VISIT TO FEMA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 127
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 9, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 10, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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STAT
Next 2 Page(s) In Document Denied
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EMERGENCY OPERATIONS
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ORGANIZATION
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
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F,ENIA Civil Security Functions and Information R~gtrirA&WOts
March 1983
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FEMA Civil Security Functions and Information Requirements
March 1983
This document was prepared by the MITRE Corporation for the
Federal Emergency Management Agency, Civil Security Division
under contract EMW-C-1035.
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Page
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
LIST OF TABLES
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
iv
v
vii
1.
INTRODUCTION
1-1
1.1 Purpose and Objectives
1-1
1.2 Scope
1-2
1.3 Approach
1-3
1.4 Report organization
1-3
2.1 Background
2-1
2.2 FEMA Civil Security Roles and Responsibilities
2-4
2.3 Civil Security Information Management as a
Microcosm
2-6
3.
ANALYSIS OF FEMA CIVIL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
3-1
3.1
Functional Overview
3-1
3.2
Pre-Event Preparedness Functions
3-4
3.3
Trans-Event Response Functions
3-15
3.4
Post-Event Recovery Functions
3-20
4.
INFORMATION REQUIRED TO SUPPORT FEMA CIVIL SECURITY
FUNCTIONS
4-1
4.1
Classes of Information Requirements
4-1
4.2
Pre-Event Information Needs
4-1
4.3
Trans-Event Information Needs
4-17
4.4
Post-Event Information Needs
4-21
5..
INFORMATION PARAMETERS AND CONSTRAINTS
5-1
5.1
Attributes of Civil Security Information
Requirements
5-1
5.2
Pre-Event Phase
5-4
5.3
Trans-Event Phase
5-23
5.4
Post-Event Phase
5-38
APPENDIX A - GLOSSARY
A-1
iii
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Figure Number
Page
2.1
CIVIL SECURITY SEGMENT OF FEMA
INFORMATION SUPPORT MECHANISM
2-7
2.2
NATIONAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS OF CIVIL
SECURITY CONCERN
2-9
3.1
FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT OF FENA CIVIL SECURITY
MISSION
3-2
3.2
PRE-EVENT PREPAREDNESS FUNCTION
3-5
3.3
TRANS-EVENT RESPONSE FUNCTIONS
3-16
3.4
POST-EVENT RECOVERY FUNCTIONS
3-21
4.1
MAJOR CLASSES OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
4-2
4.2
FEDERAL RESPONSIBILITIES FOR NATIONAL
RESOURCE SYSTEMS
4-4
4.3
CATEGORIES OF EXTERNAL THREAT ASSESSMENT
DATA REQUIRED BY CIVIL SECURITY
4-6
4.4
INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS FOR CONDUCTING
RISK ANALYSES OF NATIONAL RESOURCE
SYSTEMS
4.5
RISK ANALYSIS INFORMATION MODEL, WITH
EXAMPLE
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Table Number
Page
P.1
TASKING THE PROVIDERS OF THREAT ASSESSMENTS
5-5
P.2
SYNTHESIS OF AVAILABLE THREAT ASSESSMENT
PRODUCTS
5-6
P.3
RISK ANALYSIS
5-8
P.4
POLICY DEVELOPMENT
5-9
P.5
PLANNING GUIDANCE
5-11
P.6
PLANS REVIEW AND EVALUATION
5-12
P.7
PROGRAM COORDINATION
5-14
P.8
INITIATE PROPOSED NSC/LEGISLATIVE ACTION,
AS WARRANTED
5-16
P.9
ADVISORY ASSISTANCE
5-18
P.10
LIAISON WITH CIVIL SECURITY COMMUNITY
(FEDERAL AGENCIES/STATE/PRIVATE SECTOR)
5-19
P.11
REPRESENT FEMA ON INTERAGENCY CS COMMITTEES/
GROUPS/TASK FORCES
5-21
P.12
TRAINING/TEST/EXERCISE/GAMING SUPPORT
(CS-RELATED ASPECTS)
5-22
P.13
PERIODIC STRATEGIC NET APPRAISALS OF CIVIL
SECURITY
5-24
T.1
VERIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE
5-26
T.2
WARNING/ALERTING NOTIFICATION
5-28
T.3
DECISION SUPPORT
5-29
T.4
DECISION IMPLEMENTATION ACTION
5-32
T.5
INTERIM COORDINATION OF IMMEDIATE
EMERGENCY ACTIONS
5-33
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LIST OF TABLES
(Concluded)
Table Number
Page
T.6
INITIATE EXECUTION PLANNING/ASSET
MOBILIZATION/READINESS FOR RECOVERY
5-35
T.7
CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS UPDATE
5-36
T.8
BAND-OFF/TRANSITION TO FEMA RESPONSE
MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS
5-37
R.1
ASSIST FEMA EICC/OEO AND STAFF ELEMENTS
5-39
R.2
ASSESS CONTINUING FOLLOW-ON CS THREAT
5-41
R.3
MONITOR RECOVERY PdASE ACTIVITIES/PROGRESS
5-42
R.4
DEVELOP AFTER-ACTION LESSONS LEARNED
5-43
R.5
REAPPRAISE/ADJUST POLICY, PLANS, PROGRAMS
5-45
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is the focal
point within the federal government for dealing with a wide
spectrum of emergencies affecting the United States in peace
and war. It has a central role in both domestic and national
security emergencies ranging from natural and technological
disasters through nuclear attack. One of its mission areas
falling midway on the emergency spectrum is civil security.
The organizational element of FEMA principally involved is the
Civil Security Division of the Office of Mobilization Prepared-
ness under the'National Preparedness Programs Directorate. A
growing awareness of the functional dimensions and operational
complexity of the mission made it increasingly apparent that
existing information handling arrangements were inadequate, and
that significant improvements were necessary if all of the
diverse responsibilities of civil security were to be ful-
filled. Accordingly, as part of a larger task to assist FEMA
in developing an overall National Emergency Management System
(NEMS), The MITRE Corporation was requested to give priority
attention to a component sub-system of NEMS that would provide
data and information management support expressly for civil
security. The present report documents the results of this
initial effort.
Purpose and Approach
The basic task objective is to identify and define the informa-
tion requirements of the FEMA civil security mission. In order
to reach that objective, specific answers are sought for the
following questions:
o What are FEMA's responsibilities with respect to
civil security?
o What functions are performed to discharge those
responsibilities?
o What information is required to support each of the
functions?
o What are the associated parameters and constraints of
the needed information?
The analytically derived findings that answer these questions
in detail are contained in the body of the report. Salient
highlights are summarized below.
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FEMA Civil Security Responsibilities
The scope of FEMA s civil security mission is broad. It covers
a variety of measures to reduce the risks and potential con-
sequences of disruption caused by deliberate acts of terrorism,
civil disorder, sabotage, and subversion. This includes
responsibilities for mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery - and the coordination of related activities among
other federal agencies, the States and local governments, and
numerous private sector organizations. The mission is cast in
a comprehensive time frame: pre-event, trans-event, and
post-event. And it is concerned with the entire span of vital
national resource systems, such as, electric power, telecom-
munications, transportation, food and water, governance, and
public health..
FEMA Civil Security Functions
MA's civil security functions can be divided into three broad
time phases: (1) pre-event preparedness; (2) trans-event
response; and (3) post-event recovery. A total of 26 essential
functions has been identified throughout all three periods. By
far the largest number, amounting to 13, is found in the
pre-event preparedness phase. These are on-going functions
performed on a continuing oasis under normal conditions. They
include all those activities of a prudential nature undertaken
in anticipation of any civil security incident prior to its
occurrence. They are projected toward the future, with tae aim
of enhancing prevention, mitigation, preparations for, response
to, and recovery from such incidents should they materialize.
These pre-event functions mainly address: threats and risks;
policy, plans, and programs; coordination and liaison; legisla-
tive and interagency matters; and training and exercises.
Trans-event response functions focus on the actual emergency at
hand, and are therefore largely extempore, unique to a par-
ticular event, and of relatively short duration. Depending on
scenario circumstances, most are temporary, and some might be
concurrent, truncated, or omitted entirely. Direct participa-
tion by civil security staff personnel may be brief, confined
only to the early stage until the FEri& response management
principals can take over. Among the eight functions identified
for this time phase, the major ones are: warning notification;
providing various forms of decision support, including monitor-
ing and assessment; decision implementation and interim opera-
tional coordination; plus initiating execution planning,
mobilization, and readiness for recovery.
The fewest number of civil security functions occur in the
post-event recovery phase. They are oriented to ancillary
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support of those FEIMA elements having primary responsibility
for recovery management. Of the five functions identified, the
most notable are: staff expertise and advice on residual
threats and risks; special liaison regarding civil security;
and drawing lessons learned from the emergency experience.
Information Requirements to Support Civil Security Functions
The foregoing civil security functions were then subjected to
further analysis to determine the kind and extent of informa-
tion required in order to perform tnem. The results of this
analysis reveal that a total of approximately 145 major cate-
gories of information is needed for all of the functions: some
83 types are essential for the pre-event preparedness func-
tions; 40 types during the trans-event phase; and 21 in the
post-event recovery phase. Most of these information require-
ments, moreover, are cast in generic terms, each category
embracing a considerable breadth and depth of substantive
content. Much of tnat information, by its nature, has to be
obtained piecemeal or in increments from many different
sources, and then must be aggregated syncretically before it
can be utilized. Clearly, the volume and variety of informa-
tion demands posed by the civil security functions imply a
correspondingly sizeable and complex systems capability to
acquire, process, and exchange the large quantities of data
involved.
Information Parameters and Constraints
Finally, the functional information needs were examined at the
next level of detail and characterized in operational terms.
Each requirement item was analyzed according to the following
attributes: source, security classification, frequency,
accessibility, and application. It was founa in the majority
of instances that multiple sources must furnish the informa-
tion; sometimes ten or more contributing agencies are
involved. Security classification, even within a given infor-
mation category, tends to run the gamut from unclassified
through top secret, and often beyond into the compartmented
levels. Frequency of need for information, and of its updat-
ing, ranges from hourly or daily to quarterly and annually,
with many of the entries indeterminate because of scenario
dependency.
In general, those requirements pertaining to pre-event func-
tions permit a more structured flow of information. There is
usually less urgency and longer intervals between updates.
During an actual civil security incident, however, the informa-
tion processes are likely to change dramatically. In such a
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trans-event phase, the need and currency are dictated by situa-
tional imperatives that are inherently unpredictable -- varying
with the nature, scale, and pace of the emergency as it
unfolds. For certain types of information, the desired fre-
quency, on both counts, then approaches real time. In the
post-event recovery phase, the time-sensitivity of some infor-
maton, though diminished, nevertheless remains relatively
acute. Here again, frequency depends on the circumstances
surrounding the recovery situation itself.
FEMA's access to the different types of information may be
routine, limited, or on an ad hoc basis, that is, only case by
case upon request. Overwhelmingly, throughout all three
phases, accessibility of most categories should be routine,
while roughly a fifth would be limited in one way or another,
and about 10 per cent ad hoc. The last parameter was the
application of the required information when received, defined
in terms of whether it is used by and within FE4A or becomes
part of an output product. Some of the information types fall
into both classes. For all functions and information require
meats, the ratio between internal and output applications is
found to be on the order of three to one. These output pro-
ducts, however, are disproportionately critical, for they
embody and articulate FEi4A's civil security management role in
practice.
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1. INTRODUCTION
At the time of its establishment, in 1979, the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA) was assigned responsibility for
an "all hazards" approach to disaster mitigation, preparedness,
response, and recovery in the United States. In carrying out
this mandate, the Agency tries to provide the vital ingredients
for comprehensive emergency management--spanning the full spec-
trum from local disasters to nuclear war and extending through
all levels of government and the private sector.
One of the vital ingredients in comprehensive emergency manage-
ment is the development of information systems designed to sat-
isfy both the mission requirements of FEMA as a whole and those
of its separate components. The basic goal that FEMA has set
for itself is the establishment of a National Emergency Manage-
ment System (NEMS) and its correlative integrated information
systems architecture. In its efforts to achieve this goal, the
FEMA management has requested the assistance of The MITRE Cor-
poration, an organization that has specialized in the develop-
ment and utilization of advanced information systems. As a
part of this larger task, MITRE was asked to concentrate
initial attention on one of FEMA's component missions--the
preparation for and response to major civil security threats
and incidents. The present report records the results of this
initial study.
1.1 Purpose and Objectives
The basic purpose of this study is to review the FEMA civil
security mission requirements and to identify the data and
information needed to fulfill these requirements. More spec-
ifically, the study is aimed at the following four questions:
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o What are FEMA's responsibilities with respect to
civil security?
o What functions are performed to discharge those
responsibilities?
o What information is required to support these civil
security functions?
o What are the associated parameters and constraints of
the information?
The answers to these questions are documented in this report.
Its contents present the substantive findings and recommenda-
tions resulting from the study effort, and the product consti-
tutes the "Requirements Book" called for in the sponsor's
statement of work.
1.2. Scope
The Scope of the FEMA Civil Security Mission is quite broad,
covering efforts to reduce the consequences of major acts of
terrorism, civil disorder, sabotage, and subversion. It
includes actions aimed at mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery--and the coordination of these actions among
Federal, State, and local governments and numerous organiza-
tions in the private sector of society. It deals with these
actions in a comprehensive time frame: pre-event, trans-event,
and post-event. And it is concerned with protection of the
entire range of national resource systems--including all the
lifeline systems (electric power, telecommunications, and
transportation, as well as water, petroleum, natural gas, and
waste disposal pipelines) and food, raw materials, industrial
production, finance, public health, governance, and people
(civil society). These various dimensions are taken into
account in the subsequent analysis of the information func-
tions, needs, and resources essential for the fulfillment of
the FEMA civil security missi o2n.
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1.3 Approach
The key members of the MITRE staff assigned to this project
have had extensive previous contacts with FEMA and its prede-
cessor agencies and have drawn on this background of experience
in formulating and conducting the present analysis. This
previous experience provided basic knowledge of the structure
and functions of FEMA. This basic knowledge was augmented and
refined in a series of interviews with staff members of the
Civil Security Division and other relevant FEMA.components.
These initial fact gathering interviews, in turn, were supple-
mented by reinterviews wherein the "straw man" briefing tech-
nique was utilized to test the applicability, relevance, and
usefulness of the central ideas developed for this study. This
involved. the presentation of the conceptual framework and
central ideas to key FEXA staff members and--based on several
interactive iterations-the progressive refinement and elabora
tion of this conceptual framework and body of ideas. These
data were further supplemented by an extensive and detailed
review of numerous documents pertaining to FEMA as a whole and
to the responsibilities and mission of the Civil Security
Division.
1.4 Report Organization
The subsequent chapters of this report are devoted to a
detailed presentation of the analyses dealing with the FEMA
civil security mission requirements and the corresponding data
and information management needs. Chapter 2 begins the anal-
ysis with a review of the FEMA civil security mission and with
the notation that. this analysis has broad applicability for
other FEMA mission areas. Chapter 3 presents an analysis of
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FEMA civil security functions in relation to pre-event pre-
paredness, trans-event response, and post-event recovery
phases. Chapter 4 details the types of information needed*to
support FM civil security functions during each of these
three time phases. Finally, Chapter 5 deals with various
attributes of the needed information in terms of source, sec-
urity classification, frequency of need and update, access-
iblity, and application.
Beginning in Chapter 3, the reader will note that an internal
coding scheme has been incorporated into the text, figures, and
tables. The contents of this report were reproduced, at the
request of the sponsor, on a Wang word processor Diskette as an
added product of the research effort. The code is based on an
alpha-numeric key designed to facilitate machine access and
retrieval of the substantive findings according to any pre-
selected combination of system features and their related
information properties. A detailed explanation of the key is
presented below.
The first element of the code is a letter designating the
respective time phase, as follows: "P", for Post-event
Preparedness; "T", for Trans-event Response; and "R", for
Post-event Recovery. The next element is an ordinal number
corresponding to one of the discrete civil security functions
performed within a given phase; thus P.5 refers to the fifth
pre-event function. The third character is a letter indicating
the particular information requirement associated with a
specific function; thus T.4.B represents the second information
requirement for the fourth trans-event function. The final
element is a number in parentheses denoting one of the five
parameters relating to a particular functional information
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requirement. An example drawn from the report that illustrates
the full code would be R.2.C.(4), which translates into: R,
the "Post-event Recovery Phase"; 2, the function cited is
"Assess Continuing or Follow-on Threat:, C, the information
requirement specified for that function is "Projected Risk
Analysis Estimates"; and (4) the parameter of the required
information pertains to "Accessibility".
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2. FEMA CIVIL SECURITY MISSION
2.1 Background
Prior to the formation of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency, there was no mechanism for coordinating all civil
security emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assis-
tance fuctions of the Federal Establishment. On August 25,
1977, President Carter authorized a reorganization study of
Federal emergency preparedness and response programs. A
special task force of the President's Reorganization Project
was established to review the then-current status of those
programs and to recommend appro- priate organizational remedies.
One on the principal foci of attention in this task force was
the wave of hijackings, kidnappings, bombings, and assassina-
tions around the globe that seemed to signal an increase in the
frequency and violence of terrorism and other civil disorders.
The final summary report of the President's Task Force on
Federal Emergency Preparedness and Response recommended a com-
prehensive reorganization by consolidating existing agencies
and additional responsibilities into a single, independent
Executive Agency accountable to the President and to Congress
for all Federal mitigation, preparedness, and response activi-
ties. Among the specific recommendations was one dealing with
the Federal response to the consequences of terrorist incidents:
Experts on terrorism charge that Federal organization for
dealing with terrorist incidents is insufficiently compre-
hensive. Specifically, they express concern over the lack
of a focal point for coordination of the Federal response
to meet such potential consequences of terrorist action as
significant resource disruptions and physical damage.
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The Project finds that such a focal point is lacking, and
recommends that responsibility to coordinate vulnerability
analysis and preparedness measures to mitigate the conse-
quences of terrorism should be assigned to the new
agency. (Task Force on Federal Emergency Preparedness and
Response, President's Reorganization Project, Summary
Report. Washington, D.C.: Executive Office of the
President, June 19, 1978.)
The consolidation of existing emergency preparedness and
response agencies into a single new agency called the Federal
Emergency Management Agency was accomplished by Reorganization
Plan No. 3, submitted to the Congress by President Carter on
June 19, 1978. In his transmittal message, the President also
noted that responsibility for the Federal response to the con-
sequences of terrorist incidents--a new function not then
assigned to any specific agency-would subsequently be assigned
to the new Agency. That assignment was made in Executive Order
12148, which charged.FEMA with responsibility for "the coordi-
nation of preparedness and planning to reduce the consequences
of major terrorist incidents". That same Executive order gave
FEMA much broader authority for handling emergencies than
existed in its predecessor agencies. The "all hazards" mission
of FEMA is clearly stated in the following sections of that
Executive Order:
2-101. The Director of FEMA shall establish Federal
policies for, and coordinate, all civil defense and civil
emergency planning, management, mitigation, and assistance
functions of Executive agencies.
2-102. The Director shall periodically review and
evaluate the civil defense and civil emergency functions.
of the Executive. agencies. In order to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of those functions, the
Director shall recommend to the President alternative
methods of providing Federal planning, management,
mitigation, and assistance.
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2-203. For purposes of this Order, "civil emergency"
means any accidental, natural, man-caused, or wartime
emergency or threat thereof, which causes or may cause
substantial injury or harm to the population or substan-
tial damage to or loss of property. (Executive Order
12148, July 20, 1979.)
Additional authority on the subject of civil security was given
to FEMA in two other Executive Orders. Executive Order 10421
provides for the physical security of facilities important to
the national defense to include "security against sabotage,
espionage, and other hostile activity and other destructive
acts and omissions" not attributable to military defense or
combat or to the dispersal and post-attack rehabilitation of
facilities. The Director of FEMA is given broad authority to
prescribe policies and programs governing activities of Federal
agencies; developing and promulgating standards; assigning
facilities to Federal agencies; approving or revising security
ratings established by the Department of Commerce; reviewing
physical security programs of Federal agencies; and keeping the
President informed about the physical security of the facili-
ties and furnishing him with appropriate recommendations.
Executive Order 11490 consolidates the assignment of emergency
preparedness functions to various Federal departments and
agencies. The Director of FEMA is assigned responsibility for
determining national preparedness goals and policies for the
performance of emergency preparedness functions by Federal
departments and agencies and in coordinating their performance
with the total national preparedness program. FEMA also is
directed to provide guidance to Federal departments and
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agencies and to evaluate their emergency planning and prepared-
ness activities.
2.2 FEMA Civil Security Division Roles and Responsibilities
Following the establishment of FEMA, these various authorities
and responsibilities were delegated to the Civil Security Divi-
sion, located in the National Preparedness Programs Direc-
torate's Office of Mobilization Preparedness. The basic mis-
sion of the Civil Security Division is to coordinate the
Federal Government's preparations for and response to civil
security threats and incidents. This includes responsibilities
for transforming national objectives and federal policy into
planning guidance for the Federal. Government's activities aimed
at avoiding or mitigating the consequences of acts of ter-
rorism, civil disorder, sabotage, and subversion. This
involves requesting and receiving threat estimates; evaluating
their impact on civil security programs; coordinating the
production of vulnerability and consequence estimates for the
various threats; reviewing and coordinating the civil security
planning development of the executive agencies; and performing
periodic appraisals of the government's civil security readi-
ness posture.
The major generic functions of the Civil Security Division-
officially recognized by FEMA--include the following:
o Conceptualizes and develops policy options for the
Director of FEMA on the activities required to avoid
*For other, more basic, authority on the civil security mission,
see Pompan and Murray, A Practice Guide to the Legal Authorities
for Reducing Widescale Consequences of Incidents Caused by
Deliberate Manmade Acts, Washington, D.C. 1983.
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or mitigate consequences resulting from acts of
terrorism, civil disorder, sabotage, and subversion.
o Prepares and promulgates Federal planning guidance to
implement the approved policy.
o Reviews existing authorities for civil security
programs and recommends changes or new authorities,
as appropriate.
o Develops civil security programs and reviews Federal,
State, and local government and private sector plans
to avoid or mitigate the consequences of civil
security incidents.
o Coordinates the development of vulnerability and
consequence estimates for each of the national
resource systems (energy, transportation, food,
etc.). Ensures that appropriate threat information
is received and acted upon by other responsibile
agencies.
o Funds research relating to the mission and functions
of the Civil Security Division. Develops procedures
to ensure the exchange of civil security information
between scientific and technical groups and Federal,
State, and local agencies.
o Recommends procedures for reviewing, evaluating, and
improving the Federal Government's civil security
preparedness. Prepares reports on the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Federal civil security program
for inclusion in the Director's annual report to the
President.
o Develops the "lessons learned" from incidents and
exercises, and coordinates recommendations for
necessary changes in policies and programs.
o In coordination with the Information Resources
.Management Office,'develops a management information
system that will effectively support civil security
objectives.
o Represents the Federal Emergency Management Agency in
meetings where civil security issues are discussed.
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o Participates with other FEMA components and other
Federal agencies in the design and conduct of
exercises to test emergency procedures and plans for
dealing with civil security incidents.
o Develops coordination procedures between Federal,
State, and local governments and the private sector
for the exchange of civil security information.
2.3 Civil Security Information Management as a Microcosm
These and other specific functions of the Civil Security
Division are subjected to detailed analysis in the following
chapter. Before turning to that analysis, however, it should
be noted that the civil security functions of FEMA comprise
only one segment of the total FEMA information management
system. The analysis that follows focuses attention exclu-
sively on the civil security domain but should be viewed in a
wider context of the information support mechanism needed for
the conduct of all FEMA emergency management activities.
Figure 2.1 depicts the overall National Emergency Management
System (HEMS) and the civil security mission within that sys-
tem. The civil security domain comprises only one segment of
the larger NEMS. Despite certain unique features, it can serve
as a microcosm of similar information management requirements
characterizing other FEMA mission areas. As a microcosm of the
larger system, civil security shares the following characteris-
tics with most of the other mission areas:
o The actors involved in emergency mitigation, pre-
paredness, response, and recovery plans, programs,
and operations are numerous and diverse. As shown in
Figure 2.1, they include the President and the White
House Staff, other Federal Agencies, the FEMA
regions,. the States and local jurisdictions, and many
agencies in the private sector.
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o The audiences with whom FEMA must communicate in
carrying out its missions are similarly numerous and
diverse, both in terms of input and output
information.
o The types of information required pertain to func-
tions in all emergency time phases-pre-event miti-
gation and preparedness; trans-event response; and
post-event recovery.
o All activities must be closely coordinated internally
and externally--with both governmental and nongovern-
mental agencies.
o Persons responsible for carrying out mission respon-
sibilities must be prepared to act in both a routine
and in an emergency or crisis mode. The sudden shift
from routine planning activities to emergency opera-
tions places a premium on organizational adaptiveness
and flexibility.
o Risk assessments and vulnerability and consequence
analyses are essential in structuring mission activi-
ties and in determining key informational
requirements.
o The national resource systems of civil security.
concern (see Figure 2.2) are also of concern to all
other mission areas. They cover the gamut of ele-
ments essential for societal survival and continuity
and thus require continuing attention and protection.
o Education and training programs, the conduct of tests
and exercises, and the continuing critical evaluation
of actual emergency operations are essential for
achieving the requisite coordination of effort among
relevant agencies and for developing an enhanced
state of readiness.
In the light of these similarities, the subsequent detailed
analysis of the information needed for handling civil security
functions can be viewed as a prototype for studying other FEMA
mission areas and for developing the overall architecture of
the FEMA National Emergency Management System.
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3. ANALYSIS OF FEMA CIVIL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
Inherent in the broad scope of the civil security mission is a
wide variety of roles played by FEMA. Most of these roles are
of complex dimensions, some with many ramifications. The fol-
lowing analysis, identifying the different kinds of component
activities that must be carried out, reveals the range of dis-
crete functions essential to accomplishing one or another
aspect of the overall mission. Not every function, by any
means, is actually executed by the Civil Security Division
alone. Many are performed by or with substantial assistance
from other FEMA staff elements, or by other Federal agencies or
even the States and local jurisdictions. The role of the Civil
Security Division is one of initiation, coordination, over-
sight, and general orchestration, to ensure that all of the
functions are in fact fulfilled.
3.1 Functional Overview
A salient feature of the civil security mission is the sheer
number of functions involved. Depicted schematically in Figure
3.1 is a macro-view showing the total functional universe of
FEMA civil security. It is intended to be comprehensive and
embraces the full spectrum of major functions to be performed
throughout the successive stages of the entire management
process relating to the,civil security mission area.
The functions displayed are arranged in successive groups from
left to right along the horizontal axis according to three time
frames. Those appearing in the first, or pre-event prepared-
ness phase, are generic functions performed on a continuing
basis under conditions of normalcy. They are of a contingency
nature and include all conceivable preparatory measures that
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EXTERNAL. I1111TS
FNOIt OUISIOE FEMA
1- - - - - -
TeuaT Asusushut
,ESTIMATIVE "POSTS
I TWO INT111I$INCE
COMMON/TV. AID
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P.2 STuuUSIs use CS-uuui TMatAT
ASSESSMENT
P.3 RISS Alatvsis
P.4 Potlcs DEVEterius is CS
P.6 Pta111Ne 6eloaec1
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IPuuauiwllcaciuillscovtss )
P.7 PaNNsM CMpIUTIM IPoolieluoNl
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P.S INITIATE PROMSte NSCIUsIS&ATIVE
ACTION. AS WNNAIIIN
P.S MVIMRV ASSISTANCE
P.10 EIa1664 Milo FtiE AL AuiIEs.
S1AT[t 11NOVS110
P.11 Ruustu FEMA ON IMlteaeuicv
CS CMMIllus/6MiPsS1asr foects
P.12 IRA/11MITss;SIEuuaciu/16AM11o
(CS ASPECTS 1111)
P.13 PEslalc STSaltelc NET
APPuAI$ats of STATE of CS
'vial'
U1_JI *IIS-E T NESPOYSE
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1.1 VEUf ICAT1o1
1.2 NASMINOIAttUTINS NOTIfiC*TIM
1.3 Dsclsisa SurrosT (SiTYATION.
IwiIcAl1ON$. OPTIONS SIC.)
1.4 Dtcisio1 INPtlNIa1ATIM
T.6 INVEST* MANASEUMT COORDINATION
- ENgUEMCV RESPONSE ACTIONS
T.6 INITIAU PIAMINOIAsuT
IlosutIlATION Fee Rtcovuas
1.7 CMs.sssloN*L AMD Poetic AFF1les
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11.5 81APPsAISEIA83esl POLICT. PLANS.
Psiaaas
FUNCTIONAL CONCEPT FEMA CIVIL SECURITY MISSION
(Emergencies Resulting from Terrorism, Civil Disorder, Sabotage, Subversion)
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might be taken in anticipation of any civil security incident
prior to its occurrence. Those grouped in the second time
frame, the trans-event response phase, are the ad hoc
emergency-specific functions performed in real time when such
an incident actually happens. Triggered by the event itself,
they are acute, usually compressed in time, and, depending on
scenario circumstances then prevailing, may be of relatively
short duration before giving way and melding into the functions
of the next phase. This last set, associated with the
post-event time frame, marks an indefinite period. It repre-
sents those ancillary civil security functions attending the
restoration and clean-up operations to recover from the conse-
quences of an incident. The basic dynamics of this three-stage
process can be viewed as a single grand cycle closing upon
itself, one where the last function links again with the very
first.
Within each time frame, the functions are also arrayed
generally in descending order along the vertical axis. The
sequence, however, reflects logical relationships as much as
chronology. There is considerable overlap among them. Some of
the functions are performed concurrently, while many others
generate feedback affecting preceding ones. Together they form
a coherent continuum that unfolds more or less incrementally as
shown. This, however, may not always be the case. Under some
conditions, the sequence of functions may be compressed, trun-
cated, or inverted. Discussion of the individual functions
themselves will be deferred to subsequent sections immediately
following. There, each function is described in detail for all
three time phases in turn.
As shown in Figure 3.1, there is an obvious time-skewed pattern
to the functional distribution. Overwhelmingly the greatest
number of functions take place during the first, or pre-event
? 3-3 _
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preparedness phase. The number diminishes markedly in the
second, or trans-event phase. By far the least are found in
the final, or post-event phase. The explanation for the
decrease is that once such an emergency has materialized there
are few civil security-unique functions remaining. On a
majority of occasions the response and recovery demands con-
fronting FEMA are likely to be little different from those
posed by similar disruptions irrespective of cause. The conse-
quences of a critical bridge collapsing, for example, are
fundamentally the same whether the result of terrorist demoli-
tion, natural disaster, or accident. Most management func-
tions, therefore, would devolve upon appropriate elements of
FEMA normally responsible for recovery activities in the after-
math of any emergency situation. Civil security considerations
then become peripheral compared to the main task of recovery
itself.
3.2 Pre-event Preparedness Functions (P)
The pre-event phase is a continuous on-going process that
includes all of FEMA's management activities addressed to
future civil security contingencies. The object is to enhance
prevention, mitigation, preparation for, response to, and
recovery from such incidents before they occur. Figure 3.2
identifies the specific types of functions involved. Each is
described in further detail in the sections below.
3.2.1 Tasking the Providers of Threat Assessments (P.1)
The process begins with threat. FEMA is not in the intelli-
gence business, but is a user of finished threat assessment
products obtained elsewhere. It relies on external inputs from
the intelligence community and other sources to acquire the
needed assessments, as well as updates and amplification. For
3-4
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EXTERNAL DIPM
FROM OuTsIDE FEMA
INTtILIStNCt TNREAT
L AtG[NNNtNT PROOSCTS -~
? TNREAT Ys TARscTS/ATTACE TYPEIVULNERASIIITY/POTENTIAL
CONSESUENCts
- DISiCNINATION. As APPROPRIATE
US GOVERNMENT NATIONAL OuccTlrtsIINTERtsts
I PLANS INFORMATION FRO1 I
I FEDERAL AstiC299. STATSS.I
I INDUSTRY I
I FEDERAL AGENCits. STATES.
(P) PRE-EVENT PREPAREDNESS
(CONTIN000R ON-GOING FUNCTIONS)
P.1 TASKING OF THREAT INFORMATION PROVIDERS (EEI)
P.2 STNTNtsIS OF AVAILASLE THREAT ASSESSMENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS
P.3 RISK ANALYSIS
P.11 POLICY DtrtloPN[NT It CS
(GOALS. RES-ouszSZLMIS. ROLES. ANTNORITY)
P.S PLANNINi GUIDANCE
(CoictPTS. DOCTRINE. STANDARDS)
P.G PLANS REVIEW AND EVALUATION (PREVENTION. REACTION. RECOVERY)
- Ellsttset. COMPLIANCE WITH GuIDAStt. ADEQUACY/
INPLENINTANILITY
- CONFLICT RESOLUTION
P.7 PROGRAM COORDINATION
- PHYSICAL SECURITY (PRtvENTIouIPROTECTIoMISAKiuAROs)
- HAZARD REDUCTION U.S.. CONCtAI4ENT. HAsotMINS)
? DAMAGE LISITATIONIEFFECTS MITIGATION U.S.. CONTAINMENT.
REDUNDANCY)
- RESPONSE
- DIRECTION AND CONTROL MECHANISM
- PROetDNREs
P.9 ADVISORY ASSISTANCE
? TECHNICAL THREAT DEVELOPMENTS (E.G.. NEW EXPLOSIVE DEVICES)
SECURITY TECHNOLOSY DEVELOPMENTS U.S.. NEW PENETRATIOM
SENSORS)
P.10 LIAISON WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES/STATES/TNDUSTRY RE CS MATTEPV
P.11 REPRESENT FEMA ON INTERAGENCY CS COMMITTEES/GROUPS/TAGS FORCES
P.12 TRAINING/TESTS/EXERCISESIGANINI (CS ASPECTS ONLY)
P.13 PERIODIC STRATtlIC NET APPRAISALS OF CS
- THREAT LEVELICLIMATE/TRENDS
- CS CAPASILITIES/POSTUREIREAOINtS$
FIGURE 3.2
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civil security purposes, the tfireat information derived from
sources outside FEMA may be regarded as strategic intelli-
gence. It serves as the premises.on which most of the
pre-event functions are predicated.
The first function (P.1), accordingly, is the tasking by FEMA
of those organizations that are in a position to supply threat
assessment information. This presumes that prearranged autho-
rity to do so exists. The tasking may be in the form of
requests for formal estimative products analagous to a National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), but dealing with civil security
threats, or to a Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE)
focusing on a particular aspect of a given threat. In addi-
tion, FEMA might also levy standing requirements cast in a form
similar to Essential Elements of Information (EEL) to guide
those who acquire threat information. Provisions must also be
made for periodic, spot, and by-exception reporting of signi-
ficant new items bearing on the threats as they develop.
3.2.2 Synthesis of Available Threat Assessment Products (P.2)
The second function is one of aggregation, collation, and
integration of the threat assessment information coming from
multiple external sources. It has to be organized and inter-
preted into a master current assessment expressly tailored to
the needs and interests of civil security. For a full appre-
ciation of the threat, common patterns must be recognized,
trends inferred, and forecasts extrapolated. These second
order implications are the driving factors that determine how
and where the threat intelligence should be exploited to
enhance national civil security. They motivate and shape all
aspects of preparedness.
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3.2.3 Risk Analysis (P.3)
Based on the threat assessments, the next function is to
analyze what they mean insofar as risks posed for national
resource systems. All that is known about a given threat has
to be matched against the resource systems that it might
disrupt. Then, each such combination of threat vs. system must
be examined in terms of:
o Types of targets likely to be struck
o Probable attack mode employed
o Vulnerability and susceptibility of those targets to
such attack
o Potential consequences expected or possible if the
postulated threat action succeeds.
Each of the above dimensions of risk analysis constitute major
subfunctions in their own right. Many of them, however, would
be performed in large part by others in coordination with the
FEMA Civil Security Division.
3.2.4 Policy Development for Civil Security (P.4)
One of the most important functions is formulating national
policy with respect to civil security matters. Since the civil
security community is so large and pervasive, with many dif-
ferent participating agencies, echelons of jurisdiction, and
private sector organizations involved, there is need for a
coherent and comprehensive body of U.S. Government policy
establishing common national aims and priorities. A concomi-
tant of setting policy goals is allocating roles, missions, and
authority governing who is assigned which tasks and objectives,
along with defining the responsibilities and prerogatives
attendant thereto. The function of FEMA in this regard is to
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help initiate, develop, and coordinate such national civil
security policy, and once adopted, to promulgate and implement
it. The function applies equally to amendment or amplification
to existing policy.
3.2.5 Planning Guidance (P-5)
This function is essentially the issuance of strategic direc-
tion and terms of reference for the development of civil secu-
rity plans or annexes to plans. Central management at the
national level is necessary to ensure that the resulting family
of plans is compatible and the plans reinforce one another.
The guidance stems largely from the preceding policy function.
Depending on the agency concerned, the plans to be drawn can
pertain to any phase or aspect of civil security operations,
from prevention and mitigation, through preparedness, to
response and recovery. FEMA, besides levying the requirements
for such planning, provides the concepts and premises on which
it will be based, outlines the doctrinal principles its sub-
stance should reflect, and establishes criteria and standards
to be met. Other instructions may also be given, such as
identifying critical areas where planning coordination is
needed between agencies.
3.2.6 Plans Review and Evaluation (P.6)
Effective preparedness requires quality assurance of civil
security plans. A mosaic of separate yet interrelated plans
must be produced by the various Federal departments and
agencies, by the States and localities, and by private sector
organizations. They would differ in content, purview, and
application. An important FEMA function, therefore, is to see
to it that, individually and collectively,these plans take into
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account and adequately provide for every contingency need
oeariag upon civil security.
The first step is determining wnetner required plans exist, and
if so, their status. They must then be reviewed for compliance
with current policy and FEMA guidelines, and be evaluated from
the viewpoints of completeness, currency, appropriateness, and
feasibility. Missing plans must be'developed, and any gaps,
problems, or conflicts within or between plans must be recon-
ciled. The function is essential to a sound planning struc-
ture, national in scope and accommodating all civil security
requirements waatever the action level or scenario circumstance.
The large number of plans involved will undoubtedly require the
delegation of a portion of this function. such delegated
review and evaluation, as well as the major planning products
that result, would oe subject to oversight by FEMA.
3.2.7 Program Coordination (P.7)
The program coordination function is multidimensional and
complex. It may be regarded as a set of parallel but sepa-
rately performed functions. There is virtually an unlimited
number and variety of potential programs, or distinct program
increments, to contend with, though not all are being actively
pursued at present. They can range the gamut of preparatory
measures directed toward reducing vulnerability, improving
response capability, or lessening the disruptive consequences
when an incident occurs. Characteristically, many participants
are involved in implementing them. The national focal point
for coordinating and managing all such programs is FEMA.
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Physical Security is a broad program area containing several
major components. It embraces prevention, protection, and
safeguards against disruptive acts. The measures and means are
designed to deter or preclude successful attack, or to counter
and defeat it if attempted. Illustrative examples, either
currently underway or. projected, are:
o Emplacement of barriers and perimeter fences
o Surveillance devices and alarms
o Patrols
o Tactical teams to eliminate or neutralize threats
A complementary program area is hazard reduction, such as con-
cealment or hardening of sensitive facilities and critical sys-
tem elements. An example might be to put emergency operations
centers underground, or to install failsafe equipment, such as
automatic sprinklers wherever flammable or volatile substances
are concentrated. Another closely related program pertains to
damage limitation and mitigation of immediate effects stemming
directly from an attack. This. could be, for example, redundant
or backup facilities, modular configuration and dispersed sit-
ing of components, or containment features to minimize collat-
eral damage. The latter is extremely important for certain
inherently inviting and exposed targets where any initial
destructive impact is likely to be escalatory, triggering wide-
spread chain reactions. A case in point is POL tank farms--or
storage depots for explosives. These attractive, high-value
targets of opportunity, particularly if located within or in
proximity to congested urban and industrial centers, call for
special program attention on civil security grounds alone. The
program could, among other things, encourage construction codes
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requiring revetments and levees around such installations, or
zoning ordinances to isolate them geographically.
Other programs are oriented mainly to enhancing the civil
security infrastructure and its capacity to respond. They
provide for better organization and training, upgraded facili-
ties, and acquisition of necessary resources, including person-
nel, equipment, and supplies. A more general program area of
FEMA that has direct utility for civil security purposes is the
development of direction and control mechanisms at every
response level. This applies particularly to telecommunica-
tions and information management systems. An additional
response program, though not formally defined as such,
emphasizes emergency action procedures, which apply to civil
security emergencies in common with other types. There is also
currently underway a program covering all aspects of civil
security relating to maritime ports. It represents in micro-
cosm the entire civil security mission. Presumably other
analagous applications programs will follow.
In sum, program coordination is a constellation of functions,
each keyed to its respective program. It may be expected that
over time the total agenda of civil security programs under
FEMA purview will expand.
3.2.8 Initiate Proposed NSC or Legislative Action (P.8)
As the civil security environment evolves and policies and
strategy change, there will be need for new authority, modifi-
cation or clarification of existing charters, or other basic
institutional adjustments regarding the civil security struc-
ture and process. At issue might be jurisdictional ambiguity
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or statutory constraints impeding FEMA's civil security mis-
sion. Initiating, coordinating, and advocating such proposals,
whether to be acted upon by the Executive Branch at the White
House level or by Congress, is a function of the FEMA civil
security staff. It is the Agency's organizational element
having the relevant expertise, subject competence, and respon-
sibility. Thus, in conjunction with the legal counsel, it
would, formulate, develop, and coordinate any proposed execu-
tive orders, directives, or laws affecting its sphere. This
includes preparing the supporting rationale and testimony to
justify the proposed action before the National Security
Council or Congressional committees. By extension, the func-
tion also includes similar staffing vis-a-vis regulatory boards
and commissions.
3.2.9 Advisory Assistance (P.9)
Advising the civil security community is a general function.
Advice might be requested or volunteered, and could cover a
wide range of topics. One specific area'would be technology.
FEMA is in a unique position to serve as the central clearing-
house for maintaining and exchanging technical information
regarding civil security. As part of its responsibilities in
this mission area, it could advise all parties concerned on
current and emerging technical developments with respect to
threat capabilities, such as new explosive devices and toxic
agents or sophisticated new skills and techniques employed in
perpetrating terrorist acts or sabotage. On the other hand, it
could also advise on developments in technology designed to
thwart threats, such as new penetration sensors and surveil-
lance devices or new methods of fire suppression and bomb dis-
posal. In addition, advice might also be provided on new
vulnerabilities being incurred in national resource systems
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because of technological advances, such as the introduction of
sensitive and critical control equipment.
None of the above excludes other, more basic kinds of advisory
assistance. This could be in the form of recommended organiza-
tional and procedural solutions for dealing with local problems
or special circumstances.
3.2.10 Liaison with Federal Agencies, States, and Private
Sector Organizations (P.10)
The liaison function is essential for establishing and main-
taining rapport with the civil security community at large.
The purpose and scope are broad and flexible, rather than cir-
cumscribed. It is performed through informal dialogue directly
between the FEMA civil security staff and counterpart elements
of key agencies and, at times, selectively with state officials
and with certain private sector organizations having a major
role in the national resource systems. The mutual exchange of
information allows FEMA to keep abreast of what is happening
throughout the community and to recognize latent or emerging
problems and opportunities that might not otherwise become
apparent. Conversely, members are apprised of developments
elsewhere that may have implications for them. Such open
channels promote cooperation generally, and when occasion
demands, can facilitate coordination to deal with specific
matters of immediate concern.
3.2.11 Represent FEMA on Interagency Civil Security
Committees (P.11)
At any given time there are a number of interagency committees,
panels, and task forces set up to address civil security
issues. One'of the functions of the FEMA civil security staff
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is to serve as the agent of FEMA, presenting its views, posi-
tions, and recommendations is the deliberations of these
groups. This function includes performing all the staffing
preparations and coordination, both internally within FEMA as
well as externally with other agencies affected and other
interested parties. It may involve extensive interactions with
many levels of FEMA's civil security constituency, at the
Federal, State, local and private sector levels Achieving con-
sensus beforehand on controversial points could be critical to
the favorable outcome of such interagency proceedings.
3.2.12 Training, Tests, Exercises, and Gaming Support (P.12)
This function refers to a standing' requirement to provide
special expertise in support of, or to participate in, any
training, tests, exercises, and simulation gaming wherever
civil security is involved. It could include assisting in the
development, planning, or conduct of such activities, as well
as managing their execution and evaluating the results. What
the function consists of and how it is performed, therefore,
vary considerably insofar as the kind and extent of demands
placed on the FEMA civil security staff.
3.2.13 Periodic Strategic Net Appraisals of Civil
Security P.13
From time to time, FEMA must produce strategic net appraisals
of the state of the nation's civil security. Basically the
function is overall assessment of conditions with respect
to threat, vulnerabilities, and capabilities. Included would
be an estimate of the threat climate in terms of its current
level, salient characteristics, and perceived trends. A cor-
relative estimate would address significant vulnerabilities
presently existing in national resource systems, their suscep-
tibility to attack, and the disruptive effects likely to
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ensue. There would also be an accompanying estimate of civil
security capabilities, posture, and readiness to cope with the
threats, along with vulnerability reduction measures underway
or planned. Finally, summary conclusions would be drawn as to
the prospects for responding to such emergencies and recovering
from their potential consequences. The function provides a
vital service, not only in support of senior executives and
decisionmakers, both in FEMA and the Administration, but also
may have value for Congress and the public.
3.3 Trans-event Response Functions (T)
The trans-event response phase commences when a threat mate-
rializes and a civil security incident occurs. By definition,
it focuses on the event at hand and, therefore, the functions
are ad hoc, performed in real time, and are emergency-
specific. Figure 3.3 presents schematically a description of
the major functions carried out during this phase.
Normally the functional sequence would be triggered abruptly by
the first awareness by FEMA that something has happened relat-
ing to civil security. However, as the dotted area appearing
in the Figure 3.3 diagram igdicates, there may sometimes be
advance tactical warning that an event is imminent, thus pro-
viding lead time. The functions would then begin immediately
upon receipt of such warning.
It should be noted that the duration and extent of civil
security involvement is scenario-dependent. On most occasions
it is expected to be relatively brief, lasting only until the
regular FEMA apparatus for response management is marshalled
and can take over. Hence, the civil security staff may not be
directly involved in all of the functions listed.-
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(T) TRANS-EVENT RESPONSE
(AD HOC EMERGENCY-SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS)
T.2 WARNING/ALERTING NOTIFICATION (INTRA-FEMA AND EXTERNAL.
E.G.. WHSR)
T.3 DECISION SUPPORT
- DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
- IMPACT/CONSEQUENCES PROJECTION (SCOPE. SEVERITY. DURATION)
- SITUATION MONITORING/ANALYSIS (STATUS REPORTING)
- RESPONSE-REACTION OPERATIONS MONITORING
- PRELIMINARY REQUIREMENTS ESTIMATES
- BRIEFING FEMA/EOP DECISION MAKERS (FACTS AND IMPLICATIONS)
- OPTIONS/COURSES OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT AND RECOMMENDATION
- RECOMMEND AUGMENTATION OF EICC/ACTIVATION OF EMERGENCY
ACTION TEAM
T.5 INTERIM COORDINATION OF IMMEDIATE EMERGENCY ACTIONS
(RESCUE. EVACUATION. DAMAGE. CONTROL. LIFE AND PROPERTY
PRESERVATION)
T.6 INITIATE EXECUTION PLANNING/ASSET MOBILIZATION/READINESS FOR
RECOVERY
T.8 HAND-OFF/TRANSITION TO FEMA RESPONSE MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS
(MAY OCCUR AT ANY EARLIER STAGE. DEPENDING ON SCENARIO)
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The individual functions are discussed in the sub-sections
immediately following. Selected details explain and amplify
each 'of them in turn.
3.3.1 Verification of Occurrence (T.1)
The essential first function is to verify that a reported civil
security incident has indeed occurred. A vital component of
that function is establishing basic facts: what happened,
where, and how serious does the event appear to be?_ Initial
characterization and sizing estimates are critical as to
whether many of the subsequent steps should be taken. The
report could be a false alarm, or the incident may be only of
local significance. On the other hand, a seemingly trivial
event may be seen from the national perspective as bearing the
seeds of a major emergency.
3.3.2 Warning and Alerting Notification (T.2)
The next function is a crucial one. All of the agencies,
officials, and watch centers having a direct need to know must
be warned that an emergency exists. Among those to be immedi-
ately notified, for example, would be the FEMA Emergency Infor-
mation Coordination Center (EICC) and the Director and senior
executives of FEMA, the White House Situation Room (WHSR), the
National Military Command Center, the FBI operations center,
other relevant departments and agencies, and perhaps certain
State governments. Also to be alerted as a second priority
would be those agencies and organizations likely to be affected
in one way or another by the event or its aftermath. This
could include private sector elements, such as the transporta-
tion carrier industry or telecommunications companies.
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3.3.3 Decision Support (T.3)
A vital function of the trans-event phase is the multifaceted
one of providing decision support, which shapes the kind of
operational response that is taken in connection with the inci-
dent. The function consists of its own sequence of functional
steps. As outlined in figure 3.3, the series of component
sub-functions comprises the following:
o initial assessment of the emergency event in terms of
immediate casualties and damage incurred, based on
the information available
o Estimated direct impact on national resource systems
and projected consequences, including the probable
scope of disruptive effects, their severity, and
duration
o Monitoring the current situation on scene and
updating status changes, along with analysis of
reported information
o Monitoring the current response-reaction operations
underway on scene to cope with the incident
o Preliminary estimates of resources required to
respond to the event
o Briefing decisionmakers in FEMA and senior executives
of the Administration on the facts and implications
of the event
o Developing strategy options and proposed courses of
action to deal with the emergency
o Recommending augmentation of the EICC and activation
of FEMA emergency action teams to manage response
activities.
3.3.4 Decision Implementation Action (T.4)
This function sets in train the course of action adopted. It
involves preparing and issuing orders and instruction tasking
all of the agencies and organizations responsible for carrying
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out the response operations decided upon. The function is
time-sensitive, and different kinds of instructions may have to
be given to many agencies.
3.3.5 Interim Coordination of Immediate Emergency Action (T.5)
In the interim, before the full response is implemented, some
urgent crisis actions of immediate priority may have to be
executed as soon as possible. These could be, for example,
rescue and evacuation operations to save lives, damage control
to prevent the situation from getting out of hand and turning
into a large-scale catastrophe, and a variety of other efforts
to preserve life and property. The function of coordinating
such immediate actions at the outset of the emergency may
temporarily have to be performed by the FEMA civil security
staff.
3.3.6 Initiate Execution Planning, Asset Mobilization, and
Readiness for Recovery (T.4)
Another function that civil security may temporarily have to
perform is to begin preparations for recovery operations.
Depending on the scenario, delay might prove costly. The func-
tion could include getting execution planning started, seeing
to it that mobilization of necessary manpower and resources is
underway, and initiating an appropriate state of readiness
generally. Again, a considerable number of agencies and organ-
izations might be involved. The staffing and coordination task
would be correspondingly large and subject to time pressures.
3.3.7 Congressional and Public Affairs Update (T.7)
In any emergency there is always a great demand for information
from many quarters. In collaboration with the EICC, the civil
security staff would input that information, through briefings
and status reports, to the FEMA Congressional relations staff
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and the public affairs office. The latter would process and
release it through their own channels to their respective
audiences. The FEMA civil security staff would not itself deal
directly with the news media or members of Congress.
3.3.8 Hand-off and Transition to FEMA Response Management
Principals (T.8)
This function marks the termination of civil security's direct
role in response management. Presumably at this stage, FEMA's
regular response management principals would be actively taking
over and in charge. The transition could come quite early in
the emergency -- indeed could be the first step taken in the
trans-event period. As soon as the hand-off was effected,
civil security would retire to the background and eater into
the next phase, where its post-event recovery functions become
relatively peripheral to the main stream of FEMA activity in
relation to the emergency.
3.4 Post-event Recovery Functions (R)
In tae final phase, during post-event recovery, civil security
is relegated to a subordinate role. Relatively few functions
that are uniquely of a civil security nature remain to be
performed. Most of the recovery responsibilities fall in other
mission areas of FEMA, and the civil security staff is more or
less on standby, though it does provide certain ancillary sup-
port to recovery management. Depending on scenario, some of
these residual functions can nonetheless be important and of
considerable scale. Figure 3.4 depicts the sequence of typical
post-event recovery functions expected to be performed. Each
is discussed in further detail in the subsections below.
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(R) POST-EVENT RECOVERY
.(ANCILLARY MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FUNCTIONS)
R.1 ASSIST FEMA EICC AND STAFF ELEMENTS
- PROVIDE CS STAFF EXPERTISE. AS REQUIRED
- MAINTAIN LIAISON WITH CIVIL SECURITY COMMUNITY
R.2 ASSESS CONTINUINGIFOLLOW-ON CS THREAT
- RISK ANALYSIS (OTHER TARGETS. VULNERABILITY.
CONSEQUENCES)
- ADVISE ALL CONCERNED (INTRA-FEMA AND EXTERNAL)
R.3 MONITOR RECOVERY PHASE ACTIVITIES/PROGRESS
(APPRISE INTERESTED AGENCIES)
R.4 DEVELOP AFTER-ACTION LESSONS LEARNED
- SUBSTANTIVE PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED
- SYSTEMS DYSFUNCTIONALITIES EXPERIENCED
R.5 REAPPRAISE/ADJUST POLICY. PLANS. PROGRAMS
FIGURE 3.4
POST-EVENT RECOVERY FUNCTIONS
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3.4.1 Assist FEMA EICC and Staff Elements (R.1)
A post-event function performed on a sustained basis is to pro-
vide timely specialized staff support regarding civil security
matters to the EICC, the Office of Emergency Operations (OEO),
and other elements of FEMA whenever such expert assistance is
required. Many of the recovery operations can have significant
civil security implications, and recovery management must take
these considerations into account. Another aspect of the same
function is maintaining active liaison with those agencies and
organizations of the civil security community that may have
continuing interest in the emergency event or may be affected
by or have a role in recovery. An example would be law
enforcement to prevent looting, or to cordon off dangerous
areas. Much of the necessary coordination of this kind could
be accomplished via such specialized liaison between the civil
security staff and other groups involved in the recovery
process.
3.4.2 Assess Continuing or Follow-on Threats (R.2)
A given emergency event confronting FEMA may be only one in a
series of incidents, or part of a concerted larger campaign of
threat actions to follow. Accordingly, an essential civil
security function is intensive risk analysis to identify other
vulnerable targets that might be affected, and also to estimate
the likely consequences if these too were to be struck. In
some senarios, this could be an extended iterative process
requiring interaction with many agencies and organizations.
The products of the risk-analysis function would be dissemi-
nated to all concerned, within FEMA and externally. The
resulting alert notification might prove critical to those in
charge of security for the national resource systems in
particular.
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3.4.3 Monitor Recovery Activities and Progress (R.3)
In the post-event phase, this function would be a continuation
of the earlier monitoring of the emergency situation, but on a
more summary level, and tracking the general progress of
recovery operations. It would be performed derivitively, based
on the primary monitoring being done by other elements of
FEMA. The object is for the civil security staff to keep
itself abreast of developments, and for it to apprise all other
interested parties in the civil security community on the
status of recovery.
3.4.4 Develop After-action Lessons Learned (R.4)
The experience gained in the course of the event offers a
unique opportunity for drawing lessons that can be of great
value for future emergencies. An important civil security
function, therefore, is to reconstruct what happened, based on
its active involvement, and see what can be learned. Evidence
must be gathered and analyzed relating to all aspects of the
emergency, from mitigation and preparedness prior to its occur-
rence through response and recovery. Things to look for would
be problems encountered, both substantive and procedural.
Attention should be given to identifying achievements as well
as deficiencies, with special emphasis on systems performance.
Structural dysfunctionalities may be revealed that might other-
wise not be detected. Existing policy, plans, and organization
can also be examined for adequacy and appropriatness. The
potential benefits of such post mortem evaluations should be
exploited to the fullest.
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3.4.5 Reappraise and Adjust Policy, Plans and Programs (R.5)
The final post-event function is the feedback that closes the
loop, leading again to the, pre-event phase. In light of the
lessons derived from the previous function, the FEMA civil
security staff is now in a position to reappraise and, where
necessary, adjust,. refine, or amplify policy, plans, programs,
and all the other functional components of its mitigation and
preparedness mission. The kind and extant of adjustment
resulting from this last function would depend on the nature of
the event just concluded and the significance attributed to
that experience.
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4. INFORMATION REQUIRED TO SUPPORT FEMA CIVIL SECURITY FUNCTIONS
An essential step in the development of any operational infor-
mation system is the translation of organizational functions
into the types of information required to fulfill these func-
tions. This chapter identifies the information needed to
support the pre-event, trans-event, and post-event civil
security functions discussed in the previous chapter.
4.1 Classes of Information Requirements
Figure 4.1 briefly outlines the major classes of civil security
information requirements by time phases. These and other more
specific information requirements will be discussed in greater
detail in the subsequent sections.
4.2 Pre-event Information Needs
Identifed in this section are the categories of information
required to fulfill the essential civil security functions
during the pre-event mitigation and preparedness phase.
4.2.1 Tasking the Providers of Threat-Assessments (P.1)
To acquire threat assessment products and other essential ele-
ments of information (EEIs), FEMA must have the authority to
levy information requirements-on relevant agencies and organi-
zations in the intelligence community. Correspondingly, Civil
Security Division personnel must be fully cognizant of the
various statutes, executive orders, and memoranda of under-
standing that give them this authority. But the possession of
this authority is not sufficient to ensure that the threat
information will be obtained. In addition, civil security
personnel must be fully aware of the range and types of threat
data that can be made available to FEMA. This requires the
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.CLASS SES OE-INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
PRE-EVENT
THREAT
RISK ANALYSIS
NATIONAL POLICY
PLANS
PROGRAMS
TECHNOLOGY
T ANS-EVENT
ALERTINGIWARNING
POINTS OF CONTACT
SITUATION
ON-SCENE RESPONSE
RECOVERY REQUIREMENTS
ST-EVENT
RECOVERY PR06RESS
HISTORICAL RECORD
FIGURE 4.1
MAJOR CLASSES OF INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS
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maintenance of point-of-contact rosters for the primary intel-
ligence, security, and law enforcement agencies, both public
and private. It also requires a set of standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs) for guiding the query-response transactions
involved in gaining access to the relevant data bases. Thus
the key information requirements for this function are as
follows:
P.1.A Existing FEMA Authority for Levying Threat EEIs
(Statutes, Executive Orders, Memoranda of
Understanding)
P.1.B Roster of Threat Assessor POCs (Intelligence
Community and Others)
P.1.C Query-Response SOPs
Where the authority for levying threat EEIs does not exist,
FEMA must initiate the necessary action to establish such
authority (see section 4.2.8).
4.2.2 Synthesis of Available Threat Assessment Products (P.2)
The variety of sources that must be tapped in formulating
threat assessments is illustrated in Figure 4.2. This shows
that a coverage of threats to the various national resource
systems requires contacts with over 30 other Federal agencies
in addition to the intelligence community at large. Thus one
of the difficult tasks that the FEMA Civil Security Division
must perform is to collate and synthesize many different EEI
inputs in developing its threat assessments. The following
categories of information are needed to fulfill this function:
P.2.A Source of Threat (Identity and Nature)
P.2.B Historical Profile (Objectives, organization,
Linkages, Support)
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P.2.C Method(s) of Operation (Tactics, Targets, Time
Frames)
P.2.D Capabilities (Deployable Strength, Technical
Skills, Resources)
P.2.E Geographic Data (Base of Operations, Staging
Points, Pre-positioned Assets)
P.2.F Recent Activities (Type, Periodicity,
Patterns/Trends)
P.2.G Extrapolation/Forecasts of Possible Threat Action
The complexity involved in this process is further illustrated
in Figure 4.3. It shows, at the next level of detail, the
major categories of data needed for these threat assessments,
including some of the key data elements that must be taken into
account in the evaluation of the threats.
4.2.3 Risk Analysis (P.3)
The development of risk analyses is a complicated process. It
requires the mobilization of data on current civil security
threats, and on the national resource systems at risk and their
interdependencies. It also requires data on the likely targets
for disruption, on the likely modes of attack, on the vulner-
ability of various targets, and on the potential consequences
of an attack in terms of primary and secondary effects, seve-
rity, scope, and duration. The following information is needed
to support this function:
P.3.B National Resource System Descriptions
(Structural Configuration and Operational
Characteristics)
P.3.C Interdependencies among Systems
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CATEGORIES OF EXTERNAL THREAT ASSESSMENT DATA
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P.3.D Likely Target Types for Disruption, by System
(Critical Nodes/Choke Points, Essential
Elements, Key Personnel)
P.3.E Applicable Attack Modes (Demolition, Arson,
Seizure, Chemical/Biological, Etc.)
P.3.F Vulnerability Appraisals (Target Accessibility,
Exposure, Value vs. Attack Feasibility/
Probability)
P.3.G Potential Consequences Estimates (Primary
Impact/Secondary Effects) - Severity, Scope,
Duration
Figure 4.4 expands on these requirements, showing some of the
detailed information needed under each component for analyzing
risks to the various national resource systems. Figure 4.5
outlines a requirements model showing the kind of algorithm
that can be used for such a risk analysis and postulates an
example illustrating its application in a hypothetical case,
namely, risks to bridges and tunnels in the railway
transportation resource system.
4.2.4 Policy Development (P.4)
In its role as a developer and coordinator of policy, FEMA must
be aware of relevant civil security issues that need policy
resolution or clarification. This requires knowledge of admin-
istration decisions, directives, and statements on goals,
interests, and priorities. The sometimes overlapping Federal
responsibilities, roles, and authorities (see Figure 4.2) must
also be understood, and the views of interested parties must be
solicited as input to any policy development. The following
information requirements are encompassed in this civil security
function:
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P.4.A Administration Statements/Decisions/Directives
on National Civil Security Goals, Interests,
Priorities
P.4.$ Nature and Background of Issue(s) Needing Policy
Resolution or Clarification
P.4.C National Resource System(s) Affected
P.4.D Agencies Involved
P.4.E Statutory Imperatives and Constraints
(Responsibilities, Roles, Authority)
P.4.F Relevant Existing Policy and Memoranda of
Understanding
P.4.G Views of Major Parties Concerned
P.4.H Policy Implementation Requirements
4.2.5 Planning Guidance (P.5)
The Civil*Security Division provides guidance in the develop-
ment of plans for dealing with threats to the national resource
systems. As the information requirements below indicate, this
guidance must take into account national strategies, the range
of potential threats, and agency responsibilities and
capabilities:
P.5.A National Policy Posture (Administration
Strategy, Concepts, Desiderata)
P.5.B Statutory Mandates (Executive Orders,
Legislative Authority)
P.5.C Range of Potential Threats
P.5.D Vulnerabilities of Threatened National Resource
Systems
P.5.E Responsibilities Hierarchy/Network (Roles and
Missions)
4-10
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P.5.F Existing Plans, Memoranda of Understanding,
Established Precedents
P.5.G Capabilities and Limitations of Agency(ies)
Involved
P.S.1 Resources Required, including Assets Available
from Private Sector
4.2.6 Plans Review and Evaluation (P.6)
The Civil Security Division takes an active role in the review
and evaluation of the civil security plans of other agencies
and organizations. Among the information needs in satisfying
this role are: a point of contact roster of those personnel in
the responsible agencies who developed the plans, an identifier
to locate the plan's custodian or repository, and an internal
record of policy and guidance issued by FEMA regarding the
respective plans. The information needs involved in this
process are noted below:
P.6.A Master Inventory of Civil Security Plans/Annexes
(Identity and Responsible Agency)
P.6.B POC Roster of Agency Planners
P.6.C Repository of Plan (Custodian)
P.6.D Orientation of Plan (Mitigation, Preparedness,
Response, Recovery)
P.6.E Scope and Content (Summary of Provisions)
P.6.F Status (Completeness, Currency, Tested/Untested)
P.6.G Subordinate Related Plans (Regional/State/Local/
Private Sector)
P.6.fl Interrelationships Among Plans (Convergence and
Dependencies)
4-11
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P.6.I Internal Record of Policy/Guidance Issued by FEMA
P.6.J Test/Exercise/Real-life Data on Plan Application
4.2.7 Program Coordination (P.7)
In addition to reviewing and evaluating plans, the Civil
Security Division coordinates Federal, State, local, and
private sector programs relevant to its mission. As noted in
the following list, this involves the collection of information
on relevant statutes, executive orders, and memoranda of under-
standing, the repertoire of mitigation, preparedness, response,
and recovery techniques and technology in use, and program
implementation, strategy, and schedules:
P.7.A Master List of Civil Security Programs
(Identity, Purpose, Scope, Participating
Agencies)
P.7.B Interrelationships/Dependencies Among Programs
P.7.C Relevant Statutes, Executive Orders, Memoranda
of Understanding
P.7.D Formal Steering Committees, Working Groups,
Panels Involved (Standing and Ad Hoc)
P.7.E Catalog of Major Program Components (Objectives,.
Priorities, Milestones)
P.7.F Responsibility Network for Each Program/Program
Element (Federal, State, Local, Private Sector)
P.7.G Roster of Program Managers, Action Officers,
Cognizant Staff (POCs)
P.7.R Repertoire of Mitigation, Preparedness,
Response, and Recovery Techniques and Technology
P.7.1 Program Implementation Strategy and Schedules
P.7.J Resource Requirements (Manpower, Special Skills,
Equipment and Supplies, Funding Assistance)
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P.7.K Status of Programs (Progress, Delays, Changes,
Problems)
4.2.8 Initiate Proposed NSC/Legislative Action, as
Warranted (P.8)
In conducting its mission, the Civil Security Division may
encounter problems, conflicts, and the need for additional
executive or legislative authority. Based on the information
requirements stated below, FEMA may find it necessary to pro-
pose and initiate National Security Council or legislative
action to resolve these problems:
P.8.A Nature and Background of Problem Needing such
Remedy
P.8.B Pertinent Existing Directives/Legislation
P.B.C Internal Staff Views of Interested FEMA Elements
P.8.D Opinions and Views from Other Affected Agencies
P.8.E Legal and Political Considerations
4.2.9 Advisory Assistance (P.9)
A vital function to be performed by FEMA's Civil Security Divi-
sion is to serve as a clearinghouse for information on threat
technologies and vulnerabilities and the corresponding security
technologies needed for dealing with them. The following
information needs have been identified with this function:
P.9.A New Developments in Threat Technology
(Instruments/Methods)
P.9.B New Technological Vulnerabilities in National
Resource Systems
P.9.C State-of-the-Art Security Technology for Dealing
with Threats/Vulnerabilities/Consequences
4-13
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FEMA must keep abreast of new trends and developments that are
likely to'change the vulnerabilities of the various national
resource systems. For example, as transportation systems
become more dependent on electronic data processing for such
functions as scheduling, routing, maintenance, and coordina-
tion, their computers become increasingly vulnerable targets.
4.2.10 Liaison with Civil Security Community (P.10)
The Civil Security Division is primarily a recipient and
end-user of information supplied by other agencies and organi-
zations in the civil security community. Its success is there-
fore largely dependent on developing and maintaining good
relationships and effective liaison with other elements of this
community. The following information needs serve this purpose:
P.lO.A POC Lists of Reciprocal Liaison Counterparts, by
Agency and Subject Area
P.10.B Updated Reference Material on Organizational
Structure and Roles of Other Civil Security
Elements
P.10.C Checklists/Briefs of Current Topics, Problems,
Concerns of Mutual Interests
4.2.11 Represent FEMA on Interagency Civil Security
Committees/Groups/Task Forces (P.11)
To enable the various agencies with civil security interests to
discuss issues and problems and share viewpoints, many inter-
agency committees, groups, and task forces have been or will be
established. The FEMA Civil Security Division has a vital
interest in being represented in these organizations, or at
least being aware of their activities. As the following
information requirements indicate, this representation requires
knowledge of the agenda of each group, of FEMA's own position
on various issues, and of the positions and viewpoints of other
agencies:
4-14
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P.11.A Master List of Interagency Groups concerned with
Civil Security matters
P.11.B Agenda of Key Issues/Problems to be Addressed
P.11.C Participating Agencies, Structure of Committee,
Members of Delegations
P.11.D Terms of Reference on FEMA Position to be
Advocated, and Strategy
P.11.E Other Agencies' Positions and Views
P.11.F Cumulative Record of Proceedings (Proposals,
Agreements, Impasses, etc.)
P.11.G Formal Products/Outcomes Resulting from
Committee Action (Final or.Incremental Findings/
Reports)
4.2.12 Training/Test/Exercise/Gaming Support (P.12)
For the FEMA Civil Security Division to support training,.
tests, exercises, and games related to civil security, it must
have information on the following five subjects:
P.12.A Sponsor and Participants
P.12.B Planned Goals and Objectives
P.12.C Schedules/Time Frames
P.12.D Postulated Scenario/Syllabus to be Followed
P.12.E Control Mechanism Employed
The control mechanism refers to the management of exercises,
for example, the operational constraints and degrees of freedom
in running them, and the method of determining success or
failure.
4-15
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4.2.13 Periodic Strategic Net Appraisals of Civil Security
(P.13)
A vital function and output product of the Civil Security
Division is the appraisal of the Nation's civil security
posture. -This entails keeping abreast of the current threat
climate, recent civil security incidents and their conse-
quences, major shortcomings in civil security, and remedies
underway to redress those shortcomings. The current civil
security capabilities of Federal, State, and local governments,
and the private sector must also be evaluated frequently, not
only to ensure an adequate defensive posture and response
mechanism but also to ensure that appropriate steps are being
taken to mitigate and ameliorate adverse consequences. The
list below reflects the information needed to satisfy this
function:
P.13.A Historical/Statistical Data on Changing-
Character, Patterns, Trends in Threat Climate
(Domestic and Foreign)
P.13.B Historical/Statistical Data on Nature,
Frequency, Distribution, Consequences of Recent
Civil Security Incidents Against National
Resource Systems
P.13.C Major Civil Security Problem Areas/Shortcomings
Experienced (Mitigation, Preparedness, Response,
Recovery)
P.13.D Status of Remedial Measures Underway
P.13.E Federal, State, Local and Private Sector Civil
Security Capabilities and Readiness to Mitigate
and Ameliorate Adverse Consequences
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4.3 Trans-event Information Needs
Identified in this section are the information categories
required to fulfill the essential civil security functions
during the trans-event response period.
4.3.1 Verification of Occurrence (T.1)
When the Civil Security Division receives notification of a
civil security event, activities are immediately initiated to
provide verification of occurrence. The following three items
of information are essential to this function:
T.I.A. Report(s) of event (What, Where, When, How
Serious)
T.l.B POC Roster for Verification/Corroboration/
Amplification
T.1.C News Media Bulletins/Accounts
The point-of-contact roster contains names of Federal, State,
local, or private sector response-reaction principals whose
timely input can provide an accurate assessment of the
unfolding events.
4.3.2 Warning and Alerting Notification (T.2)
Once a civil security event has occurred and been verified, the
Civil Security Division must ensure that priority need-to-know
agencies, direction and control centers, and key personnel are
notified-in an orderly manner with minimal delay. This noti-
fication might actually be performed by the OEO/EICC. The
following three information items ale needed to fulfill this
function:
T.2.A Priority Need-to-Know Agencies/Centers/Key
Personnel
4-17
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T.2.C Checklist Notification Procedures
4.3.3 Decision Support (T.3)
During a civil security event, FEMA must provide timely esti-
mates and assessments of the unfolding events to permit the key
decision makers to make wise and effective decisions aimed at
minimizing potential damage or ameliorating negative conse-
quences. The civil security staff, depending on its degree of
involvement, must therefore be-prepared to acquire -- or assist
the OEO/EICC in acquiring -- the following types of needed
decision-support information:
T.3.A Direct Impact Damage/Disruption Incurred (Locus,
Type, Systems Affected, Scale)
T.3.B Pertinent Pre-calculated Implications/Potential
Consequences Extrapolation Data
T.3.C Status Updates on Situation/Changes
T.3.D Status Updates on Operational Response-Reaction
Measures
T.3.E Relevant Policies, Doctrine, and Strategy
Alternatives
T.3.F Matrix of Responsibility/Jurisdiction (Federal,
State, Local, Private Sector)
T.3.G Readiness Posture/Capabilities of Response
Elements Apt to be Involved
T.3.E Cumulative Requests for Assistance (Source,
Status, Disposition)
T.3.I Agency Estimates of Likely Additional
Requirements
.T.3.J Resource Availability Data
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T.3.K Views, Needs, Problems of Affected
Agencies/Interested Parties
T.3.L Emergency Operations Procedures of Emergency
Information and Coordination Center/Office of
Emergency Operations
4.3.4 Decision Implementation Action (T.4)
The information required for implementing the decisions
dictates that the FEMA Civil Security Division have at its
disposal a master list of agencies having primary, coordinate,
and support responsibilities and of the procedures for issuing
requests and instructions for each agency. The Division will
also need periodic updates of each agency's responsibilities
and points-of-contact. Thus the following types of information
are required:
T.4.A Master List of Agencies Having Primary/
Coordinate/Support Responsibilities
T.4.B Procedures for Issuing FEMA Tasking/Requests
T.4.C POCs in Affected Agencies
4.3.5 Interim Coordination of Immediate Emergency Actions (T.5)
As noted in Chapter 3, the civil security staff may temporarily
have to coordinate, or assist OEO/EICC in coordinating, the
Federal response at the outset of a major civil security
event. The Division staff therefore has to be familiar with
the primary points-of-contact in each agency and know the
agency-specific procedures for orchestrating coordination. The
conduct of this interim coordination function will require the
following information:
T.5.A Emergency Action POC Roster and Procedure
Checklist
T.5.B Existing Applicable Plans
4-19
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T.5.C Operative Direction and Control Infrastructure
T.5.D Available Rescue/Evacuation Lift Assets
T.5.E Candidate Host Area/Safe Haven Relocation Sites
(Shelter and Logistic Support Capacity)
T.5.F Available Damage Control/Containment Resources
T.5.G Available Protective Equipment, Supplies,
Personnel
T.5.H Status of Priority Actions in Outside Agencies
(Unilateral and Collaborative)
The status of priority actions by outside agencies is monitored
to ensure prompt attention to activities deemed most critical.
4.3.6 Initiate Execution Planning/Asset Mobilization/
Readiness for Recovery (T.6)
During the trans-event response period, it may be necessary to
initiate steps as early as possible for handling the needed
recovery and stabilization measures. In preparing for this
transition to the post-event recovery period, the Civil
Security Division will require information on the following
topics:
T.6.A Master List of Agencies Having Recovery
Responsibilities
T.6.B Existing Recovery Agencies
T.6.C POCs within Recovery Agencies
T.6.D Readiness and Execution Procedures (Federal,
State, Local, Private Sector)
T.6.E Recovery Resource Requirements Estimates
T.6.F Resource Location/Availability
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4.3.7 Congressional and Public Affairs Update (T.7)
The Civil Security Division must be in a position to provide
accurate, timely, and appropriate civil security-related infor-
mation for dissemination through the public affairs and Con-
gressional relations' staff of FEMA. This requires access to
up-to-date information on the civil security activities of all
agencies involved in the event. The internal FEMA procedures
for preparing and briefing these staffs must be well understood
by civil security program personnel.
T.7.A Accurate, Current Data on Event and Response
T.7.B Procedures/Criteria for Briefing/Updating FEMA
Congressional Relations/Public Affairs Staffs
4.3.8 Hand-off and Transition to FEMA Response Management
Principals (T.8)
As the trans-event response phase comes to an end, the Civil
Security Division personnel need to prepare for the transfer of
responsibilities to the FEMA response management principals.
As noted before, such a transfer may occur earlier in the
trans-event phase. Two information needs must be satisfied to
achieve this transition:
T.S.A Matrix of Responsibilities within FEMA
T.B.B Record of FEMA Actions Completed, in Process,
and Pending
Accurate records of the FEMA actions completed, in process, or
pending are required to avoid duplication of effort and to
expedite recovery measures.
4.4 Post-event Information Needs
This section identifies the information categories required to
fulfill the essential civil security functions during the
post-event recovery period.
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4.4.1 Assist FEMA Emergency Information and Coordination
Center/Office of Emergency Operations and Staff
E ements R.1
During the post-event recovery period, Civil Security Division
staff elements and resources must remain available to assist
the Office of Emergency Operations, the Emergency Information
and Coordination Center, and other FEMA staff members in
addressing residual civil security concerns, recognizing poten-
tial civil security contingencies, and maintaining contacts
within the civil security community involved or interested in
the recovery phase. The list below covers the information
required to perform this function:
R.l.A Checklist of Potential Civil Security
Contingencies During Recovery
R.1.B Residual Civil Security Concerns of Agencies
Involved in Aftermath of Event
R.1.C POC Roster of Civil Security Community Involved/
Interested in Recovery Phase
4.4.2 Assess Continuing/Follow-on Civil Security Threat (R.2)
During the post-event recovery period, the Civil Security
Division must recognize that additional targets and national
resource systems might be threatened. Forecasts and risk
analyses, combined with updated threat information, may be
needed to cover these possibilities. This threat assessment
activity requires the following information:
R.2.A Updated Threat Information
R.2.B Additional Possible Targets and Other National
Resource Systems that Might be Affected
R.2.C Projected Risk Analysis Estimates
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R.2.D POC Roster for Threat/Risk Forecasts
R.2.E POC Roster of Parties to be Advised
4.4.3 Monitor Recovery Phase Activities/Progress (R.3)
Civil security personnel should monitor recovery phase activi-
ties and develop an overview of recovery operations to ensure
that civil security concerns are being fully addressed. They
should review and, when necessary, change FEMA's criteria and
procedures for reporting to interested agencies. And they
should update their point-of-contact rosters to reflect neces-
sary changes in the communication network. This will require
information on the following four topics:
R.3.A Summary Overview of Recovery Operations
R.3.B Status of Current and Planned Civil Security
Related Actions
R.3.C Criteria/Procedures for Reporting to Interested
Agencies
R.3.D POC Roster of Agencies Needing Civil Security
Update
4.4.4 Develop After-Action Lessons Learned (R.4)
To assess the effectiveness of plans and programs, as well as
overall national policy on civil security issues, it will be
necessary for all agencies involved in the event to provide
after-action reports to the FEMA Civil Security Division.
These reports. should include an assessment of successes,
failures, and problems, accompanied by a critique of agency
actions and suggested future improvements. FEMA civil security
personnel will analyze these and their own after-action reports
and prepare a summary document outlining the lessons learned
and the needed remedial actions. The information requirements
noted below are aimed at the fulfillment of this function:
? 4-23
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R.4.A Reconstruction of Pre-Event Civil Security
Posture
R.4.B Cumulative Archival Journal/Chronology of-Event,
Response, Recovery Experience
R.4.C Detailed Documentation of Salient Problems
Encountered
R.4.D Logs, Records, and Observations on System
Performance (Achievements and Deficiencies)
R.4.E Critique Reviews/Suggestions by Participants
4.4.5 Reappraise/Adjust Policy, Plans, Programs (R.5)
Section 4.4.4 mentioned the Civil Security Division's need to
develop after-action lessons learned from a civil security
event to adjust future policy, plans, and programs. This
activity provides a feedback mechanism for improving mitigation
and preparedness plans and programs, as well as future
trans-event response and post-event recovery operations. Based
on careful evaluation of the effectiveness and appropriateness
of the policy, plans, and programs, as revealed by the after
action reports on the recently managed emergency event, the
Civil Security Division will initiate, coordinate, and ensure
that important remedial adjustments are made internally within
FEMA and by the other appropriate Federal agencies. The imple-
mentation of such adjustments requires the following
information:
R.S.A Policy Issues Bearing on Civil Security Revealed
by Emergency
R.S.B Appropriateness and Adequacy of Civil Security
Plans to Cope with Event
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R.5.C Civil Security Program Shortfalls Demonstrated
R.5.D Indicated Areas of Civil Security Information
System Support Needing Improvement
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5. INFORMATION PARAMETERS AND CONSTRAINTS
In the previous chapter, the types of information required to
support the respective civil security functions were identified
and discussed. The next step is the development of a more
detailed characterization of the operational parameters and
constraints associated with the types of information identified.
5.1 Attributes of Civil Security Information Requirements
The following attributes establish the framework for refining
the character of the civil security information requirements:
source of information, security classification, frequency,
accessibility, and application.
5.1.1 Source
FEMA will have to task many different sources to ensure that
the information needed to meet civil security functions is both
available and complete. Other agencies have statutory respon-
sibility for developing and implementing civil security plans
and programs, for managing the response during an actual event,
and for ensuring that appropriate security steps are taken.
However, in its oversight and focal point roles, FEMA must
recognize that the primary action agency may not be the
singular supplier of civil security information. Additionally,
Civil Security Division personnel must be able to synthesize
the information from all sources to provide the most useful
product for internal and external consumers. It should be
noted that some sources will provide information only in
support of pre-event preparedness activities. Other sources
will be brought into play only during trans-event response or
post-event recovery periods, depending on the nature of the
event as it unfolds.
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5.1.2 Security Classification
The security classification of civil security information can
be expected to run the gamut from unclassified to top secret
and, at times, will require various compartmentalized or code
word intelligence clearances. The level of security classifi-
cation will depend on the source, the specific content of the
data, the sensitivity attached to it, and individual scena-
rios. Civil security and other FEMA personnel must constantly
be aware of the potential need to reclassify the information
that they produce as a result of data aggregation.
5.1.3 Frequency
The frequency with which civil security information is needed
and the frequency with which this information requires updating
will obviously vary in terms of the functions to be performed,
the time being considered, and the urgency of operational
requirements. In general, those functions that pertain to
pre-event mitigation and preparedness measures will permit a
more routinized flow of information, longer intervals between
updates, and less urgency in securing new or updated data. In
such cases, the entire process is likely to be fairly predict-
able, regularized, and controllable. During the occurrence of
actual terrorist, civil disorder, sabotage, or subversion inci-
dents, however, the information collection, interpretation, and
dissemination processes are likely to change dramatically. In
such trans-event periods, the frequency of need and frequency
of update become dependent on situational imperatives that are
inherently unpredictable. Thus the need for information and
the update frequency are likely to be more dynamic--varying
with the nature, scope, and pace of the individual event as it
unfolds.
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5.1.4 Accessibility
FEMA's access to civil security information may take three dif-
ferent forms: (1) routine; (2) limited; and (3) ad hoc
requests. Routine information is received on a repetitive,
regular, or periodic schedule from numerous governmental and
private sector sources, and it is based on pre-established
mutual understandings and procedures. Limited access refers to
information that may be similarly programmed in advance, but
which can only be obtained or received under stipulated condi-
tions, depending on the nature of the particular event and the
security classification of the information. Ad hoc requests
refer to information that is obtained by FEMA on a case-by-case
basis, that is, only when such information is expressly
requested and the supplier agency agrees to respond.
5.1.5 Application
In a general sense, civil security information is utilized in
two ways. First, some types of information are necessary to
support internal civil security functions. Second, Civil
Security Division personnel, after the receipt of information,
will analyze, synthesize, and condense it. Output products may
then be generated and sent to other FEMA elements or to
agencies and organizations external to FEMA.
In the following sections of this chapter, each category of
information required for a particular function is discussed
within the context of these information attributes. Section
5.2 presents the parameters and constraints of information
requirements to support pre-event preparedness functions.
Section 5.3 presents a discussion of the parameters and con-
straints relating to information on trans-event response func-
tions; and Section 5.4 deals with post-event recovery functions.
5-3
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5.2 Pre-Event Phase - Information to Sustain Preparedness
Activities
Section 2.3 notes that the audiences with whom FEMA must com-
municate in carrying out its mission are numerous and diverse.
This 'statement is particularly true regarding civil security
functional information requirements. The information to
support preparedness functions forms the baseline for the
communication process which is essential in carrying out civil
security planning, oversight, liaison, and training activi-
ties. The following sub-sections present a discussion of the
parameters and constraints relating to pre-event information
needs. Further details on these parameters and constraints are
presented in tables at the end of each subsection.
5.2.1 Tasking the Providers of Threat Assessments (P.1)
FEMA will have to look to the intelligence and law enforcement
agencies as points-ot-contact as well as to private security
organizations. The FEMA Civil Security Division requires
standard procedures for gaining access to the various data
bases on a daily basis. FEZ4A.'s authority to task other
agencies for this purpose will necessarily also provide for
access to the various bodies of classified data. POC rosters
will probably be used on a daily basis to maintain contact with
agencies. Any changes in POCs should be transmitted to FEMA on
a weekly basis.
5.2.2 Synthesis of Available Threat Assessment Products (P.2)
As can be seen in Table P.2, the primary sources of threat
assessment products will be the agencies with intelligence and
security missions as well as those with responsibilities for
emergency management of the national resource systems. Supple-
mental data can also be provided by the private sector through
5-4
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Functional kdormabon
RequiremerN
cods D.suipwon
41)
Source
PInwey securwr.wy
Se'( )
Class'n
(3)
Frequency
Nwd uprab
(4)
Accessibility
Ad. ie.rr
Hawes t.Mled ns
~~s ~
(5)
Application
Mse
Use PIOu"il
CK W
P.1.A
Authority to levy three
Legislation,
U-S
N/A
N/A
X
X
BBl tasking
6.0.. HOU.
(NSC)PD
P.1.1
POC roster
FBI, State,
Pvt. Sector,
U-S
Daily
Weekly
x
X
CIA. DIA, S
Media, State
i Local
Govt.
P.I.C
Query-Response SOP's
du*
do
U
Daily
Qrtly.
I
X
*do - ditto
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Fww AKp i MNorrt~alion
PagtrremarM
code Duo""
Since
POMWI Secw t
Seix rY
Y
Ciass'n
Fr pi
ency
Nw lydme
c
ROOM /Mwd Ad Ow
Raw"
151
Appkmm
wwtaai Ouyw
Lks am1a
P.2.A
Source of threat
FBI, State,
Pvt. Sector,
C-
Monthly
Weekly
I
I
I
CIA, DIA,
Media, State
T8+
INS, 08A,
and Local
DOT, DOE.
Govt.
Nub, NBC,
DOC
P.2.1
Historical profile
do
do
U-TS
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
I
P.2.C
M.O./tactics
do
do
C-TS
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
I
P.2.0
Capabilities
do
do
TS-
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
I
TB.
P.2.9
Geographic data
do
do
T8-
Monthly
Weekly
I
I
T8t
P.2.P
Recent activities
do
do
C-TS
Weekly
Daily
I
I
P.2.0
forecasts of possible
do
do
T8-
Weekly
Daily
I
I
I
threat action
TS+
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corporation security offices, the media, and the law enforce-
ment arms of the State and local governments. In those
instances where the security classification includes compart-
mentalized or code word intelligence, special arrangements will
have to be made to ensure that FEMA civil security personnel
have access to the essential threat assessment data. The Civil
Security Division will synthesize these data and disseminate
the information to the necessary recipients. Strategic-type
studies should be reviewed by FEMA on a monthly basis. Weekly
updates of recent activities and changes in forecasts will
ensure currency of strategic threat information.
5.2.3 Risk Analysis (P.3)
The intelligence and law enforcement community will be the
providers of information needed for civil security risk
analysis activities. The nature of the data, the sensitivity
associated with collection processes, and the potential value
to hostile interests will place most information at the upper
levels of security classification. The civil security staff
should review risk analysis data on a regular basis. Monthly
updates should ensure adequate currency. The classification
level will necessitate restrictions or limitations on FEMA's
access to risk assessment data maintained by other agencies.
The finished products of risk analysis obviously have both
internal and external application.
5.2.4 Policy Development (P.4)
Information will be provided by the various agencies and
organizations involved in responding to policy and other regu-
latory issuances. Most information will be unclassified, but
MOO's and some of the views of cognizant or affected agencies
may fall into the classified arenas. Frequency of use and
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'7 &.S 17
Functional kNornulan
Hegrrremenl
cod. Oozuwron
11)
Source
s.roiaary
12)
Swwky
G ass'n
131
Frequency
rJaed updaN
N)
Accessibility
Rwsw lwwud Ad-ac
n.quea
11s)
Apps.
how" owwu
Use PNwMid
P.3.A
Current threat assess.
UI, State.
Pvt. Sector,
C-
Monthly
Weekly
X
X
data
CIA, DIA,
state 4 Local
T4+
INS, DEA,
Govt., public
DOT, DOE,
information
NQC, DOC,
NUB
P.3.5
National resource
cognizant
Affected
U-S
monthly
monthly
I
X
system description
Agency(iss)
Agency(ies)
P.3.C
Inderdependoncies
Legislative
Atty General,
U-S
Monthly
monthly
I
I
ii Executive
General
authorities,
Counsel
OHS,
cognizant
interagency
committees
P.3.D
Target types, critical
Cognizant
Affected
C-TS
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
Dodse, etc.
Ageacy(ies)
Agency(ies)
P.3.E
Attack lodes
do
do
C-TB
Monthly
monthly
I
X
P.3.1
Vulnerability appraisals
do
do
C-TS
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
X
P.3.G
Consequence estimates
do
do
C-TS
Monthly
monthly
I
I
X
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TABLR P.4 - POLICY DEVRLOPNENT
Functional Mrlormalion
Req wrement
Cods OsWpk"
(1)
Source
P.eawy Secenday
Security
class's
(3)
Frequency
Need Updals
(4)
Accessib I4y
Adfla:
Rouwr Lolled
(5)
Applecalwn
MMemal OuNrr
Use NoWd
P.4.A
Admin. statements/
NBC, BOP
Affected
U ?
N/A
N/A
X
I
docisioa?/directives
agencies
P.4.B
Nature i background of
Internal
General
U
N/A
N/A
X
I
issues needing
PENA,
counsel(s),
resolution
affected/
Atty General
cognizant
agencies.
interagency
cos ittees
P.4.C
Affected national
Legislation,
affected
U
N/A
N/A
X
X
resource systems
cognizant
agency(Les)
agency(ies)
P.4.D
Agencies involved
Legislative
Admin., BOP,
U
N/A
N/A
I
X
mandates/
NSC
authority
directives
P.4.1
Statutory imperatives
do
do
U
N/A
M/A
X
I
i constraints
P.4.P
Relevant exist. policy
Cognizant
do
U-8
N/A
N/A
I
I
i N.o.Urs
agency(ies),
Legislative
mandates
P.4.0
Views of major parties
cognizant
Affected
U-S
N/A
N/A
I
I
I
concerned
ageacy(ies)
agency(iee)
P.4.N
Policy implemeatatioa
do
do
U-S
N/A
N/A
I
I
X
requirements
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update requirements are not predictable and will depend upon
the priorities of each administration. FEMA should have no
restrictions or limitations on access to required informa-
tion. FEMA will produce a consolidation of the views of the
major parties concerned and offer a summation of the policy
implementation requirements for external use.
5.2.5 Planning Guidance (P.5)
FEMA will look to a variety of sources in providing civil
security planning guidance to the executive agencies. The
sources can be expected to range from Federal, State, and local
governments to various public interest groups (National Gover-
nor's Association, Council of State Governments, National Asso-
ciation of Counties, National League of Cities, U.S. Conference
of Mayors, etc.), and other private sector organizations. In'
most cases policy information will be unclassified. But infor-
mation on threats and documents outlining detailed plans and
giving the capabilities, limitations, and needed resources of
agencies are likely to carry various levels of security classi-
fication. Since the Civil Security Division must be contiw-
ually aware of national policy posture in all its activities,
frequency of need and update is on-going rather than periodic.
Some data, e.g., those on threat and vulnerability, are suffi-
ciently dynamic to require review and updating at least
monthly. The information required for planning guidance should
be routinely accessible to authorized FEMA civil security
personnel.
5.2.6 Plans Review and Evaluation (P.6)
As reviewers and evaluators of plans, civil security program
personnel must have access to the civil security plans of
5-10
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TABLE F.5 - PLANNING GUIDANCE
Functional kdormation
Requirement
Code Dssa *on
(1)
Source
penny Secondary
(2)
Security
Class'n
(3)
Frequency
Ness U14aw
N)
Accessibility
HouM? tended riequw Noc
esl
(5)
Appiscalon
real ".d
Me WaYN:I
P.54
National policy posture
SOp,NSC
Cognizant
U
M/A
MIA
X
X
ageocy(ies)
P.5.3
Statutory mandates
Existing
Atty General
U
N/A
M/A
X
X
Legislation.
Houle, SOP
P.S.C
Range of potential
cognizant
Affected
U-S
Monthly
monthly
X
I
X
threats
agency(ies)
agency(Les)
P.5.1
Vulnerabilities of
do
do
U-S
Monthly
Monthly
X
X
X
national resource
systems
P.5.E
Responsibility
Existing
Att. General
U
N/A
N/A
X
X
hierarchy/network
Legislation.
MOU's
P.5.P
Exist. plans. MOU's,
do
do
U-S
Monthly
Monthly
X
X
I
precedents
P.5.0
Capabilities '&
do
do
U-S
N/A
N/A
X
I
I
limitations of involved
ageacy(ies)
P.5.11
Resources required
Cognizant
Affected
u
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
I
agency(ies)
agency(iea).
private Ind.
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Functional k otmalon
Requiremed
code a.scs ion
(1)
Source
Pnhiary S.candoq
Set ily
Class n
(3)
Frequency
Und tV W.
44)
Accessibrily .
Roane Hewed M "DC
PA*"
(5)
/lpplicabon
YYanal ouywl
use Padua
P.6.A
Inventory of C8 plans/
Cognizant
Affected
U
S/D
Monthly
x
I
neexes
agency(ies)
agency(ies)
(State,
(State,
local,
federal.
Federal)
local)
P.6.1
O.C. roster of agency
do
do
U
8/D
Nontbly
I
I
lannsrs
P.6.C
epository of plan
do
do
U
3/0
monthly
I
P.6.D
rientation of plan
do
do
U
monthly
Monthly
I
I
P.6.1
cops 6 content
do
do
U-T8+
Qrtly
Qrtly
I
I
P.6.F
status
do
do
U
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
I
I
P.6.C
Subordinate related plans
do
do
U-TS*
8/D
Qrtly
I
I
P.6.N
lane interrelationships
do
do
U-TS*
Qrtly
Qrtly
I
I
P.6.1
Internal record of -
Internal FENA
Affected
U
Qrtly
Monthly
I
I
olicy/guidance issued
Agency(ies)
by FINA
P.6.J
eat/exercise/rsal-life
Participating/
Cognizant
U-TS*
N/A
8/D
I
I
I
data on plan application
Affected
agency(ies)
agency(iss)
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Federal, State, and local agencies. The security classifica-
tion of information on plans will depend on the agency, its
responsibilities, and the nature of postulated scenarios.
Updating of points-of-contact should occur at least monthly,
and updating of plans as required. FEMA personnel should have
routine access to most civil security plans. It may be neces-
sary to make ad hoc requests for certain sensitive plans, as
well as for status reports when new plans or significant modi-
fications are mandated, e.g., when there are changes in the
regulatory base or changes in threat assessments.
5.2.7 Program Coordination (P.7)
As in the case of program guidance and plan review and evalua-
tion, information will be needed from all the Federal, State,
and local agencies that have responsibility for, cognizance of,
or are affected by civil security actions. This information
will generally fall in the unclassified to secret range, with
some in compartmented levels. Access to information on program
coordination should generally be routine. Some limitations or
restrictions. may be imposed when compartmented information is
required. Most of the information will be used by FEMA person-
nel on an internal basis. Such items as the comprehensive
catalog of programs and a master roster of program managers
should be made available to the various agency program man-
agers. A basic catalog of mitigation and preparedness techni-
ques and technology should'be produced and distributed, as
required. Finally, status reports will be provided to FEMA
senior management. and be used for the formulation of the
periodic Director's report to the President.
5.2.8 Initiate Proposed NSC/Legislative Action (P.8)
The need to seek National Security Council (NSC) or legislative
assistance in resolving problems will require information on
5-13
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
TABLE p.7 - PROGRAM COORDINATION
Functional k Iormalion
Nequwremenl
code Damywm
(1)
Source
POMMY Seoondwy
SB`a'rily
CAM*"
(3)
Frequency
Nnd UpdAM
(4)
AccessibiNly
b I lam
Perm LOd" PA*"
(51
Appfalion
bownW Ou%Md
Uu Pia-id
P.7.A
Koster list of CS
Cognizant
Public
C-S
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
X
program$
agency(Les)
information
(State/local/
sources
private
agencies),
MSC
P.7.5
Interrelationships/
do
do
U-8
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
dependencies along
program.
P.7.C
Relevant statutes,
Existing
Affected
U-S
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
RO's, MOU'e
legislation,
agency(Les)
Cognizant
agency(iss),
NBC, sop
P.7.D
pormal steering
Cognizant
Affected
U
Monthly
Monthly
X
X
cotmittses, working
Agency(iss).
Agency(i82)
groups, panels
state/local/
private
agency's
p.7.5
Catalog of major
do
do
C-8
Monthly
Monthly
I
X
X
program components
P.7.V
Responsibility network
do
do
U-C
Weekly
Monthly
I
X
P.7.G
Boater of program
do
do
u
Weekly
Daily
I
X
X
managers etc.
P.7.N
Repertoire of mitigation
do
do
C-TS+
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
X
X
preparedness techniques
& technology
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TAILR P.7 - PROGRAM COORDINATION (Concluded)
Func*onal n4ounaUon
flequMemer
cad. o.sapw.n
(1)
Source
Piw wy S.cww:rY
Securely (2)
Class'n
(3)
Frequency
r"d Up wo
14)
Accessd 4 ily
Adibu;
nm.rr Lwww Re%WS1
(5)
Applicakon
wUse Pik l
P.7.I
Program implementation
cognizant
Affected
C-S
Monthly
monthly
I
I
strategy & schedules
agency(ies).
agency(ies)
cognizant
state/local/
private
elongate
F.7.J
Resource requirements
do
do
C-S
Monthly
monthly
I
I
P.7.9
Status of programs
do
do
C-S
Monthly
Monthly
x
I
I
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
TAMLI P,.8 - INITIATI PROPOSID NSC/LIOIBLATIVI ACTION. AS W1RMANTID
Functional Wormahon
Hequiremer-
Nature i background of
problem
I:isting directives/
legislation
PIM internal staff
views
Opinions, views from
other affected
agency(ies)
Legal i political
considerations
11)
Source
Affected
agency(ies).
NBC
Affected
agency(iss),
NBC, NOU's,
IOP
Internal
PINA
Affected
agency(ies)
Nor, use,
DOJ.
Congressional
liaison
Cognizant
agency(ies)
Cognizant
agency(ies).
Agency
counsels
Cognizant
agency(Les)
(21
secwily
Class'n
(3)
Frequency
Acre +966ft
Apphcatinn
Roulrw
&W4"
Adltr:
k u.n;Y
Ouy.M
?
PMP"
Uia
Pro*r.Y
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
X
I
x
I
I
I
I
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
the opinions and views of the affected agencies, as well as
internal staff views of interested FEMA elements. Depending on
the nature of the problem and the agencies involved, the infor-
mation may require security classification. The priorities of
the administration will determine the frequency with which FEMA
requires the information to support this functional area.
While some of the information may be obtained via other pro-
grammatic activities, it is anticipated that much of the infor-
mation will be requested by FEMA on an ad hoc basis. FEMA will
analyze the available data, summarize the nature of the pro-
blem, and recommend a proposed course of action to be submitted
to the NSC or appropriate legislative offices.
5.2.9 Advisory Assistance (P.9)
The primary sources will be those agencies that furnish intel-
ligence and security (e.g. law enforcement) information. Much
of this information will be highly classified. Frequency of
need will be dependent on the release of new developments in
technology, the responsiveness of the security community in
developing countermeasures, and the ability of the intelligence
community to maintain currency on the activities of adversary
groups. The Civil Security Division will provide reports on
new threats and security technologies to authorized
organizations.
5.2.10 Liaison with Civil Security Community (P.10)
The FEMA civil security program will require-that information
on points-of-contact, organizational structures, current
topics, problems, and issues be furnished by each of the
cognizant agencies. Most information will be at the unclassi-
fied and confidential levels. Since information will be used
frequently, it should be updated often enough to ensure
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
TAILS P,9 - ADVISORY ASSISTANCE
FunGronal wormalion
Re Weamd
New developneats in
threat technology
Now tech. vulnerabilities
in national resource
systems
Security technology for
dealing with threats/
vulnerabilities/
consequences
FBI, NRC,
TVA, SEC,
M. FCC,
FEDC, DOE,
DOT, DOG
(2)
Seciuily
Glass'n
(1)
Sauce
NSA, CIA,
public
info.
sources,
Cognizant
agency(ies)
(3)
Frequency
(4)
AccessihMyt
AaIk
45)
APP
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
TABLE 1P'-I0 - LIAISON WITH CIVIL SECURITY COMMUNITY (FEDERAL AGENCIES/STATE/PRIVATE SECTOR)
Functional brlormalion
Requirement
P.O.C. lists of liaison
counterparts by agency
& subject
Updated ref. material
on org structure i
roles of other CS
elements
Cbeckliste/briefs of
current topics, problewss
concerns of mutual
interest
(M)
Source
Cognizant
agency(ice)
(states
local,
Federal).
private
sector
(2)
Socially
Class'n
(3)
Frequency
Accessibilily
Adrwm
Requu l
Mdwisw
use
Ou4?d
Pitwkri
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
currency, particularly with respect to changes in points-of-
contact. FEMA should require and expect fairly routine access,
with some limitations imposed in the areas of agency-spgcific
or unique civil security concerns. Information utilized by
FEMA civil security personnel should generally be made
available to other agencies in the civil security community.
5.2.11 Represent FEMA on Interagency Civil Security
Committees/Groups/Task Forces (P.11)
The Civil Security Division will require input from within FEMA
concerning the FEMA position on a variety of topics. Informa-
tion from other agencies that participate in interagency meet-
ings will be required to ensure that the FEMA position is con-
ceptually correct and current. The security classification
will generally be at the secret level. Since most groups can
be expected to meet on a monthly basis, the Civil Security
Division should review and update its data monthly. Any
products, i.e., reports, studies, and meeting minutes, may be
transmitted to other FEMA staff elements on a selective basis.
Accessibility to outside agencies will probably be constrained
in such areas as agency internal positions and viewpoints.
5.2.12 Training, Test, Exercise, and Garcia Support
(Civil Security-Related Aspects) (P.12)
The Civil Security Division will require information from the
sponsor of these activities, from participating agencies, and
from other involved FEMA elements. These same sources will be
tasked to provide the Division with relevant data on test
goals, schedules, scenarios, etc. The Division will evaluate
the pertinence and applicability of the civil security aspects
and provide pre-test feedback to concerned players. Some
information, such as goals, objectives, and scenarios, will
fall into the confidential and secret classification levels.
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TABLE P,11 - REPRESENT BEM ON INTERAGENCY CS COHHITTEES/GROUPS/TASK FORCES
Funchonal
Requiremons Iwn
Cody DU$U On
Source
P mwiy Secomrrary
(2)
Security
Classn
(3)
Frequency
lXL"
Hssa
141
Accessibility
Ad Ha:
Hodes LMnAed PAqued
151
/1{m(mlicalioxm
MMwoar Ouyws
u" Pwdud
P.11.A
Master list of inter-
Cognisant
--
U
monthly
monthly
I
I
agency groups with
agency(ies),
FRM CS representation
OKB, COP,
NSC
P.11.5
Agenda of key issues/
affected
--
U-S
B/D
Monthly
I
I
problems to be addressed
interagency
committee/
group/task
force
P.11.C
Participating agencies,
do
--
U
monthly
monthly
x
I
structure of committee,
members of delegation
P.1l.D
Terms of reference on
Internal
--
U-S
monthly
monthly
I
I
VIM position ?
BIM
P.11.1
Other agency(ies)
Cognizant
--
U-S
Monthly
monthly
I
I
positions 1. views
agency(Les)
P.ll.*
Cumulative record of
Affected
--
U-S
monthly
monthly
I
I
procedings
interagency
committee/
group/task
force
P.11.G
Formal products/outcomes
do
--
U-S
Monthly
Monthly
I
I
from committee action
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TABLE P,12 - TMINING/TEST/EIERCISE/CANING SUPPORT (CS-RELATED ASPECTS)
Functional bdornwlion
RequiremerM
cods
S urce
w?a.~ s y
121
Sepxily
Class n
131
Frequency
a Up
14
Acces bft
w Lrnr.a Ad lrw
15)
App Caton
Wong- Oa4md
P.12.A
Sponsor 1 participants
Affected
Cognisant
U
8/D
Daily
I
I
Agency(ies).
Agency(ies).
Internal
Private
ram
sector
P.12.1
Planned goals i
do
do
U-8
8/D
Daily
I
I
I
objectives
P.12.C
8cbedules/tioefcasae
do
do
U-C
8/D
Daily
I
I
P.12.D
Scenario/syllabus
do
do
U-8
8/D
Daily
I
I
I
P.12.E
Control necbanism
do
do
U
8/D
Daily
I
I
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The need for information will depend on the timing of planned
training. Updates and the civil security aspects of tests will
be required daily during the execution of tests. Access will
generally be on a routine basis with some limitations imposed
on test scenarios because of their security classification.
The Civil Security Divison will generate civil security goals
and objectives for inclusion in test scenarios.
5.2.13 Periodic Strategic Net Appraisals of Civil
9' (P.13)
The sources available to FEMA in developing consolidated net
appraisals include internal FM elements, cognizant agencies,
the National Security Council, and the relevant intelligence
and security communities. A substantial portion of the infor-
mation will be dealing with the threat climate, including civil
security problem areas and shortcomings. The security classi-
fication can therefore be expected to extend into compartmented
intelligence levels, with commensurate access restrictions.
The Civil Security Divison should review appraisals monthly.
Problems and shortcomings should be forwarded from the affected
agencies as they are discussed. Remedial measure status
reports, prepared on a weekly basis, will ensure that the
Division is able to maintain currency. Information concerning
civil security problems, remedial measures status, and organi-
zational civil security capabilities will be documented and
distributed to authorized civil security community personnel.
5.3 Trans-Event Phase - Information for Response Management
Depending on the amount of warning received prior to an event
and the nature and scope of the event, the Civil Security Divi-
sion may either play a significant initial role in event
response or merely act as an advisor on the civil security
aspects of an event. The information needed during this
5-23
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
TABLE P.13 - PERIODIC STIATSCIC NET APPRAISALS OP CIVIL SECURITY
Functional Wwifte f
D~capMon
Code
Ce
Seca,W?y
P"""'y
(2)
SecurNy
Class'n
Fr (3equency
H.ra up Is
141 y
Howrw tMww an a
R
(App1cahm
U" OWPA
Proar1
P.13.A
Niatorical/statistical
Internal
State/local
U
Monthly
Monthly
X
data on threat climate
PEMA,
agency(ies),
cognisant
Private
agency(iea).
Sector
NEC
P.13.1
Historical/statistical
do
do
U
Nontbly
Monthly
Y
data on national
resource systems
P.13.C
Major CS problem areas/
do
do
C-TS+
8/D
Daily
Y
Y
X
shortcomings
P.13.0
Status of remedial
do
do
C-T8+
Weekly
Daily
Y
X
Y
neasures underway
P.13.g
Federal, state, local,
Cognisant
Public
U-TS*
Monthly
Monthly
X
Y
X
private sector CS
agency(ies),
information
capabilities
NSC. state
sources,
i local
interagency/
SOC's i
interdis-
agency(iss).
cipliaary
private
committees
sector
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
phase-in terms of frequency of use and updating, classifica-
tion, and source--will vary dramatically based on the event
scenario. As a result, the Civil Security Division must ensure
that the information processes are in place to support the easy
flow of information under varying conditions. The need for an
information system that can accomodate a variety of demands and
yet be flexible enough to ensure comprehensive access to a
broad spectrum of information is underscored in the following
discussion of the detailed parameters and constraints asso-
ciated with response management information requirements.
5.3.1 Verification of Occurrence (T.1)
The primary sources of information for an impending event or an
event-in-progress will usually be the agencies with tactical
indications and warning centers. The nature of the event, the
target, and the type of perpetrator will determine the security
classification. For example, information regarding an impend-
ing massive demonstration with a potential for large-scale dis-
ruption, will probably be unclassified; but a threat of assas-
sination against the President or other elected officials would
be handled through classified channels of communication.
Regardless of classification, information about impending or
actual events that impact the civil security program should be
routinely made available to the Civil Security Division. Where
the Division is the first activity notified within FEMA, it
will transmit the notification to the other relevant FEMA ele-
ments. POC rosters will be consulted frequently during the
event as it unfolds, so the rosters will be current. They
should be updated at least daily, preferably with immediate
notification of changes in key personnel. Depending on the
nature of the event, the radio, TV, and the wire services may
be in the.best position to provide immediate information on the
5-25
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
A
T
Q
Y
a
x
X
s
3b
. C
D
O
~
O
I
Q
d w V e~w
a Can a w
a. Oil M O
O
m
.- Q
u t~ Y O
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
occurrence of an event. A periodic summary of news media
information should be sent to FEMA emergency response manage-
ment elements by the Civil Security Division.
5.3.2 Warning and Alerting Notification (T.2)
Each agency should provide FEMA with information on its key
personnel. During an event, the points-of-contact roster
should be checked at least daily to ensure currency. To make
sure that all affected agencies can be contacted by FEMA per-
sonnel, each agency should inform FEMA of any unique notifica-
tion procedures. Because of'the classification level of key
personnel and POC rosters, procedures within some agencies may
be classified. Thus FEMA may have to conform to certain
restrictions or limitations on access. The information will be
used internally to make certain that the affected agencies can
be notified of an event by FEMA on a timely basis.
5.3.3 Decision Support (T.3)
Sources with direct and tangential responsibility must be in a
position to support FEMA's civil security activities in the
response period. For example, there is an obvious interdepen-
dence between information concerning the damage and disruption
incurred and the potential consequences. Depending on the
nature of the event scenario, the information classifications
will range from unclassified through at least secret levels.
Information required by civil security will be accessed
frequently. It should be updated at least hourly in the early
stages of the event. The scenario will ultimately determine
the need and frequency of update. Current emergency procedures
that define the Civil Security Division-Emergency Information
and Coordination Center interface should be in place and
reviewed at least monthly by the civil security staff. They
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
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5-30
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should also be updated monthly. The rapidity with which the
event unfolds will probably dictate the need for ad hoc
requests in the early stages of the event. Because the infor-
mation may be highly classified, some access limitations can be
anticipated. The Civil Security Division will also be required
to provide decision makers with consolidated information on the
civil security resources required during and immediately
following the actual event.
5.3.4 Decision Implementation Action (T.4)
The Civil Security Division will require information on
specific delegations of responsibility within each affected
agency. Information on tasking procedures should be provided
by other FEMA elements. The event scenario will determine fre-
quency of need. The Division will also need periodic updates
of each agency's responsibilities and points-of-contact. Most
information to support FEi's functions in this area should be
available on a routine access basis because it will be
unclassified.
5.3.5 Interim Coordination of Immediate Emergency Actions (T.5)
During the trans-event phase, the Civil Security Division must
have information on the primary civil security points-of-
contact from each agency. It will frequently refer to informa-
tion on rescue and evacuation assets, resources for damage
control and containment, and the status of emergency actions to
date. The frequency of updates will be dictated by the nature
of the scenario. The Division staff should have ready access,
although access to some information will be limited by high-
level security classification. The Division, in collaboration
with OEO, will prepare up-to-date summaries of information on
the civil securityrelated aspects of response operations, such
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 - -- - --------
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as relocation sites, special protective equipment, supplies,
and skilled personnel, to the affected agencies.
5.3.6 Initiate Execution Planning, Asset Mobilization, and
Readiness for Recovery (T.6)
Agencies that are responsible for recovery activities should
provide the Civil Security Division with relevant information
on plans, procedures,. and resources for post-event recovery.
While most of the information should have been provided as part
of preparedness activities, the nature and scope of the event
requires that agencies give the Division necessary updates and
changes. Most of the information snould be routinely available
to FEA, although the security classification may dictate some
restrictions. As information on recovery requirements and
resource location is compiled, it should be transmitted to the
affected agencies.
5.3.7 Congressional and Public Affairs Updates (T.7)
The Civil Security Division must have access to up-to-date
information on the civil security activities of all agencies
involved in the event. The internal FEMA procedures for
preparing and briefing information for the FEMA Congressional
relations and public affairs staffs will be used frequently
during the event. Classified data on current events may have
to be accessed and transmitted to the Congressional.
5.3.8 Hand-off/Transition to FEMA Recovery Management
Principals (T.8)
The Office of Emergency Operations should inform the Civil
Security Division of those FEMA elements that will ultimately
assume response management. In turn the Division will provide
the EICC/OEO with a record of its actions during its initial
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period of event management. It will also provide hourly
updates of its activities related to event response. Informa-
tion on responsibilities will likely be unclassified and rou-
tinely available to the Division. Notification of changes
should be furnished to the Division as frequently as necessary.
7.4 Post-Event Phase - Information Associated with Recovery
In the recovery phase, the Civil Security Division has two
generic information tasks: (a) addressing civil security-
related issues associated with the event or with the recovery
operations, and (b) evaluating the overall effectivenessa of
the Federal, State, local and private sector civil security
activities during the emergency. As noted in Chapter 4, the
information required to support recovery activities involves
maintaining communication with all agencies that were partici-
pants in the event and documentation of their actions. The
specific items and sources of information will vary, depending
on the nature of the event. The parameters and.constraints
discussed in this section continue to underscore the need for
data gathering and information dissemination that is suffi-
ciently flexibile to allow for varied sources, classification,
and frequency of use.
5.4.1 Assist FEMA Emergency Information and Coordination
Center/Office of Emergency operations and Staff
Elements R.1
Information on possible civil security problems arising from or
impinging upon recovery must be acquired from the agencies
affected and conveyed to all interested parties. Most of the
information collected and transmitted during this phase will
have a maximum security classification of secret and should be
accessible on a routine basis. Information on potential new
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
contingencies and residual on concerns must be available on at
least a daily basis. When there is a significant potential for
secondary or tertiary effects (which may alter the scale or
character of recovery demands), the Civil Security Divison
should receive and disseminate information on civil security
concerns to the EICC/OEO elements one daily basis, or more
frequently if circumstances warrant.
5.4.2 Assess Continuing/Follow-on Civil Security Threat (R.2)
Assessment information on additional targets and resource
systems must be furnished by the intelligence and security
communities. They should also furnish threat information and
estimates updates. To ensure that the Civil Security Division
can maintain flexibility and be prepared to modify its civil
security operations and network of communication channels, POC
rosters must be updated daily. Information for these activi-
ties will cover the entire range of security classification..
Reports on civil security threats must be disseminated to
affected members of the intelligence and security community.
5.4.3 Monitor Recovery Phase Activities/Progress (R.3)
Civil security personnel should monitor recovery phase activi-
ties based on information from all agencies involved. FEMA
should provide procedures for reporting to interested agen-
cies. Agency point-of-contact rosters should be provided to
the Civil Security Division, and updates should be forwarded
daily. Since most.of the information on this subject will be
classified secret or below, access by FEMA should be on a
routine basis.
5.4.4 Develop After-Action Lessons Learned (R.4)
All agencies involved in the event should prepare after-action
reports for the FEMA Civil Security Division. During the
5-40
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
recovery period, the Division will need such historical infor-
mation on a daily basis as it consolidates and summarizes the
record of what transpired. Agencies should furnished updatqs
whenever there are significant ohanges in their activities.
Much of this information will be security sensitive and will
require appropriate classification and commensurate restric-
tions on access. Copies of these summaries, including appro-
priate recommendations, should be disseminated to all appro-
priate agencies and organizations in the civil security
community.
5.4.5 Reappraise/Adjust Policy, Plans, and Programs (R.5)
All agencies involved in the event must provide the Civil
Security Division with after action reports on the event. As
in the case of after-action reports, much of the information on
needed adjustments and improvements in civil security policy,
plans, and programs will be security sensitive and will there-
fore require appropriate classification and restriction on
access. Recommendations on improvements needed will be for-
warded to affected agencies.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89BO133OR000600870001-6
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
Civil Security
Central Intelligence Agency
Functional/logistic areas of highest
vulnerability within a national resource
system
Mitigation, preparedness, response, and
recovery activities to reduce the
consequences of terrorism, civil disorder,
sabotage, and subversion
Civil Security Division Division under the Office of Mobilization
Preparedness within the National
Preparedness Programs Directorate of FEMA
concerned with civil security matters
Code Word
Compartmented
Control Mechanism
A specific security classification above
Top Secret
A specific security classification above
Top Secret
In an exercise, test, or game, the method
by which it is managed, the operational
constraints and degrees of freedom, and the
method for. determining success or failure
Critical Nodes Functional/logistic areas of highest
vulnerability within a national resource
system
?Civil Security
Civil Security Division of FEMA
Drug Enforcement Administration
Defense Intelligence Agency
Department of Commerce
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Department of Transportation
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/09: CIA-RDP89B01330R000600870001-6
E ICC
FLEA Regions
FERC
FPC
GSA .
Management Information
System
Matrix of
Responsibiliee
National Resource
Systems
Essential element(s) of information
Emergency Information and Coordination
Center within FEMA
Executive order
Executive Office of the President
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Emergency Management Agency
The ten geographic regions of FEMA in the
United States, each under a regional office
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Power Commission (now FERC)
General Services Administration
Department of Health and Human Services
Immigration and Naturalization Service
A computer-based organizational information
system which provides data to support
management activities and functions
A method of graphically relating agencies
to their respective areas of responsibility
Memorandum of understanding
The thirteen categories, defined in Figure
2.2, potentially vulnerable to disruption
by terrorism, civil disorder, sabotage, and
subversion
National Emergency Management System
National Intelligence Estimate
A-4
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Post-Event Recovery
Phase
Pre-event Preparedness
Phase
Readiness Posture
Responsibility Network
SEC
S /D
SNIE
SS
Straw Man
National Preparedness Programs Directorate
in FEMA
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
National Security Agency
National Security Council
Office of Emergency Operations in FEMA
Office of Management and Budget
Presidential directive
Point(s) of contact
Petroleum, oil, and lubricants
The period of activity, following a civil
security event, in which recovery
operations occur
The period of continuous, on-going activity
in preparation for and prior to a civil
security event
The capabilities for dealing with a
contingency
The interrelationships and overlap among
agencies' responsibilities
Securities and Exchange Commission
Scenario Dependent
State and Local Programs and Support
Directorate in FEMA
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Secret Service
A technique used to test the applicability,
relevance, and usefulness of a proposed
central idea
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WHSR White House Situation Room
Threat Climate Appraisals of the likelihood, context, and
form of terrorism, civil disorder,
sabotage, or subversion
Trans-event Response the period of activity during and
Phase immediately following a civil security
event in which immediate reaction-response
measures are taken
TVA Tennessee Valley Authority-
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Internal
External
W-20
F. Holland C. Light (20)
J. Nuneville D. Ray
W-21
C. Fritz
T.
E.
H.
Hunzeker
Janicik (5)
Strong
W-21 File (2)
W-27
F.
Tompkins
W-30
W.
M. Hall
W-50
M.
Scholl
W-73
S.
R. Hirsch
W-74
D.
R. Friedman
Document Control
Atre/Metreu Library
Records and Resources
D-1
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