SOVIET TANK PROGRAMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP00-01872R001001550001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 55
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: December 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Director of Top S cret
Central
Intelligence
Soviet Tank Programs
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum
Top !Secret
NI JIM 84-10016
December 1984
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NI I I M 84-10016
SOVIET TANK PROGRAMS
Information available as of 1 December 1984 was
used in the preparation of this Memorandum.
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CONTENTS
Page
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS ............................................... 1
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 7
A. Role of Tank in Soviet Concept of Land Warfare ................... 7
Historical Overview .................................................................... 7
Tanks and Nuclear War ......................................................... 8
Technical, Tactical, Organizational, and Operational
Adjustments ......................................................................... 8
The Future Role of Tank Forces ............................................... 9
Tactical Improvements ........................................................... 9
Organizational Improvements ............................................... 9
Economic Constraints ................................................................. 10
B. Soviet Tank Programs ................................................................. 10
Design Requirements .................................................................. 10
First Postwar Tank Generation: T-54, T-55, and T-62............ 11
Second Postwar Generation: T-64, T-72, and T-80 .................. 11
T-64 Series ............................................................................... 11
T-64A ................................................................................... 11
T-64B ................................................................................... 15
T-72 Series ............................................................................... 18
T-72 ...................................................................................... 18
T-72M .................................................................................. 20
Soviet Medium Tank M-1981/3 ........................................ 20
T-80 .......................................................................................... 23
Tank Modernization Programs .................................................. 25
Armor ...................................................................................... 25
Armament and Fire Control .................................................. 25
Mobility ................................................................................... 25
Future Soviet Tank Programs .................................................... 25
The Challenge of Future Antitank Weapons ....................... 27
Initial Soviet Response ............................................................ 27
Future Soviet Tank Development Options ........................... 28
Which Option Will the Soviets Choose? ............................... 28
Future Development Options and Technology Transfer .... 29
Technology Transfer and the Challenge to Tank
Producers ............................................................................. 31
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C. Tank Production ......................................................................... 31
Production Facilities ................................................................... 32
Expansion and Modernization of Facilities .............................. 32
Current Programs ....................................................................... 33
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant ..................................................... 33
Khar'kov Tank Plant .............................................................. 33
Nizhniy Tagil Tank and Railroad Car Manufacturing
Plant ..................................................................................... 33
Omsk Tank Plant .................................................................... 33
Future Programs ......................................................................... 38
D. Tank Deployment ....................................................................... 39
The Soviet Tank Force: Present and Future ............................ 40
Western TVD .......................................................................... 41
Northwestern TVD ................................................................. 41
Southwestern TVD ................................................................. 44
Southern TVD ......................................................................... 44
Soviet Forces in the Far East ................................................. 44
The Strategic Reserve ............................................................. 44
The Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Tank Force: Present and
Future .................................................................................. 44
Czechoslovakia ........................................................................ 44
East Germany ......................................................................... 45
Poland ...................................................................................... 45
Hungary ................................................................................... 45
Bulgaria ................................................................................... 45
Romania ................................................................................... 45
Export of Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Tanks ............. 45
E. Implications for NATO .............................................................. 46
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ANNEX B: Trends in Soviet Tank Gun Ammunition ....................... 51
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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS
The Soviets continue to regard the tank as the most important
element of their army's conventional combined-arms team. They rely
on the tank to provide mobile, protected firepower for decisive, high-
speed, offensive operations in a way that no other currently available
weapon system can. The tank will almost certainly continue to be the
primary weapon in the Soviet combined-arms inventory for the rest of
this century, although we expect that the Soviets will have to make
continuous technical, tactical, and organizational adjustments to make it
possible for the tank to remain a viable weapon on both the nuclear and
the conventional battlefields. These adjustments appear to be already in
progress.
Current Programs
In an effort to ensure that their army will always be equipped with
sufficient numbers of tanks capable of participating effectively in
rapid-paced offensive operations, especially against NATO forces, the
Soviets have created a costly armored vehicle research, development,
testing, and evaluation (RDT&E) establishment that includes thousands
of scientists, engineers, technicians, and managers and involves the
employees of numerous defense-industrial ministries and even many
civilian ministries. Most recently, this establishment has developed three
major new tank models that are currently being fielded with tank
troops: product-improved versions of the T-64 and T-72, and the T-80.
The latest T-64 version-the T-6413-is the first Soviet tank capable of
firing tank gun ammunition and antitank guided missiles (ATGMs)
through its main gun tube. The T-80, which appears to incorporate
features of both the T-64 and T-72 series, also can fire ATGMs through
its main gun tube in addition to conventional ammunition. Moreover,
the T-80 is the first Soviet tank to be propelled by a gas turbine engine.
This publication was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for General
Purpose Forces. It was drafted by Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated within CIA
and with the National Security Agency and the intelligence components of the Departments of State and
Defense.
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All three of these tanks are formidable fighting vehicles that are ca-
pable of defeating any currently fielded NATO tank at normal battle
ranges. They are not invulnerable to US antitank weapons, however,
and probably could be defeated by selected US antitank weapons, if
these weapons were properly employed and available in adequate
numbers.
Future Programs
We judge that the Soviets almost certainly will field a completely
new tank design or designs by the early 1990s to meet the threat posed
by NATO's formidable future antitank forces. We expect the Soviets to
continue to develop main battle tanks in the foreseeable future instead
of returning to the development of light, medium, and heavy tanks, as
they did during the 1940s and early 1950s. Because of the recent
Western advances in armor-piercing ammunition and shaped-charge
warheads for ATGMs, the major challenge to Soviet tank designers will
be to increase armor protection while maintaining mobility. The Soviets
probably will arm their tanks with improved versions of the 125-mm
smoothbore tank gun in the future because this gun design still has
significant potential for performance growth. Soviet designers may be
able to create an acceptable vehicle using the traditional turreted tank
design that has dominated the battlefield for the last 50 years. If so, the
design will require technically advanced armors to provide the required
protection with a 45- to 50-metric-ton weight limit. On the other hand,
they may field a tank with a reduced-volume turret or no turret at all-
an option that would not require the development of technically
advanced armors. Any of these options could result in a tank weighing
less than 50 metric tons with a significantly greater level of armor
protection than currently available designs can provide.
Whichever option or options the Soviets choose, they almost
certainly will strive to overcome other, less critical weaknesses that are
apparent in their current generation of tanks. Specifically, they proba-
bly will:
- Continue to improve fire-control systems to increase their
ability to acquire a target and reduce the time needed to find
the target's range and hit it.
- Fit their tanks with improved night vision equipment, either
active or passive or a combination of the two.
- Strive to develop a thermal imaging system similar in capabili-
ties to the ones used in the M-1 and M-60A3 tanks.
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- Continue to develop and improve their antitank weapon coun-
termeasures and supplemental armors.
Future Tank Development and Technology Transfer
We believe that the Soviets can develop and produce tanks to suit
their future operational requirements, the embargo on the transfer of
Western technology to the USSR notwithstanding. The embargo may,
however, cause the period necessary for development to lengthen and
developmental costs to rise. Stemming the flow of manufacturing
technology to the Soviet tank production establishment, moreover, may
make it more difficult for the Soviets to fabricate complex new tank de-
signs efficiently.
Tank Production
The Soviets appear to have been expanding the tank production
area of their three major tank assembly plants at Khar'kov, Nizhniy
Tagil, and Omsk and have recently begun assembling T-72-series tanks
at the tractor plant in Chelyabinsk, which previously had been a
producer of major tank components. The expansion at the three major
plants may have been undertaken in part to accommodate a new
generation of sophisticated machine tools, many of which were pur-
chased in the West, and new fabrication techniques. These improve-
ments probably do not presage an increase in annual output. Instead,
the Soviets probably have undertaken them in an attempt to maintain
previous production levels in spite of the substantially greater sophisti-
cation of the latest tank models and the strain that this sophistication
places on production resources, both human and material. We expect
that Soviet tank production will continue to average about 3,000
vehicles a year, which was the estimated average annual tank produc-
tion level in the 1973-83 period.
The Soviets continue to possess an impressive excess of production
capacity at their main plants. If they were to mobilize their industrial
base and place it on a wartime footing, they could increase their tank
production level substantially if they were able to maintain an adequate
flow of key subcomponents to the main tank assembly plants.
Tank Deployment
We expect the Soviets to continue to adhere to their deployment
strategy of the past 35 years: they will equip tank units opposite NATO
forces in Central Europe with the latest, most capable tanks before they
begin to send large numbers to units in other theaters of military
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operations. The tank inventories of units opposite NATO's central and
southern European forces and of units belonging to the Soviet army's
strategic reserve are substantially more modern than those of units in
other Soviet theaters. The bulk of the modern tanks in the strategic
reserve probably would be used to support the forces operating against
NATO. The tank inventories of other theaters probably will continue to
be significantly less capable than those of units earmarked for commit-
ment against NATO's forces in central and southern Europe.
Implications for NATO
In a war in Central Europe between NATO and the Warsaw Pact,
the Pact's objective would be to mount an irresistible, rapid-paced
ground offensive. Supported by theater air forces, Pact forces would
seek to quickly cross the Rhine River and overrun France and the Low
Countries. They would hope to force NATO to capitulate, ideally
before any strategic nuclear exchange occurred. NATO defenders
would use air, ground, and, in selected circumstances, naval forces in an
effort to prevent the Pact from achieving this goal. NATO defenders'
chief task would be to slow or defeat Soviet armored formations. NATO
air forces would certainly engage these formations, but the burden of
defense would fall most heavily on ground units tasked with destroying
Pact, especially Soviet, tanks.
Currently, Pact tank forces outnumber NATO's about 3 to 1 in
central Europe. The majority of the Soviet force is made up of tanks of
the T-64 and T-72 series, although a substantial number of older tanks-
T-62s and T-55s-remain in many units. The latest tank, the T-80, is in
the early stages of replacing T-62s in Soviet units in East Germany. The
newest version of the T-72 is replacing T-62s and T-55s in Soviet units
in Czechoslovakia. The latest version of the T-64 is supplementing older
T-64 models in East Germany. The replacement process will not be
completed until 1986 at the earliest and may take even longer.
If a Soviet conventional ground attack were to occur in the near fu-
ture, US Army units would be armed with only limited quantities of
ATGMs and armor-piercing ammunition with the technical capability
to defeat these tanks at normal battle ranges.
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To counter the Soviets' weight of numbers and the lethality of their
weapons, US commanders would have to implement their tactical
doctrine optimally and strive whenever possible to slow the enemy's
advance and to engage the enemy from above or from the side in order
to maximize the number of tank kills. At the same time, US command-
ers would have to try to preserve their own forces by minimizing their
exposure to Soviet fire. Adequate levels of well-coordinated air support
might prove to be critical to a successful defense.
Large numbers of tank and motorized rifle divisions from the
western military districts of the USSR, which make up the forces of the
second strategic echelon, would be even more difficult for US antitank
forces to defeat than the forward-area Soviet tank force because the
second echelon has a greater number of T-72s, T-64s, and T-80s. F_
This situation probably will not change significantly for several
years because programed improvements to US antitank forces in West
Germany will be offset by the continuing improvement of the Soviet
forward-area tank force. The Soviets' chief advantage will continue to
be their superior numbers.
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DISCUSSION
A. ROLE OF TANK IN SOVIET CONCEPT OF
LAND WARFARE
1. The Soviets continue to regard the tank as the
most important element of their ground forces' com-
bined-arms team: it forms the backbone of their tank
and motorized rifle units (see figure 1). They rely on
the tank to provide mobile, protected firepower for
decisive, high-speed offensive operations in a way that
no other currently available weapon system can. C
2. In a conventional offensive, Soviet reconnais-
sance elements, including tanks responsible for per-
forming reconnaissance by fire, would attempt to
ascertain the disposition of the enemy's forces. After
assessing the enemy's deployment of forces, motorized
rifle troops would concentrate for an attack on appar-
ent weak points in an effort to achieve a breakthrough.
Tanks usually would accompany these troops to pro-
vide direct fire support. Their targets probably would
include personnel, armored vehicles, and fortified
positions. Their fire probably would be supplemented
by that of attack helicopters and close-air-support
(CAS) aircraft. Indirect fire support would be provided
by rocket and tube artillery units. After a break-
through had been achieved, tank units accompanied
by motorized rifle troops would lead an exploitation
force through the newly created gap to pursue fleeing
defenders or encircle and destroy outflanked defend-
ers that chose to stand and fight
3. Even nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC)
weapons have not diminished the importance of the
tank. If anything, that importance has been height-
ened because the tank appears to be more readily
adaptable than most other weapons to operations
under NBC conditions.
4. Soon after the formation of the Red Army, its
leaders recognized the potential combat value of the
tank. By 1931, they had developed a fundamentally
new doctrine stressing attacks into the enemy's rear
areas by combined-arms forces that depended heavily
on tanks for their striking power. In support of this
Figure 1
Tank Holdings of a
Soviet Tank or Motorized
Rifle Division
319
Tanks
220
Tanks
MOM 12-80
new doctrine, the Soviets embarked on a major tank
development program.
5. Despite initial setbacks during World War II,
which were in large part due to the chaos created
within the army by the purges of the late 1930s, the
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Soviets took the offensive and eventually inflicted a
series of decisive defeats on the German Army. These
successes resulted from both joint and combined-arms
operations, but the Soviets concluded that the tank,
operating with adequate fire support, had contributed
more to these successes than any other ground force
weapon. Moreover, they learned that, to ensure opera-
tional success, their army had to have far greater
numbers of armored vehicles, especially tanks, than
their opponents.
6. The development of nuclear weapons did not
cause the Soviets to stop the development and procure-
ment of tanks. After extensive study and debate, they
concluded that, although nuclear weapons would be
decisive in any future general war, they had not
rendered the tank obsolete. Indeed, the Soviets identi-
fied the tank as the weapon system most likely to
survive on the nuclear battlefield and as the best
system for rapidly exploiting nuclear strikes on the
opposing forces. Soviet war plans, therefore, envi-
sioned that tactical nuclear weapons would open gaps
in enemy defenses through which tank troops could
quickly pour to pursue surviving defenders, destroy
reserves, and capture key installations in the rear area.
7. The continuing utility of tanks on the modern
battlefield was reemphasized in 1967 when NATO
formally discarded the doctrine of massive retaliation
in favor of the doctrine of flexible response. This gave
official NATO recognition to the concept that a
general war in central Europe would probably begin
with a conventional phase, possibly prolonged-a con-
cept shared by the Soviets.
Technical, Tactical, Organizational, and
Operational Adjustments
8. In the Soviet view, continuous technical, tactical,
and organizational adjustments have made it possible
for the tank to remain a viable weapon on both the
nuclear and the conventional battlefields. The Soviets
recognized at an early date that the tank's relatively
heavy armor protected its crew against the blast of a
nuclear detonation as well as against selected forms of
initial and residual radiation. By providing their tanks
with radiation-absorbing liners, they have been able to
increase the protection level further. This means that
tank troops can operate close to areas contaminated by
nuclear detonations and survive, while troops riding in
vehicles with thinner skins cannot in many cases.
Moreover, the tank's mobility means that tank troops
can be dispersed until just before an attack, making
them relatively elusive targets for enemy nuclear
weapons.
9. On the nonnuclear battlefield, the principal chal-
lenge has been to adjust to the threat posed by the
Western development of antitank guided missiles
(ATGMs),' highly lethal kinetic-energy (KE) rounds,
sophisticated target acquisition systems, and precision-
guided munitions. The Soviets have responded to this
threat in a variety of ways:
- Reorganization of many of their ground combat
formations to include greater numbers of more
capable fire-support weapons to suppress enemy
antitank forces.
- Experimentation with new fire-support forma-
tions designed to engage powerful, mobile enemy
fire-support systems operating deep in the ene-
my's rear.
- Alteration of operational plans to provide addi-
tional fire-support for combat formations as they
move forward to contact the enemy.
- Rapid expansion of the Soviet CAS helicopter
force.
- Reorganization of the CAS helicopter force to
make it more responsive to lower-level combat
unit commanders.
- Increase in the number and quality of Soviet
combat engineering forces to help ensure the
rapid passage of tank forces across the battlefield.
- Development of tactics to maximize the surviv-
ability of tanks and their crews.
- Development of laminate armor more resistant
to both shaped-charge and KE rounds than tradi-
tional steel armor.
- Provision of additional armor in many newer
Soviet tanks as well as systems to reduce the
likelihood of enemy detection.
- Development and deployment of system-specific
countermeasures against guided munitions.
10. In addition, the Soviets have created an exten-
sive logistic support system to ensure that they can
sustain a rapid, continuous offensive in central
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Europe. This system includes forward-area depots of
critical supplies, such as POL (petroleum, oil, and
lubricants), ammunition, and rations, and a transporta-
tion network capable of moving these supplies to units
on the march. The transportation network includes
materiel support brigades subordinate to fronts and
armies and materiel support battalions, which are
organic to divisions. As a front's combat units moved
forward in wartime, depots of critical supplies would
be moved forward too, but these depots would always
remain outside the range of conventional field artil-
lery. The materiel support brigades would transport
these supplies farther forward, where temporary facil-
ities would be established for the transfer of the
supplies to divisional materiel support battalions.
These battalions would then distribute the supplies to
the divisions' regiments. In the case of POL, tactical
pipelines would be laid as the front advanced, con-
necting the mobile supply depots of the front with
major commercial pipelines.
11. Technical support units, which are part of the
rear services structure, include mobile maintenance
units whose job it would be to repair severely damaged
equipment, including tanks. Less seriously damaged
equipment probably would be repaired by divisional
or regimental maintenance personnel with assistance
from army-level maintenance units
The Future Role of Tank Forces
12. The tank almost certainly will continue to be
the primary weapon in the Soviet combined-arms
inventory for the remainder of this century. Although
the Soviets appear to be alert to the tank's vulnerabili-
ties, we see no evidence that they are planning
fundamental changes in their doctrine or tactics that
would diminish the importance of the tank, nor have
they discussed a replacement. Further, they are ex-
panding the research, development, and production
facilities that have been associated with tank pro-
grams. In addition to this, they are also substantially
modernizing older tank models. Apparently, they con-
tinue to believe that no other weapon combines fire-
power, protection, and mobility more effectively than
the tank in the shock force role. Moreover, they have
made such a heavy investment in tank forces that
replacement would require an enormous expenditure.
13. However, to ensure that the tank continues to
be an effective weapon, the Soviets must continue to
make organizational and tactical adjustments, as well
as technical improvements, to compensate for the
growing lethalit of Western antit nk weapons and
forces.
Tactical Improvements
14. Substantial change is already under way in the
Soviet army. The Soviets have continued to refine
their combined-arms tactics in an effort to adjust to
NATO's rapidly improving antitank forces. Probably
the most important current development is the opera-
tional maneuver group (OMG). It appears that the
front OMG is an elaboration of the tank army concept.
The tank army was developed during World War II as
a second-echelon force specifically charged with pur-
suit and exploitation missions. The front OMG mission
will be undertaken by a tank-heavy combined-arms
force of varying size and composition that can be
assigned a wider range of tasks than the tank army and
is also designed to operate independently farther from
friendly forces-sometimes as much as 300 to 500
kilometers. According to Warsaw Pact military writ-
ings, the OMG was devised to be more effective than
the tank army in ensuring high rates of advance
against NATO forces, especially antitank forces. An
OMG, unlike a tank army, would seek to avoid combat
with an enemy main force or frontline units and
march instead to capture or destroy key rear objectives
such as nuclear delivery systems and depots, airfields,'
river-crossing sites, and command posts. It can also be
used to interfere with mobilization and the movement
of enemy reserves.
15. The OMG is designed as part of a larger
operational scheme that relies more on maneuver than
on fire to achieve victory. If this overall plan is
implemented successfully, it could buy victory more
cheaply in terms of casualties and destroyed equip-
ment than previous operational plans.
Organizational Improvements
16. Although there has been relative stability dur-
ing the last several years in the organization and
authorized equipment of tank battalions, the number
and capabilities of mechanized infantry, artillery, and
helicopter fire-support weapons and combat engineer-
ing equipment in ready tank and motorized rifle
divisions have been increasing significantly. Non-
divisional missile and field artillery units are also being
strengthened. These improvements boost the fire-
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power of the combined-arms forces and increase their
mobility and flexibility. From the army commander's
perspective, these improvements translate into a great-
er ability to disrupt enemy defenders in general and to
suppress enemy antitank forces in particular. Thus, the
Soviets believe that these force improvements should
enable tank units to exploit initial successes by rapidly
advancing deep into enemy territory to destroy re-
serves and capture key installations despite improve-
ments in enemy antitank forces.
Economic Constraints
20. These organizational and tactical adjustments
and the potential technical improvements explored in
section B, below, will not come cheaply, and, because
the Soviet economy appears to be experiencing funda-
mental difficulties, we expect that the Soviet military
will be obliged to be selective and circumspect in their
expenditures for their tank force during the next
several years. Because the tank is so important to the
Soviet army, the army will continue to procure large
numbers of new tanks, but the procurement rate
probably will be more modest than during the late
1960s and early 1970s, when we estimate the Soviets
procured nearly 4,000 tanks a year. Moreover, the
Soviets probably will modernize large numbers of
older tanks to reduce the need to procure new, more
expensive models.
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21. We have estimated the procurement costs of
various Soviet tank models in 1982 dollars and have
concluded that the cost of individual tank models has
risen sharply in the last 20 years. The T-55 and T-62,
both of which were introduced 20 to 25 years ago,
would now cost about $500,000 each to produce. The
next models to be introduced, the T-64A and the
initial production version of the T-72, cost $800,000 to
$850,000 each. The latest, most sophisticated tanks,
the T-64B and the T-80, cost $1-1.4 million each.
Future models promise to be even more expensive.
The costs involved in the reorganization of Soviet
ground forces and the costs inherent in the develop-
ment of new doctrine and tactics are also high,
B. SOVIET TANK PROGRAMS
22. Improvements in Western tank and antitank
weapons, organization, and tactics impel the Soviet
defense establishment constantly to develop new,
more capable tanks. To ensure that the Soviet army's
ready divisions will always be equipped with sufficient
numbers of tanks capable of participating effectively
in rapid-paced offensive operations, the Soviets have
carefully organized their tank-related research and
development efforts (see annex A, page 49). Over the
years they have established an extensive and expensive
armored vehicle research, development, testing, and
evaluation (RDT&E) establishment that includes thou-
sands of scientists, engineers, technicians, and manag-
ers and involves the employees of numerous defense-
industrial ministries and even many civilian ministries.
Some of these professionals engage in basic and ap-
plied research that relates to tanks and tank compo-
nents and even to fabrication technology. Others are
responsible for translating the fruits of domestic and
foreign research, acquired legally or illegally, into new
tank designs.
Design Requirements
23. Since World War II, these RDT&E personnel
have worked to develop tanks meeting a set of opera-
tional requirements that appear to have changed little
over the years. The Soviet army's Main Armored
Directorate of the Ministry of Defense has consistently
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commissioned designs that promise to result in a tank
that, given available technology:
- Mounts a powerful main armament capable of
defeating enemy tanks at most anticipated battle
ranges.
- Is protected from most antitank weapons across
the frontal 60-degree arc of the turret and the
upper glacis at expected battle ranges.
- Possesses a power-to-weight ratio sufficient to
assure that the vehicle can move across most
types of terrain.
- Has the capability to travel at least 450 kilome-
ters over roads without refueling.
- Can operate in the presence of NBC weapons.
- Can cross rivers less than 5 meters deep without
bridging equipment.
- Is narrow enough to be transported by rail.
- Can operate reliably under day and night com-
bat conditions and in adverse weather.
- Involves minimal production costs and complex-
ities.
First Postwar Tank Generation:
T-54, T-55, and T-62
24. In the immediate post-World War II era, the
Soviets produced the T-54, a design that met most of
these requirements adequately. It mounted a larger
gun than Western designs, was lighter by virtue of its
configuration and the concentration of most of its
armor in the frontal 60-degree arc, and possessed a
higher net power-to-weight ratio that ensured reason-
ably good mobility. Moreover, it was rugged, reliable,
nuclear weapons to highly capable enemy tanks and
ATGMs. If the Pact's tank forces were to remain
capable of spearheading a rapid-paced offensive oper-
ation against NATO, new tank designs would be
needed.
27. Soviet designers responded with the T-64 and
T-72 tanks. These tanks incorporated a number of
relatively complex and expensive components and
design features that were not carryovers from the T-54,
T-55, and T-62 line.
T-64A
28. In many ways the T-64 series was a bolder
departure from previous designs than the T-72. The
series' first version produced in large numbers was the
T-64A (see figure 2, page 12)
29. Protection. The development of ATGMs and
more effective shaped-charge warheads meant that it
was no longer practical to protect a tank with solid
steel armor because it would have to be so thick to be
effective that the tank would be virtually too heavy to
move. The T-64A's designers solved this problem by
incorporating nonmetallic substances into the tank's
armor array. When compared with an equal weight of
steel, these substances give a much higher level of
protection against shaped-charge warheads. Soviet de-
signers sandwiched a layer of nonmetallic material
between two plates of rolled steel-the outer plate
being thicker than the inner one-and angled them to
form the front upper hull, called the glacis (see figure
3, page 13).
and relatively cheap and easy to produce
25. The Soviets proceeded to perfect this design by
making incremental improvements, using components
of proven technology to minimize the risk of designing
and producing a tank that would be a costly failure.
This program of progressive improvements resulted in
the T-55 and T-62. The T-55 followed the T-54 into
the active inventory in the late 1950s, and the T-62
followed the T-55 a few years later. The T-55's better
power-to-weight ratio made it more mobile than the
T-62, but the T-62 mounted a main gun of larger
caliber.
Second Postwar Generation:
T-64, T-72, and T-80
26. In the mid-1950s the Soviets realized their tanks
would soon face a variety of new threats from tactical
30. The T-64A's turret also reportedly incorporates
nonmetallic material that fills cavities in the front of
the turret (see figure 5, page 15). Although we lack
details about the materials and precise configuration
of this turret armor array, we estimate that it provides
the same level of protection against KE and shaped-
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Figure 2
Soviet T-64A Tank
Weight: 38 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, cored
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 370 to 440 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 500 to 575 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 370 to 440 mm against KE rounds, 500 to 575 mm against shaped-charged warheads
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun
Number of main gun rounds on board: 39
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Coincidence
Engine type: Five-cylinder, opposed-piston diesel
Horsepower: 700 to 750
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 18.5-19.7:1
Top speed: 85 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Three
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Figure 3
Configuration of Soviet
T-72/T-64 Glacis Armor Array
304184 12-84
charge rounds as the front upper hull. Moreover, the
T-64A incorporates this level of protection while
weighing only 38 metric tons.
31. We assess that the armor on the top of the T-64A's
turret is 50 mm thick; the armor of the hull roof, 30
mm; and the armor of the hull floor, 20 mm.
32. Some sources report that, in addition to this
integral protection, the T-64A, as well as other tanks of
the second postwar generation, is equipped with sup-
plemental armor in the form of screens or shields for
the turret and the hull sides.
33. The T-64A also has a radiation-absorbing liner
to protect the crew against the effects of residual
nuclear radiation. This liner will also provide some
protection against spalling, which occurs when projec-
tiles striking the armor envelope cause small chunks of
metal-spall-to break away from the interior surface
of the armor and careen around inside the tank at high
velocity, damaging the tank and possibly killing the
crew
34. The T-64A's crew is provided further protection
by a collective protection system that automatically
senses the presence of radiation or selected chemical
and biological agents and, immediately after detec-
tion, seals large openings (other than the hatches) into
the crew compartment and uses the overpressure there
to prevent the introduction of contaminated air. All air
for the crew is filtered. The T-64A also has an
automatic fire-extinguishing system.
35. In the last few years, Soviet tanks have been
fitted with smoke grenade projectors, mounted on the
front of the turret. By using these smoke projectors, a
tank crew can make it much more difficult for an
antitank gunner to acquire the tank as a target, and
smoke also degrades the performance of most ATGM
guidance systems and laser designator beams. Broad-
band obscurants could also be dispensed and would
substantially degrade thermal imaging systems.
36. Armament and Fire Control. The T-64A is
armed with a high-velocity 125-mm smoothbore gun,
which is derived from the T-62's 115-mm gun. This
gun is capable of achieving high levels of armor
penetration using KE ammunition
It can also fire
other conventional tank munitions, and, like the T-62's
gun, it is stabilized horizontally and vertically. Sepa-
rated ammunition is fed into the gun with an automat-
ic loader that eliminates the requirement for a human
loader and reduces the crew size from four to three.
The use of an automatic loader permits, among other
things, a more efficient layout of the commander's and
gunner's stations and storage of main gun ammunition
below the turret ring. The gun is aimed using a
partially automated, coincidence-rangefinding gun-
sight that enables accurate range determination out to
4,000 meters-an improvement of several hundred
meters over the T-62's aiming provisions. The fire-
control system is partially automated in that the
rangefinder feeds range data directly into a ballistic
computer, which in turn shifts an aiming mark in the
eyepiece to show the gunner the correct elevation of
the gun for accurate fire. The gunner uses hand-
operated power controls to move the gun to the firing
elevation. As the tank approaches a fixed target, the
computer can continually adjust the aiming mark to
remind the gunner to compensate for the decreasing
range
37. The only aspect of the T-64A's fire-control
system that does not represent an improvement over
the T-62 is the night vision equipment, which provides
night aiming up to a range of only 800 meters for any
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ammunition. This infrared system is no better than the
T-55's and, although it was competitive with Western
tanks in the late 1960s and early 1970s, now lags far
behind contemporary Western capabilities.
38. Mobility. The T-64A incorporates an engine
radically different from the 12-cylinder diesel that
was developed for the T-34 and incorporated with
progressive improvements in the T-54, T-55, and T-62.
The new engine-a five-cylinder, opposed-piston, die-
sel model-is lighter and more compact than the V-12
design. Like any other diesel engine, it is technically
capable of operating on a variety of fuels, but, when
another fuel is substituted for diesel fuel, it will run
inefficiently and with less reliability. This new engine
gives the T-64A a power-to-weight ratio of between
18.5 and 19.7 horsepower per metric ton, as compared
with 16 horsepower per metric ton for the T-55.
39. The T-64A also has a new, manual transmission
system that performs much better than the T-62's
transmission and steelplate clutch system while avoid-
ing the complexities and the efficiency losses associat-
ed with a fully automatic transmission.
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Figure 5
Reported Configuration of
Soviet T-64 Series' Cored
Turret Armor Array
hand signals and signal flags to help preserve radio
silence. Commanders of T-64-equipped battalions and
regiments are provided with a variant called the T-64K,
which is equipped with a second radio called the
R-130M, whose range is 50 km. Normally, the company
commander receives messages from the battalion or
regimental commander via radio and then transmits
them in turn to the tanks in his company. The company
commander also is usually the only one who transmits
messages up the chain of command. Each tank also is
equipped with an R-124 intercom for communication
between members of the crew. To the best of our
knowledge, all tanks of the second post-World War II
design generation are equipped with the same commu-
nications gear as the T-64 series.
T-64B
42. The T-64B is a further development of the T-64A.
It is distinguished chiefly by its ability to fire both
ATGMs and conventional ammunition through its
125-mm main gun-which, although it has a develop-
mental designator different from that of the gun of the
T-64A and the basic T-72, is externally indistinguish-
able from that 125-mm gun model (see figure 7, page
17). We assess the ATGM, called the 9M112 (designat-
ed by NATO as the AT-8), to have a maximum range
of 4,000 to 5,000 meters and an ability to penetrate
700 to 800 mm of rolled homogeneous armor (RHA).
The missile also can be employed in a self-defense role
against helicopters and possibly against slower flying
40. The T-64A's track and suspension system are
more complex than the first postwar tanks' suspension
and flat track and makes the T-64A capable of much
smoother, faster cross-country travel. The new system
includes support rollers, additional shock absorbers,
and a double-pin, bushed, live track. These features
make the T-64A a more stable gun platform while
firing on the move. The track and the suspension
system are still vulnerable to mines, however, and
even a relatively small mine is capable of immobiliz-
ing the tank. This vulnerability extends to all other
Soviet medium tanks.
41. Communications. The T-64A is equipped with
an R-123M radio set, which has a range of 20 km with
its whip antenna fully extended. The tank commander
can use it to communicate with other tanks in his
platoon or company, although extensive use is made of
tactical aircraft.
43. This missile-firing capability gives the T-64B
greater tactical flexibility than the T-64A. In the
attack it could perform more effectively than the A
model in an overwatch role. Overwatching tanks
deploy for an attack well behind the leading tanks and
fire over them to suppress antitank fire. Recent Soviet
military publications envision the use of ATGMs for
just this sort of fire suppression. In the defense, the
T-64B could fight from well-situated positions with
extended fields of fire and use its missiles to destroy
enemy vehicles at much greater ranges than could a
T-64A
44. The T-64B's fire-control system differs substantial-
ly from the A model's. Apparently it incorporates optical
components and a laser rangefinder to control fire of
conventional tank rounds as well as components to track
the missile's infrared beacon and guide its flight with
radio commands. The missiles may replace or supplement
the five or six high-explosive antitank (HEAT) rounds that
normally make up part of a T-64A's ammunition load and
are fed into the gun by the automatic loader.
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whether it is armor steel, ceramic, or glass-reinforced
plastic, it will significantly increase the tank's protec-
tion against smaller antitank weapons that are de-
signed to hit tanks from above and will at least
marginally increase radiation protection. Two other
45. Externally, the B model lacks a right-hand optic
tunnel and optical rangefinder head on its turret.
Instead, it mounts an armored box that houses the
radiofrequency antenna for the guidance of the missile.
The gunner's sight housing is much larger than that
found on the A model. These features, plus the presence
of smoke grenade projectors and rubberized side skirts,
constitute the chief differences in appearance between
the A and B models. At normal battle ranges, the two
models would be virtually indistinguishable.
46. T-64Bs recently sighted in northern East Ger-
many have additional armor. Some have been ob-
served with a layer of additional armor bolted both to
the forward hull roof and to the top, sides, and rear of
the turret. The composition of this armor, which
appears to be about 25 mm thick, is not known, but,
T-64Bs were seen in October 1984 with reactive armor
boxes mounted on the hull front, on the top, front, and
sides of the turret, and on the side skirts
The reactive armor boxes mounted the
turret top appeared to be mounted over the new turret
applique armor. The reactive armor will significantly
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when detonated by an incoming round, drives a metal plate into the
penetrating weapon. e armo~ 2525XI
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Figure 7
Soviet T-64B Tank
Weight: 38 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, cored
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 370 to 440 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 500 to 575 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 370 to 440 mm against KE rounds, 500 to 575 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts (some tanks observed with applique top armor also, at times apparently
with reactive armor as well)
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun and cannon-launched ATGM (antitank guided missile)
Number of main gun rounds on board: 39
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Laser
Engine type: Five-cylinder, opposed-piston diesel
Horsepower: 700 to 750
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 18.5-19.7:1
Top speed: 85 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Three
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50. The T-72 series, which has been produced in a
number of variants, is the second member of the
second postwar generation of Soviet tank designs.
Among the several variants, we generally recognize
three principal versions: one with an optical coinci-
dence rangefinder and another two with a laser
rangefinder. We call these three the T-72, the T-72M,
and the Soviet medium tank M-1981/3, respectively.
We do not understand why in the space of a few years
the Soviets developed and produced two distinctly
different tank designs-the T-72 and the T-64-that
they apparently consider equally effective in combat.
increase protection against shaped-charge warheads.
We cannot precisely calculate the effectiveness of this
reactive armor without further information.
51. The basic T-72 (see figure 9) has been seen
serving with Soviet units, non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
(NSWP) units, and various Third World armies. Exter-
nally, the domestic and exported versions appear to be
identical, although we cannot dismiss the possibility
that the domestic version has superior capabilities. L
52. Protection. The T-72's glacis armor reportedly
is similar in configuration to the T-64's, but we assess
its protection level to be less because of a difference in
materials.
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47. T-64Bs previously sighted in East Germany do
not appear to have additional armor, indicating that
the Soviets are in the early stages of a program
designed to provide their tanks with better protection
against NATO ground-launched ATGMs and top-
attack weapons and antitank munitions that would be
delivered by helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.
Eventually, frontline tanks fielded before 1984 proba-
bly will be retrofitted with this additional armor. El
48. We assume that the T-64B's basic hull and
turret armor is the same as that of the T-64A.
Likewise, we assume that the two models incorporate
the same engine
49. Some T-64s have been observed with Soviet
units in Hungary that exhibit some but not all of the
T-64B's external characteristics. Like the B model,
they lack a right-hand optic tunnel and incorporate an
enlarged gunner's sight. Unlike the T-64B, however,
they do not have an armored box on the front right-
hand side of the turret. These tanks may be T-64Bs
that have not yet been fitted with armored boxes
containing the missile guidance antenna or may repre-
sent an improved version of the T-64A having a laser
rangefinder and other fire-control modifications]
53. The T-72's turret armor is composed of solid,
cast steel that probably provides better protection
against KE rounds than the T-64's turret armor, but
less protection against shaped-charge rounds.
range
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Figure 9
Soviet T-72 Tank
Weight: 41 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, cast steel
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 350 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 450 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 450 mm against KE rounds, 450 mm against shaped-charge warheads.
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun
Number of main gun rounds on board: 39
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Coincidence
Engine type: 12-cylinder diesel
Horsepower: 780
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 19.1:1
Top speed: 60 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Three
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55. Although the exported version of the T-72 has a
radiation-absorbing liner to protect the tank's crew
against the effects of residual nuclear radiation, this
liner does not appear to be as effective as Polish T-55
liners and no more effective than the T-64A's liner.
The T-72 assigned to Soviet units may have a more
effective liner. Like the T-64 series, the T-72 series is
also fitted with an NBC collective protection system
and an automatic fire-extinguishing system.
56. Armament and Fire Control. The T-72
mounts the same high-velocity, horizontally and verti-
cally stabilized, 125-mm smoothbore gun as the T-64A
and uses a different automatic loader that contains six
fewer rounds than the T-64A's. This loader feeds
separated ammunition into the gun, thus eliminating
the requirement for a human loader and reducing the
crew size from four men to three. The T-72's fire-
control system, including the night firing capability, is
nearly identical to that of the T-64A.
57. Mobility. In contrast to the T-64 series' innova-
tive engine design, the T-72 series uses a V-12 diesel
that is a direct, although modified and improved,
descendant of the T-34's engine. This supercharged
engine produces enough power to give the T-72 a
power-to-weight ratio of 19.1 horsepower per metric
ton, as compared with the T-64A's 18.5 to 19.7.
However, while nearly as mobile as the 38-metric-ton
T-64A, the T-72 cannot quite match the T-64A's
acceleration and overall agility
58. In 1980, we observed the T-72M, which has an
enlarged gunner's sight housing but no right-hand
optic tunnel and incorporates a laser rangefinder (see
figure 10). This tank also has full-length rubberized
side skirts and several smoke grenade projectors at-
tached to the turret face. The smoke grenade projec-
tors were probably developed to counter improved
Western antitank weapon target acquisition and guid-
ance systems. Otherwise, this tank appears to be
virtually identical to the T-72. The Soviets reportedly
began producing T-72Ms and assigning them to army
units as early as 1977, although this has not yet been
confirmed.
59. We assess the T-72M's armor protection and
automotive performance to be the same as the T-72's.
ly in its capabilities from the exported version.
60. The T-72M appears to be the T-72 variant
being produced by the Czechoslovaks and the Poles
for fielding with the Soviets' Warsaw Pact allies.
Licensed production of the T-72 is scheduled to begin
soon in Yugoslavia. By 1983 this variant apparently
had been exported outside the Pact to India, Iraq,
Syria, and Yugoslavia.
Soviet Medium Tank M-198113
61. In November 1981 the Soviets paraded a T-72
variant that, like the T-72M, has no right-hand optic
tunnel or optical rangefinder head on its turret (see
figure 11, page 22). It also appears to have thicker
turret and glacis armor, and, like the T-72M and the
T-64B, it is fitted with rubberized side skirts and
smoke grenade projectors. It also is slightly longer than
the T-72 and the T-72M. The Four Powers have
designated this tank the Soviet medium tank (SMT)
M-1981/3. Regardless of this tank's T-number, it is a
highly refined T-72 designed to counter the latest
Western antitank weapons.
63. The armor on the front of the turret also
appears to have been thickened It is
unclear whether the additional armor consists solely of
cast steel or incorporates a layer of nonmetallic materi-
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Figure 10
Soviet T-72M Tank
(Shown Here in East German Army Markings)
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Weight: 41 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, cast steel
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 350 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 450 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 450 mm against KE rounds, 450 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun
Number of main gun rounds on board: 44
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Laser
Engine type: 12-cylinder diesel
Horsepower: 780
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 19.1:1
Top speed: 60 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Three
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Figure 11
Soviet Medium Tank 1981/3
Weight: 42 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, cored/layered
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 400 to 450 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 450 to 500 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 500 mm against KE rounds, 650 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun
Number of main gun rounds on board: 44
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Laser
Engine type: 12-cylinder diesel
Horsepower: 850
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 20.2:1
Top speed: 60 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Three
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64. Like the T-72M and the T-64B, the M-1981/3
has a radiation-absorbing liner, has full-length, rubber-
ized side skirts, and has rubber shields for the external
fuel tanks. It also has smoke grenade projectors mount-
ed on the turret front.
65. Armament and Fire Control. The M-1981/3 is
armed with a 125-mm smoothbore gun, which is
basically the same as the gun mounted on the T-64
and other T-72-series tanks, although it may be
marginally improved in its resistance to barrel wear.
The M-1981/3's fire-control system probably is at least
as good as the T-72M's. The M-1981/3 probably has a
laser rangefinder and a ballistic computer different
from that of the basic T-72, but its night vision devices
do not appear to be significantly different. In addition,
the main searchlight may be more powerful. Another
possible improvement is an automatic loader that
feeds ammunition to the gun faster. There is no
evidence that this tank can fire ATGMs through its
main gun.
66. Mobility. The M-1981/3 incorporates the same
engine deck configuration as the basic T-72 and the
T-72M, strongly suggesting that it is powered by the
same diesel engine as these older models. Further
improvements in the supercharger could boost the
engine's output, however, and give the 42-metric-ton
M-1981/3 a power-to-weight ratio of about 20 horse-
power per metric ton. The M-1981/3 almost certainly
uses the same transmission as earlier models.
67. In the spring of 1983
new type were seen with a
area in East Germany
know this tank is the
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against KE rounds as the glacis of the M-1981/3, but
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the T-80 's glacis armor is similar in de4gnto
that of the T-72 and T-64 series: it incorporates a layer
of glass-reinforced plastic between layers of steel. We
better protection against shaped-charge rounds.
The T-80 's turret armor may incorporate
assess that this array provides the same protection series, but this has not been confirmed. We assess that
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Figure 13
Soviet T-80 Tank
Weight: 42 to 45 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, layered; turret, unknown
Armor protection level:
Glacis: 440 to 450 mm against KE (kinetic energy) rounds, 500 to 575 mm against shaped-charge warheads
Turret: 500-mm against KE rounds, 650-mm against shaped-charge warheads
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 125-mm smoothbore gun and cannon-launched ATGM (antitank guided missile)
Number of main gun rounds on board: 39
Type of loader: Automatic
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Laser
Engine type: Gas turbine
Horsepower: About 1,000
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 22.2-23.8:1
Top speed: 85 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 600 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch of)
Crewmen: Three
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ization effort entails extensive improvements and is,
therefore, fundamentally different from past pro-
protection as the turret armor of the M-1981/3.
69. Armament and Fire Control. The T-80, like
the T-64B, can fire ATGM through its
main gun as well as standard tank gun projectiles. Both
tanks probably also will be able to fire the new 9M117
ATGM when it becomes available-probably during
the next two or three years. This missile-firing capabil-
ity would give the T-80 the same tactical versatility
that we attribute to the T-64B. We believe that the
T-80 and the T-64B share virtually identical fire-
control systems.
70. Mobility. The T-80 is powered by a gas turbine
engine with a peak power output of about 1,000 to
1,200 horsepower. It also is probably equipped with a
variable-height suspension, which would contribute to
giving the T-80 better cross-country mobility than any
other fielded Soviet tank. This feature also helps
overcome a traditional weakness in Soviet tank design:
restricted main gun depression
a diesel engine version of the T-80 exists,
units
71. The T-80 is being fielded currently with Soviet
units in southern East Germany. This assignment to
units in the forward area follows service in selected
tank units in the USSR at least since 1981.
Tank Modernization Programs
72. the Soviets
and their Warsaw Pact allies are planning thorough
modernization of sizable numbers of T-54s, T-55s, and
T-62s instead of replacing them with newly produced
tanks. This approach will save substantial amounts of
money: a T-55 or T-62 could be modernized for the
estimated dollar equivalent cost of $350,000. The
latest model tanks cost the equivalent of $1-1.4 mil-
lion. The modernized Soviet tanks probably will be
assigned to units opposite China, Afghanistan, and Iran
and should be a match for any potential enemy tank in
that area during the next two decades. The modern-
ized NSWP tanks presumably will incorporate the
same improvements as the modernized Soviet tanks.
73. Although the Soviets have always funded mod-
est tank modernization programs, the current modern-
grams.
74. The T-62s will receive additional armor on the
glacis and noseplate, the front and top of their turrets,
and the bottom of their hulls (see figure 14, page 26).
he T-55s will be similar-
ly upgraded. Unfortunately, we cannot meaningfully
estimate the increase in protection that this will
provide until we have closely observed these modern-
ized versions. The modernized tanks also will be
equipped with side skirts.
75. We expect that most of the modernized T-54s,
T-55s, and T-62s will retain their original guns, but we
cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviets will
equip at least some of them with newly designed main
guns. at least some
modernized T-55s will be capable of firing ATGMs.
The fire-control systems of all these tank models will
be considerably improved by replacing the original
equipment with systems that include a laser range-
finder, an improved main gun stabilization system, an
electronic ballistic computer, and a more powerful
infrared searchlight.
Mobility
76. The Soviets are developing a new engine, be-
lieved to be in the range of 640 to 690 horsepower, to
replace the existing diesel engine in the T-55 and,
presumably, in the T-54 and T-62, which have basical-
ly the same engine. The additional weight of the extra
armor necessitates an increase in engine power if the
modernized tanks are to maintain or improve their
previous mobility. The Soviets also will refit these
older tanks with the track of the T-72 to enhance
cross-country mobility and service life.
Future Soviet Tank Programs
77. Although some influential defense officials, in-
cluding Marshal Ogarkov, have called for intense
scrutiny of the future military value of the tank, the
Soviet army appears to be firmly wedded to the tank
as the principal element of its combined-arms force.
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Figure 14
Modernized Soviet T-62 Tank
Weight: 39 metric tons
Armor type: Hull, welded steel with applique; turret, cast steel with applique
Armor protection level: No estimate available
Supplemental armor: Standoff skirts
NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical) protection: Collective protection system and radiation liner
Main armament: 115-mm smoothbore gun and possibly ATGM (antitank guided missile)
Number of main gun rounds on board: 40
Type of loader: Human
Auxiliary armament: 7.62-mm coaxial machinegun, 12.7-mm turret-mounted machinegun
Main gun stabilization: Two-plane
Type of rangefinder: Laser
Engine type: 12-cylinder diesel
Horsepower: 640 to 690
Power-to-weight ratio (horsepower to metric ton): 16.4-17.7:1
Top speed: 60 km per hour
Maximum cruising range: 650 km with auxiliary fuel tanks, 450 km without
Radio: R-123M (range 20 km with squelch off)
Crewmen: Four
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The aggregate working area of known RDT&E-related
facilities is expanding.
Western a orts to
stem the flow of weapons-related technology to War-
saw Pact countries are successful, we anticipate that
Soviet RDT & E efforts will increase even more. F_
80. The Soviets have every reason to develop a
distinctly new, more capable design. Although the
T-64B, the SMT M-1981/3, and the T-80 went into
serial production in the early 1980s, at best they
represent the technology of the mid-1970s. They do
not appear to be adequate to the task of reliably
countering the variety of new, potent NATO antitank
systems that will be fielded later in this decade. F
81. Because we do not have a clear picture of
individual Soviet tank RDT&E programs, we must
take a rather circuitous approach to predicting the
capabilities of future Soviet tank models. First, we
examine the capabilities of US antitank weapons that
Soviet tanks would have to engage in a general war in
the late 1980s or early 1990s.5 If we assume that the
Soviets have fairly accurate information about these
weapons, we can conclude that they will strive to
develop tanks that are capable of defeating a vast
majority of these threats. Finally, we can assess the
' We do not assess the performance of future non-US NATO
antitank weapons here. We assume that none of these weapons will
be substantially more capable than their US counterparts.F_~
develop such a design or designs.
current state of relevant Soviet tank-related technol-
ogies in an attempt to estimate the Soviets' ability to
The Challenge of Future Antitank Weapons
82. US antitank weapons that are already entering
or should soon enter the inventory present Soviet tank
designers with a difficult challenge
warhead o the TOW 2
and theme
The shaped-charge
He 'e ATGM, which is designed
to be fired from the AH-64 attack helicopter,
mines pose a "bottom attack" threat.
Various new or improved antitank weapons
are designed to attack the relatively thin armor on the
hull and turret top. In addition, newly developed
83. All of these weapons probably were designed to
engage any currently fielded Soviet tank without
resort to a flank attack. This poses a serious problem
for the Soviet operational planner, who is concerned
with maintaining a high rate of advance in any
Warsaw Pact offensive operation in a general war with
NATO.
Initial Soviet Response
84. The Soviets appear to have begun to respond to
these developing threats, especially in the areas of add-
on armor and countermeasures. Soviet tanks are now
being fitted with smoke grenade projectors, presum-
ably to make it more difficult for enemy antitank
weapons to hit their targets. By reducing the tank's
radar and infrared (IR) signatures, the rubberized side
skirts on the latest Soviet tanks impede the ability of
enemy target acquisition sensors to discover the vehi-
cles. Exhaust baffling and engine heat deflection also
contribute to IR signature reduction. Moreover, we
believe that the latest Soviet tanks may be coated with
paint that makes it more difficult for IR target
acquisition devices to distinguish the tanks. Reported-
ly, the Soviets also are fielding turret-mounted devices
to disrupt selected ATGM guidance systems. These
measures only partially solve the NATO antitank
threat to today's Warsaw Pact tank forces, however.
We believe they do not meet the future threat ade-
quately
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Future Soviet Tank Development Options
85. The Soviets' response to this future challenge to
their tank force could take one of several forms. For
instance, they could choose not to continue to develop
medium tanks. They could decide to substitute mobil-
ity for protection and field large numbers of small,
lightly armored vehicles that are capable of high cross-
country speeds while still mounting a relatively large,
powerful main armament. This solution has been tried
before in the West and to date has always proved
unsatisfactory. We believe the Soviets share the belief
that mobility is a poor substitute for adequate armor
protection. We believe that the Soviets are well aware
of this and would not choose this option
86. Another option would entail the rejection of the
main battle tank concept and a return to a force mix
made up of medium and heavy tanks, and possibly
light tanks as well. Under this concept, very heavily
armored tanks would be used to penetrate combat
zones that are heavily defended by formidable new
antitank weapons. Because of their heavy armor, the
heavy tanks would lack the mobility to pursue a
fleeing enemy. Thus, it would fall to more lightly
armored and faster medium tanks to exploit break-
throughs created by the heavy tanks. The Soviets have
devised such tactics before and could do so again
87. The Soviets also may opt to continue to focus on
the development of main battle tanks-tanks designed
to perform the roles previously peformed by light,
medium, and heavy tanks-but they might provide
them with more armor and more powerful engines
that would give them an acceptable level of mobility.
The challenge for Soviet tank developers is to protect
this gun and tank crew and move them across the
battlefield until they can get close enough to engage
enemy units.
Which Option Will the Soviets Choose?
88. We cannot predict with a high degree of cer-
tainty which of these options the Soviets will choose. If
for no other reason than that they have concentrated
for the last 25 years on the development of main battle
tanks, we expect them to continue to develop main
battle tanks. This would not prevent them from
providing some of these tanks with a longer range
firing capability.
89. Clearly, however, if the Soviets do in fact
choose to continue to focus on the development of
main battle tanks, they must protect these tanks better.
They could solve this protection problem in a variety
of ways, some of which would not entail any basic
redesign of present tanks. They could, for instance,
strive to increase incrementally the frontal, top, and
belly armor of their tanks and, like the Israelis,
supplement it with additional shields, screens, or
reactive armor. At the same time, they could add more
effective countermeasures and strengthen their com-
bined-arms forces with more units to suppress antitank
weapons.
91. The Soviets probably would strive to keep such
a design at or near the 50-metric-ton weight limit
because tank designs substantially exceeding this limit
would require the development of more powerful
engines than the Soviets have used in the past. The
Soviets reportedly have been developing both high-
may be able to accomplish this goal.
90. It is unlikely that the Soviets would pursue only
a stopgap solution to protect the principal element of
their combined-arms force. Instead, we anticipate
their development of new tanks that incorporate sub-
stantially higher levels of integral protection, including
liners that would provide increased protection against
enhanced radiation weapons. We cannot discount the
possibility that they will be able to achieve the
necessary levels of protection by developing a tradi-
tional, turreted design or designs. If they do, however,
they will have to perfect technically advanced armors
to provide the required protection without exceeding a
50-metric-ton upper weight limit. Because the Soviets
have an extensive basic and applied materials research
establishment that does not depend to any significant
extent on the transfer of Western technology, they
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output diesel and turbine engines since the early 1970s
or earlier, but it would be in their interest not to have
to produce completely new engine designs. There
apparently have been problems with Soviet turbine
designs. Reportedly, the Soviets consider these engines
too noisy and prodigal in their fuel consumption. The
deployment of the T-80 with a turbine engine indi-
cates that the Soviets believe they have lowered noise
and fuel consumption to the point of operational
acceptability. Nevertheless, the addition of a third
external fuel drum to the T-80 supports the thesis that
this turbine consumes significantly greater quantities
of fuel than a diesel engine of the same power.
eliminating it altogether might result in a 45-metric-
ton design that would have substantially increased
protection due to the application of the weight saved
from the turret to increased frontal, top, and belly
armor and a strengthened suspension that could better
resist mines. Such a design, unlike a fully turreted
tank, probably would not call for the development of a
radically new type of armor, nor would it require a
more powerful engine.
93. Western designers find turretless designs attrac-
tive, but such designs require the development of
automatic loaders that can reliably handle large-
caliber ammunition and fire-control optics or sensors
that can rotate with the gun or even independently of
it to provide the gunner, who would be seated within
the hull, with a 360-degree field of view. Although
finding a solution to this vision problem probably
would tax the Soviets' engineering skills heavily, the
automatic loader requirement would not be a deter-
rent because Soviet designers have length ex erience
with such loaders.6
94. The Soviets could opt to follow a two-design
strategy as they apparently did with the T-64 and T-72
6 The Swedes are currently developing a new turretless tank
design, and they encountered significant difficulties in providing the
gunner with fire-control optics that rotated with the pedestal-
mounted gun. Finally, they opted to create a turret basket that
allowed the gunner to rotate with the gun while remaining within the
hull's armor envelope.
series. Such an approach would allow them to under-
take the development of a higher risk turretless or
reduced-volume-turret design while also developing a
more traditional turreted tank as a backup
95. Whichever options the Soviets choose-turret-
ed, turretless, or both-they almost certainly will
strive to overcome some weaknesses that have been
apparent in their current tank generation. Specifically,
they almost certainly will continue to improve fire-
control systems to decrease target acquisition time.
Because of the ballistic performance of their 125-mm
gun with its high muzzle velocities and attendant flat
ballistic trajectories, the gunnery problems are not as
complex as those confronting Western tank designers.
Currently, most Western tanks are equipped with a
rifled 105-mm gun armed with projectiles of lower
muzzle velocities and less flat ballistic trajectories.
Consequently, the Soviets probably do not need many
of the features that are included in the latest Western
fully integrated fire-control systems, such as wind
sensors, cant sensors, and muzzle reference systems. F_
96. We also expect the Soviets to develop improved
night vision equipment, either active or passive or a
combination of the two. We think it is highly probable
that they are striving to develop a thermal imaging
system equal in capability to the ones that are used in
the M-1 and the M-60A3 tanks. Recent evidence
reveals that an airborne thermal imaging system for
civilian use incorporating 1970 technology has been
developed. An improved thermal imaging technology
for use in armored vehicles is certainly practicable.
We also expect improvements in stabilization systems
for their main armament, and they will also continue
to make their automatic loaders even faster and more
reliable.
97. The Soviets almost certainly will continue to
improve their future tanks' antitank weapon counter-
measures and supplemental armors. Moreover, we
predict improvements in the tactics, organization, and
equipment of the other elements of their combined-
arms force in an effort to provide more effective
antitank suppression
Future Development Options and Technology
Transfer
98. We believe that the Soviets can and will devel-
op and produce tanks to suit their future operational
requirements. The embargo on the transfer of US
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Figure 15
Future Soviet Tank Design Options
??
0 ,
Turret tank with separated
placement of crew (driver in
hull, commander and gunner in
turret)
?
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technology to the USSR will not cripple Soviet tank
development programs. Although Soviet tank develop-
ers have exploited Western technology in many signif-
icant ways, they have not been dependent on it. In
fact, the Soviets have frequently led the West in
fielding advanced armored-vehicle-related technology
such as infrared night vision equipment, automatic
loaders, long rod penetrator KE ammunition, and
nuclear, biological, and chemical detection and pro-
tective systems
99. Weapons that make extensive use of sophisticat-
ed electronic components, such as tactical aircraft,
owe more to Western technology than weapons like
tanks. Still, certain Western technologies, which the
Soviets have acquired both legally and illegally, proba-
bly have shortened the time necessary to develop
certain key tank components and have reduced associ-
ated development costs. If the technology embargo
persists, the time necessary for the development of
new tank designs probably will lengthen and costs will
rise.
100. In the past the Soviets probably had access to
detailed information about early US experiments with
laminate and composite armors. This access would
have facilitated their development of these types of
armor. Similarly, recent Soviet patents covering a
high-output diesel engine with potential military ap-
plications strongly suggest that the Soviets are inti-
mately familiar with French research in this area.
However, we have no direct evidence that the Soviets
have been dependent on US or Western technology for
to fire-control systems. The greater emphasis on the
development and manufacture of improved fire-con-
trol systems and countermeasures to antitank weapons
will aggravate these problems. The Soviets are even
beginning to experience difficulties in areas in which
they have been masters, such as metalworking. For
example, turret casting operations at Nizhniy Tagil
have been running into trouble, although these prob-
lems may actually involve difficulties in combining
ceramic armor with cast steel armor.
102. Soviet fabrication technology has lagged be-
hind the West's in some areas, and the Soviets have
tried to overcome this gap in capabilities by purchas-
ing a variety of sophisticated Western machine tools to
be used in the tank production process.
to cut and weld steel to fine tolerances faster and with
fewer workers than they could previously. The acqui-
sition of these tools should also reduce the time needed
the development of key tank components
Technology Transfer and the Challenge to Tank
Producers
101. Certain aspects of these future design options
probably will strain Soviet tank production capabili-
ties, just as they have strained Western tank manufac-
turers (see section C, on tank production, beginning at
paragraph 103). Generally, Soviet designers create
capable weapons, but often Soviet weapon producers
have difficulty developing manufacturing technology
that enables them to translate these designs efficiently
into production versions. In the past this has not been
as much of a problem for the manufacturers of tanks
because these weapons did not make extensive use of
sophisticated electronic components. In the future,
tank producers will increasingly have such difficulties.
They already have problems manufacturing delicate
electronic and electro-optical subcomponents integral
103. The Soviets maintain the world's largest tank
fleet and have a correspondingly large production
capability to support it. There are about 50,000 tanks
in the inventories of active army units; and several
thousand more tanks serve as training vehicles, main-
tenance float vehicles, and war reserve weapons. In
addition, the Soviets export substantial numbers of
newly produced tanks.
104. Because ground weapons technology has ad-
vanced steadily since World War II, the Soviets have
had to replenish their huge tank force constantly with
new tank models to keep it from becoming obsoles-
cent. This requirement has led to a major research and
development program and the construction of an
extensive production establishment that has supported
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a high annual tank production rate-an estimated
average of about 3,000 vehicles a year for the last 10
years. This high rate of production has enabled the
Soviets to keep their tank force opposite NATO
equipped largely with modern, highly capable vehi-
cles
105. The future Soviet requirement for tanks will
increase as the Soviet army expands from its current
size of about 215 divisions to a projected total of
about 240 by the year 2000.' Because of the high cost
of procuring large numbers of increasingly complex
and expensive tanks, the Soviets apparently plan to
meet part of this requirement by modernizing sub-
stantial numbers of T-54s, T-55s, T-62s, and early-
model T-72s. Even so, they will have to continue to
produce large numbers of new tanks every year for at
least the rest of the century.
Production Facilities
106. The Soviets maintain four main tank assembly
plants, in Khar'kov, Nizhniy Tagil, Omsk, and Chelya-
binsk (see figure 16). Some sources claim that the
heavy equipment plant in Leningrad also assembles
small numbers of tanks, as we know it did in the case
of the T-80, but it is not clear if this is limited
production for RDT&E or low-volume series produc-
tion. The Soviets also maintain at least 20 capital
repair facilities throughout the USSR and Eastern
Europe. All four assembly plants fabricate major tank
components as well as assemble tanks, but they all are
dependent on producers around the country for a
variety of components and subassemblies. Technicians
at the capital repair facilities refurbish tanks after the
vehicles have been subjected to heavy use. Often the
rebuilding includes improvements to the vehicles that
result in a product that is more combat capable than
the original design
Expansion and Modernization of Facilities
107. The Soviets' traditional excess of tank produc-
tion capacity appears to be growing even larger. Since
1965, the area devoted to military production at the
three major tank plants-Khar'kov, Omsk, and Nizh-
niy Tagil-has increased significantly. In addition to
this recent expansion of production area, the tank
assembly plants are being retooled with a variety of
'This projection is part of a formally coordinated CIA-DIA-
Army assessment of the order of battle, organization, and equipment
of future Warsaw Pact ground forces.
Figure 16
Major Soviet Tank Assembly Plants
equipment. Indeed, the production
area expansion may have been undertaken in part to
accommodate these new tools, many of which have
been imported from the West. The Soviets also are
developing new fabrication techniques to take advan-
tage of the capabilities of this new machinery.
108. These improvements probably do not presage
a significant increase in output. They probably have
been undertaken in an attempt to at least maintain
previous production levels in spite of the difficulties
involved in the manufacture of vehicles incorporating
sophisticated features like laminate armor and requir-
ing the precise assembly of complex components.
109. These improvements should offset the strain
that this growing sophistication places on both human
and material production resources. The new industrial
robots probably have been purchased to reduce the
number of workers needed in the production process,
and the latest generation of machine tools can help
workers with relatively modest skills to accomplish a
variety of difficult and exacting manufacturing tasks.
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will allow tank assembly
workers to batch-produce different types of compo-
nents and vehicles in relatively rapid succession with-
out the need to halt production and retool whenever a
different vehicle must be produced. Future Soviet
tank models promise to be even more complex than
the current models, and the Soviets undoubtedly are
modernizing their tank assembly plants with an eye to
the future. The new tools probably will greatly reduce
the startup time needed to prepare for the production
of a new tank design.
Current Programs
110. Currently, tanks of the T-64, T-72, and T-80
series are being serially produced in the USSR. In
addition, the Soviets are beginning to modernize ex-
tensively their T-54s, T-55s, T-62s, and early-model
T-72s that will be in service in the 1990s1
Chelyabinsk Tractor Plant
111. The plant at Chelyabinsk
recently began assembling T-72s-probably the
T-72M, but possibly the basic model with a coinci-
dence rangefinder as well. These tanks probably are
intended for the export market. Because Chelyabinsk
has just begun assembling tanks, we have not yet been
able to determine the level of production that the
Soviets have programed for this facility. We estimate
that it will be relatively modest, probably amounting
to no more than a few hundred vehicles a year.
Chelyabinsk could be taking over production of these
models from Nizhniy Tagil.
112. The T-64B is being assembled at the tank plant
in Khar'kov , presumably in the
new assembly building
=T-64A production may have ceased after T-64B
production hit full stride, but this has not been
confirmed. T-64As are still being delivered to army
units, but it is unclear if these vehicles are new or
transfers from units that are receiving newer equip-
years, Khar'kov's annual serial production probably
has amounted to somewhere between 500 and 800
vehicles a year.
Nizhniy Tagil Tank and Railroad Car
Manufacturing Plant
113. The tank plant at Nizhniy Tagil
produces tanks of the T-72 series.
including the M-1981/3 variant.
the responsibility
for the production of at least one of these variants
may have been shifted to Chelyabinsk. This shift
probably means that Nizhniy Tagil will concentrate
on the serial production of the new tank recently
identified there. If the history of the T-54/55 series
can serve as a guide, the T-72 family, which entered
series production in 1974, will remain in production
for several more years. This suggests that the new
tank may be an advanced variant of the T-72 series.
In recent years, Nizhniy Tagil's annual serial produc-
tion probably has amounted to somewhere between
1,700 and 2,300 vehicles a year.
114. In addition to its assembly activities, Nizhniy
Tagil is manufacturing components for use in the
modernization of T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s.
115.
curr n 1 is in serial production at Omsk
116. It is difficult for several reasons to predict
future annual tank production levels at Omsk. Despite
its capacity, Omsk has never produced as many tanks
as Nizhniy Tagil. The last serial production program at
Omsk was the T-55, and the annual T-55 production
at Omsk never exceeded 1,200 a year.
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possibility that Omsk will serially produce other weap-
ons in addition to tanks
Future Programs
118. Given the level of uncertainty regarding cur-
rent Soviet tank production programs, we cannot
estimate the precise composition, scope, and timing of
future production with a high degree of confidence.
We believe, however,. that - a new tank design or
designs probably will soon enter serial production. F_
We expect that an entirely new
design will certainly be available for fielding by the
1990s. We also believe that the Soviets will not
produce nearly as many tanks annually as they did
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, when annual
production often exceeded 4,000. We judge it more
likely that they will continue to produce an average of
about 3,000 tanks per year, as they did in the 1973-83
period. We estimate that this level of production
would allow them to continue to keep their tank force
opposite NATO equipped with modern tanks as well
as to supply their traditional export customers with a
flow of new vehicles that matches delivery rates of the
past several years
119. We believe that the Soviets will not attempt to
achieve a higher rate of production for several reasons.
The latest tank models are much more expensive to
produce. Given the growing civilian competition for
ever scarcer economic resources and the army's ambi-
tious modernization agenda-which includes many
objectives besides the procurement of new tanks-we
do not believe the Soviets can afford to procure as
many tanks as they did during the late 1960s and early
1970s. We see the Soviets' ambitious modernization
program for T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s as a cost-cutting
response to these sharply increasing production and
procurement costs. If the Soviets planned to procure
4,000 to 5,000 new tanks a year, we doubt they would
undertake so extensive a modernization program
throughout the ground forces. Therefore, the recent
expansion and modernization of tank production facil-
ities probably was undertaken to enable the Soviets to
maintain the average annual production level of the
last 10 years.
Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Tank Programs
120. Since the late 1970s the Soviets have been
pressuring their Pact allies to improve their land forces
with new, Soviet-designed weapons. They formed a
consortium with their allies for the licensed production
of the T-72M. All members of the consortium were to
supply components, and the tanks were to be assem-
bled in Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Czechoslo-
vaks and the Poles were to supply their own national
forces as well as those of the other East European allies
with new tanks. Moreover, the Soviets may have
agreed to allow the export of these T-72Ms to selected
customers outside the Pact.
Czechoslovakia
121. Currently, the Czechoslovaks are engaged in
limited serial production of the T-72M at their tank
plant at Martin. We estimate that they programed an
annual production rate there of about 300 vehicles,
but, to date, they have fallen short of this rate,
principally because of difficulties in obtaining ade-
quate quantities of key subcomponents. Those pro-
duced will be for the Czechoslovaks' own forces and
other non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. The Czechoslo-
vaks also may attempt to market their T-72Ms outside
122. The Poles have experienced at least as many
problems as the Czechoslovaks in their attempt to
produce the T-72M,
programed annual T-72M production rate will be
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. This program has been
under way since the late 1970s, and it is likely that it
will continue for the rest of the decade and that the
work will be accomplished at tank ca it al re air
facilities.
123. In addition to providing various components to
the T-72M assembly programs in Czechoslovakia and
Poland, the Romanians produced about 200 TR-77
East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria
124. East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria
sions.
Generally, the Soviets assign the newest, most capable
tanks to units that have the highest probability of
becoming involved in combat with NATO forces in
Central Europe. Ready divisions in the Baltic, Belorus-
sian, and Carpathian Military Districts, selected train-
ing units, and ceremonial units are usually the first to
receive a new tank model as permanent issue. Howev-
er, after the General Staff is convinced that the new
model can be reliably maintained by the army's
equipment support structure, the new model is sent to
selected Soviet units in Eastern Europe. In recent
years, modest numbers of new tanks have also been
sent to selected units opposite China. Only later do
units in other western military districts receive the
new model. Older tanks replaced by the new models
are usually reassigned to units less likely to engage
NATO forces in Central Europe. The oldest tanks in
the inventory are held in mobilization base divisions or
low-strength cadre divisions, especially those in interi-
or military districts. These are the units least likely to
become involved in combat with NATO ready divi-
126. As a general rule, during a typical tank's 25 to
30 years in active service it spends the first 10 to 15
years in the inventory of ready divisions in the western
USSR or in the forward area and the last 10 to 15 years
in other parts of the country in not-ready divisions.
Tanks that emerge from their active service in rela-
tively good condition may be placed in equipment
reserves or refurbished for export. Other old tanks
probably are cannibalized for parts, then scrapped.F
D. TANK DEPLOYMENT
125. Soviet strategy for tank deployment ensures
the most operationally efficient use of various tank
models and minimizes the need to procure new tanks."
9 This analysis grew out of the Warsaw Pact ground forces
estimate that is contained in the Land Armaments and Manpower
Model (LAMM), a data base recently developed by CIA, DIA,
NPIC, and the US Army to facilitate the study of Warsaw Pact
127. Equipment replacement is a continuous but
slow process; even in the Western Theater of Military
Operations (called a TVD after the Russian teatr
voyennykh deystviy for "theater of military opera-
tions") roughly half of the active tank inventory, at
any given time, is composed of vehicles of the previous
design generation. In 1983, for instance, the medium
tank inventory of the Western TVD comprised 11,150
T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s, and 7,950 T-54s, T-55s, and
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Table 1
Current and Future Tank Inventories
of Soviet Ground Forcesa
PT-76 light tank
1,181
JSU-122 assault gun b
26
JSU-152 assault gun b
188
SU-100 assault gun b
JS-3 heavy tank
T-10 heavy tank
T-34 medium tank
Flamethrower tank
31
T-54/T-55 medium tank
19,440
T-62 medium tank
14,227
T-64/T-64A medium tank
7,163
T-64B medium tank
1,466
T-72/T-72M medium tank
5,633
M-1981/3 medium tank (SMT)
1,658
T-80
Modernized T-55
Modernized T-62
Future Soviet tank design(s)
Total
a Includes inventories of active units as well as ei
mobilization base divisions.
b These weapons are included in the equipment
are used in place of tanks by selected tank units.
1985 1990
524 523
188 94
16,655 5,955
13,317 6,025
7,376 7,201
2,480 4,565
5,565 5,167
3,220 5,703
1,616 5,244
853 5,909
957 8,239
563
53,272 55,481
uipment of
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130. All agree that T-80s are replacing the aging
T-62s in the Soviets' two southern armies in East
Germany because the T-80 is the latest tank available
in sufficient numbers to replace the older tanks, not
because the T-80 has unique features that were de-
signed for use in southern Germany
The Soviet Tank Force: Present and Future
131. Analysis of the composition of the current and
future Soviet tank force reveals dramatic differences
in capabilities among the various constituent theaters
of military operations. (See table 1 for a breakdown of
the current and future Soviet tank force by tank type.)
The tank inventory of the Western TVD, which would
be used against NATO forces in Central Europe in a
war between the Warsaw Pact and NATO, is substan-
tially more modern than those of other theaters of
operation. The next most capable tank inventories
belong to the strategic reserve and the Southwestern
TVD. The bulk of the modern tanks in the strategic
reserve belong to the Kiev Military District and proba-
bly would be used to support the forces operating in
the Southwestern TVD. The tank inventories of the
Northwestern TVD, the Turkestan Military District,
and the Soviet Far East are significantly less capable
than those of the Western and Southwestern TVDs
and the strategic reserve. These differences in capabil-
ities among the various theaters will persist throughout
this decade.
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Figure 21
Soviet Ground Forces Regional Commands by Theater of Military Operation (TVD)
United
Kingdom
Meth Norway ~~
Ioe Sweden
F.R.G.. 7,
Moscow
MD
Kiev
MD
Volga
MD
Ural
MD
G.D.R. = B,nrl' Finland
Baltic r
MD
Caspian
,Sea j
Turkestan
MD
Central Asian
MD
Siberian
MD
Soviet Union
Far East
)MD.;
I Japan
c ''I I
North
Korea
i South
Korea
10000
t MD't ..
\ Birc;;
North
Caucasus
MD
Saudi
Arabia }
'Bhre
tar
Sea
Leningrad 132. The Western TVD comprises forces in the
Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts
and the Groups of Soviet Forces in East Germany,
Poland, and Czechoslovakia (see figure 21). Currently,
the tank inventory of this TVD-including mobiliza-
tion base divisions-is composed of about 19,000
medium tanks and a few hundred light tanks and
assault guns that serve in a medium tank role (see
figure 22, pages 42 and 43). A little more than half of
this force is made up of tanks whose designs were
finalized after 1961-the T-64, the T-72, and the
T-80. The remainder comprises models designed be-
fore that date-the T-54, the T-55, and the T-62. The
size of this inventory probably will not grow
41
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Western TVD
Southwestern TVD
Southern TVD a
Soviet Far East
Strategic Reserve
a Since 1979 the Soviets have been developing
contingency plans for military operations in Southwest
Asia and the Persian Gulf region. These operations
would be controlled by the Southern TVD and would
include, among others, the forces of the North Caucasus
and Transcaucasus Military Districts that normally are
controlled by the Southwestern TVD.
Transbaikal
MD
The United States Government has not recognized
the incorporation of Estonia, Latvia. and Lithuania
appreciably in this decade, but its composition is
expected to change substantially. By the end of 1985,
T-64s, T-72s, and T-80s probably will make up 75
percent of the Western TVD tank force and, by the
end of 1990, nearly 100 percent.
133. The Northwestern TVD is made up of the
forces of the Leningrad Military District. Currently,
the tank inventory of this TVD is composed of about
1,150 medium tanks and about 450 light tanks, but
only about 15 percent of the medium tanks were
designed after 1961. By the end of 1990, this force
probably will not have changed much in size, but new
tank models will account for about a third of the
inventory
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T- fa,ra+
Figure 22
Changing Composition of Tank Forces
in Warsaw Pact
T-62, T-55, T-54, or older tanks
Tanks designed after the T-62
0 5,000
Western Theater of "''5
Military Operations
85
Northwestern Theater of 1983 Li 1,389
Military Operations 4
85 1,563
0
90 1,461
717
1,793
3,166
3,708
Southwestern Theater of 1983 5,186
Military Operations 1,479
85 4,829
Turkestan Military 1983 1,932
District 4
85 2,132
90 2,297
~~ __0_
Soviet Far East 1983 _ 13,108
603
85 13,456
599
14,538
90
6639
2,954
85 6,053
3,031
90 1 4,644
4,612
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10,000 15,000 20,000
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Czechoslovakia
1983
3
290
,
85
1 3
256
,
90
224
3
,
2,213
94
11 2,512
94
90
1 2,354
470
Poland
1983
1 3,452
32
85
3
482
251
,
90
1 3
349
,
Hungary
1983
1,258
64
85
1,252
64
90
1,177
105
Bulgaria
1983
1 1
864
41
,
85
1 2
138
,
90
72
Romania
1983
1
857
,
85
1
690
,
90
1
780
,
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the Sout western TVD includes Soviet
forces in Hungary and the Odessa, North Caucasus,
and Transcaucasus Military Districts.
Currently, this theater's tank force is made up of about
6,550 medium tanks and a few battalions of light
tanks. Only a little more than 20 percent of the
medium tanks were designed after 1961. By the end of
1990, the inventory will have grown by about 200
tanks, and more than half of this inventory probably
will be made up of modern tanks.
135. Since their invasion of Afghanistan and the
destabilization of Iran, the Soviets have been presented
with a new set of strategic problems and opportunities
136. The Turkestan Military District includes Sovi-
et army units currently serving in Afghanistan as well
as units actually stationed within the district. Current-
ly, the district's tank force is composed of nearly 2,000
medium tanks of older design and a few light tanks.
By the end of 1990, the inventory probably will have
grown by about 300 vehicles, and the bulk of the
medium tanks probably will have been modernized.F-
137. Forces in the Soviet Far East are those of the
Central Asian, Siberian, Transbaikal, and Far East
Military Districts. Currently, the tank inventory of
these forces consists of about 13,700 vehicles, nearly all
of which are older models. By the end of 1990, this
tank force probably will have grown by nearly 1,500
vehicles, and the quality of the force will have im-
proved. Although probably only about 5 percent will
be tanks of relatively new design, about 7,300 of the
older models probably will have been modernized.
ized T-54s, T-55s, and T-62s
The Strategic Reserve
138. The ground forces of the Kiev, Volga, Moscow,
and Ural Military Districts are generally considered to
make up the strategic reserve of the Soviet army,
although the forces of the Kiev MD are much more
capable than the others and would probably be com-
mitted to combat at a much earlier point during a
general war. Currently, the tank force of the strategic
reserve consists of about 7,800 medium tanks and
1,100 light and heavy tanks and assault guns serving in
a tank role. One-third of the medium tank inventory is
made up of tanks whose designs were finalized after
1961. By the end of 1985, the strategic reserve tank
force probably will have increased by a few hundred
vehicles, but the percentage of medium tanks of
relatively modern design will remain the same. By the
end of 1990, the strategic reserve tank force probably
will have grown to about 9,250 vehicles, and about 50
percent of this force will be made up of modern tanks.
The rest probably will be made up largely of modern-
The Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Tank Force:
Present and Future
139. Soviet forces in the Western and Southwestern
TVDs would be joined by non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
allied forces in the event of a general war with NATO.
For the last several years, the Soviets have been
encouraging their NSWP allies to improve, among
other things, their tank force capabilities. The NSWP
states have responded with varying degrees of enthusi-
asm and success.
140. The Czechoslovak tank inventory currently
contains about 3,350 medium tanks, all of which are
T-54s and T-55s except for two to four battalions of
T-72s and two battalions of T-34s. We project that by
the end of 1985, the T-34s probably will have been
retired, and the tank inventory will still contain about
3,325 vehicles, most of which will still be T-54s and
T-55s. By the end of 1990, the size of the Czechoslovak
tank force probably will be virtually the same. About
50 percent of it probably will be made up of T-72s,
and the rest will be modernized T-54s and T-55s.
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East Germany
141. The East German tank inventory currently is
composed of about 2,300 medium tanks and a few
light tanks. Except for three battalions of T-72s, the
medium tanks are T-55s. By the end of 1985, the
inventory probably will contain about 2,600 medium
tanks, but there probably will be no T-72s added to the
inventory. By the end of 1990, the total tank inventory
may have grown to about 2,825 medium tanks, about
15 percent of which will probably be T-72s and about
20 percent, modernized T-62s.
142. The Polish tank inventory currently is made
up of about 3,400 medium tanks and 100 light tanks.
The bulk of the medium tanks-about 75 percent-
are T-54s and T-55s, while a little over 20 percent are
T-34s. The Poles also possess a battalion of T-72s. By
the end of 1985, the Poles' medium tank inventory
may grow to 3,800. T-72s almost certainly will make
up less than 10 percent of this force. By the end of
1990, the light tanks probably will still be in service,
while the medium tank inventory probably will have
increased to about 4,100 vehicles. T-72s probably will
make up nearly 20 percent of these medium tanks,
while modernized T-55s probably will make up a little
more than 10 percent. The remainder will be T-55s,
T-54s, and T-34s.
Hungary
143. The Hungarian tank inventory currently is
made up of nearly 100 light tanks and about 1,200
medium tanks. Ninety-five percent of the medium
tanks are T-54s and T-55s; the remaining 5 percent are
T-72s. We project that by the end of 1985 neither the
size of the medium tank force nor its composition will
have changed. By the end of 1990, the light tank
probably will have been retired, and the size of the
medium tank inventory will shrink slightly. By that
date, nearly 10 percent of those vehicles probably will
be T-72s.
Bulgaria
144. The Bulgarian tank inventory currently con-
tains about 1,900 medium tanks. Two-thirds of them
are T-54s and T-55s, while nearly one-third are T-34s.
The Bulgarians also have one battalion of T-72s. By
the end of 1985 this tank force probably will have
grown to about 2,200 vehicles, and have changed only
slightly in composition. Nearly all of the force proba-
bly will continue to be made up of tanks designed
before 1961. We project that by the end of 1990 the
size of the tank inventory will have increased by
another 200 vehicles. Modernized T-62s probably will
make up about 15 percent of this force, while T-72s
will make up less than than 5 percent. T-34s probably
will make up a little more than 20 percent of the
inventory.
145. The Romanian tank inventory currently con-
tains about 1,900 medium tanks-including one bat-
talion of T-72s-and 300 assault guns serving in a tank
role. Nearly one-half of the medium tanks are T-54s,
T-55s, and Romanian-designed T-55 derivatives. The
remainder are T-34s and assault guns. By the end of
1985, the Romanian tank force probably will have
shrunk slightly, and the continuing introduction of
Romanian-designed T-55 derivatives may reduce the
proportion of T-34s in the force to about one-fifth. By
the end of 1990, the assault guns probably will have
been retired, and the force will total about 1,800
medium tanks. About 80 percent of these vehicles
probably will be modernized T-54s and T-55s and the
Romanians' own improved versions of the T-55. Near-
ly 20 percent of the force probably will still be T-34s.
The Romanians probably will still have only one
battalion of T-72s
Export of Soviet and Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
Tanks
146. The Soviets, Poles, and Czechoslovaks have
aggressively marketed both newly produced and re-
furbished Soviet-designed tanks around the world.
Currently, T-34s that have been refurbished and, in
some cases, improved can be found in various Third
World armies, and T-54s and T-55s are in service on
every continent except Antarctica and Australia. T-62s
still serve as frontline tanks in the armies of Afghani-
stan, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, Libya,
Syria, Vietnam, and South Yemen. The T-72 has also
been marketed outside of the Warsaw Pact (see table
2, page 46). Currently, the armies of Algeria, India,
Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yugoslavia have purchased
basic or improved T-72s. In some cases, the numbers
of T-72s involved have been nominal, but, in the case
of India, Iraq, Syria, and Libya, the purchases have
been more substantial. To date, T-64s have not been
exported, even to Warsaw Pact allies.
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Table 2
Soviet Exports of Tanks in T-72 Series to States
Outside Warsaw Pacta
the basic T-72 makes it difficult to draw reliable
conclusions about how NATO antitank forces would
fare when confronting a Soviet conventional offensive
spearheaded by Soviet tank units. We must assume
that our estimates about the protection levels of Soviet
tank armor are correct and that we have also correctly
estimated the capabilities of the Soviet 125-mm
smoothbore gun and its ammunition.'
147. Currently, the Soviets are marketing at least
one improved version of the T-72 in the Third World,
and in the near future they probably will begin to
market a version of the T-80 outside the Warsaw Pact.
Potential customers include those countries that have
purchased T-72s in the past.
The USSR
probably will also market modernized T-54s, T-55s,
and T-62s to customers that do not need the latest
model tanks or cannot afford them.
148. For many years the Poles and Czechoslovaks
have marketed their domestically produced T-55s
outside the Pact. T-55 production appears to have
ceased in Czechoslovakia and should cease in Poland
by the end of 1985. After that, both countries may
seek to sell modernized T-54s and T-55s and eventual-
ly may try to market T-72s, presumably in areas
where they successfully marketed T-55s in the past.F
149. The Romanians recently entered the export
market with the TR-77 and have reportedly sold 200
to the Egyptian Arm
The Romanians pro a y will switc to
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E. IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO
150. Our lack of reliable, detailed information
about the composition, configuration, and dimensions
of the frontal armor of all modern Soviet tanks except
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158. Despite US antitank forces' improving position
in regard to individual engagements with Soviet vehi-
cles, they and their NATO allies still are confronted
with the substantial numerical superiority of Soviet
tank forces. 12 This fact will make it necessary for US
soldiers responsible for engaging Soviet tanks with
direct-fire, ground weapons to make intelligent use of
well-prepared defensive positions, to exercise fire dis-
cipline, and to strive whenever possible to engage the
enemy from above or from the flanks. Such tactics will
remove the guesswork from frontal engagements by
ensuring kills even when ranges are long or when US
soldiers are armed with older, less capable munitions.
Even if these soldiers are able to apply these tactics
successfully, adequate levels of well-coordinated air
and artillery support may prove to be critically impor-
tant to a successful defense.
159. This situation probably will not change signifi-
cantly for several years because slow improvements in
Soviet posture will be offset by gradual improvements
in US antitank capabilities. Many of the T-62s in the
Groups of Forces are being replaced with T-80s,
T-64As, and T-64Bs, but this replacement process is
1Y The Warsaw Pact's tank inventory in the Western Theater of
Military Operations outnumbers NATO's tank inventory in central
Europe by a nearly 3-to-1 margin
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air and artillery fire support weapons should also be
available
160. Thus, for the foreseeable future Warsaw Pact
tank forces will face a formidable array of NATO
antitank weapons. However, the Pact can still feed
many more highly capable tanks into a conflict in
central Europe than NATO. Ultimately, this fact alone
presents NATO commanders with a problem that
cannot be solved strictly through technological ad-
vances.
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ANNEX B
Trends in Soviet Tank Gun Ammunition
1. When the Soviets adopted the smoothbore gun as
the principal armament of their main battle tanks,
they did so to achieve high muzzle velocities and,
therefore, flatter ballistic trajectories and greater
kinetic-energy penetrations. Because no rifling was
present in the barrel to impart spin to stabilize the
projectile in flight, Soviet ammunition designers devel-
oped projectiles that incorporated fins to provide
stabilization. Following traditional Soviet practice,
which reflects the varied nature of the combat mis-
sions that a Soviet main battle tank would be expected
to undertake, the Soviets developed three main types
of ammunition: a kinetic-energy armor-piercing
round, a shaped-charge round, and a high-explosive
fragmentation round. The first two types were de-
signed principally to destroy armored vehicles, while
the third type was intended for use against "soft"
targets such as personnel or lightly constructed fortifi-
cations.
2. The T-62's armor-piercing round uses a long-rod
penetrator; that is, it attacks enemy armor by means of
Figure 23
Cutaway View of a Soviet BM-9 125-mm
Kinetic-Energy Tank Gun Round
Auxiliary propellant
charge (single base)
Sabot (three
pieces, steel)
Subprojectile
(steel)
Ballistic cap
(sheet steel)
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a metal dart that is long and thin (see figure 23). This
dart is encased in a jacket or sabot that holds it in place
in the gun barrel. The sabot falls away after the dart
leaves the barrel. The dart moves at high velocity and
forces its way through armor plate by concentrating its
kinetic energy in the small cross section tip of the dart.
The standard armor-piercing projectile for the T-62,
called the BM-6, uses a steel dart, and it performed
impressively in its day. Recently, we have discovered
that the Soviets fielded an armor-piercing round for
the T-62 that incorporated a steel dart with a tungsten
alloy cap. Apparently, they discontinued producing
this round, the BM-3, in favor of the BM-6.
3. The T-62's shaped-charge round, which uses the
BK-4M warhead, attacks armor plate by means of a jet
of molten metal. Its warhead consists of a cylindrical
block of explosive with a copper-lined, cone-shaped
depression in the forward end (see figure 24, page 52).
When the explosive is detonated at or near the surface
of its target, the metal of the cone collapses and is
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Figure 24
Diagram Illustrating Penetration of Rolled
Homogeneous Armor by a Shaped-Charge Warhead
A. Physical contact with target.
Detonation begins.
B. Detonation continues.
Jet and slug start to form.
C. Detonation continues.
Formation of jet and slug
continues.
Jet makes initial contact
with target.
D. Detonation continues.
Formation of jet and slug
continues.
Target is penetrated.
E. Detonation completed.
Slug material remains
in newly formed cavity.
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propelled forward in the form of a thin high-speed jet.
Essentially, this jet flows through the armor in the
same way a stream of water from a garden hose would
flow through a mass of compacted mud. Generally,
the penetration of a shaped-charge warhead is directly
proportional to the diameter of the metal cone: the
larger the diameter, the greater the penetration poten-
tial. Penetration capability is also sensitive to the
explosive fill, the material and design of the cone, the
general precision of manufacturing, and the standoff
distance from the target.
4. The second postwar generation of Soviet tanks all
incorporate a 125-mm smoothbore gun, which we
believe to be a direct outgrowth of the T-62's gun.13
The 125-mm gun's KE projectile, called the BM-9,
closely resembles the T-62's original steel dart projec-
tile, although it can penetrate more armor because of
greater mass and higher velocity. The shaped-charge
round-its warhead is called the BK-14M-is also
similar in design to the T-62's, but it has greater
penetration capability by virtue of its larger diameter.
Likewise, the high-explosive fragmentation round is
marginally bigger and, therefore, more lethal than that
of the T-62. It also incorporates improved explosives
and a better warhead design
5. These rounds all come in two pieces-a propel-
lant charge and the projectile. Their design enables
" The early production version of the T-64 series mounted a 115-
mm gun, but we believe that these tanks were later retrofitted with
this large ammunition to be easily handled by both
crews and automatic loaders. Except for its metallic
stub, the propellant casing is combustible. It is con-
sumed during firing, thus eliminating the problem of
disposal of spent shell casings that could quickly
clutter the fighting compartment in combat. The
metallic stub is automatically ejected from the rear of
the turret in the T-72 series and automatically re-
turned to the loader carousel in the T-64 series
6. The BM-9 KE projectile was followed by a
projectile called the BM-12 which apparently provides
no appreciable improvement in penetration. The
BM-12 incorporates a tungsten carbide core, and
evidence strongly suggests that the 125-mm KE projec-
tile called the BM-23 incorporates a penetrator with a
tungsten alloy core. This denser metal probably gives
the BM-23 at least 20 percent more penetration
7. No evidence exists to suggest that an improved
shaped-charge round has been developed for the
125-mm gun. ATGM probably supple-
ments or, in certain instances, replaces the shaped-
charge round for the T-64B and the T-80, and it
almost certainly can penetrate more armor than the
BK-14M warhead
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