LETTER TO ROBERT M. GATES FROM ALBERT C. PIERCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89G00720R000600760002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 113
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: LETTER

Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY
NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20319
REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:
Dr. Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, DC 20505
This is to confirm that you are scheduled to address the
students and faculty of the National War College on Wednesday,
December 10, from 8:30 to 10:00 a.m. (The audience will consist
entirely of U.S. government employees cleared through the TOP
SECRET level.) We would appreciate it if you would arrive at
8:10, so you will have a chance to have coffee with our
Commandant, RADM Addams, who just completed a three-year tour as
commander of the Mideast Force in the Persian Gulf.
As for your remarks themselves, it would be most helpful to
us in our course on national security decisionmaking if you
would address two subjects, the first of which is by far the
more important for our purposes:
1.) The relationships between the intelligence community
and senior national security policymakers. What kinds of
problems arise, what sorts of pressures are brought to bear on
the intelligence community as it seeks to provide accurate,
timely, and useful information and analysis to those
policymakers?
2.) The problems of coordinating collection and analysis
among the many intelligence agencies and centers in the U.S.
government. What makes coordination difficult? How well are
policymakers served when uncoordinated intelligence reaches
them? Can too much coordination obscure important differences
within the community, and what problems can that cause for
senior policymakers?
I realize this is an ambitious (perhaps too ambitious)
agenda, but our students will benefit immeasurably from whatever
first-hand insights you can provide.
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
Enclosed, for your reference, are the relevant sections of
the syllabus for the course. If you or your staff have any
questions, please do not hesitate to call me at 1175-1935.
I look forward to meeting you on the 10th.
Sincerely,
&/VU
ALBERT C. PIERCE
Professor of National
Security Policy
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
TOPIC 4: THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
Tuesday
9 December
1330-1630 DR
Wednesday
10 December
0830-1000 L
1330-1500 IS
A. General
This section of the course has several objectives: 1.) to provide a capsule
overview of the major intelligence agencies; 2.) to raise some fundamental
questions about the nature, capabilities, and limitations of the intelligence
business; 3.) to highlight several contemporary perspectives on the intelligence
community; 4.) to examine the relationship between the providers of intelligence
(i.e., the intelligence community) and the consumers of intelligence (the policy- and
decisionmakers in the USG); and 5.) to analyze in depth one case study--the
"discovery" of a Soviet "combat brigade" in Cuba in 1979.
The principal focus will be on the relationship between the providers of
intelligence and the consumers of intelligence. The providers are many--by design--
but fragmented--despite the legislatively mandated coordinating role of the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). The theory behind the diversity of
intelligence agencies is that policymakers are better served by having access to a
range of competing centers of analysis. But as the KAL 007 incident (which we will
examine more closely in Topic 5) seems to illustrate, the existence of many
competing centers does not ensure that the most senior officials will have timely,
full, and useful access to the analyses produced by these competing centers.
Even when senior officials do have access to different analyses of the same
issue, there is the problem of how they resolve differences within the intelligence
community. One good example is estimates of Soviet defense spending, where CIA
and DIA traditionally differ. Secretaries of defense tend to resolve the differences
by adopting the DIA--i.e., the higher--figures, and ignoring the esoterica of the
methodologies which produced the two different estimates.
This leads to the problem of explicit or implicit pressures on various elements
of the intelligence community to produce analyses consistent with senior officials'
preconceived notions or policy preferences. There are plenty of potential
opportunities for intelligence analysis to conflict with policy preference--ranging
from verification of proposed or existing arms control agreements to the smuggling
of arms to anti-government guerrillas in El Salvador. Overt pressure pops up from
time to time, but perhaps group-think creeps in as well.
Two other important issues are raised in the KAL 007 incident. One is the
trade-offs in giving senior officials intelligence that has not been fully analyzed and
evaluated. To be sure, in a crisis, decisionmakers want as much intelligence as they
can get as quickly as possible. Accuracy and thoroughness are often traded for
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
speed under these intense pressures, as in the premature use of hasty translations of
taped conversations of the Soviet pilot who shot down KAL 007. A second, perhaps
even more volatile, issue is the inadvertent or even deliberate public disclosure of
sensitive intelligence information by senior officials--for example, statements about
Japanese intelligence collection capabilities in the KAL 007 incident, or President
Reagan's public remarks about communications intelligence intercepts regarding
Libya and terrorists operating in Europe.
Especially when one looks at intelligence as an integral part of the national
security decisionmaking process, these issues assume great importance. "Good
judgment requires good information," Walt Rostow is said to have remarked once,
"but good information doesn't guarantee good judgment."
B. Issues for Consideration
Topic 4A
1. Are "surprises"--sometimes also known as "intelligence failures"--
inevitable? Why? What can be done to minimize them?
2. Some would argue that the most successful DCls have been those who were
personally closest to the Presidents they served, among the reasons being that close
personal ties may help overcome the inherent suspicion of the intelligence world
which many Presidents bring to the job. But aren t they also the DCIs who are most
vulnerable to subtle pressures from the White House to "get on board" and support
administration policies? How important is it for the DCI to be close to the
President?
3. Granting the advantages of competing centers of analysis, do we have too
many? Specifically, do the disadvantages--in terms of cost, overlap, inefficiency,
compartmentalization-.-of having separate service intelligence organizations
outweigh the advantages--being able to meet service-unique requirements? As,
under the new DoD reorganization, the CJCS and the CINCs become more important
and powerful, should more military intelligence be ioi ntly (a la DIA, NSA) collected,
analyzed, and produced, as opposed to the current system in which service
intelligence agencies play large roles and exercise considerable independence?
Topic 4B
1. In the Soviet "combat brigade" affair, what exactly went wrong where?
Was this an "intelligence failure"? Or a decisionmaking disaster? Or both? What
would you have done differently at various points in that situation--as Vance?
Brzezinski? Carter? Church? Turner?
2. In her retrospective analysis of the 1977 Soviet "combat brigade" affair,
Gloria Duffy concluded, "The primary image the U.S. presented to friends and foe
alike...was one of painful confusion." Has our performance in crises since then been
any better? And what should be done to make our performance better next time?
C. Readings
There are three clusters of readings under Topic 4: The Role of Intelligence. In
Topic 4A, the excerpts from Richelson's book should cover objective #1 on the
previous page, and the piece by Betts #2. The selections from Turner's book
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89G00720R000600760002-0
introduce the questions subsumed in objective #4, the relationship between
providers and consumers of intelligence. The readings on the Soviet brigade (Topic
4B)--which consist largely of first-person accounts by the principals--constitute a
case study (objective #5) of that critical and complex relationship. Lastly the short
readings under Topic 4C introduce some aspects of the current debates within and
about the intelligence community (objective #3).
Topic 4A
1. Required
Read carefully for the issues and questions raised:
b. Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures
Are Inevitable," World Politics, Vol. XXI, No. 1, October 1978, pp. 61-89.
c. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democrat : The CIA in Transition (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pp. 113-127, 237-251.
2. Optional
Skim the following to get a quick overview of the principal intelligence agencies:
a. Jeffrey Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community_ (Cambridge,
Massashusetts: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1985), pp. 1-9,11-41,46,95-98,
103-106.
1. Required
Topic 4B
a. "2,300-Man Soviet Unit Now in Cuba," by the Associated Press, The
Washington Post, August 31, 1979, reprinted in DoD Current News, August 31, 1979,
pp. 1-2.
b. Cyrus Vance, Hard Choices (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983),
pp. 358-364.
c. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle (New York: Farrar-Straus-Giroux,
1983), pp. 344-353.
d. Stansfield Turner, Secrecy and Democrat : The CIA in Transition (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), pp. 229-236.
e. Gloria Duffy, "Crisis Mangling and the Cuban Brigade," International
Security, Summer 1983, pp. 67-87.
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89G00720R000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89G00720R000600760002-0
Topic 4C
Optional
a. Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottoway, "Casey Enforces 'Reagan Doctrine'
With Reinvigorated Covert Action," The Washington Post, March 9,1986.
b. Patrick E. Tyler and David B. Ottoway, "Casey Strengthens Role Under
'Reagan Doctrine," The Washington Post, March 31, 1986.
c. Leslie H. Gelb, "Overseeing of C.I.A. by Congress Has Produced Decade of
Support," The New York Times, July 7,1986.
d. Michael R. Gordon, "C.I.A., Evaluating Soviet Threat, Often Is Not So Grim as
Pentagon," The New York Times July 15, 1986, reprinted in DoD Current News,
July 16,198 ,pp. 7-8,16.
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89G00720R000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
86/87 NWC UNIT IV, Crs 2, T-4A, R-b
Richard K. Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are
Inevitable," World Politics 31, no. 1 (October 1978). Copyright a 1978 by
Princeton University Press. Reproduced with permission of Princeton Univer-
sity Press for use in the courses of the National Defense University.
ANALYSIS, WAR, AND DECISION:
Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable
By RICHARD K. BETTS*
M ILITARY disasters befall some states, no matter how informed
their leaders are, because their capabilities are deficient. Weak-
ness, not choice, is their primary problem. Powerful nations are not im-
mune to calamity either, because their leaders may misperceive threats
or miscalculate responses. Information, understanding, and judgment
are a larger part of the strategic challenge for countries such as the
United States. Optimal decisions in defense policy therefore depend
on the use of strategic intelligence: the acquisition, analysis, and ap-
preciation of relevant data. In the best-known cases of intelligence
failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors
of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished
analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the prod-
ucts of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and
administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is po-
litical and psychological more often than organizational.
Observers who see notorious intelligence failures as egregious often
infer that disasters can be avoided by perfecting norms and procedures
for analysis and argumentation. This belief is illusory. Intelligence can
be improved marginally, but not radically, by altering the analytic
system. The illusion is also dangerous if it abets overconfidence that
systemic reforms will increase the predictability of threats. The use of
intelligence depends less on the bureaucracy than on the intellects and
inclinations of the authorities above it. To clarify the tangled relation-
ship of analysis and policy, this essay explores conceptual approaches to
intelligence failure, differentiation of intelligence problems, insur-
mountable obstacles to accurate assessment, and limitations of solutions
proposed by critics.
1. APPROACHES TO THEORY
Case studies of intelligence failures abound, yet scholars lament the
lack of a theory of intelligence.' It is more accurate to say that we lack
? For corrections or comments whose usefulness exceeded my ability to accommodate
them within space limitations, thanks are due to Bruce Blair, Thomas Blau, Michael
Handel, Robert Jervis, Klaus Knorr, H. R. Trevor-Roper, and members of the staff of
the National Foreign Assessment Center.
t For example, Klaus Knorr, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case
? 1978 by Princeton University Press
World Politic, 0043-8871/78/010061.2961.45/1
For copying information, sce contributor page
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002.0 _~ND DECISION 63
62 WORLD POLITICS "'" '
a positive or normative theory of intelligence. Negative or descriptive
theory-the empirical understanding of how intelligence systems make
mistakes-is well developed. The distinction is significant because there
is little evidence that either scholars or practitioners have succeeded in
translating such knowledge into reforms that measurably reduce fail-
ure. Development of a normative theory of intelligence has been in-
hibited because the lessons of hindsight do not guarantee improvement
in foresight, and hypothetical solutions to failure only occasionally
produce improvement in practice. The problem of intelligence failure
can be conceptualized in three overlapping ways. The first is the most
reassuring; the second is the most common; and the third is the most
important.
i. Failure in perspective. There is an axiom that a pessimist sees a
glass of water as half empty and an optimist sees it as half full. In
this sense, the estimative system is a glass half full. Mistakes can hap-
pen in any activity. Particular failures are accorded disproportionate
significance if they are considered in isolation rather than in terms of
the general ratio of failures to successes; the record of success is less strik-
ing because observers tend not to notice disasters that do not happen.
Any academician who used a model that predicted outcomes correctly
in four out of five cases would be happy; intelligence analysts must use
models of their own and should not be blamed for missing occasion-
ally. One problem with this benign view is that there arc no clear indi-
cators of what the ratio of failure to success in intelligence is, or whether
many successes on minor issues should be reassuring in the face of a
smaller number of failures on more critical problems.' In the thermo-
nuclear age, just one mistake could have apocalyptic consequences.
2. Pathologies of communication. The most frequently noted sources
of breakdowns in intelligence lie in the process of amassing timely
of the Cuban Missiles," World Politics, xvi (April 1964), 455, 465-66; Harry Howe
Ransom, "Strategic Intelligence and Foreign Policy," World Politics, xxvu (October
197,4),145-
2 "As that ancient retiree from the Research Department of the British Foreign Office
reputedly said, after serving from 1903-50: 'Year after year the worriers and fretters
would come to me with awful predictions of the outbreak of war. I denied it each
time. I was only wrong twice."' Thomas L. Hughes, The Fate of Facts in a World of
Men-Foreign Policy and Intelligence-Making (New York: Foreign Policy Association,
Headline Series No. 233, December 1976), 48. Paradoxically, "successes may be indis-
tinguishable from failures." If analysts predict war and the attacker cancels his plans
because surprise has been lost, "success of the intelligence services would have been
expressed in the falsification of its predictions." which would discredit the analysis. Avi
Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur
War," World Politics, xxvnt (April 1976), 378?
data, communicating them to decision makers, and impressing the lat-
ter with the validity or relevance of the information. This view of the
problem leaves room for optimism because it implies that procedural
curatives can eliminate the dynamics of error. For this reason, official
post mortems of intelligence blunders inevitably produce recommenda-
tions for reorganization and changes in operating norms.
3. Paradoxes of perception. Most pessimistic is the view that the roots
of failure lie in unresolvable trade-offs and dilemmas. Curing some
pathologies with organizational reforms often creates new pathologies
or resurrects old ones;' perfecting intelligence production does not
necessarily lead to perfecting intelligence consumption; making warn-
ing systems more sensitive reduces the risk of surprise, but increases the
number of false alarms, which in turn reduces sensitivity; the principles
of optimal analytic procedure are in many respects incompatible with
the imperatives of the decision process; avoiding intelligence failure
requires the elimination of strategic preconceptions, but leaders cannot
operate purposefully without some preconceptions. In devising meas-
ures to improve the intelligence process, policy makers are damned if
they do and damned if they don't.
It is useful to disaggregate the problem of strategic intelligence fail-
ures in order to elicit clues about which paradoxes and pathologies are
pervasive and therefore most in need of attention. The crucial prob-
lems of linkage between analysis and strategic decision can be sub-
sumed under the following categories:
i. Auac!( warning. The problem in this area is timely prediction of
an enemy's immediate intentions, and the "selling" of such predictions
to responsible authorities. Major insights into intelligence failure have
emerged from catastrophic surprises: Pearl Harbor, the Nazi invasion
of the U.S.S.R., the North Korean attack and Chinese intervention of
1g5o, and the 1973 war in the Middle East. Two salient phenomena
characterize these cases. First,, evidence of impending attack was avail-
able, but did not flow efficiently up the chain of command. Second,
the fragmentary indicators of alarm that did reach decision makers
were dismissed because they contradicted strategic estimates or assump.
tions. In several cases hesitancy in communication and disbelief on the
part of leaders were reinforced by deceptive enemy maneuvers that
cast doubt on the data.`
s Cotnpare the prescriptions in Peter Szanton and Graham Allison, "Intelligence:
Seizing the Opportunity," with George Carver's critique, both in Foreign Policy, Na
22 (Spring 1976).
'Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbor: Warning and Deci ion (Stanford: Stanford
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 M
Q 3 c
~.~..E
Cl
O
.f , c7 V
, y u
fi
C:=e,
v
O ~-o v ~-~ ? 3 c
bQ u E
. E H N
N 'p O vNi R-'
by 0 !Z
c7 'H E w
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
rl > O cn b wCa
u O "'
bC 0 p4 ~^^~..11 ~~My I [ u e,~ ~CJL v
y .N?1 V L1 1..1 O Cl-0 U 4 Q
S M 3 .~. ea ,~ o u
b0 [ C bq ^p C .O
c7 >
-0 u 'G N Q O? O
cGa C c~ .~ u
Q uw J O
cis
ej 40
F~1 ^ -a c
.o CIS - r+V N
u 4 0 4.
U v >. cyyua 0 C ' C > C u 0
w H O
4 O u C G.
u
p e"e c~a '
O cl V
1~ C:
cc -0
'~ Cp u O O .u.
M^O 4ah E'C 4.u
u v 0 C H
C yr I N ~?. f0 ~ O `~
by C y~ a 1~?q ' P L C b0
u 2 Q u O Q
r
v>; ~ C by h v h
v ? u G. F? u O
O O
C '.r , h 3
E 6. C:
CJ C,
- O
L.1 r v
0 O C C
O W r
? >.3U
v?v cl
C7
I. N y
Cl IVn ~.. (~
a -0
?'+ w B u C,
u "..Cl
CIO bQ C C' u ca Cl
N ?.(y f7 ..' 3 N In V
0 >..Cl O 7
Q2r-
0 O
T O , C]. O C u
L? 8~.=
2
O V Cl ~
U U s 'C . O
u C -~ C C
eo Vn C G
G
O '.' . w LI V Id G1 V u 6
~.S 5 0~0~~'.o aoa a
b0 u~'fl u " 0'"
1. ~. 3 u
u O G C'[ :~ O ^I" F.~i G U G.
1j u .~ C ed uj
u c. Cl U
G.
aN o o?2
go u
8 c ~; bn -EU
aE eo>
A u -v?u~
U
2 R 'u 4 ..Cr N O T
CG. "" N 171 y vi
c bC v ~. U N
y
-p c'-a
0 e0 to O C .
L r.
O- O C .u .a aV.v O u
C
u O ?~ .. y y 0
a,ed
C
1-+ a~ Ov
?v
Cjj U i ~C`~ yte'e'
Eu -4
G ~~th a! O `u"SY ~ e~f
D Oyu, n C
EST
u~ u3=~ o
E u to
~sc3HZ~
F- -S
u u U ^
vC
' - pO T ed
O YO
Cr v
`
V
2 9-5
R u ..~. ?y 7 t~
~ ;-?co3
.t' Z N Y
A=Q
0u0
y -2 1
.: ?0 U
bO u - o -9 yj
-0
E ?-3
? Co -,oO
8
-?7>a
C: 0
U S^r
T T
G.
ca
'v ed ~+ O Q C Q ti Ruud ` bpp
O
$ y
G -p ed u u 'p uu w o G.
'A Z3 4j
0-4 q all. S.
0
N t.
8 a. u y
+k~~ Y qq ca ca.
ea ..C u
t3 4; 44 y ?
9 ou."'0 u-?c [
u ,0
G O b
?. ?~ u rn u u+ u u U. pQ
.7 7v.
0
. Y
-a 0 '. cc
U be
0 45 "0 0
"0 - ~ ~
g ;g u u? u u u
? w -y+M Y b0 'LS Y .CI to ate. V ?O
45 O> O Y u a a4 C ~.
u 04 J ea O Oes H
c bra ~ ti G >. ~ u ?,~ ?~ o Y~ Y _ S
u O C;
y {!~i+y.? x 3 a
~ y O N A A
ea ^ ., u ee u y V
C R1 pG > C uu+ U >
Ca 1. L ? ca E.
A O ~.
C1 t2V? 'r L w .~a .C c C v n V
?a
M
9 N
C9 ~'+ ~ ??w ,u.. u V ,C N
y u C9 ?O' V C7 of ..
I 3; [l.
' 0 Ca
O 00 2 u r
Cv . -O
CIS ee - * C
C 7 C
U
O n 1:. Ca pn `. C
E eCa ~ Cl
i~0 u fi `9
U y. ? o
Cl U > E
h F& E
ac `c4- E- .c u u-vu
C , L L M C G YQ G C. ,>..
L, oo.t u a. cv~ w O y u tz vu,
E h L N O Cu V u y , '- "C
u E c E ooa~ c `~ L.!n
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 -0 h
u ~r N
'O Cq eye y 4' 4;
0 4j
0.2
p V
-~ 3 ?
c - o v G. y .[
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
N
E
c7
o [
4- v O
C 4.
?~ u
V.1
4?A
o
>' u u u S u
CL U ?U~ Cl O u
u 3
-a c u a
c~.
O y > E
'..
0
N 4+ u N 1-.1 u ?~ ~' ~ ~ 'O . V urr ?r ? u u Q ~C
7 . S .C Hdt C, > ea E u
41
- ed u 'v L' '5 'C x -8
V. 0
?c ?o--W E- o c c a6o
U. V. -4 tor C, it um
u O r (: CO `' bC u . -, C1' e0 4+ Q >. u N
44
& -5 ca bo,
E h
Ova =
->. ' v u ? C "~ bC w0 ? E b0 O i O O
ca u Cis 0, C=
.0 0E? cac^v
O
O V in C, ti C6, C` 'n u C C E ~~ k 25 O
V c t'? u. . `~ ~.' ~~+ ?'O N u ^O
V Q. u -a
C J u . C G CL rJ ? it a L" y u ~ E r~1
b u ~`. _ . E d CIS CO /~
~C V cb h L ~..? O ? ?~ ' . . L. y '.u. L e u u h v .4: fn v N
Cl r- NO bo Rl Q O %~ LO r. u ti C's 4 ? 0 .4 O E( a O+
c c C ~>.u ~. ar. ea u o-o E
GL W
lu
cu 4
E u u w u 'C
C'S . U u E u ea
72
y E Q m ea f7
c.C N I.r =
.. y .-+ O u
" .c E two
0
u
00
U
Xu
v a o c -fl
Q 0 .0
u .-
Y
o ~.' to ?i., u C
u o ?E c -? c -~'3 c
0 cu
p, O Cl a .y
O 'D u bQ Cd y O y h E ti.
C 4. .. C O v Cl 0 .C u 'v
E '~ O 7 N0 u u C7 y u
. ., u
u I.. H u i1 u+ N C'0 w . I~
aEizv3ox v. '~~-v3
ai ' '0 av
C7
V, u u 2
-Z u r.
n u
N
C
u
~ ~ N A
u 4 u
~.C,1 C u
O
c .0
eS
O b0
CL"- y h
6
c7 y -10
u y
-0 tg
TEE
s 0 c? -~ n U
0
G 'O a ?.u". H C
q U .+ N
P7 y 0 u u ?.. [,'
^ C A Q
v~EL~'0'-C CIS
n yF $ U ?? v
C y v o y Q o
3-`V{ u
u'- u ~'u u
v J 2 -s S
C
Gcu
u
c Ca :c v H .9
U 4..G 7
0
t `.
c v
U o
N 4+
7
Ju
?
u N
?V
N
4-
?
a
L`?v^Ec
-+ ?~ ? -N E L
C .G O C G
- n - u O
X to [ U
c >~ c
o E
3 o E m
O 0 ' v
u ,0 0 'C y >
rC ea ^-~.E.4. u Cl
u u u -. y N
o- E 0 N N C
a
.~ C
f: it
bQ co
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
oi0
44.
u c v L? a
tC L
00 U 2-2
r,- u C e a "I u a u .`
21
Z5 V C o E N L O u
V _ C t C
L e o
v
u `~ u'c ap c'~ O O'er
u~l~
a0 o ~ E > sue
N L U
O
4-4 -Z boo a. ouL? Eo
a - u U t?s n oL L '
g ? U .'.? ~ n L ~ a ~ C I -~ ._
90 N. . E
O J 3 O o- u 'O ?r
'o u y u C
n = ?2 32 caG.E?u
V ru, (I1
L C'J 0 L h ?' ` L
1-1
C, U,
Svcuu9,
vu !!Z- aLh c To u
u u'
c~^=C
VOCt~ru'a` $ 2' U=-S72 aV ?~ N L u L~ 3 .
C7~0 ?~ ecEaU3 u
N L
.. ~ '. .. y rv1 in ?.fir t: uC > 6
Z7 eVc- u E 3
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
a,= o
C u 0 U U O"
D
it k; u g 'v0 8
o?~TM`?:$3ycu>.~uuQ'~oy~~oo$~ a
u 0 to !2 cc to ca
a r-. .0 w C. gyp"' u Y 103 ~?.a.? `~ u I 'R
y 'to
u u u C u O. C 0 u 5 .~ ~D .. >.
8 u
u u >, wp 0+ -? .r7 ,1~" e. Y 0 w -`~ 0 SO c% a 8 BE
`~ '~ >`?u w w me > -0 C uC
60 c,
;6 ce
V-0 0
. " C u >` a u 8 a ?'" C ev >
v" eua u V '~ ? ``d a
4-1 0 -0 -0 lox Sco
u b .2, Y
cl q; 0 E- 0.
v_ H u Q c0 v ~.. y bar" C, O v `9' '~ Q '+r ~. u
tu,
~:v" H 8 vb~ E o ~a y~ u 0 3 ?u o[ g
CIS
tcu:
tv v u u 'n ^C 2.- C a7 5
cYd C .~ c ? ~" M a u
C C ., C
`. cc
O rV+ nn C ~'- y
u u . 0.?m v u O ?p u v
>u O
-
V Y ~
C r"+ Y N V
i V
u` .>. O
v
~
u
ti u
G v
. y
p
y u i
.0
?, > C C .n
a u . a u
^Y lea ~: O y C v -C o
u v O> O ba m? 4 C C O C Y
O, uui C E C v...0 u v~. :S -. O .'-' .C > E E w
CO Y Vl _ ..r
y- Y N
ba 88 2 E .c ^ C c3 v -C - u Y -O N .a: C
N u
N Y
a ; U -a
a
O v tCv to E u O C .ar
C E e0 u i` O. C
'0 aouo-vEa?3u"E ~~ cy
43
61 S r. u
O ., b? to C u ~, W S O' N
p, ~. y a1 ea LL
o ?.~ N
-v y Oa ? > O .E u u > Oa .o. 3 ...E-
z -v E. -5 E
y = 3 z
r u -C
O C
u'
ed
a
u O
c a E e ^N S r E
c ` nom`
"4 >.~ a c'% uW,Q.oi?~
13
C
?u ? 3L 3 o ei a ~s_ 0cd o0
C O rn v' a >. n u' V C C
Ti V .^ O V C 7 C u .'
E.~ C
fi
~' ??o~ '~P.~C~eaEp'7~q'~
u n O~ E" ~ a ri u ~_ -i
uL ~~ =Cti` c cs A ? c: ?'
>
tj A.
os v a c+ u u c~N ?p?- V
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
1-~
'++ ?C
P m J ca
-0 u a v s 7 '1- !~ ?p
j= 0
y~ 1Q i3 g
79 V 25 -B V
u o u c .? .. o-
.y F/~.~J1 u ,._, .QQ 3 3 ,, ~GQQy~ w . tai .?5i~~
0 O I ~ ' ~ M {d j11 w~ y ~?1 y 'iY O
o c[e
a; G uE-cc
o 0 Al
~
o E c~? Z ~urc uwyy ~ y 0
av~ou
u e%. CA
c-o ~.c i, c ~ R
>; u u a .r R ^C
OS 00 2 Q^ v c u v
C u1 u "'
O u
-?o c e v z
u
Cc C u u ca a. w u E
7 C GL E N se
-
w-O v w b-v
M ^ O N (3 .r '?O rw
- _c
cl 0 ?
u C
b 0 3 4 u
'y y
10
~O"" ~ O S OC
w
. ?e3yEi U
N?~u,.c cu' c eta QuQ + ? i c ca 3 >. >
~, C v ed e~I > O u u ~. C'S
O E + bQ U+ +Q. y C' u E C y G ^O ~4+ C Q' O
10 fi r.. ? '?0 E?[ W ?~ "O V N N. n,?dy N t 1.- C >' H l'^ V
0 ?.. 0 'C O MO T bA C ?v ?. u .~ .."u o 2 E O .C ?9 is u ~^ w t9
N Vl ~' -Q V ?[ ?' E 6. V C" V V,d ti O y '~ V W
fd a 1.. Y Cd 7 y V C. ~'i ~-i "~ N ? 1.- _E QJ i -0 r?". v N ci 0 RI V
y.ew ; Cu^v o bo a.~ ? 'u 2 u a. `u?
c 3 ~cuJ ,r c o ? o ~ ti 0 9 p ?a c .~ u
~?'+ 0". N C".. u -C N "Q H 1 N O y V N -,? >V ti W. ~~'' Ci N ...
0 V Q .1j , 0 Q O ~+ / V y y N 4L`- to (7, v {"O ? N N u w L?i ri
~f.0 [ E c Q?~? 0 "0. 3" en6 u u c H" N , q, 41
0 -u
CC,. b
> 11
V ??C 4 u u cc o V ' ~? u L L u tO V y; U W N u
41 0 E 't:
2
E 0 a- cn o _o E? V O a'G c: u i ?E u
Q '- N V E .y r r u ? fd 4~ V7 ~+. L '~ ?.O N~ ?~ ? -y .Q ?u u u
20 L-
E C Zt u u c u A- ~. u
E u o c e2s o o o E E sue' c
7 Ln ?.-w ' u u ~+
I' ??. bd ~O E N .+- y N ?y y O v, by Z-i > u V ??4.
X [. 5 EE, E C. _N O N ? N u ,^ E u 6. u
0 V
u ?
3 ,r E 1, z cpp, CC c
ca v `, w .. w G d C O c G G. G o > '^ u a'-CU c u
c o q [ C a.- ~_~a~?u v_ 'v
o 2 y .~ E ce t~ C u C a o -y eo . C G 4. -p ._: u w O v
y_H ea o u ? v 'v~ c 3~+'0 c
-
?
u V
u N ??G ??G N ~.. ? 171 Y, c l-. y E
N
H k G 'C c u !C 'c a^ s d VJ _ e; in O 0 z u ~, w
~rr
$b8 ean,~
As OC -.!2
`E
S E7
? S ..Q
0 10
3$uu
Qu 1rn~n
O . w M t `n, O~
o v- ~-'2 a.e a
ciuuu~U"~oa~
00~ U V C
6. C 'r'12 ft-'N
o.uu~ yc~~
ue~a.~OQ.?_~
s-~~yuaL"m
F arc :Z
mot.- u^u
N O a m u
wry Q u?>,CL u.~ a'
Y Z~CCg ~'P^n a
N L ?~ V
Z)-4 E
v ~? v:c~ u i ~. `4
a. ~ ~ v V M b
r < a,W E ~ .:
C O 1~
U E ?`o~ U4 yy~1 e
u h. .?? Co0 N N \/
L? Y VV
U?,$ a .4. W., N?
U N `
u c r+ C
to ?e C
.W M, U.C 0
vE..via
q C1 ?0 w
0 CE ,,:6
E 3 o ry ,;,
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 .o .'b
O tL"
0 V
O
0 cu
CIS
4LJ. >,u
c y IryU
pp
y~y_ u Y, C f4 ,
- l7
V N .N.. fd Q u u V
Ia. cc y a:
U y V
i 14 U -= U r_ r-
CI 0. U 'a r_
r
C's r.
> 41 S.
19
0 a~ N O ?~ ., G ca ..
a H 0 O 0 Y !~0
N M Y V Cl
O
G N 'O -S
u
O 0 0 0
o
a , N o
, O
o ~4 " 3
Cl
~y?OO~ouu~?o-o3Y
y y u u u u 7 0 C U
cl a'u` u >'5 ~ w'c
C, ? u ? 5 u
? [ erd a' ?'g "?' 7 M ed .g "O ed:.. 'S [ u 1'.01. 0
N 'L7 O V O "O y 3 "C7 ~.. ~i O e Y OQ a ?>. 3 u "G 0 ee O O w
u ,u .+
~y C ~+ ~1 Cam' [ u L.
O O. 'S
Y ..
C~' u
v y ?u [ U 'may U V ??O y O {J O O Y Oi IW IN 4 .- W? . 4
U D .? ~ Y y u O O u ..yl a u:. O "'~ `~'~ [. u ~+ ?~ .~ ?~ M
N U . w Y u u L. U u C
y~ Y 1w ??d~+ U O ~p~+ ?~ V A V .y U ,~7 '?~
q ~' [ ed w u v u e'd O ~e y vs ed D Lt
n' u 7 uQ 4 d ea u c N 3' ~[f 'J
y .. Lr -~ V W 1w
V Ulu
Q ~LJJ L.
~+ u ..ur c11 CCU~E 3 ".7 O ... 1~' 1.r >. l7
O[:?~o
c >
.. v^4 G o -F cl
? acs ~ ~ - c,, u a a [~
. 'o c Cc Cl 6.
82 0
[ w u [
h G .. N O "O V V ~ bQ ? C u
. rr V u ??~ W Y ?N Q V N V V L. u
o n n ee -+ r _ V!
a
O L
~' ~" u '~o.n e0 a O w a. 0 O, eyd U O V V? u 00 ? C C'S
'J?1 '~ .0 .7 's. ~ O C O '.~ ?~ '~ y Gn w u
r~ NO
Cc to
'Z ~+ >' ~~ Ir ~pt^O N U U N a '~ Ci Y >u c7 .y. ~:+ M w
H y ad u 4 ?~ Ci y a 41 V ?~ a' ri ~. ?1.. 'v N
~? .V. ?y N rLr
U3 V
> ?
?"
3
U
S
M ?-
Ly
04 =
V J
..i 3 N CoCV u 56 V 'O $ a ?> ,
- ?U u
o o c
u..r1 ..,
0 u c' a vP u Q
3 3-au v w>Z~?~
? 0~
.~
N y ~.a C'O > y C. ?U vp?t-'uN > -0?U.. U Cwiyy..-O.O y U ~ L ~.f.
to cis a -to - c ! v u O v ee A -O O wow ' u u
7 0 v .~ .0 u > do C u G u bi0 co E ewe w 'C ?+ O u a u ~' u
C, 0 cc
10 144-
0 C! ;6 a
Id CCS I-j cm, 12, 1; -
Ou.~
U u,a 'L.- 3.S ovU Fj `?.M oa,?G ~.~ 3 11
ca L.
, on
c u >. . u U. .0 a u C U _, ~??i E w a b H a ~.
o a o
u ca O u u . u C u u w._ u .C 0-0 0
C's ev C ,y b0 u O u by ~? C. E u a >' ? .". .wu. u ???? u u w u C ee
8 C C ~
u [ u [ .O $ a C C~ -J '; U u O 3 ~? Cl y v U u w .n w -O O L
tE O O -O '? O u > ' [ C O ca ' C . y x V V U w N' cc >
E 8. R w, -v > ~ w . .E 2 2 . eo u -~ oo eo ~ .s?. ~ h N 9 " n..c
O V L A W C`?..~ O C O 0
~p?H w v h u 0
0
u ~~ H u u c e0 " o? 0 3.a
i " ?Q " ~? cOV >eya c 3 C7 ' H 3 " co
p
41 ra
D O 0-5 O. m C ^O Cry ~.+ O u p 7 -C A
L w L C u
O y E C u H H ''' (uu~ ; L' V. C u p
41 n w U U' .f?..0 E W " 7 C~ L u ry yL L
u O ?~
c co C v
F. C O i7 7 'C ~+ C U, -p O C ' u O
CIS a _w ? = U
R -0 z- 0- C's
> wbo O U 7 V
^ " ' c .~ C.
'o 'D ..G v ~' '~ C C .. m C j>
o L ao'v' v H o u
Ct D vi .O O u "' n u C O
++ U CL O u
u v o h o. n. 3 .v
tj .!2 CF
? E .. c7 .. . tJ -o
? 3- -o c u
L L~~ y eoN V- o...9 0 0
ry e- b0 W C L U iel - > Cl u V
E:aottiE (., oewo=
U n u C
x u v .L' ~t7 b0 OQ O
w `d' a.o 3H 5
u~ n, y ,-' ? c o E
u C
f-- V3 WE
7 u C
Q. C > c7 'y o u
E E
7 p, n t7 O ti
H O. 7 L. a,
E to' I'
V u ~, E ' eo e
y ` .. V
u d. u u '~ u? u v .5 a s ,:.
V
3 O > bL gf- ro oL u
L w ~7i ' r C ~. O f~ c,' C~,1 '; O 00~ s .. .? .. ~ t7S . `? u . ~ n
. C .. 9C u w 4.. u ? C c0 ? V V 7 O H O' 7..n. t
~...^ C u 0 .C L? v ti 3 u U F. U c Q LO
>` ..+ .y o u .r u U w e7 C'L
vi 'C+ t _u 7 O IV
y C x 9i w C >. u 0
n
U C O6
C 11 "U
c> ., oL a.
NI J, -C
L. u .. ?. 3 v u o
-
'u A E > r.
Hac C 3.;
Kto =.=
~?.D
>` 0 0 > O ?E H p : 1 ,
Co -O E O w u$uu b..vzt uu
u C3..~ LO ?N C .a O `^ ` C u U'y _.: or j a~S E s 3
c'G^e E E 3 v m> v o?.Is" ?_3CSe.a SEAS
u a
C =
U. C a
.r
>. 3 5
cut :w
u a N Ln1 U
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
C; -ZI u u u c n.o [~ U "a o ~~??"S~~ ? u o'v~ q
MCI -5,"a
on ?., ~v O u o 3 -- $r E z W T y 3 J a u [ J
H (~ W cCi o to. - U ", -S r~
-o ~..?.!:z o?S w a ' u? AZ~ o u u o N.
O cd L.' C u IU 'C O O .w C. E mu ?.. p u .~ ~" .~ .. ` N
b4 u ~' u u u r7 O E U O u ~+ '" w .C ~'o ed u" y$ ?.? u
a. ., .. ~. q e7 C
z. C ?.V. 3 O W o c? g v E" o? G C u G ed .G
O ~-- 0 ? C C:
""
u
X
N a C J'u
u~ 3c E u `m d? aU
y
Cy'v ' N ,,+ ee 5 '.v~. ~, u '~ ?+ .. ,., o u '~ '~ u U
W W '3 N !~ U i7 '?~! 'fl "O O E 7
C .G - ~ u G3. ,',,, ry . fl r - ~ 72
.~ u
V
0
C .2-0 'J u [ a .$ u `O '?s P, U e? -S Cj Cep -a rx
`++ O. u N C, y N C O. U cd y N u 4
"z If
? V
? o:~ c "
a 3 [ [
.
U
~
~
" ~ 3
0
~
A 0
u
~
2
: V N E C u 7-- U -5 u u E O c u ~' p ci . ~'p" > e. a.. tj
u , N g -S > ? ' u vi 4. " yr ? .. u ...? OS ?..? ~''.
E
?
"
u O n'
" y V
~u" u u u id ~^ u u ? C C G au+ '"
0 ea Q ?~ O w u N eti u C, ~- C w w " ? y " b0
n . ~ a >'W C? 'S.> y,~~ U 0 u u C.E -
z o e"e
O 0 u E C- ~?' 4 u- O FO u 'v u u[ eta 0 u$ E b ''' a
.-. u ee u 0 1]
" ~+ H U ry H . N T U a+ U ... " r. {Q zj
N u 3 ??+ . 7 N
W O ,., u u u 0 u z 'v ~J u bQ Cu "G .~ _ O u u a A N "C ^"' N ?.~'r
b -0
Z u O Cr ~?' yy 'fl M U w U r.r U ? [ E - 8 >u - ?" rw
? .1~i ld ..Nr .~ U
O u w? o" o c 'a. 0 -0 ~" 3 u a c u u u 'O '~ .c o.~ c u
`? .".: 0. O C O C .Na M CO b0 N u N C 7 O C 'bo cc r- 4.1
C c 4 co a do O a' u '~' . z' u C CO u u eo
> 3 N? M a M fs7 a u C a u &C
c ~L Yu cub c w
? E b0 .. a. A ~? ~.~? U Ci ' 1??r '~ ~/ L? U U U ?
O u Ch . a :r a o u a u Ono E z E u (- -S .a E" Q -v ~aW a" d -.?' u
.uN, u L Ttt [ ?C U
N..".?~ '1 4,o
4. 0
N v u" M C1 ? T .N.
-
n, 3 V v y.
-v .~ n u .a n?
c c i -u- 'u 0
(y N Nrn u
N 7
tic V
o
u
U-16 E-- ~ T
E ^
4u >
p CL u -0 w E
?
O
A u
u
N ?
Q
n C S. C ` C
? = - - V V O [ :~ w
C O U. w
`? C? CI ? O u ?
- -
a 3 E._-[ u:s m u
0 0, 41 44
r. !; 5? mAM n
E.? E M. .... u ? " .?
u .4 C u C a? 4 u u C O V
cc V > .5
C? !0 ? a E 6. ' zuN (N~ v {I
u C u N c O? 3 ao to " ?" a c
E 'M
q C's C. ". C W4 C u ?k m C1 - C u m
0 C1
*04
u c
C1
2
G
ft S.
Q..m 11 N u p .2 ^R? $ .C. u C O c ` a N u
4G~ e`"a
O
0. 11 OU no ft cH3
'ca
N A (~ '"r " lO ri " r
O T v -
u yC +3 N O u C.~4
Ai z o
,Q N ?C u `~'p " a0 U u U u b n
bO U 0 Cc -0 U
t1 v N y 7 9
O C v C 7 u 7[ Q a E
u $ w A y a. u U u w ^p
dp -. y
1y' V? y 1 ~I QJ .N NV W ~' V
4u t
N E'N ~~ C y
to
0-
u 0 N O u N Q' V u c ~? u
1?' ~-' T E T
4W &A a ec ce ? 'E ' [ ocuc ~
y,y 4. L". w w
C1 u
0 W1 M -u
Q' A u u 0 7 N -. a c C ? ? >
m 06
i
s
O c
d ce
0,-8 0 '1
o c u v o e?
a
'
u
N o
[
5-5 r-
T O E' C 0 OM 0 u.0 C C
I m e"a 0 " O Q A
0 C o
C LO c C1
V CO
> Ca
EE ... 0 0. U- tr 14
0. 0'G
~0. E`:
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
O ?e ' U U u y L ~??' y ? 1~
00 Z.5 g 4.,
~4 d, O v, ey ,7 C~ .1'J ' G O a'
r~ y V .~ O O .. ?~ w .T 3 "C 1: . L V u
a>'o -'w.;Yom.,
u G v [ [ rv~i a $ > u ~oyo . > y
PCG [ 4U~ -v U ~ ?~ LU u eta ? 0 G, :3
-j 41
.~ ? '~ [O ' ~ ?y ~' C~ ~+J [ . ~', to c7 '~ u
`Cn V" C. " ^Ci C H y y L `7 ; a N ^p c0
". >O iC G. G N O 71 N 7 C. C
o?a Q A 3 U U0 a a^> --00
o O CO cb .~
-v-~ Q?Hb,y 3v 3c.2L Hou
Q' bA c0 u u O E . V [ yU . O w p0 e0 id
u C u u y H CO ? 2 yv, ' u :d C y L C
0
ew ' y 3 a E-' -0 c a F" v?~ v -u0 0 ?:..c . S ~.
boo
ai Cl~ p >, Q V e3 a ,
O a~ t~ S l - C' 9i 8 ~, u
4.9
c I U
4j -.1
to y ,`3 L. q , 'C! L7 'L'J ?by cl
C~ 'CC
0 C1 w - u
ti `~ C O Lu. L. cI `~ ed
V V ? u > u
73 0 9 O Q ^ 2 .r
~i ?~ y y U ? a .iy Q~?~. , V
-,a,? 3 c 3'3 [ E ~o
-u cu"
:-S
co
L O a, ai uu
tj L: '~ U R L ?~ ~~ ,r. H O ?~ L U r
is o cU, ~.' y ? C C cc ?~ C
C! .C. u ca o ~. H O u u y. u
Z: cl
vJ
_
b0.[ 'h ?r7 O O O S-0 O 04
v H
C M t0 G 9 .: w U T J U 0 O yy . ,`~. U 04 U
^
'0 -0 - . -, a 110 , , . h `u? u -c
~ CC Q ? 7 E u E ~L. V v? 7 ?~ a _T ;, N
.. C T v 1+? O E C H C H U .~C C -p "0 O 3' y OL E U 'v ca C a
C's (u
3 " a c ? -? ~a c ~, ec h : ^ ?C ~= ao o c a c 3 -? -o 3 ? -? ~'+ `" s
U O C a
' -5 T c
+ O E u C > 7 .. .
cv cv U
.
.
N
C? c{t vvi _O bD u y -. 0 ? N CO VD C C L C -C u o c: p .~ ? H ~`' p
41 cl 41 cc
c0 w >U O '" ' . , C L CQ Q C y h U. ,'n. O ,Y O y y? O ~?? a C U W u 60 Q -
M ca O
~"' ~- -r tW C? L .. L ?C E O ??0 v y' y C >. U L U T 7 cl ..,. .y.. > W ?. y. 0 C9 U L .
cu E ~
C 4
u;. C C N T -ca. -C O .~ > cL7 v coal y H O U L. W 3 u O~ C v v N >. C T UC
.n _ C: u C c b
evv u c c - o ?ae c_, ?'v v c,:.~ 3 ~'c cc a";; -~
-0 O ? C O 'y' 0 a L '.- M
. O '- C ~? a 'J biC $. e0a O O v v ?LJ o
GJ .~. C' Ci. $ .D C 7 C O u u yy. 3 ~, L T ~q V > y > t1c _Y
ca 0- u a u -~ CIS U L - CO O UU eo v u c y c E a o ??v c o
U H 4
C's 3 0 0 $ y R ? >'" a , ' ~~ E L .. E 3
u C. :`"r b4 C v U O E C u O U H ~. C 3? .. U L C L' n y
o E>'Vj - s>>cu ru~3vc u Rn,? ...ayv
-Q u o ^., b0 O ca y C u L y 3 C >. ~~.- .C a O E ? u C n? _ -cI -0 u,L u u 0 v-. 712 + V O L ~Jr u u> 6! C O
D?'.. > 0 ?~ W > ... .v ,-C; .~ C H 0 cl U u ? C `+-' 3 < in
?C >U ?~ O E L U 7 T? fi. C L 3 W u - L W R W C U y^ .u. C O E
:3 M IU t9 u 3 E.~ ? h .y ?.? o uo g E y-o N c o 3:c.2 E EV:~ =x
cu ..0 ? > oL E u' :?. o~ c 3 u v. 3 M. $ b
7 T L la ~ fb L H k r. y ON V - ' 'O 00 '~ H O " M
C 1. , C U 'O ^q ev V = iv
to [ -y U cd 47 cv ? d.:: T O O E L ^ 3 O U 'C N 0 U U '~ L
a .S .C ->p eo C '_ cy > U ~+ u 4 y C -0 O U u u y o c? C V e A IS E r-
G' "0 L C y E H L ? t C !C O O (7 cb ~' ^ u .. C^ ~; ~. C '> u L v
M y Vl -~ > ti u V'?1 ^ L?? .,C W yi C T ~-? 4d L?' A ?~ VI N U cE L
4u y' u y
a c? 3 3.': E 0 v a a c a'J. c E ?.= ., U c'^ .~ ??>?-o U `?L -0
Q p'> u O y0 .L. v v C v O s .a a 3 a v -0 V. O .. u ci
y .C c c r
?' u>? N. au oc o g `c~? 3 3 -?J pc a? ^o y? c H. c u-p 3 v e
o
~t 0 E T U a0 C u C .y >
O O L ~C u o >^ U U C1. 'O ~_ w 3 U y w O u u 9
C C. y ~r C? O L c0 M ... YJ L L d. > L ~, H U y > y < C ~.
C/1 M C/1 ~i O ca u Q. C .~ 7 "0 _u cd U U U C u ca ? y cry A u T 7
'0 'C v, e7 u "0 L .. C (? ' 4., O m E a
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 b.y..Q-z
CIS
"O [ u O o?e u
IN SSA D.U
O u.u
V2 E-4 ..
0.
F
'.-S? o,,c
C ~ O [ ~
a
Cl
u c~ ,[
0
z.~
CIS
c[V -C+ O
E 3 3
U >`
3?~ u
c .c
U, V - U
u 7 ed a
> ~ W U
NO >` o ? G, cb u
'~ I.n I.n f0 .C IV-
-0 O 9
o C? ea ( ?
n.o..a' Uw$,c
L C . ^ U N
C93 O
'u?? ' u > Cl
C .~ . `. b? C >
C? o V ui > ?
G U ? H C0 - N u
o?0?33~
a-? a?
[ O v u~ v c[a Cl O
u
,~ ? 0 _ h L ' ' L by
.- r M 1... ti V e.M T? ? l7
v ti 7 >. c~t c3 -0 Is
C, E a.>> o
P qLj a. y o cj O E
u y 0' u u v y
C'J
e0 O C
3-5-
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
0- 154
G '~ "C C> b0 a '~ 'C H 0 ed A a
'y b? v u o. ? w be
8 8-u~[ >,>.h a 6i
x be
V U C N > V C% V ?v ? '~ Cj W
t; 41
-0 u 3 'S O GL .. C
-cI >0
:R 95 -0
I" U
'C [~ a,earp y n, u beV
cc cl
it 40J
.2 k. bo
Ia. tL 3 >
a~ u u
v o O 0 C w H id C 0
0 C, N
0 0 0 0 1I-w' .? y c[ Cl2 0 0, 0C
. F'v in bb? 0 CIS
b0 F .0 ,O t~ F. u -C6 w v e0 0 0 u ?+ry O u u
O 3 v `~ R > O b :~ 52 C ~C.' 'L ~d .+ C
Vi ? .y CRS
v b? V W U ~U?. UUC [ , , H . 8 L'? ? 1~ .'ice >wri I 01
..
U o 2
{- u
CIS
V
U O
'O
-r O ..a
qj -9 U
U -p Cl
-0 Cl r
> O
H h V
U
O
0
V
C
CIS
c
7
CIS
V
E u
C ~' u
e?~rJ
U r-
>
C WN
4j V,
Qj 6.
43
r -
u
u 0 ep
o C
o H v >
V cl
w C
Cl O b0 O U
C L h
cl .!d
-U U `? ? y cl
1.n ?'v 2 ?
b4 m .yi Cj UN
C C W .' u 3 .C
S. W
" c o o c E 3
v c O H e? ea "' o T :+ C 4" u cl
= u V Q
U u I b ? ? co" 0 C, ~'.Ha,'M ?u uz S x v o
H - v - :y^? G.
0 4j
N N C U 00. t4 -0
3 w~,'~^ ?A u'~ y
H u 3 u u >.fl Go [
, ' i 7 C u L - ...? C. C _ u v C
0 7 0 :` N a
b0 y > 7 ,ate c
r. qj N O !y '~,uu+ V.-I--
Cl
41 .2=5 id
0 0 u 0 .. 0 0 Cs. c ,, > .- u N
c? ~. u.0 u U T v, 9 u'C ' E
Sao c c~ u L. ~" oR
3 v n 0 C u S ''ten
w C v u ~, [ U a fn C O :
v u
D C's
O E C's
'1 v a h u 0 a .C u a
CT,
CIS r-'a
O 'C CJ T U cl cc o >, 0 v
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
45
? e>a ~i ?
to -0 bAu u ?[''e~ cY?i~.C G0 ., d~yon.^a'^~~" u u,o'ti
Or- tj
,Q "0 c"I cc c
V 0 ~u~'~.a w o0 3. ~.c'~ c 0 u~~cwo u~ -4[
0 --a
tj I.
O u ? c c A "~ `ti a '~ >. " -~ B a " _u g, > > u n, u CYi ?^' Cc o 4 Q? ? a
o > 00 O US tP
?-. R ed "O a Z .~e
ea ea ,r~ u O ca ea ~. --. u u "C O -, h 'fl u vi '~ z
q ? E u g 1- 0 R. v b Q N ^O *Gb u -, 4, c u o. O 9, p ?., a, u u ?D ?u u O u cat y O O .,
A w? u g -.'o-[-o o..~ u 3r~. u u u c o -.$ u.. .. c
;~ 4..G ? ~ ~ '' N
u -v Cc 'H '0, 'o C w ?'~ ; ; 0 u u ? . 5 ~ ~ ~ Q ~ a ,~ ? ?~ u ~ ~tl m ? W '-
.utn c ~S^ "'~ ~w~ ?'o ?ea
Cl ~'? " N 0 ' .?+ 0 co
o u o w v u G u a c -~. ~+ 0 u W G. G. v V a u a o>
3 ?r R. u ca > .C o u ca N [ .. w
p uNi u Q ,~ u O p r E
`n rte. N O ? O u UJ W .+ e4
u c f" n
yrj cu? ~ y C. V a n' v C C V 0. is c .,. u .u7 O ^v ~+" cCe ."~ 1~' L ,^u,, ^ ~p -^ d 3 0
G u 'G u C .,y I `- u A `~" ' '.. O c q? 4 w 'i. C '++ H '~ ~~? '~ N .c ^h ?_U
y O `' O ? ? c .. > to t'. >u N U [ Q ca >+ ca ? u w u V 3 ^ n ~, m
u n' u O ?. u GO M O v ~, G u ., U v N u?[ c O N v~ v e u 4.
O u u .. C O[ ~, v ~? 'C u C ~0 O ,-, N w ti T C by a
"~ > tJ ' u 4 7 O tt u eo C c .~ :; '~ y " [ w 10
b C 0a ., $, h ca b0 ~? c[a ea
c r- U G i1 $ x n C
[ v?. W .u Q rr R s. H .N. E u u ?~ u ?[ w _ v B ?" 'N o - ~~ ''
v [ I 3 U v '> c .? : F
v 4 '~-[ 'D ?~ N 'N A? U V V
'~ `~? ' A
y u b4 ca O ~? u -.' u ~? 7O i.. N O O '+ c 0'A N -p u oy "'?
a y C c[ a c ,R y Q. w 'N u > LL.. > u vw'C ti
L.
H N ca '~ u v O J ~C b
o u> G, v ca by p u s 12 u O. ' -0 > 0 >,
T+ -u. V r ., .. u C U ` w
.c V C. r. -C u y'i u H u t. v C. ry. L 0 u ~+ pC? 'u r3 1.. N
O C ca '- >, ..N. E c O 7 [ ~c+. ~i au+ Lu ' a. /a~. ~^+ [ "C i" c~V O. U -. N ~l 'C1 N a ~
C13 L. Cr O O .C: >` Q ca 0
O co Zf G W N E?^ CL. A R w ~O O ~+ N L ?s ?e O x w
a G, cdd u v cv V N a u V n 4. . . y c in ? rr c~0 L -V 'C C. y '~ cu+ G U CA ~L
C u v .~ v bT0 C u ~^ .: is R a`. Q[ C u G p cu ee
C ca ~~ > u py V .~ .. ~+ C C [ c o A r t ~ u O MI N
42
u 5 a n, a .~?~ u Q W u' H o c o o r O y "v
u u
.c C L' N O t. S c w C _N 1. cr cm C_ ?3 O &.
3, 9 2 v c ' `? W .c .~ ~?..5 `c a -v u z a o " u ~ u ^? o $ ?.
c ? a
u v v o. -o >
V u .. is u ea h pp~ ~u7 y I -~ v j o a + 3 ? > . ?..'
O C C H C C ca .Li cr R V O > !a v`i r > N ?~. bo r'
~~u+ u ~' V O e7 r" cd u ~' ?~
c cq ca r- 0 ~+
{'i n' c+ h W 7 u u [ E 0 .- '-. Q -ca
c
3 ~. N p O G O O O W ? .c is .u 3 .C ' V H h W O O. C U. "cc Q
- -'0 E u ? _V y .r
E
V m E 20.2-
0 ' ', ^y v r' r?? ? ?~ bp y O L. CJ O .?Q C's W u 'L~? ?-/ u
cc r,
.y. C. pa C'S a 7 d. `~' V .~ u Cl. f0 O c u ~.. W ce . c u
.2 C -. C u O
ca ZS G. N T cr u ~a ? u u N ..4 7 E. O c~0 C N V u?
bC u O '~^, '.u"+ C 'v "~ 7 y Q a'i ?~ ' vim. O[ a w
U > t' C -0 V .. ca O V 7 Q. 4 u a V O a? u 0
0 ~O ~~' -u w W v u g ,~ O (y T V u> w v -?
' X cd ?y 'w"+ H O.'~ ? V V ??" c ?~^ Cl C y. ? a i~ v -~ u ~i O G. u F' 7 cu lu q u .. as >.8 0~'? v v-o 0 E c:-5 -0 U aG NaU ,, B'c N r.
V , C C
r- , cl C: -c o cd u ?~ Q y ,~ > u V c0 . C E
cY. o "~ H C. ? ca Gn to N C". u
3? a a.do~ $ c ewc :~ $ c c V 0 5 o a
v 7 .O v 0 CIS -, qj u' ; O u u u ~a u 0 ca ub0 N [-. u .y v ~' u >~ v co u N vi
u A u "Q ?v >. V u ^ -0 U co ..c L N r. ca 7d "~ ~.i 4?I Q > N Um ca a Q ?
O 3 3 r, O. N W O O Ti C-' -' Vl Q O O v+ ca ca C W L. b .C 0 E
?? u V ca ca O I r. to L 7 V O 4 y vA u v~ u y .~?y ^ Q ~. y ^~ N_ u y
N a y u V 0 .'d o 0"' 0 ..y u CJ yu C ca C. y aM+ u V Q ca V? k' . ~""'? a ~ '?~ N
c o? o E .
ca o 0
c W u o o, a ea N u 1,0Z c u v a: '404 E
0 o~ 5 c 0 u m ?? 3 u c.5 acN-' u 00? A '0= u .-S
C
"? u _y x c AG oo c C u o c? u on c CI c o
u ... Q . ^ be ~" i~l 4.r a? N I o Q a N u 6n ?^ L,i u 1...
.V u ca .. u O y ?~ u u c 1a. N N d. A ,. C Q.
L. bO w u u O .c L" u> C W 'u .1-1 u u u 3 N > 'w
" o y O Q > C. W OO b ..y ?: > u 0 ca W '' u y$ c ?V o etl
'0 ? Ec ~, E o`.occ>.~~J! v v ao 8 a_oc_ `a H?~~~oo~~ 6 CeC+ a m
cl -C r, C
M 4j
. S U V ^ O, C G~ V ? ?^ ^ ? N ? V i+ W ? u O ca `: G b0
G. ? Q O Q o ? y Q r1.. ~. u u r ~. cc u~ '0-5 u ca ? (. o caa eq 0 y 0 1..
m C O .G V 4'~ 'D Q u w w c'a O -. ~+ = .-, u Cl
5 y u '$ a c a, y
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
0
u N C'.
C. .u+ b0 y
> ? .C u u ce to
u
v v 0 o C.a
e`a w 5 C 0
'0 %j -Z ... u
U ?- O O
cu V
O H [ 'eye ,u cd
u cd cc Co
A o u u w z ed a
Cl pp u u
v C S `U. 15 a a[
-. ~ u LQ~ "C e e \ V
" v eye 2 ea . ?y. a. a
ao u
3w u v
S Q.
O e O u
.r
QQV!
N y
? {?q.. G lu.. y .7
'y^ y.~. 92 ~ .O u
?.>r+ .4 O 9 v u ?i
e
Z. I
00 s c ed >, ' o b u u I y C ~ ~ -v p ee ..u. u o0 "
E (1 00 aE y a 3 xo ci 0.
E u u -o: yv~a
aX.~o $3~,uE
V c
'o -m
co co (A
to 0.
z y Cy0 .~ u O W N O ~' e7 u C >. 0O b
W ?~ Ei u W 4n W U > A U u
ee u >? ?~. O c rJ
h 190.
o 'd C93
P C: :3
R "' Cwz -ti ~. y ov u n. 0" v v y? E
Q u
Q ? ?. O ?~ .-?-~i 4?M ? G Ia. ^~ u W " w 6?+ y4'j .~ ?, 60 r 0.-
2
o ?n c W V C V C V 7 A y s u
104 -= ~- 4j A4 u >
cl 04 L. c
1 9 au -. - .:. 00
'
.6 6. 8
a
u 6.
~oo90
6~r y L ~" "+ Iui
>` [ c C 0
- u opt .. 9
L y ?y u u
ee
u 4'C?~ u~~?y..11?~0
QQ QQ CC -o u o
ao ed 4 ~' o
-" d d 1.9 - 6w o.E.a rn
eoyj a ; ; c ^ U ee a -
G>.2 72
Eu 0ok.4epo.
C 7 .C w Q.. E H ? 0 CID
a 41
:o ---ut-ss .u.->
FE
2 d; u
70 am U*,..e
0_0 E ? E ^ . - 5oc
Q CO yyyuy~~ ~= a uz a
o E
a .. a
u
~ $ o V `acq
~V:! ~_
eJ ? ^ x E e?o
CHI 10
u'.'-E~eu~~=4
u , C ? 7 0
? u 7 .... u-0 E
V ~ fy0 y
C
^O V 'O .y...O R
u+ ee y W? y lyr 'b
"
c ''~' `u ? c ? C .e0 8
00..~~~ " vV >
y u C u A O
A '~ ' C ti ^pO w "
0 .t?. cd C ' [ [ u cd
E " ~-. u y u
"O y
v W M U ~^ o?
u 3> c c U -c
~ u U R? 2 o' 4
cat~c~
y v z Q? C w >0 " W
VI w 0r0 O ?~ e0
0 cc 10
e? _. U _ r.. u u 4 C .. ~ u N n .. .. C ._
ci
v 3 y. 0 s W 0 W 'm > &.4 C 3 E u > u u C -?
Q. u u cx W oC o A 3 u `u' 3C' y u Z-0 -v > u v c? i ei y
O u r- Lj O I C' w C 0: 30
7 C
m T--
co W V C O` 'D w
0 C3
.??. C cl ~N.?-~~ i~ .yn ? 4- co O O z > W C I
L u r.+ N' N co y OQ A .l': N C y,?. /\ ..r?. ~y U1-s f-. u .~ v A
u G L C. '~ u 60 3 ? e0g?E
~ cue X 0 >?"L7 ~.
V O. ca
u
E .R
ea
e
~~oz
. e V - H=
V Y
~'VZ a e ti'" e ~
QQ e
V ~ L 3
;;~~HaNa~o
o oW? a oC E
(` C Y z
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
"v L N 1 L W m
+
,
'
7 .~
to 41 be u 41 0
O V y w [, u y G
u ca . O. ez~, ;? .~ G ~[~ 'J w O. 'n -0 o[ u N vl ti O u >' a
o 2 y
y N > u 4. aM u c u W N - u a V > ~ u u
? u. 7 U [ 7 B O0 u u u O H C: u u c~0a u u. t0 a
u N ..c c u ..., u > Q Q u u u N c H u a
a 3 c o 3 > o o ., u u 6. Cgs
V eo >0 0 0 E-? ., c >. '~ u u ra u -o e'd u C'v E
,..acH E NS.[ c' E [ -4
H T `?_ Cl
u' .. 3 O~ e? u 7 s~ v ~0 C. > u u 0p u[ ` a .G
S D. N cU C: Q u u ,n Wes', a w to O cd 3 Ej
L. U E .r1. G ..OS 'r1 c V G. C n
? '~ O H [ u 'O [ E ' .G C ~i >. `rJ e'd ?~ O A ~,~ v w
164 u u
V~ C. 7 ... U u N ?ry .7 u ..J , E a ^Q [ u p u 'Q ~, u
N d0 43
Co u 'C V O r" Qo `+ ~' U a V V u V O .~+ ey u E V ~! U
N ed N CL , V N .r U ..~ c
O x 5 Ey tr O o &. Oo c~ cl G O O y ca 0 H c v R .4 V "O .
O ?.? H l." H
~ u b a S]. c " 'O u co E T eedd u^ 0 N 41:1 u N u V ~+ E `" u -,
3E~~`'cn? ~e'?3~c -aEr,.'3cC?^u~::>.?;~5~ii[[u~es
u
U O? e c o u E 7 E
?'c h? c?:C: u ?=H [m 3 w c-s -o c "c'
c Q?~ Cl E u u Q. (I c .c? Q &~ tea; " U `d -S eo o 3 v~
3 ?v'5
G. O to ~. '' 'C u C h . N. `?' T .: E ba Co ed 11 - 0 _ 4. o> e u ^o C v .. [ O N c c u c: s u
cd .c u M ?r7 C O h :J u -9 O E 00 'i ^ a O^ N O O V u u 3 C u u>
o e[d ~= ea L v u a00o u-5 3 H u ea >.-v ti
" m o L u ~ cc > 0 ; c? T o o = o
u L `cd' O c v u tie >` S eyd u u
C y y o u
V y to
ft 4
EI 4-1 ""
u In ?~ Li - a
u
u
cl a ?L
u
g V
%
-
G ?
i 00
0.
%64 co
c .. , c O Cgs +C v p N 0 N C u .c h e- > `' -v cc v C6 c
c O .C y
-
c~a E E Lu Cl
d .. C u ~
. 00 O v '.+ u .. Co G >
u ~0 u > ..
k ! u c
c
. .
n
u .. -5 :. O C C 'n a O>> :. V 7 C[ u a W D u u
u >. -: ~' 7 4j . y >, cce 7 a a c u .1 A "t -Q u . y u
U u?- " a u ~~ 3 w E u u oS h c v~ S u~.S~ a.?pc ; E"' y c~
; 4u a c ? a~ [ $ co u " e+~oo u o $~ c D. [ c u
0 0 o a E o u X c u 3 ao . E 0 E " -~ yod u u- c U >.
o .r7 3 a E ed W u N b' E o ,. N 3 E-~ -5 a H 7. 9 ee u `ed end '~ ed H
U W-
'C u ~
>`j7 `~ "
c c O 'J ?. a e cd u u 'C U ~u
40J >, u c
u
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
86/87 NWC UNIT IV, Crs 2, T-4A, R-c
Reprinted from SECRECY AND DEMOCRACY by Stansfield Turner. pp. 113-127, 237-
251. Copyright ? 1985 by Stansfield Turner. Reprinted by permission of
Houghton Mifflin Company for use in the courses of the National Defense
University.
Analysis:
What It All Means
THE ANALYTIC BRANCH of the CIA is given to tweedy, pipe-
smoking intellectuals who work much as if they were doing re-
search back in the universities whence many of them came. It
probably has more Ph.D.'s than any other area of government
and more than many colleges. Their expertise ranges from an-
thropology to zoology. Yet, for all that, they can be wrong.
On November i 1, 1978, an envelope came to CIA Headquar-
ters in Langley from the White House with instructions that it be
opened by me personally. I found in it. a short, handwritten note
from President Carter:
To Cy, Zbig, Stan: I am not satisfied with the quality of our politi-
cal intelligence. Assess our assets and as soon as possible give me a
report concerning .our abilities in the most important areas of the
world. Make a joint recommendation on what we should do to im-
prove your ability to give me political information and advice. J.C.
Although this was addressed to the Secretary of State and the
President's National Security Adviser, as well as myself, it was
obviously an implied complaint to me about our intelligence-re-
porting on Iran.
The President's note was a hard blow. Just a week earlier, in a
private conversation, he had told me that I was doing a fine job
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
.r ? .r w ?r
u.c 3 a" y"
?~?~,~E3 y 3 ??~ us ? c o'Cpp
A 1.01
? V Lpo 'G A C V 0 4? C S C C V r t0
~c to C SO O C CS ?'
rA S C % O 00 O C w u
00 Qr O '" o .L' Z3
Q u c O y 8 'C c C 'O vOi (~ 3 C A 8 3 .~. .+C t
2
Lc cz C Z .2 8 < O O c E V E to ~. c 3 2 C .~ V 3
.. f'. C ~3 ~C O 3 _O O =j V V t~ A 0 a V V .- C_ C C V Z
i
? C is ~ _fe 10
T e 3u ? 3 ` ~y
~ ?~rn~3 c ~~.. b,? E "
Ess" ~ L c ? v E C c ~' u~ ~ ~,= u u~ u
asv~"s.~ e E c 8 ? c " II 'o, u '- o -v 0? L i? ,e 8? ax 8 s s
aw E ~' y? 'v E-i?v v_ a .. ~ g ? u_ u E E C s-" -PV
0
fl u??"~c he ?-o E3~:?'se?e~ ~e
m =?-~E Ea~ew'o?o~E~ u>?s? ?'eg~ o
-03 c=~o~?co~? w uu =Quue ~-oa_~0a~'+'o,ee`~uE
os'~ ~~. 9 2 c u'? `-'L e c -~ 3 ?c? a 3,E Es :.?a o E u 3 E c
V; V 8 -u E _'
.21 - o ?~ 8 u s ;, V u w ?v ?~ C y V 9 'C 'fl v~ V
44 -M N I :. w .}?l u E s ~? -w 2.0 v_ s S2 - ~?' E = ~a w c 'mu 00 8 3~ l~ =
C ?~ ~1 ~, ? y r L A ?rI u O E f/J ? ? O
~?~ =3 mg m 3 u uw ~.t o 8 u c u u~ 3 ?v`~ y ~s 8. 0 s a 3
2 9 ? ~s ht s?vs h ? 9 w co Es 3 c `- o~?
,o u ,y c C u oo , .c 0s to a "~ ? c ??? a a.E
u S V ; V u e0 C r, E A u u O u ~+ ? C 7 to S
C
'~ ms's 3t3 3t e o x v v e 3 s
`o as 8 8 y~?? 3 0 > a.~ oo ~.
8 p -v ?v -o
N~` s A t' s w ~? C V' y `+ o
v R?vCs.E 8s:ycV ~s3 os O3
0~ ~3 =s ;~0s~ u 3
?m
F
3 w T A 8 O O .~ A C
to m w .C S
EhB~a3a.y~a- Ems,,. 0
60 t; E
.-u lu Eli c~ c a..cs,v-8.C?~ o~~ E
t0 p ,? ?C '~' u ~" d. C u
-am 0
s ~?" y C?
a? V u G C s
L
i
=
3uu u
a
'
.~
a
~
R
c~m_...
e~
c
0 wya
EC~'a'co" ~0i'E-z cs
.C -0
w 3
E 3 h Z V= V I r V >. 3 ?~ V .` r ? .r 0 0 C ~'.
s?- i?~,``a ?- >,a.~ `u o auNS.y. u o ?; d do"o
,~ , V. C l~wQ >"fl C .0 V S V C C E. C `. ?.I C Z " V O
[ice; 3 u
T7 S ? C 'Yl u ? '.3 ?. '~ ?1~ w lCA Z' .~' w l1 .~ B. a 1-4.9
'C?CLCN? 3CC 4C 3 3xr'C 'CC aV. E ?:+ rr r /0~ 7 w;'+ e0U
E
eou ~ ~- u
c w E ~a ~e
~i ed e'O A
w E
u
o. [ e0e
Q u 0Er. C
.0
y
V ?
E c
.~ t t
? us
C.2 A
i
11
V V t y
3a~o3~ ~Z
ss 0~
!
uZ
u ; P_a
C~ u Z N q
Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
 Approved For Release 2011/08/10: CIA-RDP89GO072OR000600760002-0
S n, S? h C V Oo di y> c A 0 a `03 y_ c t" O O 'C ~,+ ? t' V X C
8 c V A 7 _u V L c V p '~ l~dq E y '~ V O T>. G~ fu E 7
'fly ? s _ 4...{Y7~.v? ,.
s ?.~?vcc o'SB~?~3'So
0 ~$ 04. as c a }ur 2:, U a u top. u '8 a to is
!~'' = .Vr V .c ?- 7 ?' c t y .C v V E O " V ?r 'd ,~
> ;,? ~~ 8 ? ~'v ~s e 3 ?v' E o~ c.~ ?'
~~- E e E ~a?E ~?= = L 0,-.
; ? o ...o ~?_ $?c 5, y `uy?
V O E 'O
~? O'E $_u' c G
V ,~ .~ .. C ?~ ; t.75 . 'c
60C t4tl'A V ?7 CO c'C='= 5-2 '~ c h v r 3 > >,.C A
o o g.C 3., .C ?u `" ~o A E eo?~ tGii b' u
o.cr _ ~ay,ci o?z" o u a.o~ o-i o~?*, c 3 c E M 3
o
$I1.11t:.c
e`. C O .+ 3 2 V w O
Y o ee~'~ E E~ uur w E
;:cJS 3 o u t0 yCsg< o u~ ..
V
u ~' e e L? c e w ~sUs 33 e
C ey 5 as -or.
0
a C O 5 '~ .5 00~ v >` c C C V ? 7 7 '~ ` ~~ ?== G p
Ten?-se-8,.
> ? >:eL?$Z}.,.,_..E?
5'c a Q ~? ~'c a:.~.` ? ?c v c '$ . = n'~+u o ?
C u C > C rs ? t Z Vs?u o .. 'O .C as O Os c.0w
O ?~, ~. c > ~
c /-
.. O (tl "' .Z Q O ?r. R .C V l0 /~ Op
ii Yl N r/ `.._ F".
?8
00 V 1-0 l0 o F.. :6 2 A 8 c sit to
.2 0
s3oE L Ea-~?Eoosaa 8 A& oc..EE E
?.cuEe~.?~LLc.e
u""o_s .33.0
G 'LO' V a V O
? uU
M.Aw Qs C V c
euo= ~t c c
y
8:5 5&V;L
.5s W0 c &u u u E o
ca.' $c-0' 3s c
csa>'teoa-?
31 E
.a Eucu?-atu
os?c
.oa;o.cc;cpyy,a
C
s
aO.8i1$;v.2
r a -C .8 A,
a0 =c tou u'
3 3
A 7 .9 .~ ~ q c~ Oo "V V eoEsv
9 i
c_ai? -- .
V
"
_ L.
l0 2 V 1?.
14 =
c ~' r ~.+ X ld
0 o -
.o
S e czvl
.._ ?
R A
...,E c
o ?~ u < c v.
u~~ csUy?8
-v - eo c
o
41t D 'vi V s
_ E >.V aA
to 8 E
V
.2.08
.sL=
u u s Cac?~ -C v oC
iae~~a
to 0
F ov u~ cQ .. L?~ o