INDICATIONS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN KEY COUNTRIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP84-00894R000200330007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 1, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
of tical logt'
indications
in Key Cou i
GI IN 83-002
July 1983
690
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 Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
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This quarterly was produced by and coordinated
within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and
suggestions are welcome and may be addressed to
Instability and
Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues, on
Secret
GI IPI 83-002
July 1983
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Indications of
Political Instability
in Key Countries
Preface This is the second issue of a quarterly publication designed to provide
timely warning of significant instability in countries of key importance to
US interests. The quarterly, which in this issue includes data from 1 April
to 30 June 1983, examines events and processes that could lead to major
regime or policy changes. It is not intended to supply short-term warning of
revolution or collapse, but rather is designed to address the potential for in-
stability during the next two years in a periodic, systematic, and thematic
way through the consistent application of a set of indicators. These
indicators are listed at the end of this issue. We believe that most of the 90
indicators are applicable to most of the countries we examine; other
indicators are more country specific. All indicators are examined for every
country for each issue. Those countries for which indicators have changed
significantly or which are otherwise of special interest are treated in a
detailed way in the text.
The quarterly includes four parts:
? A brief overview of each country.
? A more detailed assessment of countries in which there have been
developments of concern.
? A chart summarizing the status of key indicators for each country and
tables tracing political and economic changes during the past several
years.
? A reference list of the indicators (revised and reprinted periodically).
This issue assesses-as will each subsequent issue-a total of 26 countries
that we have identified as particularly salient to US interests. These
countries are included because they are strategic choke points, major oil
producers, key US friends or allies, or geographically close to the United
States.
iii Secret
GI IN 83-002
July 1983
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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
Part 2. Countries in Which There Have Been Developments of Interest
5
Part 3. Graphic Indicators
21
Part 4. Indicators of Political Instability
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Part 1. Major Developments at a Glance
civil violence.
General Severe economic difficulties-aggravated in some instances by drought or
flooding-are decreasing the ability of many governments to secure
additional foreign loans and investment. The imposition of austerity
measures to satisfy IMF lending conditions is increasing domestic tension
in many key countries. Impending national elections in a number of
countries are creating an upsurge of political activity that could lead to
political support as economic discontent increases.
Mexico President de la Madrid is adroitly pursuing a firm program aimed at
regaining control over the enormous foreign debt, along with steps to retain
might delay the national election scheduled for late this year.
El Salvador' The guerrillas show signs of coordinating their operations more closely and
have become more aggressive in the east. Foot-dragging by politicians
vulnerable to new demands by the military.
Guatemala' President Rios Montt has survived-for the moment at least-a series of
attacks by opponents in the military, the Catholic Church, and the private
sector who resent his evangelism, his delay in setting an election timetable,
and alleged corruption among his key advisers; he remains particularly
Honduras The declaration in April of a popular revolutionary war by the National
Directorate of Unity, a new Cuban-backed organization of four extremist
groups, and a greater US military presence increase the prospect of
terrorist attacks. Popular and legislative hostility to the presence of
Salvadoran military men at the new US-supported regional training center
probably will continue.
Panama The announcement by National Guard Commander Paredes that he plans
to retire in August to pursue the presidency and Chief of Staff Noriega's
likely accession as the new Guard Commander could occasion temporary
discord within the Guard hierarchy as senior officers vie for position and
power.
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Venezuela An orderly transfer of power is likely if, as we expect, the center-left
opposition Democratic Action Party wins the December election; the party
is adeptly exploiting the Herrera administration's failure to turn the
deteriorating economy around.
Spain
Turkey
threaten the regime.
The deepening economic recession and increased attacks by insurgents-
who have rejected the government's offer of amnesty-do not seriously
but we believe the President will survive at least over the short term.
Heightened insurgent activity, natural disasters, and major economic
problems are placing considerable pressure on the Belaunde government,
ties, including a lessening ability to pay foreign debts.
Progress continues in the transition to civilian rule scheduled for 1985
despite moderate social and labor unrest and continuing economic difficul-
the year for a turn to the left.
Prime Minister Gonzalez appears determined to pursue his moderate
domestic and foreign policies, but rising unemployment-now running at
18 percent-could create pressure within the Socialist Party by the end of
by opposition labor groups.
The government's inability to halt the economic downturn and a controver-
sial new labor law-calling for "socialization" of the public sector and
restricting strike activity-have frightened investors and evoked protests
November parliamentary election.
The resumption of political activity probably will result in new public
disharmony and divisiveness, but President Evren is likely to hold contend-
ing politicians to the new rules of the game after as well as before the
of civil unrest.
The government faces serious foreign financial problems and an increasing
probability of domestic economic discontent that could lead to an upsurge
' See part 2 for detailed discussion
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Egypt
Saudi Arabia The regime remains stable, despite continuing criticism of King Fahd's
Iraq
reforms and schedule national elections for 1984 or 1985. The opposition is
preparing to challenge his proposals but is fragmented, disorganized, and
losing support. Communal tensions in Karachi remain close to the surface.
opposition muckraking, may crack down on his critics.
A continued decrease in oil revenues is forcing the government to face
further tough economic decisions. President Mubarak, angered by zealous
poor leadership and exaggerated rumors of infighting among the senior
Guerrilla activities and terror-bombings by native Kurds, Shia Muslims,
and a small group of Communists torment but do not endanger the regime,
which continues to retain the support of most Iraqis in the war with Iran.
Iran The clerical regime has made much progress in restoring stability and
successfully asserting its authority throughout most of the country al-
though it remains plagued by factionalism that could erupt after Ayatollah
Pakistan Ina promised 14 August statement President Zia may announce political
violence.
Nigeria The economy remains weak, and worsening consumer shortages could
provoke urban unrest despite increased oil production and other positive
developments. The election campaign, which will culminate in early
August, is heating up but so far has prompted only a moderate amount of
Somalia Increased tribal fighting does not threaten Siad's continued rule, nor are
Ethiopia and Libya providing increased support to Somali dissidents.
Kenya
The political opposition pposition shows no signs of coalescing soon enough to
seriously challenge the Moi government in the September national election.
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Fiscal austerity, insisted upon by the IMF, has led to further hardships;
although widespread discontent persists, opposition to the Mobutu regime
remains unorganized and is unlikely to pose a serious threat in the near
term.
South Africa' The government faces the prospect of increased turmoil and violence
resulting from an upsurge in terrorism, heightening racial tensions, the loss
of some conservative Afrikaner political support, and economic problems
stemming from a severe drought.
Philippines President Marcos's suppression of moderate opponents is enhancing short-
term stability but may unify and strengthen the opposition over the long
haul. The armed forces currently are being reorganized to better counter
the Communist insurgency, which may benefit from the adverse economic
effects of a severe drought.
Indonesia So far, the 30 March rupiah devaluation, subsequent austerity measures,
and the military's intensified anticrime campaign, in which hundreds of
criminals have been summarily killed in recent months, have not led to
organized public opposition
South Korea A hunger strike by prominent dissident Kim Young Sam and antiregime
student demonstrations have gained publicity, but determined government
surveillance prevents dissidents from coordinating their activities or mar-
shaling broader support. The government is concerned that North Korea
might resort to terrorism to disrupt the Interparliamentary Union confer-
ence in Seoul in October.
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Part 2. Countries in Which There
Have Been Developments of Interest
? Inflation has risen to about 100 percent a year and
Mexican private-sector economists estimate 2 mil-
lion jobs have been lost during the past year.
? The IMF's determination that Mexico met its first-
quarter performance targets has cleared the way for
an additional $1.43 billion in IMF and commercial
bank loans.
? Labor continues to support the government despite
the regime's adherence to strict wage guidelines.
? Political violence over local issues and personalities
is increasing but poses no threat to the central
government; opposition parties seeking to ex loit
discontent appear to be making minor gains
? Criticism of the United States, primarily of the
administration's Central America policy, is slowly
increasing.
Comment
Controlling Mexico's massive foreign debt continues
to be an Augean task for President de la Madrid.
Implementation of the IMF austerity program and an
83-percent devaluation of the peso against the dollar
since February 1982 have led to a sharp curtailment
of imports. There is now a substantial surplus in
Mexico's trade account, and the current account is
moving toward balance. However, governmental fiscal
and monetary restraints are producing serious domes-
tic dislocations. We calculate that economic activity
fell at an annual rate of about 6 percent during the
first half of 1983. At the same time, according to
unofficial estimates, unemployment is running at 20
to 30 percent, and inflation is in the triple digit range.
Price controls and shortages of imported raw materi-
als, intermediate goods, and spare parts are eliminat-
ing the profits of many industrial firms and leading to
bankruptcies and plant closings. A recent poll of
North
Pacific
Ocean
private businessmen shows that 76 percent of the
respondents expect losses this year, 62 percent plan
additional layoffs, and 15 percent are teetering on
bankruptcy. Business leaders see no chance of revers- 25X1
ing the steep economic slide this year unless they are
able to increase the imports needed for expanding
industrial production. On the labor side, the 15.6-
percent hike in minimum wages implemented in mid-
June represents a small concession as compared with
the effects of inflation. Real wages for those who
retain jobs are down substantially since earlier this
year.
So far, the government has been able to maintain the
support of labor leaders, and the rank and file have
acquiesced in their loss in real earnings. There has
been no noticeable unrest in urban tenements, slums,
or squatter settlements. The few rallies that have been
held to protest austerity have been poorly attended.
Nevertheless, we believe the strains on the govern-
ment's traditionally strong relations with labor and on 25X1
the social fabric of the country are increasing.F--] 25X1
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It is difficult to determine the point at which tradi-
tional safety valves might prove inadequate or if a
particular incident could now ignite the anger of the
unemployed and underemployed enough to evoke
serious disturbances. We believe that the very poor
who are out of work and lack unemployment insur-
ance have sought to obtain new sources of income in
lower productivity areas and personal services-as
tourists besieged by hawkers numbering in the hun-
dreds are learning. Legions of others probably are
sharing jobs, depending on one job or part-time work
in place of their previous two or more positions, or
receiving support from extended families. Illegal im-
migration to the United States, another avenue of
relief, has risen considerably during the past year and
continues to accelerate)
In the event that these safety valves are insufficient
and serious violence does erupt, we believe the central
government is prepared to use whatever force is
necessary to quell disturbances. Local force has been
adequate for dealing with growing regional violence
focused on local personalities and issues. Nonpolitical
robberies, kidnapings, and assaults also are continuing
at a high rate and are perhaps still rising according to
press reports.
Opposition parties on the left and the right are
seeking to exploit the growing discontent. The center-
right National Action Party appears to be conducting
an effective campaign aimed at winning some key
municipal elections scheduled for later this year. The
Unified Socialist Party, however, is suffering serious
internal disputes that threaten to split the 18-month-
old coalition.
Leftist groups organized a series of small demonstra-
tions against US policy in Central America during the
quarter, and press criticism of US activities in the
region rose. Criticism by public officials has been only
moderate, however, and has been aimed at foreign
intervention by all parties.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Deterioration in the compact between the ruling
party and labor.
? The dilution of austerity measures in order to
preserve the compact.
? A significant increase in the size or nature of anti-
austerity rallies.
Veteran Mexican labor leader Fidel Velazquez Excelsior
reaches wage agreements with business while
? Unrest in Mexico City's slums.
? Divisions within the PRI over economic policy.
? Heavyhanded measures by the government to pre-
vent potential electoral gains by opposition parties.
? Regional violence directed at de la Madrid's policies
or necessitating federal intervention.
? Attacks by public officials on the United States as
the source of Mexico's economic ills
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? General Vides's appointment as Defense Minister
has ended the power struggle within the armed
forces but led to increased rightist influence in the
military.
? The guerrillas have become more aggressive in the
east, attacking isolated towns and military garrisons
and destroying transportation and power facilities.
Boundary repro e,tation is
not necessarily authoritative.
fective, but the armed forces recently began a
pacification program that could prove successful.
? Government sweeps generally continue to be inef-
? The government has released two-thirds of its politi-
cal prisoners under the new amnesty law, which so
far has attracted only a few guerrillas and their
dependents.
? The presidential election slated for late this year is
imperiled by legislative foot-dragging and the ap-
parent belief of many political leaders that it should
be postponed until spring.
Comment
We expect Vides will grow even more frustrated by
armed forces deficiencies in the months to come. He
recognizes the need for a more aggressive war strate-
gy and wants to alleviate command and control
problems but is hamstrung by a lack of competent
officers. We believe that the few changes he has made
will not significantly improve military performance
and that he probably will order further changes soon.
Frustration is pushing Vides toward extreme rightist
officers, some of whom he apparently regards as more
competent and aggressive than others in the military.
The rightists are encouraged by Vides's political
conservatism and signs that he will prove less adept
than his predecessor in keeping the military out of
partisan politics. Vides, for example, recently appoint-
ed a crony of extreme rightist Robert D'Aubuisson to
head the Treasury Police.
Still, the situation overall remains stalemated and is
not likely to soon change dramatically. Government
sweep operations seldom result in major contact, but
they do force the insurgents to temporarily disperse.
Some progress is being made in increasing night
operations, the use of long-range reconnaissance, and
the more effective deployment of blocking forces.
a pacification 25X1
program recently inaugurated in two departments will
become a model for the rest of the country. Although
the program is clearly a step in the right direction, we
believe that it may falter for lack of competent
military and civilian personnel to secure areas after
they have been cleared of guerrillas.
The release of political prisoners reflects the govern-
ment's effort to improve its human rights image, spur
guerrilla defections, and persuade moderate elements
within the insurgents' political alliance to participate
We believe the guerrillas, encouraged by their suc-
cesses in the east, will intensify their attacks in the
next few months-particularly against the commer-
cial infrastructure-in order to keep the armed forces
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in a posture of static defense. The insurgents also are 25X1
increasing psychological warfare operations, such as
releasing captured government troops, to undermine
military morale. The utility of this tactic was demon-
strated recently by the wholesale surrenders of a few
isolated government units. We are even more dis- 25X1
turbed, though, by the growing operational coopera-
tion of the five guerrilla factions. The Popular Libera-
tion Forces, the largest faction, recently proposed
further increased coordination of guerrilla operations.
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Ten-year-old leftist guerrilla talks with children wide world
in a provincial town. (u)
in the election. Exiles are unlikely to return and most
guerrillas are unlikely to defect, however, because
they fear reprisals from the left and right. Neverthe-
less, the government hopes that publicity and fair
treatment of participants will result in some defec-
tions. The amnesty probably will be extended beyond
its mid-July deadline
We believe there is only an even chance the election
will be held in November or December. The new
constitution is not likely to be ratified before midsum-
mer and logistic preparations are far behind schedule.
There also are signs of disarray in the major political
parties, only one of which has selected a presidential
candidate. The continued inability of most of the
parties to put the national interest first is underscored
by their inflexible demands for an electoral register
(which theoretically would reduce electoral fraud).
We feel it would be extremely difficult to compile the
register in time for an election this year and that, in
any case, a register would result in a substantially
smaller voter turnout than in the March 1982 elec-
tion.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Increased rightwing sentiment in the armed forces
that delays implementation of the land reform
program, prevents progress on human rights issues,
and benefits ultrarightist parties in the coming
election.
? Vides's inability to revise the Army's static defense
orientation and prod the military into more aggres-
sive tactics.
? Increased coordination between the various guerril-
la factions, leading to an intensification of attacks
nationwide and compelling the military to disperse
its forces to protect scattered targets.
? Provision of indequate forces or civic action re-
sources to implement and expand the nascent pacifi-
cation program.
? Further delays in preparing for the national election
scheduled for the end of the year.
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? Public criticism of President Rios Montt by unas-
signed Army General Echeverria prompted a chain
of events that culminated in a presentation of
demands by junior officers
? In response to these demands, the President re-
moved several allegedly corrupt key advisers and
announced that constituent assembly elections will
be held in July 1984.
? At the same time, the President invoked a State of
Alarm, enabling him to mute civilian critics by
restricting their access to the media
? A Supreme Electoral Tribunal has been established
to oversee newly allowed political activities; some 20
groups are taking advantage of relaxed regulations
to organize political parties
? The insurgents have not taken advantage of the
military's renewed preoccupation with politics and
their attacks remain sporadic
Comment
A rising tide of public criticism of the President-
focusing on his Protestant evangelism, his failure to
set an early date for elections, and alleged corruption
by his key advisers-precipitated a series of major
events in June, including a presentation of demands
by the junior officer corps. Rios Montt weathered the
crisis by making several important concessions and
imposing new restrictions. He retained the backing of
the junior officers by announcing a constituent assem-
bly election timetable and ousting several key advis-
ers. The officer corps generally continues to support
the President because it believes many of his oppo-
nents are serving only their own vested interests and
that there is no one who can adequately replace Rios
Montt. At the same time, the President has temporar-
ily quieted his opponents in the Catholic Church, the
political parties, and the business sector by imposing
press censorship and restrictions on political an-
may render him susceptible to new efforts aimed at
his ouster in the months ahead. If Rios Montt is
deposed, we believe the prospect of the political
system being opened to allow greater popular partici-
pation would be seriously jeopardized.
nouncements
The President has gained time, but his removal of key
advisers, continuing divisiveness within the military,
and strong opposition by rightwing political parties
Although General Echeverria has no personal follow-
ing in the Army and is not himself a threat, his
demand that the government announce elections and
his charge that Rios Montt's evangelical sectarianism
is factionalizing Guatemalan society have energized
the opposition within the military. The apparent
disunity in the military, in turn, has lent strong
encouragement to Rios Montt's civilian opponents,
who also seek an early election date and attack the
President's evangelism and the corruption of his ad-
visers. We believe the rightwing parties will push for
even earlier elections and will continue to agitate for
Some 20 groups are organizing new political parties
or refurbishing old ones in accordance with new 25X1
governmental guidelines. To oversee this political
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activity, which is being permitted to continue under
the State of Alarm, Rios Montt has created an
autonomous Supreme Electoral Tribunal. We believe
that rightwing elements may perceive a conspiracy
between new political parties and the radical left and
once again act to violently repress their civilian
opponents
Although the insurgents have not been able to exploit
the military's renewed preoccupation with politics,
they have recently increased the frequency of their
attacks in several areas, including Guatemala City.
We believe they will continue to emphasize ambushes,
economic sabotage, and urban terrorism in an effort
to regain momentum. Their lack of unity and loss of
internal support networks probably will preclude any
large-scale operations in the near term, however.
Key Indicators To Watch
? A continuing confrontational approach by Rios
Montt toward the political parties, the Catholic
Church, and the private sector.
? The growing perception within the officer corps that
the President will not hold elections or has lost the
confidence of politically important civilian sectors.
? Demands that elections be held earlier than the
timetable set by Rios Montt.
? Increased contacts and cooperation between new
political parties and the radical left.
? A resumption of rightwing death squad activity.
? Renewed large-scale insurgent attacks or operations
in new areas.
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? According to recent public opinion polls, dissatisfac-
tion with economic policies and growing concern
over the insurgent threat have led to a sharp drop in
the regime's popularity.
? Sendero Luminoso (SL) insurgent activity has com-
pelled President Belaunde to impose a temporary
nationwide state of emergency.
? The government's counterinsurgency strategy has
borne mixed results and provoked widespread criti-
cism by the opposition, the military, and the press.
? Economic activity decreased at a nearly 10-percent
annual rate and inflation rose to a 150-percent per
annum rate during the quarter.
? Flooding in the north and a severe drought in the
south have caused over $500 million in damage to
crops and infrastructure
Comment
We do not believe that the insurgent threat or eco-
nomic pressures will result in a coup or other major
political upheaval during the next six months. Also, in
our view, the SL's limited popular appeal and lack of
foreign support severely limit its prospects. The SL's
late May offensive, however, did demonstrate the
insurgents' resilience, underlined the inefficiency of
the civil police who are leading the counterinsurgency
effort, and belied the government's claims that it is
making steady progress. Despite the heavy casualties
the SL has taken in recent months in Ayacucho-the
primary area of insurgent operations-we believe its
political-military apparatus is largely intact. We
share the Peruvian military's assessment that elimi-
nating the SL could take two to three years and prove
costly.
Public support for decisive action against the SL is
widespread and we believe Belaunde will soon order
the military to take total control of counterinsurgency
operations. The security forces' effectiveness, though,
will continue to suffer from deficiencies in equipment,
training, intelligence capabilities, and tactics. We are
concerned that if the. security forces employ more
brutal methods arbitrarily, they will alienate local
communities and possibly elites, and thereby further
delay progress against the SL.
Peru's economy is suffering a severe setback owing to
natural disasters, depressed commodity prices, and
IMF-mandated austerity programs. Unemployment
and food prices are rising; imports declined by
$1 billion in 1982.
Belaunde's popularity has slipped from a,solid major-
ity to about 20 percent, according to recent public
opinion polls. In spite of persistent press rumors we
see no indication of a military coup, however. Al-
though top military leaders continue to defend their
institutional interests, we do not believe they wish to
shoulder the heavy burden of government at this time.
Moreover, Belaunde is catering to the special needs
and interests of the services to ensure their support.F
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Sendero Luminoso slogan:
"Against Hunger-Long Live
The left of center American Popular Revolutionary
Alliance-the major opposition party-is becoming
more popular as the government's prestige declines. It
also is gaining acceptance by the normally suspicious
military and seems to be a responsible critic of the
regime. Leftist parties and the labor movement, on
the other hand, are badly fragmented and remain
passive. They might criticize the government more
aggressively if the economy deteriorates further.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Increased SL activity, especially assassinations of
key officials, more numerous terrorist attacks in
cities and towns, and extension of guerrilla violence
into areas hitherto unaffected.
? Press reports sympathetic to the insurgency.
? Human rights violations by the security forces.
? Increased conflict among and within the security
services over counterinsurgency strategy and tactics.
? Further economic deterioration leading to still
greater unemployment and rising prices.
? Coup plotting by senior military officers in key
command positions.
? Greater unity and criticism of the regime by leftist
parties and labor groups.
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Spafa -
tar
K,) Mediterranean
? A heavy foreign debt-equivalent to two-thirds of
the gross domestic product-has significantly re-
duced the nation's creditworthiness; foreign ex-
change reserves are able to cover less than a week of
imports.
? Deteriorating social services and declining living
standards are causing discontent primarily in urban
areas.
? Rabat remains unwilling to implement austerity
measures recommended by the IMF because of
fears they would increase unemployment and
prompt social unrest.
? The King is becoming isolated owing to his reluc-
tance to entertain criticism and advice on the
economy
? A strike by national railroad workers in May for
better pay and conditions has been temporarily
suspended.
Comment
We believe that the moderate, pro-Western govern-
ment of King Hassan II is secure over the short term.
Islamic fundamentalists and socialists, though, re-
main at odds with the regime, and deteriorating
economic conditions are causing increased unemploy-
ment. We are particularly concerned about the grow-
ing number of university graduates who lack avenues
into the governmental patronage system. Although it
is difficult to determine the impact of the worsening
economy on the average Moroccan, criticism of the
regime's economic policies is growing among orga-
nized labor, students, and the unemployed, and new
urban unrest could result if living conditions deterio-
rate further. We believe that renewed economic
growth and an improvement in social services and
living standards are unlikely in the next several years.
The danger is that in the interim the economically
disgruntled will join with the politically and religious-
. ly disaffected and threaten the regime.
We believe that depressed phosphate earnings and the
need once again to increase food imports will further
aggravate the government's financial difficulties and
compel Rabat to seek new external assistance. The
government's ability to obtain additional loans from
abroad is declining, however. Saudi aid probably will
remain at its current reduced level because of
Riyadh's decreased oil revenues. Rabat also may be
unable to reach agreement with the IMF for new
borrowing in 1983. These pressures could necessitate
a sharp cut in imports, which apart from food have
remained virtually constant since 1978. Ultimately,
we anticipate that Rabat will turn to the United
States for new assistance. If the King fails to obtain
US help or if US Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
deliveries are delayed as a result of the government's
not meeting FMS repayment obligations, which it is
having difficulty doing, the current close ties between
the United States and Morocco could become the
focus of opposition rhetoric and of anger within the
military.
The King's reluctance to entertain criticism and
advice on the economy, together with his preoccupa-
tion with foreign policy, is increasing his isolation as
well as the risk that remedial economic measures will
not be implemented. Although the government is
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considering new austerity measures to deal with its
growing economic problems, Hassan is reluctant to
follow IMF recommendations, particularly a reduc-
tion of food subsidies. A cut in food subsidies in June
1981 sparked bloody riots in Casablanca in which 100
people died. We expect that the security forces, which
strongly support the King, would be able to restore
order in the event of new turmoil, but only after
significant violence.
Communal elections in June passed with little vio-
lence but occasioned an uproar of allegations of
regime interference. Parliamentary elections now
scheduled for 1984 may prove more heated and could
produce more serious confrontations between security
forces and voters.
We do not anticipate that the government will be
compelled by its current economic problems to alter
its Western Sahara strategy in the near term. If
Rabat were to sharply reduce defense spending for the
campaign, however, we believe military morale would
be badly shaken. The military also would be disturbed
by a political settlement of the dispute that, in their
view, conceded too much to the insurgents.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Further signs of economic deterioration, especially
a sharp reduction in food subsidies.
? Spontaneous civil disorder in response to economic
conditions, labor strikes, and student
demonstrations.
? IMF and Saudi responsiveness to Rabat's requests
for greater economic support.
? Anti-US rhetoric by opposition elements angered by
perceived shortfalls in US economic or military
assistance.
? Renewed heavy fighting in Western Sahara, includ-
ing heavier casualties and a lack of battlefield
victories.
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? The regime has made much progress in restoring
political stability and reasserting national authority
in most of the country
? Clerical factionalism and uncertainty about who
will succeed Ayatollah Khomeini continue to com-
plicate the resolution of key political issues.F
? The government is not having much success in
gaining control over independent Islamic revolution-
ary organizations like the Revolutionary Guard and
the semiofficial neighborhood enforcement
Komitehs
? Mounting casualties in the war with Iraq are in-
creasing the population's war weariness.
the past year.
? General economic conditions have improved during.
Comment
Khomeini has made considerable gains in reimposing
political stability and reasserting central government
authority throughout most of the country. Internal
dissidents have been decimated, the Communist
Tudeh Party has been repressed, and the minorities,
including the Kurds, have been rendered a nuisance
rather than a threat. None of the exiled dissident
leaders maintains a significant following in Iran. Only
the military and the Revolutionary Guard could
possibly seize power, but they are internally divided,
poll,.-ally weak, and likely to act only if clerical
factionalism threatens regime stability after Khomei-
ni dies.
The clerics, now burdened with the responsibility for
governing, are split by strong philosophic, personality,
and institutional differences that make compromise
difficult. These divisions and the frequent independ-
ent actions of clerics in and out of the government
hinder efforts to formulate and implement national
policies on a wide range of domestic and external
issues.
Pesiin
in Gull
0 00 Miles U. A. E.
634583 (A02843) 7-83
Most Iranians believe Khomeini favors Ayatollah
Montazeri, but this has not been confirmed. If Kho-
meini maintains his silence, we believe the clerics will
move quickly to name a leadership council of three to
five of their own after he dies. Such a "coalition"
would mask an intense struggle for power. Although
the clerics seem to realize they must work together to
avoid losing control, we believe that, in the absence of
Khomeini's overarching authority, their disputes
could eventually become uncontainable and lead to
anarchy and possibly civil war. If Khomeini were to
die this year, though, we would not expect a quick
unraveling of clerical control.
Lack of battlefield successes and heavy casualties in
the war with Iraq are making for increased grumbling
and reluctance to volunteer for military duty, even
among previously supportive lower class urban work-
ers and rural peasants. We believe that further fail-
ures and casualties could persuade the leadership to
adopt a strategy of attrition to reduce the scale of the
war. Khomeini apparently continues to oppose a
negotiated settlement.
Although several clerics would like to succeed Kho-
meini, none approach his stature. A consensus on a
single candidate is not likely to emerge in our view.
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We expect no remission'in the clerics' loud expres-
sions of continuing hostility toward the United States,
an emotion that they deeply feel and that supports the
regime's domestic standing.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Khomeini's death, although the odds are that he will
remain alive through the next year.
? Increased divisions among the clerics over the war
with Iraq, the succession to Khomeini, and econom-
ic policy.
? A lack of victories and heightened casualties in the
war with Iraq.
? A new major decline in oil prices or a successful
Iraqi attack on major Iranian oil exporting facilities
that threatened the current limited economic recov-
ery.
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South Africa
? The African National Congress (ANC) car bomb
attack against Air Force headquarters in Pretoria
killed 19 eo le and wounded 200; about half were
civilians. _ __
? The Conservative Party, established last year by
disgruntled members of the ruling National Party's
right wing, made a strong showing in rural areas in
four byelections in May.
? The unsolved murder in April of a community
leader protesting proposals to hike rents in a black
township near Durban has sparked continuin local
demonstrations, riots, and related violence.
? Intensified efforts to remove blacks residing illegally
in urban areas, especially in the Western Cape, are
resulting in violent confrontations between security
personnel and shanty dwellers.
? South Africa and its neighbors are suffering the
second year of the worst drought of the century.
Comment
Although no credible challenge to the white-ruled
regime seems likely in the 1980s, a number of devel-
opments are heightening racial tensions and increas-
ing the prospect of greater turmoil and violence. The
Pretoria bombing may signal a new strategy in which
the ANC no longer seeks to avoid harming civilians.
We believe Prime Minister Botha, in addition to
authorizing further military strikes against ANC
targets in neighboring countries, is likely to enact new
internal security measures aimed at ANC members
and their sympathizers, especially activists in the
fledgling black labor movement. But while Botha
seeks to assuage white concerns, we believe he also
will continue to press his proposal for constitutional
reform, which is designed to grant limited rights to
Indians and coloreds. Many Afrikaners fear the pro-
posal could eventually lead to black rule; further
headline-grabbing ANC violence in the near future
would undermine the chance of its approval in the
referendum for whites-only to be held some time in
0200 Kilmeters
0 200 Miles
The byelections, in which Botha's racial proposal was
the main issue, reveal a divided electorate. The results
show that the rightwing Conservative Party has
gained popularity among Afrikaner farmers in rural
areas and that the ruling National Party has gained
support in urban areas. We believe the National Party
now has nothing to fear from the liberal Progressive
Federal Party. In the election campaign the National
Party tailored its speeches to fit each audience. We
believe Botha will adopt the same strategy before the
coming referendum to persuade conservatives that his
proposals do not threaten apartheid and to persuade
liberals and nonwhites that the changes are meaning-
ful.
The government is continuing its crackdown on blacks
residing illegally in urban areas, apparently to allay
right-wing fears. Security personnel have used tear
gas to disperse shanty dwellers, employed bulldozers
to raze the areas, and erected barbed wire barriers to
keep squatters out. The police also are arresting pass
law violators at an unusually high rate.
the next year
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Since the Soweto riots of 1976, however, security
personnel have not normally interfered with peaceful
protests, apparently fearing that heavyhandedness
might spark widespread unrest. Nonetheless, we feel
that any confrontation in the current climate, even
one that begins peacefully, could trigger escalating
violence. In April near Durban, for example, a crowd
of 3,000 blacks, angered by the murder of a protest
leader, marched to the house of a local black official
and political opponent of the slain man and began
throwing rocks. In dispersing the crowd, the police
killed one person and injured over 200, which prompt-
ed scattered violence that continued through May and
June.
We believe that the black population, which already
bears the brunt of inflation and unemployment, may
become increasingly disturbed by additional drought-
related burdens such as crop failures, water shortages,
and power brownouts. For the first time in 20 years
South Africa will import corn, the dietary staple of
the black population and a principal export crop.
Lower domestic production and increased imports
imply higher inflation, already running at 14 percent,
and still greater unemployment. Black unemployment
is currently 25 to 30 percent, as opposed to only 1
percent for whites
Key Indicators To Watch
? Greater unity and nonviolent protests by nonwhite
groups opposed to Botha's new racial proposals.
? Further defections from the ruling party to the
Conservative Party because of opposition to Botha's
reform proposals.
? Terrorist attacks directed specifically against white
civilians.
? Increased numbers of blacks entering urban areas to
escape the effects of the drought.
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Secret
Philippines
? President Marcos is continuing to crack down on
opponents in the Church, the press, and moderate
political parties.
? The armed forces are being restructured to increase
their combat capability and effectiveness against
the Communist insurgents, who have made impor-
tant gains in the past year.
? The United States and the Philippines, in conclud-
ing their review of the Military Bases Agreement in
June, agreed to a $900-million assistance package
for 1985-89.
? Balance-of-payment statistics for the second quarter
show a midyear deficit of $600 million-twice what
the government anticipated.
? Marcos has accepted the recommendation of the
ruling KBL party that emergency austerity meas-
ures be implemented.
? A severe drought continues to plague vast areas of
Mindanao, the Visayas, and parts of Luzon, reduc-
ing export earnings
Comment
Marcos has revised electoral procedures to encourage
the opposition to participate in next year's National
Assembly elections yet continues to take stern action
against moderate political opponents. Besides arrest-
ing prominent politicians and journalists, he is press-
ing libel charges against several reporters and has
compelled a leading Manila daily to fire its editor.
The President also has warned in recent press inter-
views that he might reimpose martial law if the
opposition's "contacts with subversives" do not cease.
Marcos might be justified in his concern about Com-
munist infiltration of moderate political parties. Sev-
eral opposition politicians recently told US Embassy
officials that they have been approached by Commu-
nists who have claimed Communist help could guar-
antee a victory by the opposition in the 1984 elections.
-Cagayan
de Oro
Mindanao
0 200 Kilometers Indonesia
0 260 Miles
Nevertheless, we believe Marcos's moves against
prominent opposition figures will prove counterpro-
ductive. For example, according to US Embassy
officials, the case against Aquilino Pimentel, the
popular Mayor of Cagayan de Oro who was arrested
for subversion in May, is weak.and could embarrass
Marcos, who may have to allow the affair to fade
away. Some 25,000 Pimentel supporters demonstrated
after his arrest.
The US-Philippines base negotiations were completed
without major incident. Leftists were unable to orga-
nize major demonstrations during the review process
because the negotiations were concluded in quiet,
25X1
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informal sessions. We believe Marcos's opponents will
now assert that the agreement supports his heavy-
handed management of domestic politics.
During the past year Communist military operations
have been more sophisticated and larger. Although
the situation in the southern island of Mindanao has
been stabilized since Manila deployed additional units
there, casualties remain high and US Embassy offi-
cials who visited the area in June report that the
guerrillas recently opened a new front. The armed
forces are being reorganized to increase the number of
combat personnel in the field, improve command and
control, and better coordinate intelligence collection.
The military high command also is buying helicopters
to improve troop mobility, creating elite units special-
ly trained in counterinsurgency operations, and easing
the Philippine Constabulary out of such operations
because of its frequent human rights abuses)
Manila's failure to implement economic reforms in-
sisted on by the IMF was strongly criticized by the.
Fund in its midterm review in June. This together
with the increased balance-of-payments deficit and
deteriorating short-term credit standing jolted the
ruling KBL party into instituting emergency austerity
measures and may compel the government to resched-
ule some debts. Several commercial banks already are
refusing to roll over short-term credit lines, and we
anticipate that others will react similarly to the IMF's
criticism.
We believe that austerity is essential if the Marcos
regime is to improve economic performance, alleviate
mounting problems of unemployment and poverty,
and restore public confidence. However, we share the
international financial community's doubts about the
government's commitment to austerity because of its
past hostility to economic discipline. Only recently,
for example, political pressures delayed an 8-percent
peso devaluation and the elimination of fuel subsidies,
according to the US Embassy. In April, the KBL
caucus attacked Prime Minister Virata-a highly
respected economic technocrat who lacks a national
political base-for earlier budget cuts made to satisfy
the IMF. Mrs. Marcos and politicians and business
interests close to the President oppose these cuts
because of their adverse impact on pork-barrel poli-
tics. We believe the attacks on Virata may continue;
Marcos, however, is the sole authority able to dismiss
him, and he has publicly stated that Virata will
remain in office for at least the rest of the year.
Key Indicators To Watch
? Further repression of moderate political party
leaders prior to next year's elections and of news-
papers-such as the Visayan Herald-that support
them.
? An absence of additional electoral reforms aimed at
inducing greater political participation in next
year's elections.
? Insurgent gains notwithstanding the restructuring of
the armed forces.
? A further contraction of short-term credit that
narrows the government's debt management options
and necessitates rescheduling.
? The impact of the drought on exports and thus an
unanticipated need for increased foreign exchange.
? Further attacks on Virata, including a possible no-
confidence vote in the legislature.
D
25X1
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Part 3. Graphic Indicators
Status of Key Indicators
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
O developments of moderate
concern
O developments of serious
concern
Honduras
Panama
Venezuela
Peru
Brazil
Spain
Greece
Turkey
Morocco
Egypt
Pakistan
Nigeria
Somalia
Kenya
Zaire
South Africa
Philippines
Indonesia
Social change/
Economic factors
Opposition activities
External factors
Regime actions and capabilities
conflict
D
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Note: Judgments presented in this chart pertain to individual countries
and should not be used for cross-national comparisons with reference to
individual indicators.
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Secret
3developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend Qdevelopments of moderate
concern
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
r Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
?1?101 1010
41
3,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
IV I
1983
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*developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1982
1983
I II III IV
I II III IV
1 lI III IV
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
Q
0
Opposition activities
External factors
(5
a
(D
Regime actions and capabilities
Q
(a
0
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
0
225
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
'Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
I
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
-2
250
0
0
100 1
1981
IV 1
1982
III IV I
1983
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*developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Exports to OECD Countries
Us S
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
CScales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
O
O
O
O
100 1
1981
III IV I
1982
O
O
O
0
0
01010
O
4
IV I
1983
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Secret
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend O developments of moderate
concern
40
Economicd?e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
100
2.5
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
0
350
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
e Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
100 1
1981
0
?
411
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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?
41
0
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Colombia: Selected Political and Economic Indicators-
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
*developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 111 IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
O
?
?
?
Opposition activities
1
(
i~
External factors
?
?
?
S
S
O
?
i
S
C
Regime actions and capabilities
5
5
5
5
5
5
?
?
i
i
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
500 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
100
4
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
0
3,500
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
0
0
1,500 1
1981
0
III IV I
1982
0
0
40
40
IV I
1983
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0
40
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? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend C) developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II 111 IV
1982
1 II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
~i
i
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
C
O
a
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
C
0
0
0
Economica,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
0
750
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
I
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Political
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend 0 developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
S
9
?
0
0
0
?
0
Economic factors
5
!
5
5
?
5
0
0
Opposition activities
S
S
S
S
?
S
S
S
?
External factors
S
S
?
S
S
?
S
S
S
i
Regime actions and capabilities
0
0
?
0
0
9
0
0
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
4,000
3,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Spain: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend ; 'developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
120
5
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
eScales vary according to differing country conditions.
?
?
?
2,000 1
40
IV I
1982
40
III IV I
1983
32
40
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Secret
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend 0 developments of moderate
concern
)developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
1 11 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
Economic factors
0
0
0
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
I II III IV I II III IV 1 11 III IV
1981 1982 1983
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Turkey: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
1982
1983
I II III IV
I II Ill IV
1 II III IV
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
Opposition activities
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
0
40
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
400 1
1981
III IV I
1982
I
1983
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developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend ( developments of moderate
concern
C developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
?
0
i
Economic factors
Opposition activities
?
?
i
Z
5
External factors
Regime actions and capabilities
M
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
I II III IV I II III IV I II 111 IV
1981 1982 1983
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Egypt: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
*developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend , 'developments of moderate
concern
O developments of serious concern
Economicd.e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
?
4
0
0
?
010
01
I I I
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
600 1
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
Q developments of serious concern
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
e
9.5 9.8 10.1e
Saudi population includes approximately 3 million foreign laborers.
-2
25,000
I
1981
III IV I
1982
4
III IV I
1983
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Iraq: Selected Political and Economic Indicators--
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend 0developments of moderate
concern
.developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economic factors
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
0
0
?
?
0
0
0
?
0
External factors
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?b
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
Economice,f Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Concern is with recent Turkish troop incursion into
Iraq and potential effect on Kurdish minority.
c Population figures based on mid-year census.
d Estimated.
e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
rScales vary according to differing country conditions.
I
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend ;developments of moderate
concern
E developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
al
Opposition activities
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
b
\ j b
Regime actions and capabilities
Is
Is
Economice,f Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Concern is with effects of war with Iraq.
c Population figures based on mid-year census.
d Estimated.
e Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
f Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
1,500
2,500
2,000
1,000
500
I
1981
IV I
1982
IV I
1983
25X1
589890 7-83
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Pakistan: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend O developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
G
0
?
?
0
0
Opposition activities
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
Q
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
Cj
?
?
?
0
?
?
0
0
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
Nigeria: Selected Political and Economic Indicators'
? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend O developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
Regime actions and capabilities
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US S
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II 111 IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
0
?
?
9
Q
0
Economic factors
0
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
Opposition activities
?
?
?
0
O
?
i
?
0
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
A
i
?
?
?
?
?
O
?
?
?
?
0
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
eScales vary according to differing country conditions.
2,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
IV I
1983
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developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
Economic factors
?
Opposition activities
?
S
?
?
?
i
i
i
i
i
External factors
?
?
?
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
-3
800
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
500 1 11
1981
III IV I
1982
IV I
1983
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Kenya: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
0 developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend O developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
1981
I 11 111 IV
1982
1 II III IV
1983
I 11 III IV
Social change/conflict
0
0
0
0
`i
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
(D
?
0
0
0
0
C`,
0
0
Ci
Opposition activities
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
Population (millions)b
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
0-
To-
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
0
200
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
100 1
1981
II III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend 0 developments of moderate
concern
Regime Population ( actions and millions)b capabilities
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
,'developments of serious concern
1981
I II III IV
1982
1 11 III IV
1983
1 II 111 IV
Social change/conflict
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
Economic factors
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
0
?
?
0
0
?
?
?
?
External factors
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
?
0
?
?
?
?
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
0
600
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
200 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Political ? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend 0 developments of moderate
concern
developments of serious concern
Social change/conflict
1981
I 11 III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II 111 IV
0
?'
0
?
?
?
0
Economic factors
?
?
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
S
S
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
?
?
?
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries 3,500
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
1,000 1
1981
IV I
1982
III IV I II III IV
1983
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Philippines: Selected Political and Economic Indicatorsa
developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
O developments of serious concern
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
c Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
1,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
III IV I
1983
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Secret
0 developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
0 developments of serious concern
1981
1 11 III IV
1982
I II III IV
1983
I II III IV
Social change/conflict
(3
a
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economic factors
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Opposition activities
3
(9
C
Q
0
0
0
0
0
0
External factors
3
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Regime actions and capabilities
(3
(3
0
0
0
0
0
0
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
US $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
US $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
7,000
2,000 1
1981
III IV I
1982
IV I
1983
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? developments not of concern,
or not applicable
Legend developments of moderate
concern
0 developments of serious concern
Economicd,e Real per Capita Imports
Us $
Consumer Price Increase
Percent
Exports to OECD Countries
Us $
a Base year is 1975.
b Population figures based on mid-year census.
C Estimated.
d Dashed lines indicate estimated data.
e Scales vary according to differing country conditions.
0
0
0
0
40
0
0
0
0
0
0
4,000
1,500 I II
1981
10
0
0
0
III IV I
1982
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
?
0
0
0
0
III IV I
1983
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Secret
Secret
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