INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00894R000200350004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 57
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Intelligence
in Key Countries
Indications of
Political Instability
GI IPI 83-004
December 1983
668
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Directorate of
m Intelligence
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to
Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, ~
Secret
GI IPI 83-004
December 1983
25X1
25X1
25X1
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
This is the fourth issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide
timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance
to US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from
1 October to 19 December 1983, examines events and processes that could
lead to major regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-
term warning of revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the
potential for instability during a time frame of the next six months to two
years in a periodic, systematic, and thematic way through the consistent
application of a set of indicators. 25X1
We believe that most of the 90 indicators are applicable to most 25X1
of the countries we examine; other indicators are more country specific. All
indicators are examined for every country for each issue. Those countries
for which indicators have changed significantly or which are otherwise of
special interest are treated in a detailed way in the text.
The quarterly includes four parts:
? A brief overview of each country.
? A more detailed assessment of countries in which there have been
developments of interest. Included in each assessment are two subsections
listing different types of indicators to be watched for:
Prospective Scenario. Specific indicators of the scenario we believe is
most likely to unfold. We do not intend the list to be inclusive nor do we
anticipate that all of these indicators necessarily will occur.
Alternative Scenarios. Specific tripwire indicators warning that a sce-
nario other than that outlined in the Prospective Scenario might be
developing.
? A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and
tables tracing political and economic changes during the past several
years.
This issue assesses a total of 28 countries that we have identified as
particularly salient to US interests. These countries are included because
they are strategic choke points, major oil producers or debtors, key US
friends or allies, or geographically close to the United States.
Secret
GI IPI 83-004
December 1983
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Preface
Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest
7
Brazil
7
Argentina
9
Turkey
13
Pakistan
15
Zaire
17
Philippines
21
Part 3. Graphic Indicators
25
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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
Mexico/Central America
tensions in Oaxaca and Sinaloa States.
President de la Madrid will find it difficult to pull off his complex
economic program for 1984. It calls for both economic stimulation-
needed to forestall the possibility of social unrest-and measures to fight
inflation. The ruling party retained control over most city halls in recent
municipal elections, but alleged electoral fraud has increased political
El Salvador Since September the insurgents have recaptured the battlefield initiative
from the military, which proved unable to build on the gains it made
during the summer. Support for the regime is being further eroded by the
activities of rightwing death squads. A delay of the elections, now set for 25
March 1984, would also work to the insurgents' advantage.
Guatemala Chief of State Mejia's position and, indirectly, the government's counterin-
surgency campaign are threatened by antigovernment criticism from party
leaders, church officials, and international groups concerned over increas-
ing human rights abuses by military and paramilitary groups. Mejia's
domestic critics are being additionally fueled by continuing insurgent
terrorism.
Honduras Local Communists apparently are being urged on by Salvadoran insur-
gents to carry out attacks against US Government and business facilities as
well as other targets. They are hamstrung by extensive government
surveillance and their own disunity, however, and pose no immediate threat
to the government.
any outbursts are unlikely to seriously threaten the regime.
Some public protests may take place as a consequence of a deterioration in
the economy-which appears steeper than officials had estimated-but
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democratic rule is threatened.
President Betancur remains unable to halt the economic decline or to bring
the M-19, FARC, ELN, and other ongoing insurgencies under control.
Conditions would have to deteriorate a great deal more, however, before
turmoil.
President-elect Jaime Lusinchi and his victorious Democratic Action Party
must now devote top priority to reversing four years of economic stagnation
and combating rising inflation, unemployment, and bankruptcy. The new
President's anticipated tough program could lead to social and political
policies.
Persisting insurgency, ongoing economic crisis, and major leftist gains in
the municipal elections on 13 November have severely eroded President
Belaunde's political base, but so far the military has shown no interest in a
coup. Betancur may make major Cabinet changes and adopt more populist
tions.
Rising public demands for less belt tightening are continuing to create
political and economic problems for President Figueiredo, whose stock
remains low. The IMF's recent approval of a revised austerity package will
give the government some breathing room in meeting its external obliga-
Argentina ` President Alfonsin's stunning electoral victory over the Peronists-com-
bined with his willingness to compromise and the disarray within the
military-should give him at least six months' grace in which to introduce
reforms. Thereafter, mounting economic and political pressures probably
will increasingly narrow his policy choices.
holidays and summer vacations.
Although demonstrations in October and November failed to win addition-
al concessions, the opposition will continue to press the government for an
early return to civilian rule, including Pinochet's resignation. Political
activity probably will fall off through March but only because of the
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Europe
Spain The Socialist government continues to maintain its moderate, stable course
despite agitation by Communist-dominated unions and several spectacular
Greece The Turkish Cypriots' unilateral declaration of independence and the
assassination of the US naval attache in Athens have worried the
government but will have little impact on domestic stability.
Turkey' The new democratically elected civilian government should remain stable
for the next year or so. Its ability to survive after that will depend on the
ability of the new civilian leaders and the military to cooperate. The shift to
civilian rule could give an opening to renewed terrorism.
Morocco The new government King Hassan appointed in November includes
members of the socialist opposition, which should help limit domestic
discord and steer the country through parliamentary elections scheduled in
early 1984. Economic austerity measures are beginning to bite, however,
and may make for some popular discontent.
Egypt
detracted from the victory of President Mubarak's party.
The government apparently has decided to postpone an increase in
subsidized bread prices until after next April's parliamentary elections,
temporarily defusing a potentially explosive domestic issue but also making
it impossible to reach a standby loan agreement with the IMF. The boycott
by major legal opposition parties in this fall's local council elections
Saudi Arabia The government's attention is focused on problems in Lebanon and the
potential for regional instability in the Gulf. King Fahd continues to
restrict expenditures but has avoided cutting subsidies and social programs
that would hurt lower income groups and possibly foster unrest.
' See part 2 for detailed discussion.
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Iraq
endanger his regime.
Saddam Husayn ousted several close aides, including relatives, to preempt
a possible threat to his rule. He evidently is concerned that the declining
economic and military situation caused by the war with Iran could
from the war with Iraq escalate.
The economic problems that caused unrest in many cities this summer have
been only temporarily alleviated. Antiregime activity by Khomeini's
domestic rivals and by exile groups opposed to him has lessened for the mo-
ment but is likely to recur if the economy again deteriorates or casualties
Pakistan' Stern government action in Sind Province has cowed the demonstrators for
the time being at the cost of deepened Sindhi hostility. In Punjab Province,
President Zia's exploitation of opposition disunity and the opposition's own
lack of popular appeal have kept it off balance. Zia's political opponents
could eventually unite if he continues to exclude them from the political
process, but they are unlikely to grow strong enough to topple him.
Nigeria
(Late Note:
3 January 1984)
will adopt new policies seriously adverse to US interests
Major General Buhari, leader of the new military government that
replaced President Shagari's civilian regime following the coup on
31 December, is a pragmatic anti-Communist who is favorably disposed
toward the West. Although he may speak out against US policy in
southern Africa to distinguish his regime from Shagari's-which was
criticized for being excessively pro-Western-we do not anticipate that he
Somalia The success of the government's recent campaign to disarm feuding tribes
will soon dissipate because of the ready availability of weapons from
Ethiopia. Deep-rooted tribal fissures, however, prevent dissidents from
transforming the tribesmen's hostility to the Siad government into a serious
threat.
Kenya
measures imposed to satisfy foreign lenders.
Disunity within the opposition Kikuyu tribe continues to undercut any
potential threat to the regime. President Moi's government should be able
to easily contain any public discontent that might erupt from austerity
Secret 4
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of organized internal opposition.
Despite appalling economic conditions throughout most of the country,
President Mobutu is likely to remain in complete command for at least the
next year because of his security consciousness and the near-total absence
South Africa Strengthened by its 2 to 1 victory in November's referendum on a new con-
stitution incorporating limited racial reforms, the ruling National Party
probably will implement the new structure in the second half of 1984.
Terrorist and nonwhite groups opposed to Prime Minister Botha's gradual-
ist approach to reform will most likely intensify their antiregime activities
prior to elections tentatively scheduled this spring for the new Colored and
Indian parliamentary seats.
Philippines' The alienation of most Filipinos from the Marcos regime is making it
increasingly difficult for the President to govern. Elements in the military
might move to replace him, particularly if his health deteriorates or serious
urban violence erupts as a consequence of the rapidly failing economy.
While the moderate opposition remains fragmented, the Communists are
beginning to capitalize on their superior organization.
Indonesia Muslim and student groups resent the government's campaign to force
mass organizations to espouse the state ideology of Pancasila, but so far
have not engaged in public protests. The population seems to be tolerating
the regime's austerity program and the death-squad campaign it is running
against known criminals.
South Korea President Reagan's visit in November boosted President Chun's morale.
His opponents will now urge the government to live up to the democratic
values expressed in the joint statement by the two presidents. In the wake
of the Rangoon bombing, Chun may use the excuse of further North
Korean terrorist attacks to crack down on domestic dissidents, which would
increase the prospects for campus disturbances next spring.
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Included in each assessment in Part 2 are two sub-
sections listing different types of indicators to be
watched for:
Prospective Scenario. Specific indicators of the
scenario we believe is most likely to unfold. We do not
intend the list to be inclusive nor do we anticipate that
all of these indicators necessarily will occur.
Alternative Scenarios. Specific tripwire indicators
warning that a scenario other than that outlined in the
Prospective Scenario might be developing.
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
President of Brazil.
? Congressman Maluf, who is detested by President
Figueiredo, apparently has all but locked up the
ruling Democratic Social Party's nomination for
Maluf's candidacy
? Figueiredo may seek an alternative presidential
candidate from within the major opposition party or
scrap the present electoral system, which enhances
Alegre.
? High unemployment and declining living standards
sparked supermarket looting in several states and
escalating crime waves in south-central urban cen-
ters including Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Porto
several earlier proposals.
? The Congress narrowly approved a compromise
wage-restraint law in November after rebuffing
is In response to the wage-restraint law and other
austerity measures, the IMF approved a revised
rescue program and resumed disbursements,_
lag behind inflation.
Comment
We do not foresee a major threat to stability, such as
a massive breakdown in public order, arising in the
next year or so. For the moment, the introduction of
positive economic measures and consequent resump-
tion of IMF funding will give Brasilia some breathing
room for handling the financial crisis. Moreover, the
government may be able to win key economic tests in
Congress if it continues to broaden its political base
by allowing the Congress a voice in economic policy
making. The regime's stock, though, will most likely
remain low as public demands for an easing of
austerity keep rising and wage increases continue to
We do not believe the military-the real power
behind Figueiredo's civilian presidency-will tolerate
another year of ineffectual rule by the President. If
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the economic situation worsens-the recession is now
entering its fourth year-the President's own military
and political advisers may urge him to resign. Our
concerns earlier this year-and probably those of
Figueiredo's military backers-over the President's
mental and physical health have not been erased by
his more energetic performance in recent months
following his recovery from heart bypass surgery.
Even if he continues to reassert his authority and
show greater flexibility in dealing with Congress, he is
unlikely to regain the control he once had over the
nation. The liberalization process has gone too far, his
efforts are too little and too late, and he has no
cushion of popular affection or respect. His aloof
autocratic style and disdain for political horsetrading
have endeared him to few and earned him a reputa-
tion for ineffectiveness that will be difficult to over-
come.
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Efforts by Figueiredo to change the electoral process
so as to allow a new president to be directly elected by
the people could heighten the legitimacy of the ad-
ministration that succeeds him. If the President does
engineer a switch to direct balloting or reach agree-
ment with the opposition on an alternative candidate,
the incoming president-to be elected in January
1985-could obtain the first broad-based mandate in
20 years. In either case, Figueiredo's successor will be
hard pressed to balance competing political forces and
The loosening of authoritarian measures in recent
years has considerably weakened the government's
legal means of suppressing dissent and imposing its
will. Nevertheless, we believe political liberalization
will continue. Figueiredo appears solidly committed to
the process and is unlikely to try to extend his term of
office. Moreover, despite signs of restiveness against
Figueiredo, we believe that the military will not
intervene against the liberalization program unless
serious internal security problems erupt. Figueiredo
has purged most top-level military hardliners, and the
high command is now composed of moderates dedi-
cated to a return to civilian rule. The military does
remain suspicious, however, of radical populist Leonel
Brizola, who was elected governor of Rio de Janeiro in
November 1982 and who has long been considered
unacceptable by many military officers. The military
probably will insist that the President manipulate the
electoral rules to prevent a Brizola victory should
Figueiredo decide in favor of a direct presidential
election rather than a deal with the major opposition
leaders.
lead the country to an economic recovery.
Prospective Scenario
? The continuation of serious but tolerable looting and
other violence related to the deteriorating economy.
? Continued government slippage in the battle against
inflation, particularly in tightening budget
expenditures.
? Renewed congressional opposition to the austerity
program when Congress reconvenes in March.
? Emergence of a consensus presidential candidate
acceptable to broad sectors of the ruling party and
the opposition.
? Changes in the electoral system providing for a
direct popular presidential election.
Alternative Scenarios
? Rapid economic deterioration undermining the IMF
adjustment program.
? Serious breakdown of public order well beyond
sporadic incidents of violence.
? Inability of Figueiredo to work out a compromise on
a presidential candidate with the opposition or a
change in the electoral system.
? The emergence of Brizola or another populist politi-
cian as the potential winner in the presidential
election.
? Increasing expressions of dissatisfaction within the
military over political and economic developments,
leading to coup plotting.
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Argentina
? Raul Alfonsin of the moderately left-of-center Rad-
ical Civic Union was elected president with 52
percent of the vote, provided by a coalition of the
middle class and blue-collar workers.
? The Radicals, who also captured the lower house of
the Congress, have promised to reform the military
and the Peronist-dominated labor movement, revi-
talize the economy, root out corruption, defend
human rights, and strengthen ties with the Non-
aligned Movement.
? The Peronists, caught off guard, have not yet
developed a new party strategy; moderate Peronists
so far have responded positively to Alfonsin's call
for national unity and cooperation.
? Alfonsin's victory has led to still greater disarray
within the much discredited armed forces
? The shortage of foreign exchange compelled the
government to ban all imports for the first 21 days
of October. Thereafter, quotas were imposed that
allow for only about a third of fourth-quarter 1982
imports.
Comment
We believe that the strength of Alfonsin's electoral
mandate, his willingness to compromise, and the
disarray in the Peronist movement and the military
will give the President and his incoming government
at least six months' breathing space. We anticipate
that political opposition will increase toward the end
of 1984, especially if the economy deteriorates, al-
though it will not threaten the regime for some time.
The Peronists will have recovered some lost ground by
then and probably will become more aggressive. The
diverse coalition that elected Alfonsin might begin to
unravel in the face of competing demands and his
willingness to compromise with the Peronists and the
military. We do not foresee any serious threat of
military intervention during Alfonsin's first year in
office, but the reemergence of major social tensions
could again tempt military leaders.
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In the coming weeks, Alfonsin will use his momentum
to move forward on key issues. Moderate Peronists
have signaled their willingness to cooperate on some
issues. Alfonsin appears to have considerable support
among the Peronist rank and file, many of whom
voted for him, for ousting disreputable union leaders.
Alfonsin also holds an edge over the military, which
leaves office after seven years of economic failure,
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massive human rights violations, and the bitter Falk-
lands defeat last year. The new President will try to
take advantage both of his strength and of the
military's weakness to reassert civilian control and cut
military spending. To forestall military intervention in
politics, he is likely to compromise on two issues
critical to the military-human rights and corrup-
tion-by leaving them to the courts to investigate and
decide. The President also appears to be going along
with the military's nuclear program.
We believe that Alfonsin will achieve mixed results in
his primary economic objectives of restraining infla-
tion, reactivating the economy, and renegotiating the
$40 billion foreign debt. His sweeping electoral man-
date should sharply increase political optimism and
thus diminish the economic uncertainty underlying
speculative price increases and enable the government
to quickly reach wage and price agreements. Conse-
quently, we expect a temporary lowering of inflation
to around 5 percent monthly as compared with a 21.4-
percent rate in September. Alfonsin's plans to stimu-
late growth through stepped-up government spending,
subsidized commercial interest rates supported by
military spending cuts, and improved tax collection
could generate a modest economic recovery. Econom-
ic problems will intensify after mid-1984, however, in
part because large monetary growth in late 1983
probably will lead to a recurrence of higher inflation
rates and jeopardize wage and price agreements. F_
Although Alfonsin has stated clearly his intention to
service the foreign debt to ease bankers' apprehen-
sions, we believe his plans for deficit spending could
stall an agreement with the IMF, which is a prerequi-
site for reaching new terms on commercial bank
debts. There is room for compromise on the amount of
deficit spending, but, if the IMF takes a tough stance,
the result probably will be an impasse that would
increase the attraction of a debt moratorium. If
Alfonsin sticks to his stimulative spending plan de-
spite the shortfall in revenues that we expect will
occur, the widening fiscal deficit in late 1984 will give
an additional push to inflation and create added
The new President, who is 56, has demonstrated
courage and patience in pursuing a lifelong commit-
ment to democratic ideals, human rights, and social
justice. Although his principles represent strongly
held beliefs, Alfonsin is not dogmatic or inflexible
and tempers his idealistic rhetoric with appeals to
realism. He identified himself with the human rights
movement long before it became either popular or
safe. Prior to his election campaign, he organized
mass rallies and, as an attorney, defended numerous
political detainees. Alfonsin's reputation enabled him
to run as a decent, honest man who offered a genuine
alternative to Peronism. He showed an ability to
compromise and, using consistent and simple themes,
success-fully built a winning coalition. On the basis of
his track record, we believe Alfonsin has the skill and
temperament to moderate his campaign rhetoric,
adjust to political realities, and-to the degree any-
one can-walk the tightrope of remaining true to his
principles while working to bring together the dispa-
rate forces that compose Argentine society
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cals and Peronists
Prospective Scenario
? Willingness by the Radicals and Peronists to com-
promise their political differences temporarily.
? Renewed confidence in the Argentine economy,
prompting a decline in inflation and an increase in
investment.
? Acceptance by second-echelon labor leaders and the
rank and file of Alfonsin's plans to reform and
democratize labor unions.
? Military acquiescence in Alfonsin's policies and
support for the democratic process.
? Renewed higher inflation rates in late 1984.
? Consequent growing polarization between the Radi-
torium on debt repayments.
Alternative Scenarios
? The emergence of competing demands within Alfon-
sin's electoral coalition, leading to its unraveling.
? A major revival of popular support for the Peronists,
prompted by the return of Isabel Peron.
? The rapid end of cooperation by moderate Peronists,
demonstrated by their refusal to endorse Alfonsin's
policies in the Congress.
? Alfonsin's failure to reach agreement with business
and labor in the short term, leading to a renewed
wage-price inflationary spiral, labor strikes, and
popular protests.
? Alfonsin's taking a hard line on military corruption
and human rights violations.
? A rapid increase in military unhappiness with Al-
fonsin's policies, leading to an end of rivalry be-
tween the services, renewed political assertiveness
by the military, and cooperation with rightwing
union officials.
? The reemergence and subsequent escalation of ter-
rorism on the right and the left.
? Failure to reach agreement with the IMF.
? The government's declaration of a long-term mora-
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Turkey
? Turgut Ozal's moderate Motherland Party captured
a majority of seats in the National Assembly by
defeating the left-of-center Populist Party and the
military-backed Nationalist Democracy Party in
elections run by the military on 6 November, the
first since the military coup in September 1980
? The new government inherited serious economic
problems, including a 20-percent unemployment
rate and a 30-percent inflation rate.
? President Evren and his advisory council have aban-
doned efforts to restrict participation in municipal
elections to be held no later than November 1984.
Comment
We believe that the new political system devised by
the generals during their three years in power will
prove flexible enough to support both democratic rule
and political stability for the next year or so. If
economic problems and terrorism can be kept in
check, democratic institutions will be able to slowly
expand. If the new civilian government fails to grap-
ple with these and other issues, however, the politi-
cians-like those overthrown by the generals in
1980--could again be written off as ineffective by the
public and the military, making a return to military
government almost inevitable.
The new government's effectiveness in carrying out its
policies will depend in large part on the ability of
Evren and Ozal-both strong personalities-to over-
come their differences. Evren's greater constitutional
and political authority combined with his military
backing ensure that he will remain the most influen-
tial political figure for several years. Ozal, though,
has the momentum, enjoys a wide reputation as an
economics wizard, and, through his party, commands
a majority in the Assembly. In the short term, we
expect that Evren and Ozal will seek to avoid a major
falling out that might undermine the new and fragile
democratic experiment. Initially, they will both sup-
port the maintenance of tight internal security, and
Evren probably will let Ozal try to reorient the
country toward a market economy. They probably
will clash later, however, on how fast and how far to
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go in loosening government restrictions on the
economy, and on how quickly to relax martial law,
which has been extended through March 1984. Over
the longer run, difficulties will arise because Ozal is
less interested than Evren in developing closer rela-
tions with Western Europe and secularizing Turkish
society and more interested in close ties with the Arab
world.
The continued growth of democratic institutions also
depends on Evren's willingness to allow more political
parties to operate nationally and to permit former
politicians like ex-Prime Minister Ecevit a voice in
the process. Now banned from politics for 10 years,
Ecevit may wish to reestablish a "leftist" party. The
President and the generals, fearing that a prolifera-
tion of parties at the national level could exacerbate
tension and cripple the new government's ability to
rule effectively, will remain wary about all such
proposals. Evren will be influenced by the outcome of
the 1984 municipal elections and the way the parties
that do participate in them comport themselves.
We believe that a unified military holds the key to
stability over the next few years. Evren will probably
dominate military councils for the next year or two.
Then we anticipate he will be drawn by his institu-
tional role more deeply into the civilian world of
parliamentary politics, and this will lead to differ-
ences with the military over the best way to develop
the country politically and economically. If additional
major national problems develop, senior military offi-
cers could assign part of the blame to Evren and fan
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discontent within the armed forces, and then engage
in a new coup conspiracy. At a minimum, a serious
rift in military unity could develop
We fear that the return to civilian rule will embolden
terrorist groups. The government's continuing strenu-
ous enforcement of security laws and the fact that
terrorist organizations will need time to regroup and
plan should preclude a major increase in terrorism
during the next few months. Over the longer term,
however, terrorism by the extreme left and, to a lesser
extent, by Armenian separatists probably will in-
crease. Although we do not expect terrorist activities
to reach any time soon the level of violence that
precipitated the coup in September 1980, a major
upsurge eventually could trigger retaliation from the
extreme right and again threaten the democratic
process.
Key Indicators To Watch For
Prospective Scenario
? A honeymoon between the President and the Prime
Minister for several months at least.
? Thereafter, growing disagreements over major poli-
cy issues between Evren and Ozal specifically and
military and civilian leaders generally.
? Further increases in unemployment and inflation.
? A resurgence of leftwing and Armenian terrorism,
leading to violence by the extreme right.
? An upsurge in domestic and international pressure
to broaden democratic institutions, including the
proliferation of political parties at the national level
after the 1984 municipal elections.
? Plans by banned former politicians to challenge the
new system, especially if the parties they support do
well in the municipal elections.
Alternative Scenarios
? Inability of Evren and Ozal to work together from
the start, leading to an immediate stalemate in
government effectiveness.
? A serious rift, possibly involving coup plotting, in
senior military ranks over the policies being imple-
mented by the civilian government.
? Limits imposed by Evren and his military advisers
on participation in the municipal elections, permit-
ting only the three parties that took part in the
national elections in November 1983 to enter
candidates.
? Violent public demonstrations led by leftists trying
to force the pace of democratization
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? The violence in Sind Province led by the Movement
for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)-protest-
ing discrimination against Sindhis and President
Zia's plan for a return to civilian rule-has declined
since Zia ordered the arrest of potential trouble-
makers and sent troops and paramilitary units to
assist the police.
nomic sabotage
? The public is complaining, especially in Sind, over
the decreased subsidy for ghee and price gouging by
merchants.
? Conservative and religious political parties continue
to demand that Zia restore civilian rule by 1984 but
spurn the MRD-led agitation; the MRD continues
to have little impact outside of Sind.
? Zia opened talks in October with rightwing party
leaders and extended feelers to moderates in the
MRD, but he has shown no willingness to abandon
his goal of holding elections without party participa-
tion, which would allow him to run for the presiden-
cy.
in early November Al
Zulfikar terrorists were apprehended by authorities
in Lahore while they were preparing an attack on
US diplomats
Comment
We believe that President Zia's position is secure for
at least the next six months. He has temporarily
quelled his fragmented political opposition and satis-
fied military critics who had complained that he was
too lenient in Sind. He also has prevented the Sind
disturbances from spreading. Over the long haul,
however, if Zia is unable to redress political and
economic grievances in Sind, prevent new violence
there, and in Punjab Province reach a compromise
with the political parties over the form of a return to
civilian rule, we believe that major unrest will ensue
and prompt the military to replace Zia with a more
tractable general.
Boundary representation is
7 not necessarily authoritative
The problems in Sind represent the greatest threat to
Zia. If he is unwilling or unable to mitigate Sindhi
political and economic discontent, we anticipate re-
newed violence, possibly aggravated by Soviet or
Indian involvement, that will ultimately benefit radi-
cal and separatist groups. The US Consulate in
Karachi believes that a further round of violence will
include economic sabotage such as the interruption of
road and rail communications and attacks on gas and
oil pipelines and the national electric grid.
The authorities should be able to protect the economic
infrastructure from serious disruption. If they fail,
Zia's image as an effective leader will be tarnished,
and senior military officers and previously supportive
businessmen might abandon him. Successful sabotage
could lead to a reduction in industrial output, disrup-
tion of exports, and shortages of food and other
consumer goods. We also fear that Americans could
become the target of renewed violence. The US
Embassy reports that opposition politicians increas-
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A worker calls for an earl return to democracy during a recent
demonstration in Karachi.
Al Zulfikar's abortive attempt to target US diplomats
was probably related to its objective of discrediting
Zia. We do not believe the group poses any real threat
to the regime, athough it may succeed in exacerbating
Islamabad's relations with New Delhi. In fact, Al
Zulfikar's Indian connection severely reduces its ap-
peal to most Pakistanis, especially in Punjab Province.
overthrow the regime
= Zia will not give in tote enftan s o t e
opposition parties that they be allowed to participate
in next year's provincial elections, which are unlikely
to occur before September. Zia has stated privately
that candidates for these elections will not be allowed
to identify with parties and that new parties will be
allowed to form afterward. If Zia follows this proce-
dure, as we anticipate, the coming elections will
provide the MRD-led opposition with a new pretext
for nationwide protest.
Conservative and Islamic parties also want to partici-
pate as parties in the elections and are growing more
disillusioned with Zia because of the lack of progress
in their negotiations with him over the return to
civilian rule. Conversely, however, they are reluctant
to make common cause with the MRD so long as it is
dominated by the Pakistan People's Party, which they
fear would suppress them and reverse Zia's Islamiza-
tion policies if it returned to power. A few disenchant-
ed conservative politicians may try to cooperate with
MRD moderates in attempting to persuade the mili-
tary to get rid of Zia, but most will acquiesce in his
policies. Zia's electoral plans should prevail owing to
continued military support and the tacit backing of
the two best organized conservative parties-the
strongly anti-MRD Jama'at-i-Islami and the Paki-
stani Muslim League's Pagaro faction.
demonstrations
Prospective Scenario
? Escalation of violent antiregime protests, economic
sabotage, and possible attacks against American
targets in Sind.
? MRD-led protests in response to Zia's refusal to
allow parties to participate in next year's provincial
elections.
? Increased pressure on Zia by conservative and
religious parties to permit parties to take part in the
elections.
? Continued Soviet and Indian support of antiregime
Alternative Scenarios
? A decision by conservative and religious parties such
as the Jama'at-i-Islami to directly confront Zia by
launching urban demonstrations.
? Involvement by bazaar merchants, clerics, labor
rank and file, and rightwing students in antiregime
protests previously confined to student and labor
leftists, lawyers, and professional women.
? The extension of major violent protests to provinces
outside Sind.
? Military unwillingness to suppress protests.
? Moves by senior military officers to bypass Zia and
negotiate directly with the political opposition, re-
sulting in Zia's ouster.
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exile.
? A group of former legislators trying to obtain
government approval to form a second political
party in opposition to President Mobutu's Popular
Movement for the Revolution (MPR) have been
forcibly returned to their home areas in internal
further fueled popular resentment.
? Mobutu's decision in September to devalue the zaire
by 80 percent and a 60-percent inflation rate have
centers.
many unhappy.
? Substantial salary increases have been given to some
government officials and senior military officers,
but differentiated salary adjustments have left
? Economic hardships have led to some open grum-
bling among lower ranking military personnel._
? Arrangements are almost complete for an IMF
standby credit and the rescheduling of some debts.
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritativ
Mobutu's failure to develop viable political institu-
tions or provide a reasonable mechanism for his
succession, together with the low threshhold for a
resurgence of intertribal strife and regional secession-
ism, means that political instability could again erupt.
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means of preventing alliances against him.
Comment
We see no immediate challenge to President Mobutu.
His historic role as the nation's unifier, tight rein on
the government and the MPR, control over the armed
forces, and innate intelligence and craftiness ensure
his dominance of national affairs for some time to
come. He continues to strengthen his leadership by
co-opting or arresting civilian and military opponents,
and by encouraging ethnic and regional tensions as a
One of Mobutu's greatest assets is Zaire's vast ethnic
diversity-30 million people divided among over 200
tribes, who speak some 700 languages and dialects.
Zaire remains little more than a collection of dispa-
rate elements held together-to the extent it is-by
Mobutu's domination and manipulation of the mili-
tary and national bureaucracy. It is unlikely that any
potential challenger could organize a nationwide op-
position movement to Mobutu. At the same time,
Dissatisfaction with Mobutu's rule is growing across
the country largely because of the fundamental inabil-
ity of the President and his henchmen to resolve
numerous economic, social, and political problems,
notwithstanding short-lived, stopgap efforts at reform.
We believe that Mobutu is incapable of reversing this
trend and that the inexorable downward spiral of the
quality of life will continue to fuel popular ill will
against the regime. As economic conditions have
worsened in recent years, Mobutu has grown obsessed
with his and his regime's security and become increas-
ingly isolated and alienated from the citizenry. A
number of prominent former MPR members of par-
liament-several of whom recently were released
from prison-have been publicly critical of Mobutu
and his policies. The President has forcibly removed
them from Kinshasa to their home areas.
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President Mobutu, who is 53 years old and has ruled
Zaire for 18 years, is a highly intelligent, opportunis-
tic, and strong-minded leader committed primarily to
his own political survival. His actions are character-
ized by a reluctance to delegate authority, a tendency
to blame others for his failures, a strong need to be in
control, a constant demand for recognition, and sensi-
tivity to slight. Under stress, he is liable to withdraw
from his responsibilities, become less open to bad
news, and, on occasion, act impulsively before think-
The economy is a disaster. Rampant inflation, high
unemployment, blatant corruption, and a deteriorat-
ing physical and bureaucratic infrastructure are the
rule everywhere. In Kinshasa and other regions, peri-
odic shortages of food and other necessities are com-
mon and have led to hunger, malnutrition, and dis-
ease. Crime has increased dramatically. In some rural
areas the money economy has disappeared, forcing
the population to revert to a precolonial lifestyle. We
believe that alienated inhabitants of outlying regions,
plagued by corrupt and ineffective local and regional
governments, view the central government simply as
the font of their exploitation. Although current exter-
nal financial difficulties will be partially alleviated by
an anticipated IMF standby loan agreement and debt
rescheduling, we believe that mismanagement, en-
demic corruption, poor terms of trade for exports, and
Mobutu's unwillingness to sustain a reform effort
mean that economic conditions probably will continue
to deteriorate for the foreseeable future.
In our view, although the Army is the base of
Mobutu's power, it is also the chief potential threat to
his rule. Ineffective and venal, the armed forces are a
greater menace to the population than they are to any
external aggressor. Ethnic tensions pervade the officer
corps-most senior officers come from Mobutu's
home region and other tribes are discriminated
against-and grumbling among middle and junior
officers and NCOs is again on the rise. To ensure the
loyalty of key Army units, Mobutu depends chiefly on
his French, Belgian, and Israeli foreign military advis-
ers.
External factors both promote and endanger stability.
Mobutu believes that his forced or sudden departure
from the scene would precipitate new instability and
jeopardize Western interests. He claims that contin-
ued political, economic, and military aid from the
United States and other Western countries is essential
to help prevent turbulence or disintegration from once
again making Zaire a theater of big power rivalry. We
believe that the Soviets and Cubans might be tempted
to intervene by promoting insurgency if an opportuni-
ty arose-for example, a violent attempt at secession
or Mobutu's inability to contain tribal violence-and
they had the capabilities to see it through. The
expanding insurgency in Angola could eventually
threaten the vulnerable Shaba region in Zaire. If
Luanda, encouraged perhaps by the Soviets and Cu-
bans, comes to believe that Mobutu is again aiding
UNITA insurgents, it could unleash the 4,000 to
6,000 anti-Mobutu guerrillas now based in northern
Angola, causing Mobutu to again call on the West to
keep Zaire together.
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Prospective Scenario
? Further economic decline, leading to new price
increases and shortages of fuel, food, and other
necessities.
? Strikes by mineworkers and other outbreaks of
popular discontent, protesting the deteriorating eco-
nomic conditions.
? Growing support by urban elites for the former
legislators who are trying to form a second political
party.
? Increasing unhappiness within senior military ranks
and strikes by enlisted men, leading to an unwilling-
ness to suppress protests.
? A harsh crackdown on dissent that heightens anti-
Mobutu sentiment.
? A resurgence of tribal conflict over the next year or
so.
? Attempts by outlying regions to secede over the next
year or so.
Alternative Scenarios
? Angolan preparations to send the anti-Mobutu
guerrillas into Shaba.
? Serious and sustained efforts by Mobutu to carry
out meaningful political and economic reforms.
? Lessening of support for Mobutu by his Western
backers.
? Direct interference by the Soviets and Cubans in
Zaire's domestic affairs.
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Philippines
demonstrations.
? The moderate opposition has kept up the pressure on
the regime by holding regular, large antigovernment
management of the political crisis
? Dissension within the military and the ruling KBL
Party has surfaced as a result of Marcos's poor
? A nationwide plebiscite will be held in January on a
constitutional amendment calling for the Speaker of
the National Assembly to assume power should the
president die or become incapacitated; beginning in
1987 a new vice president will be next in line.
? The original commission of inquiry into the Aquino
assassination resigned in October and has been
replaced by a new, independent commission.
murder.
? Central Bank reserves fell to below $300 million in
late October from over $2 billion prior to Aquino's
end of 1984
? On 14 October the government declared a 90-day
moratorium on loan payments and subsequently
decided to reschedule most foreign debts before the
financing gap have held up the program.
? The IMF has agreed in principle to provide a
standby loan of $652 million over the next 18
months, but disagreements over the size of Manila's
pendently of the high command.
Comment
We believe that the breach between President Marcos
and the majority of Filipinos is deep and irreversible.
Even if Marcos makes further concessions to open up
the political process, he will find it increasingly
difficult to govern. Nevertheless, Marcos is a survivor
and he is probably secure through the next year unless
his health deteriorates further or serious violence
erupts in the cities, in which case the military proba-
bly would move to replace him. A further danger is
that lower ranking officers will attempt to act inde-
In our view, even though moderate opposition groups
have been buoyed by business, middle class, and labor
support, they will not be able to oust Marcos because
of their disunity and inability to mobilize an effective
antiregime movement. They may also have surren-
dered the initiative to more radical groups. The
Communist Party of the Philippines has moved quick-
ly to exploit the unrest and penetrated a number of
important legal opposition groups. We share the US
Embassy's belief that the newly formed National
Alliance for Justice, Freedom, and Democracy, for
example, is a Communist front. Although leftwing
groups do not pose a direct threat to the regime at this
time, their potential for exploiting worsening political
and economic conditions and provoking serious insta-
bility is increasing rapidly.
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Guards facing an attack on a government food store following
antiregime demonstrations in Manila on 27 November. The store is
We do not anticipate that Marcos will change his
political strategy in, any major way. Because he feels
that the opposition's disunity will help him weather
the crisis, he will most likely continue to use heavy-
handed pressure and minor political concessions, such
as loosening up the election process. Although the new
Aquino commission is moving ahead aggressively in
its investigation, it will find it almost impossible to
come up with a set of conclusions that satisfy both the
Filipino people and the Marcos regime. We doubt
that Marcos would allow the release of conclusions
that contain evidence damaging to him or advisers
close to him
Marcos is concerned about dissension within his rul-
ing KBL party, which has surfaced publicly in state-'
ments by KBL figures regarding the succession prob-
lem. Marcos's decision about the vice-presidency was
probably designed to stem further expressions of
unhappiness. The decision has done little to alleviate
the fears of the business community, however. The
current Speaker of the National Assembly, a Marcos
loyalist without an independent power base, is not.a
credible successor, and the accession to power of one
of the current elite, such as Imelda Marcos, is also
possible. Marcos also has been damaged by former
Industry Minister Paterno's resignation from the
KBL and by the moves of Prime Minister Virata and
Foreign Secretary Romulo to distance themselves
from him.
Marcos's woes increasingly are being compounded by
The deepening financial crisis, which many Filipinos
and the international lending community attribute
directly to political uncertainties related to the succes-
sion and the prospect of future turmoil. While Manila
faces an estimated foreign exchange shortage of $2.3
billion over the next 15 months, many smaller banks
are refusing to roll over existing credit lines and the
foreign exchange shortage has virtually halted the
issuance of letters of credit needed to finance trade.
Nonetheless, Marcos will still have to face heightened
opposition to his regime by business and labor groups,
which are suffering the havoc of price increases
(needed to restore order to the balance of payments),
labor layoffs, and other austerity measures. The crisis
will be prolonged if Manila and the IMF do not
resolve their differences over the standby program.
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activity in the countryside.
Prospective Scenario
? Deterioration in Marcos's health to the point that
his ability to rule is questioned.
? Further defections from or dissent within the KBL.
? Large numbers of arrests or other repressive meas-
ures as part of a crackdown by Marcos against his
opponents.
? Coup plotting within the military high command or
by lower ranking officers.
? Worsening economic conditions, including new
rounds of inflation and unemployment, leading to
more labor strikes and escalating street violence in
Manila and other cities.
? Prolonged difficulties in rescheduling negotiations,
leading to an extended economic crisis.
? Increasingly successful organizational efforts by the
Communists in the cities and stepped-up guerrilla
politics.
? Greater unity among the moderate opposition
Alternative Scenarios
? Reimposition of martial law and its strict
enforcement.
? Meaningful concessions by Marcos on elections,
including the compilation of a new voter registration
list, a reconstituted elections commission, and less
restricted access of the legal opposition to the
media.
? Immediate restoration of the vice-presidency.
? A definitive withdrawal by Imelda Marcos from
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0developments not of concern,
or not applicable
? developments of moderate
concern
*developments of serious
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