THE CHERNOBYL' ACCIDENT: SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08S01350R000300900002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 1, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
A Research Paper
?Secret-
-Starer
SOV 87-10078X
December 1987
Copy
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The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
A Research Paper
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This paper was pret)ared by Office
of Soviet Analysis,
Comments
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and queries are welcome and may be directed to the
Chief, Domestic Policy Division, SOYA
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SOV 87-10078X
December 1987
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The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
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This research paper focuses on the societal and political implications of the
first major domestic and international crisis under General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev. It examines the impact of the Chernobyl' accident on
the Soviet population, popular reaction to the event, and the effect on
popular attitudes toward the Soviet bureaucracy and leadership. It provides
the reader with a feel for how various strata of Soviet society reacted to 25X1
this near-catastrophic event during a period of leadership-induced social
ferment. 25X1
This paper
provides infor-
mation on crisis decisionmaking under Gorbachev but does not deal in
depth with the implications for the Soviet nuclear program.
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SOV 87-10078X
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Summary
Information available
as of 5 December 1987
was used in this report.
The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
The explosion of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor in April 1986 presented a
serious problem for Gorbachev's efforts to portray the new leadership as a
reasonable and accountable government. The accident led to the emer-
gence of nuclear energy policy as a significant public issue. Moscow's delay
in reporting the accident to its people and neighbors left it open to charges
of disregard for public health and eroded confidence in the regime. The
psychological consequences of the Chernobyl' accident are likely to be long
term and not limited to the immediately affected geographic areas.
Soviet citizens?in contrast to their counterparts in the West?have not
mounted a successful campaign against the development of nuclear power,
but antinuclear sentiment is growing in the aftermath of the Chernobyl'
accident. Some members of the elite with policy influence have much less
confidence in the safety of the Soviet nuclear system. Even ordinary
citizens apparently worry that the regime's determination to rely more
heavily on nuclear power will increase pressure on the nuclear sector to
place growth above safety. They are reluctant to trust official assurances
that safety alterations have been made and that existing safety rules will be
enforced.
Regime claims that radiation fallout from Chernobyl' will not add
significantly to the normal incidence of cancer have not silenced rumors
and anxiety about health issues. A large segment of the population living in
the European section of the USSR apparently believes it is in danger from
radiation and continues to link genetic abnormalities, cancers, and poor
health in general to the accident. These concerns are probably greatest
among the 135,000 evacuees and more than 20,000 recovery workers?
mainly military reservists?nearly all of whom are non-Russians.
We have evidence of considerable fear of contaminated food and water that
is likely to continue. The effects of this fear were still being felt in the far-
mers' markets this past summer, and Moscow probably is concerned that
this apprehension could result in workers' resistance to transfers to the
Chernobyl' region, an inability to sell products from the region, and
increased demand for medical services.
Chernobyl' also had an adverse impact on the regime's credibility. More
than a year after the accident, Soviet citizens continue to criticize top
officials for initially concealing the Chernobyl' accident, and some think
the regime's response to the disaster exposed the insincerity of Gorbachev's
openness (glasnost) policy.
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The regime brought many of these problems on itself by initially reacting
with its traditional secrecy. Immediately after the accident, an information
blackout was imposed until international pressure forced a grudging
admission followed by a propaganda counterattack. Gorbachev himself
remained silent until 14 May, almost three weeks after the accident,
probably to minimize his personal responsibility and to wait for his experts
to gain control of the situation.
Once Gorbachev got involved, however, he exploited the initial public
relations setback to push his own reform agenda. By demonstrating that
suppressing information about domestic problems can backfire, the acci-
dent gave added impetus to his drive for openness in the Soviet media. Sev-
eral articles in Pravda, for example, pointed out that a lack of complete in-
formation had encouraged harmful rumors, and supporters of Gorbachev's
policy criticized the domestic media's early silence.
Gorbachev also used the accident to eliminate some Brezhnev holdovers.
He retired three elderly members of the Central Committee who were
rumored to share some blame for the disaster. In addition, several ministry-
level officials in the nuclear industry were fired, six Chernobyl' plant
managers received jail sentences, and 27 party officials were expelled from
the party either for contributing to the accident or for being inattentive to
the evacuees' needs.
By laying the blame on local authorities, attacking the West for exploiting
the disaster, and pressing forward with domestic reform, Gorbachev has so
far largely avoided personal accountability.
claimed that Gorbachev favored prompt publication of infor-
ma ion su met resistance in the Politburo. However, this story conceivably
was put out by his supporters to exonerate him
The costs to regime credibility were especially serious in the Ukraine,
Belorussia, and the Baltic. Dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of the
Chernobyl' accident exacerbated longstanding popular frustrations in these
regions:
? The nuclear radioactive contamination of Ukrainian and Belorussian
territory and the dislocation of Ukrainian and Belorussian people pro-
voked dissatisfaction with the Soviet policy of placing nuclear plants near
populated centers and strengthened the environmentalist lobby in the
Ukraine.
? Chernobyl' sparked demonstrations in the Baltic, where ecology-sensitive
issues had already provoked anti-Russian demonstrations and Moscow's
callup of reservists to clean up Chernobyl' was perceived as ethnic
discrimination.
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The new consciousness about environmental issues spurred by Chernobyl'
has contributed to a climate of public activism that could contest Moscow's
plans for nuclear power expansion in the next decade. Some 60 members of
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences signed a petition opposing the
completion of units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl' because the project leaders had
failed to adjust their plans to the new postaccident conditions. Reportedly,
the petition was about to be made public when Moscow decided to shelve
the expansion plans for the nuclear plant, conceivably in response to the
arguments advanced by the Ukrainian group and possibly other public
opposition.
Local Soviet press accounts indicate that concern about the safety of the
nuclear industry is particularly high in areas with Chernobyl'-type reac-
tors, like Kursk, Leningrad, Smolensk, Ignalina, and Chernobyl' itself.
Demonstrations against the Ignalina and Leningrad nuclear plants were
held in June 1986 as well as this year, and two nucle-
ar projects have been recently shelved because of public reaction. Even
though there have been greater efforts to reassure the public and perhaps
some rethinking of the strategy for siting nuclear power plants,
the public's apprehension about the regime's
commitment to make the necessary safety modifications remains well
founded.
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Despite the fact that ministries responsible for nuclear industry have been
given a formal mandate to achieve more stringent safety standards, there is
no indication that public resentment will compel changes in the direction of
Soviet nuclear power policy. The major bureaucracies resent public
pressure and there are some signs of backtracking on glasnost:
? Despite Moscow's avowed openness policy, the July 1987 legal followup
of the accident was conducted in secret, probably in an effort to avoid re-
vealing technical testimony that addressed reactor design flaws.
? In the spring of 1987, Soviet reporters complained that the authorities
were still tightly controlling information on Chernobyl', leaving the
public largely in the dark.
? The official Soviet report presented to the International Atomic Energy
Agency at the August 1986 meeting in Vienna, and made widely
available to the West, was never released to the Soviet general public.
Soviet leaders probably hope that the consequences of Chernobyl' will fade
from public view. Continued publicity poses difficulties because long-term
environmental and health consequences will require further allocations of
resources, which Moscow appears unwilling to make. A debate about the
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location and safety of nuclear plants is troublesome to a regime formally
committed to nuclear energy and the economic benefits of building nuclear
plants near highly populated areas.
In an era of continued reform policies, another nuclear mishap, even a
comparatively minor one, could unleash a backlash against nuclear energy
that would be harder to ignore and might hasten the process of retiring the
Chernobyl'-type (RBMK) reactor:
? The democratization campaign unveiled by Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and
other senior leaders presupposes more sensitivity to public opinion.
? Legislation presented at the June 1987 Supreme Soviet on public
referendums on local issues may give the people a mechanism to express
their concerns.
? Public groups have been able to exert pressure on other environment-
related issues through mass demonstrations.
? Some critics of current nuclear policy, including prominent journalists,
probably can be more influential under glasnost.
In addition, the Gorbachev regime has issued a number of broader policy
statements designed to curb pollution and improve health and appears
willing to provide resources to support these policies. In July 1987, the
CPSU Central Committee issued a sweeping resolution on ecology aimed
at improving safety in the workplace and the quality of air and water. A
month later, it announced a crash program to improve the medical system.
The new Law on the Restructuring of Public Health stresses major reforms
in the area of health through prevention and, given the growing concern
with pollution and industrial safety, may be implemented more rapidly
than usual.
Accommodation to popular frustration carries a danger for the regime and
could make the situation worse by exciting expectations. The population
will be more attentive to future regime performance in the areas of nuclear
safety, public health, and ecology. There is increased discussion of these
issues in the intellectual community, and social initiative groups are taking
the issues to the street. These concerns are not likely to evaporate. As
public dissatisfaction becomes more evident, the Chernobyl' accident may
provide a focal point around which disgruntled citizens can organize, and
Moscow may discover that Chernobyl' is a continuing irritant with a
potential for social and ethnic tensions for years to come.
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Contents
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Summary
Regime Handling of the Chernobyl' Crisis
1
Formation of Decisionmaking Bodies
1
Evacuation and Decontamination
3
Trauma of Relocation
7
Reservists Shoulder the Burden of Decontamination
7
Handling of Information
9
Propaganda Counterattack
11
Offering Up Scapegoats
12
The Costs of Chernobyl'
14
Damage to Regime Credibility and Reputation
15
Health Problems
16
Anxiety Over Food and Water
19
Strain on Health Care System
20
Opposition in the Republics
21
The Baltic
21
Belorussia and the Ukraine
22
Antinuclear Sentiment
24
Consumer Dissatisfaction
25
Implications for Regime Policy
27
Chernobyl' and the Glasnost Debate
28
Nuclear Energy Policy
30
Another Nuclear Accident?
30
Outlook
31
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The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
Regime Handling of the Chernobyl' Crisis
The accident at the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant
on the morning of 26 April 1986 set off a sequence of
events the Kremlin and Soviet populace are still
grappling with. The belief in the safety of Soviet
nuclear design had been widely shared among Soviet
nuclear specialists, and most experts believed that an
accident like the one at Chernobyl' could never
happen, leaving them ill prepared to cope with a crisis
of such magnitude.'
The government commission that investigated the
accident concluded that the world's worst nuclear
accident was caused by a bungled test at Chernobyl's
unit 4 reactor, but Soviet media and reporting both
indicate that more basic problems with reactor safety
were also partly to blame. The top leaders were
informed of the accident almost immediately and
members of a government commission were on the
scene within a few hours, but they apparently failed to
give a high priority to prompt evacuation or the
release of accurate information that could have
stemmed rumors or facilitated more rapid public
health precautions, like those taken in Poland.
The delay and uncertainty that characterized the
regime's initial response can be explained in part by
the magnitude of the Chernobyl' disaster, which
would have been difficult for any government to
In 1984, Academician Valeriy Legasov, a member of the presidi-
um of the USSR Academy of Sciences and first deputy director of
the prestigious Kurchatov Atomic Energy Institute, published an
economic analysis on the acceptable level of risk in nuclear energy.
He concluded that plants are designed and constructed so that there
is no risk to human health not only during normal operation but
even in an the event of a catastrophe, such as an earthquake or an
aircraft crashing into the reactor. Legasov was one of the first to
visit the scene of the disaster as a member of the government
commission entrusted with the investigation of the Chernobyl'
accident. He was clearly amazed by the scope of the devastation as
were most specialists worldwide. "Frankly speaking," he said in a
later interview, "I could never imagine that I would witness such an
accident which was believed to be quite improbable by specialists in
nuclear engineering."
1
handle. The leadership quickly recovered from this
brief period of hesitation and effectively responded to
control the radiation release, to evacuate and resettle
135,000 persons, to decontaminate most of the Cher-
nobyl' environs sufficiently to permit workers to con-
tinue the recovery operations, and to reduce the public
relations damage. The break in Gorbachev's political
momentum appears to have been temporary, and, by
laying the blame on local authorities, Gorbachev has
avoided any personal accountability.
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Formation of Decisionmaking Bodies
Moscow officials were at the scene of the accident
within hours after the explosion occurred, according
to nuclear physicist Boris Semenov, the Soviet dele-
gate to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) board of governors. Semenov told IAEA
board members in late May that Gorbachev and other
members of the top leadership learned of the accident
at Chernobyl' early in the morning of 26 April. A
group within the Politburo under the direction of
Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of
Ministers, was formed to deal with the accident. In
addition, a special government commission headed by
Boris Shcherbina, deputy chairman of the Council of 25X1
Ministers, was formed that morning to investigate the
causes of the accident.' This commission immediately
took over direction of the emergency response and
recovery effort. 25X1
Maj. Gen. Vladimir P. Pikalov, chief of the chemical
troops of the USSR Defense Ministry and a decorated
Hero of Soviet Union for his work at Chernobyl', told
Pravda in December 1986 that he was summoned to
the General Staff headquarters in the early morning
hours and ordered by General Staff Chief Sergey
the on-site head of the commission rotated every two
weeks starting 9 May 1986, with various deputy premiers serving
their turn as its director. These included Ivan Silayev, Yuriy
Maslyukov, Lev Voronin, Vladimir Gusev, Genadiy Vedernikov,
and Boris Shcherbina.
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Laxity and Poor Design of the Chernobyl' Plant
The report of the investigation presented to the
Central Committee of the CPSU stressed the Cherno-
byl' accident was caused by a "one-in-a-million"
chain of events, but Western experts maintain that an
accident was possible because of dangerous design
characteristics that make the RBMK?a graphite-
moderated reactor? vulnerable to accidents. Be-
cause many of these deficiencies cannot quickly and
cheaply be remedied, the RBMK will continue to be
considerably less safe than other type reactors, and
planned safety enhancements will not raise these
reactors to Western safety standards.
Construction of Soviet nuclear plants has been ham-
pered by inefficient design bureaucracies, bottlenecks
in component manufacturing, and overambitious plan-
ning that resulted in some substandard construction.
The chief design engineer for the ventilation system of
the Kursk and Chernobyl' nuclear power stations from
1974 to 1980 gave a good example of industry's use of
inferior components. The Chernobyl' and Kursk venti-
lation systems were built from ungalvanized sheet
steel to reduce cost. Similar problems with construc-
tion and workmanship halted work projects at the
Rostov nuclear plant in April 1986, indicating that
these conditions are widespread in the industry.
On the eve of the accident, a Pripyat' resident, in an
article published by the Ukrainian literary weekly
Literaturna Ukraina, attempted to draw attention to
problems at Chernobyl's unit 5?then under con-
struction?including shortages of skilled labor, infe-
rior materials, unsafe shortcuts, and unrealistic
building programs. Further revelations of precarious
safety conditions prevailing at the plant were provid-
ed in a report from the trial of those responsible for
the accident at Chernobyl'. At the July trial the
technical commission of experts charged the experi-
ment that commenced before the accident was a
continuation of a series of similar and unsuccessful
research projects, including a near mishap during a
similar experiment in 1985. The Soviets told a
Japanese visitor this September that the experiment
was initially proposed at the Leningrad and Irkutsk
nuclear power plants but was refused. It was then
done at the Chernobyl' plant.
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Soviet Account of Accident to the IAEA in Vienna
The official Soviet version of the accident, as report-
ed to the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in Vienna on 25-29 August 1986, is largely
accepted in the West. Based on the conclusions of the
Soviet Government commission investigating the acci-
dent, the world's worst nuclear accident was caused
by a bungled attempt to test a minor part of the
safety system of unit 4 of the Chernobyl' nuclear
power plant. The experiment involved a scheme to use
the rotational inertia of the turbogenerators to gener-
ate electricity to bridge a one-half minute gap be-
tween the loss of normal power and the beginning of
auxiliary power supply in the event of the loss of
normal supplies of electricity. The operators were
under pressure to carry out the test, since another
opportunity would not present itself until the next
year.
According to the Soviet account at the IAEA meet-
ing, the experiment was never officially approved and
was not executed according to plan. The operators
allowed the reactor to reach a highly unstable condi-
tion as a result of deliberately disabling some safety
systems and a series of delays and mishaps. When the
experiment began, the rate of cooling-water flow
decreased, leading to increasing water temperature in
the core and increased steam formation. Because of a
design characteristic of the Chernobyl'-type reactors,
the increased steam content in the core caused a
power increase that quickly ran out of control. The
power excursion ruptured fuel channels, and the
pressure of the escaping steam blew apart the reac-
tor's core and caused severe damage to the reactor
building. Eyewitnesses report hearing a loud explo-
sion and seeing sparks and burning chunks flying
high into the night sky above unit 4 at 0123 hours on
26 April. The burning chunks fell back onto the roofs
of surrounding buildings and started several fires.
Akhromeyev and Minister of Defense Sergey Sokolov
to go to Chernobyl' and take charge of the chemical
troops there. Within minutes of his meeting with these
officials and less than two hours after the accident
occurred, Pikalov alerted the mobilized military units
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in Kiev. He and the first brigade of chemical troops
arrived in Kiev just over 12 hours after the explosion
and, soon after, set up headquarters in the city of
Chernobyl', 15 kilometers from the burning reactor.
By the evening of 26 April the chemical troops were
conducting radiological reconnaissance and continu-
ous monitoring of radiation levels and weather data in
the area surrounding the devastated Chernobyl' plant.
According to General Pikalov, the health situation in
Pripyat' had sharply deteriorated through the night of
the 26th, and by 1000 hours on 27 April the planning
to evacuate 47,000 persons from Pripyat' had begun.
Pikalov's account confirms Boris Shcherbina's state-
ment at the 5 May press conference that he and other
members of the commission were on the scene literally
"within a few hours" of the explosion. This scenario
strongly suggests that the leadership had the informa-
tion channels it needed to evaluate the situation,
despite the persistent Soviet line that "internal com-
munication difficulties" had been the cause of the
initial problems in dealing with the disaster. It also
suggests that, while the decisionmakers began to react
to the crisis by at least the afternoon of the 26th,
safeguarding the population was not their first
priority.
Evacuation and Decontamination
The Soviets initially responded to the accident as if it
was a local emergency confined to unit 4 of the
Chernobyl' nuclear power plant. Even after it was
known that high levels of radioactivity were present,
the accident was handled at first as a site emergency.
Thousands of plant workers and their families in the
city of Pripyat', located only 10 kilometers from the
stricken plant, were neither informed about the acci-
dent, nor instructed to take precautions against radia-
tion fallout. Evacuation was initiated 36 hours after
the accident. Apparently there were no off-site emer-
gency evacuation plans, and additional evacuation
within the established 30-kilometer contamination
zone continued for two weeks. The 2.5 million people
living in Kiev, located less than 103 kilometers south
of the reactor, were not warned publicly about the
hazard until nine days later.
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The Evacuation of Pripyat'
The actual evacuation of the city of Pripyat' took
place 36 hours after the initial release of radiation.
What we know of Pripyat 's evacuation is based
entirely on Soviet retrospective accounts, since no
television pictures or photographs of Pripyat' just
before or after the dramatic evacuation have been
released.
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In later months, the press described the exodus as an
orderly and efficient process. A caravan of more than 25X1
1,100 buses, mostly from Kiev, got under way on
Sunday afternoon, carrying the townspeople in a line
that stretched for almost 19 kilometers. The com-
plete operation took less than three hours, a striking-
ly short time to move so many people.
Despite this impressive achievement, firsthand ac-
counts of local officials directly involved in the
evacuation present a picture of disorganization, sup-
porting speculation there were no evacuation plans for
an event such as the one unfolding at Chernobyl'. The
Soviet press details how officials hastily decided on
where to move such a large number of people; how to
assemble the transportation; and what resources to
tap to shelter, feed, and provide medical services for
such a large number of evacuees. One Kiev Obkom
official said that shortly before the evacuation an
information group composed of oblast party officials,
militiamen, and voluntary police (druzhinniki) went 25X1
from house to house informing the residents of the
evacuation. The people were given less than an hour's
advance warning, and no additional information
provided for fear of creating a panic.
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reacted "very emotionally," because they had no
previous emergency exercises about what to do after
an accident and stressed the need for such a public
education program for people living around nuclear
plants. 25X1
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The official figure on the number of people eventually
evacuated from the Ukraine and Belorussia was
135,000, but the total number of those who left the
area is probably much higher. In addition, some
400,000 children were evacuated from Kiev, and
another 100,000 from points in Belorussia to Pioneer
camps and summer resorts.
Initially, confusion seemed to reign among the offi-
cials on the spot, who seemed totally unprepared to
deal with a catastrophe of such magnitude. In a later
effort to explain the delay in the evacuation of
Pripyat', Valeriy Legasov, presidium member of the
USSR Academy of Sciences and the first deputy
director of the prestigious Kurchatov Atomic Energy
Institute, told a US visiting nuclear delegation that it
was an appropriate precaution taken to protect the
people because the radioactive plume had traveled
over the likely evacuation route. Information released
at the trial of the Chernobyl' plant managers this
July, however, revealed that no effort was made by
plant officials to check the radiation levels in the city
in the immediate aftermath and that the nuclear plant
had no off-site measuring capabilities. Court testimo-
ny also showed that the staff at the plant was ordered
by plant officials to keep quiet about radiation levels
and that they reported to their superiors lower levels
of radiation than actually measured. As noted, the
first comprehensive readings of radiation levels in
Pripyat' were made on the evening of 26 April by the
chemical troops who arrived earlier that day. As a
result, schools and shops stayed open on 26 April and
residents went about their business as usual.
The Soviets responded relatively quickly to dispatch
medical teams to surrounding areas to screen the
population. According to the vice president of the
Academy of Medical Sciences, there were 1,300
health care personnel involved, grouped into 230
medical teams, mostly from the Ukrainian and Belo-
russian medical services, with support from military
mobile medical teams. Nevertheless, there were short-
ages of medical personnel, medical supplies, and
radiation-detection equipment,
As a result, the evacuees were forced to wait
long periods of time to be processed at relocation
centers, where they received a medical examination, a
shower, and clean clothing.
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Firemen's Effort to Contain Catastrophe
When the Pripyat' firemen responded to the fire at
the nuclear power plant only minutes after the explo-
sion released a radioactive cloud, they did not know
the full extent of the accident. The chief of a MVD
directorate, Maj. Gen. V. M. Korniychuk told Litera-
turna Ukraina in May that the message alerting the
firemen indicated only that there was a fire in the
plant. When the firemen arrived on the scene of the
burning reactor, within minutes of the accident, they
found that the roof over the control room was burning
and part of it had already collapsed. Fires had
broken out at different levels of the 215-foot high
structure housing the reactor and were threatening to
spread to the other reactor. The firemen had no
special equipment except for the face mask, breathing
apparatus, and heavy heat-resistant outer clothing
standard in a firemen's uniform.
The first shift of firefighters fought for two and a half
hours before reenforcernents came from nearby towns.
Col. Leonid P. Telyatnikov, the plant's fire chief and
the only survivor of the group of firefighters who first
scaled the roof to put out the fire, said that they
worked until they weakened and collapsed from
radiation exposure burns, although at that time he
thought it was from physical exhaustion. Many of the
firemen had received a lethal dose of radiation by the
time the fire was extinguished at 0653 hours. All six
firemen working alongside Telyatnikov died, giving
their lives to contain afire that, left unchecked, could
have spread the nuclear disaster to the other reactors
in the Chernobyl' plant.
Ground Forces units from the three military districts
in the immediate vicinity of the accident?the Kiev
Military District (MD), the Belorussian MD, and the
Carpathian MD?played a key role in the evacuation.
Military personnel performed traffic control, provided
extensive medical support, assisted with transporta-
tion, and food distribution. Curiously, the Soviet civil
defense, which is responsible for rescue and recovery
from peacetime disasters in addition to its wartime
responsibility, did not play a major role in the evacua-
tion.
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In the evacuation, some decisions may have uninten-
tionally aggravated the potentially dangerous health
situation, while others indicated that protection of its
citizens was not always the top priority. For example:
? In the Pripyat' countryside, where another 20,000
persons lived, cattle and horses from the state and
collective farms surrounding the city were evacuat-
ed first, beginning a day after the city was evacuat-
ed. People followed in buses about 24 hours later.
According to the Kiev Oblast deputy chairman for
agriculture, the animals were moved first because
people were needed to load the 51,000 head of
cattle.
? Letters from Soviet citizens to relatives abroad
indicate that people from some villages located
3 to 4 kilometers from the city of Pripyat' were not
moved until 6 May, 10 days after the accident.
The 30-kilometer evacuation zone, established within
the first 24 hours after the accident, was chosen
because it encompassed the general population living
around the reactor and did not necessarily correspond
to the actual areas of high radioactivity. Legasov
admitted to Western scientists that later radiation
calculations showed a need to adjust the zone to make
it correspond more closely to the actual distribution of
radiation. Eleven villages in Polesskiy Rayon in
Ukraine?where many of the Pripyat' people were
initially evacuated?were forced to reevacuate after
radiation levels were reassessed to be unsafe. Later,
Moscow News criticized local officials for rushing to
resettle these villages inside the zone to give an
appearance of normalcy without proper consideration
for the safety of the inhabitants.
Despite continuing concerns among scientists, no fur-
ther evacuations were authorized.
5
Secret
While some selective evac-
uation beyond the 30-kilometer zone was observed
near Gomel' and Chernigov starting 9 May, a decision
to expand the evacuation zone to 50 kilometers would
have displaced an additional 75,000 civilians in south-
ern Belorussia alone, at a time when the designated
receiving areas were overflowing with Chernobyl'
evacuees.
Moreover, the Soviets did no preventive evacuation,
with the exception of the extensive evacuation of
children in the broader region.' For example, although
Mogilev Oblast in Belorussia, 320 kilometers north-
west of Chernobyl', received sufficient radiation fall-
out from heavy rains on 27 and 28 April to prompt
officials to close many wells, scrape and remove layers
of contaminated soil, and ban sale and consumption of
local milk and meat and vegetables, only the children
were evacuated. Tens of thousands of people in the
contaminated villages were not evacuated and re-
ceived minimal information about the dangers of
radiation, according to the rayon chief physician.
The evacuation of the nearby town of Chernobyl' and
its environs?With a population of some 44,000?was
begun only after radiation levels began to rise rapidly
there on 3 May. Delaying the evacuation until then
also allowed May Day festivities to take place in
Chernobyl', as well as in Kiev, as if nothing unusual
had happened. the 500
buses and 200 trucks that came to evacuate Cherno-
byl' on 3 and 4 May were the same buses that came
Starting 8 May, school-age children went to Pioneer camps,
children between the ages of 3 and 6 were evacuated with the
kindergarten teachers and medical workers, while children under 3
were evacuated with their mothers to vacation areas.
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Figure 1
Evacuated and Repopulated Sites Surrounding Chernobyl"
Poland
Initial
radioactive
plume
..:-?"/
?
?, Minsk
\ Go el'
? Soviet Union
Romania
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Chernobyl'.
Kiev Do
To,
Radioactive
fallout
7 2.0 Kilometers
0 20
Belorussian
S. S. R. Narovlya
00vroch
Gomei' Obi
Gomel'
Rechitsa
Ivan ovka
0Khoyniki 0 ?
Dvorishche?
Markovichi
oNedanchichi
*Slavutich
R. S. F. S. R.
0Cherni ov
Vil'cha
? sskoye
0
Korosten'?
Nivetskoye
A
A Cherno
Cheremosnaya
Sukachi
0
olvankov
Chernigov
beast
Blidchao
Kiev
Reservoir
Zhitornir Oblast
0
Makarov
SZhitomir
a Only selected evacuation and repopulation
Ukra inian S.S
sites are shown.
_i
4* Nuclear power station
O Evacuated site
o Repopulated site
50Kilometers
50 Miles
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from Kiev a week earlier to evacuate Pripyat'. They
had been decontaminated and returned to Kiev in
25X1 time for the two-day May Day celebration there.
After the festivities were over, the buses returned to
Chernobyl' to continue with the evacuation.
25X1
Trauma of Relocation, some
newspaper articles have admitted numerous foul-ups,
suggesting the evacuation was far less orderly than
the media first reported. An initial attempt to keep
records was quickly abandoned, and later it was
difficult for families to find each other because they
were scattered to the farflung villages in the sur-
rounding area. One Soviet documentary called it "a
nightmarish situation," where children became sepa-
rated from their parents and families were divided.
For weeks some people did not know where family
members were or how long they would have to stay in
their new surroundings. Some officials complained in
the press that they could not always tell the parents
where their children were going because some camps
were refusing to take the children from the Cherno-
byl' area.
Some individuals were even left behind in the confu-
sion. According to a Soviet account, two elderly
women were discovered in their house in Pripyat' two
months later, apparently living on what was left in the
house. They reportedly stayed because they did not
want to abandon their domestic animals, which were
not evacuated.
The dispersion of the Chernobyl' evacuees spread fear
and rumors in a ripple effect far beyond the borders of
the Ukraine and Belorussia to areas as far away as
Siberia, Kirghiziya, Uzbekistan, and the Baltic repub-
lics. Many people resented the Chernobyl' refugees
because they took scarce housing from local families
and factories were compelled to take workers for
whom there were no jobs. An engineer from the
Chernobyl' plant spoke of the callousness and indif-
ference he encountered while looking for a job after
resettlement. Jokes circulating in the Siberian city
of Omsk?where a large number of evacuees were
resettled?reflected the resentment local people felt
toward the refugees who exacerbated the chronic
housing shortage there. For example, "Oh, Your
apartment was taken from you? Do not worry, the
resettlers have a high mortality rate."
7
Many in the general population feared the Chernobyl'
evacuees because of the widespread belief that radia-
tion was contagious and that the evacuees could infect
the healthy population. In Estonia, a rumor was
spread that the normal death rate rose in Tallinn on
the arrival of 3,000 Ukrainian and Belorussian evacu-
ees. A Moscow Embassy official observed an elderly
couple who arrived by train from Kiev in early May
having trouble getting their Moscow relatives to take
them in, even after they were checked by a dosimeter
at the station. A letter from one Chernobyl' displaced
person, which appeared in the press, perhaps best
summarizes the feelings of the evacuated population:
"In an instant, we lost our homes, our jobs, friends,
surroundings, our whole microworld."
Reservists Shoulder the Burden of Decontamination.
The recovery force at Chernobyl' consisted of tens of
thousands of people. Most were military reservists and
regular military and civil defense troops. Despite the
high public profile that the Soviet media accorded the
Chernobyl' volunteers,
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a widespread callup of
military reservists for a period of two to six months
provided the main work force in the contaminated
area.
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In addition to the evacuees, these recovery workers
have been exposed to relatively high levels of radia-
tion. According to their own statement, the Soviets
initially permitted the workers to be exposed to 25 25X1
roentgen equivalent man (rem). According to the
international guidelines for permissible levels for
workers, a 25-rem dose is appropriate only for a very
small number of people and, preferably, volunteers.
Soviet nuclear officials told a western embassy source
visiting the zone in June 1987 that some 20,000
persons were still working in the zone, half of them
military personnel. More recent guidelines indicate
that these men are now being limited to a total dose of
5 rem?the internationally accepted dose?before be-
ing transfered.6 25X1
'The rem is a measure of radiation's effect on humans. Medical
experts say that blood changes begin at a dose of about 25 rem.
Sickness usually starts at 100 rem and severe sickness at 200 rem,
with death coming for nearly everyone who has absorbed 1,000
rem. The 25-rem exposures are almost twice the average exposure
of the civilian evacuees, hence these recovery workers will face a
higher risk.
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Figure 2. a) Military reservists decontaminating one of the villages
in Chernobyl' Rayon inside the 30-kilometer zone in August 1986.
b) A June 1986 photo of a military field camp for chemical troops
working inside the contaminated zone.
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A Soviet reporter who wrote five unusually candid
articles in the Estonian Komsomol newspaper Noorte
Haal described the treatment of reservists from Esto-
nian as brutal and their working conditions as danger-
ous and harsh. The articles stated that several workers
became sick from high levels of radiation, and some
men voluntarily exposed themselves to high levels to
receive an early discharge (see figure 2).
According to an account in a Stockholm daily, some
Estonian conscripts avoided decontamination duties in
the Ukraine by paying a bribe of 500 rubles to a high-
ranking military official in Estonia, who has since
been arrested. (Reportedly, this same official extract-
ed twice that to escape duty in Afghanistan.) Al-
though the claim that he has been arrested and
executed has been denied by TASS, he had already
been publicly named in the Soviet media for abuse of
office.
Handling of Information
The Kremlin's silence of almost three days embar-
rassed the Soviet leaders at a time when they were
just beginning to proclaim Gorbachev's new policy of
openness. The official Soviet news agency TASS
made the first brief announcement at 2100 hours,
28 April, and only after angry demands for informa-
tion from Sweden, the first country to announce
fallout detected from the stricken Chernobyl' plant.
In many ways, Moscow's initial response to the
Chernobyl' nuclear accident was similar to that in the
KAL shootdown in 1983, when an information black-
out was imposed until international pressure forced a
grudging admission of the event, followed by a propa-
ganda counterattack
In the initial period after the explosion, there were
indications that differences among top Soviet leaders
about how much information to provide the public
may have contributed to delays and missteps.
Gorbachev?at some un-
specified time early in the crisis?reportedly met
resistance from all Politburo members except KGB
9
chief Chebrikov and Russian premier Vorotnikov, in
his attempt to persuade the Politburo to release
information quickly. Close Gorbachev allies?like
Moscow party boss Boris Yel'tsin?were defensive
about the initial delay.
the Politburo had been divided over how much to
reveal and that Gorbachev was overruled when he
recommended prompt airing of the news. Valentine
Falin, an early supporter of Gorbachev's glasnost
policy and editor of the news agency Novosti, ac-
knowledged that the delay had been a mistake and
distanced himself from the decision to withhold infor-
mation.
It is possible that rumors of tension within the
leadership were orchestrated to minimize Gorbachev's
personal responsibility,
In public, at least, Soviet officials have
justified the delay on grounds that it was necessary to
avoid public alarm. Thus, for example, the deputy
director of the Institute of Power Engineering, Ivan
Ya. Yemel'yanov, who was later fired for his promi-
nent role in the RBMK reactor design, told the Italian
Communist Party paper Unita in late May that it was
not in the public interest to release critical informa-
tion to the people. He told the interviewer the regime
opted for selective release of information to prevent a
tide of panic because "we could not cause terror in
Kiev."
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This logic was apparently prevalent among those on 25X1
the scene. Some local officials, such as the health
officers at the Pripyat' hospital, were alerted to the
dangerous situation soon after the explosion, when the
hospital began to receive the first casualties from the
burning reactor. the 225X1
health officers began monitoring the radiation levels 2bAl
at the hospital but failed to inform the city popula- 25X1
tion. Pripyat' residents appearing in a Soviet docu-
mentary said these same health officers even denied
that an accident had occurred when questioned by
some citizens.
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The Civil Defense Role in Chernobyl'
The Chernobyl' accident provided the first opportuni-
ty to study the performance of the Soviet civil defense
program when confronted with a large-scale nuclear
accident. The civil defense program, a nationwide
program under military control, is responsible for
rescue and recovery from peacetime disasters in
addition to its wartime responsibilities. On the basis
of Soviet unclassified writing and emigre reporting on
the program, we expected civil defense staffs and
military civil defense units to play a leading role in
the evacuation and cleanup of Chernobyl'. These
staffs and units, however, did not respond as we had
anticipated. Although military civil defense units
were active throughout the cleanup effort, they ap-
peared to perform support functions, while chemical
defense staffs, MVD units, and various party and
governmental organizations played the key roles.
Civil defense units assisted in decontaminating, con-
trolling traffic, coordinating logistics, and monitoring
radiation levels; we do not think, however, that they
were involved in the evacuation. More surprising is
the lack of visibility of civilian civil defense staffs at
the plant and in surrounding rayons. Although some
civil defense personnel assisted in the cleanup, the
staffs did not participate on the whole.
The fact that civil defense did not play a prominent
role was reflected in Soviet media coverage of the
accident. We expected the Soviets to use the accident
as an opportunity to stress the importance of the
program to the general population. The press has
made few references to the actions of the civil defense
forces. One article published in June 1987 revealed
public criticism of the local civil defense authorities
for their part in the response. At the same time, civil
defense has not received outright criticism from the
leadership and civil defense personnel have not been
publicly charged with criminal action. Although we
think that the replacement of the Chief of the USSR
Civil Defense Ste a few months after the accident
was part of Gorbachev's plans to revitalize the Minis-
try of Defense, the timing, as noted, was reportedly
related to displeasure with the performance of civil
defense forces in the cleanup.
We have not yet been able to resolve the various
explanations for the limited civil defense participa-
tion. One theory is that civil defense personnel may
have made serious errors in the initial stage of the
accident, thereby requiring the military to take com-
plete control. The immediate involvement of General
Pikalov and the lack of criticism in the press, howev-
er, does not support this explanation. A second theory
is that civil defense forces may not have been involved
more because other assets were more readily avail-
able. Civil defense forces have responded to other
peacetime disasters, but the scope of the Chernobyl'
accident may have been beyond reasonable expecta-
tions of peacetime activity by the civil defense units.
A third theory is that our expectations may have been
inflated by incorrectly interpreting Soviet civil de-
fense writing as describing the current civil defense
mission instead of long-term, not yet realized goals.a
An attempt was made to keep Kiev, with its 2.5
million population, completely in the dark. Beginning
30 April, travel was cut off to the city for US and
other diplomats.
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A deliberate show of normalcy prevailed under
Shcherbitskiy, who was not an ardent exponent of
glasnost at that time. The republic central newspaper
on 28 April carried only the brief TASS announce-
ment on the accident. Not even rudimentary informa-
tion about the accident and the potential health
hazards was made available to Kiev residents until
several days later. The Ukrainian Health Minister
Anatoliy Romanenko gave the first public health
warnings to the citizens of the republic on 5 May?
more than a week after the accident. In Belorussia
such warnings were provided even later.
fuller information on the
accident was available to local party and government
officials, despite the initial reassuring tone of the
media
Consequently, the office released only
the official TASS reports.
Propaganda Counterattack
Once the Soviets realized they could not conceal the
accident, they launched a public relations effort that
bore the imprint of Gorbachev's glasnost policy. In
addition to releasing a large amount of information
about the Chernobyl' accident, Moscow employed
several other tactics designed to minimize its responsi-
bility for what happened, restore popular confidence
in the regime, regain credibility abroad, and shift
blame to the West for exploiting Soviet problems. The
authorities have:
? Alleged that the reactor safety problems?until the
Chernobyl' accident?have been more common and
serious in the West.
? Depicted the mishap as a failure of a handful of
people rather than of the system and highlighted the
courage and self-sacrifice of the Soviet people in
dealing with it (see figure 3).
? Denounced Western media for making political
capital from Soviet misfortune and used the nuclear
mishap to push Soviet arms control proposals (see
figure 4).
? Played down in media accounts the long-term
health risks and emphasized progress in decontami-
nation and recovery operations.
11
Figure 3. Chernobyl' Victims as Heroes:
The Soviet press consciously exploited the Cher-
nobyl' disaster to marshal citizen support for
regime policies. It was full of stories of sacrifice
and heroism of workers engaged in the cleanup of
Chernobyl', comparing their work with the heroic
deeds of World War II soldiers. Those who died
in the accident were given heroes' funerals and
were posthumously awarded the title of "Hero of
the Soviet Union." This photo, which appeared in
Pravda Ukrainy on 4 July 1986, depicts a monument
erected at the Cherkassy Technical School for
firemen in the Ukraine where some of the firemen
who died were trained.
Gorbachev himself remained silent until 14 May,
almost three weeks after the accident. By lowering his
own profile and allowing others to take the heat, he
probably hoped to be associated with recovery rather
than disaster and thus avoid blame. When he at last
spoke on 14 May, he used the opportunity to present
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Figure 4. The May 1986 issue of the Soviet
journal Ogonyok carried this caricature of the
West under the caption "Irradiation by Lies."
The teeth spell out "gloating over other's misfor-
tune"; the signs read "anti-Soviet agitation," and
"anti-Soviet falsehoods and fabrications."
to Western observers the compassionate, humane face
of the Soviet Government during a tragic accident
and to promote himself as a peacemaker. A recurrent
theme has been that the accident demonstrates the
need for removal of the nuclear weapons from Europe,
where a conflict could unleash the radiation equiva-
lent of dozens of Chernobyl's. He also used the
occasion to announce an extension of the Soviet
nuclear test moratorium.
Offering Up Scapegoats
To minimize its responsibility for what happened, the
regime blamed lower level officials for mishandling
the situation in order to insulate top leaders from
criticism. Minister for Power and Electrification Ana-
toliy Mayorets, the official directly responsible for the
power plant, was sharply reprimanded. Several other
senior officials were fired outright for their incompe-
tent performance, including the Chairman of the
State Committee for Safety in the Nuclear Power
Industry, Yevgeniy Kulov, for "failing to ensure
compliance with safety regulations." Several local
functionaries were also removed for being inattentive
to the needs of the evacuees (see table).
Meanwhile, plant officials have been tried for their
involvement. At the Chernobyl' trial in July 1987?
initially open to international press and subsequently
Secret
conducted behind closed doors?the former director
of the Chernobyl' nuclear plant, Victor Bryukhanov,
his chief and deputy chief engineers?Nikolay Fomin
and Anatoliy Dyatlov?and three less senior manag-
ers were convicted of safety regulations violations that
led to loss of life. They received sentences in labor
camps, ranging from two to 10 years. As a further
admonition to bureaucrats that they will be held
accountable for their actions, the regime reportedly
plans to bring to trial the people responsible for the
design flaws in the reactor.
The easing out in 1986 of three Central Committee
members, rumored to share some blame for the
accident, suggests Gorbachev also used the nuclear
disaster to eliminate some elderly holdovers from the
Brezhnev era:
? President of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ana-
toliy Aleksandrov?who reportedly had a part in the
reactor's design?retired October 1986. Although
he was well above retirement age and rumors about
his prospective retirement circulated for some time,
he publicly criticized his own performance and
hinted that mistakes he made regarding Chernobyl'
helped prompt his retirement.
? The 88-year-old Minister for Medium Machine
Building Yefim Slavskiy, whose organization is
responsible for the military nuclear program and for
handling nuclear fuel for civilian reactors, also
retired in November 1986, several months after his
first deputy was fired because of the accident.
? Deputy Defense Minister responsible for civil de-
fense Aleksandr Altunin?whose organization ap-
parently was ill equipped to deal with the crisis?
retired sometime during summer 1986.
Despite Gorbachev's interest in using the accident
against the old guard, one top Brezhnev protege?
Ukrainian party leader Vladimir Shcherbitskiy?has
so far managed to survive, despite rumors that Gorba-
chev wanted to use Chernobyl' against him.
Shcherbitskiy was able to escape
blame for the accident, and we have no evidence that
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Political Fallout From Chernobyl'
Title
Remarks
Central Committee members
Anatoliy Aleksandrov
President of the USSR Acade-
my of Sciences
Replaced in October 1986 (at age 83) in effort by Gorbachev to
make Soviet science and technology more responsive to industry.
Speculation that the design of the reactor was faulty put a blot on
his record.
Yefim P. Slavskiy
Minister of Medium Machine
Building
Retired in November 1986 at age 88, possibly for the "health"
reason officially cited. One of the first officials to fly over stricken
reactor.
Anatoliy I. Mayorets
Minister for Power and Electri-
fication
Reprimanded in July 1986 by the Politburo, but not fired because
of his "short tenure in office." Power Ministry attacked by Pravda
in June 1986 for failing to take interest in housing, food, and
consumer services in Chernobyl'.
Aleksandr Altunin
Deputy Defense Minister, Chief Apparently removed in July 1986.
for Civil Defense
Other officials
Yevgeniy Kulov
Chairman of State Committee
for Safety in the Atomic Power
Industry
Fired July 1986. The Politburo censured the State Committee in
July for failing to ensure compliance with safety regulations.
M. P. Alekseyev
Deputy Chairman of State
Committee for Safety in the
Atomic Power Industry
Reprimanded.
Viktor A. Sidorenko
First deputy chairman of State
Committee for Safety in the
Atomic Power Industry
Given severe reprimand in August 1986.
Aleksandr G. Meshkov
First Deputy Minister of Medi- Fired July 1986.
um Machine Building Ministry
Yevgeniy V. Kulikov
Chief of a main administration Fired and expelled from party.
of the Ministry of Medium Ma-
chine Building
Genadiy Shasharin
First Deputy Minister of Power Fired July 1986. Reportedly responsible for the construction and
and Electrification operation of nuclear power industry.
Aleksey Makukhin
First Deputy Minister of Power Reprimanded in Janunary 1987.
and Electrification
Gennadiy Veretennikov
Deputy Minister of Power and
Electrification and chief of All-
Union Association for Atomic
Power Stations (Soyuzatomen-
ergo)
Fired in July 1986.
Ivan Ya. Yemel'yanov
Deputy Director of institute re-
sponsible for design of Cherno-
byl'-type reactor
Politburo announcement of firing published July 1986.
Leren P. Mikhailov
Director of Power and Electrifi- Reprimanded.
cation Ministry's turbine design
institute (Gidroproyekt)
FNU Zaval'nyuk
Acting head of the Board for
the Southwest Region of State
Committee for Safety in the
Atomic Power Industry
Fired and severely reprimanded in July 1986.
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Political Fallout From Chernobyl' (continued)
Title
Remarks
Sergey K. Parashin Secretary of Party Committee
at the Chernobyl' plant
Fired and given severe Party reprimand in July 1986.
Aleksandr Gamanyuk First Secretary of Pripyat City
Party Committee
Given severe Party reprimand in July 1986.
Vladimir Bryukhanov Director of the Chernobyl'
plant
Fired in June 1986 for failing to assess seriousness of accident and
delay in initiating rescue operation. Expelled from CPSU in July
1986. Sentenced on 29 July 1987 to 10 years in labor camp for
gross violation of safety regulations and for poor handling of
evacuation.
Nikolay Fomin
Chief engineer of the Cherno-
byl' plant
Fired in June 1986 for failing to assess seriousness of accident and
delay in initiating rescue operation. Expelled from CPSU in July
1986. Sentenced on 29 July 1987 to 10 years in labor camp for
gross violation of safety regulations.
Anatoliy Dyatlov
A. Kovalenko
B. Rogozhin
Y. Laushkin
Deputy chief engineer of Cher-
nobyl' plant
Chief of unit 4
Shift chief of unit 4
Senior engineer
Sentenced on 29 July 1987 to 10 years in labor camp for gross
violation of safety regulations.
All sentenced on 29 July 1987?Kovalenko to 3 years, Rogozhin to
5 years, Laushkin to 2 years?for violating safety rules.
A. Sicharenko
A. Shapoval
A. Gubskiy
Leaders of the Yuzhatomener-
gostroytrans, transportation
agency serving atomic power
plants in the southern region of
the USSR
Fired in May 1986 for acting irresponsibly toward evacuees.
Sicharenko reprimanded; Shapoval expelled from party; Gubskiy's
punishment unspecified.
the mishandling of the evacuation has been laid at his
doorstep. A US Embassy source learned from one of
Shcherbitskiy's aids he was treating Gorbachev's re-
ported instructions to keep quiet after the accident,
which came in a cable, as insurance against an
attempt by the General Secretary to force him into
retirement. Shcher-
bitskiy had refused to sign an approval for activating
the Chernobyl' nuclear plant at its completion, re-
questing instead that the permit be signed by Mos-
cow. This maneuvering may have helped Shcherbits-
kiy avoid blame for the catastrophe. Gorbachev could
still use the accident as one point in a bill of indict-
ment, should he decide to move against Shcherbitskiy
or other officials linked to Chernobyl', but this be-
comes progressively less likely as more time passes.
Secret
The Costs of Chernobyl'
In terms of domestic public opinion, the regime
clearly paid a price for the accident. Its handling of
the event, at least initially, created a credibility gap
for the leadership and has heightened public appre-
hension about the safety of nuclear power, public
health, and the environment. It also gave new impetus
to environmental groups, highlighting the strong envi-
ronmentalist bent of intellectuals who constitute a
growing lobby. Moscow's callup of mostly non-
Russian reservists to clean up Chernobyl' sparked
some nationalist dissent. Although the economic dis-
ruption is expected to be only short term, the cost of
cleaning up and safety modifications will have a
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minor adverse effect on Gorbachev's economic mod-
ernization effort and will make it harder for the
regime to deliver on its promises of better health care,
more housing, and safer work conditions.
Damage to Regime Credibility and Reputation
In the short term, Moscow's failure to disclose infor-
mation about the Chernobyl' nuclear accident to its
citizens, thousands of whom have been affected in
some way, exacerbated fears, created widespread
alarm, and started the rumor mill churning. A Kiev
resident told a US Embassy official in September that
she was outraged at the authorities for withholding
timely information and accused officials of deliberate-
ly postponing public announcement of the disaster
until after the May Day celebration to show happy
Kievans dancing in the streets. A joke circulating in
the city some time later shows that public opinion
reflected this citizen's feelings toward the authorities:
"On May Day, the faces of demonstrators in Kiev
were radiating." Residents also cite the international
annual bicycle race?which was permitted to take
place through the city streets one day after the May
Day celebration, despite the possible health hazards
and withdrawals of some foreign competitors?as an
example of leadership callousness. A radiologist in
Kiev sent his wife and children to Moscow because he
believed the authorities would issue false radiation
levels.
Soviet citizens received no immediate instructions on
how to protect themselves against radiation, but
neighboring countries such as Poland and Finland
were warning their people. Residents of Kiev and
other Soviet citizens found this particularly reprehen-
sible. Many in Kiev heard that Poland, for example,
had dispensed iodine pills for children under 16 in its
northwestern provinces to protect them from radioac-
tive iodine-131. The Kievans reportedly resorted to
their own version of an iodine?wine, and vodka
cocktail?according to rumor.
Public resentments were probably further fueled by
rumors that the party elite was taking special precau-
tions.
15
"Warning": A Documentary Film
One of the most extraordinary examples of Gorba-
chev's glasnost policy to date came from two Soviet
journalists assigned to cover the accident at Cherno-
byl'. Lev Nikolayev and Aleksandr Krutov reported
on the accident almost from the very beginning and
subsequently produced a documentary film from the
daily coverage of the immediate aftermath called
"Warning." The film, which was shown to Soviet
citizens on the first anniversary of the accident,
captures in honest and unsparing detail the "unthink-
able" catastrophe.
The documentary opens with a panoramic shot from
a helicopter of the destroyed reactor; the red glow
from the burning graphite is still clearly visible on
the morning of the 28th of April. In one of the
sequences, the film shows the clinic at Pripyat', which
received the first casualties steering from radiation
sickness and burns. The commentator asks the chief
physician why he did not warn the people of Pripyat'.
"It was not my sphere of action," the doctor replied.
A Pripyat' health worker is seen telling the commen-
tator that local officials covered up the accident and
turned away people who offered their assistance,
saying that nothing had happened. She also said that
the "management" had emergency plans available,
yet, they did not even tell us to close the windows and
doors, and allowed our children go to school."
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residents said that they realized that something very
serious occurred at Chernobyl' when families of party
members suddenly left for "vacation" on 28 April.
Moscow US Embassy officials heard from several
sources, including the Archbishop Antoniy of
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officials who had more complete information or per-
sonal contacts with foreigners to tell them what was
happening. According to interviews with citizens and
recent emigrants, in the two months immediately
following the disaster, more respondents?over one-
third?initially learned about the Chernobyl' disaster
from Western radio than from any other source. Even
after Soviet media began detailed but selective cover-
age of the Chernobyl' accident, Soviet citizens contin-
ued to turn to Western radio for additional informa-
tion. According to survey data, 49 percent said they
turned to Western radio as a supplementary source of
information on Chernoby1'.8
Gorbachev's subsequent openness and domestic re-
form measures have deflected public attention from
Chernobyl' to a considerable extent, and the heavy
play given to alleged foreign overreaction to the
catastrophe had some success in shifting public anger
to the West. Many citizens accepted Soviet propagan-
da that the West was responsible for the panic and
hysteria surrounding Chernobyl' and that the acci-
dent presented less public danger than the Three Mile
Island accident or the Bhopal toxic gas leak that
killed more than 2,000 persons.
Although many Soviet citizens not directly affected
by the accident appear to have accepted the regime's
explanation, those in the affected regions continue to
fault top officials for initially concealing the Cherno-
byl' accident, and some think the regime's response to
the disaster showed the insincerity of the new open-
ness policy. A strongly worded indictment of incompe-
tence, which appeared in the June 1987 monthly
Yunost' in the form of public letters, accused local
officials at Pripyat' and Kiev of criminal irresponsibil-
ity for their role in the coverup. The fire chief, Leonid
Telyatnikov, who risked his life putting out the fire at
the plant on the night of the explosion, was quoted by
the Soviet magazine Smena as saying he was ashamed
s Of the 528 respondents, 36 percent first learned of the disaster
from Western radio; 28 percent, Soviet television; 15 percent word
of mouth; 10 percent Soviet radio; and only 10 percent Soviet press.
The interviews were conducted by Soviet Area Audience and
Opinion Research, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Liberty
Secret
of local Communist party officials who failed to use
their power to protect the population after the
disaster.
Some Soviet intellectuals were angry with the regime
for failing to be honest. However, they blamed the
technocrats for the accident, believing that the tradi-
tional arrogant attitude of nuclear bureaucracies?
willingness to take risks for the sake of scientific
progress at the expense of the people?has been the
root cause of the Chernobyl' disaster. Some ordinary
citizens share this point of view with the intellectuals.
Because they believe that this attitude is pervasive
among the Soviet technocrats, the public is reluctant
to accept the regime's assurances that the safety of
the Soviet nuclear plants has been improved in the
aftermath of Chernobyl'.
Health Problems
Despite Gorbachev's success in overcoming the initial
embarrassment and, even to some extent, turning the
issue to his favor, there have been real long-term
human costs, particularly in the affected region. The
chaotic nature of the evacuation alienated a number
of the evacuees and stirred fear and resentment
among the general population, thus broadening the
psychological impact of the accident. The handling of
the evacuation has contributed to public anxiety about
health issues, which the regime has been unable to
allay fully. Moscow's concern that public fears will
have serious economic consequences including resis-
tance to transfers of workers to the region, inability to
sell products from the region, and increased demand
for medical services by fearful people have already
been borne out.
Although the final human toll from the effects of
radiation will be difficult for scientists to predict,
many of the 135,000 evacuees from the 30-kilometer
zone have been exposed to sufficiently high levels of
radiation to increase their risk of long-term health
problems. The regime apparently acknowledged this
fact when it blamed local party leaders and ministry
officials at the recent trial of Chernobyl' plant manag-
ers for failing to properly protect the population from
the effects of radiation fallout and for delaying the
evacuation.
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As preoccupation with the massive evacuation eases,
attention has turned to the impact of Chernobyl' on
the long-term health of the general populace. Some
Western estimates claim that over the next 70 years
Chernobyl' could be responsible for up to 10,000
additional cancer deaths in the Soviet Union. The
Soviets have publicly assessed a much lower figure
and have assured their citizens that the radioactive
fallout from Chernobyl' will not significantly add to
the normal incidence of cancer. Although most offi-
cial Western estimates agree with the Soviet figures,
the public remains skeptical, and anxiety over health
issues persists. In an open letter to Pravda addressed
to Gorbachev, a resident of Pripyat'?the father of
three?protested the slow evacuation from the city
and blamed the authorities for jeopardizing his
family's health.
Given the psychological reaction to the disaster of
many Soviets who probably have not suffered measur-
able health effects of radiation, the accident's full
impact on social attitudes has been out of proportion
to the actual risk. Despite evidence to the contrary, a
large segment of the Soviet population believes there
will be dire health consequences from the accident
and continues to link its poor health to the Chernobyl'
radiation fallout.
Articles in the Soviet press indicate that anxiety about
radiation fallout has not completely subsided in the
general population, and the rumor mill is still churn-
ing. In December 1986, letters to the Belorussian
daily Sovetskaya Belorussiya criticized the behavior
of the authorities following the accident for failure to
inform the population about the risk to which they
were exposed, and demanded to know why children
were not evacuated from towns in Belorussia just
within the 30-kilometer zone.
The psychological consequences of the Chernobyl'
accident are likely to be long term, for the public will
continue to link even unrelated cancers, genetic ab-
normalities, and other illnesses to the disaster:
? A year after the accident, doctors from the new
Center for Radiation Medicine in Kiev reported
that much of the population is affected by a syn-
drome of radiophobia, and that many of those who
17
Rumor Mill
In the absence of factual information, some Western
reporters estimated the immediate death toll in the
thousands, with thousands more soon to follow. They
also speculated that the water supplies serving the 2.5
million people in Kiev were contaminated. Stories
filtering back into the USSR via Western radiobroad-
casts were matched by those spread by the Soviet
citizens themselves. A good example is the well-
publicized story by a former Soviet dissident who
lived in Kiev at the time of the nuclear accident. He
insisted that Soviet authorities covered up the deaths
in Kiev hospitals of some 15,000 persons from the
town of Pripyat' who died shortly after the accident
from radiation sickness. Rumors circulated that:
? Kiev was being evacuated to Moscow, and all the
roads leading from Chernobyl' were clogged with
refugees fleeing the explosion.
? The streets of Chernobyl' were full of dead bodies
and animal carcasses.
? There was no food or water in the Ukraine.
? Many people died before they could be evacuated
and had been thrown into common graves and
buried by bulldozers.
took part in the cleanup show clinical changes
described as situation neurosis unconnected with
radiation.
? Kiev physicians have come up against the psycho-
logical consequences of the Chernobyl' accident.
Kiev radio announced on 21 April 1987 that, in the
span of several days, more than 25,000 city resi-
dents requested complete medical checkups at
Kiev's clinics.
?
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athlete recently pressured the RSFSR sports com-
mittee to transfer his daughter, an Olympic medal-
ist from Kiev, to another city. She had a child who
was sick, and she believed that her son would not get
better as long as they remained in Kiev in the
"radiation-polluted atmosphere."
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? Citizens as far away as Leningrad worried about
whooping cough and diphtheria among the children
last winter because they feared that their resistance
may have been lowered due to the radioactive
fallout from Chernobyl'.
? A doctor told Marina Orshanskaya?a Kiev refu-
senik who was diagnosed as having a malignant
brain tumor in August 1986?that her cancer might
be related to the effects of radiation from Cherno-
byl'. The diagnosis?medically unlikely, even
though there are fast-growing brain tumors?indi-
cates that trained professionals may be subject to
the same overreaction.
Local officials appear to be aware of the public
mistrust but have been unable to stem it. In an
interview with Western journalists last December,
Ukrainian Health Minister Romanenko said some
people in the Chernobyl'-Kiev area are asking for a
blood test every 10 days, "three times more often than
recommended." (The blood test measures changes in
the bone due to radiation exposure.) Although au-
thorities brush aside such public concern as rumor
and ignorance, they admit that, even a year later, the
population remains skeptical and refuses to be reas-
sured by officials. Romanenko expressed his frustra-
tion during a press conference on Chernobyl's first
anniversary, saying that many still continue to stay
indoors as much as possible, refuse to open windows,
and avoid eating many foods, despite assurances that
there is no longer a need for such precautions.
Responding to continued popular anxiety and discon-
tent, Pravda Ukrainy on 23 November 1986 an-
nounced the formation of special centers in Kiev and
Chernigov Oblasts as well as the major health care
centers in the city of Kiev to handle the questions
about health risks from radiation. The creation of
such centers eight months after the accident indicated
regime recognition that public trust has eroded.
Moscow is sensitive to the credibility gap created by
public anxiety about health issues and has tried to
counter by vigilant monitoring of information released
to the public. Although Moscow has admitted 31
deaths?all within the first three months of the
incident?grounds for public doubt remain. When the
Secret
Estimates of Chernobyl's Impact on Health
According to a draft report from a US Government
task force presented at a meeting of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 6 February 1987,
the release of radiation from the Chernobyl' explo-
sion and fire may cause up to 4,000 cancer deaths in
Europe and 10,000 additional unanticipated cancer
deaths in the Soviet Union during the next 70 years.
The interagency government task force, chaired by
Harold R. Denton of the NRC, also estimated that
the accident may eventually cause mental retardation
in up to 300 newborn babies in the Soviet Union.
These were infants born of women who were pregnant
at the time of the accident and who lived within 30
kilometers of the nuclear reactor. NRC officials said
that the figures represent the US Government's best
assessment at that time of the long-term health toll
from the disaster.
A more recent unofficial study claims 39,000 may die
of cancer in the next 50 years, most of them outside
the Soviet Union. According to our experts, this study
does not use reliable or complete data, but may
further contribute to public uncertainty in the USSR
and Western Europe.a The Soviets are estimating an
increase of 1,000 to 3,000 cancer deaths over the next
50 years in the Soviet Union or less than 0.4 percent
of the natural death rate.
a This information is from the monthly journal Science, 8 May
1987, "Recalculating the Cost of Chernobyl'," pp. 958-59. The
chief author of the report is Marvin Goldman of the University of
California at Davis.
Soviet weekly journal Nedelya disclosed in its May
1987 edition the death of the filmmaker Vladimir
Shevchenko from radiation exposure received while
making a documentary "Chernobyl': A Chronicle of
Difficult Weeks," the regime reacted quickly.' Leonid
Il'in, vice president of the USSR Medical Academy,
9 Shevchenko died sometime in March 1987 but has not been
included in this official toll. The regime maintains that there have
been no additional deaths from the accident since June 1986 when
the official death toll was put at 31, and that only the 237 members
of the initial group of plant workers and firemen had radiation
sickness.
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told the Ukrainian republic newspaper that Shev-
chenko suffered from a fatal illness before his involve-
ment in filming cleanup operations between May and
August 1986. Il'in also denied Nedelya's statement
that some of Shevchenko's cameramen are now in the
hospital with radiation sickness.
Clearly, Moscow is concerned that revelations such as
the filmmaker's death will reinforce suspicion among
the Soviet population that the regime is not being
candid in its treatment of the health risks. Fear is
probably high among the families of the tens of
thousands of military and civilian personnel who were
ordered to the zone for decontamination work and the
evacuees. Health problems among the reservists, most
of whom are non-Russians, could increase social
tension and anti-Russian sentiments.'?
Anxiety Over Food and Water. In addition to concerns
about overall health risks, there is evidence that
considerable fear of contaminated food and water is
likely to continue. The effects of this concern were
still being felt in the farmers' markets as recently as
this summer. According to the USSR Ministry of
Health, all produce on sale until August 1987 had to
have a stamp certifying the product had passed
inspection for radiation. Shoppers reportedly continue
to suspiciously question the vendors about the origin
of the food and frequently ask to see the vendor's
passport to be certain the produce was grown outside
the Chernobyl' region.
Fear of radiation-contaminated food was not limited
to the affected regions. People reportedly avoided
eating meat and drinking milk as far away as Lenin-
grad.
although meat was abundant in Leningrad during the
summer of 1986, people were afraid to buy it. Similar-
ly, powdered milk became scarce because people were
buying it instead of fresh milk.
it was necessary to call in soldiers from a
nearby military division to butcher livestock in a
Leningrad meat factory because the workers refused
1? Our judgment that most of the reservists at Chernobyl' were non-
Russians is based on the
identity of the operational units mobilized for the cleanup effort.
They came from throughout the Soviet Union?including Ukraine,
Belorussia, Estonia, Kirghiziya, and Siberia.
19
Chernobyl' Area Kolkhoz Markets
The official banning of anything grown in the Cherno-
byl' region has given way to rumors that Chernobyl's
irradiated vegetable gardens and orchards produce
apples and tomatoes of unusual size. Many jokes
capture the citizens' continued fears and skepticism
regarding official reassurances of the safety of the
food they eat. One particularly cynical joke making
the rounds is a good illustration: An old woman at a
Moscow collective farm market shouts; "Apples from
Chernobyl', apples from Chernobyl'!" A visitor asks
her aghast, "Who would buy such apples?" She
replies, "They are very popular?some buy them for
their wives, mothers-in-law. . . ."
Belorussian kolkhoz markets were also affected.
Shoppers reportedly avoided buying plums from Be-
lorussia, fearing the fruit came from the Ukraine.
According to the vice president of the Soviet Medical
Academy, 11 percent of a total of 270,000 food
samples taken this May in southern Belorussia con-
tained radioactive matter. Although he did not give
the levels of radiation, he did stress that no radia-
tion-related illnesses have been reported in Belorus-
sia since the accident. Six months later, he told a US
official that the massive banning of foodstuffs?the
second most important pathway of exposure to cesi-
um, the first being ground deposits?probably re-
duced the overall level of exposure by a factor of 10
to 20.
to do the work, believing the livestock to be contami-
nated with radioactive material.
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Chernobyl' region during the 1987 spring floods.
People worried that the runoff from the melting snow
could threaten to contaminate the water supply with
radiation. A French science counselor visiting Kiev in
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Protecting Water Supplies
The marshy portion of Poles 'ye region west of Cher-
nobyl', which received the highest level of radioactive
contamination, is not a major agricultural area, but
it contains the headwaters of Pripyat' River, which
flows into the Kiev Reservoir. The reservoir, also
supplied by the Dnepr River, provides water to some
32 million people.
The Soviet report to the International Atomic Energy
Agency in August 1986 conceded that high levels of
cesium-137 are expected to be relatively persistent in
the marshes of Belorussia and the Ukraine in the
next few years. As long as the radioactivity remains
in the marsh's plants and soil, the water supplies are
in danger of contamination.
To protect water resources against contamination, in
September 1986 the Soviets began to install nonover-
flow dams, filtering dikes with a fill of a special
material to prevent the possibility of radionuclides
being washed into the river in hazardous quantities.
Pravda said at the end of October 1986 that a 29-
kilometer network of such barriers had been built
around the Chernobyl' nuclear power plant water
supplies at a cost of 11 million rubles.
March 1987 reported that rumors circulated about a
reevacuation of area children, and bottled water
stocks were wiped out all across the region as people
stocked up for the perceived emergency.
In November 1986,
a new water supply pipeline was being
constructed for the inhabitants of Kiev. Although
Kiev's existing water supply from the Dnepr River
was found to be safe from contamination, concern by
the government regarding the possibility of residual
contamination led to the construction of an alternative
water source from the Desna River. Lukonin admitted
that this assessment was not made public for fear of
causing a further bout of panic among the local
population. Since then, the water supply from the
Secret
Dnepr has been resumed, and continued reports con-
firmed that the water in the Kiev Reservoir remains
safe.
Strain on Health Care System. Medical resources
diverted to treat the Chernobyl'-related medical prob-
lems are likely to further strain the Soviet health care
delivery system and intensify public frustration. Sovi-
et health care even before Chernobyl' was inadequate
to deal with many medical problems associated with
contemporary industrial society and has been the
object of recent criticism from top leaders, including
Gorbachev.
The medical costs of monitoring and treating as many
as 500,000 people?an official Soviet figure?for
radiation effects will burden the health care system. A
team of Soviet physicians visiting the United States in
October 1987 told an audience of American physi-
cians that the medical cost of treating the Chernobyl'
victims and screening the population has reached 16
billion dollars (see figure 5)."
The accident exposed widespread shortages in medical
supplies and equipment. To fill the gap, the Soviets
have been relying heavily on Western medical equip-
ment. Much of this Western medical technology will
be used in the new Kiev Center on Radiation Effect
on Humans.
This new All-Union Scientific Center for Radiation
Medicine of the USSR Academy of Sciences?
established in Kiev?has set up an all-union registry
to monitor the radiation effects and cancer develop-
ment in the 135,000 evacuees and other people under
medical supervision exposed to radiation, but by early
1987 it had not yet been allocated enough money to
carry out the program.
" Boris Shcherbina, head of the government commission, told a
Western newspaper on 28 April 1987 that all the people who were
in the contamination zone are under medical supervision and gave
the total number of 500,000. The breakdown of this figure was
provided by the Ukrainian Minister of Health this September:
20,000 in hospitals, more than 200,000 adults and almost 100,000
children.
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Figure 5. Radiation burns on a Chernobyl' fire-
man, one of the 500,000 persons now being
monitored for long-term effects of radiation.
it is not clear which organization is
handling the program, what data the Soviets have
collected, or what they are planning to do. This
suggests that the program has little direction from
Soviet leadership, and that the prospects for adequate
long-term care for the Soviet citizens who were put at
risk by the nuclear accident?mostly Ukrainians and
Belorussians?are not guaranteed.
The cost of the nuclear accident is likely to be
reflected not only in impaired health of evacuees but
also in poorer health care provided to areas losing
health care personnel as a result of the exodus of
people from the Chernobyl' area. Although the initial
transfer of Ukrainian and Belorussian medical teams
to deal with Chernobyl'-related patients had only a
short-term impact on the health delivery systems, the
21
loss of health professionals to permanent relocation
has created shortages in this sector in the Ukraine and
Belorussia, according to the Kiev Oblast officials.
Opposition in the Republics
The most significant long-term cost of the accident
may be the exacerbation of longstanding tensions and
resentments among the non-Russian minorities. This
is particularly true in western non-Russian republics
of the USSR?the Baltic, Belorussia, and the
Ukraine.
The Baltic. Moscow's requisitioning of food, housing,
and summer places for the Chernobyl' evacuees and
the conscription of reservists for decontamination
aroused great resentment among ethnic nationals in
the Baltic republics and led to active protests:
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conscripts, who were sent to help decontaminate the
Chernobyl' 30-kilometer zone, conducted a work
stoppage when they were told in June 1986 that
their tour had been extended from two to six
months. a demonstration was
held in Tallinn in support of the work stoppage and
to protest the forcible use of military reservists for
decontamination work.
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? In Latvia and Estonia, where ethnic populations
constitute only a bare majority, citizens reportedly
protested the resettlement of Ukrainian and Belo-
russian Chernobyl' refugees because they viewed
these Slavic "immigrants" as further evidence of
Moscow's desire to dilute Baltic nationalities.
? In Lithuania, emigre press reported active demon-
strations in June 1986 against the construction there
of another reactor similar to the one at Chernobyl'.
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The widely held belief that many Baltic conscripts
were sent to Chernobyl' against their will is bolstered
by persistent?though contradictory?rumors of
soldiers being shot by the Soviets for refusing to do
decontamination work. Even if untrue, the rumors
still merit attention as an indication of the intense fear
felt by those engaged in the cleanup of Chernobyl'
and the degree of opposition to the regime's handling
of the crisis. For example:
? The Chairman of the Estonian Refugees Committee
of Solidarity in Sweden reported that 12 Estonians
were executed in June 1986 for refusing to take part
in decontamination.
Belorussia and the Ukraine. The accident does not
appear to have fueled as much antiregime or anti-
Russian protest in the Ukraine or Belorussia as it did
in the Baltic, but some groups have expressed strong
dissatisfaction with the regime regarding Chernobyl':
? A Soviet citizen from Minsk traveling abroad re-
ported that chemical plant workers in that city held
a sitdown strike in May 1986 over mandatory pay
deduction for the Chernobyl' Aid Fund. The work-
ers reportedly shouted that they were in no less
danger (from chemical contamination in this case)
than the people of Chernobyl'.
Secret
? Citing unidentified Soviet sources, a Western news-
paper reported hundreds of residents in Kiev used
the first anniversary of the the accident for a public
demonstration to demand compensation for dam-
ages they had allegedly suffered.
Some Christian believers in the Ukraine expressed
fear over the nuclear contamination of the 800-year-
old Ukrainian town of Chernobyl', viewing the un-
precedented event in religious terms.'2 A widely circu-
lated rumor, reportedly started by Ukrainian Baptists,
reached the West through samizdat sources, linking
the events at Chernobyl' to the apocalyptic tale of a
star by the same name chernobyl="wormwood"?
which heralds the end of the world in the Book of
Revelation.
Ukrainian officials are probably concerned with the
religious dimension because of the continuing prob-
lems with the Protestant sects and the outlawed
Ukrainian Catholic Church." In a religious connec-
tion with Chernobyl', people have been flocking to a
small Ukrainian village?some 530 kilometers south-
west of Chernobyl'?where a schoolgirl reportedly
saw a vision of the Virgin Mary on the anniversary of
the Chernobyl' nuclear disaster. According to an
August 1987 article in Literaturnaya gazeta, more
than 100,000 people converged on the village in the
first month after the sighting. Since then, authorities
have locked up the church where the vision reportedly
appeared in an effort to discourage visitors. Despite
that, the paper revealed that some 40,000 to 45,000
faithful visit the site daily, and even a Soviet journal-
ist covering the story admitted seeing the vision (see
figure 6).
"Chernobyl' was founded in 1160 as a princedom and has existed
since then, thus occupying an important place in the national
historical consciousness.
" Moscow displayed sensitivity to the religious issue when it
allowed Mother Teresa, the Nobel laureate and Roman Catholic
nun, to visit the Chernobyl' area this August. She requested to set
up a charity mission. Their granting of her request would represent
a significant shift in the official attitude toward religious activity in
the Soviet Union.
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,
Figure 6. "Miracle in Grushevo"?the Western Ukrainian village
in L'voy Oblast where a young girl reportedly saw a vision of the
Virgin Mary on the first anniversary of the Chernobyl' accident. In
August 1987, Literaturnaya gazeta reported daily crowds of
40,000 to 45,000 persons converged on the site.
Although evidence of popular demonstrations and
protest in the Ukraine and Belorussia is generally
lacking, the accident fueled strong criticism among
intellectuals, who were already upset about the siting
of so many nuclear reactors in the region. At a recent
writer's conference sponsored by the literary journal
Druzhba narodov, Ukrainian writer and poet Vladi-
mir Yavorovskiy implicitly blamed Moscow by noting
that his people paid the price for the accident at
Chernobyl': "There is a dead slice of Ukrainian and
Belorussian land from which the people have depar-
ted." The Belorussian writer Ales' Adamovich?who
has been a strong proponent of more openness and
public control over the nuclear power decisions, told
an audience attending a film festival in Berlin that a
23
2,000-megawatt nuclear plant under construction
near Minsk had been converted to a thermoelectric
plant because of public protest. The large Minsk
nuclear heat and power plant, which is scheduled for
completion in 1992, is a particularly sensitive public
issue because it is situated close to the city with a
population of 1.5 million. Legasov confirmed in No-
vember 1987 that the Minsk nuclear plant has been
shelved because of public opposition
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Chernobyl' has even been invoked by the Russian
nationalist group Pamyat' as part of its anti-Semitic
arsenal to "cleanse" Jewish influence from the Soviet
Union. They blamed the accident on the Zionists.
Such sentiments show Chernobyl's continuing poten-
tial to inflame ethnic and social tensions that hinder
Gorbachev's efforts to unite public opinion behind his
domestic reform program.
Antinuclear Sentiment
The accident has further raised public consciousness
about environmental issues that have received promi-
nent media attention under Gorbachev. Environmen-
tal concerns have contributed to a climate of public
activism that could contest Moscow's plans for accel-
erated nuclear power expansion in the next decade.
The Ukraine, for instance, is still scheduled to in-
crease the number of plants in the 1990s from four?
one of which is Chernobyl'?to 10, each with multiple
units. Many of these will be built near cities of a
million or more, including Kiev, Khmelnitskiy, Khar-
kov, Odessa, Rovno, and Zaporozhye.
Concern among scientists about the impact of nuclear
plants in the Ukraine existed even before Chernobyl'.
A week before the accident, the president of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, Boris Paton,
publicly called for a review on siting and distribution
of reactors in the republic and recommended the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences coordinate environ-
mental protection programs in the republic. Since the
accident, Paton has expressed his view that large
industrial complexes should be held accountable for
ecological disasters and that they should be required
to maintain stringent safety measures ensuring
"absolute reliability" of their technology.
On the first anniversary of the Chernobyl' accident,
Vitaliy Chumak, head of the Radiological Ecological
Center at the Institute of Nuclear Research of the
Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, criticized the Soviet
nuclear industry in the English language weekly
Moscow News for continuing to base their decisions
on where to build nuclear plants mostly on logistical
considerations?existing roads, labor resources, water
resources?without fully considering public safety or
the environment. Chumak's concern about siting sev-
eral nuclear power stations close together near heavily
Secret
populated areas had been raised by Soviet scientists as
early as 1979. In June 1987, the popular literary
weekly Literaturnaya gazeta published an article by
the Ukrainian poet Boris Oleynik, specifically blam-
ing the planners and designers of Chernobyl' for not
heeding the warnings of scientists and economists and
siting the giant nuclear power plant on a river flowing
into a major water supply reservoir and in a flood
plain of the Poles'ye region. More recently, a Western
press account reported that an unofficial club called
Svetlitza was gathering signatures in Kiev protesting
the presence of nuclear power plants in heavily popu-
lated areas. Another example was provided by the US
Embassy in Moscow, which obtained a petition, re-
portedly circulating in Moscow, calling for the shut-
ting down the Chernobyl' nuclear plant, halting con-
struction of other nuclear plants, and changing the
policy of siting nuclear plants near large cities. Re-
portedly, the petitioners are particularly disturbed
with the construction now in progress on the nuclear
power plant in Crimea, a popular and widely used
resort area.
In the Caucasus, where the republic elites are not
enthusiastic about nuclear energy, the Chernobyl'
accident revived hopes among proponents of small-
scale hydroelectric power plants (GES). Such plants
powered the Soviet Union in the reconstruction years
(1945-65), but in the last 15 years have been overshad-
owed by large thermal plants. According to recent
press reports, Georgia, which has fought having a
nuclear plant on its land, is also arguing strongly for
more small-scale hydroelectric plants. These reports
confirm the republic's commitment to pursue this
option. This October, some 2,000 Armenians demon-
strated in Yerevan for the closure of the nuclear
power plant and a chemical factory that they say has
polluted the area for 40 years.
While Soviet citizens?in contrast to their counter-
parts in the West?have not mounted a major protest
against the development of nuclear power, antinuclear
sentiment is growing as noted by the Armenian
demonstration and the formation of the Svetliza
group. Nuclear energy has also become more of a
public issue after the regime's attempts to minimize
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the effects of the nuclear accident. Local Soviet press
indicates that concern is particularly high in areas
with Chernobyl'-type reactors (RBMKs) like Kursk,
Leningrad, Smolensk, and Ignalina in Lithuania. The
Leningrad nuclear plant is located in Sosnovyy Bor,
70 kilometers northwest of Leningrad, near Estonia,
and residents of both Leningrad and Estonia are
worried about the safety of the plant. Recently, an
unofficial environmental group, formed in opposition
to the nuclear plant in Sosnovyy Bor, has asked to join
a Leningrad coordinating organization for various
environmental groups. The citizens of Sosnovyy Bor
may have already won certian concessions from their
city executive party committee (gorispolkom) regard-
ing the ecology-sensitive project. According to
Pravda, a promise was extracted from city officials to
consider public opinion and environmental factors in
future city planning.
more
emphasis has been placed on reactor safety in the
USSR since the Chernobyl' accident, probably as a
result of public concern. However, Soviet citizens are
apparently reluctant to trust official assurances that
safety alterations in the other Soviet nuclear facilities
have been made or that existing safety rules will be
enforced. They worry that a greater demand for
energy to make up the loss caused by Chernobyl' will
increase pressure on the nuclear sector to place
growth above safety. Throughout the summer of
1986, officials found it necessary to assure the public
that the repairs on all remaining 14 graphite-moder-
ated reactors have not been waived to overcome
electricity shortfalls and that extensive safety checks
were carried out even in a nongraphite nuclear reactor
like the one in Armenia.
While it is unlikely that public opinion will alter the
Soviet commitment to nuclear power, debate on the
location and safety in the nuclear industry should
continue to grow, particularly in the present atmo-
sphere of greater openness. For example, in April
1987, some 60 members of the Ukrainian Academy of
Sciences signed a petition opposing the completion of
units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl'. Reportedly, the petition
was about to be published by Literaturnaya gazeta
when Moscow decided to shelve the expansion plans,
conceivably in part as a response to public opposition.
25
Environmentalists have also successfully protested
against the construction of new nuclear power plants.
In November, the head of the government commission
investigating the accident, Valeriy Legasov, told the
Western press that public pressure caused the cancel-
lation of the Minsk and Odessa nuclear power plants,
and the Soviets have sus-
pended plans to operate the Gorkiy nuclear plant for
the same reason.
Consumer Dissatisfaction
While the most serious costs have been to regime
credibility, the need to divert state funds into contain-
ing the disaster may result in some readjustments to
Gorbachev's initiatives for social programs, including
better housing and health care, and may undermine
the regime's ability to deliver on its promises.
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Moscow announced in December 1986 that a total of
800 million rubles were budgeted for direct compen-
sation in housing and short-term subsidies for the
Chernobyl' victims. The rest of the cleanup opera-
tion?entombing the damaged fourth reactor, decon-
taminating the remaining reactors and plant environ-
ment, and protecting the water and soil from
contamination?was initially projected to cost .
2 billion rubles, or 0.2 percent of GNP for 1986, but
in December that this estimate was too conserva-
tive. A Soviet engineer attached to the Chernobyl'
government investigation commission estimated the
cost of cleanup to be 25 billion rubles, or more than 2
percent of GNP for 1986.'5
The evacuation has aggravated housing shortages in
some areas. A large number of those who were
evacuated to cities far away from the republic, such as
Frunze in Kirghiziya, stayed there. Housing was built
for them and they were integrated into the work
" Disruption to the Soviet nuclear power industry through 1990 will
be relatively minor and will not delay Soviet intentions to increase
reliance on this energy source.
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Incidents in Soviet Nuclear Power Plants
Accidents in Soviet nuclear power plants were rarely
discussed before Chernobyl'. The Soviets have consis-
tently denied that such accidents had occurred. In
part, this is a problem of the Soviet definition of a
nuclear accident, which is so narrow that even the
Chernobyl' accident may not qualify. However, the
Soviets do report "incidents involving the nuclear
plants" to the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Some of the incidents reported include:
? A leak of primary-cooling water through the
pressure-vessel-heat flange seal in unit 3 of the
Kola nuclear reactor in 1983.
? Damage to one of the main circulation pumps in
unit 1 of South Ukraine nuclear plant in 1983.
? Corrosion-erosion damage caused steam-generator
tubes to leak in unit 3 of Novovoronezh nuclear
power plant in 1983.
? Corrosion-erosion damage suffered by the reactor
vessel at Kolskaya nuclear power plant in 1983.
? Shutdown of Kalinin's unit 1 because of malfunc-
tion of pilot-operated relief valve of the pressurizer
in 1985.
? A primary coolant leak into a steam generator at
the Rovno nuclear power plant in 1982, which
damaged the units's steam generator and shut down
the plant.
Reportedly these incidents did not involve the reactor
core nor caused any radiation damage.
There have been more serious accidents at Soviet
nuclear power plants, according to Pyotr Neporozh-
nyy, the former Minister of Power and Electrifica-
tion, including an explosion and a radiation leak. He
said to a US Congressman in 1987 that one accident
involved a rupturing of a coolant line, and another an
explosion that spread radioactive steam to other
parts of the unit.
fires and other accidents
at plant facilities:
there was afire in
the Armenian nuclear power plant in 1980-81.
? In a series of fictional short stories, which appeared
in the November 1986 monthly journal Neva?but
reportedly were based on the personal experience of
Grigorij Medvedev, a senior engineer at a Soviet
nuclear facility?the author describes slipshod
safety practices, dangerous cleanup techniques, and
a reactor power surge, similar to the one that
actually happened at the Chernobyl' plant, result-
ing in several deaths.
On 11 September 1987, Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya
gave a list of 368 accidents in Soviet nuclear and
conventional plants that happened between 1981 and
1984. They were all caused by plant operator error,
according to the paper. It did not say how many
accidents of the total took place in a nuclear plant
and how many in a conventional plant, or list other
nonoperator-caused accidents.
force some 120,000 persons have
been completely and permanently rehoused (see figure
7). In addition, many fled on their own from nearby
cities such as Kiev, Chernigov, and Gomel', according
to US Embassy officials. A samizdat letter from the
Ukraine, which appeared in the Paris emigre paper
Russkaya Mysl', puts the number of those who left
Kiev on their own at 150,000. Housing assigned to the
Secret
Chernobyl refugees have added to the chronic short-
ages in Kiev, Chernigov, and other cities. The former
Premier Aleksandr Lyashko said that upward of
13,000 apartments will be needed to be replaced in
the city of Kiev alone.
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Figure 7. Thousands of evacuees were resettled
in or near Kiev, many in hastily built settlements
like the one depicted behind a displaced Cherno-
byl' woman.
The sudden loss of hundreds of thousands of people
from the affected area is already having repercussions
in social services and the agricultural labor force.
Kiev Oblast party boss Revenko last December said
the area faces serious shortages of specialists for state
farms, schools, stores, and hospitals because most of
the people who left the area after the accident have
not returned and may never return. In addition,
people are apparently reluctant to work in the con-
taminated zone where Chernobyl' nuclear plant units
1, 2, and 3 are now in operation. The new director of
the plant and other experts expressed concern about
shortages of workers?now at about half the preacci-
dent strength.
27
Moscow eased part of the pinch on its coffers by
forcing the population to bear some of the costs of the
cleanup. Decontamination duty was assigned wher-
ever possible to the military, whose wage costs are less
because civilian cleanup workers received double
wages. The regime also defrayed costs through so-
called voluntary contributions made to a special Cher-
nobyl' Aid Fund. The 530 million rubles, collected
from the deduction of one day's wages from every
Soviet worker, offset about one-fourth of the lowest
official estimate but, as noted, cost was probably
much higher. Many Soviet citizens told foreign tour-
ists and US Embassy officials that the contributions
were mandatory and were demanded even from re-
tired elderly people on meager pensions. While many
Soviets?possibly even a majority?welcomed an op-
portunity to help, the de facto compulsory nature of
the contributions probably generated some resent-
ment.
Other involuntary costs imposed by the government
were also unpopular. The cost for the apartments
"borrowed," presumably on a temporary basis, from
various enterprises and local soviets in different re-
publics to house the evacuees was mostly borne by
these enterprises. Some of the cost for the evacuation
of large numbers of children and their mothers to
Pioneer camps and vacation resorts was borne by
various trade unions and local soviets, but the greatest
cost was shouldered by individual families. Through-
out the Soviet Union, parents had to find alternate
summer places for their children and ways to finance
them. Many regular planned vacations in Soviet
resorts were canceled. The Black Sea coast was
reportedly completely closed to all but Chernobyl'-
area evacuees.
Implications for Regime Policy
Gorbachev's drive for increased open criticism of
shortcomings in Soviet society and his announcement
of domestic reform, glasnost, and democratization has
already begun to divert domestic and foreign attention
from Chernobyl'. Despite this, however, the Cherno-
byl' accident continues to pose several longer term
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Relocation
Moscow announced the evacuation of 135,000 per-
sons: approximately 30,000 from Belorussia 's Gomel'
Oblast and the remaining 105,000 from the Ukraine.
Reportedly, thousands more left the nearby cities on
their own. By the end of the summer of 1986, it was
clear that most of the evacuated population would
not be returning for the winter and more permanent
resettlement was needed. Belorussia resettled 10,000
families in hastily constructed prefabricated houses
in Gomel 's northern rayons.
The Ukraine resettled upward of 27,000 people in the
56 new villages built just outside of the 30-kilometer
zone. Many evacuees are still living in very crowded
conditions, however. According to Kiev Oblast offi-
cials, there are plans to build another 3,000 homes
and 1,500 apartments to alleviate the crowding.
Only 300 evacuees from the Ukraine have been
permitted to return to two of the decontaminated
villages in the zone. Further north of the site in
Belorussia, the inhabitants of 10 villages?about
1,500 persons?have gone back to their dwellings.
The rest have been permanently resettled elsewhere
with their possessions and livestock.
The new homes have modern facilities, are complete-
ly furnished, and constitute a great improvement over
the overwhelming majority of the housing stock left
behind in the Chernobyl' countryside, according to
local officials. Still, some evacuees refused to resettle
there. Local officials say it is because of the remote-
ness of the area, but the real reason for their
reluctance may be the nearness of the new settlements
to the contamination zone.
Plant operators have been allocated 8,000 apartments
in Kiev and Chernigov and another 6,000 apartments
in other rayons and towns of Kiev Oblast. About
3,000 online operators at the recently restarted reac-
tor units 1 and 2 shuttle between Kiev and Zelenyy
Mys?the partly completed settlement on the banks
of the Dnepr River?in a two-week rotation.
In October 1986, plans for the construction of a new
city called Slavutich were advanced by the Central
Committee of the Communist Party. Slavutich will
be located in Chernigov Oblast and will house 20,000
power engineers and plant operators at its completion
in two years, according to Soviet press (see figure 1).
problems. The public's confidence in the nuclear
system has been shaken, and there is skepticism about
the leaderships's commitment to guarantee safety.
The growing popular resentment and concern about
environmental protection and individual safety is forc-
ing the regime to give a higher priority to these issues,
putting pressure on the nuclear ministries and depart-
ments and ultimately on national resources.
Chernobyl' and the Glasnost Debate
Gorbachev successfully exploited adverse Western
publicity to the accident to extend his domestic
glasnost campaign?which was only in its infancy
when the accident occurred. The disaster spurred
Gorbachev's move to open up discussion of social and
Secret
economic problems.
Gorbachev hoped Chernobyl' would shake up the
party establishment so that it will henceforth comply
with his demand for more openness and honesty in
internal party communications. The initial public
relations debacle strengthened the argument for
greater media openness in discussing domestic short-
comings. Several articles in Pravda, for example,
pointed out that a lack of complete information had
encouraged harmful rumors. Supporters of Gorba-
chev's glasnost policy, like the noted journalist Fedor
Burlatskiy, criticized the domestic media's early si-
lence as costing the regime credibility. In his closing
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remarks following the January Central Committee
Plenum, Gorbachev said the precise means that can
protect the party from errors in politics are openness,
criticism, and self-criticism. "The price of these errors
is known to all of us," he added, which no doubt in
large part, applied to the Chernobyl' information
coverup.
Since April 1986, on several occasions the Soviet
media have promptly reported on accidents causing
loss of life and publicized punitive measures taken
against the officials responsible. Soviet media treat-
ment of the sinking of the Admiral Nakhimov passen-
ger liner in August 1986 because of gross negli-
gence?apparently drunkenness?and the firing of
the responsible minister and prosecution of its captain
and his deputy is a striking example. Other disasters,
such as a collision of two passenger trains that killed
40 persons because one of the engine drivers was
asleep, the spectacular methane coal mine explosion
in the Ukraine late last year, and the more recent one
in Chaykino mine in Donetsk have been reported
immediately.
A year after the accident, however, there are signs
that the Soviets are again being less direct about
Chernobyl' and that the openness in the months
following the accident may have found its limits.
Despite signs of popular concern, the regime has not
taken steps to give the public more of a say on these
issues. The major bureaucracies are resisting public
pressure, and there are some signs of backtracking on
glasnost:
? Two Soviet journalists complained this April in the
Soviet weekly Moscow News that information on
Chernobyl' is being withheld and is increasingly
difficult to obtain, noting that information reported
to the International Atomic Energy Agency is not
being given to the public.
? The official Soviet report presented to the IAEA at
the August 1986 meeting in Vienna, and made
widely available to the West, was never released to
the Soviet public. A 20-page summary was eventu-
ally published in the November issue of Atornnaya
Energiya, and Elektricheskiye stantsii, both highly
technical journals with a limited distribution.
29
Secret
? Despite pledges of cooperation at the outset, the
Soviets have been reluctant to share the research on
radiation data they have collected since the acci-
dent, according to the US Department of Energy
and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In addi-
tion to the traditional reluctance of the Soviet Union
to disclose information, the Soviets may fear new
data will disagree with the information they have
already made public or will prove embarrassing if
future casualties appear among those being moni-
tored, since they have claimed the health effect will
be insignificant.
The Moscow News article suggests the traditional
argument that public opinion has no role in the
scientific and technical sphere is still being used to
justify the restrictions. Many in the affected bureau-
cracies, and even some senior leaders, have a vested
interest in ensuring the consequences of Chernobyl'
disappear from public view. They would like to avoid
a real debate on the direction of the Soviet nuclear
energy policy and on the location and safety of
existing and future nuclear plants. Such a debate is
troublesome to a regime formally committed to
nuclear energy and the economic benefits of building
nuclear plants near highly populated areas. Moreover,
continued publicity will leave the regime open to
criticism if it is unwilling to allocate further resources
to deal with long-term environmental and health
consequences.
The news blackout during the three-week trial of
plant officials in July was further indication that
authorities are tightly controlling information on
Chernobyl'. Shortly before the trial, Soviet Foreign
Ministry officials described it as open and indicated
Western reporters could attend. On the second day of
the proceedings, however, foreign reporters were
barred from the courtroom, and the trial continued
behind closed doors. The decision to conduct the trial
in secret, possibly in an effort to avoid revealing
technical testimony that addressed reactor design
flaws, demonstrates Moscow's sensitivity to issues
that can feed the growing domestic concerns about
the safety of the Soviet nuclear industry.
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Criticism of official suppression of open discussion on
Chernobyl' was voiced at the April All-Union Wri-
ter's Plenum by the Ukrainian poet Boris Oleynik. In
his speech, he expressed his frustration with the
central press, saying he has been denied access to the
media to publish his reservations about the completion
of units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl'. He told Literaturnaya
gazeta he repeatedly tried to speak out but was not
permitted to do so. Another prominent Soviet literary
figure, Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, told lzvestiya there
were attempts by unspecified ministries and depart-
ments to suppress the production of the Chernobyl'
documentary, "Kolokol Chernobyl'ya," because the
film was critical of nuclear technocrats.
Nuclear Energy Policy
While popular support for nuclear power in the West
has been eroded further by the Chernobyl' disaster,
Moscow's formally stated nuclear energy goals re-
main unchanged, despite signs of public anxiety.
However, it is attempting to be responsive on the
safety issue, creating an internal tension in regime
policy.
The nuclear energy bureaucrats remain firm in their
determination to rely more heavily on nuclear power.
Minister of Atomic Energy Nikolay Lukonin an-
nounced in April 1987 that Moscow's plans to double
electricity output at nuclear power stations by 1990,
as compared with the 1985 level, and more than treble
it by 1995 remain unshaken. According to Andronik
Petros'yants, the recently retired head of the State
Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy, after
the RBMKs already under construction are complet-
ed, the graphite-moderated reactor will be phased out
in the Soviet Union, and future construction of nucle-
ar plants will be based on water-cooled, water-moder-
ated reactors. This change has not gone far enough to
satisfy those among the Soviet environmentalists who
demanded the closing of all Chernobyl'-type reactors,
but energy needs and high cost apparently rule out
this option.
The regime has meanwhile publicized new measures
to ensure reactor safety, including a new decree on
nuclear safety by the USSR Council of Ministers in
July. In the same month, the Politburo passed a
resolution for the development of automated systems
Secret
at nuclear power stations. What impact on safety
these changes will have is not yet clear. The new
decree designed to strengthen safety inspection regu-
lations for the State Committee for Safety in the
Atomic Energy Industry focuses primarily on new
nuclear power stations. And more rigorous operator
training and a few hardware modifications proposed
by the Ministry of Atomic Energy will do little to
improve the existing RBMKs reactors and the earlier
pressurized water reactors (VVERs), which have sig-
nificant safety problems. Decommissioning or extend-
ed shutdowns of these reactors may be the only safe
solution, but not one that the Safety Committee is
now capable of executing.
Since the accident, the nuclear energy industry has
undergone an extensive reorganization designed,
among other things, to make it more responsive to the
public concerns of safety. The reference at the Cher-
nobyl' trial to the secrecy of nuclear engineering is an
implicit criticism of the industry's wholly technocratic
approach, which had traditionally given little weight
to social concerns. There is also renewed discussion on
the siting of future nuclear plants in more remote
areas, stressing ecology as a major consideration.
However, it is too early to judge what actual changes
these measures will bring.
Another Nuclear Accident?
Western analysts agree that the RBMK reactors?
nearly half of the Soviet nuclear power capacity?
have fundamental deficiencies that no reasonable
modification can eliminate and pose a continued
safety hazard, remaining vulnerable to severe acci-
dents.' The Soviet Union now has more experience
and is better prepared to deal with a nuclear power
plant accident than any other country in the world.
Still, another nuclear catastrophe would deliver a
serious blow to Soviet nuclear policy and could pro-
duce high-level political shakeup?including in the
Central Committee and ministries responsible for
"Although a serious accident in another Chernobyl'-type reactor
would pose considerable social and political repercussions for the
Soviets and could mean the end of RBMKs, a major accident in a
VVER reactor would have far graver implications for Soviet
confidence in nuclear reactor design because the water-moderated
reactor is slated to be the workhorse of the 1990s, while the RBMK
was being phased out even before Chernobyl'.
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a
Reorganization of the Nuclear Industry
Since the accident, the nuclear energy sector has
undergone an extensive reorganization designed to
make it more responsive to the concerns of safety.
Currently, the ministries and Soviet organizations
responsible for nuclear power in the USSR are as
follows: (a) the Ministry of Atomic Energy (newly
formed since July 1986 and headed by Nikolay
Lukonin) assumed responsibility for operating all
nuclear power plants, taking over some authority
from other ministries; (b) the State Committee for
Safety in the Atomic Power Industry; (c and d) the
Ministry of Power and Electrification and the State
Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy?
which earlier controlled some plants but now have
diminished authority; (e) the Ministry of Heavy Pow-
er and Transport Machine Building?which com-
bined the responsibilities of the now defunct Minis-
tries of Power Machine Building and of Heavy and
Transport Machine Building; (f) the Ministry of
Medium Machine Building; (g) and the Ministry of
Health?which will follow up on the radiation risks.
Out of the previously existing bodies, the State
Committee for Safety in the Nuclear Power Industry
has undergone the most significant changes. It has a
new director, Vadim Malyshev, and a larger number
of field engineers to conduct inspections since Cherno-
byl'. Its old director, Yevgeniy V. Kulov, was fired.
The committee's power has been spelled out and
includes the authority to stop an operation if a
violation of regulations occurs. Whether this author-
ity will be exercised is still an open question.
against nuclear energy and the regime that might be
hard to ignore. Another accident would probably
provoke public demonstrations of the sort increasingly
used by independent groups as a platform for political
and social issues
These demonstrations have already had some effect
on regime policy and have sometimes taken on an
anti-Russian cast. The actions of the growing environ-
mental lobby?like the well-organized groups in Len-
ingrad, which led a demonstration of 10,000 persons
to successfully press for the closure of a chemical
complex polluting the environment in Kirishi, or the
public campaign in northern Georgia to halt the
Trans-Caucasus railway planned to tunnel through
the Caucasus Mountains?could serve as a model.
The regime is not likely to maintain a business-as-
usual attitude the second time around, and major
changes in the nuclear industry would have to be
considered.
Outlook
Certain factors point to the potential for public
opinions playing a greater role on nuclear power
decisions in the future:
nuclear industry, which have been given a mandate to
bring the Soviet reactors to more stringent safety
standards.
A segment of the Soviet population?including some
members of the elite with some policy influence?has
much less confidence in the regime's capacity to
guarantee safety. Another nuclear mishap, even a
comparatively minor one, could unleash a backlash
31
25X1
25X1
25X1
The democratization campaign unveiled by Gorba-
chev, Yakovlev, and other senior leaders presup-
poses more sensitivity to public opinion if it is to be
taken seriously. Some informal environmental
groups have apparently been able to get their candi-
dates on the ballot in Leningrad, and the new law on
public review of legislation provides for discussion of
the construction of new enterprises?presumably 25X1
including nuclear power plants?and environmental
issues.
? The views of some of the critics of nuclear power,
like Boris Paton, a full member of the Central
Committee, and some prominent journalists proba- 25X1
bly carry more clout under glasnost and have a
better chance of keeping the pressure on the nuclear
power industry.
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? Finally, the Gorbachev regime would be embar-
rassed by a repeat of the Chernobyl' disaster, or
even an accident on a much smaller scale, given the
effort it has put into cultivating a positive image
abroad.
Although there is no guarantee that public resentment
will translate into policy changes on nuclear power?
evidence now points in the opposite direction?it may
mean greater efforts to reassure the public and,
perhaps, some rethinking of the strategy for siting
nuclear power plants.
Chernobyl' has created a degree of public disillusion-
ment in the regime's capacity to guarantee personal
security and its commitment to provide for the public
well-being. Under the greater latitude of public de-
bate in the Gorbachev era of glasnost?spurred in
part by Chernobyl'?the Soviet citizenry is challeng-
ing national and regional authorities to solve long-
standing societal problems, and there are signs of
leadership support for giving a higher priority to these
issues. Chernobyl' awakened public interest in the
safety of industrial facilities and hightened public
awareness of health and environmental issues. As
noted, public demand to address some of these con-
cerns has already led to specific action by the authori-
ties, like halting construction of a hydroelectric plant
in Latvia this spring, after the public protested its
harmful impact on the environment.
Secret
In addition, the Gorbachev regime has issued a
number of broader policy statements designed to curb
pollution and improve health, and Gorbachev appears
concerned about providing resources to support these
policies. In July 1987, the CPSU Central Committee
issued a sweeping resolution on ecology aimed at
safety in the workplace and improving the quality of
air and water. A month later the Committee an-
nounced a crash program to improve the health care
system. The new Law on the Restructuring of Public
Health stresses major reforms in the area of public
health through prevention and may be implemented
more rapidly than usual, given the growing concern
about pollution and industrial safety.
Accommodation to popular frustration carries a
danger for the regime, however, and could make the
situation worse by exciting expectations. The popula-
tion will be more attentive to future regime perfor-
mance in the area of nuclear safety, public health, and
ecology. There is increased discussion of these issues
in the intellectual community, and social initiative
groups are taking issues to the streets. These concerns
are not likely to evaporate. As public dissatisfaction
grows, the Chernobyl' accident may provide a focal
point around which disgruntled citizens can organize,
and Moscow may discover that Chernobyl' is a con-
tinuing irritant with a potential for social and ethnic
tensions for years to come.
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