MEMO TO ROBERT AMORY FROM GEORGE C. MCGHEE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80S00003A000100060001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 51
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 18, 1961
• Content Type: MEMO

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
THE COUNSELOR
WAS H I N GTO N
ATTACHMENT
PI~l3g RETURU TO
o/n~/~ txsc~
August 18,,1961
MEI~RANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT Al~RY
Central Intelligence Agency
.The attached paper is proposed for
discussion by the Luncheon Group, Tuesday,
August 22. Flease reserve time for dis-
cussion until 4 P.M.
Attachment;
gaper-entitled: "Guidelines of
US Policy Toward Latin Amer i,ca"
'-~ ATTACHMENT
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This document consists of 50 pages.
~ Copy No. ~_ of 1'00 copies, B.
PLEASE RETURN TO
GUIDELINES QF UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIATT AFRICA
CONTENTS
Para.
I.
STRATEGIC CONCEPT AND OBJECTIVES
A.
Strategic Concept - - - - - - - - - - - -
1
B.
Objectives - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - -
Satisfaction of Basic Human Wants - - ? - ?' ?'`
2
Resistance to Communism and Communist Subarersibn -
3
Vital Role for Latin American Military - - .- --
4
.Growth of Hemispheric Strength - - - - - - -
5
II. LINES OF ACTION
POLITICAL
A. Positive Program to Win Peoples - - - - - -
- Association of U. S. with Progress and Reform` -
Encouraging Democracy - - - -'' - - - - -
Influencing Leaders and Representative Groups -
Forward Action in the Labor Field - - - - -
B. Defense Against Communism - - - y- - - - -
Strengthening Internal Security - - - - - -
Creating Awareness of Communism - - - - - -
Combatting and Restricting Communist Influence -
Sanetions Against Close Bloc Ties - - - - -
Communist Domination of an American Republic -
C. Inter-American Affairs - - - - -
9
9
9
10
12
14
10 14
11 14
12 15
13 17
14 17
Strengthening Hemispheric Solidarity - - - - 15
Maintenance of Peace - - - - - - - - - 16
Threats to Vital U. S. Security Interests - - i7
D. The United Nations - - - - - - - - - - 18
E. Special Problems - - - - - - - - - -
Cuba - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 19
Dominican Republic - - - - - - - - - - 20
Panama -Canal - - - - - ? - - - - - - 21
Inter-American Highway - - - - - - - - - 22
Three Mile Limit - - - - - - - - - - - 23
Elzropean Dependencies - - - - - - - - - 24
F. Understanding by European Allies - - - - - - 25
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II.
LINES OF ACTION (continued)
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
A. Economic and Social .Development - - - - - - -
Participation of United States. - - - - - -
Free Enterprise - - - - - - - - - - -
Sources of Capital - - - - - - - - - -
U. S. Agricultural Surplus - - - - - - - -
Technical Assistance - - - - - - - - - -
Peace Corps - - - - - - - - - - - -
Military Role in Economic Development- - - - -
B., Trading Policies - - - - - - - - - - - -
Measures to Eacpand Trade - -~ - - - - - -
Common Markets and Free Trade Areas - - - - -
Commodity Problem - - =- - - - - - - - -
INFORMATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SCIENTIFIC
A. Informational Support for Policy Implementation -
B. Development of Mutual Cultural Appreciation - -
C. Cooperation in Scientific Field - - - - - - -
MILITARY
26
27
28
29
3O
31
32
33
34
35
36-41
42-4g
49-51
a4
a4
26
~7
~9
29
~0
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31
~~
~1
31
32
3
36
A. Primary ,Military Responsibility of United States -
52-53
37
B. Mission of Latin American Military - - - - - -
5456
37
C. Provision of U. S. Training and Equipment - - -
57-64
3g
D. Security Against Subversion and Guerrilla .Activities
6-5-66
4~
E. Limitation of Armaments -- - - - - - - -
67
42
F. Orientation of Military Toward Civilians,
United States, and Communism - - - - - - -
68-71
43
G. Inter-American Defense Board, Joint Pro,~eets,
and Other Matters - - - - - - - - - - -
72-75
44
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Para. Pane
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Communist Capture of Other American States
IV. RATIONALE
The Pressure for Economic and Social Progress - - - - 78 46
The Power Struggle - - - - - - - - - - - - - 79-$1 46
Trend Toward Neutralism - - - - - - - - - - - - $2 47
Blemishes in the U. S. Image - - - - - - - - - - $3 4$
Favorable Factors - - - - - - - - - - - - - - $4 4$
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CUIp~;LINN;S OF UN'ITI:D STATI i PQI.TCY Tt~WARD I.ATJ~1 AM1~:RICA
I. STRATf~CIC CONCEPT AND QIIJECTIVF~,
A. Strategic Concept.
i. In the grim competition bettyeen the Free k'orld and Communism, Latin
America more than ever before is essential to the security of the United
States. Of the countries which are individually the moat important to
our security, Cuba has been lost for the time being to the Sino-Soviet
Bloc. Two others, Mexico and Brazils are veering toward neutralist
expressions in their search for national identity. In most of Latin
America there is a semi-feudal social order, economic underdevelopment,
an exploding population, political instability. Arising demand for
social justice and a decent living is beginning to sweep through the
masses. The Communists are trying with purpose and skill to direct this
force into violent revolution and turn it against the United States,
Our strategy in this situation is: 1) to lead and assist Latin
America in a grand Alliance for Progress to satisfy basic human wants and
to right old wrongs (cost of the program over ten years is estimated at
$20 billion from United States and other .outside sources, public and
private); 2) to strengthen the Latin Americans' will and capacity to re-
sist Communist subversion, and if possible win their help in isolating,
weakening, and eliminating the Communist beachhead in Cuba; and 3) to
strengthen the inter-American system and cultivate closer relations with
all the Latin American countries and peoples, especially with those key
nations
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nations which appear destined to play an important role in the hemisphere
and in the w orld, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico.
" In this enterprise we moat exert liberal leadership. We must coop-
erate to the fullest with the self-help efforts of countries seeking to
modernize themselves. We must disassociate ourselves f rom reactionary
forces which decline to respond to the needs of the people. We must
influence and help the military to become guardians of constitutional
order and agents of constructive change. We must be patiently understand-
ing of the growing pains of countries which in striving to establish their
national identity are feeling a temporary need to demonstrate their inde-
pendence of us. We must dedicate the resources required for the task.
2. Satisfaction of Basic Hwnan Wants.
a. Satisfaction of the basic aspirations of the peoples of Latin
America for economic improvement and social welfare, and continuing
identification of the United States with this progress.
b. Essential advances toward social justice, in countries where it
is now lacking, by governments able and determined to deal effectively,
and by orderly and peaceful means, with maldistribution of wealth,
inequality of opportunity, and other in~uatices, through such means as
agrarian and tax reform and attention to housing and community facili-
ties, health and education, and neglected human resources.
c. Significant and continuing increases in per capita production, in
stable but dynamic economies where f ree enterprise is welcomed.
d. Long-range
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d. Long-range planning for balanced social and economic development
and internal security needs.
e. Mutually beneficial economic relations among Latin American
countries and between them and the United States and other Free World
countries.
f. Adequate production of, and access b y the United States at prices
which do not fluctuate violently, to Latin American resources and
materials.
Time-frame: It is imperative that significant progress ta~+ard the
satisfaction of basic human wants be made within the next three years.
-~, A substantial degree of realization of this objective should be possi-
ble in the 1960'x.
Resistance to Communism and Communist Subversion.
a. Devbtion to freedom and abhorrence of Communism and all forms of
dictatorship by the peoples of the American Republica.
~. Awareness by governments of the threat of international Communism,
particularly as exemplified by Castroism, and of its capacity for sub-
version or guerrilla action; and determination and ability, individu-
ally and collectively, to defeat it, and to accept and use effectively
U. S. assistance to that end.
c. Evolutionary development of democratic governments supported by
stable political, economic and social institutions compatible with,
though not necessarily identical with, those of the United States.
Time-frame: The evolution toward democracy under even favorable con-
ditions is slow, and in Latin America will be anything but smooth in
the decade ahead. For democracy to have a chance to grow or even to
survive
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survive, effective internal defenses must be built against Castroist-
Communist subversion. This need is pe-ramount and immediate, and
intimately related to it is the need fora dramatic attack on the
problem of social and economic progress referred to in the first
objective.
4. Vital Role for Latin American Military
a. Latin American military leadership believing firmly that the
mdseion of the military includes preservation of democratic constitu-
tional order, maintenance of internal security, a reasonable contri-
bution to collective defense, and, Where possible, a contribution also
to economic and social development.
b. Modification of existing military programs to bring them into
alignment with U. S. objectives and to give the Latin American mili-
tary a sense of a vital and dignified partnership with the United
States in maintaining the security of the hemisphere against threats
Yrom outside and within.
c. Military establishments in Latin America capable of accomplishing
their mission, and no larger than necessary.
Time-frame: This objective calls for an accelerated process of educa-
tion, to be generally completed within three to five years, and kept
fresh thereafter on a continuing basis.
5. Growth of Hemispheric Strength.
a. Friendship, mutual respect and sense of interdependence and hemis-
pheric regional cooperation among governments and peoples of the
American Republics.
b. Development
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b.
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Development of the OAS into an organization sufficiently viable
to achieve effective contributions from all its member states toward
the realization within the hemisphere of peace and security and
political., economic; social, and cultural growth.
c. Fulfillment of Latin American potential to become a significant,
dynamic element in the international. scene.
Time-frame: Greater solidarity of the American Republics, and
strengthening of their regional organization, are a continuing long-
term ob3ective. It may prove not to be achievable, due to internal
stresses (Cuba) and the tendency of some countries (brazil, Mexico)
to follow a more independent line of action in international stfairs.
(See CONTINaHdCIES.)
Ii. LINES QF ACTION
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II. LINF~S OF ACTIQN
(to be applied in each country to the extent
they are pertinent and feasible)
PQLITICAL.
__.__._
A. Positive Programs to Win Peoples.
b. Association of United States with Pro[~ress and Reform. Associate our-
selves actively with the forces which are working to satisfy the desires of
Latin American peoples for higher living standards at levels which are
attainable, acre social justice, and a sense of independe~ national pride.
Demonstrate through means such as the Alliance for Progress that economic
and social progress can be beat achieved in cooperation with the United
States and the Free World.
7. ~hcourapying_Democ, racy. While maintaining correct relationships with
all recognised governments, give special and public encouragement to those
which have a popular base and are making a genuine effort to estaffi ish demo-
cratic institutions. In apportioning U. S. foreign aid, take into account
not only the needs of Latin American countries and their own efforts at
self-help but also their attitudes toward Coauaunism and other forms of
totalitarianism and their past and present attitudes toward the United
States and the Free World. ~ctend no favors or honors to representatives of
governments which act in a manifestly anti-democratic manner without fully
considering the possible political implications of such actions. However,
exercise care not to contribute to the overthrow of pro Western governments,
even those identified as dictatorships, by Castro-Communist elements.
6. Influencing
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8. Influencing Leaders and Representative Groups.
" a. Increase efforts to develop a high sense of civic responsibility
among present and potential political, military, religious, and labor
leaders, journalists, commentators, educators, and others exercising
substantial opinion-forming influence. Try to influence them to ini-
tiate or support accelerated programs of political, economic, and
social development, using democratic processes. Promote close personal
relationships between appropriate Latin American leaders and distin-
guished U. S. leaders.
b. Make special efforts to convince members of the traditional ruling
classes of the wisdom of not only accepting but associating themselves
with the forces of evolutionary change as the best means of averting
revolutions of the Castro type.
g. Keeping in mind lpeal sensitivities and the need for discretion to
prevent such an effort from becoming counter-productive, United States
representatives should be ready and able to discuss with local leaders,
in their awn language, the principles of representative democracy, the
fallacies and shortcomings of Communism, and the re]a tive validity of
the two political and economic systems.
d. Try to develop attitudes favorable to U. S. policy ob3ectives among
.students and intellectuals, including artistic, literary and profes-
sional persons.
e. Encourage and support moderate elements of Leftist, nationalist,
and other reform groups and parties in their aspirations for genuinely
needed reform so that they will be drawn toward us and become an
indigenous
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indigenous grassroots base for resistance to Communist and Castroist
influence. Make them see that the United States does not fear or
resist change but rather welcomes it when it is democratic and
directed to the betterment of the masses. However, do not support
or foster change merely for the sake of change.
f. Maintain contact with elements of the political opposition, if
not Communist, to an extent and a t a level and in a manner which wil].
not strain U. S. relations with the government.
g. In cultivating close personal relations with individuals and
groups described above, take care not to mistake those which are
merely progressive, nationalist or leftist for those which are
Communist, and avoid becoming identified with entrenched, reactionary
elements.
h. Make increased and systematic use of U. S. citisens and business
firms operating a broad, and.of leader and. Point IV grantees, to carry
out the purposes outlined in this paragraph.
i. 1n order to implement the previous portions of this paragraph the
Ambassador should develop a carefully thought-out program, and assign
targets and responsibilities.
~. Give attention in the selection of personnel for service in Latin
America to their ability to contribute to the over-all ob3ectives of
the United States, in addition to their competence in their individual
specialities, in the environment to which they are being sent.
9. Forward
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9. Forward Action in the Labor Field.
a. Make clear, by word and action, that the United States is inter-
ested in cooperating with Latin American countries for the purpose of
increasing educational, health, housing and employment opportunities
of working people; that it accords equal status and respect to
workers as to employers; and that.it recognizes the right of workers
to form unions and negotiate with employers as fundamental to a demo-
cratic society.
b. Within the framework of programs approved 3ointly with the host
Government, assist local trade unions in the development of self-help.
worker projects for housing, school construction, and clinics,-and
cooperative efforts for the provision of food, water, clothing, and
transportation.
c. I+~eourage and assist governments in measures to provide workers
children with educational opportunities in accordance with their
abilities.
d. Make a vailable useful U. S. and other experience in enlightened
human relations between labor and management. Sponsor point training
classes for labor and management, publicizing examples d progressive
management practico in Latin America.
e. Build up technical skills by:
i. Helping Latin American educational institutions to expand
their facilities for teaching technical subjects.
ii. Trying to get U. S. industry and trade union concurrence to
train numbers of Latin Americans in this country side by side
with
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with theme American counterparts in U. S. factories.
iii. It~c9seding among the Peace Corps volunteers men with trades
such as carpentry, bricklaying, cabinet-mtalting, blacksmith work,
and mechanics.
iv. Making available in quantity and in the local language
extensive do-it-yourself information; other technical material on
topics useful to working people, including nutrition and. home
economics, accident prevention in home and factory, gardening,
First aid, personal hygiene, child care, and choosing a trade;
and stories of self-made men.
v_. FY-couraging greater utilization of available technical courses
in military schools in the United States and the Canal Zone.
~. Encourage and assist non-Communist labor organisations. Promote
and support the training of effective labor leaders in the United
States and other countries of the hemisphere to counteract Carmsnanist
infiltration in labor organizations. Encourage and/or conduct labor
information and educational activities designed to teach workers the
purposes and methods of free trade union organization. Assist, as
feasible and appropriate, in the establishment of ]a bor centers for
these and other purposes.
g. Clarify in the minds of the workers that in the U. S. economic
system, although it is commonly called capitalism, most of the great
corporations are owned by the stockholding public, that the Government
intervenes in a regulatory capacity where necessary in the interest of
social justice, and that it engages in enterprises such as the TVA.
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}fake clear also that while we believe in private enterprise as the
best means of providing for mans material need8, we do not approve of
excessive.. profits or of projects that make the rich richer while hold-
ing the wage line for the workers and failing to pass benefits to the
consumers, and we recognize the need for governmental regulatory
action in many areas of the econamly. Explain that we believe in a
substantial role for non-statist ownership because it promotes initia-
tive and gives better assurance that individuals will be compensated
according t o their abilities and their efforts.
h. In the employment of local labor by the U. S. Government, pursue
exemplary labor practices. IIicourage private U. S. employers to
follow similar practices and to develop, by special training, enlight-
ened, progressive and capable managerial and entrepreneurial talent.
i. Assist, as appropriate, the activities of Flee World regional and
international labor organizations and trade secretaries.
B. Defense Against Communism.
10. StrenRtheninQ Internal Security. Strengthen the internal capabilities
of Latin American countries, and especially the weak countries of the
Caribbean area, for defense against subversion, civil disorders, guerrilla
activities, and other Communist and Castroist take-over tactics. (See also
paragraphs 61a and 65. )
11. Creati~Awareness of Communism.
a. Through a vigorous information program
i. Stress the effects of Communist tyranny on the individual.
ii. Dnphasize the fallacies in Communist doctrine.
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ist activities;
ii. Adoption of measures to prevent the manipulation of student,
labor, and other legitimate organizations by international
Communism;
iii. Restriction on the entry, production, and dissemination of
Communist and Bloc information and propaganda material;
iv. Restriction on the admission of Communists into their
territory;
v. Limitation
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b.
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iii. k~cpose, as far as possible without attribution to the U. S .
Government, the activities of local Communist and Castroist
parties and of the Sino-Soviet bloc as they rely to to Latin
America.
See that our field representatives have a sufficient knowledge of
Communist doctrine and techniques. to identify them, however disguised,
and denouncethem, but that they are equally quick to recognize and
denounce the misuse of the charge of Communism. Scrupulously avoid
labeling as Communism things that are not Communism.
12. Combat_tintt and Restricting Communist Influence.
a. g-courage the development and coordination of indigenous anti- ~
Communist and anti-Castroist movements.
b. To the extent that our effort holds promise of positive results
without becoming counter-productive, encourage action by the other
American Republics against Sino-Soviet bloc influence and Communist-
Castroist subversion by such measures as:
i. Adoption and enforcement of adequate laws to control Commun-
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v_. I.i.mitation of trips by Latin American nationals to ffioc
countries and to Communist international-front nraetings and adop-
tion of adequate measures to brief and otherwise influence those
non-Communist individuals or groups with whose trips the local
government does not feel it can interfere.
vi. Discouragement of the opening of new diplomatic and consular
establishments by bloc countries; limitation on the size of the
staffs and the activities of existing establishments; expulsion and
exposure of bloc and Castroist mission personnel engaged in unde-
sirable activities; and, when appropriate, breach in diplomatic
relations.
vim,. Prevention of direct or indirect trade in strategic materials
with the Sino-Soviet bloc and Cuba.
y~~j~,. Prevention of other trade with the bloc at levels or in
fields or on terms which would create damaging dependence on the
bloc or result in a significant bloc influence over the interna-
tional actions of the country. (F~ccept for these limitations, the
United States should normally refrain from discouraging Latin
American countries from selling non-strategic commodities to the
bloc, but might point out as opportunity offers that when the bloc
trades, it is often for purposes of political gain.)
ix. Refection of bloc aid and exclusion of bloc specialists and
technicians in sensitive areas.
c. F~cchange information with Latin American Governments on local and
international Communist and Castroist activities.
S1.CRF T
d. Propose
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d. Propose creation of a committee that might be called a Committee
for Defense of Freedom (similar to the Advisory Committee on Political
Defense of -World War II) to assist governments to identify, expose,
and put .into effect measures against threats to constitutional order
Yrom Castroist-Commmunist sources.
e. Obtain maximum recognition by .those States which approved Resolu-
tion 32 of the Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogota and/or Reso-
lution 93 of the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas and the
Declaration of San Josg of 1960 of their continuing responsibilities
under these articles with respect t o Communism.
13. Sanctions Against Close Bloc Ties. If an American State should estab-
lish with the Sino-Soviet bloc close ties of such a nature as materially to
threaten the peace, security, or welfare of the United States or the Hemis-
phere, be prepared to diminish or suspend governmental economic and finan-
cial cooperation with that country and to take any positive political,
economic or other actions deemed appropriate.
11a. Communist Domination of an American Republic. In the event any Ameri-
can State should come under the domination of Communism, seek maximum
possible OAS action under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro, within the limita-
tions imposed by the United Nations Charter, to remove or reduce the threat
to the security of the Hemisphere. Unilateral action should be considered
by the United States if effective multilateral remedies are not forthcoming
promptly and should be undertaken if it is determined by the,President that
such action is so important to the national interest as to over-ride limit-
ing international commitments.
C. Inter-American
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C. Inter-American Affairs.
15. StrenRtheni.n~ Hemispheric Solidarity. Strengthen hemispheric solidar-
ity by:
a. Providing effective U. S. leadership for the hemisphere, including
decisiveness with respect to Latin American problems and occasional
shows of strength.
b. Demonstrating our intention to live up to all our inter-American
commitments, including the commitment of non-intervention, except as
intervention may be determined by the President to be indispensable in
the national interest. (See paragraph 14.)
c. Strongly supporting the OAS, utilizing it as an important means'of
achieving inter-American objectives and a s a mayor forum for multi-
lateral discussions of questions affecting the hemisphere, realistic-
a11y recognizing but constantly endeavoring to overcome its limitations
as an effective instrument for ma3or collective action.
d. Stimulating as may be required Latin American governments and dele-
gations to discharge the responsibilities imposed upon them by member-
ship in the OAS, the United Nations, and other international organiza-
tions.
e. Working with other members of the OAS to develop and maintain
practicable Secretariat action programs in economic and social affairs,
cultural relations, technical assistance, and the development of
science, and to bring about adequate administration of?the Pan American
Union activities, as well as coordination of these with other similar
progra~-s both bilateral and multilateral.
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f. Providing
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f. Providing Latin American countries with inforrastion to increase
their awareness of the security and other inter-relationships of the
Western Hemisphere with other areas of the Free World.
~. Consulting through diplomatic channels with all Latin American
States, wherever possible, before, taking actions which w ill affect
them or for which we wish their. support, giving special attention to
key States such as Brazil, A~exico, and Argentina and including them
in any plan for diaelnsure of selected semi-confidential information
that may be adopted with respect to count~.a?ies which the United States
is especially desirous of cultivating.
h. Bringing Canada (and, when it gains full autano~y in foreign
affairs, The West Indies} into closer relationship with the inter-
American system, including membership in the OAS.
i. Unofficially encouraging, but without ourselves entering into, an
inter-American organitzation of democratic political parties that
believe basica].].y as we do.
~,. Stimulating greater collective military solidarity through the
us$ of the It~ter,American Defense hoard. `
76. t~laintenance of Peace. `Fake all practicable measures in accordance
with t3AS principles and procedures to prevent ax~aed conflicts between
States in the Western Hemisphere and to promote the resolution of disputes
between or among American States.
a. encourage and support actions by the OAS to solve disputes
between American States pesoeably.
b. Seek
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~,. Seek to prevent boundary and territorial disputes from developing
into threats to the peace. Attempt to have the OAS as a whole,
rather than specific member stator, accept responsibility for the
resolution of boundary problems and the execution of settlement or
guarantee arrangements, when the parties concerned are unable to
arrive at a mutually satisfactory settlement.
c. Continue t o urge that the members of the OAS resort in the first
instance to the OAS rather than!to the United Nations Security
Council with respect to diaputee~.or other threats to peace arising
among the American Republica. Oppose efforts of the Soviet bloc to
have the Security Council approve or disapprove the actions of the
r
OAS, under the general provisions of the UN charter.
17. Threats to Vital U. S. Seeurit~- Interests. In situations where the
peaco of the Hemisphere fa threatened, or where there are serious threats
from within the Hemisphere to vital U. S. security interests, seek reme-
dial action through the inter-American system, to the extent possible.
In situations involving a?direct threat to vital U. S. interests where
effective remedial action cannot be obtained multilaterally, take appro-
priate unilateral action as indicated in paragraph ty.
D. The United Nations.
18. Continue to urge friendly Latin American states t o support the United
States position on mayor issues in the United Nations while, at the same
time, recognizing that special circumstances or a desire not to appear to
be a United States satellite will result in some Latin American UN members
sometimes
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sometimes adopting different positions from us on individual items. We
should actively but discreetly discourage Brazil, Mexico, and other Latin.
American states, as may be necessary, from identifying themselves as
members of the so-called uncommitted or neutral groupings in the United
Nations. (See also paragraphs 14, 15d and ibc.)
E. Special Problems.
a. Seek by all appropriate means, including all feasible measures in
the OAS, to weaken, isolate, and promote the downfall of the Castro-
Communiat dictatorship.
b. Establish, preferably within the framework of the OAS, on a
bilateral basis which might later be made multilateral, Caribbean
Security arrangements to defeat possible attempts by the Castro
regime to supply arms or men for guerrilla actions against govern-
ments of the area.
c. Be alert to and take advantage oY any circumstances which would
permit the United States to intervene forcefully to prevent a Commun-
ist take-over of a Latin American country.
20. .Dominican Republic. Apply pressure and persuasion, unilaterally and
through the OAS, on the Government oY the Dominican Republic to bring
about the restoration of full civil rights in that country, the preparation
and carrying out of free and open elections, and the elimination oY all
repressive vestiges of the Trujillo dictatorship. Encourage responsible,
moderate opposition groups to seek fulfilLnent oY their political aspira-
tions through elections and not through revolution. Be alert to forestall,
through
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through assistance to the Government or by direct efforc~ts if necessary,
preferably in conjunction with Venezuela and Colombia, any attempt at a
take-over of the country, from without or within, by Castro-Comanuniat
elements or other elempnta hostile to the United States and the Free
World.
21. Panama Canal. Emphasize as suitable opportunity offers the impor-
tance to Latin American countries of the Panama Canal and of its opera-
tion by the United States. Reduce ground for possible Latin American
criticism of the U. S. presence in Panama by removing so far ae possible
sources of friction between Panama and the United States. Seek when the
proper time comes to develop attitudes throughout Latin America, includ-
ing Panama, that would be favorable to U. S. construction and U. S.
participation in the operation of a sea-level successor to the present
canal, in Panama or elsewhere, by 1980, and help Panama before then to
becomo less dependent on Canal revenues by stimulating the growth of
Panama's economy and social institutions. For more specific guidance,
see "C~uidelinea of U. S. Policy toward Panama and a Flrture Inter-Oceanic
Canal in the Isthmian Region".
22. Inter-American Hiahwav. Aggressively support legislation to provide
funds on the 2/3 - 1/3 basis to complete the surfacing of the Highway in
the shortest possible time. Encourage the establishment of a maintenance
authority to maintain the entire Highway; the signing of the Commercial
Hus and amuck Agreement to increase cortamercial usage; and the provision,
by the various countries, of tourist facilities along the Highway to
promote the flow of tourist traffic.
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23? Three Milo Limit. Unless and until other criteria are accepted,
refrain from giving recognition to claims by Latin American governments to
sovereignty over territorial waters beyond the three-mile limit.
24? European Dependencies. ,]7-courage acceptance and implementation by
the interested Ek-ropean States of the principle that dependent peoples in
this Hemisphere should progress by orderly processes toward an appropriate
form of self-government. Encourage acceptance by the Latin American
States of the fact that meaningful progress toward self-government is being
made in those areas which have not attained that status. To all parties
concerned stress our belief that any such areas accorded full independence
should be economically viable. If any disputes between American and non-
American States over dependent territories cannot be settled by direct nego-
tiation, encourage peaceful settlemegt by other methods. Keep under close
observation the problem of Communist penetration developing in British
Guiana.
E. Understanding by Ehropean Allies.
25. Endeavor to obtain understanding of our policies t award Latin America,
particularly among our mayor European allies. Seek the cooperation of
other countries, as needed, in our implementation of these policies.
ECONOMIC
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ECONOMIC ANll SOCIAL
A. Economic and Social ll~avelopment.
26. garticipntion of United States. Implementing the principles enuncir
ated in the Act of Bogotg and in the President's Alliance for Progress
program, but taking care not to in3ure national pride or weaken a country's
moral fiber, and not to stimulate demands which we would be unable to
satisfy, strongly assist.I.atin American states which are genuinely striving
toward economic and social progress.
a. Urge and assist all countries to establish over-all long-term
development plans that aim at the best utilization of available
investment resources for development purposes, guarantee social ae
well as economic advancement for the masses, balance rural and urban
development, base the early stage of their industrial development for
the most part on the processing of local primary products and on-the
simpler manufactures that can be made with a minimum of capital and
technical know-how, and avoid ostentatious show projects which con-
tribute prestige to political incumbents but little to economic
advancement of the masses. See that plans for developmental expendi-
tures take into account also the financial requirements for adequate
internal and external security.
b. Give priority help, working with the appropriate regional organi-
sations, especially during the next ten years, to Iatin American
efforts toward improvement in health and education, reform of tax
systems and administration, housing improvement, better and more
equitable land utilization, construction of roads and other public
facilities
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facilities, establishment of productive enterprises, and better dis-
tribution of income. Include some selected programs of high visi-
bility and popular-impact.
c. Devote special attention, and allocate a substantial part of U. S.
financial and technical aid, to rural areas. Associate the United
States with the aspirations and prcB ress of subsistence Indian and
campesino groups, and urge governments to integrate them into the body
politic and the market economy through emphasis on both social and
economic development programs in rural areas.
d. Show special attention also to the needs of small countries, which
are less able than large countries to attract private investment, and
where the impact of our help on the total economy can be relatively
high.
e. Stimulate the establishment and growth of honestly and competently
administered self-sustaining economic institutions, divorced from
political pressures.
f. Make U. S. financial aid conditional on the adoption of self-help
policies which will also accelerate the development program, and be
prepared to halt major financial assistance to governments which are
unwilling to make minimum feasible progress in solving basic socio-
economic imbalances.
g. Persuade Latin American Governments that they should not only
orientate their economic plans and projects toward assisting the mass
of the people but that they should explain to the people how these
plans
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plans and pro3ects are going to be of concrete help to the most
humble citizen.
27. I~ee Enterprise. Publicize the contribution of U. S. investments to
the Latin American economy and at the same time seek to reform and improve,
as needed, the practices and postures of U. S. business operating in Latin
America. Encourage the Latin American nations to:
a. Base their economies on a system of progressive free enterprise
adapted to local conditions, and create a climate conducive to respon-
sable private investment, domestic and foreign. American and other
foreign private investment going into Latin America should be urged to
seek and accept the participation of local investment funds and
responsible local participation in policy formation and management.
b. Promote a business philosophy of high-volume, low-unit profit to
replace the present preference for low-volume, high-unit profit.
c. Develop mechanisms appropriate t o local conditions to control
abuses of the free enterprise system through monopoly and other
restrictive trade practiceso
d. Develop with government capital and entrepreneurship those service
enterprises and industries which are important to the economy but are
neglected by private investors even though the climate is generally
conducive to private investment. Offer any technical assistance
needed to ensure that these enterprises are run on an efficient basis
and encourage public disclosure of accounts.
2$. Sources
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28. Sources of Capital. ~
a. Urge and help governments to take all steps possible to encourage
the ma~dmum supply of capital from domestic sources.
b. Give technical and financial assistance for the development of
savings institutions such as savings and loan associations, credit
unions, and postal savings systems, Advise on tax structures which
will encourage savings and investment through tax credits and ade-
quate provision for depreciation allowanceso
c. Encourage Latin American countries to look to private capital and
international regional lending institutions as mayor sources of
external capital for development, negotiating whenever needed and
feasible investment guarantee agreements, Treaties of Friendship,
Commerce and Navigatione and tax agreements designed to reduce obsta-
cles to international trade and investment and to give. recognition
to tax incentives offered by Latin American countries.
d. Be prepared to extend public loans, including "soft" loans if
necessary, which are consistent with relevant Ua S. loan policy con-
siderations, to increase the flow of capital available for Latin
American economic developmento
e. Be
~ The $20 billion of external resources which the Uo S. Delegation at
Punta del Este estimated would be required and available to implement the
Alliance for Progress can be broken down roughly as follows, on an annual
basis:
From Uo So Government funds . o 0 0 0 0 0 . . . $1005 billion
From international lending institutions . o o . 030.
From Western Europe and Japan o . . o . . . . o .30
From private Uo Se and other foreign investment .35
sEC~r
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e. Be prepared to provide financial assistance for balance of pay-
meats, or less frequently, budgetary purposes, when such problems are
caused by conditions xholly or partially beyond the control of the
country concerned, or by effective and feasible development programs
the magnitude of which is not excessively large. Assistance of this
tape should be temporary and the country concerned should be expected
to take such reasonable steps as may be necessary to utilise domestic
resources to the ~ayi~3~ feasible extent, and to remove the need for
special external assistance of this typeo Such financial assistance
and domestic measures should be designed to prevent interruption or
unwarranted scaling down of an effective and feasible development
program.
f. As necessary, assist Latin American governments and autonomous
agencies to develop loan applications to international institutions
for credits consistent with the ;~?an poli~.es of these institutions,
and facilitate as appropriate their favorable consideration.
g. Supp?rt efforts, including those by international lending insti-
tutions, to bring about desirable financial sad economic reforas
such as the avoidance of inflation, establishment of realistic
exchange rates, currency convertibility and an adequate-.and equitable
system of taxation.
h. Utilize the facilities of the OAS where possible and feasible in
conjunction with the Inter-American Bank and ECLA for the purpose of
assisting Latin American countries in development planning and with
preparation and engineering of development projects.
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i. TQ
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i. To the extent that it is in the best interest of the United States,
encourage other Free World countries to provide capital and technical
assistance to Latin America.
29. U. S. Agricultural Surplus. Negotiate with Latin American governments
P. L. 1~$0 sales and/or grants of surplus U. S. agricultural commodities
where ap}~ropriate, avoiding to the maximum extent practicable detracting
from the ability of other Latin American countries to market their own
exportable produce in those countries. Step up 'Food-for-Peaee~~ emergency
programs, help establish food reserves i.n areas of recurrent drought, pro-
vide school lunches, and offer feed grains for use in rural development.
30. Technical Assistance. Expand and improve technical cooperation and
be prepared to furnish it on a long term basis. Give assistance in formu-
lating development plans and integrate U. S. technical assistance in these
plans. Technical aid to rural areas should be rapidly expanded, including
help in developing widespread rural extension services, support for inter-
mediate schools teaching elementary farming methods, and programs to
improve agricultural sciences in universities and other existing schools.
a. Give technical help in the development of a sound civil service
structure. Urge all countries to establish a non-political civil
service and to placd the vast majority of government jobs under this
system with competitive recruitment based on examination and tenure
based on work performance.
b. Provide technical assistance for projects designed to increase
export earnings, including projects in such fields as standards,
processing,
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proceseYng, packaging, marketing, research in product utilization,
and development of export financing institutions.
c. For the development of technical skills see paragraph 9.e.
31. Peace Corps. Utilize the Peace Corps to the maximum extent found to
~, .
be beneficial and feasible in improving economic and social conditions,
particularly in rural areas, and in getting elementary knoxledae to the `,
population. Concentrate on the creation of bonds of understanding and
friendship betxeen the Peace Corps Volunteers and the peoples among xhom
they live and work, and on the cooperative "counterparts aspects of Peace
Corps projects, i.e., the two xay street approach.
32. Military Role in Economic Development.
a. Encourage the use in peacetime of selected Latin American mili-
ersonnel,
tary~quip~ment, and dual purpose military units (including military
air transport) in economic and social development projects which
would not interfere with unit capability or with the missions of the
Latin American Military Forces.
b. Assist the Latin American military to utilize the conscription
period to proeide some education in literacy, civics,. hygiene, and
agricultural and technical skills.
c. courage the formation and training of dual purpose military
units which could also be used in economic development gro~ects.
d. Promote the participation of the military in literacy campaigns
for the people.
e. See paragraph 9 e.v_.
B. Trading
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B. Trading Policies.
33. Measures to Eland Trade.
a. Make every effort to maintain stable, long-term trading policies,
and avoid restrictive practices which adversely affect Latin American
exports.
34? Common Markets and Free Trade Areas.
a. Encourage and endorse the establishment of customs unions or
Pree trade areas in Latin America which conform to GATT criteria.
b. Endeavor to assure that common markets and free trade areas out-
side Latin America, consistent with the principles and provisions of
GATT, contribute to the expansion of world trade, including that of
Latin America.
35? Commodity Problem.
a. Cooperate in case-by-case examinations of serious commodity
market problems, and seek cooperative, practical methods of bringing
an end to the pattern of violent changes in commodity prices, of
expanding market opportunities for the less developed countries of
Latin America to increase their volume of trade, and of encouraging
the development of the first stages of processing the raw materials.
b. Encourage and assist sound programs aimed at diversification of
production, conservation of soil and scarce resources, and expansion
of internal consumption.
INF08IYIIATIOMAL
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INFORMATIONAL, CULTURAL AND SCIIIdTIFIC
A. Informational Support for Policy Implementation
36. Develop and carry forward vigorous informational programs in support
of our foreign policy objectives in Latin America.
37. 1Kake more extensive use of indigenous Latin American literary and
artistic talents in our informational program.
38. Increase informational activities designed to:
a. Present the United States as a constructive force cooperating
with Latin America through the Alliance for Progress toward the
achievement of a greater measure of political, economic, and social
progress for the benefit of the individual. As an integral part of
this activity, promote greater awareness and acceptance by Latin
Americans of the principle of self-help.
b. Expose, to the extent possible through indirect means, the
Communist conspiracy, showing particularly how it seeks to subjugate
the hemisphere through its Cuban beachhead. In this context,
portray the true nature of Castro's totalitarian dictatorship, its
betrayal of the revolution that brought Castro to power, its
suppression of basic human liberties, its departure from the ideals
of Western civilization and especially from the democratic concept
that government rests on the consent of the governed, its blighting
effects on the Cuban economy, its atrocities, and its threat through
subservience to the Sino-Soviet bloc to the free institutions and
countries of the Western Hemisphere.
39. By
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$Y every appropriate means a t our command promote and encourage the
development of a free press, financially strong enough to resist
political pressures.
40. Eadeavor to improve through propaganda the national image of the
United States in Latin America, emphasizing positive qualities but bear-
ing in mind complaints against us like those listed in paragraph 82.
41. Make our utterances and our actions both reflect the genuine affec-
tion we feel toward Latin America and our sincere desire to be helpful.
B. Develownent of Mutual Cultural Appreciation.
42. Seek wider use of regular cultural activities (binational centers),
exhibits, presentations, book translations, information centers, exchanges
of persons, etc.) to strengthen bonds of mutual understanding and respect
within the Americas.
k3. Make available, on a mass basis and at give-away prices, books in
local languages by American and other authors that explain the concepts, ~~
ideals, and methods of democracy. - ?``?. Q `?''~"? '~ `~~"~
~.
44.
American students selected for their ability to propagate democracy,
and brief them thoroughly on the situations they will encounter in
the university of their choice. Finance this program through
student loans, to the extent possible.
Maximize exchanges of professors, teachers, and student leaders.
a. Acquaint visiting students with our democratic institutions and
processes, and put them in the hands of persons who can skilfully
promote the objectives of democracy.
b. Increase the enrollment in Latin American universities of
c. Recruit
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c. Recruit Cuban students in the United States who are known for
their anti-Castro, pro-U. S. convictions and their ability t?
? advocate then>4, and arrange for their enrollment in Latin American
universities where their talents are needed to combat Castroist
influences. Approach U. S. business firms for seholar~hips for
this purpose.
a. Maintain contact with Latin American students after their
return to their respective countries to keep fresh their favorable
impressi?ns of and interest in the United States as they increase
in the 1?eal influence they wield.
e. Eacourage universities in the United States and Latin America
to arrange and Finance professor and student exchange programs of
their own.
45? a. Seek, through technical assistance and other appropriate
programs, to help establish, improve and assist Latin American
educational institutions, especially normal schools, universities,
graduate schools, and research institutions, with special emphasis
on more full-time students and faculty in higher education, includ-
ing technical and scientific education, greater faculty control of
universities, higher teaching standards, higher educational per-
formance standards, more student discipline and leas direct student
political activity, use of new educational techniquea, more emphasis
on the social sciences, and more practical. and scientific education
including more lab work and greater use of the problem-solving and
case study methods.
b. Fhcourage
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~. Encourage American higher educational institutions to interest
themselves in Latin America and to cooperate in programs to imple-
ment the preceding paragraphs. ,
c. Provide substantial assistance to Latin American universities
in the form of professors, b?oks, etc., that can be used to teach
the positive achievements and possibilities of democracy. In
granting equipment tm Latin American universities, endeavor to
assure that changes in teaching methods needed for the utilization
of this assistance are made.
d. Consider assigning members of the Peace Corps wh? have a good
background in our history, government, etc., to help as teaching
assistants, library aides, and in other roles in Latin Americas
universities and possibly also in binational centers.
46. Encourage Latin American countries to extend educati?nal opportu-
cities at the pre-literate and primary level to as large a part of the
population as available resources permit.
47. In planning and carrying out educational, cultural, and scientific
programs, take into consideration that through such programs Latin
Americans may achieve a sense of progress that will contribute to
political stability and counterbalance to some extent the relatively
sl?wer rate of progress in the per capita income field.
48. Enhance U. S. prestige by promoting the 1?cal presentation of well-
chosen American cultural and sports attractions, both those sponsored
by private initiative and those financed by the President's Fund, and
encourage similar presentations by other Free World countries.
C. Cooperation
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C. Cooperation in Scientific Field.
49. Carry out the President's invitation to Latin American scientists
to work with U. S. scientists in new projects in fields such as medi-
cine, agriculture, physics and astronomy. Strengthen cooperation
between universities and laboratories. in the Americas.
50. ~pand science s#~d teacher training programs to include Latin
American teachers, and assist in establishing such programs in other
American countries. Make available to Latin Americans new teaching
materials irs physics, chemistry, biology and mathematics; see that
textbooks are adequately translated.
51. Emphasize to the Latin American public, governmental authorities
and scientists the non-military character and objectives of U. S.
space programs, in order to obtain Latin American cooperation, includ-
ing the giant of facilities required for the implementation of such
programs.
MILITARY
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MILITARY
A. Primers Militar9 Responsibility of United States.
52. Assume primary responsibility for military operations in the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans and the Caribbean Sea, including the sea and air
approaches to the Panama Canal. Encourage acceptance of the concept that
the United States has primary responsibility for the defense of Latin
America against external attack, that the role of the Latin American
nations in this mission should be de-emphasized, and that the internal
security mission of Latin American nations should be accorded increased
emphasis.
53. Maintain the United States as the predominant foreign military
influence in Latin America and seek, in our relations with the states
concerned, the acceptance of U. S. leadership in military operations
throughout the area and contiguous waters. Take action, as necessary,
including military action, to insure the continued availability to the
United States of bases and bgse rights in Latin America that are con-
sidered vital to the security of the United States.
B. Mission of Latin American Militar9.
54? Encourage acceptance and fulfillment of the concept that each of
the Latin American countries is responsible for contributing to the
defense of the hemisphere by:
a. Maintaining security against the communist-Castro threat of
violence and subversion, including guerrilla warfare, and the
- - movement
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movement of armaments and men clandestinely across land, sea and air
borders for subversive purposes.
b. Maintaining security, against overt external aggression, of
their ports and coastal waters, bases and strategic areas within
their territories, but placing maYimr~m reliance on the $io Treaty
and U. S. military power to deter or counter such aggression.
c. Contributing to over-all hemispheric defense capabilities in
adjacent areas of the Caribbean Sea and the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans, e.g. anti-submarine warfare, patrol harbor defense, and
related functions.
d. Contributing patrol or combat forces, or other feasible assist-
ance, for any Caribbean Security arrangements that may be negotiated
and for implementing any OAS decision that collective military
action be taken to maintain the peace and security of the hemisphere.
55? Review the bilateral agreements and defense plans and when
politically feasible bring them into consonance with the provisions
of paragraph Sk.
56. When called for by the UN, Latin American countries should be
encouraged to contribute, out of the military resources they main-
tain for other purposes, at least token military assistance for
extra-continental defense or police actions.
C. Provision of U. S. Training and Epuipment.
57. a. Make available to Latin American countries, on a grant basis, if
necessary, the training and minimum military equipment necessary to
assist
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assist them to carry .out the missions described in paragraph~;54,
according first priority to the provision of assistance required to
perform the role described in 54?a_? To this end continue to appose
Congressional restrictions on the provision of assistance of the
type described in 54.a, and when politically feasible rescind those
portions of our MAP bilaterals which prohibit U. S. materiel being
used for internal defense purposes.
b. If participation of Latin American military units is required
and provided in future extra-continental defense actions (e.g. Korea),
be prepared to assist in the provision of logistical support to such
units.
58. Discourage Latin American governments from purchasing military equip-
ment not essential to the missions in paragraph 54. However, if a Latin
American government cannot be dissuaded from purchasing unneeded military
equipment, and if it is essential for U. S. political interests, make
additional equipment available on a cash, credit or, under extraordinary
circumstances, grant basis, if appropriate.
59. In order to be in a position effectively to supply military equipment
on a reimbursable basis in accordance with 57 and ~ above, make equipment
available to Latin American. countries on terms which insofar as feasible
are sufficiently favorable to encourage the Latin American governments to
obtain such equipment from the United States rather than from another
source.
60. Encourage, to the ~paximum extent consistent with the needs and capa-
bilities of each Latin American nation, the standardization along U. S.
lines
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lines of military .doctrine, unit organization and training. Except when
it will create undue demand on the United States seek, in the interests:.
of standardization as well as for other reasons, to discourage purchases
by Latin American governments of military equipment from other countries,
primarily by assuring the Latin American countries that we will endeavor
to fill their essential requirements expeditiously and on reasonable
terms. Where appropriate, seek to dissuade other Free World countries
from selling Latin American countries military equipment.
61. Continue, and establish where appropriate, military training
missions in .Latin American countries, countering any trend toward the
establishment of military missions, or agencies or individuals with a
similar function; other than those of other members of the OAS loyal to
the principles of the Organization. Assign to U. S. MAAGS and military
missions personnel qualified to assist the host country in developing a
capability to perform th4e missions described in paragraph 54. (See also
paragraph g.,~.
62. Seek by all feasible means to discourage or prevent the acquisition
of military equipment or training by an American state from Communist
governments, and to develop a conviction that military .collaboration,
including military purchases, by any of the American states with Commun-
ist nations would be a serious hazard to the security of the hemisphere
and would jeopardize the continuance of U. S. military aid.
63. Continue a program of timely combined military exercises, confer-
ences and exchange of visits involving U. S. and selected Latin American
military forces and personnel.
64. Provide
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64. Provide adequate quotas for qualified personnel for training in
U. S. armed forces schools and t raining centers, especially training
required by Latin Americans for the performance of the mission described
in paragraph Sk. Encourage Latin American states to fill their author-
ized quotas at the three Service Academies.
D. Security Against Subversion and Guerrilla Activities.
65. a. As a matter of high importance and priority, strengthen the
capabilities of military and police forces to maintain internal
security against comeiunist-supported attempts to overthrow Latin
American governments from within by such means as subversion and
guerrilla activities.
b. l~courage the development of civilian police forces, independent
of the military, with a strong esprit de corps and adequate training
in the techniques of combatting subversion.
c. The activities of all U. S. Departments, and components thereof,
which are concerned w ith the problem of internal security 25X1
should be fully coordinated at the 25X1
Gpuntry Team and Washington levels.
66. II~courage Latin American countries to agree to the creation of an
inter-American police and patrol force and/or Caribbean Security
arrangements (see 19.b.) within the framework of, or consistent with,
the Rio Treaty, recognizing that the United States will have t o pro-
vide the principal share of any such force.
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E. Limitation of Armaments.
67. a. Encourage and stimulate Latin American initiatives designed to
limit armaments unrelated to the type of threat they may reasonably
anticipate, and seek to remove or reduce frictions and rivalries
that might be used as pretexts for the acquisition or maintenance
of arms in excess of the levels and not of a type required for the
missions described in paragraph 54?
b. Discourage Latin American governments from seeking to purchase
from U. S. or other sources military equipment not essential to the
missions described in .paragraph 54,, If a country cannot be dis-
suaded frc?n purchasing equipment regarded as unnecessary by the
United States, consider the desirability of offering it for sale at
competitive prices, taking into account:
i. Whether failure to procure U. S. equipment would likely
result in procurement from the Sino-Soviet bloc.
ii. Whether furnishing U. S. equipment would stimulate
national rivalries and provoke valid charges that the United
States had contributed to an arms race.
. Tdhether the ill will created by U. S. failure to provide
the equipment would be seriously detrimental to tJ. S. across-
the-board interests, including the U. S. interest of promoting
the pro-U. S., anti-Soviet Bloc orientation of the Latin
American military.
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F. ?Orientation of Military Toward Civilians, United States,
and Qommunism.
68. Design U. S. military programs not only to maintain the friendship
of the politically influential military groups, but also to win the
support and respect of non-communist civilian elements, both for the
programs and for the local military. To this end programs should:
a. Provide types of assistance that can be ~ustifie d to non-
communist elements of the population as a bona fide security
requirement for them and for their constitutional governments.
b. Whenever possible without losing primary military capability,
include assts tance having some visible economic utility, e.g.
assistance for dual-purpose units which contribute to economic
development as well a s security.
c. Acquaint the Latin American military with the complete port-
folio of Communist techniques, including the Communist tactic of
alienating the military from the support of the civilian population
by depicting it as a repressive, extravagant and irresponsible ele-
ment in public lif?.
69. Foster clone military relations with the Latin American armed forces
in order to increase their understanding of, and orientation toward, U. ~.
ob3ectives and policies, and t o promote democratic.:,.: concepts and foster
pro-American sentiments among Latin American military pcersonnel.
70. Cultivate an awareness by Latin American military personnel of the
nature and threat of international Co~+~n~sm and Castroism in Latin
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w ~,~, r
America and the need for developing a capability to counter Communist
subversion and guerrilla warfare and deal humanely but effectively with
mob violence. Point out that they would be the first to be purged under
a Castro-Communist regime.
71. Conduct an information and education program targeted at the Latin
American military forces. The material therefor, in appropriate lan-
guages, should be cleared before utilization in any foreign country by
our Ambassador to that country.
G. Inter-American Defense. Board, Joint Proiects. and Other Matters.
72. See1~ the conclusion of an arrangement authorizing the Council of the
Organiza~Eit~n of American States to call upon the Inter-American Defense
.Board for such military advice and services as may be required by the
COAS.
73. Make most effective use possible of the IADB to achieve U. S. ob~ec-
tives, and continue active participation in the Joint Military Commissions
we have with Brazil ~d Mexico.
7k? In the event that the American States should agree to establish and
share the maintenance costs of such an institution, contribute to the
support of a Defense College for Latin America at a level of instruction
comparable in prestige to the U. S. National War College.
75. Seek the continued cooperation of the Latin American states in
carrying out the hemisphere mapping program.
III. CONTINGP~TCIES
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III. CONTI~TGEl~CIES
76. Decline of OAS. The Organization of American States could be weak-
ened or even destroyed by a~split over some critical issue (e.g., Cuba)
or by a decision of some of the members (e.g., Brazil, Keaico) to
renounce or gradually abandon their OAS commitments and go their separate,
independent gays in international affairs. The OAS should be preserired
if possible, even though it does not operate as effectively as we would
wish, and we should be careful not to put upon it responsibilities which
it would be incapable of discharging. Should the Organization break np,
our course shoeild be to enter into new agreements, bilateral and/or
collective, with the countries with which we were in general accord on
questions of mutual security and international policy and strengthen them
while trying at the same time to heal the breach and prevent a Communist
take-over in any Latin American country.
7?? ee~memunist Capture of Other American States. In spite of our efforts
Castroism-Communise might succeed in capturing one or more of the other
Ame-rican States from within. In such event xe should redouble our
efforts unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally to weaken and iso-
late the Communist regimes in the Hemisphere while assisting the other
countries to defeat similar attempts at Communist take-over. We should
at such tines consider again the question of whether our vital security
interests require us to take unilateral intervening action. In anticipa-
tion of this contingency we should study the possibility and advisability
of proposing a new regional doctrine to thwart the overthrow of a demo-
cratic Latin American government by Communist subversion.
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IV. RATIONALE
78. The Pressure for Economic and Social Progress. Latin America today
is generally in a state of economic underdevelopment and deep social un-
rest. The wealth is largely concentrated in the hands of a small, com-
placent, landed "upper" class. Impoverished masses suffer from hunger,
poor housing, lack of fob opportunities, inadequate health safeguards,
and illiteracy. More and more of them are clamoring for the right to a
decent living. In some countries large rural groups, which include most
of the Indian peoples, are not integrated into the economic and social
life of the nation at all. The population is rising by leaps and bounds,
outstripping production. Capital is required in large amounts for devel-
opment, but local capital formation is slow and difficult, and the
climate for new foreign private investment is generally unattractive.
There is an extreme shortage of technical and managerial know-hew. It is
becoming daily more evident that sweeping reform and economic and social
development must take place soon if violent social upheavals are t o be
averted.
79. The Power Strup.,gle. In this explosive atmosphere the power struggle
for Latin America between the Free World and the Communist world has
begun. The capture of the Cuban Revolution by the forces of interr~atianal
Communism has brought home to the United States more acutely than any
distant experiences how almost impossible it is for us, while observing
international law, and more specifically the principle of non-intervent~n,
to get rid of Communist control in a country that has once succumbed to
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it. From Cuba as a center, Communist infection is now spreading toward
other parts of Latin America, aided by the prevalence of human misery,
the example of Castroism, and the employment of skillful propaganda and
~0.
subversive techniques. /`'~Fiere is widespread ignorance in Latin America
of what Communism is, and haw it works, and a failure t o realize how
dangerous it can be under present conditions. For this ignorance we are
partly responsible because we, like many Latins, have often used the
label of Communism indiscriminately. Under the circumstances, it is not
surprising that there has been no real determination in most of Latin
America to guard against Castro-Communist efforts at infiltration or sub-
version, nor any appreciable capability developed to do so.
81. The OAS and most of its members have shorn a disinclination to face
up to the implications of the Communist take-over in Cuba, and some seem
not even to have recognized that it has occurred. The appeal of the
originally announced objectives of the Cuban Revolution, though since
betrayed by Castro, is still strong among them. Whether the Organization
would survive the teat of a showdown on Cuba is uncertain.
82. Trend Toward Neutralism. The cohesiveness of the Latin American
countries in support of the United States on Free World-Communist issues
has been further breached by the tendency of some of them to strike out
in a seemingly neutralist direction. Mexico has long taken an independent
attitude on issues of importance to the Free World, and by a number of
statements and actions Brazil's new President appears to want to show the
world that Brazil's foreign polio is entirely her own and not that of the
United States. The example of these countries, and of Cuba, is having its
effect on other apuntries.
83. Blemishes
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/~g' ..
83. Blemishes in the U. S~ Image. 7n its relations with Latin America
the United States labors under some serious handicaps. There are psycho-
. logical and cultural differences that make it hard for Americans and
w
Latins fully to understand each other. Latina generally feel that most
Americans look down on them and patronize them, and they resent it. They
believe that American investors in Latin America have carried out exces-
sive profits on their investments, and that American buyers of Latin
American primary products have generally purchased these at unfairly la-~:~,
~:;
prices. Many feel that the net effect of our activities in their lands
has been to retard their development and in some cases to condemn them to
subsistence economies dependent on one or two commodities. They consider
that the United States since World War II has taken Latin America for
granted and neglected it while showering economic help on other parts of
the world including former enemy countries. The liberal elements accuse
us of having hypocritically given. aid and comfort to dictatorships while
preaching democracy, and of having associated ourselves too much with
the privileged classes and not nearly enough with the masses and their
nerds. For our "intervention" in the abortive Cuban invasion we are
roundly criticized for an illegal action, a weak and inept one, or both.
Our national image in Latin America is in great need of improvement.
84. Favorable Factors. The aforementioned disadvantages, however, are
more than counter-balanced by the following factors that favor the
accomplishment of U. S. policy objectives.
a. Backward economic and social conditions are within our power to
help remedy, Latin America is looking to us for this help, and we
have announced our intention of providing it in the Alliance for
Progress
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Progress. The governments are sensitive to the need for improvement,
ana tine miiiLary K].11 be a strong bulwark on the side of democracy
and freedom if they can be guided in the right direction.
b. The advantages iri the power struggle continue to lie overwhe]a-
ingly with us. Latin America belongs traditionally to the Christian,
western world. It is nlearer and more accessible to us than to the
Sino-Soviet bloc. It is bound together and to us by treaties resting
on common interests and b y close political, economic, military and
cultural ties.
c. We can legally come to the defense of any government that reggests
our help in preventing a Co~?~st take-over.
d. The OAS, for all its shortcomings as an instrument of direct
action, is nevertheless a powerful legal and moral force for the
defense of national independence and human rights in the Americas.
e. While the tendency of Brazil and Mexico to go their own ways makes
our problem of hemisphere leadership more difficult, this is a neces-
sary part of the process of nation-building and growing up, and these
countries, as powers in their own right, can do more to uphold the
principles for which they and we--stand than if they xere our satel-
lites.
f. The blemishes in the U. S. image, real or imagined, can be over-
come by information and performance. Most Latin Americans in spite
of some reservations about Americans and the United States, look to
us as the leader of the Free World and the leader of the Western
Hemisphere.
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August t8, 1961
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