tradeoffs and risks that
America faces, because we realize that our knowledge
of our adversaries is never certain and that all
resources, including our national will, are finite.
Walter Lippmann once wrote:
. . . the behavior of nations over a long period of
time is the most reliable, though not the only index
of their national interests. For though their interests
are not eternal, they are remarkably persis-
tent . . . There is no great mystery why this should
be: the facts of geography are permanent . . . thus
successive generations of men tend to face the same
recurrent problems and to react to them in more or
less habitual ways.
Lippmann's observation is particularly apt. While it is
commonplace to hear that U.S. National Security
Strategy changes erratically every four to eight years as
a result of a new Administration taking office, in reali-
ty there is a remarkable consistency over time when
our policies are viewed in historical perspective. The
core interests and objectives of this Nation have
changed little since World War II.
The first historical dimension of our strategy is
relatively simple, clear-cut, and immensely sensible. It
is the conviction that the United States' most basic na-
tional security interests would be endangered if a
hostile state or group of states were to dominate the
Eurasian landmass-that area of the globe often re-
ferred to as the world's heartland. We fought two
world wars to prevent this from occurring. And, since
1945, we have sought to prevent the Soviet Union
from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to
dominate its neighbors in Western Europe, Asia, and
the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the
global balance of power to our disadvantage.
The national strategy to achieve this objective has
been containment, in the broadest sense of that term.
Administrations have differed over which instruments
of national power-diplomatic and informational,
economic or military-should receive the most atten-
tion at any particular time. But, in the final analysis,
every Administration since World War II has endorsed
the concept that the United States, in partnership with
its allies, must prevent the Soviet Union from domi-
nating those great concentrations of industrial power
and human capacity that are Western Europe and East
Asia. Thus, shortly after World War II, the United
States helped rebuild, through the Marshall Plan, the
war-ravaged economies of Europe, limiting Soviet op-
portunities to exploit Europe's economic distress. In
addition, America deployed military forces forward, as
necessary, to help deter and contain Soviet military
expansion. As Soviet capabilities grew, our security
also required a large strategic nuclear force to aug-
ment the forward-deployed conventional deterrent and
to reinforce our deterrence of both nuclear and con-
ventional attacks on ourselves or our allies.
The advent of nuclear weapons and intercontinental
delivery systems added another dimension to our
thinking about National Security Strategy: these
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weapons became the primary threat to our national
survival. Thus, for over forty years, the deterrence of
nuclear war and the reduction of its threat have been
major objectives of U.S. National Security Strategy. We
have pursued these objectives with renewed vigor, and
heartening results, during this Administration.
Similarly, the economic element of our national power
has long been an important component of our Na-
tional Security Strategy. This Administration's strong
support for an open and expanding world economy
and trading system reflects a fundamental national in-
terest. The industrial democracies have long been im-
portant trading nations. An open world of enterprise
and the free movement of people, goods, and ideas
are not only the keys to our prosperity, but basic
moral principles. We see an expanding global pros-
perity as enhancing our own. The global economy is
clearly even more interdependent now than early in
this century when America first endorsed these prin-
ciples; and our need for access to markets and raw
materials has increased. As a result, our commitment
to free and fair trade among nations is greater today
than ever.
The facts of geography, as Lippmann pointed out,
dictate basic dimensions of our National Security
Strategy. Since the early 19th century we have not
feared invasion of the American mainland; and even
to this day, our national territory remains relatively
secure against conventional attack, protected by
oceans on the east and west and friendly nations to
our immediate north and south. However, nuclear
weapons and the means to deliver those weapons over
great distances can now threaten our national survival.
And most of our friends and allies-as well as the
markets and resources that are integrated with our
economy-are physically distant from the continental
United States.
To help protect our friends and allies, and other U.S.
interests abroad, we must not only possess national
strength, but we must be able to project this power-
diplomatic and informational, economic, and
military-across great sea and air distances. In the
military sphere, we must maintain the capability to
secure our worldwide lines of communication; to pro-
ject military power quickly; to sustain forces at great
distances for extended periods of time; and to pose a
credible deterrent to those who might contemplate
aggression against our allies and friends.
The United States has long recognized that, even as
we have taken up a major role of world leadership,
our interests and political values call for a deepening
partnership with like-minded nations to advance the
cause of peace and freedom. Thus, an abiding com-
mitment to strong alliances has been a consistent and
vital component of American strategy since the Se-
cond World War. Even if we could afford, economi-
cally and militarily, to chart our National Security
Strategy without allies-which we cannot-we would
not want to do so. "Fortress America" is an obsolete
concept. Such a policy would be dangerously mis-
guided and self-defeating. Solidarity with our allies
multiplies the strength of all. It permits a sharing of
responsibilities and it reminds us that the cause of
democracies is, after all, one of our most fundamental
goals.
As with all Administrations, during our stewardship we
have faced unique security challenges-and oppor-
tunities-presented by a dynamic world and America's
own needs. This has given our National Security
Strategy two additional emphases worth noting. The
first is realism. We have sought to deal with the world
as it is, not as we might wish it to be. A strategy
without illusions, based on observable facts, has been
our goal. We attempt to deal with both friends and
adversaries on a basis that recognizes that acts are
more important than words, and that frankness is the
foundation of productive and enduring relationships
among nations. At the same time, we have emphasiz-
ed our willingness to dialogue-to engage our adver-
saries, in particular, in negotiations aimed at finding
areas of common interest, reducing sources of tension,
and rendering our relations more stable and predic-
table. By emphasizing realism and a willingness to
talk, we have been able to place our arms reduction
negotiations with the Soviets on a more solid basis,
culminating in the first agreement between the super-
powers to achieve significant reductions in nuclear
arsenals.
This list of historical dimensions of U.S. National
Security Strategy could be extended. Academics and
practitioners have debated the issue for years. But the
fundamental point should be clear: there has been im-
pressive continuity in U.S. National Security Strategy,
reflecting the fact that the strategy is grounded in un-
changing geographic considerations, and designed to
preserve the fundamental values of our democracy.
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II. Fundamentals of U.S. National
Security Strategy
THE FRAMEWORK-VALUES,
INTERESTS, AND NATIONAL
SECURITY OBJECTIVES
Traditionally national security has been viewed as pro-
tection from external attack, thought of largely in
terms of military defenses against military threats. But
that is clearly too narrow a conception. A nation's
security today involves much more than the procure-
ment and application of military forces.
National Security Strategy must start with the values
that we as a nation prize. Last year, in observing the
200th anniversary of our Constitution, we celebrated
these values with a sense of rededication-values such
as human dignity, personal freedom, individual rights,
the pursuit of happiness, peace and prosperity. These
are the values that lead us to seek an international
order that encourages self-determination, democratic
institutions, economic development, and human rights.
The ultimate purpose of our National Security Strategy
is to protect and advance those values. But, if they are
to serve as the basis of a National Security Strategy,
these values must be translated into the more concrete
terms of national interests and objectives.
U.S. Interests
Our National Security Strategy reflects our national in-
terests and presents a broad plan for achieving the na-
tional objectives that support those interests. The key
national interests which our strategy seeks to assure
and protect include:
1. The survival of the United States as a free and in-
dependent nation, with its fundamental values intact
and its institutions and people secure.
2. A healthy and growing U.S. economy to provide
opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource
base for our national endeavors.
3. A stable and secure world, free of major threats to
U.S. interests.
4. The growth of human freedom, democratic institu-
tions, and free market economies throughout the
world, linked by a fair and open international trading
system.
5. Healthy and vigorous alliance relationships.
Major Objectives
in Support of
U.S. Interests
U.S. national security objectives are broad goals
refined from our national interests. They provide a
general guide for strategy in specific situations which
call for the coordinated use of national power. Our
principal national security objectives are:
1. To maintain the security of our nation and our
allies. The United States, in cooperation with its allies,
must seek to deter any aggression that could threaten
that security and, should deterrence fail, must be
prepared to repel or defeat any military attack and
end the conflict on terms favorable to the United
States, its interests, and its allies.
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Specifically:
? To deter hostile attack on the United States, its
citizens, military forces, or allies and to defeat
attack if deterrence fails.
? To deal effectively with threats to the security of the
United States and its citizens short of armed con-
flict, including the threat of international terrorism.
? To prevent the domination of the Eurasian landmass
by the Soviet Union, or any other hostile power or
coalition of powers.
? To prevent transfer of militarily critical technologies
and resources to the Soviet bloc and hostile coun-
tries or groups.
? To reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons by
strengthening our conventional forces, pursuing
equitable and verifiable arms control agreements
and developing technologies for strategic defense.
? To assure unimpeded U.S. access to the oceans and
space.
? To foster closer relations with the People's Republic
of China.
? To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
2. To respond to the challenges of the global eco-
nomy. Our national security and economic strength
are indivisible. As the global economy evolves in in-
creasingly interdependent ways, we must be aware of
economic factors that may affect our national security,
now or in the future. Since our dependence on for-
eign sources of supply has grown in many critical
areas, the potential vulnerability of our supply lines is
a matter of concern. Additionally, the threat of a
global spiral of protectionism must be combatted, and
the problem of debt in the developing world is a
burden on international prosperity.
Specifically:
? To promote a strong, prosperous and competitive
U.S. economy, in the context of a stable and grow-
ing world economy.
? To ensure access to foreign markets, energy, and
mineral resources by the United States and its allies
and friends.
? To promote a well-functioning international eco-
nomic system with minimal distortions to trade and
investment, with stable currencies, and broadly
agreed and respected rules for managing and
resolving differences.
3. To defend and advance the cause of democracy,
freedom, and human rights throughout the world. To
ignore the fate of millions around the world who seek
freedom betrays our national heritage and over time
would endanger our own freedom and that of our
allies.
Specifically:
? To promote national independence and the growth
of free institutions worldwide.
? To encourage and support aid, trade, and invest-
ment programs that promote economic develop-
ment and the growth of free and humane social
and political orders in the Third World.
? To encourage liberalizing tendencies within the
Soviet Union and its client states.
4. To resolve peacefully disputes which affect U.S. in-
terests in troubled regions of the world. Regional con-
flicts which involve allies or friends of the United
States may threaten U.S. interests, and frequently pose
the risk of escalation to wider conflagration. Conflicts,
or attempts to subvert friendly governments, which are
instigated or supported by the Soviets and their client
states, represent a particularly serious threat to the in-
ternational system and thereby to U.S. interests.
Specifically:
? To address, where possible, the root causes of
regional instabilities which create the risk of war.
? To maintain stable regional military balances
vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and states aligned with it.
? To neutralize the efforts of the Soviet Union to in-
crease its influence in the world, and to weaken the
links between the Soviets and their client states in
the Third World.
? To aid in combatting threats to the stability of
friendly governments and institutions from insurgen-
cies, subversion, state-sponsored terrorism and the
international trafficking of illicit drugs.
5. To build effective and friendly relationships with all
nations with whom there is a basis of shared concern.
In the world today, there are over 150 nations. Not
one of them is the equal of the United States in total
power or wealth, but each is sovereign, and most, if
not all, touch U.S. interests directly or indirectly.
Specifically:
? To make major international institutions more effec-
tive in promoting peace, world order and political,
economic and social progress.
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? To seek opportunities to improve relations with the
Soviet Union on a realistic and reciprocal basis.
? To improve relations with other nations hostile to us
in order to reduce the chance of future conflict.
? To strengthen U.S. influence throughout the world.
PRINCIPAL THREATS TO U.S.
INTERESTS
The most significant threat to U.S. security interests re-
mains the global challenge posed by the Soviet
Union. Despite reforms that the leadership of the So-
viet Union has recently undertaken-the significance
and durability of which remain unclear-Soviet mili-
tary power and active diplomacy continue forcefully to
challenge our vital interests in many parts of the
world. The Soviet Union places a high priority on
creating and exploiting divisions within and among
the Western allies. In key developing countries it sup-
ports communist parties, insurgent movements, and
other elements that seek to undermine governments
allied with or friendly to the United States and to re-
place them with authoritarian or totalitarian regimes.
In other developing countries, modernizing forces
struggling to create or consolidate democratic and free
market societies are actively opposed by groups sup-
ported or inspired by the Soviet Union and its allies.
As a result of changes in leadership style, the Soviet
Union has succeeded in projecting a more favorable
international image. Proposed domestic reforms and
foreign policy initiatives have given rise, in some
cases, to hopes for fundamental changes in Soviet
behavior. The new style of Soviet policy has its
political impact. Moscow is moving in new directions,
offering an array of initiatives, putting old assumptions
in doubt, attracting new support internationally, and
sometimes placing Western governments on the defen-
sive. This poses a new, continuing, and more
sophisticated challenge to Western policy. Whether re-
cent changes constitute a real opportunity for more
fundamental improvements in relations with the Soviet
Union remains to be seen. We are open-minded on
this score. While recognizing the competitive and
predominantly adversarial character of our relation-
ship, we shall maintain a dialogue with the Soviet
Union in order to seize opportunities for more con-
structive relations.
Although the Soviet Union still poses the primary
security threat, we and our allies and friends also face
a diversity of other serious security challenges:
regional and low-intensity conflicts; the potential for
nuclear proliferation; international terrorism; narcotics
trafficking; radical politico-religious movements; and
problems of instability, succession, and economic
development in countries that are important friends
and allies.
In Europe, the principal threat to America's interests,
and to those of our allies, continues to be that posed
by the ongoing buildup of Warsaw Pact military capa-
bilities. For decades the Soviet Union has allocated a
disproportionately high share of its national income to
military expenditures and has created technologically
sophisticated forces far in excess of any plausible need
for self-defense. Equally threatening, but much more
subtle, is the continuous political warfare against
Western cohesion through propaganda, particularly
focused on the younger generations of Western Euro-
peans. Through such means the Soviet Union is
attempting to affect public opinion in allied countries
to weaken relations with the United States, erode the
commitment to defense, and encourage support for
Soviet policies and proposals. Ultimately, the Soviet
Union still seeks to separate Western Europe
politically and militarily from the United States,
thereby altering the global balance of power in the
most fundamental way.
Beyond the challenges in Europe, other areas give
cause for concern. Free World interests in the Middle
East are seriously threatened by the protracted war
between Iran and Iraq, and by Iran's drive to become
the dominant power in the region. Tehran's threats to
friendly Gulf States and to international shipping in
the Persian Gulf have caused the United States and
several of its allies to provide naval protection for their
own shipping, and to assist certain of the Gulf States.
The aggressive radical regime in Iran persists in
threatening its neighbors which are friends of the
United States with military force, and through ter-
rorism and subversion. Its terrorist surrogates in Leba-
non fuel the anarchy in that stricken country, while
Iran advertises its willingness to use terrorism against
United States personnel and facilities in the Middle
East and elsewhere. Whatever Iran's mistrust of the
Soviet Union, Iran's policies undermine Western
friends and Western relationships in the Middle East
and objectively benefit the Soviet Union globally.
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Fragile democratic governments in Central and South
America are being confronted by myriad social and
economic problems. At the same time, radical and in-
surgent groups supported by the Soviets, the San-
dinista regime in Nicaragua, and by Cuba are a
source of political destabilization. Prospects for an en-
during peace in Central America will be bleak as long
as the Sandinista leaders betray their promises of gen-
uinely democratic government and support insurgent
forces attempting to subvert their neighbors.
Other regional tensions and conflicts-such as those
on the Korean peninsula, in Indochina, in Southern
Africa, and between Israel and its Arab neighbors-
threaten both international peace and the internal
stability of friendly states. In the Philippines, for exam-
ple, the fledging democratic government is besieged
by a variety of extremist forces some of which wish to
impose authoritarian regimes.
Low intensity conflicts, the increasing linkages be-
tween international terrorists and narcotics traffickers,
as well as racial, sectarian, and other tensions con-
tinue to challenge U.S. interests and our hopes for
human betterment. Refugees from these conflicts can
place powerful burdens on the economies and
societies of host countries, and require substantial
quantities of international relief.
The spread of nuclear weapons to additional nations
threatens to exacerbate regional conflicts and could
conceivably involve the United States and the Soviet
Union in nuclear conflicts. This proliferation could
ultimately make nuclear deterrence less stable. At this
time, the most difficult regional nuclear rivalry in-
volves India and Pakistan, but other areas of the
world, including the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America could be subject to similar dangers in the
future.
Although in recent years the international economic
and financial system has proved to be remarkably
resilient, sudden, unexpected shocks can pose major
new challenges to U.S. interests. The hard currency
debts of many developing nations-including several
that are neighbors and important friends and allies of
the United States-have had severe and destabilizing
consequences within their societies. Most of the
debtor states have been unable to achieve sustained
and significant economic growth since the early 1980s
and have experienced high rates of unemployment
and inflation, and extended periods of unpopular
austerity. Many of these countries are also adversely
affected by low commodity prices in the international
market, capital flight, excessive government spending,
narcotics production and trafficking, and other in-
digenous and externally imposed problems that will
not be easily remedied. The longer the economies of
the major debtor states fail to rebound from these
conditions, the greater are the possibilities that ir-
responsible elements will gain local support for na-
tionalistic responses that could damage important U.S.
interests.
In addition, rising pressure in some major trading na-
tions for greater protection from foreign competition
could place powerful new downward pressure on
these national economies. Potentially, this could result
in a spiral of protectionist measures that would en-
danger the international trading system.
Finally, the prospects for world peace and prosper-
ity-and thus for U.S. interest in a just and progressive
international order-will be influenced by other pro-
blems in certain parts of the world. Critical shortages
of food, a lack of health services, and inabilities to
meet other basic needs will keep millions of people,
particularly in Africa, in peril. The dangerous deple-
tion or contamination of the natural endowments of
some nations-soil, forests, water, air-will add to their
environmental and health problems, and increasingly
to those of the global community. These problems
cannot be resolved simply through outside assistance,
for many of them will require policy changes and
leadership by governments and elites in the countries
themselves. But all create potential threats to the
peace and prosperity that are in our national interest,
as well as the interests of the affected nations.
In summary, this broad range of threats to our national
interests provides the backdrop against which we for-
mulate our National Security Strategy. As we seek
ways to promote our national interests and objectives,
a careful understanding of these evolving threats is
essential to proper strategy formulation.
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III. Power, Policy, and Strategy
ELEMENTS OF U.S.
NATIONAL POWER
Having described our national security interests, ob-
jectives, and the range of threats that we face, it is
appropriate next to turn to the national means
available to achieve our objectives, and to the strat-
egies that relate means to ends.
The means available are the elements of national
power that the United States possesses-diplomatic
and informational, economic and military-and which
we employ to influence the behavior of other nations.
Power, it is often said, is the quintessence of strategy.
Unfortunately, America's national power is sometimes
thought of only in coercive or military terms. I believe,
however, that national power is also derived from a
nation's moral legitimacy and leadership, as we ex-
emplified by the Marshall Plan after World War II-an
act of strengthening allies, of enlightened self-interest.
Today, nations understand that the effective use of na-
tional power is something more than the simple use
of force; and we seek to follow a National Security
Strategy that ensures we can relate to other nations on
the basis of credibility rather than simple capability.
We have an exceptionally diverse array of instruments
for employing the various elements of national power.
Exercised by the Executive Departments and Agencies,
these tools are most effective when integrated, tailored
to the specific situation, and guided by a common
strategy for their implementation. These instruments
include:
? Moral and political example. American spirit and
prosperity represent a critical challenge to the
ideology and the practical record of our adversaries:
free, pluralist societies work. Since the days of our
Founding Fathers, this power of example has
represented a potent leverage in international rela-
tions. But we should not leave its expression and
understanding to chance. It is in our interest to
spread this message in an organized and effective
way.
? Military strength. A strong military capability is
essential for a stable, secure environment in which
our adversaries are deterred and diplomacy can be
effective.
? Economic vitality. America's economic strength sus-
tains our other elements of power and fortifies our
relations with the countries that share our interest
in a free and open international economy.
? Alliance relationships. The pursuit of American
security objectives depends on cooperation with
like-minded international partners. These relation-
ships enhance our strength and mitigate the under-
standable reluctance of the American people to
shoulder security burdens alone. The predictable
difficulties that arise from time to time in all
alliance relationships must be measured against the
enormous benefits that these ties bring us and our
friends.
? Public diplomacy. This is a key instrument-one
with an impact both strong and subtle on interna-
tional political events and how people perceive
them. Through our public diplomacy activities, we
seek to explain to foreign audiences our policies
and actions in ways that are clear, credible, and
likely to elicit support for our interests and
objectives.
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? Security assistance. By helping friends and allies ac-
quire the means to defend themselves, we comple-
ment the rebuilding of our own military strength
and increase the human and material resources
available for the defense of free world interests. In
the process, we reduce the likelihood of direct
American involvement in potential conflicts. Secu-
rity assistance is a key instrument in our national
security strategies, a productive and highly lever-
aged investment that promotes our security interests
at bargain prices.
? Development assistance. It is in our national interest
to support efforts of friendly developing countries to
provide for the basic needs of their people.
Development assistance plays a vital role in encour-
aging market-oriented approaches with the potential
to increase income levels in recipient countries. A
well structured and financed development
assistance program enhances our world leadership
and influence.
? Science and technology cooperation. For many
countries, access to advanced scientific and techno-
logical resources is critical to prosperity and long-
term economic growth. U.S. world leadership and
our vast resources in science and technology are
important strategic assets to strengthen existing ties
with friends and allies, and promote positive rela-
tionships with key developing nations.
? International organizations. Multilateral diplomacy
and participation in international organizations such
as the United Nations and the International Mone-
tary Fund provide opportunities to address common
global problems and share the task of solving them.
Skillful diplomacy within these and other multi-
lateral organizations can serve to enhance our
overall goals on issues such as peacekeeping, pro-
motion of human rights, and encouraging the de-
velopment of free economic and political systems.
? Diplomatic mediation. In regions where conflict
threatens our interests or those of our friends,
political efforts can play a major role in ending
violence, promoting freedom and national self-
determination, and laying the foundations for future
stability. The initiatives of American diplomacy take
their strength from effective and integrated use of
the tools already discussed, and from the ability of
U.S. representatives to act credibly as mediators of
disputes. Making clear the firmness of our com-
mitments to friends and allies increases the incen-
tives to negotiate seriously.
A PERIOD OF TRANSITION
We are living in times that historians will characterize
as a period of transition in international security
affairs. As noted in my first National Security Strategy
Report, this transition really began in the late 1970s
when our policies to rebuild our allies' economies
had long since succeeded, and America no longer
held an overwhelmingly predominant economic posi-
tion vis-a-vis Western Europe and East Asia. This
realignment of economic strength is likely to continue
into the next decade with the further evolution of East
Asia's industrial economies, particularly that of China.
This transition period has also been marked by the So-
viet Union's massive military buildup-consuming as
much as 15-17 percent of annual GNP. This large, un-
matched investment provided the Soviets by the 1980s
a position of strategic nuclear parity, quantitative con-
ventional force superiority around the Eurasian
rimland, and a modern, globally deployed navy. The
buildup has also supported the projection of Soviet in-
fluence into many areas of the world-particularly the
unstable Third World regions of Southeast and
Southwest Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The
buildup's consequences will continue to present a ma-
jor threat to our security and that of our allies for
years to come.
Two other major trends characterize this period of
transition in international security affairs. The first is
the revolution in military technology that is already
well underway. New surveillance and targeting sys-
tems, new means of destruction, and low observable
(stealth) technology will soon provide military
capabilities previously thought wholly infeasible.
Similarly, rapid advances in microelectronics will
allow the command, control and communications, in-
tegrated with intelligence sources, to provide the
necessary strategic and tactical direction of such
advanced military operations.
Our military leaders, as well as those of our adver-
saries, are now rethinking military doctrines and force
structures as a result of these and other applications of
advanced technology to military power. As this trend
continues, military competition is likely to focus in-
creasingly on non-nuclear weapons, where the
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combinations of stealth and extreme accuracy at long
ranges will reopen the possibility of non-nuclear stra-
tegic attack. Space will also become a more promi-
nent area of activity, not the least because of its grow-
ing importance for air, ground, and naval warfare. We
expect that this revolution in military technology will
continue well into the next decade and necessitate the
adaptation both of military doctrines and of national
security strategies. In this regard, the recent report of
the bipartisan Commission on Integrated Long-Term
Strategy helps bring into focus the essentiality of
maintaining our technological superiority through
coherent military research and development programs
aimed at exploiting emerging strategic opportunities.
The last major trend of this transition period is the dif-
fusion of economic power and advanced technology
to the Third World. This combination of economic
growth and technological maturation has already pro-
vided several countries with an independent capability
to produce large numbers of advanced weapons
systems, both for their own use and for export. Thus,
countries dependent on neither the United States nor
the Soviet Union could in the not too distant future
possess the capability to conduct a major war, either
against each other or against a world power. The
arsenals at the disposal of these sovereign countries
are likely to include chemical weapons, and may
eventually include nuclear weapons and space systems
for target location. As this trend continues, the poten-
tial for mid- and high-intensity conflict increases in
many regions of the world, some of which are already
suffering from various types of low intensity conflict.
In responding to these emerging features of the strate-
gic landscape, we have formulated our strategies to
play to our strengths and to exploit our adversaries'
weaknesses. For example, our defense policies stress
that the United States and its allies must continue to
enjoy technological superiority over the Soviet Union.
The West's spirit of inquiry and the free flow of infor-
mation permit technology and innovation to flourish
to a far greater degree than in a closed society. Our
advantages in areas such as precision guided muni-
tions, stealth technology, submarine quieting, and
super-computer technology are important strategic
assets and we intend to exploit them, and to protect
them from Soviet attempts to acquire them-either by
purchase or theft.
In a similar manner, our diplomatic policies are
designed to play to the strength of our alliance rela-
tionships. In Europe, we and our NATO allies are part-
ners in a voluntary coalition of sovereign, equal
nations-in stark contrast to the Warsaw Pact and the
Eastern European countries still dominated by Soviet
military power. In this period of transition we have
new opportunities as our allies display an increasing
willingness to seek a larger role in providing for West-
ern European defense. We welcome this trend, know-
ing we are working from the strength of an abiding
alliance partnership, and that increasing allied con-
tributions are important to assuring the Alliance's long-
term effectiveness and viability.
But the period of transition is not over; and ad-
ministrations after mine will continue to adapt strate-
gic concepts and policies to the realities of an evolv-
ing world-one in which America must always play a
leading role, to help shape a positive future for
ourselves and our allies.
The remainder of this section discusses the fundamen-
tal policies-diplomatic, economic and defense-that
guide our use of the elements of national power as we
formulate strategy. These policy guidelines provide
coherence and consistency among the set of inte-
grated strategies which are discussed in the chapter
that follows.
U.S. DIPLOMATIC POLICY
Policies to Move America
Forward
As I have stated on many occasions, our diplomacy
has aimed at ensuring, in the nuclear age, both peace
and freedom. Working with our allies and friends, we
have sought to push beyond the stalemates of the
postwar era and directly confront two transcendent
issues affecting our national security-the danger of
nuclear warfare and the continuing expansion of totali-
tarian rule.
In dealing with the nuclear threat, we have gone
beyond traditional arms control and, together with our
NATO allies, have sought verifiable reductions in
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nuclear arsenals. At the same time, we have launched
a new program of research into ways to defend our-
selves against ballistic missile attack. In doing so, we
seek to maintain deterrence while moving away from
reliance on retaliation, and toward a situation in
which ballistic missiles will ultimately be rendered
obsolete.
While we have sought arms reductions and greater
reliance on defensive measures, we have never lost
sight of the fact that nations do not disagree because
they are armed; they are armed because they disagree
on very important matters of human life and liberty.
The fundamental differences between totalitarian and
democratic rule remain. We cannot gloss them over,
nor can we be content with accepted spheres of in-
fluence, a world only half free. Thus, we have sought
to advance the cause of freedom where opportunities
exist to do so. Sometimes this means support for
liberalization; sometimes support for liberation.
In regional conflicts, for example, we have elaborated
a policy of helping anti-Communist insurgents in their
battle to bring self-determination, independence, and
human rights to their own countries. This doctrine was
first reflected in our decision to assist the people of
Afghanistan in their fight against Soviet invasion and
occupation. It was an important part of our decision
to assist the people of Nicaragua in their battle to
restore the integrity of their 1979 revolution and make
the Sandinista government keep its promise of
democratic rule. Our current efforts in Angola in sup-
port of freedom fighters constitute the most recent ex-
tension of this policy.
Undergirding all of this is our continuing commitment
to public candor about the nature of totalitarian rule
and the ultimate objectives of U.S. foreign policy:
peace, yes, but world freedom as well. We refuse to
believe that it is somehow an act of hostility to pro-
claim publicly the crucial moral distinctions between
democracy and totalitarianism.
Informational Support to
Diplomatic Power
We are faced with a profound challenge to our na-
tional security in the political field. This challenge is
to fight the war of ideas and to help support the
political infrastructure of world democracies. To ac-
complish this we must be as committed to the use of
the informational aspects of our diplomatic power as
to the other elements which comprise it.
Here in the United States, public opinion polls con-
sistently find that, depending on the issue, up to
two-thirds of the American electorate normally take no
interest in foreign policy. Moreover, only a slight ma-
jority of Americans today believe that this country
needs to play an active part in world affairs. There is
no natural domestic constituency for America's foreign
policy-we must build one.
The agencies which we use to implement such an ap-
proach include the Departments of State and Defense,
Agency for International Development (AID), and U.S.
Information Agency (USIA), as well as several less
traditional participants, including the Departments of
Commerce and Treasury, and the U.S. Trade Repre-
sentative (USTR). All contribute to our Public
Diplomacy and related informational programs.
Another important way of achieving this is through the
private sector. During the past seven years, we have
encouraged the American private sector to become a
key element in the projection of U.S. foreign policy
goals. Leading private citizens and groups have taken
steps to identify and organize the many local forces
throughout America that have a direct stake in our na-
tion's relations with the rest of the world. These
private voluntary organizations are doing an indispen-
sable job of public education. They have our strongest
encouragement and support.
While we focus on the needs of an effective
diplomatic and informational policy, we must keep in
mind that the Soviet Union is pursuing a very ag-
gressive public deception and propaganda program,
using a wide range of techniques aimed not only at
the Third World, but also at us and our alliance part-
ners. The challenge is to counter Soviet propaganda
and so-called "active measures" using the full range of
our informational programs to tell the truth about
American values, interests, and policies.
Our political and informational power must also reach
to the peoples of denied areas, particularly the USSR
and Eastern Europe-to encourage hope for change
and to educate publics on the benefits of free institu-
tions. We undertake this through the electronic media,
written materials, increased contacts and the exchange
of ideas that come from such contacts. Any process of
change must find its roots within a closed
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society, but knowledge of the world at large may be a
stimulant; and the free flow of ideas and information
is, in itself, one of the goals of those who seek
democratic change. For our part, we proceed from our
fundamental belief that a world composed of free,
sovereign democracies will be a safer, more stable
world-one where respect for the dignity of all people
has a better chance to be realized.
U.S. ECONOMIC POLICY
International Economic Policy
U.S. national power rests on the strength of our
domestic economy. A growing, resilient and techno-
logically vigorous economy is vital to our national
security. In peacetime it is the fundamental underpin-
ning of our national defense capabilities. In a crisis or
during wartime it provides the ability to respond
rapidly with skilled personnel, expanded production
capacity, and supplies of critical materials. World Wars
I and II demonstrated the vital importance of a strong
domestic economy able to produce quickly and
efficiently the goods needed to defend ourselves and
our allies.
Our economic strength has domestic and international
dimensions, although the distinctions are neither easy
nor rigid. Domestically, it is in our national security
interest to maintain a dynamic research and develop-
ment capability which enables us to be in the fore-
front of technological advance. Our manufacturing
sector must remain competitive with those in other
leading industrial countries. Our financial and service
industries must provide up-to-date tools for the con-
tinued growth of our economy. Other sectors of the
economy, such as energy and transport, need to be of
sufficient size and diversity to provide a critical nu-
cleus should we need to respond to an emergency.
Finally, our labor force is-and will remain-a key ele-
ment of our economic strength. An innovative, adap-
tive and educated labor force remains essential to the
development of new technologies, the continued
growth of our economy and the production of com-
petitive goods.
While mindful of the need for a strong domestic
economy, we do not-and should not-strive for
domestic economic self-sufficiency or' for dominance
in all economic sectors. Market economies are in-
terdependent. Since 1945, we have pursued a vigorous
policy, first, of helping rebuild the European and
Pacific economies devastated by war; and second, of
supporting economic cooperation and development
among all Free World economies. We strongly be-
lieved then-as we do now-that national economic
strength is a shared strength. For example, we support
European efforts at economic integration through the
European Community because we believe that a
strong European economy will be better able to con-
tribute the resources necessary for a strong Alliance
defense. Likewise, the Free Trade Area Agreement
recently negotiated with our largest trading partner,
Canada, directly and positively contributes to our col-
lective security in North America. Just as our defense
depends on the cooperation and participation of our
allies, so does our economic prosperity. Thus our
economic objectives in support of our security
policies are necessarily global. However, one central
consequence of our interdependence is that we can-
not dictate economic policy but must consult and
negotiate, recognizing the realities of mutual
dependence.
As the world's leading economic power, we have a
responsibility by our actions at home to help sustain
and extend the global economic recovery. The un-
precedented peacetime expansion of the American
economy since 1982 provides a vivid demonstration of
the power and creativity that free enterprise can
unleash. However, the United States has not ac-
complished this alone. International flows of people,
capital and goods have enabled us to improve our
standard of living far beyond that which would have
resulted from a closed economy. In return, American
technology, capital and goods have enabled other
countries to improve their economies. Our success
also provides constructive examples of the benefits of
open societies and economies. At home we must im-
plement economic policies that continue to promote
growth, while holding down inflation and reducing
the federal deficit by controlled government spending.
The budget compromise which we reached late last
year with the leaders of the Congress is an important
step toward those ends. Limiting the cost of central
government will allow resources to be more produc-
tively used by the private sector. By reducing the
federal deficit and promoting private saving, we can
reduce undue dependence on inflows of foreign capi-
tal and play a stronger role in providing capital to
support growth in the global economy.
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A natural consequence of societies' striving to grow
and be competitive in the world economy is periodic
tension manifested in trade disputes and other bi-
lateral economic difficulties. The United States, as the
leading proponent of an open international trading
system, has led in the construction of the present
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
system, which has promoted over the years a vigorous
expansion of trade to the benefit of all. We are now
seeking to strengthen that system and bring it up to
date. We strongly support the Uruguay Round of
multilateral trade negotiations which aims further to
reduce barriers to global trade. For the first time,
agriculture, intellectual property rights, trade in ser-
vice (such as banking, insurance and transportation),
and investment will be the focus of serious
negotiation.
History has shown that free, open economies with
unrestricted trade are strong economies, which grow
faster and have the resources with which to defend
themselves. Open trade and cooperation among na-
tions also help to cement alliances which in turn
bolsters our coalition defense efforts. The challenge to
the United States now is to avoid letting tensions and
disputes over trade issues undermine domestic sup-
port for free trade, or become a catalyst for policies
which only serve to reduce overall economic growth,
and thus work in opposition to our security objectives.
In this regard, we must actively resist the temptation
to impose protectionist measures in order to cope
with trade imbalances, while responding to the
legitimate concerns of U.S. industry about the unfair
trade practices of other countries. Protectionist trade
legislation would be a major threat to our economic
health, to economic and political relations with our
allies, and to our collective economic and military
strength.
There are times, however, when we must restrict
economic relations between the United States and
other countries not only for reasons of national securi-
ty, but to protest odious national behavior. By restric-
ting economic relations, we seek vigorously to
persuade the target country that its behavior is unac-
ceptable. For example, U.S. economic leverage is
employed against nations that threaten regional stabili-
ty or support international terrorism, such as Cuba,
Libya and Nicaragua. However, economic sanctions
are never imposed without careful consideration, as
they inevitably impose costs on American business as
well as foreign clients. For that reason our policy will
continue to be to use them sparingly, and only con-
tinue them when their need and effectiveness can be
clearly demonstrated.
Energy is an important underpinning to our economic,
industrial and military strength, and thus to our na-
tional security. Over the long term, our national
energy policy is aimed at ensuring adequate supplies
of energy at reasonable prices by strengthening
domestic energy industries, diversifying energy
sources, and improving energy efficiency. We are
working through the International Energy Agency to
assist our allies to develop complementary strategies.
More immediate objectives are to reduce the nation's
vulnerability to disruptions in foreign energy supplies
and to lessen the impact on the civil economy if
disruptions should occur. This includes plans for in-
creasing the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve,
promoting international cooperation with allies and
partners in the International Energy Agency, and en-
couraging research into economically viable tech-
nologies that increase energy efficiency or that make
use of alternative sources of power.
Internationally, we have led in the coordination of
economic policy among the major industrialized
countries. In addition, we will continue to assist
developing countries to realize sustained, non-
inflationary growth, since we understand that this is in
our mutual economic and security interest. We will
encourage an effective adjustment process for debtor
nations, supported by adequate private and public
financing. To help debtor countries, we have expressed
our willingness to negotiate additional resources for
the World Bank. The United States has welcomed a
proposed enlargement of the IMF's Structural Adjust-
ment Facility. We also have proposed a broadened
IMF facility to provide a financial cushion for
vulnerable developing countries dealing with the
vicissitudes of external economic forces.
As noted earlier, our nation's defense edge is based on
technological, rather than numerical superiority. If we
lose this edge, we also lose an essential element
of our military deterrent. There is concern that the
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loss of advanced production capabilities in critical in-
dustries could place our defense manufacturing base
in jeopardy. We must avoid situations where increased
reliance on other countries for advances in critical
technologies could, over the long term, turn into
vulnerabilities.
Furthermore, the fruits of the free-market economy
must not strengthen the military capability of our
adversaries. We, as well as our allies, must continue to
ensure that economic relationships with the Soviet
bloc do not weaken our national security. For exam-
ple, we have reached agreement on eliminating pref-
erential credit terms to the Soviet Union. Working
through the International Energy Agency, we and our
allies have reduced the substantial risk of Western
European dependence on Soviet energy. Acting with
our allies through the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), we are making
progress toward ensuring that militarily-sensitive
technology does not flow to the Soviet Union and that
competitor firms in COCOM member nations bear the
same export restrictions as U.S. firms. We will con-
tinue to improve the COCOM review process, to har-
monize and tighten national licensing and
enforcement procedures, and to encourage greater
cooperation with allies and friends. The dual objec-
tives of protecting and sharing militarily significant
technologies pose a challenge, one made more dif-
ficult by rapid technological changes. But it is a
challenge we must meet.
We willingly offer our philosophy of free-market econ-
omies to centrally planned regimes. Indeed, it is only
by adopting market mechanisms that these regimes
can satisfy the economic needs and desires of their
peoples. However, market economies only flourish
where freedom and individual rights are encouraged.
The IMF, GATT and other international economic in-
stitutions are mainly concerned with improving rela-
tions among free individuals, businesses and financial
institutions. While we note recent Soviet policy
statements regarding "reconstruction" and economic
reform, the Soviet economic system remains at this
point fundamentally incompatible with participation in
free-world institutions. Policy statements must be
translated into positive actions before such participa-
tion can be considered.
U.S. DEFENSE POLICY
A Policy of Deterrence
The third element of U.S. national power is military. In
some cases, the integrated use of the other elements
of national power will be insufficient to meet the
threats to our security interests. We therefore must
be-and are-ready to employ military power in coor-
dination with the other elements. However, the ulti-
mate goal when applying military force, or projecting
military power, is to encourage political solutions.
War is the least desirable alternative, but only by
being prepared to wage war successfully can we deter
it.
America's defense policy throughout the postwar
period has been aimed at deterring aggression against
the United States and its allies. Deterrence works by
persuading potential adversaries that the costs of their
aggression will exceed any probable gains. Deterrence
is the basis of our military strategy against conven-
tional as well as nuclear aggression. Because any con-
flict carries the risk of escalation, our goal is to
dissuade aggression of any kind.
We seek also to prevent coercion of the United States,
its allies, and friends. Successful coercion could give a
hostile power the benefits of victory without the cost
of war. As discussed earlier, the Soviet threat manifests
itself not only in the danger of an actual attack, but in
the form of propaganda, intimidation and coercion as
well. The Soviets still seek to dominate Western
Europe and Japan without having to fire a shot-a
coercive threat which must and will be deterred by
our political determination, our defense capabilities,
and our alliance relationships.
To deter the Soviet Union, we must make clear to its
leaders that we have the means and the will to res-
pond effectively to coercion or aggression against our
security interests. While emphasizing our resolve to
respond, our policy is to avoid specifying exactly what
our response will be. This is the essense of our
strategic doctrine of "flexible response;' which has
been United States policy since 1961 and NATO
strategy since 1967. Specifically, our forces deter a
potential aggressor by confronting him with three
types of possible responses from which we would
choose at the appropriate time:
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? Direct Defense: To confront an adversary with the
possibility that his aggression will be stopped with-
out our resorting to actions which escalate the con-
flict. This is sometimes referred to as "deterrence
through denial:' Defeating a nonnuclear attack with
conventional forces only would be an example of
direct defense.
? The Threat of Escalation: To warn an adversary that
his aggression could start hostilities that might not
be confined in the manner he hopes or envisions
and that escalation could exact far greater costs
than he anticipates, or could bear. In this regard,
NATO's deterrence of a Soviet conventional attack is
enhanced by our ability and resolve to use nuclear
weapons, if necessary, to halt aggression.
? The Threat of Retaliation: To raise the prospect that
an attack will trigger a retaliatory attack on the ag-
gressor's homeland, causing his losses far to exceed
any possible gains. Our deterrence of a Soviet nu-
clear attack on the United States is based on our
resolve to retaliate directly against the Soviet
Union.
Maintaining Strategic
Deterrence
While deterrence requires capabilities across the entire
spectrum of conflict, its essential foundation is pro-
vided by our strategic nuclear forces and the doctrine
which supports them. Nuclear deterrence, like any
form of deterrence, requires us to consider not what
would deter us, but what would deter a potential at-
tacker, particularly one whose perceptions of the
world and value system are substantially different from
our own. Since we can never be entirely certain of
Soviet perceptions, we must ensure that both the
effectiveness of our strategic forces and our will to use
them, if necessary, are never in doubt.
In the interest of ensuring deterrence, the United
States maintains diversified strategic retaliatory forces
to hedge against a disarming first strike, to complicate
Soviet attack plans, and to guard against technological
surprise. To this end we maintain a variety of basing
modes, launch platforms, and attack vehicles, achiev-
ing diversity through a triad of submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs) and bombers. Adequate and sur-
vivable command, control and communications are
essential to our strategic force structure and critical to
the credibility of our strategic deterrent.
Our strategic forces and the associated targeting policy
must, by any calculation, be perceived as making nu-
clear warfare a totally unacceptable and unrewarding
proposition for the Soviet leadership. Accordingly, our
targeting policy:
? Denies the Soviets the ability to achieve essential
military objectives by holding at risk Soviet war-
making capabilities, including both the full range of
Soviet military forces and the war-supporting in-
dustry which provides the foundation for Soviet
military power and supports its capability to con-
duct a protracted conflict; and
? Places at risk those political entities the Soviet
leadership values most: the mechanisms for ensur-
ing survival of the Communist Party and its leader-
ship cadres, and for retention of the Party's control
over the Soviet and Soviet-bloc peoples.
This basic policy of targeting those assets which are
essential to Soviet warmaking capability and political
control has been an integral part of U.S. strategy for
many years. In implementing this policy, the United
States does not target population as an objective in
itself and seeks to minimize collateral damage through
more accurate, lower yield weapons.
Holding at risk the full range of Soviet assets is
necessary for an effective deterrent, but is not suffi-
cient. As President, I cannot be limited to the options
of capitulation or massive mutual destruction in re-
sponse to aggression. We must have flexibility in the
employment of our strategic forces. For our deterrent
to be credible, it must be clear to the Soviets that the
United States has military options appropriate to a
broad range of plausible situations.
Finally, the United States requires sufficient residual
capability to provide leverage for early war termina-
tion, and to avoid coercion in a post-conflict world.
For this reason, we maintain a nuclear reserve force as
an integral part of our strategic forces. In addition, we
maintain Continuity of Government programs to en-
sure the Soviets cannot escape retaliation by initiating
a quick, "decapitating" attack aimed at incapacitating
our political and military leadership. Our civil defense
program also contributes to the Nation's preparedness
in the event of an attack.
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These capabilities do not imply that we seek the
ability to fight a nuclear war. I have repeatedly em-
phasized that a nuclear war cannot be won and must
never be fought. But we must deter an adversary who
has a very different strategic outlook from our own-
an outlook which continues to place great stress on
nuclear warfighting capability. It is essential the
Soviets understand that they cannot gain their objec-
tives through nuclear warfare, or nuclear coercion,
under any conceivable circumstances.
Our policy of flexible response and deterrence
through the threat of offensive retaliation has
preserved the security of the United States and its
allies for decades. Looking to the future, the Strategic
Defense Initiative offers an opportunity to shift deter-
rence to a safer and more stable basis through greater
reliance on strategic defenses. Such defenses, which
threaten no one, would enhance deterrence by inject-
ing greater uncertainties into Soviet estimates of their
ability to achieve their military objectives should they
attempt a first strike. Even less than perfect defense
could increase stability by denying the Soviets con-
fidence that they could achieve meaningful military
goals, thereby eliminating incentives for a Soviet first
strike. In judging the suitability of systems for possible
deployment, we will continue to be guided by the cri-
teria of military effectiveness, survivability, and cost-
effectiveness at the margin.
By reducing the military value of ballistic missiles,
strategic defenses would facilitate Soviet acceptance of
significant arms reduction agreements. In a world with
fewer ballistic missiles, however, Soviet incentives to
not abide by such agreements would be greater.
Strategic defense can effectively negate such incentives
by eliminating the utility of covertly stockpiled
missiles. Thus enhanced strategic defenses offer the
prospect of a safer, more stable world in which deep
reductions in strategic offensive arms are both
negotiable and enforceable. We will continue to try to
persuade the Soviets to join with us in working out a
stable transition to this desirable goal.
Continuing the modernization of our strategic forces is
essential to assure reliable deterrence, enhance stabili-
ty, and provide motivation for the Soviets to negotiate
broad, deep, equitable and verifiable reductions in
strategic offensive arms. While we are firmly commit-
ted to using arms reductions as one component of our
policy for enhancing U.S. and allied security, success
in arms negotiations does not alter the need for
modern, effective, survivable nuclear forces to provide
deterrence, promote stability, and hedge against Soviet
cheating or abrogation. Nor does it eliminate the need
for a nuclear weapons production complex capable of
supporting such weapons in the future. Neglecting
modernization in expectation of arms reduction
agreements would actually decrease the likelihood of
such agreements by reducing Soviet incentives to
negotiate.
For their part, the Soviets continue to invest heavily in
accurate, fast-flying ballistic missiles which can destroy
hard targets. Their goal has been, and remains, an ef-
fective disarming first-strike capability. Moreover, they
are continuing to enhance their ICBM survivability
through silo hardening and mobility, including deploy-
ment of the road-mobile SS-25 and the rail-based
SS-24. At the same time, they invest roughly the same
amount in their strategic defense programs as in their
offensive force modernization. They are expanding
and improving the world's only deployed anti-ballistic
missile (ABM) system, violating the ABM Treaty with
construction of their radar at Krasnoyarsk and other
radar deployments, and increasing their capability to
deploy a territorial ABM defense. Their vast growing
network of deep underground leadership shelters is
aimed at ensuring the survival of Communist Party
control over the Soviet nation, economy, and military
forces in war. Their strategic communications are
highly redundant, survivable, and hardened against
nuclear effects.
In response to the buildup of Soviet capabilities, the
United States is continuing the Strategic Moderniza-
tion Program in order to maintain the essential sur-
vivability and mission-effectiveness of our own forces.
The Soviets' active and passive defenses, their buildup
of offensive forces, and their published doctrine all
continue to provide evidence of Soviet nuclear war-
fighting mentality, and underline the essentiality of
maintaining an effective U.S. deterrent through support
for this highest priority defense program.
Arms Reductions
Arms control is not an end in itself, but only one of
several tools to enhance our national security. Our
arms reductions objectives are fully integrated with
our national security policies to enhance deterrence,
reduce risk, support alliance relationships, and ensure
the Soviets do not gain significant unilateral
advantage.
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Based on this view of arms control as a complement
to a strong national defense posture, we have been
guided since the beginning of this Administration by
several fundamental principles:
? The United States seeks only those agreements
which contribute to our security and that of our
allies.
? The United States seeks agreements which reduce
arms, not simply limit their increase.
? Achieving verifiable agreements on broad, deep
and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms
is the highest arms control priority of the United
States.
? Within the category of offensive nuclear arms, the
United States gives priority to reducing the most
destabilizing weapons: fast-flying, non-recallable
ballistic missiles.
? The United States also seeks equitable arms control
measures in the area of nuclear testing, chemical
weapons and conventional forces.
? The United States insists on agreements that can be
effectively verified and fully complied with. Arms
control agreements without effective verification
measures are worse than no agreements at all, as
they create the possibility of Soviet unilateral ad-
vantage, and can affect U.S. and allied planning
with a false sense of confidence.
Our perseverance in adhering to these principles paid
off on December 8, 1987, when Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev and I signed a treaty on
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) eliminating
all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched ballistic and
cruise missiles and their launchers, with ranges
between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The INF agree-
ment is an important tribute to NATO solidarity, per-
sistence, and political courage.
The Soviet Union, because of its massive buildup, is
required by the treaty to eliminate an INF missile
force capable of carrying four times as many warheads
as the United States. Thus, the treaty establishes the
important principle of asymmetry in arms reduction
agreements, to compensate for large Soviet quan-
titative advantages. It is noteworthy that the systems
the Soviets must eliminate are primarily based within
the Soviet Union, where they are not particularly
vulnerable to conventional attack in a possible NATO-
Warsaw Pact conflict. In contrast, the U.S. systems to
be eliminated are high priority targets for Soviet con-
ventional attack. Finally, the Soviet systems eliminated,
particularly the shorter-range INF missiles, have
chemical and conventional as well as nuclear
capabilities, and could be employed against NATO
bases and forces during non-nuclear phases of a
NATO Warsaw Pact conflict.
The military benefits of the INF Treaty will be even
greater if we succeed in negotiating a treaty on strate-
gic arms reductions. An agreement which significantly
reduces strategic systems will lessen Soviet capability
for a first strike, inhibit their ability to use intercon-
tinental weapons against theater targets, and substan-
tially increase the Soviets' uncertainty of
accomplishing their political ends through military
means.
While reducing the Soviet threat, the INF treaty does
not alter NATO's basic approach to deterrence. NATO's
strategy of flexible response continues to demand a
strong allied nuclear capability. Fears that an INF
agreement will somehow decouple the defense of
Europe from the U.S. nuclear arsenal are based on
fundamental misunderstandings of the U.S. commit-
ment and capability to participate in the defense of
Europe. The United States retains substantial nuclear
capabilities in Europe to counter Warsaw Pact conven-
tional superiority, and to serve as a link to U.S.
strategic nuclear forces. NATO aircraft will continue to
have the capability to hold at risk a broad range of
targets, including those within the Soviet homeland. In
addition, U.S. sea-based forces assigned to NATO will
continue to provide Alliance authorities with a com-
parable targeting capability. Thus, the Soviets can be
under no illusion that they could attack NATO without
placing their own territory at risk.
Eliminating an entire class of ground-launched
missiles, while an achievement of historical propor-
tions, does not remove the large Soviet conventional
and chemical threat to Europe. The next NATO prior-
ity for arms control, therefore, is to redress existing
imbalances in conventional and chemical warfare
capabilities which favor the Soviet Union. Recogniz-
ing this, the Alliance Foreign Ministers meeting in
Reykjavik, Iceland in June 1987 called for a coherent
and comprehensive concept of arms control which
reduces remaining European-based nuclear forces only
in conjunction with the establishment of a conven-
tional balance, and the global elimination of chemical
weapons. I fully support this approach.
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The most important unfinished arms control task is to
achieve deep reductions in strategic offensive arms.
Both we and the Soviets have introduced draft texts for
strategic arms reduction treaties (START). Our ap-
proach provides for specific restrictions on the most
destabilizing systems-fast-flying ballistic missiles,
especially heavy Soviet ICBMs. We are pursuing a
goal first agreed to in October 1986 and reaffirmed
during the December 1987 Summit: a 50 percent
reduction in strategic offensive forces to a total of
6,000 warheads and 1,600 delivery vehicles. We are
negotiating seriously; if the Soviets are willing to
match our seriousness, agreement is possible. At the
same time, a bad agreement is worse than no agree-
ment, and we will not accept any agreement which
does not enhance our security.
We are also engaged in a wide variety of arms
negotiations and discussions on other subjects. The
U.S. approach to all of these areas is consistent; we
seek only those agreements which are equitable,
verifiable, and will enhance our security and that of
our allies.
Specifically:
? Consistent with our belief that strategic defenses
may offer a safer, more stable basis for deterrence,
we seek Soviet agreement for an orderly transition
to a more defense-reliant world.
? We seek an effective and verifiable global ban on
chemical weapons.
? We seek alliance-to-alliance negotiations to
establish a more secure and stable balance in con-
ventional forces at lower levels from the Atlantic to
the Urals. Any steps ultimately taken in this area
must be effectively verifiable and must recognize
the geographic and force asymmetries between the
two sides. Alliance policy in this regard, which we
fully support, is quite clear-increased security and
stability, not reductions per se, are the objectives of
Western conventional arms control efforts. Given
the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority in cer-
tain key areas-particularly those important for of-
fensive operations-even modest reductions in
NATO forces, in the absence of larger reductions
from the Warsaw Pact, would reduce NATO's
security and would not promote stability. The
challenge is to synchronize NATO's force improve-
ment plans and conventional arms control efforts
toward the long-term goals of increased security and
stability.
? In the area of nuclear testing, on November 9, 1987,
we began formal negotiations with the Soviets on
essential verification improvements to permit
ratification of existing treaties: the Threshold Test
Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
Treaty. Once our verification concerns have been
satisfied and the treaties ratified, we would be
prepared immediately to engage in negotiations
with the Soviets on ways to implement a step-by-
step program to limit and ultimately end nuclear
testing, in association with a program to reduce and
ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons. Until that
ultimate stage has been reached, however, the
United States must continue testing to maintain a
safe and reliable deterrent.
? Finally, we seek to enhance stability through im-
proved measures which could prevent misunder-
standing. To this end, we signed an agreement with
the Soviets on September 15, 1987, to establish
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers in each national
capital as a mechanism to avoid incidents resulting
from accident or miscalculation during periods of
tension.
In all of these areas we consider effective verification
provisions to be as important as specific negotiated
limits; they must be negotiated concurrently. We can-
not accept obligations that limit our military programs
unless we can effectively verify Soviet compliance
with those same obligations. This is particularly im-
portant in light of the continuing pattern of Soviet
violations documented in the several reports which I
have submitted to the Congress on Soviet non-
compliance.
We have made solid progress in the area of arms
reductions. Sound agreements-those that enhance our
security and that of our Allies-require patience, firm-
ness and strength. If we continue to display these
qualities, and if the Soviets are willing to build on the
progress we have made, arms reductions can help
keep us on the path toward greater stability and a
safer world. In moving to that world, I will maintain
my commitment to broad, deep, equitable, and
verifiable arms reductions, focused especially on
ballistic missiles, and my equally strong commitment
to the Strategic Defense Initiative.
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Maintaining Conventional
Deterrence
Modern strategic nuclear capabilities are essential for
deterrence, but they alone are obviously not enough.
The United States and its allies require robust
conventional forces, backed by adequate theater nu-
clear capabilities, as an integral part of our overall
deterrent. As noted earlier, U.S. National Security
Strategy has historically been based on the concepts
of forward defense and alliance solidarity. Consistent
with that strategy, we maintain large, forward
deployed forces at sea and on the territory of our
NATO and Asian allies in time of peace. The overall
size, capabilities, and characteristics of U.S. Armed
Forces are strongly influenced by the need to
maintain such presence, which is essential to deter
aggression.
The most demanding threat with which those forces
must deal is, of course, the Soviet Union. Soviet forces
will always outnumber our own in any presently
foreseeable conflict-particularly when viewed in
terms of active forces and major items of combat
equipment. For this reason we must continue to give
the most careful attention to ensuring our forces'
technological superiority and high readiness to
accomplish their deterrent and warfighting missions.
An additional premise of American defense policy is
that the United States does not seek to deal with the
threat from the Soviet Union unaided. A system of vig-
orous alliances is essential to deterrence; and the
most important of these is NATO. The United States
contributes to the NATO deterrent in several ways.
Most visible is the peacetime stationing of over
300,000 military personnel in the Alliance area. This
significant presence of U.S. forces makes it clear that it
is not possible to attack a NATO ally without
simultaneously engaging the full military might of the
United States. The proximity of major Warsaw Pact
ground, air and naval forces to Alliance territory, the
speed with which modern conflict can unfold, the
Pact's significant numerical advantages, and the
Soviets' strong doctrinal emphasis on surprise, all
argue for the continuation of substantial, qualitatively
advanced U.S. and allied conventional forces in
Europe.
In addition to the direct provision of forces, the
United States provides security assistance to those
NATO allies whose economies do not permit them to
make as great a contribution to the common defense
as we and they would wish; and we encourage the
more affluent Alliance members to do so as well.
Such assistance serves as an important force
multiplier-increasing both the political solidarity and
the military effectiveness of NATO.
Under NATO military strategy, the land-based forces of
the Alliance nations, including the United States,
would have primary responsibility for blunting a
Warsaw Pact attack and defending Allied territory,
while simultaneously disrupting and destroying the
follow-on forces which Soviet strategy relies upon to
exploit any initial successes. Allied ground forces,
supported by tactical air power, require the capability
to halt a Pact attack and restore the integrity of
Alliance territory if NATO political and military
objectives are to be achieved. Absent such capability,
Alliance strategy becomes heavily dependent on the
threat of resorting to nuclear weapons to achieve
essential deterrence and warfighting objectives.
The capability needed to halt such a Warsaw Pact
attack, without risking an early transition to nuclear
war, is the principal determinant of the size and
composition of the more than 300,000 military
personnel we currently have forward deployed in
Europe. In collaboration with our allies, U.S. military
planners consider the Pact's capabilities, the battle
terrain, allied capabilities, and NATO strategy when
determining the size, composition, and location of our
contribution of forward deployed forces along the 720
kilometer Central front, and on the flanks and
adjoining seas.
In addition, certain U.S. forces perform functions for
the theater that are not within the capability of our
allies, such as certain types of reconnaissance and
intelligence missions; or they provide the capability to
receive and rapidly deploy reinforcements and
resupply received from the United States. While
marginal changes may be feasible in the future, with
adjustments in the U.S: allied division of labor, the
basic U.S. contribution has been carefully planned to
assure that the strategy for the defense of Western
Europe, and the U.S. contribution to it, are militarily
effective, and are seen by our adversaries to be so.
In addition to the right numbers and mix of units, U.S.
and allied forces require constant upgrading and
modernization to retain a qualitative edge in the face
of the Pact's superior numbers and rapidly improving
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technologies. Our policies relating to force moder-
nization and retention of our technological edge em-
phasize cooperation among the Allies on research,
development, and production. This approach reduces
duplication of R&D resources, shares the best
available allied technology, promotes interoperable
equipment, and provides incentives for our Allies to
increase their contribution to Alliance capabilities.
Congressional initiatives aimed at stimulating
cooperative R&D have aided materially in advancing
these programs.
NATO's strategy of flexible response requires a
capability for Alliance reaction appropriate to the
nature of Soviet provocation. In addition to conven-
tional forces, this strategy must be supported by effec-
tive and substantial theater nuclear forces. In contrast
to the policy of the Soviet Union, it is NATO's policy
to maintain theater nuclear forces at the lowest level
capable of deterring the threat. In pursuit of this
policy, the Alliance decided in October 1983 to
reduce the number of warheads in Europe. These
reductions, taken independently of any arms reduction
agreement, decreased NATO's nuclear stockpile in
Europe to the lowest level in over 20 years. This
makes it essential that the remaining stockpile be
modern, survivable, and effective.
With the prospective removal of our INF forces in
Europe, it will be particularly important that our re-
maining theater nuclear forces be fully capable of
supporting the Alliance's flexible response strategy. We
have examined the military implications of the treaty
from that standpoint and are confident that the
resulting force structure will provide the necessary
military capability, provided that necessary force
modernization continues and that we effectively
capitalize on available nuclear weapons delivery
platforms.
While neither NATO nor the United States seeks to
match the Soviets weapon for weapon, deterrence
would be dangerously weakened if the Soviets were
allowed to field a major capability which was com-
pletely unmatched by a countervailing NATO
capability. This premise underlies our determination
to modernize U.S. chemical weapons capability
through development of modern, safe, binary muni-
tions. This modernization will provide us the capabili-
ty needed to deter Soviet first use of'chemical
weapons. Absent such capability, we will remain
dependent on a stockpile of obsolescent chemical
weapons ill-suited to modern delivery systems. This
places undue reliance on Alliance nuclear capabilities
to deter Soviet first use of chemical weapons-an ob-
viously undesirable and risky situation.
U.S. strategy recognizes that the Soviet Union is
capable of simultaneous aggression in more than one
region. Should aggression occur in several areas
simultaneously, U.S. responses would be governed by
existing commitments, general strategic priorities, the
specific circumstances at hand, and the availability of
forces. Our strategy is not to try to fight "everywhere
at once." We would do what is strategically sensible
and operationally achievable under the circumstances.
Our capability to respond would be enhanced by the
flexibility we have built into our force structure, in-
cluding capabilities for global strategic mobility and
power projection. This visible capability to respond ef-
fectively in distant theaters reduces the risk that we
will ever have to meet such attacks.
NATO is not our only alliance. The United States has
bilateral or multilateral security commitments with
some 43 nations around the globe, including impor-
tant treaties with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and
Australia.
In support of those commitments, and to deter adven-
turism by the Soviets and their client states, we main-
tain forward deployed forces in other regions of
strategic importance. Our naval forces deployed in the
Pacific and Indian Oceans assist in protecting our
growing strategic and economic interests, and suppor-
ting allies and friends, in Asia and the Pacific.
Substantial ground and air forces are deployed in
Korea to complement forces of the Republic of Korea
in deterring aggression from the North. Naval and
tactical air forces deployed throughout the Pacific
assist in meeting our security commitments to such
nations as Japan and the Philippines.
These global forward deployed forces serve several
functions. They are essential to the creation of
regional power balances which deter Soviet aggres-
sion and promote overall regional stability. They sup-
port the political independence of nations on the
Soviet periphery, hence are key to the fundamental
U.S. security objective of avoiding Soviet domination
of the Eurasian landmass. Finally, they provide an
immediately available capability to deal with lesser
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military contingencies. However, for military con-
tingencies not involving the Soviet Union, we look
primarily to the nations involved to provide for their
own defense.
In the past seven years we have made substantial pro-
gress in improving the capability of our forward
deployed forces to protect U.S. interests, execute our
military strategy, and support alliance commitments.
We remain firmly committed to continued improve-
ment in our deployed capabilities in support of our
forward-defense, alliance-based strategy. The following
paragraphs will discuss selected capabilities which
provide essential foundations for that strategy.
? Maintenance of Global Support and Mobility
Capabilities.
The ability to reinforce and resupply forward deployed
forces is essential to the execution of U.S. military
strategy. A credible U.S. capability to reinforce NATO
rapidly during times of tension, for example, is critical
to effective deterrence.
The Soviets have a natural geographic advantage in
military operations on the Eurasian rim, and growing
capabilities to launch simultaneous offensives in
Europe, Southwest Asia and the Far East. Capitalizing
on interior lines of communication, they can redeploy
and resupply forces over a broad geographic range.
Recent Soviet efforts have significantly improved
military access by rail and road to strategically
important areas along the USSR's southern frontiers.
Our global support and mobility capabilities, in-
cluding airlift, sealift, and prepositioning, are therefore
essential to allow us to meet military challenges
around the periphery of the Eurasian continent, which
remains the primary locus of Soviet expansionist in-
terests. Prepositioning ashore or at sea can sharply
reduce our response times. Airlift, the quickest and
most flexible of our mobility assets, would deliver in-
itial reinforcements in most contingencies, but sealift
will inevitably carry the bulk of our reinforcement and
resupply, as it has in past crises. Mobility capabilities
are especially critical to our strategy for dealing with
contingencies in Southwest Asia, where we have no
military bases or permanently stationed military
forces.
? Maintenance of an Adequate Logistics Base.
To maintain a strong conventional deterrent, it is vital
that we provide adequate logistic support for U.S.
forces. A robust logistics infrastructure strengthens
deterrence by demonstrating our preparations for
hostilities at any level of intensity, and for the length
of time necessary to defend U.S. interests. Adequate,
sustained support helps raise the nuclear threshold
and improves prospects for early success in conflict.
Adversaries must not conclude that U.S. and allied
capabilities would be exhausted if confronted with a
complex or prolonged military campaign. With the
support of Congress we will seek continued improve-
ment in this unglamorous but essential component of
military power. Concurrently, we will continue to
emphasize to our allies that the sustainment of their
forces in combat must parallel that of our own.
? Maintenance of Adequate Active Forces.
Support of our conventional deterrent requires that we
maintain balanced and effective active duty forces
sufficient in quality and quantity to make our national
military strategy credible. In the context of our
alliance relationships, deterring and, if necessary
defeating, the Soviet threat requires a carefully
structured mix of U.S. and allied land and sea-based
forces capable of executing the agreed strategy until
reinforced from the respective national mobilization
bases.
While NATO requirements are the primary focus of
our ground forces' concern, the global nature of
potential threats to U.S. interests requires maintenance
of flexible and diverse ground forces capable of rapid
deployment to, and sustained operations in, other
areas of strategic importance as well. This has led the
Army to establish rapidly deployable light divisions,
while continuing efforts have gone into the enhance-
ment of Marine Corps capabilities and amphibious lift.
U.S. tactical airpower supports the achievement of
theater campaign goals by maintaining battlefield air
superiority, providing responsive and effective
firepower for ground combat units, and conducting
deep interdiction of enemy forces, command and con-
trol facilities, and sources of logistics support. In addi-
tion, in the European theater, it plays a critical role in
assuring the essential reinforcement and resupply of
U.S. forward deployed forces by protecting port
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facilities, aerial ports of debarkation, prepositioned
equipment and munitions, and lines of communica-
tion. The capability of air forces to deploy rapidly in
crises adds to our ability to bring effective military
power to bear in distant regions in contingencies.
Maritime forces also play a unique role in supporting
our national military strategy. Given the realities of our
geostrategic position, fronting on two oceans,
maritime superiority over any potential adversary is
essential to support our alliance relationships and for-
ward deployed forces. The capability of Navy and
Marine Corps forces to project and sustain military
power in areas distant from our shores is of particular
importance, given the central position of the Soviet
Union on the Eurasian land mass and the fact that
many of the United States' most important allies are
located on the Eurasian periphery, accessible from the
sea.
Our naval power projection forces would also play a
major role in any Southwest Asia contingency. Their
current presence in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea,
together with Army and Air Force units, is providing
essential support for several important national securi-
ty objectives.
Maintaining a National
Mobilization Base
The effective mobilization of manpower and industrial
resources in the event of a conflict would provide
essential support for our military capabilities. Realistic
mobilization plans also provide a clear means for the
United States to communicate its resolve to our
potential adversaries in periods of tension or crisis.
On the industrial side, the maintenance of a broad,
technologically superior mobilization base is a
fundamental element of U.S. defense policy. As I
noted when discussing the economic elements of
power, we rely on the size and strength of the U.S.
economy as our ultimate line of defense. And, as
nuclear weapons reductions are negotiated, the
capability of the U.S. and allied mobilization bases
rapidly to generate additional conventional military
forces and the supplies and equipment to sustain
them, becomes increasingly important. Maintenance
of this capability supports deterrence and provides the
ability for a timely and flexible response to the full
range of plausible threats.
Defense industrial mobilization policies focus on steps
that industry and government can take during
peacetime and in the early stages of a crisis to acquire
long-lead time items and to prepare for surge
production. Examples of current mobilization plans
include those providing for surge production of
precision-guided munitions; for the adaptation of new
production technologies such as flexible
manufacturing systems; and for the expanded
production of machine tools.
To ensure that our industrial base can respond in an
adequate and timely fashion to a broad range of
potential emergencies, we are testing a new concept
of industrial mobilization responses linked to early
warning indicators. Under this concept, the readiness
of our industrial base would be progressively
increased as intelligence suggested an increasing
probability of hostile actions directed against U.S.
interests. To support this concept, in peacetime
planners will identify and catalog relevant industrial
base capabilities, prepare specific response options,
and create a series of graduated responses to be
implemented within existing capabilities at a time of
crisis.
Such mobilization planning cannot be done on a
purely unilateral basis. In the NATO context,
international collaboration to improve national
mobilization capabilities is important to increase
Alliance-wide efficiency and the capability to support
war plans. For example, the United States through its
representation on the NATO Industrial Planning
Committee, works closely with its allies to ensure that
member nations are prepared to support the Alliance
strategy with a coordinated and effective industrial
mobilization response.
With regard to manpower, our mobilization plans
emphasize achievable increases in defense manpower
at a pace consistent with military needs. Under
existing plans, active forces-depending on their
location-would either maintain their forward
deployment or rapidly reinforce such deployments
from the United States. Reserve forces would
mobilize, some military retirees would be recalled,
and civilian manpower would be expanded to support
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such necessary defense functions as logistics, com-
munications, and health services.
Our plans for military manpower mobilization are bas-
ed upon the Total Force policy, established in the ear-
ly 1970s, which places increased responsibilities on
the reserve component of U.S. forces. With fully 50
percent of the combat units for land warfare in the
reserve components, their importance to our conven-
tional deterrent cannot be overstated. Their priority for
manning, training and equipment mobilization is
based on time-phasing of their use in operational
plans. In many cases, the sequence of deployment
would place reserve component units side by side
with, and sometimes even ahead of, the active duty
forces. While there are specific mission areas in which
the role for reserve components can be expanded, we
need to exercise care to avoid fundamentally altering
the nature of service in the reserves, or imbalance the
reserve/active force mix. While not reserves in the
conventional sense of the term, in time of war Coast
Guard forces would provide an important augmenta-
tion to our worldwide naval capabilities.
SUPPORTING POLICIES
U.S. National Space Policy
I recently approved a new national space policy
which updates and expands guidelines for the con-
duct of U.S. national security, civil, and commercial
efforts in space. The policy recognizes that a fun-
damental objective guiding U.S. activities continues to
be space leadership, which requires preeminence in
key areas critical to achieving our broad goals. These
goals include:
? Strengthening the security of the United States.
? Obtaining economic, technological and scientific
benefits that improve the quality of life on earth,
through space-related activities.
? Encouraging U.S. private sector investment in space
and space-related activities.
? Promoting international cooperative activities, taking
into account U.S. national security, foreign policy,
scientific, and economic interests.
? Cooperating with other nations in maintaining
freedom of space for activities that enhance the
security and welfare of mankind.
? Expanding human presence and activity beyond
Earth orbit into the solar system.
The use of space systems to satisfy many critical na-
tional security requirements is an expanding and vital
element of U.S. national power. Functions important to
our national security strategy such as communications,
navigation, environmental monitoring, early warning,
surveillance, and treaty verification are increasingly
performed by space systems. In many cases, the
worldwide access provided by the space systems
makes them the only available means for ac-
complishing these important functions. Absent the
assured use of space, our nation's security would be
seriously jeopardized.
Our military policy for space encompasses five
elements.
First, we recognize that deterrence-at all levels of
potential conflict-cannot be accomplished without
space-based assets, so we seek to ensure that critical
space systems will be available to commanders, com-
mensurate with their need.
Second, we seek to ensure free access to space for all
nations, in a manner analogous to the way that free
access to the earth's oceans is maintained.
Third, we encourage interaction among national
security, civil government and, where appropriate,
commercial space programs to share critical
technologies and avoid unnecessary duplication of ac-
tivities.
Fourth, our policies provide for improved defensive
capabilities in the future, deterring or, if necessary,
defending against enemy attacks on our space systems.
Finally, we will continue to improve those space
systems that directly support our military forces by
enhancing their effectiveness.
Our civil space activities contribute to the nation's
scientific, technological, and economic well-being in
addition to making a major contribution to America's
prestige and leadership in the world. Our civil space
goals are:
? To advance scientific knowledge of the planet Earth,
the solar system, and the universe beyond.
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? To preserve our preeminence in critical aspects of
space science, space applications, space technology,
and manned spaceflight.
? To open new opportunities for use of the space en-
vironment.
? To develop selected civil applications of space
technology.
? To engage in international cooperative efforts that
further U.S. space goals.
? To establish a permanently manned presence in
space.
U.S. leadership in civilian space programs has been
taken for granted since the late 1960s. That leadership,
however, is being increasingly challenged both by our
friends and allies abroad, and by the Soviet Union.
The ambitious program of space exploration and
research that the Soviets are pursuing, centered upon
a high level of launch capacity and the Mir Space
Station, have eroded traditional areas of U.S. space
leadership. Initiatives-such as efforts to improve our
space transportation systems, develop and deploy the
Space Station, and develop the technologies to
support a range of future solar system exploration
options-are intended to ensure U.S. preeminence in
areas critical to our national interests.
The United States is first among nations in its efforts
to foster a purely commercial, market-driven space in-
dustry without direct government subsidies. We
believe that private sector space initiatives will have
positive effects on the U.S. balance of trade, work
force skills, and the development of unique manufac-
turing methods and products. These initiatives also
promise lower costs to the taxpayer and enhanced
security to our nation. We are confident that tradi-
tional American ingenuity will yield innovative space
technology applications comparable to, or exceeding,
those achieved in aviation earlier this century.
U.S. Intelligence Policy
Development and execution of sound national security
policies, and the strategies applicable to specific situa-
tions, requires timely, accurate, and thorough informa-
tion regarding actual or potential threats to our
national security. Early warning of developments
which could place at risk U.S. interests is vital if we
are to employ the relevant elements of national power
in a timely way and deal with threats before they
become unmanageable, or entail the risk of conflict.
The primary goal of U.S. intelligence activities is to
provide appropriate agencies of government with the
best available information on which to base decisions
concerning the development and conduct of foreign,
economic and defense policy.
It is axiomatic that our National Security Strategy must
be strongly supported by reliable intelligence
concerning potential adversaries' national capabilities
and probable courses of action. Intelligence also
provides essential insights into how we are viewed by
those adversaries. Their perceptions of our capabilities,
political will, national interests, and likely reaction to
hostile provocation, provide an important measure of
the effectiveness of our strategy. The collection of such
information is a priority objective of our intelligence
activities. It must be pursued in a vigorous, innovative,
and responsible manner that is consistent with
applicable law and respectful of the principles upon
which this nation was founded.
The capability to deal with the hostile intelligence
threat to the United States is equally important. The
large and active intelligence services of the Soviet
Union, its clients and surrogates, conduct
sophisticated collection and analysis operations
targeted against us, our allies, and friends. The Soviets
rely heavily on espionage and an elaborate apparatus
for illegal acquisition of Western military technology
to further their strategic aims. The apprehension over
the past few years of spies conducting highly damag-
ing espionage operations against the United States has
dramatically underlined the severity of the threat. I
have directed that the U.S. intelligence community
give special emphasis to detecting and countering es-
pionage and other threats from foreign intelligence
services.
International terrorism and narcotics trafficking, par-
ticularly when state-supported, can threaten the
security of the U.S. and our citizens. Intelligence
plays a critical role in our efforts to control and
reduce these threats. Intelligence collection and
special operations by agencies of the U.S. government
to protect against international terrorism and interna-
tional narcotics activities will remain a high priority.
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The ability to conduct covert action operations is an
essential element of our national security capability.
In selected circumstances such operations provide a
means to deal with developing threats to our security
before the employment of U.S. military power or
other actions entailing higher costs and risks are re-
quired. Over the past year, we have reviewed all ex-
isting covert action programs to ensure that they are
in accordance with applicable law and consistent with
U.S. policy. We have also put into place procedures
for approval, review and congressional notification of
new covert action operations to ensure that such
operations receive appropriate interagency review, and
are consistent with applicable law. Additionally, we
have instituted stricter accountability of access to
protect confidentiality, and have established "sunset
provisions" that require annual review of all covert
action programs, and their continuation only by
Presidential approval. We will continue to employ
such covert action operations in support of national
security objectives, and ensure that they are con-
sistently supportive of national policy.
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IV. Integrating Elements of Power
into National Security Strategy
STRATEGY FOR THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
Our own territorial security is inextricably linked with
the security of our hemispheric neighbors, north and
south; the defense of North America is the nation's
most fundamental security concern. We sometimes fail
fully to appreciate the great strategic importance of
the Latin American and Caribbean regions, in spite of
their proximity to our borders and importance to our
national security. The significance of these regions has
not been lost to Soviet planners, however, who refer to
Latin America and the Caribbean as our "strategic
rear." The USSR has, since the early 1960s,
increasingly sought to expand its influence in these
areas to the detriment of our own security. Our
national interests, as well as our political principles,
have led us to promote democracy and economic
progress throughout the hemisphere. In the past, we
have relied on a hemispheric security system
composed of a strong U.S. deterrent, broadly-based
cooperation with Canada, and collective security
arrangements with Latin America. More recently we
have built on this foundation a policy aimed at
strengthening the ability of our Central American and
Caribbean neighbors to resist outside aggression and
subversion, and facilitating the transition to democracy
in the region. Today 28 of 33 countries in Latin
America and the Caribbean, with over 90 percent of
the population, are democratic. As we work for further
consolidation of democracy, we continue to promote
economic cooperation with our Hemispheric
neighbors.
We remain deeply committed to the interdependent,
regional objectives of democracy and freedom, peace,
and economic progress. To achieve these, we must
counter the threat of Soviet expansionist policies not
only from Cuba, but now from Nicaragua. Critical
national security interests in Latin America are based
on long-standing U.S. policy that there be no Soviet,
Cuban, or other Communist bloc beachhead on the
mainland of the Western Hemisphere, or any country
that upsets the regional balance and poses a serious
military threat to its neighbors. Representative
democracy in Nicaragua is a key goal in our strategy
to achieve lasting peace and our other interdependent
security objectives for the hemisphere.
We support the Guatemala Peace Accords and
welcome the initial steps taken by the Sandinistas in
the direction of a freer, more democratic and
pluralistic Nicaragua, as agreed to in the Accords. Yet
we have reason to remain skeptical. It is too soon to
tell if the Sandinista leaders will comply with the
pledges they have made. The Sandinistas have made
similar promises in the past-including in 1979 to the
Organization of American States-which were broken.
It is important to keep in mind, however, that even if
the Nicaraguan government should live up to its
obligations under the Guatemala Peace Accords in full
and credible fashion, security concerns affecting
important U.S. interests would remain. They include
the Soviet and Cuban military presence in Nicaragua,
and the rapid growth of the Nicaraguan military
capability which threatens the military balance of the
region as well as Nicaragua's democratic neighbors.
To encourage the Sandinistas to implement the agreed
reforms in good faith, and to advance U.S. security
interests in Central America, we have engaged in
extensive and close consultation with the Central
America democracies and the Nicaraguan Resistance.
One key element of our diplomatic strategy is the
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pressure exerted on the Sandinista regime by the Nic-
araguan Resistance. We will continue funding the Re-
sistance until we see evidence that democratization in
Nicaragua is real and irreversible. Accordingly, the
Administration will request renewed assistance for the
Freedom Fighters early this year. Economic and trade
sanctions are other key elements of our coordinated
strategy.
Currently we are deeply involved in the struggle
throughout Latin America against the menace of drug
production and trafficking, which pose threats not
only to the integrity and stability of governments to
our South, but to the social fabric of the United States
itself. Working bilaterally, and wherever possible on a
regional basis, we are supplying resources and
expertise to the governments wishing to engage with
us in this priority effort.
Increased trade among the Western Hemisphere
countries is also an important element of our national
security strategy. Such trade will aid debtor countries
in the region in managing their obligations in a
responsible manner while contributing to their
economic growth. In addition, the United States
supports providing additional resources for the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to
assist these countries in adjusting to the consequences
of external economic forces, such as the decline of
world oil and other commodity prices.
Our close relationship with Canada derives from our
long historical and cultural association, as well as
geopolitical and economic factors-our physical
proximity, the openness of our more than 3,000 mile
border, and our important military cooperation, both
bilaterally and under the NATO aegis. Economically,
Canada is by far our largest trading partner. Our
primary objective with respect to Canada, a close
friend and ally, is to protect and strengthen the
already excellent relations we enjoy. In the near-term,
our goal can be best achieved by securing approval by
the U.S. Congress and Canadian Parliament of the
recently negotiated United States-Canada Free Trade
Area agreement. This agreement will benefit both
countries by removing tariff and non-tariff barriers to
trade in goods and services and by facilitating cross-
border investment by the private sectors of both
countries.
STRATEGY FOR THE SOVIET
UNION AND EASTERN
EUROPE
As mentioned earlier, the most significant threat to
U.S. national interests remains that posed by the So-
viet Union. Despite some improvement in U.S.-Soviet
relations over the past year, the long-term threat has
not perceptibly diminished.
The differences between the United States and the
Soviet Union are fundamental in nature, given the
great disparities in our political, economic and social
systems, and our divergent geostrategic interests.
While the much-publicized reforms of the new Soviet
leadership have raised expectations of more benign
Soviet policies, there is as yet no evidence that the
Soviets have abandoned their long-term objectives.
This means that U.S. strategy to counter these
objectives must also remain consistent and aimed at
the long-term. We must remain sufficiently flexible to
seize the initiative and explore positive shifts in Soviet
policy which may strengthen U.S. security; but we
must not delude ourselves into believing that the
Soviet threat has yet been fundamentally altered, or
that our vigilance can be reduced.
Consistent with this approach, our overall strategy to-
ward the Soviet Union remains to contain Soviet
expansionism, and to encourage political democracy
and basic human rights within the Soviet Union and
the countries under its hegemony. These have been
the national security objectives of successive U.S.
administrations, though the manner of their
implementation has varied. Continued emphasis on
the principles of strength, dialogue and realism in our
strategy may eventually alter Soviet behavior in
fundamental ways to create a more stable and
peaceful world.
The maintenance of adequate strength to deter Soviet
aggression anywhere in the world that our strategic
interests require is central to our strategy. Such
strength must encompass not only military power, but
also the political determination, vitality of alliances
and the economic health essential to meet our global
responsibilities. In areas where the Soviets are
currently engaged in military expansionism, such as
Afghanistan, the United States is demonstrating its
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willingness to support local resistance forces to the
degree necessary to frustrate Soviet ambitions. In
general, our goals are to convince the Soviet Union
that the use of military force does not pay, and that
the build-up of military forces beyond levels necessary
for legitimate national defense will not provide
unilateral advantage.
National strength must be complemented by
constructive dialogue. We have established a four part
agenda for discussion with the Soviet Union: arms
reduction, human rights, resolution of regional
conflicts, and bilateral exchanges. We have made clear
that substantial progress in all areas is necessary to
allow a truly qualitative improvement of U.S.-Soviet
relations. Our emphasis on human rights is directly
relevant to our security strategy because we believe
that the manner in which a government treats its own
people reflects upon its behavior in the international
community of nations.
Although progress in U.S.-Soviet relations has
historically been difficult to predict, present
indications are that the Soviet leadership recognizes
that some of the country's past policies must be
altered to prevent further domestic economic and
technological obsolescence. In this regard, the policies
of the current leadership have a marked strategic cast
to them, to the extent that they aim at placing the
Soviets in a more competitive position vis-a-vis the
United States over the long term. At the same time,
should the Soviets demonstrate that they genuinely
wish to improve the U.S.-Soviet relationship by
reducing military expenditures and force structure, by
terminating Third World subversion and expansion,
and by focusing on their internal problems, they will
find the United States welcoming their more
responsible behavior on the international scene.
While acknowledging that most of the countries of
Eastern Europe are members of the Warsaw Pact, we
have never recognized Soviet hegemony in the region
as legitimate or healthy because it is based on
military power and dictatorship, not democratic
consent. We wish to develop our relations with each
country of the region on an individual basis. Many
East European countries at present face severe
economic difficulties as a result of forced emulation of
Soviet economic models. The populations of these
countries are significantly pro-Western in outlook and
would like to strengthen ties with the Western
community of nations. At the same time, the
economic utility of Eastern Europe to the Soviet Union
is declining.
These factors combine to give the United States an
opportunity to improve its relations with Eastern
European countries. Our objectives in the region are
to encourage liberalization and more autonomous
foreign policies, and to foster genuine, long-term
human rights improvements. Our strategy is to
differentiate our policies toward these countries
according to their conduct, and to develop relations
with each based on individual merit.
The United States and its NATO Allies also are
working jointly to overcome the artificial division of
Europe which occurred after World War II and to
promote closer ties between Eastern and Western
Europe. This takes place primarily through the
35-nation Conference on Security and Cooperation in
Europe, which serves to maintain pressure on the So-
viet Union and Eastern European governments to
improve human rights performance and increases
contact and communication between East and West.
STRATEGY FOR WESTERN
EUROPE AND NATO
The security of Western Europe is a vital component
of U.S. National Security Strategy. We share a
common heritage and democratic values with Western
European countries, have a compelling mutual interest
in containing Soviet expansion, and benefit from
interdependent economic relations.
Overall, our objectives in Western Europe are to help
maintain the region's security and independence from
Soviet intimidation, to promote its political and
economic health, to consult with European
governments on effective policies toward the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact, and to work with West-
ern Europeans toward overcoming the East-West
division of the European continent.
The North Atlantic Alliance embodies the U.S.
commitment to Western Europe as well as the
members' commitment to defend each other. NATO
has preserved peace in Europe for almost 40 years, by
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far the longest period of peace on the continent in
this century. Through the Alliance, NATO members
engage in collective defense to deter Soviet aggression
and enhance security. NATO is, however, both a
political and military entity. Through NATO, the
United States also consults with its Western European
Allies on a wide range of issues.
The cohesion and unity of NATO are essential to a
successful security strategy relative to the Soviet
Union. The repeated and unsuccessful Soviet efforts to
drive wedges between the United States and Western
Europe testify to the strength of Alliance unity. These
Soviet efforts have been thwarted through close and
frequent high-level consultations among allies, to
maintain our solidarity and our common strategy on
crucial issues. The most recent success story of the
Alliance has been the conclusion of an Intermediate-
Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty between the United
States and the Soviet Union. This agreement
vindicates NATO's 1979 dual-track decision which,
through commitment both to negotiate and to deploy
intermediate-range nuclear forces, gave the Soviet
Union incentive eventually to agree to the total
elimination of this category of weapons. The cohesion
of the Alliance and the courage of Allied governments
which deployed INF missiles despite sometimes
significant domestic resistance has paid off, and
resulted in the first agreement in history which will
actually reduce nuclear arsenals.
The United States, working closely with NATO allies,
hopes to reach other successful arms agreements with
the Soviet Union; but we have made clear that the
strategy of flexible response will require the
continuing presence of U.S. nuclear weapons, and
strong conventional forces, in Europe. This is
particularly true in view of the great disparity in
conventional forces on the continent which directly
threatens Western Europe. The pronounced
conventional force imbalance has been a matter of
concern for many years. In 1985, the Alliance adopted
an ambitious plan of action designed to remedy
NATO's most critical conventional deficiencies.
Progress in some areas-such as the provision of
aircraft shelters and the filling of critical munition
shortfalls-has been encouraging, but much more
remains to be accomplished. Within the context of
these ongoing efforts, the United States will work in
close consultation with our allies toward:
? Maintenance of the credibility of NATO's nuclear
deterrent. We will work toward full implementation
of the Montebello agreement, including the
provisions on nuclear modernization, as well as
some restructuring of NATO's nuclear forces.
? Maintenance of a credible conventional deterrent
with emphasis on further execution of Alliance
approved conventional defense improvements,
including provisions for air defense and increased
sustainability stocks.
? More effective use of resources available for
deterrent capabilities through national defense
budgets. We are just beginning to realize a return
on initial efforts in armaments cooperation, and will
work closely with our allies to bring to fruition
other programs recently initiated with
Congressionally reserved funds for cooperative re-
search and development. We will also continue to
search for new opportunities to enhance
conventional defense capabilities in resource-
effective ways, such as improved crisis management
procedures and rationalization of roles and missions
with our allies.
? Improvement of the military use of technology,
while strengthening NATO's industrial base,
particularly in some countries on NATO's southern
flank.
Narrowing the gap in conventional capabilities can
enhance deterrence, raise the nuclear threshold and
reduce the risk of Soviet miscalculation. It also offers
the best hope of inducing the Soviets to negotiate
seriously toward a stable conventional equilibrium at
lower force levels.
NATO also provides a forum for Western consultation
on such political processes as the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), where
our goal is to ensure full Soviet and Eastern European
implementation of the commitments undertaken in the
Helsinki Final Act and Madrid Concluding Document.
Of special interest are the CSCE provisions on human
rights and the freer flow of peoples and information
across the East-West divide. CSCE represents a crucial
means by which the United States and its Allies are
working to reduce the repression and the artificial
barriers which have existed since the Soviet Union
imposed its will on neighboring countries after World
War II.
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Although the NATO Alliance remains strong and
vigorous, aspects of our relationship with Western
Europe transcend NATO concerns. These include
issues such as trade and protectionism, methods of
dealing with terrorism, and policy toward regions
outside of the NATO geographic area. We seek to
work closely with Western European governments on
these matters, though there are sometimes differing
viewpoints as is natural among sovereign, democratic
governments.
STRATEGY FOR THE MIDDLE
EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Despite the multitude of changes in the Middle East
over the past several decades, U.S. objectives have
held remarkably constant. In harmony with the pre-
dominant aspiration of the peoples of the region, we
remain deeply committed to helping forge a just and
lasting peace between Israel and its neighbors. Our
regional goals also include limiting Soviet influence,
fostering the security and prosperity of Israel and our
Arab friends, and curbing state-sponsored terrorism. To
achieve these aims, we must hurdle some serious
obstacles including continuing, deep-seated Arab-
Israeli tensions, the emotionally-charged Palestinian
problem, radical anti-Western political and religious
movements, the use of terrorism as an instrument of
state policy, and Soviet policies which have supported
the forces of extremism rather than the forces of
moderation.
In working to overcome these obstacles we pursue a
strategy which integrates diplomatic, economic and
military instruments. With regard to the Arab-Israeli
peace process, the U.S. initiative of September 1, 1982
remains the cornerstone of our approach. While
working diplomatically to narrow the gap and make
direct negotiations possible, we also provide military
and economic assistance to our friends in the region
to bolster their security in the face of continuing
threats. Moderate regimes must be secure if they are
to run the risks of making peace. At the same time,
we remain willing to confront and build international
pressure against those states, such as Libya and Iran,
which sponsor terrorism and promote subversion
against friendly governments.
In the Persian Gulf region, we also pursue an
integrated approach to secure our four longstanding
objectives: maintaining freedom of navigation;
strengthening the moderate Arab states; reducing the
influence of anti-Western powers, such as the Soviet
Union and Iran; and assuring access to oil on
reasonable terms for ourselves and our allies. Iran's
continuation and escalation of the Iran-Iraq War,
including its attempts to intimidate non-belligerent
Gulf Arab states, pose the most serious, immediate
threat to our interests, and provide the Soviet Union
the opportunity to advance its regional agenda.
In responding to these threats diplomatically we work
persistently to end the war, both unilaterally-as with
Operation Stanch, to cease the flow of war materiel to
Iran-and through multilateral forums, such as the
United Nations Security Council. The current chal-
lenge is to get Iran to join Iraq in accepting a
comprehensive settlement.
Since 1949, our diplomatic commitment to regional
stability and undisrupted commerce has been
supported by our military policy of maintaining a
permanent naval presence in the Persian Gulf. That
presence is currently expanded to allow us to deter
Iranian attempts to intimidate moderate states in the
region, and to play our traditional role of protecting
U.S.-flag shipping in the face of increased Iranian
aggressiveness. Five other NATO governments have
also made decisions to deploy naval vessels to the
Gulf where they assist in protecting freedom of
navigation. A prudent but responsive policy of arms
sales for the self-defense of our friends in the region is
also an integral part of our strategy, as those nations
assume greater responsibility for their own defense.
In South Asia, we aim to reduce regional tensions,
especially those between India and Pakistan; to restore
freedom in Afghanistan; to promote democratic
political institutions and economic development; to
end narcotics production and trafficking; and to
discourage nuclear proliferation. These objectives are
threatened primarily by the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan, the continuing antagonism between India
and Pakistan, and the refusal of those two states to re-
strain sensitive aspects of their nuclear programs.
In dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation in
South Asia, we have followed a two-track approach.
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First, we have made clear to the government of Paki-
stan that our provision of security assistance requires
Pakistani nuclear restraint. At the same time, provision
of U.S. military and economic assistance helps Paki-
stan meet legitimate security needs without resorting
to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Secondly,
recognizing that there is a regional context for the
Pakistani nuclear program, we have encouraged India
and Pakistan toward an agreement on confidence
building measures. We are encouraged that the
leadership in both countries is actively looking for
ways to improve their relations with each other.
We remain unequivocally opposed to the Soviet
military presence in Afghanistan. In the absence of a
political settlement which provides for a prompt and
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, restoration of
Afghanistan to its independent non-aligned status, and
self-determination for the Afghan people, we will
continue our firm support for the Afghan cause. We
also work to bolster the security of Pakistan, the
frontline state hosting nearly three million Afghan
refugees, with a second six-year assistance plan. By
expanding our ties with India as well as Pakistan, we
hope to foster stability in South Asia. Recent advances
in technological and scientific cooperation between
the United States and India, in both civilian and
military areas, with prospects for further growth, have
been important in improving relations between our
two countries. We also provide development assistance
throughout the region and support the work of the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation to
promote stability by fostering regional economic
growth.
The sharp reduction in U.S. economic and military
assistance funding, plus Congressional opposition to
the sale of modern defense weapons to a number of
states, has had a negative impact on U.S. security
interests in both the Middle East and South Asia.
These cutbacks in security assistance have been all the
more damaging because threats to friendly states have
increased their need for security assistance and
weapons. At the same time, the Soviet Union has
become more aggressive in offering weapons to
countries unable to obtain them from the United
States. The Soviets have also become more active in
using economic instruments such as debt rescheduling
to enhance their own political influence.
STRATEGY FOR EAST ASIA
AND THE PACIFIC
As a Pacific power the United States faces formidable
challenges in projecting its strength across that broad
region. Our security objectives, as elsewhere, are
aimed at helping our allies and friends in the region
to develop economically and politically as they defend
themselves from encroachment. We are meeting with
success in most areas. The free nations of East Asia
and the Pacific now lead the world in demonstrating
an economic and political dynamism that stands in
stark contrast with conditions in other nations in the
regions such as Vietnam and North Korea. Our Asian
allies and friends also stood together with us in the
years of effort required to achieve the INF Treaty,
which removes a threat from Asia, as well as from
Western Europe.
Soviet military power in Asia and the Pacific continues
its steady qualitative improvement, but the U.S.
response is not confined to technical issues of relative
military strength. Our basic aims are to strengthen the
natural political and economic ties that link us with
regional states, to evoke greater participation by our
allies and friends in their own defense, and to
proceed steadily with necessary modernization of our
military forces deployed to the area.
Cooperation with Japan remains basic to U.S.
relationships in the region. The United States-Japan
Treaty of Cooperation and Security formalizes our
defense ties, providing a security foundation for the
broad spectrum of economic and political associations
which uniquely join us.
During the past ten years, a consensus has emerged in
Japan that Japan should undertake the primary
responsibility to defend its homeland, territorial seas
and skies, and its sea lanes out to 1,000 nautical
miles. In 1985 the government of Japan incorporated
that concept into its current Five Year Defense Plan.
Japan's defense spending has increased more than five
percent per year in real terms for the past five years,
and we have encouraged Japan to continue
modernizing its forces in order to carry out its
legitimate defense responsibilities. In addition to
providing for its own defense forces, Japan contributes
over $2 billion per year to support U.S. forces
stationed in Japan.
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The economic dimension of our relationship with
Japan, as well as with other key nations in the region,
is so prominent that it must be considered an integral
part of our national security strategy. The massive
trade surplus of Japan with the United States is
unsustainable and a source of political tension, as are
the lesser surpluses of other regional nations. Such
economic imbalances must be reduced through a
combination of measures including support for U.S.
initiatives for multilateral trade liberalization in the
GATT.
In view of the globalization of financial markets,
cooperation with Japan on economic policy will be
key to maintaining confidence on world stock and
currency markets. A recent positive development is Ja-
pan's significantly increased expenditures on foreign
assistance. Japan continues to target assistance on
countries of strategic importance, and is giving more
of its aid in "untied" form than in the past.
Our alliance with the Republic of Korea remains vital
to regional stability. North Korea maintains forces that
far exceed those of the South in quantity, are
continuously strengthened by additional Soviet
weapons, and are in the hands of a government
whose aggressive demeanor and tendency to act
unexpectedly are well known. Our military presence
in the Republic of Korea underpins regional stability
and builds confidence, which is essential to that
country's remarkable economic development and
political evolution. Sound security, politics, and
economics are indivisible. In this process, the United
States has used its influence to encourage Koreans to-
ward democratic change. We have done so, however,
with respect for Korean traditions and political
realities; and we are mindful of the constant security
threat. The Republic of Korea is our seventh largest
trading partner; significant market and investment
opportunities for U.S. firms exist. Market access
barriers are coming down, but not fast enough, and
much more remains to be done.
Both the People's Republic of China and the United
States have cultivated good relations based on realistic
calculations of each country's best interests. For our
part, we continue to believe that a strong, secure, and
modernizing China is in our interest. Although our
economic, social, and political systems differ, we share
a common perception of the requirement for stability
in the region and for resistance to expansionism. On
this basis, we have continued to increase our trade,
people-to-people contacts, and even limited, defensive
military cooperation. Differences persist over some
issues, but we have continued to develop a mature
relationship that clearly benefits both countries.
Through assiduous management of the United States-
China relationship, we expect to cooperate when our
interests and China's are parallel, such as in
Afghanistan, and in maintaining stability in East Asia.
We are confident a level-headed national consensus
on how to conduct relations with China will remain
the foundation for additional growth and interaction in
the relationship.
The Philippine government has made progress
restoring democracy and laying the foundation for
economic growth. The Aquino government, however,
continues to face major political, security and
economic challenges. Through all of the tools
available to us, we are determined to help this
important Pacific ally to overcome these problems so
it can sustain economic growth, counter the threat of
a virulent internal communist insurgency, and
strengthen democratic government.
Thailand, another Association of Southeast Nations
(ASEAN) member, and our treaty ally, borders
Cambodia, which is now occupied by the Vietnamese
and the site of an active Cambodian resistance effort
struggling to regain self-determination for the Khmer
people. In support of Thailand, which also shoulders
the major refugee burden in Southeast Asia, we will
continue our close security cooperation to deter any
potential aggression and maintain our support of
eligible refugees. We will also continue our
cooperative effort with Thailand to suppress narcotic
trafficking.
We view the continued occupation of Cambodia by
Vietnamese forces as an unacceptable violation of
international law that undermines regional efforts to-
wards development, peace and stability. We also
oppose the return of the Khmer Rouge to power in
Cambodia. We will continue our strong endorsement
of ASEAN's quest for a political solution and support
for the non-Communist elements of the Cambodian
resistance coalition. Under our initiative on regional
problems at the United Nations, we are prepared to
play a constructive role in efforts to achieve a
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Cambodian settlement. In the context of a settlement
involving the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese
troops, we are prepared to enter into normalization
talks with Vietnam.
Despite our serious differences with Vietnam, through
bilateral discussions we have achieved progress in
accounting for our missing servicemen, and in release
of reeducation internees and Amerasians. We have
also seen a modest but welcome improvement in
relations between Laos and the United States. Our pri-
mary measure of Laotian sincerity in improving
relations with the U.S. is accelerated efforts to account
for our servicemen still missing.
As Australia enters its bicentennial year, close bilateral
bonds and security relationships continue to be the
keystone of our policy in the region. But regrettably,
New Zealand has now written into law the policies
that caused us to suspend our ANZUS Treaty
obligations to Wellington. This has dimmed the pros-
pect of New Zealand's resuming its place in the
Alliance.
The South Pacific more broadly is passing through a
generational change and the stresses of economic and
demographic shifts. The island nations of the South
Pacific have joined the legion of commodity-exporting
countries whose efforts to develop a stable economic
base have been undermined by persistently low world
commodity prices. At the same time, the positive
effects of improved health care have produced rapid
increases in population. Memories of U.S. cooperation
with the islanders during World War II are dimming.
Resource constraints have prevented us from assisting
as much as we would wish, but we expect Congress
to approve expeditiously authorization for $10 million
annually over the 5-year life of the new fisheries treaty
with the region's islands states. This should help offset
some of the irritants that have troubled our traditional
good relations in the region and have invited Soviet
probes.
In Fiji this past year, we have sorrowfully witnessed a
prolonged struggle within that nation's ethnic
communities over their future. We remain committed
to encouraging a broadly based resolution of Fiji's
political troubles.
The decision of the people of Palau last year to
accede to the Compact of Free Association lays the
foundation for creation of a third freely associated
state and for closing our U.N. trusteeship in the
Pacific Islands. This act of self-determination promotes
our belief in stability through democracy; and the
Compact of Free Association helps accomplish our
goal of preventing these Pacific states from becoming
caught up in superpower rivalry.
Soviet interest in East Asia and the Pacific remains on
the upswing, however, as Moscow's increasingly
skillful propagandists seek to erode the concept of
deterrence and promote seemingly benign
disarmament schemes. The United States and the
people of the region naturally seek a reduction of
tensions. But this should begin at the real points of
tension-North Korea and Vietnamese-occupied
Cambodia, for example. We will not be lured into
proposals designed to weaken relations with our allies
or unilaterally impair our ability to protect U.S.
interests in East Asia and the Pacific region.
STRATEGY FOR AFRICA
The diversity of Africa embodies a broad range of
national security interests and presents numerous
challenges for the United States. We maintain military
access or U.S. facilities in several countries in support
of our strategic interests in the region and beyond
(such as in Southwest Asia and the Persian Gulf).
Africa is an important source of strategic minerals and
a potential growth market for U.S. exports. Its shores
adjoin some of the most important international sea
lanes. It represents a significant voting group in the
United Nations and other international organizations.
A number of domestic and external pressures pose
threats to our interests in African security. The Soviet
Union and its surrogates have made the Horn of
Africa an arena for East-West competition. They have
sustained a costly civil war in Angola which has
shattered the country's economy and seriously
degraded the quality of life for innocent civilians. The
Soviet Union has viewed southern Africa as an
opportune area for its expansionist policies. And it has
been the preeminent military supplier for Libya's
Muammar Qaddhafi, whose southward aggression
threatens Chad and other sub-Saharan African
countries. Apartheid will not only continue to breed
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conflict within South Africa, but is a primary cause of
instability in all of southern Africa.
Perhaps as in no other region, economic concerns are
closely interrelated with political stability in Africa.
After more than two decades of misguided statist
policies which produced economic deterioration,
many African countries are now recognizing that
market-oriented economic reform is critical for
renewed growth and development. Public reaction to
the stringent reforms which are now needed will pose
another kind of threat to political stability, at least in
the near term. Moreover, Africa's heavy debt burden
has stymied the abilities of governments to move
beyond economic reform to economic growth.
An effective U.S. strategy toward Africa integrates
political, military, and economic elements. We must
continue to sustain relationships with our military
partners and support regimes threatened by Soviet and
Libyan aspirations. We will work for national
reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts
in Angola, Namibia, and elsewhere. We will continue
to promote peaceful progress toward non-racial
representative democracy in South Africa, and peace
between South Africa and its neighbors. We support
regional economic cooperation among the countries
of southern Africa and will assist collaborative efforts
to achieve economic development. We must
encourage governments to stay the politically risky
course of economic reform.
In a region as underdeveloped as Africa, which has
relatively little access to private sources of capital, our
ability to achieve our objectives depends in very
significant measure on effective economic and security
assistance programs. Too often security assistance is
portrayed as a tradeoff against support for
development. In Africa, this distinction is particularly
ill-founded. Our security assistance programs promote
a stable political and economic environment that
permits the exercise of individual choice and the
development of human talent. Without that
environment, sustained development is not possible.
U.S. military assistance programs in Africa have always
been modest, but recently funding has been almost
eliminated by Congress. It is in our national interest to
provide a reasonable level of support to moderate,
friendly countries such as Kenya and Zaire, to regimes
on the front lines of Soviet-supported aggression such
as Somalia, and to countries facilitating access in
support of our strategies in Southwest Asia and the
Persian Gulf.
U.S. military training programs are an invaluable
instrument for promoting professionalism and respect
for human rights. The exposure to Western values that
comes from such programs may foster a respect for
the United States and democratic institutions among
individuals who play a key role in determining the
level of freedom and stability in African countries.
Many of these programs also contribute to economic
security. The African Coastal Security Program, for
example, provides training to West African countries to
enable them to protect their coastal fish stocks from
unauthorized foreign fishing fleets.
The U.S. assistance program in South Africa for
victims of apartheid, enacted into law by Congress,
helps prepare disenfranchised citizens for participation
in constitutional democracy and a free enterprise
economy in post-apartheid South Africa. Our new
program for regional trade and transport development
in the southern African states furthers our mutual
political interests and enables these countries to
develop alternatives to total dependence on South
Africa.
As African countries struggle to liberalize and expand
their economies, market economics are on trial. Our
challenge is to be able to provide enough resources to
permit new economic policies to bear fruit and
enable African countries to become fully integrated
into the existing world trading and financial system. A
promising start has been made with the President's
Initiative to End Hunger in Africa, the African
Economic Policy Reform Program, the Baker Plan
providing assistance on debt, and the Food for
Progress program. We must ensure that our assistance
programs and those of other donor countries and
institutions give impetus to further progress.
As part of that effort, we will continue to work with
our Western and Japanese partners to find creative
solutions to the debt problem of countries
implementing reforms. Our budgetary restrictions limit
what we can do directly, but much is at stake. Al-
though the aggregate debt is small compared to that
of Latin America, it has prevented the growth benefits
of economic reform from being realized.
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STRATEGY FOR LOW
INTENSITY CONFLICT
While high intensity conflict has been successfully
deterred in most regions of primary strategic interest
to the United States, low intensity conflicts continue
to pose a variety of threats to the achievement of
important U.S. objectives. As described in last year's
report, low intensity conflict typically manifests itself
as political-military confrontation below the level of
conventional war, frequently involving protracted
struggles of competing principles and ideologies, and
ranging from subversion to the direct use of military
force. These conflicts, generally in the Third World,
can have both regional and global implications for our
national security interests. For example:
? Military basing, access and transit rights in the
Philippines, key to U.S. power projection
capabilities in the Western Pacific and Indian
Oceans, are presently threatened by the communist
insurgency being waged against the Philippine
Government.
? In mineral-rich southern Africa, insurgencies,
economic instability and apartheid, as well as
ethnic tribal conflicts, pose potential threats to the
extraction of essential raw materials and their export
to industries in the West and Japan. The conflicts
endemic to the region are exacerbated by the
activity of the Soviet Union and its surrogates.
? Soviet, Cuban and Nicaraguan support for
insurgencies in El Salvador and elsewhere in Latin
America threaten nascent democracies in the region
which are already struggling with chronic poverty,
economic underdevelopment, and the growing
influence of narcotics cartels.
? Libya has used the threat of restricting or denying
oil shipments to blunt West European response to
state-sponsored terrorism, while simultaneously
training terrorists on Libyan soil. Freedom of action
for some U.S. allies can be limited by economic
ties.
Our strategies for dealing with low intensity conflict
recognize that U.S. responses in such situations must
be realistic, often discreet, and founded on a clear
relationship between the conflict's outcome and
important U.S. national security interests. Many low
intensity conflicts have no direct relevance to those
interests, while others may affect them in the most
fundamental ways. When a U.S. response is called for,
we take care to ensure that it is developed in
accordance with the principles of international and
domestic law, which affirm the inherent right of states
to use force in individual or collective self-defense
against armed attack; and to assist one another in
maintaining internal order against insurgency,
terrorism, illicit narcotics traffic, and other
characteristic forms of low intensity conflict.
Consistent with our strategies for dealing with low
intensity conflict, when it is in U.S. interest to do so,
the United States will:
? Work to ameliorate the underlying causes of
conflict in the Third World by promoting economic
development and the growth of democratic political
institutions.
? Support selected resistance movements opposing
oppressive regimes working against U.S. interests.
Such support will be coordinated with friends and
allies.
? Take measures to strengthen friendly nations facing
internal or external threats to their independence
and stability by employing appropriate instruments
of U.S. power. Where possible, action will be taken
early-before instability leads to widespread
violence; and emphasis will be placed on those
measures which strengthen the threatened regime's
long-term capability to deal with threats to its
freedom and stability.
? Take steps to discourage Soviet and other state-
sponsored adventurism, and increase the costs to
those who use proxies or terrorist and subversive
forces to exploit instability.
? Assist other countries in the interdiction and
eradication of illicit narcotics production and traffic.
Measures which have proven particularly effective
include aid to expand and improve the affected
country's law enforcement capabilities, to preserve
the independence and integrity of its judicial
system, and to provide for the sharing of
intelligence and investigative capabilities.
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Our own military forces have demonstrated
capabilities to engage in low intensity conflict, and
these capabilities have improved substantially in the
last several years. But the most appropriate application
of U.S. military power is usually indirect through
security assistance-training, advisory help, logistics
support, and the supply of essential military
equipment. Recipients of such assistance bear the pri-
mary responsibility for promoting their own security
interests with the U.S. aid provided. Our program of
assistance to El Salvador illustrates a successful
indirect application of U.S. military power.
The balanced application of the various elements of
national power is necessary to protect U.S. interests in
low intensity conflicts. But in the final analysis, the
tools we have at our disposal are of little use without
the support of the American people, and their
willingness to stay the course in what can be
protracted struggles. We cannot prevail if there is a
sharp asymmetry of wills-if our adversaries'
determination is greater than our own. At the same
time we do hold important advantages. We represent a
model of political and economic development that
promises freedom from political oppression and
economic privation. If we can protect our own
security, and maintain an environment of reasonable
stability and open trade and communication
throughout the Third World, political, economic, and
social forces should eventually work to our advantage.
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V. Executing the Strategy
The legislation requiring this annual report wisely
emphasized the importance of discussing not only
what our strategy is, but how well it is supported, and
whether any significant impediments to its execution
exist. In a sense, this portion of the report is the most
important, for it brings into focus the fundamental
issue of whether our strategy and resources are in bal-
ance; and, if they are not, whether we should resolve
the imbalance by changing the strategy, by supporting
it more effectively, or by consciously accepting a
higher level of risk to our national security interests.
The following paragraphs will discuss U.S. capabilities
to execute the National Security Strategy presented in
preceding chapters, with particular attention to those
areas where resource shortfalls adversely affect our
ability to execute the strategy in efficient and effective
ways.
RESOURCE SUPPORT
The successful execution of any strategy depends
upon the availability of adequate resources. This
means that we must not adopt strategies that our
country cannot afford; and our diplomats and military
leaders must not base their plans on resources that are
beyond the nation's capability to provide. It also
means that Congress, operating from a shared view of
U.S. national security interests and objectives, must
provide the Executive with the resources necessary to
implement a realistic, prudent, and effective National
Security Strategy. Recently, however, the Congressional
response has been inadequate.
For example, U.S. foreign assistance, including a
balanced mix of military and economic assistance,
promotes important national interests and helps
communicate our values and principles throughout
the world. These programs convert our regional
strategies into positive, visible actions which provide
assistance to people facing severe economic privation,
and promote the economic and political development
so important to help struggling societies evolve in
constructive ways. They also help governments seeking
to defend themselves from internal and external
threats. By helping our friends enhance their security,
we aid in creating the necessary preconditions for
economic and political development. In short, our
foreign assistance programs support the types of
positive change that will protect our national interests
over the long-term.
We currently spend less than two percent of our
annual federal budget on foreign assistance. This is
indisputably money well spent. The good we do, the
problems we help solve, and the threats we counter
through our assistance programs far outweigh the
costs. They represent a highly leveraged investment,
with large payoffs for relatively small outlays.
Nevertheless, our foreign assistance programs do not
receive the support they deserve from the Congress or
from the American people. In the last few years, the
Administration's foreign assistance budget requests
have been severely cut by the Congress. Although all
programs must bear the burden of reducing the
budget deficit, the cuts in foreign assistance have often
been grossly disproportionate. While the federal
budget has been growing overall, foreign assistance
was reduced by 29 percent in FY86, an additional 11
percent in FY87, and faces another reduction in FY88.
The security assistance account now falls significantly
below the level needed to maintain, with no
expansion, programs critical to our national security
interests.
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The problem of inadequate funding for foreign
assistance is compounded by Congressionally
mandated earmarks and restrictions that take an ever
larger piece of a shrinking pie. In recent years,
Congressional action has earmarked as much as 90
percent of certain foreign assistance accounts to
specific countries. These and other restrictions force
us to conduct foreign policy with our hands tied. We
are losing the ability to allocate resources according
to our strategic priorities, and we have virtually no
leeway to respond to emergencies with reallocations
of funds. The effects of earmarking on the developing
countries is particularly damaging. These smaller
programs bear a disproportionate share of the burden
when funds earmarked for large programs are
maintained at a constant level while the overall
assistance program is cut.
The adverse effects of funding cuts are not limited to
our foreign development and security assistance
programs. To properly coordinate these instruments
and to carry out our policies, we rely on our
diplomatic missions abroad. No foreign policy, no
matter how conceptually brilliant, can succeed unless
it is based on accurate information about, and correct
interpretation of, the developments in countries we are
attempting to influence. We need to be able to
persuade others that our goals are worth supporting
and that our means are appropriate. The essential
tasks of information, analysis and communication are
the primary responsibility of our embassies and
consulates.
Funds available for operating the Department of State
and our embassies and consulates overseas have been
cut to an unprecedented point. What that means in
real terms is fewer people to work on formulating and
implementing the nation's foreign policy at all levels. It
means fewer diplomatic and consular posts-posts
which are the eyes and ears of the U.S. Government
abroad. It means not providing the country with the
level of services, reporting, analysis, or the
representation and protection of global U.S. interests
that we have come to expect.
It cannot be stressed too strongly that our diplomatic
establishment and our foreign assistance programs are
an essential part of our political and economic
elements of power. We cannot support our National
Security Strategy without them. They work to resolve
tensions and ameliorate conflicts that, if ignored,
could degenerate into crises adversely affecting U.S.
interests. Unless we are willing to be an active
participant in promoting the type of world order we
desire, we may find ourselves compelled to defend
our interests with more direct, costly, and painful
means. Congressional action to shore up support for
this weakened link in our capability for strategy
execution should receive high priority attention.
Adequate and sustained resource support is also
needed for our defense programs. Providing for the
common defense is the most important responsibility
of the federal government-shared equally by the
Executive and Legislative branches. Partnership is the
key to its successful execution. In that spirit, in the
early 1980s-for the third time since World War II-
Congress and the Executive joined in a concerted
effort to rebuild and strengthen our military
capabilities. It was clear at that time that only an
increase in defense investment would produce the
necessary sustained impact on the military balance,
and redress the serious disparities between U.S. and
Soviet capabilities which had emerged during the
1970s-a period of unprecedented military investment
by the Soviets aimed at shifting the global "correlation
of forces" in a decisive and irreversible way.
Fortunately, the Congress and the American people
recognized the criticality of rebuilding the country's
defenses, and we made impressive progress. Having
arrested the adverse trend, however, the challenge
then became not to lose the momentum gained-
always a difficult task in a democracy. Unfortunately,
we have not done as well in that regard.
When I submitted the FY88 Budget a year ago, I did
not ask the Congress to approve Defense funding
increases of the magnitude that characterized those of
the early 1980s. At the same time, I did emphasize
that Congress must act positively to protect the gains
that we together had achieved. In particular, I stressed
that we must not continue on the path of decline in
real defense spending established during the
preceding two years. With lack of perspective, we had
begun a process of reversing the improvements in the
U.S.-Soviet balance achieved during the early 1980s.
Regrettably, this process continued with the legislative
action on the FY88 budget.
While the Defense figures coming out of the "budget
summit" were significantly less damaging than would
have been the case had sequestration occurred, they
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continued the downward trend of the Defense Budget,
in real terms, for the third year in a row. Soviet
spending, on the other hand, maintained its historical
pattern of real growth on the order of 3.5 percent
annually during this period of U.S. decline. The
unfortunate consequence is that sometime in the
future the American people will again be asked to
support defense capabilities for which they thought
they had once paid. In the meantime, the inefficient
procurement rates associated with instability and
reduced budgetary resources exacerbate the impact of
the Defense Budget cuts.
The FY88 cuts, coming on top of two prior years of
decline, have confronted us with a situation in which
we must now either reduce the readiness of our
forces, or lower investment and eliminate force
structure in order to allow our remaining military units
to function at an acceptable level of combat
capability. Either way, risk will grow, and deterrence
will be reduced.
The strategic implication of this continuing decline is
that U.S. forces will confront additional risk in regions
where the potential exists for high-intensity conflict,
and particularly in their ability to conduct high-
intensity operations in more than one theater
simultaneously. In global conflict this could require us
to forego opportunities to bring the conflict to early
termination by exerting military pressures on the
Soviets from several directions. It increases the
likelihood that force limitations will require us to
conduct sequential operations in successive theaters,
with the risk and uncertainty which that approach
entails.
Some will argue that the cuts do not really injure our
defense capability; that with greater imagination and a
willingness to innovate, we can do more with less in
the defense area. In this view, more thoughtful military
strategy, improved tactics, or changed emphasis in
force structure, can compensate for reduced resource
levels. In fact, our commanders work continuously to
find better ways to use the forces we have. With our
allies, we constantly strive to improve force
effectiveness, to capitalize on Soviet vulnerabilities,
and to employ competitive strategies which exploit
our technological, geographic or other advantages to
stress the Soviets' system and require them to make
disadvantageous investments. We seek out new ideas
on military strategy and force employment, and adopt
those which promise real gains in military
effectiveness; but we should be under no illusions that
there are quick fixes which can fundamentally reduce
our current military requirements.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that-pursuant to
recommendations of the 1986 Blue Ribbon Panel on
Defense Management-the Joint Chiefs of Staff over
the past year have conducted a global net assessment
of U.S. and Soviet capabilities and reviewed the
national military strategy to examine whether
alternative approaches could improve our overall
military capability at a given budget level. They
concluded that none of the particular alternatives ex-
amined was as effective as the capabilities generated
under current plans and strategy.
That is not surprising, given the fact that our military
strategy and supporting force structure are based on
certain fundamental conditions which change slowly,
if at all. These include the immutables of geography;
the division of labor entailed in our alliance
relationships; our advantage in certain advanced
technologies; the large capital investment we have in
existing forces; and the evolution of the threat. We
will continue to review our military strategy to
revalidate and update its essential elements. But in our
deliberations we need to distinguish between soundly
analyzed recommendations for improvements in U.S.
or allied strategy-which can be helpful-and those
that simply call for a strategy which costs less, without
regard to the range of security interests it can assure.
Another way sometimes suggested to compensate for
reduced resource levels is to scale back U.S.
commitments. But commitments are not an end in
themselves; they are simply ways of protecting U.S.
interests and achieving the objectives of our National
Security Strategy.
While details of those interests and objectives may
vary over time, as noted in the first chapter of this re-
port their core elements have changed little since the
1950s. No one seriously advocates abrogation of our
treaty relationships with the NATO nations, Japan, the
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, or our Hemispheric
neighbors. Nor do responsible voices argue against
our strategic relationship with Israel, our friendly ties
with Egypt, or our cooperative relations with other
moderate Arab states. The regional strategy sections of
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this report illustrate how our diplomatic, economic,
and military relationships with these and other key
countries interact to support fundamental U.S. interests
and objectives. While there may be room for
adjustments at the margin in our contributions to
regional security, none of our current commitments
are plausible candidates for major reduction, given the
scope of our global interests, the threats to those
interests, and the increasingly interdependent nature of
free world political, economic, and security
relationships. Both Congress and the Executive Branch
should continue to review our commitments
worldwide, but I see no prudent way to reduce those
commitments while remaining true to our values,
maintaining essential and mutually beneficial alliance
relationships, and safeguarding our future.
This does not imply that the United States is
necessarily satisfied with the contributions which our
allies and friends make to the common defense in
those regions where we have major military
commitments. In Europe in particular, our NATO allies
can and should do more to enhance Alliance
conventional defense capabilities. We will continue to
press them for more appropriate levels of defense
investment and improved efficiency in the use of
Alliance resources, while rejecting the self-defeating
argument that the failure of some allies to meet
agreed goals should prompt us to reduce our own
contribution to Alliance capabilities. We are in Europe
because it is in our interest to be there; and, within
the limits of Congressional funding, we will continue
to contribute those forces which we believe are
essential to the support of our national security
interests and objectives. At the same time we expect
our allies to show an equal interest in the common
defense, and to recognize the need to take on an
increasing share of the burden as we work together to
improve NATO's conventional defense capability and
the plans for employing it.
Finally, I should note that the defense program
required to support our strategy is eminently
affordable. In fact, in the past seven years, Americans
have devoted an average of only 6.1 percent of gross
national product (GNP) to national defense-well
under rates in the 1950s and 1960s, which averaged
about 10 percent. Similarly, at about 28 percent of
federal outlays, defense spending falls well below the
peacetime average of 41 percent during the postwar
era. In both instances, the increases of the early 1980s
seem large only because the spending of the late
1970s, which averaged less than 5 percent of GNP,
was so severely depressed. The resources needed to
support our national strategy, at a prudent level of
risk, are within our ability to pay. Failure to provide
these resources simply defers to future budgets the
task of regaining lost ground, while increasing risks to
our security in the near-term.
BIPARTISAN COOPERATION
The continued development and successful execution
of U.S. National Security Strategy is a major
responsibility of the Executive Branch. But, as the
foregoing discussion has emphasized, we cannot
accomplish this alone. Supporting a security strategy
that provides a sound vision for the future and a
realistic guide to action must be a cooperative
endeavor of the Administration and the Congress.
In this regard, I believe both branches need to review
their constitutional roles and the relationship between
them in the national security area. There are
important powers here; some that are best shared,
some that are Presidential responsibilities. After seven
years in office, I am convinced that the numerous
consultative arrangements established between the two
branches in areas such as arms negotiations,
intelligence, and military contingency operations
generally represent the best way to coordinate our
views and resolve our differences. We should continue
to look for ways to improve these arrangements; but
they are far superior to more rigid structural
alternatives that, in response to a specific set of
circumstances, would attempt to define in law the
precise constitutional boundaries of Executive and
Legislative authority which the Founding Fathers
purposely left in broad terms.
Equally detrimental is the increasing tendency of the
Congress to act in a directive manner with regard to
details of foreign, defense, and arms control policy,
limiting the flexibility of the Executive Branch by
enacting into law positions on which the President
should be allowed reasonable discretion. This trend
diminishes our ability to conduct rational and
coherent policies on the world scene; reduces our
leverage in critical negotiations; and impedes the
integrated use of U.S. power to achieve important
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national security objectives. It causes others to view
us as unreliable, and diminishes our influence
generally.
In addition, I would suggest that the Congress
reconsider how it can best organize itself for fulfiling
its Constitutional role. Over the past twenty years,
power and authority have effectively drifted away from
experienced leadership and committee chairmen, and
toward individual members and special interest
coalitions. From a Congressional perspective, Cabinet
Secretaries and White House advisers may present di-
verse points of view while policy is in the formative
state; but the President speaks with authority once
policy decisions are made. The President, however,
faces a far different situation in dealing with Congress.
In approaching the Congress as a partner in the
formulation of national security policy, the President
must have confidence that the Legislative branch
leadership is capable of implementing any consensus
that is reached, without being second-guessed or
undercut by autonomous members or interest groups.
This suggests the need for other legislative reforms. I
have often emphasized that restoring and maintaining
an adequate military balance, and fulfilling our
international obligations, requires a long view and
fiscal stability. This is not accomplished in a repetitive
and topsy-turvy annual budget cycle. We must face
squarely the need for multi-year authorizations and
appropriations, consistent with constitutional
limitations, in order to support our national security
and international affairs programs more efficiently and
effectively. While some progress has been made,
particularly with the recent adoption by the Congress
of a partial two-year defense authorization bill, much
more can and should be done. In this regard, it is
important to recall the conclusion of the Blue Ribbon
Commission on Defense Management that, in the
future, significant efficiencies in the defense budget
are more likely to be achieved through greater
program stability than through specific management
improvements by the Department of Defense.
Above all, we must both work harder to rebuild a
bipartisan public consensus on our National Security
Strategy and the resources needed to execute it. The
fundamental policies and strategies we have pursued
are similar to, and consistent with, those pursued by
previous generations of American leaders. Renewed
consensus will be forged on the anvil of public
debate-among responsible officials in government,
between the Congress and the Executive, in
consultations with our allies and friends, and among
the larger community of interested and concerned
American citizens. We look forward to that debate and
to working with the Congress to achieve increased
understanding of, and broad support for, our National
Security Strategy. There can be no endeavor more
important for the long-term well-being of the
American people; and I solicit the Congress' closest
collaboration in achieving it.
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NATIONAL SECUF?,1TY S7,
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