CHEMICAL WARFARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R002304700004-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: March 22, 1982
• Content Type: REPORT

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 Approved For Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304700004-5
Special
Report No. 98
United States Department of State
Chemical Warfare in
Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan
Report to the Congress
from Secretary of State
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.,
March 22, 1982
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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON
The years from 1914 to 1918 were among the most destructive of human life
in mankind's history. Yet the sacrifice of millions brought no lasting peace. Of the
elaborate structure for collective security, and the series of pacts outlawing war and
controlling armaments which were negotiated in the aftermath of this First World
War, little remains today. The League of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the
Washington Naval Agreement were all swept away in the tide of aggression which
culminated in a second global conflict. Almost the sole surviving monument, in the
law of nations, to the twenty million dead of the First World War is the 1925
Geneva Protocol outlawing chemical and biological warfare.
Today this accord, among the oldest of arms control agreements still in force,
along with another more recent such agreement banning biological and toxin
weapons, is again in danger of being swept away by a new tide of aggression. Over
the past seven years chemical and toxin weapons have been used, on an ever-
widening scale, in genocidal campaigns against defenseless peoples. These weapons
are being used for precisely the reason mankind has condemned and sought to
outlaw them-because of their indiscriminate action and horrific effects. Today
evidence of chemical and toxin warfare has accumulated to the point where the in-
ternational community can no longer ignore the challenge.
The enclosed report on the use of chemical and toxin weapons by the Soviet
Union and its Allies in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan has been prepared for
submission to the Congress, to the United Nations, and to each member of the inter-
national community. The report is drawn from information made available to the
United States Government since 1975. It contains the most comprehensive compila-
tion of material on this subject available, and presents conclusions which are fully
shared by all relevant agencies of the United States Government.
The international community and the world public need not rely solely on this
report to form their judgment, nor only upon the United States to provide their in-
formation. Lethal chemical and toxin weapons are regrettably still in use in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. New victims appear, new witnesses come forward,
new scientific evidence is uncovered with increasing frequency. The great bulk of the
information in the enclosed report could have been collected and analyzed by any in-
terested government, international organization, or major news service. If the
efforts of the United States Government to call attention to chemical warfare in
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia stimulate others to discover for themselves, and
join in efforts to expose the truth, this report will have served its most important
purpose.
Sincerely,
Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan
Page
Introduction ......... . ......... 4
Key Judgments ................. 6
Methodology ................... 6
Discussion of Findings .......... 7
What Chemical Agents Are Being
Used? ...................... 7
Laos .......................... 8
Kampuchea .................... 10
The Soviet Connection in Southeast
Asia ....................... 13
Afghanistan .................... 14
Motivation for Using Chemical
Weapons .................... 17
ANNEXES
Annex A: A Lao Pilot's Account ... 18
Annex B: Findings of U.S. Govern-
ment Investigative Teams: Use
of Chemical Agents Against
the H'Mong in Laos ........... 19
Annex C: Medical Evidence ....... 21
Annex D: Analysis and Review of
Trichothecene Toxins ......... 23
Annex E: Overview of Natural
Occurrence and Significant
Properties of Trichothecenes ... 27
TABLES
Table 1: Laos: Summary of Re-
ported Chemical Attacks and
Associated Deaths, 1975-81 .. 8
Table 2: Kampuchea: Summary of
Reported Chemical Attacks and
Associated Deaths, 1978-81 .. 11
Table 3: Afghanistan: Summary of
Reported Chemical Attacks and
Associated Deaths, 1979-81 .. 14
Table B-1: Reports of Probable
Chemical Agent Attacks
in Laos .................... 20
Table C-1: Comparison of Reported
"Yellow Rain" Effects With
Known Trichothecene Effects . 22
Table D-1: Symptoms of Chemical
Attacks Reported in Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan . 24
Table E-1: Trichothecene-Produc-
ing Fungi .................. 28
Table E-2: Historical Trichothecene
Mycotoxicoses .............. 28
Table E-3: Physicochemical
Methods for Detection of
Trichothecenes
in Feedstuffs ............... 30
Table E-4: Spontaneous Occur-
rence of Trichothecene Myco-
toxins ..................... 31
MAPS
Laos: Chemical Warfare Opera-
tional Areas .............. . . 9
Kampuchea: Chemical Warfare
Operational Areas ..... . ..... 12
Afghanistan: Chemical Warfare
Operational Areas . . ......... 15
FIGURE
Figure E-1: General Structure of
Trichothecenes .............. 29
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This study presents the evidence avail-
able to the U.S. Government on chemical
warfare activities in Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan through January 1982
and examines the Soviet involvement in
those activities. It is based on a massive
amount of information, from a variety of
sources, which has been carefully com-
piled and analyzed over the years. The
paper is accompanied by annexes and
tables that provide details of the medical
evidence and sample analyses, a
technical description of trichothecene tox-
ins, and other supporting data.
INTRODUCTION
Nearly 7 years ago, reports of the use
of lethal chemical weapons began to
emerge from Laos. In 1978, similar
reports started to come from Kampu-
chea, and in 1979 from Afghanistan.
Early reports were infrequent and frag-
mentary, reflecting the remoteness of
the scene of conflict and the isolation of
those subjected to such attacks. In the
summer of 1979, however, the State
Department prepared a detailed compila-
tion of interviews with refugees from
Laos on this subject. That fall, a U.S.
Army medical team visited Thailand to
conduct further interviews. By the
winter of 1979, the United States felt
that it had sufficiently firm evidence of
chemical warfare to raise the matter
with the governnents of Laos, Vietnam,
and the Soviet Union, All three govern-
ments denied that a basis for concern
over the use of chemical warfare agents
existed.
Dissatisfied with these responses,
and possessing further reports that
lethal chemical agents were in use in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, the
U.S. Government in 1980 began to raise
the issue publicly in the United Nations,
with the Congress, and in other forums.
In August of that year, the State
Department provided extensive docu-
mentation containing evidence of chemi-
cal weapons attacks to the United Na-
tions and also made this material public-
ly available. In December, as a result of
efforts by the United States and other
concerned nations, the U.N. General
Assembly voted to initiate an inter-
national investigation into the use of
chemical weapons. This investigation is
still underway. To date, the U.N. invest-
igating team has been denied admission
to any of the three countries where
these weapons are in use.
Despite the volume of information
on chemical warfare in Southeast Asia
which had become available by 1980,
there remained one major unresolved
issue-the exact nature of the chemical
agents in use. Collection of physical
samples was hindered by the remoteness
of the then principal areas of conflict-
as many as 6 weeks by foot to the
nearest international border. Tests for
known chemical warfare agents on those
samples that were obtained proved con-
sistently negative.
In order to identify the chemical
agents in use, U.S. experts in late 1980
began to go back over all the'report-
ing-as far back as 1975-looking for
new clues. Ifi particular, they sought to
match the reported symptomatology of
victims-which commonly included skin
irritation, dizziness, nausea, bloody
vomiting and diarrhea, and internal
hemorrhaging-with possible causes. As
a result of this review, the U.S. Govern-
ment in mid-1981 began to test physical
samples from Southeast Asia for the
presence of toxins. These substances are
essentially biologically produced
chemical poisons. Although they have
never before been used in war, this was
a technical possibility, and it was noted
that certain toxins could produce the
sorts of symptoms observed in South-
east Asian victims of chemical warfare.
In August 1981, unnatural levels and
combinations of lethal trichothecene tox-
ins were detected in the first sample to
be tested by the United States for such
agents. This consisted of vegetation
taken from a village in Kampuchea
where an attack occurred in which peo-
ple had died after exhibiting the symp-
toms described above. In succeeding
months, further samples, taken from the
sites of attacks in both Kampuchea and
Laos, yielded similar results. So did
samples of blood taken from victims of a
chemical attack in Kampuchea.
Despite a continued flow of reports,
dating back over 7 years, of chemical
warfare in Southeast Asia and more
recently Afghanistan, and despite the
still mounting physical evidence of the
use of trichothecene toxins as warfare
agents, doubts as to the conclusive
nature of the available evidence have
persisted. These doubts have arisen for
several reasons. For one, the evidence of
the use of lethal chemical weapons has
become available over a period of
several years and from a variety of
sources. Few governments, journalists,
or interested members of the public have
been exposed to all of this evidence, nor
has it been available in any one place. A
second difficulty has been the inevitable
need for the U.S. Government to protect
some of the relevant information, often
gathered at personal risk to individuals
who secured it, or obtained through the
use of highly sensitive methods.
February 1980
A bilateral demarche was made to the
Soviets about U.S. concerns regarding chemi-
cal warfare use in both Laos and Kampuchea
and about reports that chemical weapons
were being used by the Soviets in Afghani-
stan. The demarche was made in Geneva in
the context of the U.S./Soviet bilateral
negotiations on a comprehensive prohibition
of chemical weapons production, develop-
ment, and stockpiling.
May 1980
An interagency team of U.S. Government
political, technical, and intelligence officers
was dispatched to Europe to brief the allies
about the problem and to stimulate support
for having an impartial international in-
vestigation conducted.
July 1980
Another bilateral demarche was made to
the Soviets in the context of the U.S./Soviet
bilateral chemical warfare negotiations, con-
cerning the problem of the reported use of
chemical weapons in both Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan.
The Inter-Parliamentary Union adopted a
resolution calling for an impartial interna-
tional investigation of reports of chemical
weapons use.
August 1980
The United States circulated to U.N.
member states a 125-page compendium of
reports and declassified intelligence informa-
tion pertaining to the use of chemical
weapons in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghani-
stan.
The 40-nation Committee on Disarma-
ment included language in its Annual Report
to the U.N. General Assembly on the need
for an impartial international investigation of
the problem of chemical weapons use.
December 1980
With the full and active support of the
United States, the West, and others, the
U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
(A135/144 C) establishing a U.N. investiga-
tion, under the auspices of the U.N.
Secretary General and with the assistance of
qualified medical and technical experts, of
reports of chemical weapons use. The vote
was 78 in favor to 17 opposed, with 36
abstentions.
March 1981
In accordance with U.N. General
Assembly Resolution A/351144 C and the re-
quest of the U.N. Secretary General, the U.S.
submitted detailed information pertaining to
the reports of the use of chemical weapons in
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan. The U.S.
submission consisted of a letter summarizing
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Chronology of Diplomatic/
International Actions on Chemical
Warfare Use
October 1978
The United States called to the attention
of the Lao Charge d'Affaires in Washington
the press reports alleging use of poison gas in
Laos.
Assistant Secretary of State for East
Asian and Pacific Affairs Holbrooke traveled
to Vientiane and discussed our concerns over
H'Mong human rights and other issues with
Lao leaders.
Late 1978
The Department of State directed U.S.
diplomatic missions in the Southeast Asia
area to seek to develop information on the
alleged use of poison gas against the H'Mong.
January 1979
The Department of State again informed
the Lao Embassy of U.S. concerns about
reports of poison gas use in Laos, coupling
this with a similar demarche in Vientiane.
The Lao denied the validity of the reports.
March 1979
The U.S. Representative to the 35th ses-
sion of the U.N. Human Rights Commission
expressed U.S. concern about the plight of
the H'Mong, specifically raising the poison
gas use issue.
May 1979
A State Department representative went
to refugee camps in Thailand to interview
H'Mong claiming to be eyewitnesses and/or
victims of poison gas attacks in Laos.
A State Department representative
visited Vientiane where he discussed the
problem with various diplomatic missions and
the senior U.N. representative in Laos. Dur-
ing that visit, he raised U.S. concerns about
the problem directly with the Lao Foreign
Ministry.
September 1979
A Department of Defense medical team
was dispatched to Thailand to interview and
prepare a report on H'Mong refugees having
knowledge of gas attacks in Laos.
November 1979
Demarches were made to the Vietnamese
in Paris and to the Soviets in Moscow
expressing U.S. concerns about reports of
poison gas being used against "resistance
forces" in Laos. Both the Soviets and Viet-
namese supported the Lao denial of the
validity of the reports.
December 1979
State and Defense Department officials
preserfbd evidence of gas attacks in Laos to
the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
the U.S. submission, the U.S. compendium of
reports from August 1980, an update to that
compendium covering the period through
January-February 1981, the transcripts of
congressional hearings held on the subject in
December 1979 and in April 1980, and the
texts of House and Senate resolutions con-
demning the use of chemical weapons.
July 1981
The United States provided further
details and written responses to questions
from the U.N. Group of Experts concerning
the U.S. submission of March 1981.
September 1981
Secretary Haig announced, in his
September 13 speech in Berlin, that the
United States had obtained physical evidence
of the use of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast
Asia, discovered in the analysis of a leaf and
stem sample obtained from the site of a
chemical attack in Kampuchea.
On September 14, the United States sub-
mitted a report on the new evidence pertain-
ing to the use of mycotoxins to the U.N.
Group of Experts investigating reports of
chemical weapons use.
Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Stoessel held a press conference in
Washington on September 14 and provided a
detailed press backgrounder on the new
evidence.
Secretary Haig raised U.S. concerns
about the new evidence pertaining to the use
of lethal mycotoxins in Southeast Asia and
about the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident
with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko during
their bilateral consultations at the United Na-
tions in New York.
October 1981
Following up the Haig/Gromyko discus-
sions, detailed bilateral demarches were made
to the Soviets in Washington by Acting Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency Director
Grey, and a followup in Moscow by the U.S.
Deputy Chief of Mission, on the general sub-
ject of Soviet Biological Warfare Convention
compliance and specific U.S. concerns regard-
ing the 1979 Sverdlovsk anthrax incident and
the evidence of the use of trichothecene
mycotoxins in Southeast Asia. The Soviets re-
jected U.S. concerns once again in their for-
mal response in November.
An interagency team of political, tech-
nical, and intelligence officers was dispatched
to Europe to brief the allies about the new
evidence of the use of lethal mycotoxins in
Southeast Asia.
A delegation of U.S. Government politi-
cal, technical, and medical experts appeared
before the U.N. Group of Experts to respond
to questions pertaining to the U.S. submis-
sion on September 14 of new evidence con-
cerning the use of lethal mycotoxins in South-
east Asia.
November 1981
The U.N. Group of Experts investigating
reports of chemical weapons use traveled to
Thailand to visit refugee camps and interview
and examine survivors and eyewitnesses of
chemical attacks in Laos and Kampuchea.
While there, the experts also obtained
samples from alleged chemical attacks and
samples of vegetation and blood from
refugees exposed to chemical attacks.
Richard Burt, Director of the Bureau of
Politico-Military Affairs, in testimony before
the Congress, announced the results of
analyses of additional samples of chemical
warfare use revealing the presence of high
levels of mycotoxins and the results of
analyses of control samples from Southeast
Asia which were found to contain no myco-
toxins.
The United States submitted a report on
its analyses of chemical warfare use samples
from both Kampuchea and Laos, which were
found to contain high levels of mycotoxins, to
the U.N. Group of Experts investigating
reports of chemical weapons use.
Demarches were made to the Vietnamese
in New York and to the Lao in Vientiane
regarding the evidence of the use of lethal
mycotoxins in the conflicts in Kampuchea and
Laos. Both the Vietnamese and the Lao re-
jected the evidence and denied the validity of
U.S. concerns.
December 1981
The U.N. Secretary General submitted
the Report of the U.N. Group of Experts in-
vestigating reports of chemical weapons use
(A/36/613). The report was inconclusive and
stated that the group had been unable to
carry out all the actions it had intended (i.e.,
on-site visits to Afghanistan, Laos, and Kam-
puchea) due to the refusals to cooperate of
the countries concerned, and that it had been
unable to complete some of the actions it had
planned (e.g., on-site visits to Pakistan,
analysis of the samples obtained in Thailand)
in the time available.
With the full and active support of the
United States, the West, and others, the
U.N. General Assembly adopted a resolution
(A/36/96 C) extending for another year the
mandate of the U.N. Secretary General's
Group of Experts investigating reports of
chemical weapons use. The vote on the
resolution was 86 in favor to 20 opposed,
with 32 abstentions.
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This report represents an effort of
the U.S. Government to correct the first
deficiency and to ameliorate the second
to the extent possible. In preparation of
this report, all of the information avail-
able to the U.S. Government on chemi-
cal weapons use in Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan was assembled in one
place. This information was again re-
viewed, analyzed, cross-indexed, and
organized in a coherent fashion. Based
upon this comprehensive analysis, a set
of conclusions were drawn, conclusions
which have since been reviewed and
agreed on without qualification by every
relevant agency of the U.S. Govern-
ment.
The evidence upon which this report
is based is of several kinds, including:
? Testimony of those who saw, ex-
perienced, and suffered from chemical
weapons attacks;
? Testimony( of doctors, refugee
workers, journallists, and others who had
the opportunity to question large
numbers of those with firsthand experi-
ence of chemical. warfare;
? Testimony( of those who engaged
in chemical warfare or were in a posi-
tion to observe those who did;
? Scientific evidence, based upon the
analysis of physical samples taken from
sites where attacks had been conducted;
? Documentary evidence from open
sources; and
? Intelligence derived from "national
technical means."'
These sources provide compelling
evidence that terns of thousands of un-
sophisticated ancli defenseless peoples
have for a period of years been sub-
jected to a campaign of chemical at-
tacks. Taken together, this evidence has
led the U.S. Government to conclude that
Lao and Vietnamese forces, operating
under Soviet supervision, have, since
1975, employed lethal chemical and toxin
weapons in Laos; that Vietnamese forces
have, since 1978, used lethal chemical
and toxin agents in Kampuchea; and
that Soviet forces have used a variety of
lethal chemical warfare agents, including
Only an alert and outspoken world com-
munity, intent to maintain those stand-
ards of international behavior it has so
painfully achieved and so tenuously es-
tablished, can bring sufficient pressure
to bear to halt these violations of law
and treaty. It is hoped that publication
of this report will be one step in this
process, the end result of which will be
the cessation of chemical warfare and
the strengthening of the rule of law in
the affairs of nations.
Laos. The U.S. Government has
concluded from all the evidence that
selected Lao and Vietnamese forces,
under direct Soviet supervision, have
employed lethal trichothecene toxins and
other combinations of chemical agents
against H'Mong resisting government
control and their villages since at least
1976. Trichothecene toxins have been
positively identified, but medical symp-
toms indicate that irritants, incapaci-
tants, and nerve agents also have been
employed. Thousands have been killed or
severely injured. Thousands also have
been driven from their homeland by the
use of these agents.
Kampuchea. Vietnamese forces
have used lethal trichothecene toxins on
Democratic Kampuchean (DK) troops
and Khmer villages since at least 1978.
Medical evidence indicates that irritants,
incapacitants, and nerve agents also
have been used.
Afghanistan. Soviet forces in
Afghanistan have used a variety of
lethal and nonlethal chemical agents on
mujahidin resistance forces and Afghan
villages since the Soviet invasion in
December 1979. In addition, there is
some evidence that Afghan Government
forces may have used Soviet-supplied
chemical weapons against the mujahidin
even before the Soviet invasion.
Although it has not been possible to
verify through sample analysis the
specific agents used by the Soviets, a
nerve gases, in Afghanistan since the number of Afghan military defectors
Soviet invasion of that country in 1979. have named the agents brought into the
The implications of chemical warfare country by the Soviets and have de-
in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia are scribed where and when they were
painful to contemplate but dangerous to employed. This information has been
ignore. This activity threatens not only correlated with other evidence, including
the peoples of those isolated regions but the reported symptoms, leading to the
the international order upon which the conclusion that nerve agents, phosgene
security of all depends. Those who today oxime, and various incapacitants and
suffer chemical warfare against their irritants have been used. Other agents
homelands are powerless to stop it. The and toxic smokes also are in the coun-
prohibitions of international law and try. Some reported symptoms are con-
solemn agreement are not self-enforcing. sistent with those produced by lethal or
sublethal doses of trichothecene toxins,
but this evidence is not conclusive.
The Soviet Connection. The conclu-
sion is inescapable that the toxins and
other chemical warfare agents were
developed in the Soviet Union, provided
to the Lao and Vietnamese either direct-
ly or through the transfer of know-how,
and weaponized with Soviet assistance
in Laos, Vietnam, and Kampuchea.
Soviet military forces are known to
store agents in bulk and move them to
the field for munitions fill as needed.
This practice also is followed in South-
east Asia and Afghanistan, as evidenced
by many reports which specify that
Soviet technicians supervise the ship-
ment, storage, filling, and loading onto
aircraft of the chemical munitions. The
dissemination techniques reported and
observed evidently have been drawn
from years of Soviet chemical warfare
testing and experimentation. There is no
evidence to support any alternative ex-
planation, such as the hypothesis that the
Vietnamese produce and employ toxin
weapons completely on their own.
The judgments of this study were ar-
rived at through a rigorous analytical
process.
? Every relevant piece of informa-
tion on reported chemical warfare inci-
dents was reviewed, recorded, and tabu-
lated. Numbers of attacks and deaths
were screened for possible duplication.
Extensive data on the Soviet chemical
and biological warfare program also
were reviewed.
? All the test data on physical evi-
dence available to the U.S. Govern-
ment-including environmental samples
and background controls-were re-
viewed.
? A scientific report on toxins,
which concluded that trichothecenes
probably were among the agents used in
Southeast Asia, was prepared.
? The medical evidence was ana-
lyzed, drawing on all available informa-
tion from Southeast Asia and Afghani-
stan and incorporating the findings of a
Department of Defense medical team,
which concluded that at least three
types of agents were used in Laos.
? Extensive consultations were held
with government and nongovernment
scientists and medical authorities, many
of whom were asked to review the evi-
dence. Experts from other countries also
were consulted.
After the data were organized to elusion, however, rested on a much
permit comparative analysis, the study broader base of evidence than analysis
focused on three separate questions. of one sample.
? Have lethal and other casualty- By April 1980, the U.S. Government
producing agents been used in gnntheast had already concluded that lethal agents
? What are these agents, and how
and by whom are they employed?
? Where do these agents originate,
and how do they find their way to the
field?
Although the evidence differs for
each country, the analytical approach
was the same. Testimony of eyewit-
nesses-date, place, and type of at-
tack-was matched against information
from defectors, journalists, international
organizations, and sensitive information
that often pinpointed the time and place
of chemical attacks. In addition, infor-
mation on military operations in the
areas where chemical attacks had been
reported was examined to establish
whether air or artillery strikes took
place or whether there was fighting in
the areas where chemical agents report-
edly were used. In all three countries,
instances were identified in which eye-
witness accounts could be correlated
directly with information from other
sources on military operations in prog-
ress.
There is no evidence of any system-
atic propaganda campaign by either the
H'Mong in Laos or the Afghan resist-
ance forces to promote the allegation
that chemical agents have been used on
their people. On the other hand, there
were early indications that Pol Pot's
Democratic Kampuchean resistance did
engage in an organized propaganda cam-
paign on chemical agent use. These in-
dications made U.S. Government
analysts cautious about accepting DK
allegations, which increased markedly
after the chemical attacks in Laos were
publicized. For Kampuchea, therefore,
special efforts were taken to confirm
such allegations by analyzing sources of
information that in no way could be con-
sidered part of a propaganda or decep-
tion campaign.
In September 1981, the U.S. Govern-
ment declared publicly that toxins-
poisonous chemical substances extracted
from biological material-probably were
the mysterious lethal agents used for
many years in Laos and Kampuchea.
The statement was prompted by the
discovery of high levels of trichothecene
toxins in a vegetation sample collected
shortly after a March 1981 Vietnamese
chemical attack in Kampuchea. This con-
H'Mong tribespeople in Laos. There was
less certainty then about the use of
lethal agents in Kampuchea, mainly
because of the already mentioned suspi-
cions about the propaganda campaign of
Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchean
forces, although their claims subsequent-
ly were shown to be valid. It was also
concluded that chances were about even
that lethal agents had been used in
Afghanistan. There was little doubt by
April 1980 that riot-control agents and
some form of incapacitants had been
used in all three countries. Since that
April 1980 assessment, additional
evidence has allowed a much firmer con-
clusion. There is now no doubt that
casualties and deaths have resulted from
chemical attacks in all three countries.
What Chemical Agents Are
Being Used?
As soon as it was determined that
chemical agents had been used, an effort
was made to identify the specific agents.
To do this it was necessary to collect
and analyze at least one of the following:
environmental samples contaminated
with agents, the munitions used to
deliver agents, or biological specimens
from victims of an attack. A study by
medical-toxicological experts of symp-
toms exhibited by individuals exposed to
toxic agents provides a good indication
of the general class of chemical agent
used. Thus, the range of clinical mani-
festations from chemical agents, as
reported by a U.S. Army investigative
team in Thailand, resulted in the deter-
mination that nerve agents, irritants
such as CS, and highly toxic hemorrhag-
ic chemicals or mixture of chemicals
were used in Laos.
Other medical-toxicological person-
nel who reviewed the evidence and con-
ducted their own investigation reached
the same conclusion. They further in-
dicated that toxins such as the trichothe-
cenes were a probable cause of the lethal
hemorrhaging effect seen in Kampuchea
and Laos. In many cases, symptoms
reported by the Democratic Kampu-
chean forces in Kampuchea and the mu-
jahidin in Afghanistan were similar to
those reported by the H'Mong in Laos.
Moreover, symptoms reported from
Afghanistan and Kampuchea indicated
that a highly potent, rapid-acting, in-
capacitant "knockout" chemical also was
being used. Mujahidin victims and wit-
nesses to chemical attacks reported
other unusual symptoms, including a
blackening of the skin, severe skin irrita-
tion along with multiple small blisters
and severe itching, severe eye irritation,
and difficulty in breathing-all of which
suggests that phosgene oxime or a,
similar substance was used.
Collecting samples possibly contami-
nated with a toxic agent during or after
a chemical assault is difficult under any
circumstances but particularly when the
assault is against ill-prepared people
without masks or other protective equip-
ment. Obtaining contaminated samples
that will yield positive traces of specific
chemical agents depends on many fac-
tors. These include the persistency of
the chemical, the ambient temperature,
rainfall, wind conditions, the medium on
which the chemical was deposited, and
the time, care, and packaging of the
sample from collection to laboratory
analysis.
Many traditional or known chemical
warfare agents are nonpersistent and
disappear from the environment within
a few minutes to several hours after be-
ing dispersed. Such agents include the
nerve agents sarin and tabun; the blood
agents hydrogen cyanide and cyanogen
chloride; the choking agents phosgene
and diphosgene; and the irritant
phosgene oxime. Other standard
chemical warfare agents-such as the
nerve agents VX and thickened soman
and the blistering agents sulfur mustard,
nitrogen mustard, and lewisite-may
persist for several days to weeks
depending on weather conditions.
The trichothecene toxins have good
persistency but may be diluted by
adverse weather conditions to below
detectable concentrations. To maximize
the chances of detection, sample collec-
tions need to be made as rapidly as
possible after a chemical assault; as with
many agents, this means minutes to
hours. Under the circumstances of
Southeast Asia and Afghanistan, such
rapid collection has simply not been
possible. Although many samples were
collected, few held any realistic prospect
of yielding positive results. It is fortu-
nate that trichothecenes are sufficiently
persistent and in some cases were not
diluted by adverse weather conditions.
Thus we were able to detect them
several months after the attack.
Samples have been collected from
Southeast Asia since mid-1979 and from
Afghanistan since May 1980. To date,
about 50 individual samples-of greatly
varying types and usefulness for analyti-
cal purposes-have been collected and
analyzed for the presence of known
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 Approved For Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304700004-5
chemical warfare agents, none of which
has been detected. Based on recommen-
dations by medical and toxicological ex-
perts and findings of investigators from
the U.S. Army's Chemical Systems
Laboratory, several of the samples have
been analyzed for the trichothecene
group of mycotoxins. Four samples, tw o
from Kampuchea and two from Laosl
were found to contain high levels of tri-
chothecene toxins. In addition, prelimi-
nary results of the analysis of blood
samples drawn from victims of an attack
indicate the presence of a trichothecene
metabolite of T- 2, namely HT-2.
A review of all reports indicates the
use of many different chemical agents,
means of delivery, and types of chemical
attacks. The use of trichothecene toxins
has been identified through symptoms
and sample analysis. In some cases,
however, the symptoms suggest other
agents, such as nerve gas, which have
not been identified through sample
analysis.. Significant differences as well
as similarities have surfaced in the
reports from the three countries. The
evidence from each country, therefore,
is described separately, with attention
drawn to similarities where appropriate.
Laos
Reports of chemical attacks against
H'Mong villages and guerrilla strong-
holds in Laos date from the summer of
1975 to the present (see Table 1). Most
of the reports were provided by H'Mong
refugees who were interviewed in Thai-
land and the United States. More than
200 interviews were carried out various-
ly by U.S. Embassy officials in Thailand,
a Department of -.Defense team of
medical-toxicological experts (see Annex
B), U.S. physicians, Thai officials, jour-
nalists, and representatives of interna-
tional aid and relief organizations. Ac-
cording to the interviews, Soviet AN-2
and captured U.S. L-19 and T-28141
aircraft usually were employed to
disseminate toxic chemical agents by
sprays, rockets, and bombs. In some
cases, Soviet helicopters and jet aircraft
were said to have been used.
The reports describe 261 separate
attacks in which at least 6,504 deaths
were cited as having resulted directly
from exposure to chemical agents. The
actual number of deaths is almost cer-
tainly much higher, since the above
figure does not take account of deaths in
attacks for which no specific casualty
figures were reported. The greatest con-
centration of reported chemical agent
use occurred in the area where the three
TABLE 1
Laos: Summary of Reported Chemical Attacks
and Associated Deaths, 1975-81
Time Period
Area
Attacksa
Deathsb
Summer 1975
Vientiane
2
25+
Fall 1976
Phou Bia
8
10
Savannakhet
1
10
Winter 1976-77
Phou Bia
2
16
Spring 1977
Phou Bia
6
66+
Khammouan
2
1
Summer 1977
Phou Bia
6
95
Fall 1977
Phou Bia
1
25
Winter 1977-78
Phou Bia
10
1,328+
Savannakhet
6
224
Spring 1978
Phou Bia
34
969+
Summer 1978
Phou Bia
22
664+
Fall 1978
Phou Bia
19
572
Winter 1978-79
Phou Bia
5
15+
Spring 1979
Phou Bia
36
257+
Summer 1979
Phou Bia
5
239+
Fall 1979
Phou Bia
10
56
Xaignabouri
2
24+
Winter 1979-80
Phou Bia
4
10+
Spring 1980
Phou Bia
3
24
Summer 1980
Phou Bia
6
187+
Fall 1980
Xaignabouri
1
12
Phou Bia
7
88+
Savannakhet
3
1+
Winter 1980-81
Xaignabouri
2
57
Phou Bia
4
82
Vientiane
1
1+
Spring 1981
Houaphan
2
?
Phou Bia
7
218
Vientiane
1
Summer 1981
Phou Bia
1
?
Fall 1981
Phou Bia
4
500+
Khammouan
3
534+
226
6,310+
a This tabulation omits 35 attack sites, accounting for 194 deaths, which could not be geographically
located in the reports. The totals overall were 261 attacks and more than 6,504 deaths.
b A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum figure. In some cases (shown with a
question mark) deaths were reported, but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a dash) gave no in-
formation on fatalities.
provinces of Vientiane, Xiangkhoang,
and Louangphrabang adjoin (see map).
This triborder region accounted for 77%
of the reported attacks and 83% of the
chemical-associated deaths. Most of the
reported attacks took place in 1978 and
1979. Since 1979, the incidence of chemi-
cal attacks appears to have been lower,
but reported death rates among un-
protected and untreated victims were
higher. Only seven chemical attacks
were reported in the fall of 1981, for ex-
ample, yet 1,034 deaths were associated
with those incidents.
The medical symptoms reportedly
produced by the chemical agents are
varied. According to knowledgeable
physicians, the symptoms clearly point
to at least three types of chemical
agents-incapacitantlriot-control agents,
a nerve agent, and an agent causing
massive hemorrhaging. The last-named
was positively identified as trichothecene
toxins. This was announced publicly by
Secretary Haig in September 1981.
In a number of the refugee reports,
eyewitnesses described attacks as con-
sisting of "red gas" or a "yellow cloud."
Laos: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
Thailand
Vietna5
Houaphan Province where chemical attacks have occurred
It Military region headquarters containing chemical sections
Refugee camp
Sampling area-trichothecene toxins
4 Airfield
Names and boundary representation
are not necessarily authoritative.
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Kampuchea
China
 Red gas was considered the more lethal.
A former Lao Army captain stated that
the "red gas" caused the H'Mong to die
within 12 hours. An employee of an in-
ternational organization interviewed vic-
tims of a September 15, 1979 attack in
which nonlethal rounds preceded an at-
tack by five or six "red gas" bombs that
covered a 500-meter area. Persons
within 30-100 meters of the circle died
in 10 minutes after severe convulsions.
Others had headaches, chest pains, and
vomiting but did not die.
Every qualified interrogator who
systematically interviewed the H'Mong
refugees concluded that they had been
subjected to chemical attacks. A U.S.
Government medical team returned
from Thailand in 1979 convinced that
several unidentified chemical warfare
agents had produced the symptoms
described by the refugees. This evidence
was expanded by testimony from a
variety of sources, including that of a
Lao pilot who flew chemical warfare
missions before defecting in 1979. His
detailed description of the Lao, Viet-
namese, and Soviet program to use
chemical agents to defeat the H'Mong
resistance helped dispel any lingering
suspicions that the refugees had
fabricated or embellished the stories.
The Lao pilot described the chemical
rocket he had fired as having a more
loosely fitting warhead than a conven-
tional rocket. (His account appears in
Annex A.)
In 1977, a H'MMong resistance leader
found a U.S. 2.751-inch rocket* with a
modified Soviet wrarhead that fits the
Lao pilot's description. Other sources
reported that U.S. 2.75-inch rockets
were fitted with Soviet-supplied lethal
chemical warheadls by Soviet and Viet-
namese technicians at facilities in Vien-
tiane as well as in Xiangkhoang and
Savannakhet Provinces. Munitions
storage facilities suitable for storing
chemical agents and weapons have been
identified in each of these provinces. The
aircraft types-AN-2s, L-19s, and
T-28/41s-most often reported by the
H'Mong refugees as being used to
deliver chemical agents have been iden-
tified as based on airfields in northern
Laos throughout this period. A special
Lao Air Force unit is responsible for
chemical rockets. The unit is com-
manded by a Soviet-trained Lao and has
a Soviet rocket expert attached as an
adviser.
* During withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Vietnam, thousands of these fell into Viet-
namese hands.
Obtaining additional data for Laos
has been difficult because of the nature
of the fighting there. There have been
few major operations. The reports
reflect numerous minor engagements be-
tween the opposing forces. In nearly all
cases, the chemical use reported has
been directed against villages, in the
absence of obvious combat operations.
This lends support to the Lao pilot's
claim that the Vietnamese and Lao
military commands were engaged in a
"H'Mong extermination" campaign.
Of particular interest are the circum-
stances surrounding the collection of
two physical samples found to contain
lethal toxins. The first was collected
after a March 13, 1981 attack on a
village between the villages of Muong
Chai and Phakhao in the Phou Bia
region. In this case, a large two-engine
plane reportedly sprayed a mist of a
moist, yellow, sticky substance; two
villagers and all village animals died.
The second sample is from Ban
Thonghak, another village in the Phou
Bia region, collected following an April
2, 1981 attack in which a jet aircraft
reportedly sprayed a yellow substance;
24 of the 450 villagers died. In the
spring of 1981, seven separate chemical
attacks, resulting in 218 deaths, were
reported to have occurred in this region.
It is significant that these attacks
took place following a period of escala-
tion in overall resistance activities in the
Phou Bia area in the winter of 1980-81.
During that period, joint suppression
operations by Lao People's Liberation
Army and Vietnamese Army forces had
achieved only limited success, perhaps
spurring both forces on to greater
effort. The more intense use of chemical
weapons may have been part of this
effort.
Evidently the fact that chemical
agents were being used in Laos was not
widely known among units of the Lao
Army. In June 1981, a group of
refugees from a village in Vientiane
Province reached Thailand and described
attacks against them carried out a
month earlier by helicopters "dropping
poison" into their water supply. Lao field
units subsequently entered the village
and were surprised at the sight of many
villagers still suffering from symptoms
of acute poisoning. According to a
villager, when the Lao military person-
nel saw the "small yellow grains" spread
around the village, they were convinced
that toxic chemicals had been used on
the village and requested medical assist-
ance for those villagers still suffering
from nausea and bloody diarrhea.
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In a December 15, press con-
ference in Beijing, former Lao Health
Ministry Bureau Director Khamsengkeo
Sengsathit-who had defected to
China-confirmed that chemical
weapons were being used "in the air and
on the ground" in Laos, killing "thou-
sands." He asserted that the Vietnamese
alone were using such weapons, keeping
the matter secret from the Lao. He also
stated that 3,000 Soviet advisers were in
Laos and "have taken control" of the
Lao Air Force, while 40,000-50,000
Vietnamese troops had "reduced Laos to
the status of a colony."
Kampuchea
Since October 1978, radio broadcasts,
press releases, and official protests to
the United Nations by the Democratic
Kampuchea leadership have accused the
Vietnamese and the Hanoi-backed Peo-
ple's Republic of Kampuchea regime of
using Soviet-made lethal chemical agents
and weapons against DK guerrilla forces
and civilians. DK allegations for a time
were the only source of information con-
cerning chemical warfare attacks in
Kampuchea. In November 1979,
however, the guerrilla forces of the
Khmer People's National Liberation
Front reported that the Vietnamese had
attacked them with a tear gas which,
from their description, resembled the
riot-control agent CS. Subsequently,
Thai officials, Democratic Kampuchea in-
formants and refugees, Vietnamese Ar-
my defectors, U.S. and Thai medical
personnel, officials of international aid
and relief organizations, and Canadian
and West European officials also have
implicated the Vietnamese in the offen-
sive use of lethal and incapacitating
chemical agents in Kampuchea.
There are reports of 124 separate
attacks in Kampuchea from 1978 to the
fall of 1981 in which lethal chemicals
caused the deaths of 981 persons (see
Table 2). The mortality figure represents
a minimum because some reports state
only that there were deaths and do not
provide a number. The earliest reports
cite attacks in Ratanakiri Province, in
the northeastern corner of the country
(see map). Reports from 1979 to the
present show the use of lethal chemicals
primarily in the provinces bordering
Thailand. The greatest use of chemical
agents apparently has been in Battam-
bang Province, with 51 reported inci-
dents; Pursat Province has experienced
the next highest frequency, with 25
TABLE 2
Kampuchea: Summary of Reported Chemical Attacks
and Associated Deaths, 1978-81
Time Period
Area
Attacks
Deathaa
1978
Ratanakiri
5
Summer 1979
Kompong Speu
4
37
Fall 1979
Siem Reap
1
Battambang
4
22+
Pursat
2
1+
Koh Kong
2
6+
Kampot
1
3
Kompong Chhnang
2
118
Winter 1979-80
Battambang
12
64+
Pursat
5
21+
Koh Kong
2
4
Spring 1980
Battambang
3
20+
Pursat
8
24+
Koh Kong
5
13
Summer 1980
Siem Reap
1
82+
Battambang
3
23+
Pursat
2
7
Koh Kong
3
Winter 1980-81
Battambang
8
Pursat
2
Preah Vihear
1
Battambang
12
163+
Pursat
3
42+
Koh Kong
1
Kampot
1
Kompong Thom/Cham
1
Siem Reap
16
305
Battambang
6
16
Pursat
3
-
Koh Kong
1
-
Kampot
1
-
a A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum figure. In some cases (shown with a
question mark) deaths were reported, but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a dash) gave no in-
formation on fatalities.
reported incidents. These numbers are
consistent with the overall high level of
military activity reported in the border
provinces.
A review of information from all
sources provides direct and specific sup-
port for 28 of 124 reported attacks.
There is, in addition, some evidence that
in all reported instances some form of
attack took place. This evidence includes
reports of troop movements, supply
transfers, operational plans, postopera-
tion reporting, and air activity. It in-
dicates that military activity took place
at the time and place of every incident
reported to involve lethal chemical
agents. In some cases, it provides strong
circumstantial evidence that the action
involved chemical substances-for exam-
ple, the movement of chemicals and per-
sonal protection equipment into the
area.
There is no doubt that in late 1978
and 1979 the Vietnamese, and what
later became the People's Republic of
Kampuchea forces, made at least limited
use of riot-control chemicals and possible
incapacitating agents against both Com-
munist and non-Communist guerrilla
forces in Kampuchea. The chemicals
used probably included toxic smokes,
riot-control agents such as CS, and an
unidentified incapacitating agent that
caused vertigo and nausea and ultimate-
ly rendered victims unconscious with no
other signs or symptoms.
In March 1979, during Vietnamese
operations against Khmer Rouge forces
in the Phnom Melai area, a Vietnamese
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Army private, who later defected, ob-
served the following activities related to
chemical warfare. During the fighting,
all regiment (740th) troops were issued
gas masks. However, the 2nd Battalion,
a "border defense unit," was not issued
masks. This unit was in the Phnom
Melai area and was virtually surrounded
by Khmer Rouge forces. At another
point in the battle, the regiment's troops
were ordered to don masks. The Viet-
namese Army private reported that he
saw two Soviets (Caucasians) fire a
DH-10 (a hand-held weapon identified
by the private's comrades). He was
about 50 meters from the firing point.
The weapon at impact, which he was
able to observe from his position, gave
off clouds of white, gray, and green
gas/smoke. His signal unit subsequently
passed a message reporting that there
were 300 dead, including the un-
protected Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese
of the border defense forces' 2nd Bat-
talion. The corpses reportedly had traces
of white and green powder on their
faces and clothes. Their faces were con-
torted, with eyes wide open. No blood
was seen. (A H'Mong resistance leader
described an incident in 1981 in which
two Soviet soldiers fired a hand-held
weapon that dispersed a similar lethal
agent.)
Starting in February 1980, reports
revealed that the Vietnamese were using
60 mm mortars, 120 mm shells, 107 mm
rockets, M-79 grenade launchers filled
with chemical agents, as well as muni-
tions delivered by T-28 aircraft. Accord-
ing to the DK, the chemicals used were
green and yellow and powderlke in ap-
pearance. In some instances the gas was
described as yellow or white. The symp-
toms described were tightening of the
chest, disorientation, vomiting, bleeding
from the nose and gums, discoloration of
the body, and "stiffening" of the teeth.
In July 1980, the DK described artillery
attacks that produced a black smoke
causing itchy skin, weakness, skin le-
sions, and in some cases decaying skin
and blisters. In December 1980, the
Vietnamese were once again firing
chemical artillery shells, and it was
believed that poison chemicals were
being brought into Thailand's border
region. By March 1981, the Democratic
Kampuchea forces had reported numer-
ous attacks directed against them with
lethal chemical agents and the poisoning
of food and water.
U.S. analysis of contaminated vege-
tation samples collected within hours of
a March 1981 attack showed high levels
of three trichothecene toxins in a com-
bination that would not be expected to
be found in a natural outbreak in this
 Kampuchea: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
ttam
BattB
ai\
2~ T 11
Kompong
Chhnang
Ko
Koh Kong S eu
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Takeo Province where chemical attacks have occurred
0 Sampling area-trichothecene toxins
Oddar Meanchey
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environment. At the levels found on the
vegetation, the three trichothecenes
would produce vomiting, skin irritations
and itching, and bleeding symptoms.
Water samples taken from the area of
the same attack also contained tricho-
thecene toxins. Control samples from
nearby areas confirmed that these toxins
were not indigenous to the locale.
(Details on the sample analysis appear in
Annex D.)
There also is ample evidence of mili-
tary activity at the place and time of the
acquisition of the samples. Vietnamese
Army defectors described plans for
multiregimental sweep operations to be
conducted along the border in north-
western Battambang Province before
the end of the dry season in May. Actual
fighting, however, continued to be char-
acterized by guerrilla tactics on both
sides, including, according to a Viet-
namese Army defector, "staging am-
bushes, laying minefields, and use of
deception." Indeed, Democratic Kampu-
chean resistance forces were ordered to
avoid large-scale operations and to limit
combat operations to scattered sapper
attacks. Such information is consistent
with other reports of Vietnamese Army
forces spreading toxic chemicals in
streams, along roadsides, and around
villages and firing toxic gas shells
against enemy positions. The Phnom
Melai sector, where Phnom Mak Hoeun
is located, was described as an "anthill
of DK activity," and actions reported
during March were "sporadic firefights"
around Phnom Mak Hoeun involving the
Vietnamese Army's 2nd Battalion, 2nd
Border Security Regiment.
In Kampuchea, as in Laos, the
period of late 1980 through spring 1981
was one of intensified Vietnamese opera-
tions to suppress the resistance and
break the will of the opposing forces. In
July 1981, trucks loaded with blue sacks
filled with white powder were being
moved by the Vietnamese into the
Pailin, Battambang, and Siem Reap
areas. Vietnamese soldiers told villagers
that the chemicals caused blindness,
hemorrhaging, and vomiting.
Additional evidence was derived
from blood samples drawn from victims
of Vietnamese chemical use that oc-
curred on September 19, 1981 in the
Takong area. Takong is in the same
general area as Phnom Mak Hoeun-
that is, the central region of Battam-
bang Province near the Thai border.
Although there is no independent confir-
mation of the accounts of the attack,
American medical personnel visiting a
DK field hospital examined the victims
and obtained the blood samples.
Analyses of these samples suggested the
--- ____ T.. T- -f , I
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use of trichothecenes. (Blood analysis
results also appear in Annex D.)
According to the DK soldiers
affected, the chemicals used in the
September 19 Takong attack were
dispersed as a gas or powder and as a
poison to water. The gas or powder was
released from containers by tripwires in
the area of the rear forces. This descrip-
tion is consistent with the other report-
ing for this area and time.
Thailand also has been concerned
about chemical attacks against its own
forces and civilian population. In March
1981, one Thai died from poisons placed
by Vietnamese troops, and others
became ill after suffering bleeding from
the nose and mouth. In May 1981, Thai
forces captured two Vietnamese as they
were attempting to poison the water
supply in a Kampuchean relocation camp
in Thailand. The poison was analyzed by
the Thai and found to contain lethal
quantities of cyanide. Many reports in-
dicate that it is common practice for
Vietnamese units to poison water and
food used by -the DK forces.
The Soviet Connection
in Southeast Asia
Much of the Soviet interest in Southeast
Asia is dictated by their rivalry with
China and their close alliance with the
Vietnamese. Regional Communist forces
have been strengthened to contain
Chinese influence and deter military in-
cursions. The area of northern Laos be-
tween Vientiane and the Chinese
border-where the H'Mong hill tribes
have stubbornly resisted and harassed
Vietnamese forces-is strategically sig-
nificant to the Vietnamese because it ad-
joins a hostile China. In the last few
years the Vietnamese have expanded
their military construction and strength-
ened their forces in Laos which now
number 50,000.
Initially there was a tendency to in-
terpret the Soviet role as strictly ad-
visory. Now, however, there is con-
siderable evidence to suggest that the
Soviets are far more involved in the Lao
and Vietnamese chemical warfare pro-
gram than was assumed earlier. An
estimated 500 Soviet military advisers
provide maintenance assistance and
technical support, actually running the
Lao Air Force, and give advanced train-
ing to Lao personnel in conventional as
well as chemical warfare.
The Soviets have had advisers and'
technicians working in Vietnam and
Laos for many years and in Kampuchea
since 1979. However, it was not until
early 1979 that evidence surfaced on the
Soviets' direct involvement in chemical
warfare activities. For example, the Lao
Army chemical section in Xiangkhoang
prepared Soviet-manufactured chemical
items for inspection by a Soviet military
team on February 7, 1979. A seven-man
team of Soviet chemical artillery ex-
perts, accompanied by Lao chemical
officers, inspected chemical supplies and
artillery rounds at the Xeno storage
facility in Savannakhet on June 1, 1979.
One report stated that the Soviets would
be inspecting the same chemical ex-
plosives used to suppress the H'Mong in
the Phou Bia area.
In addition to this information,
H'Mong accounts have described Soviet
advisers and technicians participating in
the preparation of the chemical weapons
for the attacks on the H'Mong villages.
H'Mong eyewitnesses claim to have seen
"Caucasian pilots" in aircraft, and one
H'Mong report states that a downed
Soviet aircraft was discovered in the
jungle along with a dead Soviet pilot. In
November 1981, a H'Mong resistance
leader described how Soviet soldiers
fighting with the Lao Army fired hand-
held weapons that dispensed a lethal
agent over a 300-meter area. Several
Lao defectors have reported seeing
Soviet advisers present when aircraft
were loaded with chemical-agent
rockets.
In July 1981, a Soviet shipment of
wooden crates filled with canisters de-
scribed by the Vietnamese as "deadly
toxic chemicals" was unloaded at the
port of Ho Chi Minh City. This incident
further corroborates the judgment that
the Soviets have been shipping chemical
warfare materiel to Vietnam for some
time. During the unloading, Vietnamese
soldiers were caught pilfering the
wooden crates containing the canisters.
The soldiers dropped one of the wooden
cases and intentionally broke it open;
they wanted to determine if its contents
were edible or valuable for pilferage.
When a soldier broke the nylon seal and
attempted to pry open a canister, special
security personnel isolated the area and
told the soldiers that the canisters con-
tained deadly toxic substances from the
U.S.S.R. The wooden crates, each
weighing 100 kilograms, were loaded on
military trucks and taken under special
guard to the Long Binh storage depot.
This incident is only one in a series
involving Soviet chemical warfare
materiel dating back several years. In
1975, for example, a Soviet captain of a
diving support craft engaged in salvag-
ing a sunken ship in the Black Sea,
which had been transporting Soviet
military supplies to Vietnam, said that
 his divers came in contact with toxic
chemicals, and a special Soviet salvage
unit took over the operation after the
divers became very ill. The salvage
operations, conducted by the ASPTR-12
Salvage, Rescue, and Underwater
Technical Services Group based in
Odessa, were monitored by high-ranking
Soviet naval officers.
The operation began with the
removal of tractors and helicopters
which cluttered the deck of the ship and
prevented access to hold hatches. Once
the surface clutter was removed, the
divers attempted to enter the holds. At
this point, however, operations had to be
suspended temporarily because of a
violent outbreak of chemical poisoning
among the divers. Contact with the uni-
dentified chemicals resulted in reddish
welts 1-3 centimeters in diameter on ex-
posed skin and was accompanied by
severe headaches, nausea, and a general
feeling of fatigue. The symptoms dis-
appeared on their own after 3-5 days of
rest. At this point, military authorities
took over from the ASPTR-12 divers,
who were temporarily withdrawn from
the project. Soviet naval divers were
sent down and determined that the
source of poisoning was chemical
seepage from an open hatch of one of
the holds. The hatch was promptly
sealed, and the salvage operation was
once more assigned to ASPTR-12 divers
who resumed work and retrieved am-
munition and an assortment of other
equipment. Once this was done, the
military took over permanently. The
ship was raised without removing the
poisonous chemicals and towed to an
Odessa shipyard where the chemicals
were unloaded by military personnel.
The ship was then broken up and
scrapped. The entire operation took
about 3 years to complete.
As another example of Soviet in-
volvement, two Vietnamese corporals,
from the 337th and 347th Vietnamese
Army divisions, have stated that Soviet-
supplied chemical weapons were stored
in caves near Lang Son in February
1979. Although their Vietnamese units
were issued gas masks, they were told
that Soviet-supplied chemical weapons
would not be used unless the Chinese in-
itiated chemical warfare. As late as
February 1981, a team of uniformed
Soviet military advisers was attached to
the corps headquarters. The team leader
was a senior Soviet colonel. The Soviets
were involved in training corps person-
nel in the use' of Soviet-supplied
weapons and equipment, including
chemical artillery shells and gas masks.
The Soviet team often inspected defen-
sive positions and observed training
maneuvers.
Afghanistan
Attacks with chemical weapons
against the mujahidin guerrillas in
Afghanistan were reported as early as 6
months before the Soviet invasion on
December 27, 1979. The information
specifies that Soviet-made aircraft were
used to drop chemical bombs, with no
clear identification of Soviet or Afghan
pilots or of the specific agents used. On
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November 16, 1979, chemical bombs re-
portedly were dropped along with con-
ventional air munitions on targets in
Farah, Herat, and Badghisat Provinces
by Soviet-supplied Afghan IL-28
bombers based at Shindand. A number
of Afghan military defectors have stated
that the Soviets provided the Afghan
military with chemical warfare training
TABLE 3
Afghanistan: Summary of Reported Chemical Attacks
and Associated Deaths, 1979-81
Time Period
Summer 1979
Province
Badakhshan
Parvan
Bamian
Fall 1979 Konarha
Farah
Herat
Badghisat
Winter 1979-80 Badakhshan
Takhar
Konarha
Nangarhar
Bamian
Spring 1980 Badakhshan
Attacksa Deatheb
1 2,000c
1 8
1 -
1 350
1 ?
1 ?
1 ?
2 10+
1 ?
1 ?
Konarha 2
Oruzgan 1
Qandahar 1
Summer 1980 Nangarhar 2 1
Vardak 1 3
Herat 2 300+
Kabul 2 -
Fall 1980 Konarha 1 ?
Lowgar 1 4
Ghazni 1 100
Winter 1980-81 Lowgar 2
Spring 1981 Parvan 2
Lowgar 3 -
Ghazni 2 ?
Qandahar 1 -
Summer 1981 Nangarhar 2 ?
Qandahar 2 16
Herat 1 119
47 3,042
a This tabulation omits some attacks described in the text because they could not be dated or located with
high confidence.
b A plus sign indicates that the report(s) of deaths gave a minimum figure. In some cases (shown with a
question mark) deaths were reported, but no number was given. Other reports (signified with a dash) gave no in-
formation on fatalities.
c The quality of reporting for this period is not as good as the information that became available after the
Soviet invasion. We are concerned that this unusually high figure may reflect an accumulation of deaths from
several incidents and not the single attack indicated. For example, reports were received describing over 1,000
deaths in Bamian Province in June-July 1979. An Afghan military officer reported seeing the bodies of many mu-
jahidin in Panjsher Valley in August 1979 after a chemical attack and stated that many had been killed. An
Afghan civil engineer reported hearing that many deaths resulted from a chemical attack in the Jalalabad area,
also in the summer of 1979. Because we could not obtain supporting evidence, these reports were not included.
Although sufficient evidence exists to conclude that Afghan Government forces used chemical weapons, mainly
bombs, from June to December 1979, no survivors or eyewitness accounts of these attacks are available to
determine the type of agent and symptoms.
Afghanistan: Chemical Warfare Operational Areas
f 420 kilometers
to Arys'
Soviet Union
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as well as supplies of lethal and in-
capacitating agents.
For the period from the summer
of 1979 to the summer of 1981, the U.S.
Government received reports of 47
separate chemical attacks with a claimed
death toll of more than 3,000 (see Table
3). Of the 47 reports, 36 came from
Afghan Army deserters, mujahidin
resistance fighters, journalists, U.S.
physicians, and others. For 24 of the
reported attacks, there is additional in-
dependent evidence supporting allega-
tions of chemical attacks. In seven in-
stances, further individual reporting ex-
ists. Evidence for 20 of the reported in-
cidents comes from information on
Soviet or Afghan Army combat opera-
tions in progress in areas and at times
approximating those of a reported
chemical attack (see map).
The reports indicated that fixed-
wing aircraft and helicopters usually
were employed to disseminate chemical
warfare agents by rockets, bombs, and
sprays. Chemical-filled landmines were
~ xanuv" ~
Vardak a Nang
an i
/ Paktia
A i
rsadibid
ayhesaray)
India
/ Pakistan
Area of concentrated chemical attacks
Parvan Province where chemical attacks have occurred
16 Soviet chemical defense battalion
+ Airfield
Feyzabad
Badak
Takhar\
also reportedly used by the Soviets. The
chemical clouds were usually gray or
blue-black, yellow, or a combination of
the colors.
Symptoms reported by victims and
witnesses of attacks indicate that non-
lethal incapacitating chemicals and lethal
chemicals- including nerve agents,
phosgene or phosgene oxime, possibly
trichothecene toxins, and mustard-
were used. Medical examinations of
some of the victims include reports of
paralysis, other neurological effects,
blisters, bleeding, and sometimes death.
While none of the agents being used in
Afghanistan has been positively iden-
tified through sample analysis, there is
no doubt that the agents being used are
far more toxic than riot-control agents
such as CN and CS or even adamsite.
Several descriptions of the
physiological action of a chemical agent
or of the condition of the corpses of vic-
tims were particularly unusual. In one,
victims were rapidly rendered un-
conscious for 2-6 hours and had few
aftereffects. In another, the bodies were
characterized by abnormal bloating and
blackened skin with a dark-reddish
tinge, and the flesh appeared decayed
very soon after death. In a third inci-
dent, three dead mujahidrn guerrillas
were found with hands on rifles and ly-
ing in a firing position, indicating that
the attacker had used an extremely
rapid-acting lethal chemical that is not
detectable by normal senses and that
causes no outward physiological
responses before death.
Shortly after the Soviet invasion,
many reports were received that both
Soviet and Afghan forces were using
various types of chemical agents. Ten
separate chemical attacks, resulting in
many deaths, were reported in the first
3 months of 1980. These reports came
from northeastern Afghanistan and pro-
vide the highest percentage of reported
deaths. During the mid-January to
February 1980 period, helicopter attacks
were reported in northeastern Afghani-
stan in which a grayish-blue smoke
resulted in symptoms similar to those
% Pakttka
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 81 L
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described by the H'Mong refugees from
Laos (e.g., heavy tearing or watering of
eyes; extensive blistering and discolora-
tion of the skin, later resulting in large
sheetlike peeling; swelling in the areas
affected by the blister; and finally numb-
ness, paralysis, and death). Medical
reports from examinations in Pakistan
of refugees from a large attack in the
upper Konar Valley in February 1980
described red skin and blisters contain-
ing fluid described as "dirty water."
Refugees estimated that about 2,000
people were affected after contact with a
dirty yellow cloud.
By spring and summer of 1980,
chemical attacks were reported in all
areas of concentrated resistance activity.
Many reports from different sources
strongly support the case that irritants
were used to drive the insurgents into
the open to expose them to attack with
conventional weapons and incapacitants
to render them tractable for disarming
and capture. On several occasions in
April 1980, for example, Soviet heli-
copter pilots dropped "gas bombs" on in-
surgents, evidently to drive them from
caves.
A Dutch journalist, Bernd de Bruin,
published an eyewitness account of two
chemical attacks occurring in the Jalala-
bad area on June 15 and June 21, 1980
(Niewsnet, August 2, 1980). He filmed
an MI-24 helicopter dropping canisters
that produced a dirty yellow cloud. A
victim with blackened skin, discolored by
extensive subcutaneous hemorrhaging,
was photographed in the village 5 hours
after the attack. The journalist evidently
was exposed because he developed
blisters on his hands and a swollen and
itchy face. He also was exposed in the
second attack, and it took about 10 days
for him to recover from skin lesions,
nausea, diarrhea,, and stomach cramps.
An Afghan insurgent provided an
eyewitness account of a July 6, 1980 at-
tack on a village 10 kilometers east of
Darae Jelga in Vardak Province. He
reported that a Soviet MI-24 helicopter
gunship dropped a bomb that, upon ex-
plosion, released a lethal chemical. A
separate report confirmed that Soviet
bombing attacks on villages in Vardak
as well as Lowgar and Parvan Provinces
were taking place during this period. In
August 1980, information surfaced on a
Soviet attack with chemical bombs on
the village of Sya Wusan, 30 kilometers
southeast of Herat, leaving 300 dead. It
was during this time that the Soviet
chemical battalion at Shindand set up an
operational decontamination station.
Reports of chemical weapons use in
1981 essentially parallel 1980 reporting
with respect to frequency and location of
attack. Soviet helicopter units par-
ticipated in chemical attacks from April
20 to April 29, 1981, in areas east and
west of Kabul and in the Konar Valley,
according to eyewitness accounts. These
attacks were intended to drive personnel
from sanctuaries, such as caves, in order
to engage them with conventional fire.
The munitions were described as Soviet
250-kilogram RBK cluster bombs. The
Soviets have such a munition, which can
be filled with chemical agents. Other
reports described similar operations by
helicopters north of Qandahar on April
24 and April 26, 1981.
A former Afghan MI-8 helicopter
pilot said Soviet forces had used chemi-
cal weapons in Badakhshan, Qonduz,
and Konarha. Chemicals in canisters
that contained toxic gas, tear gas, and
antirespiratory gas, which has an in-
capacitating effect by causing choking
and difficulty in breathing, were manual-
ly pushed from the cargo compartment
of helicopters. The pilot said that there
also was a specific gas that is absorbed
by the body and leaves the skin so soft
that a finger can be punched through it.
In one case, there was a wind shift, and
Soviet and Afghan forces were seriously
affected. Other sources also have de-
scribed an incident where Soviet and
Afghan forces were victims of their own
gas attack.
The following sequence occurred in a
small valley in Qandahar Province in
early June 1981. According to an
Afghan exile, Soviet combat groups
engaged rebel forces in that valley dur-
ing a 2-week period. The situation
worsened for the Soviets, and an air-
strike was conducted. The exile stated
that a Soviet helicopter delivered a
single rocket, releasing a chemical that
killed 16 insurgents. Nearly all reports
state that chemicals were delivered by
aircraft or helicopters; a few reports de-
scribe chemical artillery rounds.
Before a sweep operation in the
Konar Valley in September 1981, re-
sistance leaders were told by an Afghan
officer that the Soviets had four agents
available but would use only the incapac-
itant which they could defend against
with wet rags over the face. During the
operation, Soviet helicopters conducted
gas attacks in 25 different areas, using
cylinders about 1.5 meters long and 60
centimeters in diameter that exploded
4-5 meters above the ground, releasing
the incapacitating gas. Some victims lost
consciousness, were paralyzed, and
recovered, but others died, and un-
protected areas of their skin turned dark
green to blue-green.
An Afghan tribal leader recently de-
scribed a Soviet chemical attack against
a large resistance force in October 1981
near Maruf, about 100 kilometers east of
Qandahar. Soviet helicopters dropped
green cylindrical canisters (18 inches
long, 3-4 inches in diameter) which,
upon hitting the ground, emitted a
greenish-yellow gas. According to the
report, victims felt faint and dizzy; later
their skin began to itch, and many lost
consciousness. About 300 persons were
affected by the gas and many died.
Soviet ground forces captured many of
the survivors. Other information on
Soviet and mujahidin activities in the
Qandahar area during this period con-
firms that this incident did in fact take
place.
In February 1982, a member of the
resistance, with considerable knowledge
of Soviet weapons, told a U.S. official
that the Soviets were using irritants, a
hallucinogenic gas, and what he said was
an apparent nerve gas. He described the
"nerve agent" as an off-white powdery
substance dispersed from helicopters
generally during artillery or bombing at-
tacks. Victims realize they have been ex-
posed to chemical attack only when they
become faint and dizzy. Subsequently,
they begin to vomit and bleed from the
eyes, nose, and mouth. Death occurs
within a short time. The corpses are ex-
tremely relaxed, with no evidence of
rigor mortis. Flesh and skin frequently
peel off if an effort is made to move the
bodies.
According to this account, survivors
suffer aftereffects for about 6 months,
including chest congestion and pain, diz-
ziness, and mental agitation. The
powder-like substance is more effective
at lower altitudes where there is less
wind to dilute the poison, and mujahidin
groups have experienced fatality rates
as high as 70%. Many survivors of
chemical attacks in Laos and Afghani-
stan have exhibited the same long-term
health problems described in this ac-
count.
Chemical defense battalions-stand-
ard in all Soviet divisions-are deployed .
with the three Soviet motorized rifle
divisions operating in Afghanistan at
Qonduz, Shindand, and Kabul. Soviet
operational personnel decontamination
stations were observed at several loca-
tions, and chemical decontamination
field units were deployed during a sweep
operation of the Konar Valley in eastern
Afghanistan and near Shindand in the
west in 1980. The operational deploy-
ment of decontamination units for per-
sonnel and equipment suggests that
chemical battalions have supported
offensive chemical use. In addition,
Soviet personnel have been observed
wearing chemical protective equipment.
The Soviets have specifically tailored
their forces in Afghanistan, in part
because of logistical constraints; 5,000
troops and "nonessential" combat equip-
ment were withdrawn, but the chemical
battalions remain.
A Soviet military chemical specialist,
captured by the mujahidin, gave his
name as Yuriy Povarnitsyn from
Sverdlovsk. During an interview, he said
that his mission was to examine villages
after a chemical attack to determine
whether they were safe to enter or re-
quired decontamination. An Afghan
pathologist who later defected described
accompanying Soviet chemical warfare
personnel into contaminated areas to
collect soil, vegetation, and water
samples after Soviet chemical attacks.
According to firsthand experience of
former Soviet chemical personnel, the
Soviets do not require decontamination
equipment in an area where chemical
bombs are stored or loaded onto air-
craft. Thus, deployment of this equip-
ment in Afghanistan must be assumed
to be associated with the active employ-
ment of casualty-producing chemical
agents.
Afghan military defectors have pro-
vided information on ammunition and
grenades containing phosgene, diphos-
gene, sarin, and soman and have de-
scribed where and when some of them
have been used. They also have revealed
locations where these agents were stock-
piled. The agents used, plus the time
and location of the attacks, correspond
with the refugee reports and recorded
military operations.
The Soviet Union has stocked a
variety of toxic chemical agents and
munitions to meet wartime contingen-
cies. Weapons systems capable of
delivering chemical munitions available
to Soviet forces in Afghanistan include
artillery, multiple rocket launchers, and
tactical aircraft.
Motivation for Using
Chemical Weapons
In the course of this analysis, the ques-
tion has been posed: Is there a military-
strategic or tactical rationale for the
systematic use of chemical weapons by
conventional forces in Laos, Kampuchea,
and Afghanistan? The military problems
faced in these countries-viewed from
the perspective of the Soviets and their
allies-make the use of chemical
weapons a militarily effective way of
breaking the will and resistance of stub-
born anti-government forces operating
from relatively inaccessible, protected
sanctuaries.
The Soviets have made a large in-
vestment in insuring that Vietnam and
its clients succeed in extending their
control over Indochina. For Vietnam,
the H'Mong resistance in Laos is a ma-
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jor irritant to be removed as quickly and
cheaply as possible. The use of chemical
agents has played a major role in driv-
ing the H'Mong from their mountain
strongholds, relieving Vietnamese and
Lao ground forces of the need for costly
combat in difficult terrain. Much of the
H'Mong population that lived in the
Phou Bia mountain region has been
driven into Thailand, killed, or resettled.
In the mountainous areas of
Afghanistan, where rebels are holed up
in caves or other inaccessible areas, con-
ventional artillery, high-explosive bombs,
and napalm are not particularly effec-
tive. Many reports indicate that uniden-
tified chemical agents have been used on
such targets. Caves and rugged terrain
in Laos and thick jungles in Kampuchea
also have frustrated attempts to locate
and destroy the resistance forces.
Chemical clouds can penetrate the heavy
forests and jungle canopy and seep into
the mountain caves. Persistent agents ?
linger in the area and cause casualties
days and sometimes weeks after the at-
tack. Unprotected forces and civilians
have little or no defense against lethal
agents like toxins, nerve gas, or blister
agents.
Trichothecene toxins, which are
known to have been used in Southeast
Asia, have the added advantage of being
an effective terror weapon that causes
bizarre and horrifying symptoms. Severe
bleeding, in addition to blisters and
vomiting, has instilled fear in the
resistance villages. Not only have the
villagers and their animals been killed in
a gruesome manner, but the vegetation
and water also have been contaminated.
Survivors are reluctant to return to
their inhospitable homes and instead
make the long and dangerous trek to
camps in Thailand.
There is no clearcut explanation of
why trichothecene toxins have been used
in addition to irritants, incapacitants,
and other traditional chemical warfare
agents. Speculation suggests that they
are probably cheaper to make and are
readily available from Soviet stocks;
they are probably safer and more stable
to store, transport, and handle in a
Southeast Asian environment, and they
may require less protective equipment
when being prepared for munitions.
They are difficult to trace as the
causative agent after an attack-as
demonstrated by the length of time it
took for the United States to detect
them. Few laboratories in the' world
have the analytical capability to identify
precisely the type and amount of
trichothecene toxin in a sample of
vegetation, soil, or water.
The Soviets may well have
calculated that they and their allies
could successfully deny or counter
charges that chemical weapons had been
used, recognizing that it would be
especially difficult to compile incon-
trovertible evidence from inaccessible
areas of Southeast Asia and Afghani-
stan. With respect to Kampuchea, they
may also have calculated that, in view of
the lack of international support for Pol
Pot's resistance, chemical weapons could
be used on his troops without significant
international outcry.
In addition, the Soviet military very
likely considers these remote areas as
providing unique opportunities for the
operational testing and evaluation of
chemical weapons under various tactical
conditions. Years of aerial and artillery
chemical dispersion have undoubtedly
provided the Soviets with valuable
testing data. Southeast Asia has offered
the Soviets an opportunity to test old
agents that had been stockpiled for
many years as well as more recently
developed agents or combinations of
agents. This conclusion is supported by
information from foreign military
officers who have attended the Soviet
Military Academy of Clhemical Defense
in Moscow. According to their Soviet in-
structor, three types of chemical agents
may be used during the "initial stages"
of local wars: "harassing agents (CS,
CN, DM), incapacitants such as psycho-
chemicals (BZ) or intertoxins [sic-pos-
sibly enterotoxins], and[ herbicides." Dur-
ing the "decisive phase? lethal agents can
be employed under certain cir-
cumstances." In a local war, "chemical
weapons can be used to spoil enemy
efforts to initiate operations, even if the
enemy has not used them first." The
foreign officers' accounts, including
detailed descriptions of the Soviet
chemical warfare program, support the
conclusion that the Soviets consider
chemical weapons an effective and ac-
ceptable means of warfare in local
conflicts.
Insight into the Soviet bloc military
perspective on the use of toxins is pro-
vided in the following passage from a
1977 East German military manual en-
titled Textbook of Military Chemistry.
Toxins are designated as toxic agents
which are produced by biological organisms
such as micro-organisms, plants, and animals,
and cannot themselves reproduce.
By the middle of 1960 the toxins selected
for military purposes were included among
the biologic warfare agents. In principle, this
was understood to mean only the bacterial
toxins. Today it is possible to produce various
toxins synthetically. Toxins with 10-12 amino
acids can currently be synthesized in the
laboratory. Toxins are not living substances
and in this sense are chemicals. They thus
differ fundamentally from the biological
organisms so that they can be included
among chemical warfare agents. As a result
 of their peculiarities they are designated
simply as "toxin warfare agents." They would
be used in combat according to the same
principles and with the same methods used
for chemical warfare agents. When they are
used in combat the atmosphere can be con-
taminated over relatively large areas-we
can expect expansion depths of up to 6 kilo-
meters before the toxin concentration drops
below lethal concentration 50 ... the toxin
warfare agents can be aerosolized. They can
be used primarily in micro-bombs which are
launched from the air or in warheads of tac-
tical rockets. Toxin warfare agents concen-
trates can be applied. with aircraft spray
equipment and similar dispersion systems.
The Soviet designation for several
pathogenic Fusarium products is "IIF
(iskusstvennyy infektsionnyfon), which
stands for "artificial infection back-
ground." IIF devices are used in the
Soviet Union deliberately to contaminate
soil in experimental agricultural test
areas with spores of disease-producing
fungi. We are not certain if the IIF com-
pounds include trichothecenes. Nor are
we certain as to the intent of this agri-
cultural research program. It is possible
that these programs are designed to col-
onize soil with pathogenic organisms
either to determine which crop varieties
are most resistant to disease or, alter-
natively, to test eradication and control
methods in infected soils. Elsewhere in
the Soviet agricultural research pro-
gram, however, it is known that there is
widespread use of certain trichothe-
cenes, including sprays from light air-
craft. A capability exists within the
Soviet Union for multi-ton production of
light aircraft spray-delivered microbial
products such as those described above.
Evidence accumulated since World
War II clearly shows that the Soviets
have been extensively involved in
preparations for large-scale offensive
and defensive chemical warfare.
Chemical warfare agents and delivery
systems developed) by the Soviets have
been identified, along with production
and storage areas within the U.S.S.R.
and continuing research, development,
and testing activitiies at the major Soviet
chemical proving grounds. Soviet
military forces are extensively equipped
and trained for operations in a chemi-
cally contaminated) environment. None
of the evidence indicates any abatement
in this program. The Soviets have shown
a strong interest in improving or en-
hancing their standard agents for
greater reliability and effect. Their large
chemical and biological research and
development effort has led them to in-
vestigate other kinds of chemical war-
fare agents, particularly the toxins.
None of the four countries con-
sidered in this report-Vietnam, Laos,
Kampuchea, and Afghanistan-has any
known large-scale facility or organiza-
tion for the manufacture of chemical and
biological materials. Nor are they known
to have produced even small quantities
of chemical warfare agents or munitions.
The technical problems of producing
large quantities of weapons-grade tox-
ins, however, are not so great as to pre-
clude any of the four countries from
learning to manufacture, purify, and
weaponize these materials. It is highly
unlikely, however, that they could
master these functions without acquiring
outside technical know-how.
One of the most complete descriptions of
chemical warfare activities in the
1976-78 period came from a Lao pilot
who was directly involved in chemical
warfare. The pilot, a former Lao
People's Liberation Army (LPLA) officer
who defected in 1979, reported that he
flew captured L-19 and T-41 aircraft
equipped to dispense toxic chemical
agents on H'Mong villagers in the Phou
Bia area of northern Laos. He said that
the LPLA, in cooperation with the Viet-
namese Army, had conducted chemical
warfare operations in Laos since April
or early May 1976. At that time, two
Lao H-34 helicopters were flown be-
tween Long Tieng and the Phonsavan
airfield, both in Xiangkhoang Province,
on a series of flights to transport
rockets to Phonsavan for storage.
Between June and August 1976, the
LPLA launched attacks in the area of
Bouamlong-in Xiangkhoang Prov-
ince-a stronghold for remnants of the
forces of former H'Mong Gen. Vang
Pao. The LPLA used L-19 aircraft for
rocket attacks in that area aimed at
eliminating the H'Mong resisting govern-
ment control. Lao crews responsible for
loading rockets on the attack aircraft
noted that they were not allowed to use
the rockets that had been moved from
Long Tieng to Phonsavan, even though
Phonsavan was much closer to the
Bouamlong target area than Long
Tieng, where Lao aircraft had to rearm.
The pilot said that, during nearly 3
months of flying missions against the
Bouamlong area, he flew his L-19 air-
craft to Long Tieng to be armed with
rockets.
In late 1976, the pilot's L-19 aircraft
was rearmed with rockets stored at
Phonsavan. Initially, H-34 helicopters
were used to transport the rockets from
Phonsavan to a depot near the Ban Xon
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airfield (Vientiane Province), where the
rockets were fitted onto racks of the
L-19 aircraft for missions in the Phou
Bia area; later, the rockets from Phon-
savan were transported to Ban Xon by
trucks. All U.S.-manufactured rockets
were stored with the tip and canister
kept apart; the two parts had to be
joined before being fitted to the racks on
the aircraft. The pilot observed, how-
ever, that all the rockets transported
from Phonsavan to Ban Xon were al-
ready assembled.
As part of his routine flight ac-
tivities, the pilot would check his aircraft
and, in doing so, examine the tip portion
of new smoke rockets that had been
transported from Phonsavan. He said
that most appeared "loose" in the por-
tion where the tip and canister joined,
whereas the tip and canister of the ordi-
nary explosive-type rockets at Long
Tieng were noticeably more tightly con-
nected.
In late 1976, during preparation for
airstrikes on Kasy (Louangphrabang
Province) and in new areas of Phou Bia,
the pilot said he began carrying two or
three Vietnamese Army staff officers,
sometimes accompanied by a Lao staff
officer, in T-41 aircraft for recon-
naissance over the target areas. When
these airstrikes were launched, the
defector pilot initially flew his L-19 air-
craft on missions with another pilot and
a Lao staff officer. After 2 or 3 weeks,
however, Vietnamese staff officers, who
spoke excellent Lao, began alternating
with the Lao officers. Before each mis-
sion, the Vietnamese or Lao staff officer
would go over target areas outlined on
situation maps-which then were taken
along-and would point out the targets
to be attacked. The defector pilot noted
that at no time did the Vietnamese staff
officer communicate with Lao officers on
the ground, as did the Lao staff officers.
A new Vietnamese officer was assigned
for each airstrike mission in the H'Mong
areas.
The pilot related that before flying
L-19 airstrike missions with a full load
of rockets he was often warned by a Lao
commander to fly at above-normal alti-
tudes when firing rockets-to preclude
hazard to the occupants of the aircraft.
For this reason the pilot surmised that
the "smoke" rockets fired at the H'Mong
were unusual. He was able to observe
that the "smoke" rockets detonated in
the air and that some produced white
smoke, with a mixture of blue, while
others produced red smoke, with a mix-
ture of yellow. The ordinary explosive-
type rockets detonated on impact. The
commander or his designated repre-
sentative told the pilot before every mis-
sion that the operations-called Extinct
Destruction Operations-were intended
to "wipe out the reactionary H'Mong
people."
Before a mission involving "smoke
rockets," the commander warned the
pilots to keep the operation secret. The
Lao defector said that, during the nearly
2 years in which he flew rocket missions,
he learned from the Lao staff officers ac-
companying him that there were two
types of rockets. The first, mostly
"smoke" rockets, were to be fired at
targets far away from Lao and Viet-
namese troops to avoid exposing them
to the poison smoke. The second was of
the ordinary explosive type, considered a
"close support" rocket that could be fired
near Lao troop positions. Initially, the
L-19 aircraft carried eight rockets-
five "close support" and three "smoke"
rockets. Later, only four rockets, mainly
of the "smoke" type, were carried.
After each mission in which chemical
warfare rockets were used, the pilot was
returned to a "rest house" at Phonsavan,
where a Lao Army doctor and nurse
would examine him. He said that after
his missions, especially in 1978, he was
particularly well treated by the examin-
ing doctor and watched very closely by
the nurse. Those L-19 aircraft pilots
assigned to missions utilizing chemical
warfare rockets had special privileges,
including additional flight pay and free
meals at the Phonsavan cafeteria. In Oc-
tober 1978, the Lao Army stopped using
L-19 aircraft on combat missions and
began using Soviet MiG-21s for chemi-
cal attacks on the Phou Bia areas.
Several H'Mong reports corroborate
the testimony of the Lao pilot. A village
chief, for example, described attacks
covering all 7 days of the week of June
5, 1976 in the Bouamlong area. He de-
scribed L-.19 aircraft firing rockets that
produced red and green smoke: Ten
villagers were killed by gas and 30 by
shrapnel. Most of the H'Mong reports
documented by a U.S. Foreign Service
officer in June 1979 and a Department
of Defense medical team in October
1979 were consistent with the pilot's
testimony. H'Mong observers familiar
with military aircraft reported L-19s in
use until late 1978. After that time,
reports described jets or "MiGs" and
some accurately described Soviet
AN-2s.
A review of information back to
1975 shows L-19 and T-28-aircraft
were operating from airfields in
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northern Laos-including the one at
Phonsavan, where AN-2s were seen in
1978. Failure to observe chemical decon-
tamination equipment at the airfields
does not rule out the presence or
handling of chemical munitions. The
Soviets supervise the chemical warfare
activities in Laos; it is assumed that
chemical munitions are handled in about
the same manner as in the U.S.S.R. Ac-
cording to former Soviet chemical war-
fare personnel, no protective clothing or
special decontamination equipment is re-
quired for loading chemical bombs onto
aircraft and helicopters at chemical
munitions test ranges.
The Lao pilot's description of the
rockets used on the L-19 was corrobor-
ated by other sources. A H'Mong
refugee, a former commander of a
500-man resistance force, reported that
in 1977 he found a rocket canister and a
separated warhead that he believed
were the kinds used by the Vietnamese
and Lao. The canister had authentic
U.S. markings identifying it as a
U.S.-manufactured 2.75-inch rocket and,
reportedly, three lines of Russian
writing which he could not translate.
Another H'Mong resistance force officer,
reportedly trained as a liaison officer
and ordnance expert before the Com-
munist takeover of Laos, stated that he,
too, believed that the rocket canister
was of U.S. manufacture and that the
Soviet technicians in Laos had modified
the upper stage to contain a poisonous
(i.e., lethal) chemical.
The diameter of the warhead was
reported to be 12.5 centimeters (5
inches), probably a measurement taken
on a modified warhead, because the
United States does not have a 5-inch
warhead for the 2.75-inch "rocket
motor." During the Vietnam conflict,
about 35 million U.S.-manufactured, con-
ventional 2.75-inch rockets were sent to
the war zone, and many tens of thous-
ands of these fell into North Vietnamese
hands when the South Vietnamese
forces collapsed. The Vietnamese may
be using some of these rockets with ex-
isting loads, but modified warheads for
the 2.75-inch rocket motor could easily
be fabricated in Vietnam and filled with
a lethal or nonlethal agent in Laos,
especially with Soviet assistance. Ac-
cording to U.S. experts, fabrication of a
warhead 5 inches in diameter, necked
down to fit the 2.75-inch rocket, could be
accomplished by trained technicians in a
small, well-equipped machine shop and
laboratory.
FINDINGS OF U.S. GOVERNMENT
INVESTIGATIVE TEAMS: USE OF
CHEMICAL AGENTS AGAINST THE
H'MONG IN LAOS
State Department Team
In May 1979, State Department officials
visited Thailand to interview H'Mong
refugees and investigate allegations of
the use of chemical agents against
H'Mong tribesmen in Laos (see Table
B-1). From the signslsyrnptoms describ-
ed and observed, it is suggested that at
least two and possibly three different
chemical agents may have been used,
such as:
? A nerve agent (five or six in-
dividuals reported symptoms that could
be attributed to a nerve agent);
? An irritant or riot;-control agent
(one-third of the interviews); and
? More than half of the interviews
indicated such a variety of signs and
symptoms that it is difficult to attribute
them to a single known ,agent.
It is possible that in some cases two
or more agents were combined.
? Reported signs and symptoms
suggesting a nerve agent include sweat-
ing, tearing, excessive salivation, diffi-
culty in breathing, shortness of breath,
nausea and vomiting, dizziness, weak-
ness, convulsions, and death occurring
shortly after exposure.
? Reported signs and symptoms
suggesting a riot-control or irritant
agent include marked irritation or burn-
ing of the eyes, with tearing and pain;
irritation and burning of the nose and
throat; coughing; burning and tightness
in the chest; headache; and nausea and
vomiting in a few cases.
? Reported signs and symptoms not
related to any known single agent in-
clude a mixture of the above as well as
profuse bleeding from mucous mem-
branes of the nose, lungs, and gastro-
intestinal tract, with rapid death of the
affected individuals in some instances.
Estimates from the H'Mong inter-
viewed indicate that approximately
700-1,000 persons may have died as a
result of the use of chemical agents and
that many times this number became ill.
It was reported that on many occasions
entire villages were devastated by these
agents, leaving no survivors.
In the episodes described, most of
the animals exposed to the chemical
agents were killed. Generally, all
 chickens, dogs, and pigs died and, to a
lesser extent, the cattle and buffalo. On
several occasions it was reported that
where these agents settled on tree and
plant leaves, many small holes appeared
in the leaves within 2 or 3 days. Rarely
did agent exposure result in the defolia-
tion or death of the plants.
Department of Defense Team
From September 28 to October 12,
1979, a team from the U.S. Army
Surgeon General's Office was in Thailand
to conduct a similar series of inter-
views. * The team visited the following
H'Mong refugee camps of northern Thai-
land: the detention center at Nong Kai,
the large H'Mong camp at Ban Vinai,
and two smaller camps at Nam Yao and
Mae Charim. As the great majority of
refugees as well as the H'Mong leader-
ship are at Ban Vinai, most interviews
were obtained there.
The team was prepared to obtain
blood and skin samples (for cholinester-
ase activity and study of pathological
changes, respectively) from those ex-
posed to chemical agents. For such
samples to yield meaningful results they
must be taken within 6-8 weeks of ex-
posure. Since the last reported exposure
was in May 1979, no blood or skin
samples were collected.
Interviews were conducted through
interpreters; one was an employee of the
U.S. Consulate at Udorn, and the re-
mainder were hired from among the
refugees. The interpreters screened
those refugees who volunteered to talk
to the team and selected only those who
had been eyewitnesses to or had them-
selves been exposed to an agent attack.
Team members interviewed 40 men, 2
women, and a 12-year-old girl. Each in-
terview took 1-2 !hours. To insure con-
formity, a prepared questionnaire was
used as a guide.
The chemical attacks reportedly oc-
curred between June 1976 and May 1979
(Table B-1). The absence of reports of
attacks after May 1979 may be because
* The authors of the U.S. Army Surgeon
General's report are! Charles W. Lewis, M.D.,
COL, MC, Chief, Dermatology Service,
Brooke Army Medical Center, Fort Sam
Houston, Texas; Frederick R. Sidell, K.D.,
Chief, Clinical Resources Group, U.S. Army
Biomedical Laboratory, Aberdeen Proving
Ground, Md.; William D. Tigertt, M.D.
(Brigadier General, Ret., USA), Professor of
Pathology, University of Maryland,
Baltimore, Md.; Charles D. Lane, LTC,
Southeast Asia Desk Officer, OACSI, Depart-
ment of the Army, Washington, D.C.; and
Burton L. Kelley, SP5, USA, Dermatology
Technician, Brooke Army Medical Center,
Fort Sam Houston, Texas.
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TABLE B-1
Reports of Probable Chemical Agent Attacks in Laos
Oct. 1977
1978
Feb. 1978
Feb. 1978
Feb. 1978
Mar. 1978
Mar. 1978
Apr. 1978
June 1978
June 1978-May 1979
Mid-1978
Oct. 1978
Oct. 1978
Oct. 1978
Nov. 1978
Nov. 1978
Nov. 1978
Apr. 1979
May 1979
May 1979
Phu, Hay, S. of Phou Bia
Pa Sieng, S. of Phou Bia
Ban Nam Luk, S. of Phou Bia
20 kms SE. of Phou Bia
Ban Ko Mai
Pha Houei
Ban Na Pong
Ban Phamsi
Ban Nam Teng
Ban Don area
1-3 kms NE. of Phou Bia
Nam Kham
6 kms N. of Phou Khao
3-4 kms N. of Phou Bia
Phou Xang Noi
near Phou Bia
NE. of Pha Khao
Ban Nouia Pong
Nam Po
Pha Mai
Method of Attack
by Plane
Rockets
Bomb
Spray (?)
Spray (?)
Bomb
Sacks, burst in air
(?)
(?)
Rocket (?)
Spray
Rocket, air burst
Rockets, air burst
Rockets, air burst
Rockets, air burst
Spray
Bomb, air burst
Rocket, air burst
Spray
Spray
Spray, air burst
Material Used
(Smoke/Gas)
Yellow-gray
Yellow
Yellow/white
Yellow
Yellow
Brown
Yellow
White, green,
blood-colored
Yellow-brown
like rain
Yellow
Yellow
Red
Yellow
Red
Yellow-gray
Yellow, blue
Yellow
Yellow
Yellow
Yellow
Yellow
June 1976
Jan. 1977-Oct. 1978
Mar. 1977
Apr. 1977
May 1977
May 1977
May 1977
1977-1978 (3 attacks)
Jan. 1978
Feb. 1978
Feb. 1978
Feb. 1978
Mar. 1978
Mar. 1978
Apr. 1978
June 1978
June 1978
July 1978
July 1978
July 1978
Aug. 1978
Aug. 1978
Aug. 1978
Sept. 1978
Sept. 1978
Sept. 1978
Oct. 1978
Oct. 1978
Oct. 1978
Nov. 1978
Feb. 1979
Feb. 1979
Mar. 1979
Mar.-May 1979
(6 attacks)
Apr.-May 1979
(4 attacks)
May 1979
May 1979
Pou Mat Sao
Pha Khao
Nam Theuna
Houi Kam Lang
Pha Khae
Nam Moh
Pha Ngune
Phu Seu
Houi Xang
Sane Mak Ku
Tham Se Sam Leim
Kio Ma Nang
Mouong Ao
Khieu Manang
Tha Se
Pha Phay
Phou Seng
Phou Bia
Ban Nam Mo
Phou Lap
Pha Houai
Ban Thin On
Bouamlong
Pha Koug
Ban Nam Tia
Pha Na Khum
Phou Bia
Ban Done
Phou Bia
Phou Bia
Pha Mat
Tong Moei
Pha Mai
Pha Mai
Phou Bia
Moung Phong
Method of Attack
by Plane
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Spray/rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Spray
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Spray/rockets
Rockets
Rockets
Spray
Rockets
Rockets
Spray
Rockets
Spray
Spray
Spray
Rockets
Material Used
(SmokelGes)
Red, green
Yellow, red, green
Red, yellow
Yellow
Red
Yellow
Yellow
Red, green, yellow
Red, green
Yellow
Yellow, black
Yellow
White
Green
White
Yellow
Red, white, black
Red
Yellow
Yellow
Red, green
Green, red
Red, green, yellow
Yellow
Yellow, green, red
Red
Yellow
White, green, red
White, red
Yellow
Yellow, red
Yellow
Yellow
Yellow
Red
I 1-
few refugees crossed the Mekong River
after that time-as a result of heavy
rains and flooding from June to Septem-
ber 1979. Most of the early reports were
of the use of rockets releasing the agent;
beginning in the fall of 1978, the majori-
ty of the attacks were carried out by air-
craft spraying a yellowish substance
which "fell like rain." The attack sites,
concentrated around the H'Mong strong-
hold in the mountainous Phou Bia area,
also are listed in Table B-1,
The team was given a plastic vial
containing pieces of bark, stained by a
yellow substance, which several H'Mong
refugees claimed was residue from an
aircraft spray attack in April 1979. Pre-
liminary chemical analysis of the sample
indicates that no standard chemical
agent (i.e., an agent listed in TH 8-285,
U.S. Army, May 1974) was present.
Conclusions
The conclusions of these teams, based
upon interviews obtained from H'Mong
refugees, are as follows:
e Chemical agents have been used
against the H'Mong.
e The reported effects of these
agents suggest the use of a nerve agent,
a riot-control agent, and an unidentified
combination or compound.
ANNEX C
MEDICAL EVIDENCE
Southeast Asia
Since 1975, many different sources-
refugees, relief workers and medical
personnel, including specially qualified
physicians-consistently have detailed
unusual signs and symptoms of victims
of "yellow rain." Specifically, victims in
Southeast Asia subjected to a direct at-
tack of the yellow powder, mist, smoke,
or dust would be seen to begin retching
and vomiting within minutes. These
effects and those described below were
not pronounced in individuals even 100
meters from the attack zone, indicating
a relatively dense chemical/carrier com-
bination that was effective in low wind
conditions.
Following the victim's exposure to
yellow rain, the initial induced vomit-
ing-unlike that caused by a traditional
riot-control nausea agent-was pro-
tracted over hours to days. It was often
accompanied by dizziness, rapid heart-
beat and apparently low blood pressure,
chest pain, loss of far-field vision, and a
feeling of intense heat and burning on
the skin, although not described as being
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most acute in the groin and axillae.
Thus, the acute signs and symptoms
match some effects of traditional
vomiting and blister agents but clearly
not all.
Within the first hours after the at-
tack, many victims also reported intense
red eyes, bleeding gums, convulsions or
more often trembling, and vomiting of
blood, with or without production of
copious amounts of saliva-lasting many
hours to days, apparently depending on
the exposure level. Thick mucous, pin-
point pupils, respiratory collapse, pro-
longed spasticity, and involuntary urina-
tion or defecation were never reported
after a yellow rain attack; the absence of
these symptoms helped to rule out or-
ganophosphate nerve agents in the
minds of chemical warfare experts.
Many medical and environmental
samples also ruled out these and other
traditional agents such as DM, DS, and
others.
Many observers of "yellow rain"
effects reported formation within several
hours of small (1 centimeter) homoge-
neous, hard, fluid-filled blisters over only
exposed areas of skin, frequently in-
cluding the victim's hands, arms, entire
throat, and face-wherever skin was un-
covered. In most cases the vomit, after
2-8 hours, contained blood and, in many
cases, large amounts of it. About half of
those receiving the most concentrated
doses of yellow material-those who had
been directly under the spray-were
observed within several hours to cease
vomiting temporarily. This interval was
often followed in 5-15 minutes by a
period of great pain when the victim
would hold his abdomen and emit a gush
of blood from mouth and nose. These in-
dividuals usually died within minutes
afterward.
Close questioning by physicians of
witnesses to these final moments leaves
no doubt that the effects resulted from
severe gastrointestinal bleeding, signifi-
cant pulmonary bleeding, temporary
compression of accumulated blood in the
stomach, and, finally, projectile vomiting
of as many as several hundred milliliters
of blood. These findings were consistent
with animal and human autopsies.
Many victims of the yellow material
received less than the full brunt of a
spray, entered the attack zone several
hours to 2 days later, or consumed food
or water contaminated by the material.
These individuals-often within the next
24 hours-developed signs and symp-
toms similar to those more directly af-
fected but often without pronounced
skin effects if they had not contacted the
powder residue directly. In addition to
attacks of intense vomiting five or six
times a day, they also had diarrhea, with
bloody stools passed up to eight times a
day. Bleeding under the fingernails and
around the skin of the eyes and severe
bruising of the skin also were commonly
reported. Opiates helped the fluid loss in
adults, but in children or young persons
unable to tolerate the treatments of raw
opium and water, death occurred after
10 days to 2 weeks in about half the
cases. On the basis of reported signs and
symptoms, the cause of delayed death
almost certainly was dehydration.
In many cases, chemical attacks are
reported to produce symptoms other
than those described here. However,
there has always been a direct associa-
tion of the above symptoms with reports
of yellow rain attacks-that is, when
yellow material is used these symptoms
appear; other agents may give rise to
other symptoms. Although it is possible
to exhibit one or even several of these
symptoms associated with traditional
chemical warfare agents;, no expert has
been able to fit the sequence, severity,
and consistency with any of them. In
many cases, victims and observers were
examined, histories taken, and inter-
views conducted by several health pro-
fessionals weeks apart. Remarkable con-
sistency has been observed.
From the beginning of the yellow
rain episodes in 1975, autopsies occa-
sionally have been reported anecdotally.
Some have been done inexpertly, some
by nonphysicians, and some were per-
formed on animals rather than on
human victims. However, the consisten-
cy of the early reported "putrefaction"
or "rottenness" of the digestive tract
within 12-48 hours after death led many
forensic medical experts to suspect that
one effect of the poison-whatever it
was- was to cause necrosis (cell death)
of rapidly dividing mucosa (mucous
membranes), especially in the stomach
and upper small intestine. Other autopsy
findings included hyperemia (engorge-
ment with blood) of digestive mucosal
linings and remarkably intense conges-
tion and swelling in the lungs, liver,
spleen, and sometimes the kidneys.
These and other findings often led ex-
perts in toxicology and pathology, on the
basis of clinical and pathological data
alone, to suggest mycotioxin or even tri-
chothecene intoxication.
Trichothecene effects have been
reported in the forensic,, ontological, and
toxicological literature for several years.
Unpublished findings often have been
discussed in symposiums. In several
dozen cases, toxic effects in humans and
 animals have been carefully recorded,
and they match those of yellow rain with
good precision (see Table C-1). There
are no additional signs or effects of
known trichothecene intoxication not fre-
quently reported by victims, nor are
there any reported yellow rain symptoms
that cannot be explained by the effects of
the four specific trichothecene toxins
found in the samples.
There are no significant medical dif-
ferences in the reporting from Laos and
Kampuchea. Although the timing and
delivery systems have sometimes varied,
the effects of the chemical agent, clini-
cally and pathologically, are identical. In
some cases, a series of blood samples
from Kampuchean victims also showed a
trend toward leukopenia (reduction in
the number of white blood cells) and the
presence of a trichothecene metabolite
(HT-2) consistent with trichothecene in-
toxication (see Annex D). Dose-response
effects that were observed and routes of
administration were both consistent with
effects of trichothecenes.
An early hypothesis (1978-79) was
that a significant number of deaths,
especially in Laos, could be explained by
the heavy use of riot-control agents such
as CS, CN, DM, and agents which cause
itching and/or blistering. This hypothesis
was rejected quickly on two grounds.
First, trace contaminant analysis failed
to show the presence of any of these
compounds in samples; several samples
did, however, contain a trichothecene
precursor. Second, contrary to common-
ly held views, the epidemiology of
diseases endemic to the central high-
lands of Laos and the public health
situation of the H'Mong do not support
the view of malnourished, disease-
ridden, and weak persons who would
succumb easily to riot-control agents.
Also, many studies have shown the op-
posite: a relatively low incidence of pul-
monary disease, lower than what could
otherwise account for certain effects;
better nutritional states than could
otherwise account for death in 10 days
to 2 weeks from water loss (dehydration)
and calorie depletion; and a death rate
of nearly zero from causes other than in-
fection, old age, and trauma.
Afghanistan
Some deaths associated with bleeding
have been described in the accounts
from Afghanistan. In one set of cases, a
physician examined persons who had
been exposed to sublethal doses of a
yellow smokelblack smoke combination
attack and one man near death after a
series of attacks. Hemoptysis (nasal
TABLE C-1
Comparison of Reported "Yellow Rain" Effects
With Known Trichothecene Effects
Yellow Rain Reports*
1. Nausea, vomiting-severe, immediate
2. "Falling down, world turning"
3. "Burning of skin"-small blisters
4. "Shaking all over, flopping like fish
out of water"
6. "Pounding" chest, rapid heartbeat,
weakness
7. Severe pain in center of chest
8. Sleepiness, "not able to talk"
10. "Can't breathe"
11. "Skin and body hot with cold"
12. Diarrhea with blood
13. Loss of appetite, inability to eat
14. Bleeding into skin and fingernails
15. Drop in white blood cell count
16. "Rotten esophagus, stomach, intestines;
soft spleen and liver"
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Effects of Trichothecenes
1. Nausea, vomiting-severe, immediate
2. Dizziness
3. Generalized erythema with a burning
sensation of skin
4. Ataxia (failure of muscular coordination),
occasional tremors and convulsions
5. Congestion of the sclera (white outer
coat of eyeball) and blood in tears
6. Hypotension (abnormally low blood
pressure) with secondary rise in
heart rate
7. Angina (substernal chest pain)
8. Somnolence, central nervous system
symptoms
9. Stomatitis (inflammation of oral mucous
membranes) and ptyalism (excessive
salivation)
10. Shortness of breath
11. Fever and chills
12. Diarrhea with blood
13. Anorexia
14. Thrombocytopenia (decrease in number
of platelets, white blood cells involved
in clotting of blood) and purpura (skin
discoloration caused by hemorrhage into
tissues)
15. Leukopenia and anemia
16. Rapid necrosis of linings of gastro-
intestinal tract; lymphoid necrosis in
spleen and liver
17. Congestion of all organs
* Effects are immediate at levels near to or above a rough estimate of 500-1,000 mg total body burden for
an adult. Although inhalation data are pending, the levels are consistent with reported lethal and sublethal doses.
Trichothecenes in combination, when directly ingested or inhaled, or in purified form, are more toxic in lower
concentrations, and the order of signs and symptoms and timing varies.
bleeding)-but not hematemesis
(bleeding from the gastrointestinal
tract)-was reported in about half of
these cases.
Several features of at least one of
the chemical agents-an incapacitant-
used in Afghanistan defy explanation at
this time. One possibility is that the
agent(s) are highly selective for the cen-
tral nervous system rather than the
autonomic nervous system. As yet, no
good candidate agent has been identified
which will selectively inhibit the central
nervous system so as to cause uncon-
ciousness for several hours. Another
finding has been the presence of a der-
mal anaesthesia, affecting only exposed
areas of skin.
Postattack Medical Survey
There is evidence that after some at-
tacks in Laos and Afghanistan, Lao
Communist or Soviet forces entered the
attack zones to conduct surveys. Several
reports indicate that survivors from a
toxin attack on a Lao village were taken
several kilometers from the village and
injected with a small volume of a clear
solution said by their captors to be a
"new" medicine to assess the gas. The
injections, given intramuscularly in the
upper arm, reportedly did nothing to
alleviate the weakness, nausea, vomit-
ing, or diarrhea suffered by the sur-
vivors. One victim reported the drug
caused an immediate sensation of
warmth throughout his body. Only the
use of opium later eased the discomfort.
It is probable that this procedure was a
test either of a new antidote or of a
drug developed to reduce incapacitation
from the nausea and vomiting.
Similarly, in a few cases in Afghani-
stan, Soviet troops reportedly disem-
barked from helicopters or armored per-
sonnel carriers at the edge of an attack
site. Three or four, dressed in full anti-
contamination gear, walked among the
dead, examined the corpses and, opening
them with a crude incision, examined
the organs in the abdominal and thoracic
cavities. In one case, a solution was
poured into the incision. When the corp-
ses were later recovered by the mu-
jahidin, the body cavity contents had
been destroyed beyond recognition.
These and a few additional reports sup-
port the hypothesis that the perpe-
trators of some of the attacks were in-
terested in studying aftereffects, lethali-
ty, or some other quasi-experimental
aspect of the use of a new chemical
weapon. Recent indications from
Afghanistan indicate that one purpose of
the field surveys and body examinations
is to determine levels of toxic materials
still present in the attack zone before
Soviet troops occupy it.
ANALYSIS AND REVIEW OF
TRICHOTHECENE TOXINS
Sample Analyses for Trichothecenes
The Trichothecene Hypothesis. Since
1975, the U.S. Government has received
remarkably consistent reports detailing
chemical attacks in Southeast Asia.
Some of these reports described the use
of lethal agents which produced symp-
toms that could not be correlated with
those produced by known or traditional-
ly recognized chemical warfare agents or
combinations of them (see Table D-1). It
is readily apparent that the symptoms
most frequently described in Laos and
Kampuchea correspond most closely
with those produced by a group of myco-
toxins-the trichothecenes. A review of
the scientific literature revealed not only
that these compounds had physical and
chemical properties indicating potential
as chemical agents but also that they
were the subject of intensive investiga-
tion by Soviet scientists at institutes
previously linked with chemical and bio-
logical warfare research. In the fall of
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1980, the trichothecenes were added to
the list of agents suspected to have been
used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan.
Other candidates under consideration in-
cluded phosgene oxime, arsines, cyano-
gen chloride, nerve agents, riot-control
agents, and combinations of these
agents.
Many samples from chemical attacks
in Laos and Kampuchea were examined
at the U.S. Army's Chemical Systems
Laboratory (CSL) for the presence of
traditional chemical warfare agents and
were reported to be negative. In March
1981, CSL reported the presence of an
unusual compound (C15H24) in the vapor
analyses from several clothing and tissue
samples taken from the victim of a
chemical attack. The compound was
closely related in structure to the simple
trichothecenes. This finding sparked the
request for analysis of all future samples
for the presence of trichothecene myco-
toxins.
The Kampuchean Leaf and Stem
Sample: The First Analysis for Tri-
chothecenes. On March 24, 1981, a
number of samples were received from
the U.S. Embassy in Bangkok. Two
were reported to have been collected
from the site of a chemical attack that
occurred in the vicinity of TV 3391, an
area just south of Phnom Mak Hoeun. A
vegetation sample and a water sample
were collected within 24 hours of the at-
tack. Examination of bodies of victims
of this attack by medical personnel
revealed highly unusual degeneration of
the mucosal lining of the gastrointestinal
tract. The effects described paralleled
those known to be produced by the
trichothecenes. The samples were sub-
mitted to the Chemical Systems Labora-
tory for analysis for the presence of
chemical warfare agents. With the ex-
ception of the unusual presence of high
levels of CN-, Cl-, and F-ions, no evi-
dence of known chemical warfare agents
was found. An initial test for the tricho-
thecenes by thin layer chromatography
was inconclusive because of severe prob-
lems with interfering substances and the
lack of appropriate standards.
The trichothecenes are difficult to
detect even under ideal circumstances,
and the presence of interfering sub-
stances in the sample may make identifi-
cation and quantification by thin layer
chromatography inconclusive. A review
of the limitations and potentials of the
analytical methods for trichothecenes led
to the conclusion that the computerized
gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy
method in the selected ion-monitoring
mode enabled precise identification and
quantification of these compounds in
complex mixtures. A comparison of the
currently available methods suitable for
trichothecene analysis and an assess-
ment of their utility and limitations is
presented in Table E-3.
A portion of the leaf and stem sam-
ple was furnished to the U.S. Army
Medical Intelligence and Information
Agency for further analysis. This sam-
ple, a positive control sample to which
T-2 toxin was added, and a negative
control sample of similar vegetation
were forwarded to Dr. Chester J.
Mirocha of the Department of Plant
Pathology, University of Minnesota. Dr.
Mirocha was given no information con-
cerning the history or ctontent of the
samples and was requested to analyze
the three unknowns for, the presence of
trichothecene toxins using the best
methods at his disposal..
The analysis involves a series of ex-
tractions followed by ferric gel separa-
tion, selected ion monitoring on a com-
puterized gas chromatographlmass spec-
trometer, and a full mass spectral scan
for comparison with known standards.
The methods used are among the most
sensitive and specific for detection of
these compounds; also, false positives
are rare. Toxins can be identified by
their mass spectra and quantified with a
high degree of accuracy. The vegetation
sample allegedly exposed to a chemical
warfare agent was found to contain 109
parts per million (ppm) of nivalenol, 59.1
ppm of deoxynivalenol, and 3.15 ppm of
T-2 toxin; each is a potent toxin of the
trichothecene group. No trichothecenes
were detected in the negative control
sample, and 35 ppm of T-2 toxin were
detected in the sample to which T-2 tox-
in had been added. It was Dr. Mirocha's
assessment that a mixture of these par-
ticular toxins in the high levels detected
could not have occurred as a result of
natural contamination.
The possibility that the identified
toxins were produced by natural fungal
contamination was discounted on the
basis of the climatic conditions required
for production of T-2 toxin, the high
levels of toxins detected, the unusual
mixture of toxins found, and the results
of surveys of Southeast Asia for the
presence of these toxins. This conclusion
was supported by the analysis of normal
flora samples from Kampuchea de-
scribed below.
Analyses of Control Samples From
Kampuchea for the Piresence of Tri-
chothecenes. On September 20, 1981,
the U.S. Army MedicaIl Intelligence and
Information Agency received nine con-
trol samples from U.S., Army personnel
in Bangkok for the purpose of conduc-
ting laboratory analyses for background
 -- _ij ; .111rL I
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TABLE D-1
Symptoms of Chemical Attacks Reported in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
of Reports
Mentioning
Symptom
Tricho.
thecenes
Nerve
Agents
Arsines
Phosgene
Oxime
Incapacitant
Cyanogens (BZ)
Riot-
Control
Agents
Multiple deaths
Vomiting
Diarrhea
84.6
71.4
53.1
x
x
x
X
x
X
X
X
X
a
-
-
h
52.0
X
-
-
x
-
age
Hemorr
Breathing difficulty
47.95
x
X
X
x
X X
X
X
it
ti
n
ki
i
43
9
X
-
X
X
- -
rr
a
o
n
Itching and s
.
42
8
x
X
X
x
X
Nausea
Animal death
.
41.8
X
X
X
x -
.-
Blurred vision
39.7
x
X
X
x
X X
X
Headache
36.7
X
X
-
x
- x
X
X
-
Fati
ue
35.7
X
X
-
g
Nasal excretion
34.7
x
X
X
X
- -
x
Rash or blisters
32.6
X
-
x
X
- -
X
Tearing
30.6
X
X
X
x
X -
X
hi
C
28.6
x
X
X
X
X -
X
ng
oug
Effect on vegetation
26.5
X
-
x
x
- -
-
Dizziness and vertigo
25.5
X
X
X X
X
Facial edema
20.4
X
-
X
- -
X
Thirst and dry mouth
Skin color change
20.4
16.3
X
X
-
-
X
X
- -
Tachycardia
12.3
X
X
X
X X
X
Temporary blindness
9.18
X
-
x
- X
X
Rapid loss of consciousness
9.18
Xb
x
X X
-
Salivation
Hearing loss
6.12
5.1
xc
X
X
-
Tremors or convulsions
Sweating
Paralysis
Loss of appetite
Frequent urination
4
3
3
3
2
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
-
TABLE D-1 (continued)
Symptoms of Chemical Attacks Reported in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan
of Reports
Mentioning Trlcho?
Symptom thecenes
72.4
62.06
51.7
41.3
34.5
27.6
24.1
20.68
17.2
13.8
13.8
13.8
10.3
6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
3.4
Nerve
Agents
Riot.
Phosgene Incapacitant Control
Arsines Oxime Cyanogens (BZ) Agents
X X X
X - - - X
x - - X X
X X - - x
x X -
X - X X
X X X :X X
X X X :X X
- - - :X -
X - -
X :X -
X X X :X X
X -
X X - - -
X - - - -
X - - - -
X X X X X
X X - - x
X X - - X
Rapid loss of consciousness
47.9
Xb
X
-
-
X
X
-
Skin irritation and itching
31.5
X
X
X
-
-
x
Multiple deaths
30.1
X
X
X
-
X
-
-
Nausea
20.5
X
X
X
-
-
X
X
Vomiting
19.1
X
X
X
-
-
-
x
Tearing
17.8
X
X
X
X
X
-
X
Dizziness and vertigo
16.4
X
X
X
X
X
Blisters or rash
15
X
X
X
-
-
X
Difficulty breathing
13.7
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
Paralysis
13.7
X
X
-
-
X
-
-
Headache
12.3
x
x
-
x
-
x
x
Temporary blindness
8.2
X
X
X
-
X
X
Salivation
6.8
X`
X
Loss of appetite
6.8
X
X
Effects on vegetation
5.5
X
Fatigue
5
X
Confusion
4.1
X
Hemorrhage
4.1
X
Change in skin color
2.8
X
Diarrhea
2.8
X
X
-
-
-
-
Coughing
1.3
X
x
X
X
X
X
Multiple deaths
Hemorrhage
Dizziness and vertigo
Vomiting
Nausea
Skin irritation
Rapid loss of consciousness
Fever
Headache
Tearing
Breathing difficulty
Fatigue
Paralysis
Numbness
Blurred vision
Dry throat and thirst
Edema
Salivation
Vegetation affected
Diarrhea
Cough
Nasal discharge
Rash or blister
Chills
Hearing loss
Afghanistan
Note: This table is a compilation relating the signs and symptoms reported in the three countries
to symptoms associated with certain chemical agents. The frequency with which a particular
symptom was reported is expressed as a percentage of the total number of attacks.
levels of trichothecene toxins. The
samples were collected from an area
near TV 3391 that had not been sub-
jected to any reported chemical attacks.
The samples were collected by U.S. per-
sonnel under instructions to reproduce
the sampling conditions, handling, pack-
aging, and transfer conditions of the
original sample as closely as possible.
The same species of plant was sampled,
and four other vegetation samples also
were collected. A water sample and two
soil samples were recovered. Corn and
rice samples from the area also were
taken. These grains provided an ideal
substrate for growth of toxin-producing
fungi and would, therefore, be a sensi-
tive indicator of any natural occurrence.
The nine samples were forwarded under
code to Dr. Mirocha for trichothecene
analysis. A portion of each sample also
was submitted to Chemical Systems
Laboratory for background determina-
tions of CN-, Cl-, and F-levels. No
trichothecenes were detected in any of
these samples, indicating that nivalenol,
deoxynivalenol, T-2, and diacetoxyscir-
penol are not prevalent in the geographi-
cal area from which the alleged chemical
warfare-exposed sample was collected.
The appearance of these trichothecenes
in high levels and unique combinations in
a sample associated with a chemical at-
tack-which produced symptoms typical
of trichothecene exposure-indicates
that these toxins may have been used as
chemical weapons. This conclusion is fur-
ther supported by the evidence provided
by analysis of additional alleged chemical
warfare samples from Laos and Kampu-
chea as described below.
Analysis of Additional Chemical
Warfare Samples From Laos and Kam-
puchea for the Presence of Trichothe-
cenes. The U.S. Army Medical Intelli-
gence and Information Agency received
from the Chemical Systems Laboratory
three additional suspected chemical war-
fare samples for analysis for trichothe-
cenes. The first sample consisted of 10
ml of water taken from the same chemi-
I r ---
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a Bloody frothing.
b only at very high doses.
c Depending on which trichothecenes.
d Blood flecked frothing.
 cal attack site in Kampuchea as the leaf
and stem sample previously examined.
The second sample came from the site of
a "yellow rain" attack occurring on
March 13, 1981, in the village of Muong
Cha (TF 9797) in the Phou Bia region of
Laos. The agent was sprayed from a
twin-engine propellor aircraft at about
noon, local time. The falling substance
was described as "like insect spray" and
sounded like drizzling rain. Quite sticky
at first, it soon dried to a powder.
Symptoms described by victims included
nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. A sam-
ple of the agent scraped from the sur-
face of a rock by a victim and carried in-
to Thailand was turned over to U.S.
Embassy personnel. The third sample
was taken from the site of a "yellow
rain" attack that occurred at 2:00 p.m.
on April 2, 1981, at Ban Thong Hak (TF
9177). Twenty-four people reportedly
died in this attack; there were 47 sur-
vivors. Symptoms included severe skin
irritation and rash, nausea, vomiting,
and bloody diarrhea. A survivor of the
attack scraped this sample from the sur-
face of a rock with a bamboo knife.
Although the individual took precautions
(that is, cloth mask), a severe skin rash
and blisters developed.
These three samples were submitted
to Dr. Mirocha for analysis. The water
sample from Kampuchea contained 66
,ppm of deoxynivalenol and a trace
amount of diacetoxyscirpenol. A trace
quantity of the second sample was
screened as strong positive for trichothe-
cenes. Further analysis of that sample
confirmed the presence of high levels of
T-2 toxin (150 ppm) and diacetoxyscir-
penol (25 ppm). Nivalenol and deoxy-
nivalenol may also be present but are be-
ing masked by interference from
phtalate compounds (leached from the
plastic packaging). An effort to modify
the extraction process is being made in
orde'r to overcome the interference so
that nivalenol and deoxynivalenol can be
measured more easily. Interestingly, ex-
amination of the petroleum ether frac-
tion from the sample revealed the
presence of a yellow pigment almost
identical to that previously identified by
Dr. Mirocha in cultures of Fusarium
roseum, indicating, that the yellow
powder probably consisted of the crude
extract of a Fusarium culture.
There was little of the third sample
contained in the vial received for
testing. The quantity was too small to be
weighed accurately, and inspection of
the vial revealed only a small speck
estimated to weigh much less than 0.1
mg. That speck contained 10 ng of
diacetoxyscirpenol, a level equivalent to
100 ppm at the very least and probably
much higher. The sample size was too
small to allow adequate analysis for the
other three trichothecenes of interest.
These results support the hypothesis
that trichothecenes have been used as
chemical warfare agents in Laos and
Kampuchea. The presence of these high
levels of trichothecene toxins in water
and in yellow powder scraped from
rocks argues against natural occurrence,
since neither water nor rock is a suitable
environment for growth of the fungi re-
quired to produce the toxins.
Differences between the analyses of
the Kampuchean leaf and stem sample
and the water sample collected from the
same attack site raise additional ques-
tions. Failure to find T-2 toxin in the
water sample is probably due to the rela-
tive insolubility of T-2 toxin in water.
The presence of diacetoxyscirpenol in
the water might be the result of bio-
transformation or breakdown of T-2, as
they are so structurally similar, differing
only in the substitution on carbon 8.
While this hypothesis cannot be entirely
ruled out, it is unlikely on the basis of
known biotransformation of T-2 in the
laboratory. The initial vegetation sample
was not screened for diacetoxyscirpenol,
although the mass spectra from the in-
itial analysis will be reexamined for
trace amounts of it.
The absence of nivalenol in the
water sample is more difficult to explain
because nivalenol is water soluble. The
effect of environmental conditions and
microorganisms on the stability of these
compounds may vary widely for each of
the specific compounds and may explain
the analytical results. Further scientific
investigation of these factors is needed.
Analysis of Blood Samples From
Chemical Attack Victims
Blood samples drawn from victims of re-
cent chemical attacks in Kampuchea
have been received by the U.S. Army
Medical Intelligence and Information
Agency for analysis for indications of
trichothecene exposure. Little is known
concerning the rate of metabolism of tri-
chothecenes in humans; it is difficult,
therefore, to estimate the probability of
detecting trichothecenes or their metab-
olites in blood samples. T-2 is rapidly
cleared from the blood in animals, and
25% of the total dose is excreted within
24 hours after exposure; it is unlikely
that trichothecenes could be detected
unless blood samples were obtained
within 24-48 hours after an attack.
Other blood parameters are affected by
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the trichothecenes, however, and may
prove to be useful markers. The
trichothecenes induce a severe
leukopenia (decrease in white cell count)
which can persist for several weeks
following exposure. In addition, the
trichothecenes affect some liver and
kidney function marker enzymes which
can be monitored in the blood.
On October 11, 1981, four whole
blood samples and four blood smears
were received from the U.S. Embassy in
Bangkok. The blood was drawn from
four Khmer Rouge soldiers on Octo-
ber 7, 1981 at a Khmer Rouge hospital
inside Kampuchea. Detailed medical his-
tories as well as descriptions of the at-
tack were recorded on each individual
from whom a blood sample was taken.
All four men were victims of a gas at-
tack occurring near Takong on
September 19, 1981. Symptoms experi-
enced included vomiting, blurred vision,
bloody diarrhea, difficult breathing, dry
throat, loss of consciousness, frontal
headache, tachycardia, and facial edema.
Unfortunately, the samples could not be
refrigerated until 48 hours after collec-
tion. Thus, it was impossible to obtain
data concerning white cell counts and
blood chemistry. The four whole blood
samples were submitted to Dr. Mirocha
for analysis for trichothecene metabo-
lites because of the possibility, admitted-
ly remote, that some of the metabolites
might bind to blood proteins and might
still be detectable even 3 weeks after an
attack.
On October 22, 1981, additional
blood samples were received. These had
been drawn from nine victims from the
September 19 attack and from four con-
trol individuals of similar age and back-
ground who had not been exposed to a
chemical attack. The samples had been
properly refrigerated and were accom-
panied by complete and detailed medical
histories taken by trained medical per-
sonnel who examined the individuals In-
cluded in the package were blood sears
and heparinized and nonheparinize
samples from each individual. The
samples were submitted for blood assays
to the U.S. Army Medical Research In-
stitute of Infectious Diseases.
The above results show no statisti-
cally significant differences between ex-
posed and control groups (students
T-test). In eight individuals exposed to a
chemical agent, a trend toward de-
pressed white cell counts was observed.
Such an observation would be compati-
ble with the clinical picture of toxin ex-
posure; however, it is also compatible
with a number of other medical prob-
lems, and a larger control sample would
be required before such results could be
adequately interpreted. Abnormal liver
and kidney functions were not indicated
by these data.
Portions of the blood samples were
analyzed by Dr. Mirocha for the pres-
ence of trichothecenes and/or trichothe-
cene metabolites. The results of the
analyses are consistent with trichothe-
cene exposure in at least two of the gas-
sing victims and tend to support the
hypothesis that a trichothecene-based
agent was used in this attack.
Using the selected ion-monitoring
gas chromatography/mass spectroscopy
analysis technique, Dr. Mirocha was able
to identify tentatively a metabolite of
T-2 toxin (that is, HT-2) in the blood of
two alleged victims. The compound was
identified on the basis of its selected ion
masses and gas chromatographic reten-
tion times.
The tentative identification of HT-2
in the blood of two victims, and the
trend toward depressed white cell
counts in these same victims, cannot be
taken as conclusive scientific proof of
toxin exposure because the trace amount
of the compound present precluded une-
quivocal identification and quantification
and because many other medical prob-
lems in addition to toxin exposure can
cause a decrease in white cell counts. It
is interesting to note that the individual
who showed the greatest amount of the
compound tentatively identified as HT-2
in his blood reportedly received the
greatest exposure to the agent. He was
exposed to contaminated water for more
than 30 minutes and was the only victim
who fell down in the water and actually
swallowed some of it. However, the
description by victims of symptoms cor-
relating exactly with those associated
with trichothecene poisoning provides
strong circumstantial evidence that tri-
chothecenes were used as chemical
agents in yet another chemical attack in
Southeast Asia.
Trichothecenes have been identified
previously in environmental samples
taken from several other chemical at-
tacks in Laos and Kampuchea. Analysis
of control vegetation, water, soil, corn,
and rice samples from these areas, as
well as reviews of published scientific
literature, indicates that the particular
toxins that have previously been identi-
fied are not known to occur naturally in
the combinations found and at the levels
detected in Southeast Asia. The latest
analysis results contribute another piece
of evidence to the growing body of data
supporting the charge that trichothe-
cenes have been used as chemical/bio-
logical agents in Southeast Asia.
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OVERVIEW OF NATURAL OCCURRENCE
AND SIGNIFICANT PROPERTIES OF
TRICHOTHECENES
Historical Trichothecene
Mycotoxicoses
The trichothecenes are members of a
large group of naturally occurring toxins
known as mycotoxins. The word "myco-
toxin" is derived from the Greek
"mykes" meaning fungus and the Latin
"toxicum" meaning poison. It refers to a
metabolite produced by a mold that is
toxic to man and animals. Mycotoxicoses
have been described. as the "neglected
diseases," and before 1960 English-
language literature concerning the
diseases caused by mycotoxins was
scarce. Soviet scientists have been in-
volved in research with some of these
compounds for almost 30 years longer
than their Western counterparts. The
Soviet Union has had serious problems
with mycotoxin contamination of food
and has suffered several severe out-
breaks of disease in humans. The first
comprehensive studies of mycotoxin
diseases were conducted in the Soviet
Union in the late 1930s.
Since the 1940s, the group of myco-
toxins figuring most prominently in
Soviet scientific literature are the tri-
chothecenes, a class of chemically
related, biologically active fungal metab-
olites produced primarily by various
species of Fusarium. Table E-1 lists
some of the toxins in this group and pro-
ducing fungi. The fungi are well-known
plant pathogens that frequently invade
many agricultural products.
Trichothecene toxins, perhaps more
than any other mycotoxins, have been
associated with acute disease in humans.
Most of the human intoxications have
occurred in the Soviet Union (Table
E-2). The earliest recognized outbreak
occurred in 1891 in the Ussuri district of
eastern Siberia. Humans who consumed
contaminated grain exhibited headache,
chills, nausea, vomiting, vertigo, and
visual disturbances. Dogs, horses, pigs,
and domestic fowls reportedly were
affected.
The most extensive mycotoxicosis
outbreak reported to have caused multi-
ple fatalities in man also occurred in the
Soviet Union. In 1944, 30% of the
population of Orenburg district, near
Siberia, was affected by alimentary toxic
aleukia (ATA), a disease later shown to
be caused by ingestion of trichothecene
toxins. More than 10% of the entire
population of the district died of the
disease. Many other outbreaks of ATA
occurred in the Soviet Union, mainly
during the 1942-47 period. The con-
tamination was traced to overwintered
millet, wheat, and barley infected with
Fusarium. Symptoms of the disease in-
cluded vomiting, skin inflammation,
multiple hemorrhaging (especially of the
,lung and gastrointestinal tissue), diar-
rhea, leukopenia, and suppression of
bone marrow activity.
In 1939, Premier Joseph Stalin dis-
patched Nikita Khrushchev to the
Ukraine to organize ancd improve agri-
cultural operations and to identify the
disease causing the deaths of many
horses and cattle. The 1problem was
traced to hay and stra,"v contaminated
with Stachybotrys atra. The disease,
later referred to as stacchybotryotoxi-
cosis, occurred after ingestion or contact
with the contaminated ;grain. Symptoms
included ulcerative dermmatitis, peroral
dermatitis, blood dyscrasias, hemor-
rhagic syndromes, abortion, and death.
The greatest economic impact was due
to loss of horses, although cattle, sheep,
poultry, and humans also were affected.
Other disease outbreaks in which
similar symptoms were present occurred
in 1958 and 1959 among horses and cat-
tle in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe; thousands of animals were lost.
Other intoxications were reported later
Soviet Scientists Involved in
Mycotoxin Research
A. Kh. Sarkisov-All Union Scientific Re-
search Institute of Experimental Veteri-
nary Science, Moscow
V. I. Bilay (also spelled Bilai)-Ukrainian
S.S.R. Institute of Microbiology and
Virology, Kiev
V. A. Tutel'yan-U.S.S.R. Academy of Medi-
cal Sciences Nutrition Institute; Moscow
M. A. Akhmeteli-U.S.S.R. Academy of
Medical Sciences Institute of Epidemiology
and Microbiology
L. Ye. Olifson
M. F. Nesterin
K. Z. Salomatina
Ye. P. Kozhevnikova
N. D. Osadchaya
L. F. Mikhaylova
Sh. M. Kenina
V. L. Kartashova
L. R. Filonova
T. Ye. Tolcheyeva
Kn. A. Dzhilavyan
I. S. Yelistratov
N. S. Tishkova
V. I. Kaplun
Ye. P. Kozhevalkova
S. M. Gubkin
L. I. Il'ina
P. A. Win
A.. M. Kogan
D~. T. Martynenko
NI. A. Kostyunina
Y. V. Yerinakov
I. A. Kurmanov
V. V. Semenov
& K. Bystryakova
Z.. Z. Orlova
L,. S. L'vova
L,. I. Lozbina
T.'. A. Shevtsova
I., Yu. Makedon
N. S. Proskuryakova
AL. V. Borovkov
A. N. Nazypov
L. I. Lozbin
M. S. Marova
 in Japan, Europe, the Soviet Union, and
the United States, affecting various
domestic animals and-in the case of
"red mold toxicosis"-man. All of these
diseases have now been shown to be due
to ingestion of trichothecenes rather
than to an infectious agent. In earlier
outbreaks, the levels of toxin present in
the contaminated grain were not meas-
ured; however, the levels of nivalenol
and/or deoxynivalenol measured in toxic
grains implicated in more recent out-
breaks (i.e., "moldy corn toxicosis" and
"red mold toxicosis") typically were be-
tween 2 and 8 ppm.
Natural Occurrence of
Trichothecene Mycotoxins
Publications concerning the occurrence
of trichothecenes are relatively scarce
because of the lack of convenient detec-
tion methods and the complexity of the
trichothecene family of compounds. Only
recently have scientists developed
methods capable of distinguishing be-
tween close structural derivatives and
accurately quantifying the levels of toxin
present (see Table E-3 for comparison of
analytical methods). Extreme care must
be taken when reviewing the scientific
literature on natural occurrence of these
compounds because erroneous conclu-
sions can be',,,drawn on the basis of
results obtained with inadequate analyti-
cal techniques. Misidentification of com-
pounds and gross overestimation of con-
centrations have occurred using tech-
niques such as thin layer chromatog-
raphy.
Table E-4 lists the reports of natural
occurrence of T-2 toxin, diacetoxyscir-
penol, and nivalenol that were obtained
from a literature search of more than
3,000 citations concerned with tricho-
thecene toxins. Levels that are ques-
tionable on the basis of techniques used
are indicated. It is immediately apparent
that the levels of toxins found in the
various samples from Laos and Kam-
puchea are highly unusual, even if one
accepts the questionable reports in Table
E-4 as valid. The levels of these toxins
(150 ppm of T-2 toxin, 109 ppm of
nivalenol, more than 100 ppm of
diacetoxyscirpenol, and 66 ppm of deox-
ynivalenol) are markedly higher than
those reported to occur in nature. It
should also be noted that the incidences
recorded in Table E-4 concern levels of
toxin produced when Fusarium is grow-
ing on its ideal substrate, while the Laos
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TABLE E-1
Trichothecene-Producing Fungi
by various researchers. Surveys of the
toxigenic fungi and mycotoxins naturally
present in Southeast Asia conducted by
the Mahidol University in Bangkok and
the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology have not revealed the presence of
T-2, nivalenol, deoxynivalenol, or dia-
cetoxyscirpenol, although other myco-
toxins such as aflatoxin were identified.
These results were confirmed by our
analysis, using our own methodology, of
normal flora samples of vegetation, soil,
water, corn, and rice from Kampuchea
that failed to reveal the presence of
trichothecenes.
Skeptics have formulated theoretical
explanations for the analytical results to
support a hypothesis of natural occur-
rence of these toxins. It was postulated
that the trichothecenes found were ab-
sorbed through the roots of a plant,
translocated to the leaves, and exuded
and washed onto the surface of a rock
and into water where they were found.
A 1981 publication by Jarvis et al. re-
ported a Brazilian shrub that appeared
to absorb, translocate, and chemically
alter a macrocyclic trichothecene pro-
duced by soil fungi. While this citation is
used to support a hypothetical mode for
natural deposition in Southeast Asia, it
should be noted that the plant reported
in this publication did not exude the tox-
in, that the toxin was extremely phyto-
toxic to all other plants assessed, and
that the plant was not capable of de
novo trichothecene synthesis. No other
trichothecenes have been found to be ab-
sorbed and translocated in any other
plant in this manner. Control samples of
soil and vegetation from Southeast Asia
do not support endemic presence of
these toxins. The appearance of these
particular trichothecene toxins in these
high levels in environments generally in-
hospitable to their formation cannot
reasonably be attributed to a natural
contamination.
Trichothecenes
T-2 Toxin
Nivalenol
Roridins
HT-2 Toxin
Monoacetyl-
Veirucarins
Nivalenol
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Diacetyl-Nivalenol
Satratoxins
Neosolaniol
Deoxynivalenol
Vertisporin
F. tricinctum
F. nivale
Myrothecium
verrucaria
F. roseum
F. opisphaeria
F. equiseti
F. roseum
F. sporotrichioides
Stachybotrys atra
Verticimonosporium
diffractum
F. lateritium
F. poae
F. solani
F. rigidiusculum
F. semitectum
TABLE E-2
Historical Trichothecene Mycotoxicoses
Toxicosis
"Taumelgetreide" Toxicosis
Districts and
Affected Species
U.S.S.R.: man, farm animals
Symptoms
Headache, nausea, vomiting,
vertigo, chills, visual
disturbances
Vomiting, diarrhea, multiple
hemorrhage, skin
inflammation, leukopenia,
angina
Shock, stomatitis, hemorrhage,
dermal necrosis, nervous
disorders
Bean-hull toxicosis
Japan: horse
Convulsion, cyclic movement
Dendrodochiotoxicosis
U.S.S.R., Europe: horse
Skin inflammation, hemorrhage
Moldy corn toxicosis
United States: pig, cow
Emesis, hemorrhage
Red mold toxicosis
Japan, U.S.S.R.: man, horse,
Vomiting, diarrhea, congestion
pig, cow
and hemorrhage of lung
and intestine
and Kampuchea samples were taken
from surfaces-rocks and water-,-that
would be extremely unlikely to support
Fusaria growth and toxin production.
Higher levels of toxin production can, of
course, be induced when the mold
species is grown in pure culture under
ideal laboratory conditions; for instance,
the Soviets have succeeded in producing
4 grams of T-2 per kilogram of sub-
strate. In a natural environment, how-
ever, the Fusaria species cannot com-
pete well with other molds such as
species of Aspergillus and Penicillium,
and levels of toxin produced are orders
of magnitude lower.
The conclusion that the levels of tox-
ins found in the Southeast Asia samples
could have occurred only by means of an
unnatural mechanism is also strength-
ened by surveys of the area conducted
Chemical and Physical Properties
of the Trichothecenes
When considering the suitability of tri-
chothecenes as agents, factors such as
stability, solubility, and ease of produc-
tion must be considered. The general
structure for the trichothecene group is
shown in Figure E-1. There are more
than 40 currently known, naturally oc-
curring, 12 to 13 epoxytrichothecenes.
The R groups may be hydroxyls, acyl-
ated hydroxyl groups or esters. The R
group for the toxins detected in the
sample is shown below the general
structure. All of the compounds have in
common an olefinic double bond at car-
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FIGURE E-1
General Structure of Trichothecenes
T2 Toxin
Nivaienoi
Deox,ynivalenol
R1=0H
R1=CH
R1=OH
R2=OAc
R2=CH
R2=H
R3 OAc
R3=OH
R3=OH
R4=H
R4=OH
R4=OH
= =0
R
R
= =0
RS=OCOCH2CH(CH3)2
5
5
bon atoms 9 and 10 and an epoxy group
at carbon atoms 12 and 13. These com-
pounds are stable, especially in the solid
form. They may be stored for years at
room temperature with no loss of activi-
ty. They are heat stable with no loss of
activity noted after heating for 1 hour at
100? centigrade. The solubility depends
on the R groups; highly hydroxylated
derivatives are more water soluble. The
compounds are also quite stable in solu-
tion. Detoxification can be accomplished
by treatment with strong mineral acid,
which will open the 112 to 13 epoxide
bond and abolish all !biological activity.
Most of the toxins are well absorbed
through mucous mennbranes and some
through skin; this property is also a
function of the R group.
Some of these compounds have been
synthesized chemicallly; however, bio-
synthesis employing .Fusarium species is
the most effective way to produce large
quantities. In a prelitminary search of re-
cent Soviet literaturte, 50 articles dealing
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TABLE E-3
Physicochemical Methods for Detection of Trichothecenes in Feedstuffs
Trichothecenes
Method Detected
Thin-layer All
chromatography
1-dimension
Thin-layer All
chromatography
2-dimension
Gas-liquid Nonhydroxy-
chromatography lated or TMS
derivatives
Gas chromato- TMS
graphy/mass derivatives
spectrometry-
normal scanning
mode
Gas chromato- TMS
graphy/mass derivatives
spectrometry-
selection ion
monitoring
Nuclear- All
magnetic-
resonance
Radio- T-2 toxin
immunoassay
(developmental
stage)
Detection Required
Limits Standards
0.1 microgram/spot Reference
(H2SO4) Standard
0.1-1.0 microgram/ Reference
spot(H2SO,) Standard
Use and
Limitation
Qualitative
Interference
Not confirmatory
Qualitative
Less interference
Confirmatory
0.03-0.05 Reference Quantitative
microgram/ Standard Monoglyceride
microliter injection interference
Equivocable
identification
0.02-0.05 Reference
microgram/ Standard or
microliter Spectrogram
injection
0.007-0.02
microgram/
microliter
injection
Semiquantitative
Less interference
Unequivocable
identification
Reference Quantitative
Standard or Best for complex
Spectrogram mixtures
Unequivocable
identification
Reference Confirmatory
Standard or Purified toxin
Spectrogram structure
elucidation
1-20 nanogram Rabbit anti- Sensitive
T-2 toxin Low interference
anti-body
HT-2 toxin Relative structural
specificity
with the trichothecenes were reviewed.
Of these, 22 dealt with defining optimum
conditions for biosynthesis of the com-
pounds. N.A. Kostyunina has reported
production of T-2 toxin at levels of 4
grams per kilogram of substrate (nor-
mally wheat grain or rice). Many in-
dustrial microbiology plants have been
identified in the Soviet Union. Some are
involved in production of single-cell pro-
tein for fodder additives, others produce
antibiotics, and the function of still
others is unknown. Fusaria are pro-
duced in the Soviet Union at a facility
long reported in the open literature as
being a suspected biological warfare
agent production and storage facility.
This facility, Berdsk Chemical Works, is
near the science city of Novosibirsk in
Siberia. The only difference between an
antibiotic and mycotoxin is their target
specificity. Both are produced by fungi,
but the mycotoxins are relatively more
toxic to man than to microorganisms.
Mycotoxins can be produced in good
yield employing the same techniques
used to produce some antibiotics. Thus,
it may be concluded that the Soviets
could produce trichothecenes in large
amounts. They produce an antibiotic
that is a trichothecene derivative, which
would provide an ideal cover for agent
production facilities.
Medical Effects of the
Trichothecenes in Humans
The most prominent symptoms associ-
ated with trichothecene poisoning are
listed in Table E-2. Striking among
these is the rapid onset of vomiting,
along with severe itching and tingling of
the skin. Hemorrhage o~f the mucous
membranes and bloodydiarrhea follow.
The symptoms shown in Table E-2 are
similar to those reported by victims of
trichothecene attacks in Laos, Kampu-
chea, and Afghanistan. The correlation
is striking.
The LD51's (dose required to produce
death in 50%o of a test population) of the
trichothecenes in laboratory animals
range from 0.1 mg/kg to greater than
1,000 mg/kg, depending on the particu-
lar toxin, species, and route of exposure.
The LD50 of T-2 toxin in a cat is 0.5
mg/kg. However, the ED50 (dose re-
quired to produce a desired physiological
effect in 50% of a test population) is
much lower. The ED50 to produce a
vomiting reaction is 0.1 mg/kg; for skin
irritation it is in'the tenths of micro-
gram range.
Most of the data concerning the
toxicological effects of the trichothecenes
are derived from animal data in which
pure compounds were administered by
oral, subcutaneous, intraperitoneal, or
intravenous routes. Unfortunately, there
are no reports concerning the effects of
inhalation of mixtures of the compounds.
Therefore, it is difficult to speculate con-
cerning the effects that would be ex-
pected in humans exposed to an aerosol
of mixtures of these potent toxins. The
most useful data concerning exposure in
humans were obtained in a phase I
clinical evaluation of anguidine (dia-
cetoxyscirpenol) as an anticancer drug.
Diacetoxyscirpenol was administered by
intravenous infusion. Doses of 3 mg/m2/
day caused immediate onset of nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, somnolence and/or
mental confusion, fever, chills, a gen-
eralized erythema with a burning sensa-
tion, hypotension, dyspnea, stomatitis,
hives, and ataxia. Because of the side
effects, the treatment was discontinued.
The properties which make the use of
diacetoxyscirpenol potentially useful as
an anticancer drug are the same as
those responsible, in part, for its ex-
treme toxicity. It and the other tricho-
thecenes cause extensive damage to
rapidly dividing cells such as tumor cells.
Unfortunately, the cells of the lining of
the gastrointestinal tract and bone mar-
row are also rapidly dividing, and the
effects of the trichothecenes on these
cells result in severe, rapid degeneration
of these tissues. The compounds also
have direct effects on the clotting fac-
tors in the blood (that is, a primary
effect on Factor VII activity and a sec-
ondary effect on prothrombin), which
result in excessive hemorrhage following
trauma.
The other useful body of clinical data
concerning the effects of trichothecenes
in humans is drawn from descriptions of
the course of the disease in the natural
TABLE E-4
Spontaneous Occurrence of Trichothecene Mycotoxins
T-2 Toxin
U.S.
U.K.
India
Canada
India
Canada
India
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
France
U.S.
Diacetoxy-
scirpenol
U.S.
U.S.
India
India
Germany
U.S.
Deoxynivalenol
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Japan
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
France
South Africa
Zambia
U.S.
Japan
Austria
Austria
Canada
Nivalenol Japan
France
Partially U.S.
characterized India
trichothecenes
Skin irritant U.S.
factors-not
analyzed U.S.
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Mixed feed
Brewer's grains
Sweet corn
Corn
Sorghum
Barley
Safflower seed
Corn stalks
Feed supplement
Corn
Mixed feed
Corn
Corn
Mixed feed
Mixed feed
Safflower seed
Sweet corn
Corn
Corn
Corn stalks
Corn
Corn
Corn
Mixed feed
Mixed feed
Mixed feed
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
Oats
Barley
Corn
Corn
Mixed feed
Corn
Corn
Corn
Corn
Barley
Corn
Corn
Corn
Barley
Corn
Corn
Safflower seed
Concentration
(parts per
million) References
0.08b 15
NDc 19
4b, d 5
ND 4
NDd 22
25d 20
3-5d 6
0.1 lb 16
ND 7
2 8
0.3 14
0.02b 10
ND 2
0.5 15
0.38 15
14d 5
31.54 23
0.88 21
1.5b 16
1.8b 15
1.0b 15
0.1b 15
0.04b 15
1.0b 15
1.0b 15
7.4 9
0.1-25d 21
trace-25d 2, 21
1.1-10.7 26
41 25
1.0b 17
5 17
ND 18
1.0b 13
0.06b 13
0.07b 13
0.6b 10
2.5 11
7.4 11
ND 2
7.3 18
1.3 24
7.9 24
7.9 24
ND 18
43b 10
ND 25
NDd 6
93 positiveb 3
of 173
Multiple positive 21
samples
16 positive 1
of 191
a References:
1. Balzer et al. (11977)
2. Ciegler (1978)
3. Eppley et al. (1974)
4. Funnel (1979)
5. Ghosal at al. (1978)
6. Ghosal et al. (,1977)
7. Hibbs et a/. (1974)
8. Hsu et al. (1972)
9. Isshi et al. (19)75)
10. Jemmail et al.. (1978)
it. Marasas et al!. (1977)
12. Miller (1976)
13. Mirocha (1979)
14. Mirocha (1979)
15. Mirocha et al.. (1976)
16. Mirocha et al.. (1979)
17. Mirocha et al.. (1979)
18. Morooka et all. (1972)
19. Petrie eta/. (11977)
20. Puls and Grecenway et al. (1976)
21. Romer, T., Raalston Purina,
St. Louis, MO) (personal
communicaticon)
22. Rukmini and IBhat (1978)
23. Siegfried (19779)
24. Vesonder and Ciegler (1979)
25. Vesonder et al. (1976)
26. Vesonder et gal. (1978)
b Zearalenone (F-2 toxins) also detected
in the sample.
C ND =toxin concentration was not deter-
mined.
d Levels that are questionable on the
basis of techniques used.
 Approved For Release 2011/01/28: CIA-RDP88B00443R002304700004-5
outbreaks that occurred in the Soviet
Union. The effects produced are similar
to radiation poisoning, and there is a la-
tent phase similar to that seen in radia-
tion poisoning, in which the overt symp-
toms disappear.
The clinical picture may be divided
into four stages.
The first stage occurs within
minutes to hours after ingestion of toxic
grains. The symptomatology described
was produced by oral exposure to low
doses. In exposure by inhalation, the
symptoms may be more pronounced or
the time course accelerated. The char-
acteristics of the first stage include
primary changes, with local symptoms,
in the buccal cavity and gastrointestinal
tract. Shortly after ingestion of toxic
grain, the patient experiences a burning
sensation in the mouth, tongue, throat,
palate, esophagus, and stomach as a
result of the toxin's effect on the mucous
membranes. The tongue may feel
swollen and stiff, and the mucosa of the
oral cavity may be hyperemic. Inflam-
mation of the gastric and intestinal
mucosa occurs, along with vomiting,
diarrhea, and abdominal pain. In most
cases excessive salivation, headache, diz-
ziness, weakness, fatigue, and tachy-
cardia accompany the initial stage.
There may be fever and sweating, but
Bureau of Public Affairs
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
the body temperature normally does not
rise. The leukocyte count may begin to
decrease in this stage, and there may be
an increased erythrocyte sedimentation
rate. This first stage may last from 3 to
9 days.
The second stage is often called the
latent stage or incubation period because
the patient feels well and is capable of
normal activity. It is also called the
leukopenic stage because its main
features are disturbances in the bone
marrow and the hematopoietic system,
characterized by a progressive leuko-
penia and granulopenia and a relative
lymphocytosis. In addition, anemia and a
decrease in erythrocytes, in the platelet
count, and in hemoglobin occur. Disturb-
ances in the central nervous system and
autonomic nervous systems may occur
as well as weakness, vertigo, fatigue,
headache, palpitations, and mild
asthmatic conditions. Visible hemor-
rhagic spots (petechiae) begin to appear
on the skin, marking the transition to
the third phase. The second stage may
last 3-4 weeks. The transition to the
third stage is sudden, and symptoms
progress rapidly.
In the third stage, petechaal hemor-
rhages occur on the skin of the trunk,
arms, thighs, face, and head. They can
vary from a millimeter to a few centi-
meters in size. Capillaries are fragile,
and any slight trauma results in hemor-
rhage. Hemorrhages of the mucous
membranes of the mouth, tongue, soft
palate, and tonsils occur. Nasal, gastric,
and intestinal hemorrhages can be
severe. Areas of necrosis begin to ap-
pear on the lips, fingers, nose, jaws,
eyes, and in the mouth. Lymph nodes
are frequently enlarged, and the adjoin-
ing connective tissue can become so
edematous that the patient has difficulty
opening his mouth. Blood abnormalities
previously described are intensified.
Death may occur from hemorrhage,
strangulation due to swelling, or sec-
ondary infection.
The fourth stage is convalescence.
Three or 4 weeks of treatment are re-
quired for disappearance of necrotic le-
sions and hemorrhagic effects. Two
months or more may elapse before the
bloodforming capability of the bone mar-
row returns to normal.
Published by the United States Department
of State ? Bureau of Public Affairs ?
Office of Public Communication ? Editorial
Division ? Washington, D.C. ? March 1982
Editors: Norman Howard and Colleen
Sussman ? This material is in the public
domain and may be reproduced without
permission; citation of this source is
appreciated.
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