THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP02T06251R000900260001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 23
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 2, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1959
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ILLEGIB
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
Trench Coats Are Scarce at the CIA Alvin Silverman
(Cleveland Plain Dealer)
The CIA Story Don Whitehead
(New York Herald Tribune)
America's Secret Army Feared, Respected by Reds
Powers Spending Billions on Intelligence Network
Allen Dulles, `Master Spy' with Look of a Professor
U. S. Got Advance Report That Hungary Might Revolt
Agents Chosen with Care to Keep U. S. Secret Safe
The $350-Million-a-Year CIA Writes Its Own
Tight-Mouthed Ticket
(Washington Post & Times Herald)
The Other Mr. Dulles-of the CIA Russell Baker
(New York Times Magazine)
The Secret History of a Surrender Forrest Davis
(Saturday Evening Post)
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
"REPRODUCED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF THE
CLEVELAND PLAIN DEALER"
MARCH 1, 1959
Trench Coats Are Scarce
at the CIA
For Reel
. li7,e come tvith me to
Crlshall."
By ALVIN SILVERMAN
Plain Dealer Bureau
ASHINGTON, Feb.
28-There are two
types of United
States intelligence agents.
One wears a trench coat,
spotless white and buttoned
tight beneath the chin. His
narrow-brimmed hat snaps
low across the eyes, so that
vision is exercised by peer-
ing sidewise.
His habitat is Marrakesh,
Morocco; Aleppo, Syria, and
Kirkuk, Iraq, although, on oc-
casion, an assignment takes him
into a heavily shadowed alley
of the Casbah in Algiers.
college debates than football
names.
It also is quite likely that the
real agent of the CIA will be
a woman and one who is more
adept at running a Univac than
in mixing drug-laden cocktails.
That there is so much mis-
conception about our Central
Intelligence Agency and its
personnel is hardly an accident.
Dy law, it is empowered to
"withhold publication of titles,
salaries or numbers of person-
nel employed." Its director has
specific authority to spend
money "without regard to the
provisions of law and regula-
tions relating to the expendi-
ture of government funds" on a
voucher certified by him alone.
the arganization tirst formed
for this purpose originated in a
letter dated Jan. 22, 1946, in
which President Harry S. Tru-
man directed Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes, Secre-
tary of War Robert P. Patter-
son, Secretary of the N a v y
J a m e s V. Forrestal and the
President's personal represent-
ative, Admiral William D.
Leahy. to form the "national
intelligence authority."
This authority was instructed
to plan, develop and co-ordinate
"all federal foreign intelligence
activities" in order to accom-
plish "the intelligence mission
related to the national security."
The National Intelligence Au-
thority and its operating com-
ponent, the Central Intelligence
Group, were in existence for 21
months. Under the terms of the
National Security Act, which
became effective in September
of 1947, they were superseded
by the National Security Coun-
cil and the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Central Intelligence does not
confirm or deny stories of the
press, whether good or bad. It
never identifies its
alibis
never
,
can run faster in his
personnel
He suede, pointed shoes than Jesse except for a few in
Owens could sprint in spikes. the top echelon and will not. dis-
from the arms cuss its methods of operation
Ile breaks away
or sources of information.
an amorous female barely in . It
time to avoid a m i n i a t u r e sloughs off just about every-
scimitar between the shoulder thing by blandly explaining:
blades but soon enough to lay "We can't live in a goldfish
low his s w a r t h y assailant, bowl."
either with judo or 25 shots For obvious reasons. its bud-
,-(without reloading' from a six- et is secret, although this hard-
shooter. 1y is a mark of distinction in
This agent is found on tele- Washington. Try to find out
vision, the motion picture some time, Mr. Taxpayer, how
screen and in paper-bound nov- much your congressman spent
els at bus terminals. on an overseas junket or what
Then there is the other type. it costs to run his office or how
He is employed by the federal Much pension he will get when
government, probably in the he retires, voluntarily or at the
Central Intelligence Agency. suggestion of the electorate.
He is more likely to have a There is, however, nothing
slide rule in his pocket than a vague about the responsibilties
revolver. It is more probable of the agency, whose Washing-
he will be in a laboratory peer- ton operations alone are housed
ing through a microscope or at in 38 buildings, all of them so
a cartography desk drawing a closely guarded that you need a
map than racing across the pass to enter the rooms where
desert atop a commandeered cigarettes and Cokes are sold,
I camel. Incidentally, by the spring of
His training has been in for- 1961, CIA will be in one $46,-
eign languages, economics and 000,000 building situated on a
history, sociology and political 14U-acre tract near Langley, Va.
science, rather than in how to The United States has carried
I appear inconspicuous at a coun- on intelligence activities since
cil of African pygmy chiefs. the d a y s of G. Washington,
He knows far more about president, but only since World
electronics than breaking out War II has this work been sys-
of a Harbin hoosegow and the tematized on a government-wide
rhaace.s arc that hr won more basis.
The National Security Coun-
cil, which meets weekly, is com-
posed of the President, vice
president, secretaries of state
and defense, the head of the
Office of Defense Mobilization
and a couple of advisers and
executive assistants.
Central Intelligence Agency
was ordered by the act to:
ADVISE the National Secu-
rity Council with respect to
governmental intelligence ac-
tivities related to the national
security.
CORRELATE and evaluate
intelligence related to the na-
tional security.
PERFORM ser\ices of com-
mon concern for the benefit of
existing intelligence agencies.
PERFORM other functions
and duties as directed by the
National Security Council.
The agency was given no
police, subpoena, or law en-
forcement powers or internal
security functions.
Thus, the Central Intelligence
Agency has become the federal
government's analyst of infor-
mation affecting our security.
its director, at present Allen
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
W. Dulles, brother of the sec-
retary of state, acts in con-
junction with the heads of the
intelligence organizations of
the Army, Navy, Air Force,
State Department and Atomic
Energy Commission, plus rep-
resentatives of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation and
the joint chiefs of staff. He
then makes recommendations
to the National Security Coun-
cil concerning the intelligence
structure of our government as
a whole.
intelligence vital to the se-
curity of the United States and
on which our foreign policy is
based has become as extensive
and involved as the methods of
our enemies.
No longer do we need know
only about the number of sub-
marines prowling off North
American shores or the guided
missile arsenal or the move.
ment of troops.
Perhaps more importantly
we must know about the build-
rip of industries in foreign
lands, economic conditions, the
popularity of office holders with
their people, weather and its
effect on crops and transporta-
tion, propaganda techniques and
how. much and what kind of
assistance these countries are
getting from whom.
Thus, the gathering of this
intelligence has expanded from
mingling with people to an
analysis by scientists, account-
ants, historians and geogra-
phers. It entails translating dif-
ficult foreign languages and es-
tiniating political and technolo-
gical trends.
For that reason, the person-
nel being admitted to the Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency today
are, in a large degree, special-
ists, or individuals with a scho-
lastic and environmental back-
ground that can help them be-
come specialists.
And how does one obtain em-
ployment with the CIA?
It isn't easy. Ira the first
place, the agency is, to quote
one of its key administrators,
"not looking for people in any
large numbers."
Out of every 1,000 applica-
tions for employment, some 800
are screened out by the per-
sonnel officials. That leaves 200
applicants. Of these, 22 are
eliminated because security in-
vestigation disclosed they d_in'.c
too much, talk too much or
have relatives behind the Iron
'~'IiIIMIU~!I'IfIllllllillli!illllii!I!!!!!illi!i!IIfilCuliB!IIICIiCiClhlBil!IIIIIPC!CI !.",IIrIiIP-/
For Real
" ... oh, I'm not an egghead,
I'm a U.S. intelligence agent.'
Curtain which may make them
subject to foreign pressure.
The vast majority of the ap-
plicants actually has been
sought out by the Central In-
telligence Agency, which main-
tains a regular staff of recruit-
ers to persuade certain kinds
of college students that they
may have a fascinating career
awaiting them.
Assistance from College
Placement Officers
Recruiters work through col-
lege placement officers and talk
only to potential candidates in-
dividually, never in groups. The
students they are specially look-
ing for are outstanding in for-
eign languages, or the sciences,
have shown some interest in
foreign affairs and, while not
necessarily the top c a m p u s
leaders, h a v e demonstrated
some capacity to assume re-
sponsibility. They need not be
intellectuals but they must
have stood high in their class.
It is not necessary that the
males he athletic, although that
certainly is no handicap. Above
all, they must have a good rep-
utation for dependability and
"loyalty." Incidentally, t h e y
either must have completed
military service or be prepared
to take a leave of absence from
the C. I. A. to complete it. The
agency wants no dodgers and it
does not want to be an escape
hatch for those disinclined to
take basic training.
If a student evidences inter-
est in the C. I. A. even after .he
'has been told that his starting
salary will not exceed $5.000
and there is not much chance
that he ever will go beyond
$14,000 a year, he is brought
to Washington for a series of
tests. These make the college
board examinations seem like
study hall doodling. Half of
them concern his intellectual
abilities, the remainder his
likes, dislikes and attitudes.
Provided he is adjusted bright
enough and able to work well
with people under trying cir-
cumstances. The potential in-
telligent agent then must un-
dergo a series of rather rigor-
ous physical examinations.
That negotiated, a back-
ground check is started which
encompasses his family, friends,
habits, viewpoint, personality
and how many eggs he had for
breakfast. All that the agency
cares to say about this phase
is that the check is "extensive
and expensive" and takes six
weeks to four months to com-
plete.
If still "in line," the applicant
is told to report for an on-the-
job training program. This
takes from one to two years.
It depends on his special field
how broad the program is. That
is, an electronics engineer would
not be put through the same
"general" training as a foreign
language specialist.
Wish for Overseas Duty
Isn't Satisfied Fast
Many of the agents desire
overseas duty. They seldom get
it before the third or fourth
year in the agency.
While working for the C. I.
A., the agents enjoy regular
civil service status and their
pay is in accord with the civil
service bases of other depart-
ments.
A number of intelligence
agents are attracted to private
industry, particularly the sci-
ence specialists. Rarely does
one leave to go to another gov-
ernmental agency. The girls
leave for marriage in about the
same proportion as the girls of
other divisions, which is why
the agency leans to the employ-
ment of men.
Why would a
want to be an
agent?
young man
intelligence
"He knows that he is helping
furnish information on which
our foreign policy is based," an
official of the agency explained.
"He knows that the work is apt
to take him into any part of the
world. He has access to infor.
mation not held by the public,
which is a satisfying matter to
many.
"He realizes he is making a
real contribution to world his-
tory. He is serving his country
and free men. The pay is not
too bad, as government pay
goes, and he has, although we
don't like to mention it, oppor-
tunity to go into private in-
dustry, which always is looking
for people with his background
and training."
As the man said, Central In-
telligence Agency is "not look-
ing for people in any large
numbers." Especially those with
cloaks and daggers and cigar-
ettes that dangle from the lips.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF DON WHITEHEAD
AND TEE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE"
JULY 13, 1958
The C. I. A. Story
America's Secret Army
Feared, Respected by Reds
The following series was guard against American - in -
written by Don Whitehead, spired espionage and subver-
author of "The F. B. 1. sion.
Radio Moscow complains that
Story" and former Wash- the United States has raised
ington Bureau Chief of the subversive activities "to the
New York Herald Tribune. level of a state policy," spy
This is the first of five warnings are echoed by the
articles. press and radio in East Berlin,
The United States is deploying
a secret legion throughout the
world today in the grim battle
against communism.
This legion is something new
in American history. It's a pro-
fessional undercover army of
men and women who walk the
streets of strange cities in far-
away countries living two lives
-- sometimes in
the shadow of
death.
Its members
are recruited
from many na-
tions and they
are drawn to-
gether with two
common goals
-the defense of
the free world
and the even-
tual downfall of dictatorial
communism.
Prague, Warsaw and Peking.
From time to time there are
hints that the C. I. A. has pene-
trated the Iron Curtain and at
times has reached even into
the councils of the Communist
leaders in satellite states.
In informed Administration
sources it is said the C. I. A. is
nearing maturity-and can now
be rated among the top intelli-
gence agencies in the world.
Status 11 Years Ago
transmitted to the interested
military commanders."
At the time of Pearl Harbor
there was no one person
or group responsible-as the
C. I. A. is now responsible-for
pulling all intelligence informa-
tion together for an evaluation
and warning. And throughout
World War II there was no
completely centralized intelli-
gence system.
Chinese Reds'
Surprise of 1950
In 1950 there was plenty of
information, too, that the Chi-
nese Reds were massing in
Manchuria along the Yalu
River and that they intended
to launch a massive attack
against the army of Gen. Doug-
las MacArthur.
At that time Gen. Walter
Bedell Smith, then director of
C. I. A., was in the process of
establishing a new procedure
Contrary to some reports,
president Eisenhower and Sec-
retary of State John Foster
Dulles were not caught by sur-
prise even though the attack
was masked behind a wall of
official secrecy.
Israel Army Build-Up
Was First Tip to C. 1. A.
Here is what happened, ac-
cording to a reliable source:
American intelligence agents
in Israel noted the sudden mo-
bilization of Israeli youth who
left their jobs in shops, in fac-
tories and on the farms to join
their units. This build-up of the
Israeli Army to two-thirds of
total mobilization simply could
not be hidden in a country the
size of Israel.
The Administration was ad-
vised that Israel was not going
to attack Jordan-and that any
moves in that direction were
nothing more than a smoke-
screen for an attack toward
Suez.
Agents on Cyprus watched
the British and French activity
there, the combat loading of
troops, and readying of war
planes and paratroopers. The
British were so secret in their
intentions that they did not
reveal the plan to some of their
commanders - but the French
gave briefings to their news-
paper correspondents assigned
to combat units.
Additional information came
from London and from Paris as
the then Prime Minister An-
thony Eden and French Foreign
Minister Guy Mollet met in un-
usual conferences.
he prepared an estimate for
President Truman to take with
him to his celebrated meeting
with Gen. MacArthur on Wake
Island in the fall of 1950. The
estimate indicated that the
Chinese Communists would in-
tervene in Korea to protect the
reservoirs. After the conference,
however, the President said that
Gen. MacArthur had assured
him that the Chinese would not
intervene. They did-and with
tragic results.
Through the years the myth
grew-with some truth involved
-that Americans were suckers
around an international con-
ference table and in the field
of international intelligence.
Eleven years ago the C. I. A.
was a gawky amateur among the
big-power professionals in the
field of espionage, counter-espi-
onage, the gathering of intelli-
gence and the evaluation of
information gathered.
The C. I. A. developed from
historical necessity. Perhaps
the worst intelligence debacle
in American history was the
failure of government and mili-
tart' leaders to anticipate the
Japanese attack on Pearl Har-
These faceless and nameless
men and women are agents of
the Central Intelligence Agency
(C. I. A.) - the super-secret
Federal agency which was born
just eleven years ago this month.
Their primary mission is to
siphon information from behind
the Iron Curtain and to place
in the hands of Administration
leaders the intelligence they
need in zhaping American for-
eign policy and in countering
Kremlin maneuvers.
Alarms are sounding through-
out the Communist world from
Moscow to Peking, warning
officials and others to be on
bor. There were enough facts
known for the Army and Navy
commanders in Hawaii to have
been alerted by Washington in
time to avert the disaster.
From a Hoover Commission
report: "Information necessary
to anticipate the attack actu-
ally was available to the gov-
ernment, but there was no sys-
tem in existence to assure that
the information, properly eval-
uated, would be brought to the
attention of the President and
his chief advisers, so that ap-
propriate decisions could be
made and timely instructions
The C. I. A. has tried to over-
come in eleven years what this
country failed to do for 165
years-establish a professional
corps of experts to gather, co-
ordinate and assess world-wide
information.
Its operation is shrouded in
such secrecy that only the Pres-
ident and a few top administra-
tion officials really know how
good or even how big the
C. I. A. is today. But an encour-
aging sign that our intelligence
system has made long strides
came in October, 1956, when
when - without diplomatic
warning - Britain, France and
Israel launched their attack
against Egypt and the Suez
Canal.
Twenty-four hours before the
attack, it is said, the White
House had specific warning in
the form of an intelligence esti-
mate that Israel would attack
Egypt while British and French
forces would invade the Suez
Canal.
One source who should know
said: "Suez was the best intel-
ligence job ever done by the
C. I. A."
TOMORROW: Mr. White-
head reports how the world's
,great and small powers are
pend.ino billions of dollars on
espionage and counterespio-
nage.
L 1958, N.Y. Herald Tribune Inc.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF DON WHITEHEAD
AND THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE"
JULY 1 4,, 1958
The C. I. A. Story
Powers Spending Billions
On Intelligence Networks
The following series was
written by Don Whitehead,
author of "The F. B. I.
Story" and former Wash.
ington Bureau Chief of the
New York Herald Tribune.
This is the second of five
articles.
By Don Whitehead
"Gentlemen don't read each
other's mail."
This was the naive and
trusting statement of Secre-
tary of State
Henry Stimson
In 1929 when
he denied fur-
ther funds to
the State De-
partment's
modest foreign
intelligence op-
eration then
known as "The
Black Chamber.
But the gentlemen of yester-
day have had to face the facts
of life in a world where Infor-
mation is an essential part of
government operations.
Today the great and small
powers collectively are spend-
ing billions of dollars to "read
each other's mail" in a twilight
world of espionage and coun-
ter-espionage.
Russia alone is estimated to
have 250,000 agents in her
intelligence network in addi-
tioan to the Communist party
members and fellow travelers
who willingly feed information
into the pipeline. This esti-
mate has been given to the
Senate Internal Security sub-
committee by former Soviet
intelligence agents who de-
fected to the West.
Also, it is believed that Rus-
sia spends some $2 billion a
year to support the vast sys-
tern which achieved its great-
est success in filching atomic
~)omb secrets from the United
States-by Persuading British
scientist Klaus Fuchs, Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg and others
to betray their own countries.
Intelligence System
Survival Insurance
Since the start of World War
IT. the United States has been
forced into a growing aware-
ness that intelligence is a form
of insurance for survival. It
has been defined in this way:
"Intelligence deals with all the
things which should be known
(by the government) in advance
of initiating a course of action."
For 165 years, the United
States stood on the sidelines
and took the view that clandes-
tine intelligence operations were
at best a sordid business. This
attitude was , possible because
our government was isolated
from the main stream of world
politics and world responsibility.
But today the United States
is, the leader of the free world.
President Eisenhower and his
lieutenants must know what is
going on in the Middle East, in
the Far East, in Europe and
South America and-most im-
portant of all-behind the Iron
Curtain.
Ironically, even though intel-
ligence work has become such a
vital function in government
planning and policy-making,
the armed forces to this day
have never made a career in
this branch as attractive as
other branches. In all the serv-
ices, a tour in intelligence tra-
ditionally has been regarded
merely as a stepping stone to
promotion-not as a career in
itself which can lead to the
highest rank and prestige.
12 U. S. Intelligence
Agencies in 1955
In 1955, the Hoover Com-
mission task force reported that
some twelve major Federal de-
partments and agencies were
involved In some form of in-
telligence work. But the prin-
cipal agencies are the Central
Intelligence Agency, the State
Department, the armed forces,
the Atomic Energy Commission
and the F. B. I., the latter be-
ing responsible in. the field of
domestic espionage and coun-
ter-espionage and other activi-
ties relating to internal security.
The C. I. A. Is responsible for
co-ordinating the foreign intel-
ligence effort, and it is seeking
to build a career service and
an organization commanding
the respect and prestige enjoyed
by the 300-year-old British
"Silent Service."
The first major effort of the
United States in foreign intelli-
gence came In 1940 when Pres-
ident Franklin D. Roosevelt au-
thorized the F. B. I. to organize
a Special Intelligence Service
(S. I. S.) to combat Nazi spy
rings using South America as
a base for espionage in the
Western Hemisphere.
F. B. I. secret agents slipped
into Central and South Amer-
ica and uncovered ring after
ring using clandestine radios
to transmit information to
Germany. And then the Ofllce
of Strategic Services t,0. S. S..i
evolved during the war as the
government's arm for espio-
nage and sabotage against the
Axis powers outside South
America. It was commanded by
Maj. Gen. William (Wild Bill)
Donovan.
The 0. S. S. was a pioneer
in big-scale foreign intelligence
work-but in its crash develop-
ment it was Infiltrated by Com-
munists. Also, it had the repu-
tation, deservedly or not, of be-
ing a haven for some socialites
whose undercover work seemed
to be confined largely to the
Washington and New York
cocktail circuits.
Pipeline to German
High Command
Some wags said the Initials
0. S. S. means "Oh, so social."
And this cloud hung over
0. S. S. at war's er.d, although
the organization had achieved
some spectacular successes such
as establishing a direct pipe-
line into the German High
Command.
The Truman administration
and Congress recognized the
urgent need for more and better
intelligence gathering and as-
sessment as the cold war spread
over the world. And so it was
that Congress enacted legisla-
tion in July, 1947, which
established the C. I. A. as an
arm of the National Security
Council.
This action tied the intelli-
zence operation directly to the
President's office since the
K. S. C. is responsible for ad-
vising the President "with re-
spect to the integration of do-
mestic foreign, and military
Policies relating to the national
security so as to enable the
military services and other de-
partments and agencies of gov-
ernment, to co-operate more
effectively in all matters involv-
ing' national security."
While the C. I. A. has no di-
rect administrative authority
over other intelligence groups,
it does have the responsibility
under law "to correlate and
evaluate intelligence relating
to national security" and it
must perform "such additional
services of common concern as
the National Security Council
determines can be more effi-
ciently accomplished centrally."
TOMORROW: Mr. White-
head draws a profile of Amer-
ica's "master spy"-Allen W
Dulles, C. I. A. director, whc
guided one of the most suc-
cessful and daring espionage
operations of World War II.
71958. N.Y. Herald Tribune Inc.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF DON WHITEHEAD
AND THE NEW YORK H1LD TRIBUNE"
The C. 19 A. Story
Allen Dulles, `Master Spy
With Look of a Professor
By Don Whitehead
The folloNsing series was
written by Don Whitehead. au-
thor of "The F. B. 1. Storv" and
former Washington Bureau
Chief of the New York Herald
Tribune. This is the third of
five articles:
America's "master spy" looks
more like a college professor
than the man
who pulls the
strings in a vast
game of inter-
national In-
trigue.
He greets his
visitors with a
booming voice
and a quick
smile and, as he
talks, sprawls
his tall frame in
an easy chair,
puffing on a
battered pipe.
On the wall behind his desk
is a map of the world-his field
of operations in gathering in-
telligence on which President
Eisenhower must depend for so
many vital decisions in foreign
policy.
He chooses his words care-
fully and leaves the impression
at times that he's thinking out
loud as he mentally places the
pieces together in a giant puzzle.
He told a recent visitor: "The
present danger is not nuclear
war. The Russians know what
nuclear war would mean in
terms of destruction.
"They're moving cautiously.
They don't want to create an
incident that will lead to war or
open intervention by the United
States. But this caution doesn't
mean they are not exploiting
every advantage possible short
of war."
C. 1. A. Not at Best, but
15, 1958
and which included Allen
Dulles.
Gen. Smith called Mr. Dulles
--then practicing law in New
York-and said: "You wrote
this damn report-now come on
down here and help me carry
it out."
"ix-Month Stay
Extends to Six Years
Mr. Dulles came to Washing-
ton in early 1951 intending to
stuy six months but was per-
suaded to remain as deputy di-
recto.. Ana tireu in February,
1953, he was named director by
President Eisenhower.
Now it's Allen Dulles' job to
see to it that there isn't an-
other "Pearl Harbor" in Amer-
ica's future.
Mr. Dulles has been called
America's "master spy" not
only because he directs the
C. I. A. operation-but also be-
cause he directed and of the
most successful and daring es-
pionage, operations in World
War II.
In November, 1942-just as
the Allied armies were invad7
ing North Africa, Mr. Dulles
slipped across the border of
Switzerland from German-oc-
cupied France. He set up head-
quarters in Bern. His mission
was to contact the anti-Nazi
underground in Germany-if
there was one.
There came a time when Mr.
Dulles sat in a hotel room in
Bern and faced a visitor from
Germany. He was a huge man,
six feet four inches tall, named
Hans Bernd Gisevius. He repre-
sented himself. to be a member
of the Abwehr, the German
secret intelligence service.
-will go in talking about the
effectiveness of the C. I. A.,
which he has directed for the
last five years.
The C. I. A. is eleven years old
and its agents are Steployed
around the globe in a dangerous
game of seeking information
which will disclose, among other
things, the capabilities and in-
tentions of the Soviet Union and
Its satellites!
Supplementing the work of
these agents is a research or-
ganization which pulls together
Information from news dis-
patches, foreign radio broad-
casts, technical publications.
interviews with travelers and
scores of other sources.
At the center of this infor-
mation network sits Mr. Dulles,
who quit a lucrative New York
law practice to return to an
absorbing game which first
fascinated him as a youth in
World War I. when he was in
the diplomatic service.
Around him he has some 100
veterans who have had from
ten to fifteen years' experience
in intelligence work-some of
them as saboteurs and spies op-
erating behind the enemy lines
in World War II. These experi-
enced men form the hard core
of the C. I. A.
A source familiar with the
development of the C. I. A. re-
calls:
"For the first few years, the
C. I. A. had trouble establishing
Its position and relationship
with the older intelligence
agencies in the government.
There were some jealousies and
frictions. C. I. A. didn't have
much prestige until "Beedle"
Smith (Gen. Walter Bedell
Smith) became director in late
1950.
"Smith let everybody know
he was in command. He cleaned
up the organization - kicking
out the misfits, the martini set
and those who couldn't pass a
strict security test. He was
tough, and he hardened the or-
ganization."
Soon after he became direc-
tor, Smith came across a 1948
study of C. I. A. operations
made by a special board ap-
pointed by President Truman
Better Than Realized
When asked to rate his or-
ganization-the central Intelli-
gence Agency-alongside for-
eign intelligence systems, he
says: "We are maturing. We're
not as good as we want to be,
but we're better than a great
many people realize."
This is as far as Allen Welsh
Dulles-America's "master spy"
Dulles later told a friend:
"We circled each other like a
couple of strange dogs, neither
knowing whether he could trust
the other."
Brit the American decIded to
trust the German. Gisevius said
he and others-including some
of the top German military
leaders-were convinced Hitler
must be destroyed to save their
country from ruin. He said the
[underground was planning -to
[kill Hitler. Gisevius wanted the
United States to pledge support
to a new anti-Nazi regime if
and when Hitler was killed.
Mr. Dulles tried to enlist
American support for Gisevius.
No support came-but this
didn't stop the plotting which
was climaxed when a bomb ex-
ploded near Hitler at his East
Prussian headquarters on July
20, 1944. History might have
been changed had the blast
not been deflected by the heavy
leg of a table. Hitler was badly
hurt. He screamed orders to
find and kill the platters. But
Gisevius escaped with help from
Dulles and now lives in Dallas,
Tex.
During this plotting. Mr.
Dulles established contact with
another anti-Hitler German
who was an official in the Ger-
man foreign office-with access
to vital war secrets. The British
had cautiously refused to deal
with this man who Mr. Dulles
to this day will identify only
as "George Wood."
Again Mr. Dulles decided to
trust "George Wood" as he had
trusted Gisevius. The trust was
well repaid - because Wood
slipped more than 2,600 secret
documents from the War Office
and the Foreign office to Mr.
Dulles in Switzerland-evading
the Gestapo by elaborate sub-
terfuge.
It was in this operation that
Mr. Dulles learned of the top-
secret Nazi rocket experiments
being carried on at Peene-
munde. He was able to warn the
British who verified the infor-
mation in time to turn their
...ambers against Peenemunde
and the rocket sites.
It has been estimated that
this information alone set the
Germans back six months in
their rocket plans - and saved
England from weeks of batter-
ing by the rockets.
Even though the C. I. A. is
a youngster compared with the
British "Silent Service," Mr.
Dulles is convinced it is better
than the British-and improv-
ing with age.
The C. I. A. chief, now sixty-
five, is a gregarious, fun-loving
man with a twinkle in his blue
eyes. He likes parties-but he
and his wife have learned the
trick of showing tip at swank
official functions-and then
ducking out early so that he
can receive after-dark callers
and catch up on reports from
around the world.
He is married to the former
Clover Todd, whose father was
a Columbia University profes-
sor. They have two sons and
three daughters.
On his broad shoulders, Mr.
Dulles carries a terrific respon-
sibility. He knows that if there
is a failure in intelligence-the
buck stops at his door.
Tomorrow: Flow the United
States was advised by the
C. 1. A. well in advance of the
Hungarian revolt and the re-
cent struggle for power in the
Kremlin in contrast to the fail-
ure of intelligence in the Ko-
rean War.
?1958; N.Y. Herald Tribune Inc.
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"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF DON WHITEHEAD
AND THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE"
JULY 16, 1958
The C.1. A. Story
U. S. Got Advance Reports
That Hungary Might Revolt
By Don Whitehead
The following series was
written by Don Whitehead, au-
thor of "The F. B. I. Story" and
former Washington Bureau
Chief of the New York Herald
Tribune. This is the fourth of
five articles.
More than two years ago a
small group of men gathered
behind locked doors in Wash-
ington to as-
sess the mean-
ing of secret
reports of
growing unrest
in Russia's sat-
ellite states of
Poland and
Hungary.
Their conclu-
sion: The peo-
ple in these
two countries
were becom-
ing so bitterly
defiant of Russian domination
that a revolt was quite pos-
sible-and the explosion logi-
cally could be expected first
in Poland.
The explosion came first in
Hungary-after rumblings in
Poland-because events that no
one could foresee combined to
touch off the spontaneous out-
burst which rocked the world of
communism.
But the estimate prepared
long in advance of the event by
the Central Intelligence Agency,
informed sources say, alerted
the Eisenhower administration
to expect the violence when it
did erupt.
C. 1. A. Gave
U. S. Warning
Thus the super-secret C. I. A.
-while unable to say precisely
where and when the event
would occur-did succeed in
warning the United States gov-
ernment of the crisis taking
shape behind the Iron Curtain.
A few weeks after the October
revolution in Hungary, reports
reaching intelligence sources
here disclosed a power struggje
under way in the Kremlin.
These reports were that the
Politburo was split, with Com-
munist party boss Nikita
Khrushchev heading one far-
tion against another including
V. M. Molotov and Georgi Ma-
lenkov-and Marshal Georgi
Zhukov in a position to swing
the balance of power.
Six months later the world
was "surprised" by the news
that Khrushchev-with Zhu-
kov's support-had won a
crushing victory against his op-
position. Since then Molotov
has been exiled to a post as
ambassador to Outer Mongolia,
and Zhukov himself has been
banished from power.
The success achieved in these
intelligence efforts strongly
hints that the eleven-year-old
C. I. A. at last is rounding into
a position where it can be re-
garded as a mature service that
is fast correcting mistakes of
the past.
Eight years ago the C. I. A.
had not developed the ma-
chinery for making intelligence
estimates as it does today-with
the result that the United
States suffered sorely in Korea.
The tragedy there was that the
government had ample infor-
mation on the intentions of the
North Koreans and Red Chinese
-but no one read it correctly.
In March, 1950, American in-
telligence received reports out
of Red China that the North
Korean Red army would at-
tack across the 38th Parallel in
June. But this warning was
discounted by the Pentagon, the
State Department and United
States headquarters in Tokyo as
just another false alarm. The
North Koreans succeeded in
achieving surprise by masking
their intentions behind a series
of false alarms and minor forays
across the parallel.
Reports of Chinese
Attack Discounted
The second failure of intelli-
gence in Korea involved the
massive attack by the Chinese
Reds-the attack in November
which shattered Gen. Douglas
MacArthur's home-by-Christ-
mas offensive.
As early as September, Amer-
ican intelligence had reports
from Chinese and Northern
Korean agents that the Chinese
Reds were massing troops in
Manchuria along the Yalu River
on the border of North Korea.
This fact was disclosed to the
American troops and war corre-
spondents then en route to
make the assault at Inchon
harbor - the landing which
crushed the Northern Korean
Army.
On Oct. 3, the Foreign Min-
ister of Red China informed the
Indian Ambassador that if the
United Nations troops crossed
the 38th Parallel, then Red
China would intervene in de-
fense of North Korea. Similar
warnings were given by the Chi-
nese to other U. N. representa-
tives in Peiping. Also they were
broadcast by radio.
But not every one in Wash-
ington or Tokyo drew accurate
conclusions. Estimates that
were at least on the right track
either never reached the proper
commanders or were not acted
upon if they did. The optimistic
-and false-estimate was, of
course, that the Chinese Reds
would not intervene and that
their talk was a bluff to intimi-
date the U. N. into halting at
the 38th parallel.
Since that time, C. I. A. chief
Allen W. Dulles has worked to
strengthen the machinery for
analyzing such reports and
placing the information in the
hands of those responsible for
counter-action.
No one can say outside a
small circle in the government
and Congress just how good
the C. I. A. is today. Under the
terms of the laws which brought
C. I. A. into being, the agency's
methods of operation and
sources of information must be
kept secret.
Two investigations have been
made of the C. I. A. operation,
one by a group headed by Gen.
James Doolittle and another
headed by Gen. Mark W. Clark.
Each had some public criticisms
to make relating largely to ad-
ministrative matters-but the
secret reports have never been
opened to the public.
Some Congressmen
Want Data
Some members of Congress
are chafing over the fact that
the C. I. A.'s operating budget
-which is hidden in items scat-
tered throughout the Presi-
dent's massive budget-is not
open for review at least by a
joint Congressional committee
such as the joint committee
which is the watchdog of the
atomic energy program.
Director Dulles has defended
this secrecy on the ground that
vital intelligence secrets will be
in danger of disclosure if too
many people are given access
to this information.
His argument is that the
C. I. A.'s budget is scrutinized
by subcommittees of both the
House and Senate Armed Serv-
ices and Appropriating Commit-
tees-and that this provides
Congress with an adequate
check against his agency.
There have been guesses that
C. I. A. spending runs in the
neighborhood of $500,000,000 a
year and that it employs up to
30,000 people. But these are
only guesses and Allen Dulles
Says the figures are grossly
inflated.
Tomorrow: C. I. A., in con-
stant search for personnel,
cannot offer rocking-chair fu-
ture, public recognition and
fat salary, but for applicants
who survive rigid tests there
is adventure with cloak and
dagger supplied.
71958, N.Y. Herald Trihinie. Tnr
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"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PJRMISSION OF DON WHITEHEAD
AND THE NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE"
JULY 17, 1958
The C.I. A. Story
Agents Chosen With Care
To Keep U. S. Secrets Safe
By Don Whitehead
This is the final article of a
series written by Don White-
head, author of "The F. B. I.
Story" and former Washington
Bureau Chief of the New York
Herald Tribune:
If C. I. A. agents in the field
pick up reports that the Rus-
sians are about to shoot the
moon or that the Chinese Reds
are preparing to invade For-
mosa, what happens to this in-
formation?
Who evaluates It? How does
It reach the officials respon-
sible for reacting to threats to
American prestige and security?
Evaluation is after all one of
the most vital functions of in-
telligence work. It is of little
avail to have information about
hostile forces if the meaning
and purport of this information
is not properly understood.
Under the procedure now In
effect in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency any report re-
ceived from a clandestine agent
or other source goes through a
series of evaluations.
First the C. I. A. officer in the
field makes his own evaluation
of the Information as well as of
the reliability of the source.
Next his initial evaluation is
studied and evaluated anew by
the desk in C. I. A. headquarters
here to which the material is
transmitted. Following that a
full report is circulated among
other government agencies
which are properly concerned
with the subject matter-the
Army, the Navy or the State
Department, for example. These
agencies then put their own
experts to work on the material
and provide their own evalua-
tions.
As a general rule, when all
the preliminary evaluations
from the C. I. A. and the other
agencies have been assembled,
they are placed before one of
the C. I. A.'s highest bodies for
a second-last evaluation. This is
the Board of National Esti-
mates, headed by Professor
Sherman Kent, of Yale, the
author of "Strategic Intelli-
gence." The board consists of
both civilians and military
officials.
The final evaluation is made
by the Intelligence Advisory
Board, which is chaired by
C. I. A. director Allen W. Dulles.
In addition to the C. I. A. the
agencies represented on this
board are the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
State Department, Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and
Atomic Energy Commission.
The final evaluations placed
on intelligence reports are car-
ried from this body directly into
the National Security Council
by Mr. Dulles, one of the five
statutory council members. On
the basis of these evaluations
the N. S. C. advises the Pres-
ident, and it is the President's
ultimate responsibility to make
whatever decisions are neces-
sary.
C. I. A. personnel are care-
fully chosen and well trained.
Some are sent to universities
for post-graduate study in
economics, law, science and
other fields. Many study lan-
guages, off and on the job.
Only a relatively small group
go into the "cloak and dagger"
branch and they must have the
special qualities required for
losing themselves and their
identity in strange lands-and
taking the tremendous risks
which a secret agent must take
while establishing contacts with
those who can provide reliable
information.
The C. I. A. Is exempted by
law from the civil service re-
quirements imposed on most
government agencies, and thus
the agency has a free hand in
establishing employee policies
to meet its own peculiar needs
for secrecy.
Director Allen W. Dulles has
sought to create a. pride of
service and "team morale" to
match that which has made
the F. B. I. famous. He is con-
vinced this is necessary to keep
talented people in the C. I. A.
when they could earn more
money and have an easier life
perhaps in following a business
or professional career.
Close Watch Kept
To Protect Secrets
The C. I. A. keeps a close
watch over its own-not only
to help build this corps spirit
but to protect the government
from disclosures of secrets.
Whenever an agent becomes
ill or is injured, he is attended
by a C. I. A.-approved doctor.
And there are C. I. A.-cleared
psychiatrists to help those who
might be threatened with a
crack-up under the unusual
stresses in certain jobs.
President Eisenhower has an
independent check against the
operations of the C. I. A. in the
board of consultants on foreign
intelligence which he appointed
two years ago.
`Independent
Evaluation'
The duty of this board is to
"examine and report" on all
foreign intelligence activities-
with special attention to the
work of the C. I. A.
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REPRINTED BY SPECIAL PERMISSION OF
JOHN SCALI AND THE
WASHINGTON POST AND TIMES HERALD
JUNE 29, 1958
The $350-Million-a-Year CIA Writes
Its Own Tight-Mouthed Ticket
By John Scali
Associated Press
A MONEY - CONSCIOUS
Congress bestows an esti-
mated $350 million a year on
an agency so secret that only
a handful of the highest offi-
cials know how the money is
spent.
The hush-hush expendi.
tures are charged off to the
high cost of spying. And the
supersecret outfit is the Cen.
tral Intelligence Agency.
The CIA operates a vast
espionage network in an
atomic-space age when the
merest scrap of information
could mean the difference be-
tween survival and annihila-
tion.
So rigid is the secrecy that
when brickbats fly, when Con-
gress grumbles over failures,
real or, imaginary, the CIA
takes it in silence. It says
simply: "We never alibi. We
never explain."
To alibi or explain might
reveal a source and endanger
the undercover legion of, men
and women who gather its in-
formatior throughout the
world.
THE CIA IS unique among
American governmental agen-
cies.
Its estimated budget of
$350 million is little better
than a reasonably good guess.
No one outside the highest
official circles can say for
sure.
But if the estimate is cor-
rect, it is $130 million more
than the State Department
spends on its 282 diplomatic
outposts around the world.
Only a handful of tog Gov-
ernment executives know ex.
actly how many people work
for the CIA. The State De-
partment has about 16,000
American employes. It has
been estimated that the CIA
has almost as many.
(Russia is believed to be
spending six times as much
as the CIA on espionage.
And up to 45,000 Soviet
agents are said to be directly
engaged in spying.)
COMPARISONS drawn be-
tween CIA and State are par-
ticularly apt. Each is run by
a man named Dulles.
CIA Director Allen Welsh
Dulles, 65, brother of Secre-
tary of State John Foster
Dulles, is a heavyset man
with a bushy, white, walrus-
type mustache. He tells
friends that his sole ambition
in government is to stay on
as intelligence chief until he
dies. He's headed the CIA for
51/2 of its nearly 11 years of
existence.
Allen Dulles' job is unique
in at least one respect. He
can write a check for a mil-
lion dollars without telling
even the Government Ac-
counting Office exactly why
he is spending the money.
Most Congressmen, who
watch financial matters like
a detective eyeing a pick-
pocket, have onty a vague
idea of how much the CIA
spends and what it spends it
for. Yet each year the
agency's budget is appro-
priated promptly.
The exact figure is known
to six Senators and Repre-
sentatives who form the spe-
cial subcommittee w h i c h
handles CIA finances. They
alone of Congress see the
agency's detailed budget.
WHY SPEND so much on
espionage? Like everything
else, the cost of spying has
shot up like the sputniks and
missiles which make it
urgently necessary.
Only a small percentage of
ALLEN W. DULLES
... top Ivy Leaguer
CIA funds goes to pay the
salaries of its thousands of
men and women employes,
stateside and overseas. A big
chunk goes for maintenance
of its Washington nerve cen-
ter, housed in 35 buildings.
Headquarters is a gray, for-
bidding quadrangle of three-
story buildings on a hilltop
in the Capital's "Foggy Bot-
tom" area.
Tourists see little more
than spike-tipped wrought
iron gates and barbed wire
fences. There are armed
guards at each building en.
trance. Privileged visitors are
escorted through the build-
ings to keep appointments.
Inside the administration
building hangs a sign. It says:
"Classified W a s t e Only-
Stapled Bags Only-0830-
1300."
The sign means that bags
of waste paper--each bearing
a red band with the ward
"secret" in white stencil-are
burned only at specified
times.
THE ESSENCE of CIA in-
telligence reports winds up
each morning on President
Eisenhower's desk. It covers
the high spots of the previous
24 hours in the world's trou.
ble spots.
The report goes to the
President as a terse 500-word
summary, written in short,
punchy sentences. It can be
digested by a busy President
in about two minutes.
The streamlined, more
sprightly written report has
replaced a lengthier summary
previously given the Presi-
dent. The change was made
shortly after Russia beat the
United States to the satellite
punch.
That's only a coincidence,
says Allen Dulles, whom the
Russians call "America's mas-
ter spy." But Administration
foes say it's more than that.
They say the Administration
did not heed previous CIA
warnings so the agency now
is resorting to simple ABC
language in its reports.
WHAT KIND of records
has the CIA compiled in fore-
casting cold war events?
A newsman going to the
source invariably runs into
the tight secrecy surrounding
the heart of the operation.
But from other sources, in-
cluding congressional, it is
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possible to estimate the CIA
record on nine important
world developments of the
past three years.
The scoreboard:
Russian satellites-Excel.
lent. The CIA warned for a
year that Russia would be
capable of launching its first
sputnik in 1957.
Missiles-Good. But the
agency was conservative in
forecasting the size and
thrust of Soviet rockets.
Anti-Nixon riots in Latin
America-Very good. But the
CIA apparently failed to fore-
see the dangerous disorgani-
zation of the new Venezuelan
police force.
Indonesian revolt-Excel-
'lent.
Soviet nuclear test ban-
Excellent.
Bulganin - Khrushchev re-
shuffle-Very good. The CIA
not only forecast this three
months earlier but it finger-
ed Frol Kozlov as a fast-rising
Kremlin newcomer.
Hungarian revolt - Fair.
The CIA reported signs of
mounting unrest in Hungary
but even it was surprised
when the people actually re-
volted.
Suez war-Good. The CIA
predicted that British and
French troops would invade
Egypt a few days before they
did.
Suez Canal seizure-Not
good. The CIA failed to es-
timate fully Nasser's reac-
tion to the withdrawal of a
proposed United States loan
for construction of the Aswan
Dam:
THE TOUGHEST employ-
ment hurdles in the Govern-
ment are those set up before
applicants for jobs with the
CIA. Only about 1 in 15
makes the grade.
A whole section of a CIA
headquarters building is
taken up by elaborate equip-
ment designed to probe the
thoughts, feelings, inhibitions
and rationality of those who
w o u 1 d become American
espionage agents.
There's even a lie detector
-and it's used as a matter
of course.
The rigorous tests are set
up to weed out the security
risks, who may range from
infiltrating Soviet agents to
just plain blabbermouths.
Rumors occasionally make
the rounds to the effect that
the CIA pries unnecessarily
Into the sex lives of its wom-
en employes. The agency de-
nies that it asks questions
about what is regarded as
normal sex experience.
The only sex question
asked, says the CIA is: "Are
you a homosexual?"
A second question which
might have bearing on sex
is: "Have you ever done any-
thing for which you could be
blackmailed?"
AS FAR AS can be learn-
ed, the CIA is the only Gov-
ernment agency which em-
ploys the lie detector on a
mass scale as a normal per-
sonnel practice.
An applicant can refuse to
take the test and still be
hired, but it is extremely un-
likely. And if he is hired, his
chances of advancement to a
more sensitive post are vir-
tually nil.
Even after he lands a job,
a CIA employe may be ask-
ed to take the test again.
Some employes have taken
second and third tests after
being suspected of wrong-
doing on the job.
Have the Russians ever
succeeded in planting an op-
erative inside the CIA?
There has never been a di-
rect public answer to that
question. Some time ago Dul-
les was asked about it and he
skirted a flat yes-or-no reply.
"I naturally assume," he
said, "that the Soviets will
attempt to penetrate the CIA
I don't think they are
going to find it easy, (but) we
are going to keep on our
guard all the time."
THE DANGEROUS role of
spy holds a strange attraction
for many wealthy socialites
and college graduates who
could take it easy or strike it
rich in other fields. In fact,
you might say the CIA's top
leadership wears an Ivy
League look.
Of the 20 highest officials,
17 are graduates of Eastern
Universities. Harvard, Yale
and Princeton each gradu-
ated three. So did West Point.
The others came from Colum-
bia, Virginia, Williams, Johns
Hopkins and American Uni-
versity.
Dulles acknowledges that
5 Of his top 20 are independ-
ently wealthy, earning as
much from outside sources as
they do from CIA. That in-
cludes Dulles himself, a
Princeton grad, who makes
$21,000 a year as director.
THE CIA operates on the
theory that a person's Ivy
League background, social
graces or wealth should not
bar him from a spot in the
Nation's espionage network.
What Is more important,
says CIA, is a person's compe-
tence, his dedication and his
willingness to accept the
anonymity that necessarily
goes with the job. Those who
treat the work as a glamorous
sideline don't last long.
This policy apparently is
paying off. A newsman check.
ing into CIA's record finds
surprisingly little criticism,
even from those who turn a
fishy eye on almost every.
thing the Eisenhower Admin.
istration does.
"I won't knock them," says
one former leader of the Tru?
man Administration. "I think
most of this Administration
is lousy. But this is one outfit
that knows its business, be-
lieve me."
PART OF THE reason CIA
has escaped widespread criti-
cism could be the above-aver.
age quality of its rank and
file employes. This has been
noted by congressional com-
mittees and study groups
which looked into its person-
nel.
CIA salaries follow closely
the regular Civil Service
scales. But Dulles, who prob-
ably operates under less re-
strictions than any other Gov
ernment department head, Is
not required to abide by
those rules.
Salaries of new CIA em-
ployes are sometime,; low.
Some recruits quit early to
seek more lucrative rewards
in private industry. Many re-
main.
What holds them? Mostly
it's the lure of an exciting
cloak-and - dagger existence
combined-with a deep sense
of patriotism that keeps them
on, year after year, playing
a deadly, undercover game of
wits against the Kremlin.
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"REPRINTED BY SPECIAL
PERMISSION OF
RUSSEL BAKER AND THE
NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE".
MARCH 16, 1958
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WASHINGTON.
W HEN Archduke Francis Ferdi-
nand was assassinated at Sar-
ajevo in 1914, the young man
who was fated to become director of fhi
United States' world-wide intelligence
system read the news over an apdritif
at a Paris Sidewalk cafe.
He did not instantly leap up, crying,
"This means war!" The news, he ad-
mits now, did not even strike him as
particularly ominous.
Having read it, Allen Welsh Dulles,
then 21 and fresh out of Princeton
with a Phi Beta Kappa key, continued
his journey to India-where a year's
job as an English teacher awaited him
-serenely unaware that the terrorist's
bullet had opened a new age that would
cast him in a role more exotic than
Princeton had yet taught its young
men to dream of.
For Mr. Dulles, whose job today is
to sense the daily waxings and wanings
of international peril and keep the
White House alerted, it was an in.
auspicious beginning. But although he
still misses occasionally-too often,
some of his critics contend-two "hot"
wars and the. long "cold one have
made him one of the world's most
sophisticated travelers in the shadow
land of intelligence and espionage.
Since February, 1953, he has been
director of the little-known, top-secret
Central Intelligence Agency, which sits
as a mysterious gray presence at the
most solemn councils of Government.
When the news of Stalin's fatal illness
broke in March, 1953, Mr. Dulles was
one of the first persons summoned hur-
riedly to the White House. When Israel
invaded Egypt in October, 1956, he was
among the seven present at President
Eisenhower's historic decision to act
immediately through the United Na-
tions. He regularly briefs the National
Security Council, not only on events
RUSSELL BAKER is a member of the staff
of The New York Times bureau in Washington.
behind the Iron Curtain, but on devel-
oping situations in potential world
trouble spots from Guatemala to East
Pakistan.
IN the present debate about Amer-
ican responses to Soviet demands for
a summit meeting, he is the unseen
agent whose analyses of Russian moti-
vations, and of opportunities and pit-
falls in a top-level meeting, may be
crucial to this Government's final de-
cision.
One of the few men in Washington
with immediate access to the White
House, he has made long strides to-
ward realizing the ambition that
brought him to Washington. This, he
told a visitor recently, was to make a
permanent place for an intelligence
service in the United States Govern-
ment.
"What interested me," he said, "was
the idea of building up a new kind of
structure in the American Government,
creating a good intelligence organiza-
tion and giving it its momentum, its
start."
To put it dramatically, Allen Dulles
is the nation's "master spy." And, ac-
cording to Moscow, a most sinister fel-
low to boot. The Soviet pamphleteer,
Ilya Ehrenburg, was driven to religious
metaphor some years back in describ-
ing him in that dedicatedly atheistic
journal, Pravda.
"If the spy, Allen Dulles, should ar-
rive in Heaven through somebody's ab-
sent-mindedness," Ehrenburg wrote,
"he would begin to blow up the clouds,
mine the stars and slaughter the
angels."
Yet, seen in the modest, gray-car-
peted office from which he directs an
undercover network that-it can only
be hopefully assumed-rings the globe,
Mr. Dulles seems the unlikeliest of
"master spies." He has the soaring
forehead of a professor, and a thatch
of white hair. Full gray moustache,
slightly rumpled tweeds and bow tie,
glasses perched jauntily above his eye-
brows and ever-present pipe round out
the impression of a prep-school head-
master.
THE eyes are perhaps a bit too pene-
trating to go with the big booming
laugh; the hands. are certainly too
broad, too strong for anyone but a man
.of action. Although he will be 65 next
month, he still plays a strenuous game
of doubles, swims, goes around the golf
course in 90 on a good day and ago-
nizes over the ineptitudes of the Wash-
ington Senators.
He admits to reading spy thrillers
and to a passion for Erie Stanley
Gardner's mysteries. But intelligence
work, he suggests, is not what the spy
thrillers have led us to believe. "I've
never been shot at. I don't know that
anybody has ever even tried to kidnap
me," he told a visitor recently.
As C. I. A.'s director, his job is to
furnish information, including esti-
mates of foreign governments' inten-
tions, on which United States policy
decisions are shaped. Thus he has an
intimate working relationship with his
brother, the Secretary of State, John
Foster Dulles, who is five years older
than Allen.
Between the two there are striking
similarities, despite their differert tem-
peraments-Foster with his awkward,
nervous smile; Allen with his easy
charm. Both are big, broad-boned,
rugged men with a zest for physical
activity. Both were bred to a family
tradition of public service. Both at-
tended Princeton, studied the law, spe-
cialized in diplomacy and practiced law
in the New York firm of Sullivan &
Cromwell.
Though there is a fierce family loy-
alty within the Dulles clan when one
of them is under fire, there is also con-
siderable evidence of an old competitive
rivalry between Allen and Foste; , dat-
ing back to Princeton days. Foster was
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the stiff intellectual; Allen, coming
along a few years later, was the cam-
pus social lion. The rivalry was still
strong when both were members of
Sullivan & Cromwell. Informed judg-
ment in Washington today is that the
two men still have their disagreements
about substantive points affecting pol-
icy formation, but Allen, who has no
responsibility for policy-making, does
not discuss them.
The fact that family loyalty does not
dominate their working relationship is
probably crucial to American foreign
policy, for nothing could be more dan-
gerous than to have Allen Dulles mold
his intelligence appraisals to suit Fos-
ter's theories. Even critics of the Dulles
family insist that this does not occur.
More than any other individual, Allen
Dulles is responsible for C. I. A. as it
exists today. In one way or another,
he has been involved with the creation
of the agency almost frorn its inception
and over the last five years has put his
personal stamp on it.
HOW good is C. I. A. under his
stewardship? What are Its strengths
and weaknesses? Is its peculiarly privi-
leged independence essentially healthful
in a democratic government? Absolute
answers to such questions are hard to
find. By statute, the agency's opera-
tions are secret. Its size, its budget,
the character of its operations-all the
facts that other agencies must report
in detail-are known to only an elite
handful within the Government.
In this secret atmosphere a pervasive
cynicism about C. I. A. has been culti-
vated in Washington. There are such
stories as the
news account in a Washington
paper some months back of a
free-for-all in a downtown res-
taurant between C. I. A. and
F. B. I. men. Each group, the
paper reported, had mistaken
the other for Communist
agents. In casual conversa-
tion one is told vaguely that
C. I. A. crawls with incompe-
tents and poseurs, that it is
inefficient and bungling, that
it is not heeded by the policy-
makers.
EW well-informed critics-
including men who are severe
critics-support these charges.
The consensus of these critics
runs as follows:
(1) Personnel: Internal mo-
rale is unusually good, espe-
cially in comparison with the
State Department. When
threatened with a McCarthy
assault a few years back, the
agency was saved from the
rack when Allen Dulles inter-
vened at the White House.
This has given C. I. A.'s people
the reassuring conviction that
they are working for a man
PROFESSORIAL-"Seen in the modest office from which he directs an
that-one assumes-rings the globe, Allen Dulles seems the unlikeliest
who is prepared to go to bat
for them. As a result it has
been able to hold good men and
attract more of the "quality"
type that once concentrated
on getting into State's Foreign
Service. It has drawn heavily
on the national university com-
munity and the over-all quality
of its personnel is unusually
high for Government, perhaps
better now than State's.
(2) Intelligence reporting:
The bitterest Democratic crit-
ics of the Administration and
State Department critics of
the agency concede that the
quality of its intelligence-
gathering is extremely high,
perhaps as fine as any other
intelligence service in the
world, including the highly
touted British.
(3) Intelligence evaluation:
The most common criticism is
that C. I. A.'s evaluation of the
material it gathers is likely
to be incautious, to leap to con-
undercover network
of 'master spies."'
clusions that more conserva-
tive students of, say, the Soviet
Union, believe unjustified. This,
the critics say, has put the
Government in the position of
acting on erroneous assump-
tions at times in the past.
ON the other hand, the crit-
ics contend-and Mr. Dulles
agrees-that the agency has
failed to lick the problem of
getting its mass of intelligence
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information across to the peo-
ple who should have it for
policy formation. For example,
C. I. A.'s reporting on Soviet
technological achievement has
been extremely good, yet its
implied warnings went un-
heeded at the White House
until after the sputniks. Dem-
ocrats contend that the failure
here was not in intelligence
but in the Administration's
policy of giving sound money
a priority over expenditure for
technology and science.
As part of its self-improve-
ment program, the C. I. A. has
begun holding post-mortems
on its failures. Information
that was on hand before the
event is re-examined to learn
if another method of analysis
might have pointed to the
right reading.
One of the disasters of the
intelligence community, for in-
stance, was its failure to fore-
see the Chinese Communist
entry into the Korean War. In
its post-mortem, the C. I. A.
discovered one critical bit of
information that had been
overlooked: The Chinese Army,
shortly before it moved across
the Yalu, was known to have
provisioned itself with large
quantities of antibiotics. Prop-
erly weighed at the time, this
scrap of information might
have provided the warning tho
Government needed.
(4) Operational secrecy: This
is an area of great debate.
C. I. A. contends that secrecy
and freedom from Congres-
sional scrutiny are essential to
the operation of an intelligence
system. Senator Mike Mans-
field, Montana Democrat, dif-
fers. He has proposed that the
agency be put under scrutiny
of a joint Congressional com-
mittee much like the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.
There have been no notable
security breaches by the atomic
energy committee, he contends,
and there is no reason to as-
sume that C. I. A. security
could not be similarly main-
tained.
AT present there is a small
degree of Congressional control
exercised by the Armed Serv-
ices and Appropriations Com-
mittees. Key members of
these groups oppose the Mans-
field proposal, contending that
their control amply fulfills the
requirement. Other critics,
however, are not so sure and
there are great misgivings
about whether the agency is
subject to even the minimum
of accountability to the public
which is the essence of demo-
cratic government. The public,
almost totally ignorant of
what goes on behind the cur-
tain of legalized secrecy, can-
not know how its money is
spent or how many costly
blunders lie quietly buried
under the "classified" labels.
In broad, fuzzy outlines,
some of C. I. A.'s operations
are understood.
The agency was created
eleven years ago to coordinate
all of the nation's diffused in-
telligence activities. To prevent
any development of an Ameri-
can Gestapo, Congress specifi-
cally denied "police, subpoena.
law-enforcement powers or
internal security functions" to
the C. I. P_
Its aim is to lay hands on
every available piece of infor-
mation and speculation about
the Communist world and to
winnow these into a coherent,
accurate picture for the guid-
ance of the nation's policy-
makers. Much of this task is
clearly dogged, day-in, day-
out analysis of overtly pub-
lished reports, data, statistics.
Painstaking study of readily
available data builds up the
background for evaluating se-
cret intelligence funneled in
from the field. The morsel of
high-level secret information
-whether collected by acci-
dent, by intricately devious
design or by derring-do at
great risk to the agent-is
still of the utmost importance.
THUS, although the C. I. A.
has institutionalized intelli-
gence work, the secret agent
remains an important figure.
"You still need people with the
characteristics of the cloak-
and-dagger man, but we don't
want him to act in a cloak-
and-dagger way. That's the
main point," Mr. Dulles ex-
plained recently.
Parenthetically, Mr. Dulles
insists that the era of the
heavy-lidded female spy is
gone, another of science's con-
quests over romance. The
C. I. A. does not deny that
some female operatives still
work their perfumed wiles for
Uncle Sam. But scientific
snoopers, like the radar that
detected the first Soviet in-
tercontinental missile tests,
promise to dominate the new
era of espionage.
Being a hothouse of secrecy,
the C. I. A. breeds a jungle of
rumor and speculation about
itself. It is universally sus-
pected of being a global mis-
chief-maker. It has been estab-
lished, for example, that the
agency was behind Guatemala's
1954 revolution against the
Americas' first Communist
regime. On this evidence, it is
generally assumed that its
agents are busy muddying
waters in other sensitive areas.
When, as happened a year ago
in Syria, an anti-Communist
coup fizzles, word spreads
mysteriously that the C. I. A.
has bungled.
ALTHOUGH he himself has
broken with all secret-service
tradition by speaking publicly
and maintaining press con-
tacts to prevent total mystery
from enveloping the C. I. A.,
Mr. Dulles concedes that "an
element of faith" is required
from the public. Sometimes,
because the whole story can-
not be told, "we have to take
it on the chin."
Most recently, Mr. Dulles
himself has been taking it on
the chin for a speech last sum-
mer predicting that military
dictatorship might be "one of
the possible lines of evolution"
in the Soviet Union. When
Marshal Zhukov, the only po-
tential military dictator in
sight, was abruptly dumped
from power a month later, Mr.
Dulles was as conspicuous as
a base runner trapped between
second and third in the decid-
ing game of the World Series.
Hadn't he failed to predict
a major shift in the power
struggle? "Sure," he told a
recent visitor, "but plenty of
people in the Kremlin seem to
have missed it, too. Certainly
Zhukov himself didn't know it
was coming, or he wouldn't
have been in Albania [when
the plot against him was per-
fected]."
But the C. I. A.'s most im-
portant job, Mr. Dulles com-
mented, is not crystal-balling
each specific event so much as
"flagging critical situations"
which this Government must
watch and seek to turn to ad-
vantage.
The first hint that Allen
Dulles might have an extraor-
dinary interest in world af-
fairs came when, at the age
of 8, he produced his own his-
tory of the Boer War. "Eng-
land," goes a sample passage,
"ought to be content if she
owned the mines where gold
is, but no, she wants to have
the land to [sic]."
AbTE" his year in India,
he returned to Princeton for
his M. A., then joined the State
Department's Foreign Service.
Stationed in Vienna when the
United States went to war in
1917, he was transferred to
Bern, where part of his work
was to set up contacts in
Austria-Hungary and the Bal-
kans. It was his first experi-
ence with espionage.
In 1926 he quit the State
Department when he was of-
fered a chance to begin in law
at double his salary as a vet-
eran Foreign Service officer.
First, however, he fired off an
angry letter, which hit the
newspapers, commenting on
the department's miserable
pay standards. "Made quite a
splash," he recalls with relish.
"I think it may have had
something to do with upping
salaries."
When World War II came,
the international lawyer joined
the Office of Strategic Serv-
ices-"that heterogeneous out-
fit of intellectuals, dilettantes
and footpads," as one historian
has called it, put together for
espionage and sabotage behind
enemy lines.
Mr. Dulles, remembering
Switzerland's potential as a
spy center, persuaded his chief
and old friend, Maj. Gen. Wil-
liam J. Donovan, to cut him
loose to set up operations in
the heart of Festung Europa.
Late in 1942, with American
forces landing in Africa and
the Nazis sealing Vichy France,
he dashed across Southern
France from Spain, talked fast
to a suspicious Gestapo agent
at the frontier and slipped into
Switzerland.
THE story of those war
years in Bern is raw material
for a paperback thriller. The
spy network Allen Dulles built
from scratch reached into
Germany, Yugoslavia, Czecho-
slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary,
Spain, Portugal, North Af-
rica, France, Italy and Aus-
tria.
He produced the first re-
ports on the Nazi experi-
mental rocket laboratory at
Peenemuende and on the V-2
installations aimed against
Britain. Through his contact
with Hans Bernd Gisevius, a
Nazi counter-intelligence man
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with an abiding hatred for the
Nazis, he kept informed of the
developing plot of July, 1944,
against Hitler's life. Finally,
Mr. Dulles commanded the
fantastically delicate negotia-
tions, reaching into the high-
eat levels of the Gestapo and
Wehrmacht, that ended in the
surrender of a million enemy
troops in Northern Italy some
two weeks before the war's
end.
SHORTLY after C. I. A.
was created in 1947, President
Truman assigned him to a
three-man panel to recommend
ways of perfecting its opera-
tions. His report gathered
dust until 1950, when Gen.
Walter Bedell Smith, then di-
rector, phoned him in New
York.
"Well," said the general.
"you've written this report.
Now get down here and tell
me how to put it into effect!"
Assured that the job would
take only six weeks, Mr.
Dulles came to Washington.
He has been here ever since.
How does he envision the
C. I. A.'s future? "We've got
to keep our absolute integrity,"
Mr. Dulles insists. "Keep out
of politics. Be absolutely fear-
less. Report the facts as we
see them regardless of wheth-
er they're palatable or unpal-
atable to the policy-makers.
If we ever lose that objectiv-
ity, then we are finished."
What about the public con-
science, the morality of the
C. I. A.'s operations? "I don't
think that immorality pays
very much, so I don't believe
in carrying out a program
that's immoral," said Mr.
Dulles. At times in his work,
he was reminded, even a pro-
gram that is not immoral may
result in someone's getting
hurt.
Mr. Dulles conceded the
point. "If you believe in a
program," he replied, "you
may have to break a little
crockery in the cause of put-
ting it into effect."
THE END
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Tu SATURDAY
Evslaxc
J%VND&O ZAr
1711 rr
Reprinted by Special Permission of
-f THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
Copyright 1945 by The Curtis Publishing Company
This article, reproduced in convenient form for filing
and future reference, has been authorized by the
Saturday Evening Post under the following condi-
tions: (1) That it may not be used for advertising
under any circumstances, (2) that no one outside
The Curtis Publishing Company may affix an organi-
zation name or any other matter to it, and (3) that
no solicitation or sales-promotion material may ac-
company it.
The Secret History of a Surrender
By FORREST l)AVIS
HE precise details of how the war in Italy
guttered out at noonday on May second, last,
with the orderly surrender of what Mr.
Churchill exuberantly computed at "a million
men"-although only twenty-six combat divisions
were left afoot-may well have escaped you. His-
tory was piling up too fast around the beginning of
May. The fall of Northern Italy was overshadowed
by other events: the putative suicide of Hitler, the
degradation of the mortal remains of II Duce in a
Milanese square, and the crumbling of the utterly
beatgn Reichsuvehr in Germany itself.
After D day in Normandy the war in Italy had
seemed, in any case, a sort of side show-the "for-
gotten front," Mark Clark's men termed it with
some bitterness-and no American back home de-
serves censure for being hazy about the signing of
the Northern Italy capitulation on April twenty-
ninth at Field Marshal Sir Harold Alexander's
AFHQ at Caserta. AFHQ was domiciled, in case
you've forgotten, in the summer palace of the
ancient kings of Naples, a minor Versailles with some
of the finest gardens in Europe.
Present for the enemy, at the signing, were Lt.
Col. Viktor von Schweinitz-a towheaded, wispy-
mustached Junker who happens to be descended
through an American grandmother from John Jay,
our first chief justice-and Maj. Max Wenner,
short, dark and definitely non-Nordic. You will
come across Schweinitz and Wenner again in this
narrative when certain of their superiors will vainly
attempt to dishonor their signatures at the eleventh
hour and fight on back into the Alps.
The Caserta ceremony, signalizing the first of the
historic Nazi surrenders of 1945, took only twenty
minutes. For so brief a function it accomplished
The mass surrender of the
German armies in Northern
Italy didn't just happen. Be-
hind that event is an amazing
story with all the trimmings
of an Oppenheim novel.
much, putting an end, for one thing, to American
casualties in that theater and sending home many
a G. I. who otherwise would have been buried in
Italian soil. Forestalling fanatical Nazi hopes of a
last stand in an Alpine redoubt, the surrender like-
wise checkmated a plot for organizing remnants of
the defeated armies into a corps of Werewolves.
Contributing to the subsequent surrenders in Ger-
many-in Bavaria, Von Kesselring finally sued for
peace through Caserta-the April twenty-ninth
event definitely shortened the war in Europe. Cer-
tain authorities believe that, by breaking the spine
of German resistance, the surrender of Northern
Italy provided an early, clean-cut termination to a
war which might otherwise have dragged on for
days, or even a week or two, longer.
So much is known. What could not be made pub-
lic until now was the background of the capitula-
tion, which, by no means an impromptu act, had
been preceded by eight weeks of conversations
between American intelligence authorities and de-
featist Germans; negotiations-although the Amer-
icans, bent on unconditional surrender, disliked the
word-that were conducted principally in neutral,
spy-infested Switzerland by Maj. Gen. William J.
Donovan's Office of Strategic Services. The O. S. S.
throughout its career has indignantly denied that
its far-flung activities go forward in a cloak-and-
dagger atmosphere. In the case of the Italian sur-
render, General Donovan's men have preferred to
say that it was, while skillfully handled, the work of
earnest amateurs. Actually, however, the proceed-
ings at times had all the trimmings of an E. Phillips
Oppenheim novel, at other moments providing
tongue-in-cheek melodramatics reminiscent of Al-
fred Hitchcock's movie thrillers. Little Wally, the
Czech operator of clandestine radio stations inside
the enemy lines, provided most of the Hitchcock
moments.
Men risked their lives carrying the word across
the Swiss-Italian and Swiss-Austrian borders-some
crossing "white," that is, in a routine way with
papers, others stealing over "black," by remote
mountain passes. Among them were the Italian
Baron Luigi Parrilli, who, before the war, sold
American motor cars in Europe; Schutzstaffel officers
surreptitiously selling out the Fiihrer, and an Amer-
ican operative functioning as a Scarlet Pimpernel
in reverse. It was his job to rescue the most notori-
ous SS man in all Italy from the partisans because
peace needed his assistance more thah the partisans
needed his blood.
Looming at all times over the conspirators was
the black-hearted shadow of Heinrich Himmler-
the evil genius of the surrender-engaged in coun-
terespionage, dealing in agents provocateurs and
holding the family of an SS general as
hostages for his loyalty. Through the
parleys came glimpses of a demoralized
Fdhrer, stewing in one air-raid shelter
or another, alternately planning im-
possible counteroffensives, threatening
the use of frightful last-resort weapons
and issuing secret orders calculated to
drive a wedge between Russia and the
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western powers. At the other end of the
Axis, Mussolini supplied a kind of com-
edy relief; at one moment meditating
death in battle at the head of a black-
shirt brigade, at the next induced by
the curvesome Petacci sisters to ar-
range a refuge in Spain.
Apart from their military conse-
quences, the negotiations, frequently
discouraging and once abandoned by
the Allies for four days at their very
crisis, had wide political and economic
results. Through these negotiations,
Northern Italy was spared physical
destruction and a vengeful massacre
ordered by Hitler. The great cities,
power plants and factories of the rich
industrial north were salvaged for the
stricken Italian economy because the
Americans demanded it as the price of
peace. The ports of Genoa and Trieste were, more-
over, preserved intact for Allied use, expediting the
conquest of Austria-400 charges placed in Genoa
harbor being defused by the Nazis themselves.
It is this story, the secret history of Northern
Italy's deliverance, which can now be told because
the Office of Strategic Services believes that the epic
accomplishments of a handful of Americans can now
be spread before the people through the Post. The
records of the operation, known by the undescriptive
title of Sunrise Crossword, are replete with the nec-
essary subterfuges common to such fascinating
archives, down to code names and agents' numbers.
Therein, for example, Kesselring may appear as
Emperor, one SS officer as Critic, another as Grad-
uate. A nom de ruse is chosen, it should hastily be
explained, at complete random.
The first move in Sunrise-the shortened title
which the O. S. S. gave this endeavor-came, a bit
improbably, from a young SS first lieutenant named
Guido Zimmer. His motives were equally improb-
able. A good Catholic who, loving his wife, resented
Himmler's order enjoining illicit procre ireness on
likely young SS officers, Zimmer unquestionably set
the ball rolling. This was back in January of this
year. The Nazis in Italy, although dreading Alex-
ander's promised spring offensive, still were riding
high, wide and handsome along the Po. The SS
officers were doing themselves especially well. Hav-
ing enriched themselves by extorting bribes from
rich Jewish hostages and muscling into Italian in-
dustries with Nazi war orders, the elite guardsmen
occupied the villas of the nobility and the high
bourgeoisie and monopolized the best cafes in Milan,
Genoa and Como.
Among the wealthiest and most exquisite of the
SS plunderers was Gen. Karl Wolff, supreme com-
mander of the Waffen, or fighting, SS, and police
chief of Nazi-held Italy. An explosive, hard, blond
Aryan, General Wolff had been a personal adjutant
to Himmler. Coming to Italy from a high post at
Fiihrer headquarters, he was rightly regarded as a
favorite of the Nazi upper crust, deriving great
prestige from that assumption. A former advertising
man in Berlin, Wolff fancied himself as an intel-
lectual, a mystic of the Rudolf Hess school and a
connoisseur of art. Subsequently Wolff was to lay
unction to his soul because he claimed to have pre-
served the picture collections of the Uffizi and Pitti
galleries as well as King Victor Emmanuel's coin
collection. Outwardly resolute, Wolff was in Janu-
ary privately reading the handwriting on the wall.
Soon, as we shall note, he would be as deep in the
plot to betray the Fi hrer and deliver Northern Italy
as was his solemn young aide, Zimmer himself.
In January, with Wolff spreading defeatist doubts
in the mind of his friend, Field Marshal Albert
Kesselring, the Oberkommandant in Northern Italy,
Zimmer was hearing the Hitler scorched-earth policy
discussed in inner SS circles. Already disgruntled, as
we have seen, Zimmer professed him-
self sickened at the prospect of seeing
all Northern Italy blown to bits as the
Nazis fell back on the Alps. Resolving
to act, he turned to Baron Parrilli, who,
as all Milan knew, had aceuaintances
in the Allied camp.
'I here are two stories about Parrilli.
Certain partisans hold it against him
that he had friendly relations with cer-
tain SS men. In his defense it is said
that he dealt with the SS only for the
purpose of extricating Jews from the
Nazi clutches, having been instru-
mental in saving many. However that
may be, Parrilli made thirteen trips
across the border as a courier, daring
Allied bombings on the roads, Himm-
ler, the neo-Fascist secret police and
the hostile partisans.
To Parrilli young Zimmer reported
that high SS officers-for instance,
Standartenfuhrer Eugen Dollmann, a
hard case, and even the potent Karl
Wolff himself-were talking among
themselves about how one might get in
touch with the Allies with a view to
ending a hopeless war, thus saving
one's neck and Northern Italy at the
same time Others Zimmer mentioned as disheart-
ened were even more exalted. Kesselring, for ex-
ample, and Dr. Rudolf Rahn, Hitler's ambassador
to Mussolini's sawdust republic. Even Heinrich
Himmler's personal lackey in Northern Italy, a
Gruppenfuhrer named Harster, was reliably reported
to be casting about for a way to leave the ::inking
ship with advantage to himself. Although Kessel-
ring-who later was transferred to succeed Von
Hundstedt in the West--was at this stage highly
sympathetic with Wolff's sentiments, he became,
as we shall see, a principal thorn in the side of Sun-
rise.
The Zimmer disclosures convinced Parrilli of two
things: first, that behind its harsh facade, Nazi
morale in Northern Italy was cracking wide open;
and, secondly, that the weakest sector was the out-
right Nazis. Parrilli, quickly discovering that he
had no direct access to Allied authorities, bethought
himself of his old schoolmaster in Switzerland. Dr.
Max Husmann, the master of a famous boys' school
on the Zugerberg, near Zurich, was, as Parrilli
knew, a dedicated busybody and a noble soul who
circulated everywhere in Switzerland. No un-
likelier actor ever took part in a drama of inter-
national intrigue than the unworldly, intense Hus-
mann.
Through his friend Max Waibel, both a doctor of
philosophy and an intelligence major on the Swiss
army's general staff, Doctor Husmann was able to
complete the ring. Weibel took Husmann and his
information to the one man in Switzerland able to
deal with it effectively, Allen W. Dulles, the chief
representative of the O. S. S. in Switzerland. As
such, Mr. Dulles-who is the grandson of one Sec-
retary of State, Gen. John W. Foster, the nephew of
another, Robert Lansing, and the brother and peace-
time law partner of John Foster Dulles-managed
varied and important activities for the United
States in the common meeting ground of every hostile
interest in Europe. With the war ended, it can be no
secret that his jurisdiction included the enemy
countries as well as those occupied, together with
the underground forces therein.
A man of resource, Mr. Dulles had slipped into
Switzerland in the fall of 1942 a few hours after the
Nazis had closed the French border upon taking
over unoccupied France. He crossed the frontier
with the friendly connivance of the French guards,
who outwitted the newly arrived Nazi agents out of
admiration for Mr. Dulles' eloquent invocation of
the memories of Lafayette and Pershing. A judgmat-
ical man of genuine charm, Mr. Dulles conducted the
secret affairs of the United States, including Sunrise,
with discretion, skill and perseverance. For Sunrise
alone he deserves a medal.
T HE intelligence brought by Doctor Husmann
left Dulles fairly cold. At the moment, Himmler,
inspired by Hitler, was waging a peace offensive,
primarily through Vienna, aimed at splitting the
anti-Axis front. Himmler had sent word that the
Nazis were willing to quit to the Western Allies
alone, excluding the Soviet Union. This was natu-
rally unacceptable. Suspecting that the word from
Milan was another salient of Himmler's offensive,
Dulles was also skeptical of inducing the surrender
of the German military on other grounds.
Although the Western Allies never attempted to
duplicate the Russian experiment with captured
German officers, the O. S. S. had interviewed a num-
ber of imprisoned general officers late in 1944 with a
view to using them as a lever on their colleagues still
in the field. To this job was assigned Gero von S.
Gaevernitz, a German-born American who became
Dulles' chief coadjutor with Sunrise. A year younger
than Karl Wolff, Gaevernitz belonged to the same
disillusioned German generation, but where the SS
dignitary had taken the easy path of Nazi affiliation,
Gaevernitz had migrated to the United States. He
did so at the prompting of his liberal father, Dr.
Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz. In New York,
young Gaevernitz had learned the banking busi-
ness. Pearl Harbor day found him in Germany. A
friend in the Foreign Office warned him that Hitler
planned an early declaration of war. Gaevernitz
reached Switzerland only six hours before Hitler
acted.
The attempt to use the captured German generals
had come to nothing, although it had the whole-
hearted support of Gen. Omar Bradley and the able
collaboration of his G-2, Maj. Gen. Edward L.
Sibert.
While the captured German generals agreed
with Gaevernitz that further resistance was useless,
their overtures to their comrades across the lines
broke against the Gestapo agents who surrounded
each Reichswehr field commander. Still shaken by
the purge following the July twentieth attempt on
Hitler's life, fearful of the reproaches of history, the
West-front commanders fell back on the personal
oaths they had sworn to Hitler. The O. S. S. had not
yet learned that Hitler's elite corps, the SS, had less
compunction about deserting him.
While Professor Husmann's seed fell at first on
barren soil, other reports reaching Dulles from
Northern Italy soon inclined him to listen more at-
tentively. A Reichswehr staff officer, in Zurich ex-
changing free marks for Swiss francs, indiscreetly
gossiped about the defeatism prevalent at head-
quarters. Dulles learned that the German consul at
Lugano, a son of the
one-time Reich foreign secretary, Con-
stantin von Neurath, had been sent by
Kesselring to Von Rundstedt's head-
quarters to talk about peace. It seemed
apparent to Dulles-and he so advised
his superiors at AFHQ, London and
Washington-that the situation in
Northern Italy might be ripening to-
ward capitulation.
A month intervened between Hus-
mann's first soundings of Dulles and
Dulles' first talk with Baron Parrilli.
That delay was due to Swiss skepticism
as well as the American's reluctance.
Not until late in February did the
Swiss authorities accept the thesis that
they had a stake in the orderly surren-
der of Northern Italy, preserving the
economy of that region. The Swiss,
moreover, did not want hordes of ref-
ugees and the wash of a defeated army
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ITS; A *V
Meeting of Dulles, Lemnitzer
and Airey with Wolff
ARN? ~~
t7.
Dulles' O. S. S. associate confers
with Dollmann at first meeting
Lemnitzer and Airey smuggled into
Switzerland as U. S. Army sergeants
Airfield to Caserta
in Southern Italy
"Little Wally," Czech operator
of underground radio station
Baron Parrilli and Zimmer
start peace conspiracy
The scene of the action. The battle-weary Nazis wanted to surrender an army and shorten the war and save thousands of
lives. But they mistrusted one another, mistrusted the area's top commander and, above all, they mistrusted Adolf' Hitler.
First meeting of Dulles
of O. S. S. and Wolff
Lemnlizer and Airey
secreted in Dulles House
Dr. Husmann meets Wolff, Zimmer
and Dollmann on way to Zurich
At H. Q., Wolff, Kesselring and
other high Nazis talk of surrender
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pounding on their frontiers. Earlier
they had withheld a visa from Parrilli,
finally requiring a 10,000-franc bond
from the professor, which be supplied.
Seeing Parrilli late in February, Dulles
agreed to receive a duly authenticated
Nazi emissary, stipulating, however,
that the terms must be unconditional
surrender to all the Allies.
The Nazi conspirators selected Stan-
dartenfiihrer Dollmann to make the
first cast. By then Professor Husmann,
committed heart and soul to the cause
of peace, thought it his duty to travel
into Italy to indoctrinate Dollmann,
warning him that the Americans would
not negotiate terms, would spurn him
if he Came from Himmler, and under
no circumstances would discuss accept-
ing a surrender without Russia. Al-
though Dollmann, described as "a
vivid personality, temperamental and
egotistical," came with the prestige of
a liaison officer among Kesselring,
Wolff and Mussolini's generalissimo,
Rodolfo Graziani, Dulles did not re-
ceive him personally. Instead he sent
an associate to confer with him in a
private room in the Restaurant Bian-
chi in Lugano.
The associate confined himself to
exacting, as a test of good faith, the
delivery to the Swiss frontier of two
important Italian partisan leaders held
by the Nazis-Prof. Ferruccio Pam,
chief of the military resistance in
Northern Italy, and a Major Usmiani,
an officer who had been collaborating
with the Americans. Parri was in the
dungeon at Verona, Usmiani in Milan's
notorious San Vittori prison. The door
to negotiations being left open, Doll-
mann departed, promising to send back
someone of higher rank.
Wolff arrived, with Dollmann and
Zimmer, on March eighth. Still in this
thing to the hilt, Husmann met the
Germans at Chiasso, on the frontier,
riding with them to Zurich. Recur-
rently, he asked Wolff if the most
tragic chapter in Germany's history
was to end without one German per-
forming a great and humane act. Once
Wolff, traveling in a sealed compart-
ment, asked the schoolmaster to leave
him, but he did succeed in persuading
Doctor Husmann that he had a better
side to him and that he, with Kessel-
ring, had prevented the destruction of
Rome, contrary to Hitler's orders. On
the same train were Parri and Usmiani,
still mystified by their deliverance.
Declining to receive Wolff until he
had assured himself of the condition
of the two patriots, Dulles visited Pam
and Usmiani at the Hirslander clinic
in Zurich, where they were under ex-
amination. Neither had been tortured.
Dulles and Parri were warm friends.
At that moment-with the Italian re-
calling his fear when brought from his
cell that he was about to be shot-
neither could have foreseen that within
four months Parri, a member of the
non-monarchist, non-Marxist Action
party, would be prime minister of
Y.
Dulles met the SS general in his
Zurich apartment. Also present were
the German-American Gaevernitz and
Schoolmaster Husmann. The Americans
knew that Wolff had a long record as a
dyed-in-the-wool Nazi, that he had
served with the notorious Von Epp at
Munich as well as with Himmler. Be-
fore the meeting, Wolff had submitted
numerous credentials, including a full-
page photograph of himself in a Ger-
man weekly publication and a list of
references headed by Rudolf Hess.
While Dulles listened impassively,
Wolff, a rapid-fire talker, explained
that both he and Kesselring knew the
war to be lost and wished to quit, with-
out reference to Hitler or Himmler, in
order to avoid further bloodshed and
the razing of Northern Italy. Profess-
ing himself a friend of England and
America, he expressed the hope that
something he might do might palliate
the aversion in which he knew Ger-
many to be held in those countries.
Unlike Dollmann, he did not speak of
his personal fate beyond saying that,
not being a war criminal, he had no
fears of Allied justice. Promising to
hand Northern Italy to Dulles on a
silver platter, he agreed in further
token of good faith, to deliver into
Switzerland several hundred interned
Jews, to stand personally responsible
for the welfare of 350 American and
British prisoners of war at Mantua,
and to free another important resist-
ance leader, Sogno Franci.
Accustomed to the blatant tirades
of the party comrades, Wolff confessed
himself enormously taken with Dulles'
correctly firm suavity. "How different
these Americans are from what we
have been told," he exclaimed to Hus-
mann. To the Swiss he confided a curi-
ously mystical belief that he was being
spared for some great purpose. A year
before, he had walked away from an
airplane that had crashed a tree, kill-
ing the other passengers. Twice during
the Sunrise conversations, that faith
was confirmed. When he was returning
from the March-eighth interview with
Dulles, Allied fighter bombers raked
his motor car as it proceeded from
Milan to his headquarters at Fasano
on Lake Garda, wounding his chauffeur
and a staff officer. A machine-gun bul-
let punctured the tail of his blouse, and
on Parrilli's next trip Wolff sent the
scorched shred of the garment to
Dulles, asking that the Allied air forces
work over the Milan-Fasano road
lightly in future. Again, while he was
riding to an inspection with Mussolini,
the road was attacked, killing a lieu-
tenant and wounding the chauffeur of
Wolff's car, but leaving him skin-
whole.
So confident had been Wolff, so
closely did his assurances jibe with
other information, that Dulles felt jus-
tified in asking AFHQ for assistance in
buttoning up the surrender. Alexander
accordingly sent two senior officers:
Maj. Gen. Lyman L. Lemnitzer, U. S. A.,
assistant chief of staff at Caserta, and
the British Maj. Gen. Terence S. Airey,
AFHQ intelligence chief. The story of
how O. S. S. smuggled the generals
into Switzerland under the dog-tag
identities of two U. S. Army sergeants,
Nicholson and McNeely, and how they
lived for weeks behind drawn blinds in
Dulles' house at Bern-venturing out
only to buy dog biscuit for the dachs-
hund Fritzel acquired by Airey-is
already familiar to some Post readers.
Before the generals reached Bern,
the negotiations struck the first of sev-
eral infuriating snags attributable to
Hitler or Himmler. Upon reaching
Fasano on March tenth, Wolff learned
that, the day before, Hitler's personal
airplane had come for Kesselring, tak-
ing him to Fiihrer headquarters, the
supposition being that the field mar-
shal was being relieved of the Italian
command. Blow No. 2 was delivered
by Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of
the Gestapo under Himmler, who, hav-
ing got wind of Sunrise, ordered Wolff
to break off whatever contacts he had
with the Allies. Gruppenfiihrer Har-
ster, as it transpired, had turned in-
former.
The news of Kesselring's transfer-
verified when Baron Parrilli hurried
across the border from Wolff-struck
Dulles between wind and water. What
had made the Italian situation hopeful
was the identity of interest between
Wolff, the SS chief, and the Wehrmacht
authorities. Receiving Parrilli after
midnight in his Zurich apartment,
Dulles bade him ask Wolff how he
would proceed with a new Oberkom-
mandant not committed to surrender.
He strongly urged the SS general to
return at once to Switzerland to discuss
the technical details of the capitulation
with Dulles' military advisers-his de-
scription of Generals Lemnitzer and
Airey.
On March nineteenth Wolff was
back with Major Wenner and young
Zimmer, the Swiss secret service facili-
tating their trip by motor from Chiasso.
The talks were held at Ascona on Lake
Maggiore near Locarno, every precau-
tion being taken to keep them from
prying eyes. The Americans came on
two trains, dividing up to avoid notice.
Being a resort, Ascona had sufficient
visitors coming and going even at this
season, so that a dozen more or less
would not be likely to excite comment.
However, in order to avoid contact
with the villagers, the conferees sub-
sisted for the most part on Army ra-
tions brought in for the purpose. Dulles
had two villas at his disposal, one for
the Germans, the second for the Amer-
icans. In the second villa a clandestine
radio transmitter was installed for com-
munication with Caserta.
Wolff reported-what our people al-
ready knew-that Kesselring, trans-
ferred to Rundstedt's command, had
never returned to Italy. Hence, he had
not been able to convey his desire for
surrender to his successor, Col. Gen.
Heinrich von Vietinghoff. In as much
as Vietinghoff, a nonpolitical general,
greatly respected Kesselring, it was
Wolff's opinion that a recommendation
from Kesselring would be enormously
helpful in winning over the new Ober-
kommandant. This entailed a journey
to Kesselring's headquarters, which,
having to be made by motor because
the Allies had command of the air,
would take five, possibly seven, days.
To this the Americans regretfully
agreed, it seeming an unavoidable de-
lay-
To the generals, who were not iden-
tified to him, Wolff explained why the
Germans had held Northern Italy ;r.-
stead of retiring to the natural bastion
of the Alps. Back in September when
Hitler had ordered six crack divisions
from Italy to the Western front, pre-
paratory to such a retirement, Kessel-
ring and Wolff had objected, pointing
to the value of Northern Italy as a
source of food and industrial supply.
Whereupon Hitler yielded, giving as
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his reason a fear that a withdrawal
psychosis might spread through the
Reichswehr, especially after the sweep-
ing advance of the Allies in France.
This governed his decision to stay in
Norway also.
The Allied generals and Wolff did
agree on a surrender procedure. Wolff
was to deliver two parliamentarians,
armed with full powers, to the O. S. S.
in Switzerland when the time came for
a flight to headquarters at Caserta,
where the deal finally would be but-
toned up. Dulles engaged to get them
across Switzerland to the French fron-
tier and back to their own lines.
When Wolff reached Kesselring's
headquarters he found the field mar-
shal only fifteen kilometers ahead of
the hard-driving Gen. George S. Pat-
ton's Third Army. Nevertheless, Kes-
selring, according to Wolff, took time
out to authorize Wolff to recommend
surrender to Vietinghoff in his name.
He explained that he could not himself
move because he mistrusted his asso-
ciates. "Our situation," he told Wolff,
"is desperate, but nobody dares tell
the truth to the Fuhrer, who is sur-
rounded by advisers who still believe
in a last, specific secret weapon, which
they call the Verzweillungswaffe. " Trans-
lated, that means last-resort
weapon. He professed not to
know the weapon's exact na-
ture.
Although encouraged, Wolff
was subjected to further de-
lay.
Himmler summoned him
to Berlin, upbraided him for
yielding the Italian partisans,
Parri and Usmiani, and asked
for a full report on his visits
to Switzerland. Wolff' dissem-
bled. Ordered to remain in
Berlin temporarily, he fled
back to Italy when Himmler
was unexpectedly called to
Hungary. All this promptly
was reported to Dulles by the
German lieutenant, Zimmer,
who crossed the border twice
in four days.
Back in Italy, Wolff en-
countered two new obstacles.
Although the new theater
commander, Vietinghoff, and
his chief of staff, Roettiger,
were impressed by Kessel-
ring's endorsement of Sunrise,
Vietinghoff declined to move
until the situation north of the
Alps was clearly seen to be
hopeless. He argued with some
reason that he had no wish to
inspire another stab-in-the-
back legend for the postwar consola-
tion of the German people. Hitler was
at the moment assuring his people that
victory would turn on the battle of
Berlin. It seemed plain that Vieting-
hoff, believing a majority of his officers
and men still under the Fuhrer's spell,
feared disorder if he acted prematurely
and in defiance of Hitler's reiterated
orders to hold Italy at all cost.
Vietinghoff'sobstructionism wasgrave
enough, but graver troubles were piling
up for Wolff on the personal side. Back
in Berlin, Himmler telephoned, order-
ing Wolff not to leave his post again
under any circumstances. Employing
a characteristic instrument of Nazi
terrorism, Himmler broadly hinted
that Wolff's family were now being
held as hostages for his obedience.
Wolff had removed his wife, formerly a
Frau von Bernstorff, who once lived in
New York, and the children to a refuge
in his command near the Brenner Pass.
Himmler had returned them to Wolff's
estate at St. Wolfgang in the Tyrol for,
as he put it, "their safety." Wolff
could not know what orders the Ge-
stapo had direct from Himrpler, and this
new turn gave him cause for fear. To
Dulles, via Baron Parrilli, he explained
that be must be careful in as much as
he would be of no further service "as a
corpse," even though he were a corpse
"at a state funeral."
Previously he had promised to be in
Ascona on April second with authority
to surrender. He sent Parrilli instead,
insisting, however, that he was not yet
licked. Because of the twin setbacks,
Generals Lemnitzer and Airey returned
to headquarters at Caserta. Sternly
Dulles admonished Wolff, through Par-
rilli, that Allied successes were shorten-
ing the time for surrender. Warning
him that he and Vietinghoff would be
held personally responsible if Hitler's
scorched-earth policy was executed, he
reminded Wolff of his detailed promises
to safeguard hostages, prisoners and
partisans against the Fdhrer's murder-
ous intentions. Since Dulles never put
himself in the position of bargaining
with the Nazis, all his communications
to Wolff had been oral. This time
Parrilli had to memorize long passages.
The power drive launched by Alex-
ander and Clark in the first week of
April hampered, threatening to dis-
rupt, the line of communications be-
tween Dulles and Wolff. More than
ever the highways of Northern Italy
were unsafe to travel. To Dulles it
seemed the time had come to avail him-
self of Wolff's offer to shelter an Allied
radio station within the enemy lines.
Chosen for the unprecedented and haz-
ardous mission was a young Czech
known as Little Wally, who had been
trained as an operator by O. S. S. for a
job where a knowledge of German was
required. Wally had been studying
medicine at the University of Prague
when called into the army before the
German occupation of Czechoslovakia.
Going underground thereafter, he had
been caught, imprisoned at Dachau,
had escaped, becoming a parachute
saboteur with the British, been caught
again and had for the second time es-
caped, this time to Switzerland. In-
terned, he again got away and in
France volunteered for duty with the
0. S. S.
Lieutenant Zimmer took Little Wally
with his transmitter, cipher books and
secret instructions-which, however,
divulged nothing of the Sunrise opera-
tions-with him to Milan, installing
the operator in his own apartment. It
had been thought easier to conceal him
in Milan than at Wolff's headquarters.
Besides providing direct communica-
tions from Wolff to Caserta and Bern,
Wally engaged in extracurricular activ-
ity, pointing the Allied Air Forces to
likely targets. In one case, where the
target was Mussolini's current hide-out
quite near the Zimmer apartment,
Wally's directions were understand-
ably precise.
When a tip came from Little Wally
to touch up General Vietinghoff's
headquarters, which were separate
from Wolff's, the Americans marveled
at this peculiarly Germanic method of
applying pressure. Wolff had inspired
the tip.
By mid-April, with the British Eighth
and the American Fifth armies ad-
vancing steadily toward the Po, the
prospects for a useful surrender ap-
peared dim indeed. Meanwhile, two
agents provocateurs showed up to add
zest to the flagging Sunrise. One, a
German consul in Italy known to be a
Kaltenbrunner man, sought an
interview with Dullesin Wolff's
name, exhibiting too much
knowledge of the conspiracy
for comfort. A pseudo-British
officer tried to gain audience
with Vietinghoff on behalf of
Dulles.
This so alarmed the Ober-
kommandant that he wrote
a full explanation to Jodl at
Fiihrer headquarters, asking
absolution and advice. Only
after the strongest representa-
tions from Wolff, Ambassador
Rahn and Roettiger, did Viet-
inghoff tear up the letter.
Arriving in Switzerland on
April sixteenth, Lieutenant
Zimmer brought a letter from
Wolff containing condolences
on the death of President
Roosevelt together with as-
surances that the army com-
manders underV ietinghoff had
been enlisted for Sunrise and
that capitulation was immi-
nent, with or without the
Oberkommandant. Zimmer re-
ported Gauleiter Franz Hofer,
of the Tyrol, just back from
Hitler's headquarters with
word that the Fuhrer was
"crazily" planning vast new
counteroffensives.
Despite Wolff's optimism, his letter
contained a disquieting note, sharp-
ened the next day when Parrilli ap-
peared with fresh advices. Himmler
had ordered Wolff to Berlin. At first he
took evasive action, refusing to answer
the telephone, but Parrilli reported
that Wolff, after drawing up a new
will, finally had taken off for Berlin via
Prague. At the American end of Sun-
rise it seemed that little hope remained
of ending the Italian war rationally,
sparing the Allied forces and the Ital-
ian people the final draught of blood.
Knowing Himmler, Dulles supposed
that Wolff's persistent treachery to the
Fiihrer was about to meet its due re-
ward.
This was on April seventeenth. The
pay-oft came four days later in a dis-
patch from Washington, quickly con-
firmed by AFHQ, ordering Dulles to
terminate all surrender conversations
with the Germans forthwith. The or-
der, bearing the imprint of the High
Command, carried no explanation. To
Dulles it appeared that all hope had
fled; that the war in Italy must now
go on to its bitter and appointed end.
Editors' Note-This is the first of two articles by
Forrest Davis. The second will appear next week.
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 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/02 : CIA-RDP02TO6251 R000900260001-0
The Secret
History of a
Surrender
By F ORR ESi 1AVIS
In the second and last
chapter of this story of an
American triumph, the author
gives you fascinating glimpses
of Hitler, Himmler, Kesselring
and other high Nazis in the
dying days of the Reich.
If
II T seemed for a few hours on April 21, 1945, that
the exasperatingly slow endeavor to wind up
the war in Italy by surrender had fallen irre-
trievably flat. The negotiations, crammed with the
standard ingredients of spy fiction-suspense,
danger and the startling experience of meeting
notorious enemy characters face to face while the
fighting was still going on-had lasted seven weeks.
But while Allen W. Dulles, the astute chief of Maj.
Gen. William J. Donovan's Office of Strategic Serv-
ices in Switzerland, was dejectedly preparing to
break communications with the Nazi peace con-
spirators, in obedience to the day's orders from the
High Command in Washington, a message came
from the other side of the lines. Relayed by Little
Wally, the clandestine radio operator in Milan, it
announced that the SS General Karl Wolff and the
Reichswehr Col. Gen. Heinrich von Vietinghoff were
at last unreservedly ready to down arms. Even
then, in fact, emissaries, armed with full powers,
were preparing to cross the frontier and put them-
selves in the hands of the O. S. S., according to
agreement, for the journey to the Caserta head-
quarters, where the surrender would be completed.
Two days later, Baron Luigi Parrilli, the faithful
Italian go-between, arrived in Switzerland with
word direct from Wolff. The prime mover in the
peace junta was coming with the emissaries. Parrilli
had been waiting at Fasano, Wolff's headquarters
on Lake Garda, when the SS general returned from
his unsought visit to Himmler and Hitler in Ger-
many.
Himmler,' Wolff reported, was badly frayed, in-
decisively pondering whether the top Nazis should
fight it out in Berlin, retreat to a northern redoubt
or fly to Berchtesgaden. Against the third option
stood the Fuhrer's recently acquired and somewhat
hysterical aversion to flying. Both Himmler and
Dr. Ernst Kaltenbrunner, chief of the Gestapo,
castigated Wolff for his part in Sunrise; Kalten-
brunner, reading from stacked documents, confront-
ed him with details which he had thought deeply
secret. Wolff quaked as Kaltenbrunner read. Ex-
pecting to be liquidated, Wolff thought he owed his
escape solely to the fact that the nerves of the high
Nazis already had cracked.
Once, testing Kaltenbrunner's mood, Wolff
bristled, saying, -'.I will not accept. being treated as
if I were on trial; if I have done anything dishonor-
able take me out and shoot me." Kaltenbrunner
thereupon subsided. Emboldened, Wolff charged
Himmler with having miscalculated Germany's ca-
pacity to resist in the Rhineland as well as in the
east against the Russians. When the SS Reichs/uhrer
offered no defense against these reproaches, Wolff
declared that, Himmler having proved a false guide,
he felt entitled now to shift for himself. At the
moment, Himmler seemed acquiescent. Kalten-
brunner, however, insisted that all must go down
together. Late that night the Gestapo chief ordered
Wolff to accompany him to Hitler's headquarters.
Arriving at 4:30 in the morning, they found the
Fiihrer, gray and despondent, in his hunker, pre-
paring to sleep. He asked them to return at five i>.m.
At that hour there took place one of the last. con-
versations with Hitler as reported directly from high
Nazi sources. The talk began with Wolff explaining
that he undertook the parleys with the Americans
only after the Fuhrer, in February, had sent out
secret instructions to establish contact wherever
possible with the Allies. Making no comment,
Hitler launched instead into a harangue, giving
Wolff explicit orders concerning the last-stand de-
fense of Northern Italy and the scorched-earth
policy he expected to be pursued. When Wolff ad-
vised against leveling Italy, Hitler listened quietly,
but again made no comment. Preoccupied with the
defense of the Italian front, he remarked that Italy
must be held for at least two months. He was con-
vinced that the Russians could be stood off for two
months.
"We must fight to gain time," Hitler told Wolff,
as reported to Dulles. "In two more months the
break between the Anglo-Saxons and the Russians
will come about and then I shall join the party
which approaches me first. It makes no difference
which." As for himself, Hitler added that he would
then fulfill the personal ambition he had nourished
from the beginning of the war, retiring from active
duty in order to "observe and influence the fate of
the German people from a distance." This was on
April eighteenth. Thirteen days later the German
radio announced his death. To Wolff, intent on
quitting the sinking ship, Hitler seemed as uncon-
scious of the realities of his disintegrating situation
as a sleepwalker.
Back in Fasano, convinced that there was little
more to fear from Hitler and Himmler, Wolff
finally persuaded General Vietinghoff that the
sands had run out. On the twenty-fourth, Wolff
reached Lucerne with the emissaries, Lt. Col. Viktor
von Schweinitz, of Vietinghofl's staff, and his own
aide, Maj. Max Wenner. The parliamentarians were
in borrowed civvies, Wenner wearing Wolff's shoot-
ing jacket, an aggressively checked tweed. The Ger-
man party was secretly installed in the villa of Maj.
Max Waibel, of the Swiss general staff, who had
been a participant in Sunrise almost from the start.
The presence of Wolff and the plenipotentiaries in
Lucerne confronted Dulles with a problem. Upon
receipt of word that Wolff was at last delivering
what he had promised early in March, the American
had notified Caserta, London and Washington.
Dulles and his principal aide, the German-born
American Gero von S. Gaevernitz, reasoned, rightly
as it turned out, that the High Command would
not have halted the
conversations had they known the
Germans to be on the point of capitu-
lation. Caserta took that view also,
and Field Marshal Sir Harold- Alex-
ander urgently cabled the High Com-
mand to reconsider. From Caserta
came word likewise to hold the Ger-
mans in Lucerne. Yet under terms of
the order terminating the parleys,
Dulles could not communicate directly
with Wolff. Fortunately, Switzerland
also having a vital interest in the out-
come, Major Waibel was willing to
bridge that hiatus.
The High Coinmand was slower to
resume than they had been to interdict
the negotiations. Hence, for nearly
four days, while Alexander and Mark
Clark were driving toward the Po with
rising fury, the emissaries idled in
Lucerne. Wolff got out earlier. The
sweeping advance of the Allies threat-
ened, as he thought, his escape road
back to his headquarters, which were
in process of being moved, along with
Vietinghoff's, to Bolzano, in the Dolo-
mites, under the Austrian border. It
seemed to Dulles, as well as Wolff, that
the general was needed in Italy to re-
deem his promises regarding destruc-
tion of property and the safeguarding
of prisoners and hostages, as well as to
effectuate the surrender when signed
at Caserta. Furthermore, Wolff was
concerned, unnecessarily as it turned
out, over reports from Milan of mys-
terious activities of Mussolini. As
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soon would become known, with pe-
culiar force to Wolff, It Duce was
merely planning his ill-starred get-
away.
A more compelling reason for Wolff's
speedy return developed before he left
Lucerne. The evil spirit of the North-
ern Italy undertaking, Heinrich Himm-
ler, had again been moved to action.
Obviously reflecting Hitler and Kal-
tenbrunner, he had telegraphed Wolff
at Fasano, saying, "It is more than
ever essential that the Italian front
hold and remain intact. No negotia-
tions of any kind should be under-
taken." The order was read to Wolff
by telephone while in Waibel's pres-
ence. To the Swiss he said, "That no
longer counts; Himmler has played his
last card." Yet Himmler, through the
Gestapo, was still in a position to cause
harm. Two of his most lethal hatchet
men were, as Wolff knew, circulating
in Italy.
Crossing the border at Chiasso with-
out incident, Wolff soon found his way
south blocked by resistance groups.
The patriots, thinking liberation at
hand with the great drive of the Anglo-
American armies, had poured out of
the mountains, occupying Como and
other northern towns and blocking the
highways. This was on the afternoon
of April twenty-sixth. That morning a
squad of partisans had caught Musso-
lini, fleeing north along Lake Como
with Clara Petacci, his mistress, and
the infamous pair were slain. Partisan
blood was up, and Wolff, the supreme
SS police chief of Italy, would have
been another rich catch.
Taking refuge in a villa near Cernob-
hio, Wolff soon found himself again
thwarted. The patriots surrounded
him, too weak as yet to attack, but
rapidly gaining reinforcements. Hap-
pily for him, the telephone still worked.
A call to Major Waibel brought Gem
Gaevernitz at once to Chiasso, where,
luckily, he encountered Donald Jones,
of the O. S. S., an old hand with the
partisans who had just returned from
a visit with their leaders in this dis-
trict at Como. Jones agreed that
prompt action was vital. There could
be little doubt that once in partisan
hands Wolff would be shot forthwith
and, from our point of view, that would
be bad. With Wolff gone, the whole
long maneuver might easily fall to the
ground.
Jones, therefore, volunteered to
rescue Wolff. No better man could
have been found. Known to the patri-
ots as Scotti, Jones had for two years
been going and coming among them,
arranging communications, carrying in
currency and playing the part of a
Dutch uncle to them all. First tele-
phoning Wolff that his men should
hold their fire when his motorcars ar-
rived, Jones set out with a strange
cavalcade hastily assembled. In the
leading car he placed two German
officers who had managed to get away
from the villa together with a large
white flag. Jones followed in the sec-
ond car, shining his headlights on the
flag ahead. In the third car he put
trustworthy partisans armed with au-
tomatic weapons.
While rolling out of Chiasso the
motorcade was fired on by a partisan
band. Calling a halt, Jones coura-
geously left his car and walked unarmed
into his headlights with the hope that
someone among the band would recog-
nize him and put a stop to the firing.
So it happened. An old friend ran from
the cover, crying "ii amico Scotti," the
firing stopped and the expedition re-
sumed its way. At Como a friendly pre-
fect armed Jones with a pass through
all partisan lines. Often halted, but
not again made a target, the party
finally reached Wolff's villa. Wolff was
in full uniform. While he changed to
mufti, members of his staff offered
Jones some Scotch, and American ciga-
rettes, which they assured him had ac-
companied them all the way from North
Africa. Wolff was delivered by Jones
to Gaevernitz at Chiasso, taken from
there across Switzerland to Feldkirch
on the Austrian border, from which he
could reach the new headquarters at
Bolzano by way of the Vorarlberg.
Before departing from Chiasso, Wolff
uttered a new set of pledges to Gaever-
nitz. His life having been actually
saved by Jones and the O. S. S., the
SS leader put genuine fervency into
his promise to arrest Himmler should
he show up in Italy bent on destruc-
tive ends. While at the villa, Wolff re-
ported, he had telephoned Rauch, his
SS commander at Milan, renewed in-
structions to avoid fighting and pillage,
ordering him to surrender even to the
partisans if necessary. Gaevernitz had
put these directives in writing, later
entrusting them to Parrilli for delivery
to Milan. Wolff further agreed to take
forcible measures against any military
leaders who should attempt to block
surrender. As we shall see, this prom-
ise was fulfilled.
The High Command reversed its in-
structions on the twenty-seventh, and
Schweinitz and Wenner got away the
next day. These German emissaries
crossed the French frontier at Geneva
to Annemasse, proceeding at once to
the air base at Annecy, where an Amer-
ican C-47 picked them up and flew
them through the foulest weather of
the late spring to Caserta. Although it
might wet a seemed to the O. S. S.
authorities at the worst was over,
actually the, course of Sunrise from
April twenty-eighth to May second at
twelve noon, mean Greenwich time-
when arms finally were grounded
on the Italian front-was checkered,
dogged by bad weather, faulty com-
munications, treachery in the German
ranks and Heinrich Himmler.
Since the High Command did not
see fit to explain its intervention in the
negotiations, the files of Sunrise are
bare of anything that might account
for the motive. It may be surmised
with fair assurance, however, that the
reason for abandoning the matter on
the verge of success, leaving the Ger-
man parliamentarians dangling for
four days in Lucerne, was political and
not military.
The transaction ending the war in
Italy detained the German parlia-
mentarians at Caserta only twenty-
four hours. Gaevernitz fortunately
had accompanied them, and when Von
Schweinitz, representing General Vie-
tinghoff, raised some minor points con-
cerning procedure, the O. S. S. man was
able to persuade him that the surrender
had to be unconditional. Back at the
Swiss-French border with three copies
of the protocol for delivery to Vieting-
hoff and Wolff, the first in a series of
hitches which were to become monoto-
nously disheartening developed. Be-
cause of a communications delay the
O. S. S. man assigned to meet and assist
the emissaries over the border did not
appear. None of the party remembered
the names under which the Germans
were traveling.
In that extremity, Gaevernitz re-
sourcefully stepped across the border
and asked the Swiss guards if they
would oblige him by identifying his
companions as the men who had gone
out with him yesterday and allow them
to return. This the Swiss did, literally
permitting Schweinitz and Wenner back
into Switzerland on their faces. As
this was the evening of the twenty-
ninth, the capitulation being set for
three days hence, and they had an all-
night drive ahead of them to the Aus-
trian frontier, every minute counted.
The surrender party reached Dulles'
house in Bern just before midnight,
tired and discouraged. None had slept
for thirty-six hours. Arriving at Feld-
kirch the next morning, the German
emissaries met another, more serious
delay. During the night the Swiss had
closed the frontier. As the order
stemmed from the highest quarters,
the old Swiss friends of Sunrise lacked
the rank to get around it. Dulles there-
upon appealed to an elevated Swiss
functionary, telling him how material
was the passage of these men and re-
minding him of Switzerland's interest
in an orderly surrender and the pres-
ervation of Northern Italy from demo-
lition. The official, a man of decision,
acted promptly, and Schweinitz and
Wenner crossed the frontier-the only
exceptions made that day.
In Austria and Italy, where the
emissaries had only a battered German
jalopy instead of the powerful Amer-
ican car that had sped them across
Switzerland, they met with rough
going, the highways being often blocked
by late snows. Although expected at
Bolzano by midday, they did not reach
there until 12:30 A.M. on May first.
Meanwhile, Dulles was beset with
communications difficulties. With the
capitulation signed, it was clearly of
the utmost importance that it be con-
firmed by the Germans at Bolzano to
the Allies at Caserta, so that the order
to cease firing at noon of the second be
co-ordinated. Little Wally, the radio
operator secreted in Milan, had been
extricated by Dulles when negotia-
tions were broken off. The problem
now was to get Wally to Bolzano. To
this chore was assigned First Lieut.
Guido Zimmer, the humble author of
Sunrise, who previously had taken
Wally to Milan and installed him in
his own house. Zimmer, who had been
stationed at Buchs, opposite Feldkirch,
in a switch of courier posts, had suc-
ceeded in getting Wally to Bolzano on
the twenty-eighth.
At Caserta and Bern, Wally's first
signals from Bolzano impatiently were
awaited. Bolzano was pocketed by
mountains. Could Wally's crystals
clear them? Actually, the word from
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Wally was spotty, he was unable to
receive the text of the capitulation
coherently, and Caserta's first word
that the Germans were going through
with the surrender came from clear
signals to field commanders from Bol-
zano ordering them to stack arms at
the appointed time.
Fearing communications delays,
Dulles had withheld one copy of the
protocol. From Caserta he heard of
Alexander's urgent desire that the text
reach Bolzano expeditiously. For a
time Dulles thought of dropping his
copy with a parachutist-Tracy Barnes,
of the legation staff, volunteering for
the job and a Swiss pilot being retained.
Barnes, as a parachute officer, had
made a daring operational jump in
Normandy after D day, being subse-
quently decorated for it. Fortunately,
in as much as the jump into the Bol-
zano pocket would have been extremely
hazardous, this expedient was dropped
when it appeared certain the emissaries
would reach Nazi headquarters in time.
May Day was one of intense anxiety
at Caserta and Bern. No word came
from Bolzano, and at 8:30 that night
Field Marshal Alexander dispatched a
stiff note, demanding an immediate
reply if the Germans wished the firing
stopped at noon next day. That mes-
sage got through. The silence at Bol-
zano covered a frenetic sequence of
happenings which threatened, until
eight hours before the time set, to nul-
lify the long and tortuous negotiations
which had ended at the Caserta cere-
monies.
Upon General Wolff's arrival at his
headquarters on the night of April
28-29, he conferred until 7:30 A.M.
with Vietinghoff, Ambassador Rahn,
Gauleiter Franz Hofer and others. To
all but Hofer the surrender was re-
garded as a fait accompli. Hoping, as
afterward became known, to keep the
Tyrol as an unreconstructed strong-
hold of Nazism, policed by Werewolves,
Hofer had insisted that the surrender
terms forbid entrance into those prov-
inces to the Allied forces. When he
learned that the military had never
considered making such a request,
knowing its uselessness, Hofer at-
tempted to inject a monkey wrench
into the surrender. Although a ring-
leader in the Sunrise cartel on the Nazi
side, Hofer now turned informer, tele-
phoning Himmler and Kesselring the
whole story.
His treachery worked. On Himmler's
advice, Kesselring-who had been
placed in over-all command of the Ital-
ian theater along with Southern Ger-
many since Wolff's visit-at once re-
moved Vietinghoff and his chief of staff,
Roettiger, replacing them with an in-
fantry general named Schultz and a
Major General Wentzel. In the begin-
ning, Kesselring had been a tower of
strength to Wolff and the surrender
junta. Only a week before, two officers,
sent by Wolff to Kesselring, reported
the field marshal regretful that he could
not join in surrendering before the "im-
pending death," the bemrstehenden Tod,
of Hitler. The uncertain Kesselring
now ordered an army investigation of
the surrender enterprise, holding that
the sending of Schweinitz and Wenner
had been "too far-reaching."
In the explosive atmosphere pro-
duced by Hofer's ratting, the emissaries
reached Bolzano. At 6:30 A.M. of the
first, Wolff got together Roettiger,
Standartenfrihrer Eugen Dollmann, who
had been an early participant in Sun-
rise, and staff officers, to discuss the
terms with Schweinitz and Wenner.
The principal fruit of these talks was a
decision to arrest the new Oberkom-
mandant and his chief of staff.
This was done at seven A.M., Schultz
and Wentzel being confined in an air-
raid shelter carved out of the moun-
tain just back of the Reichswehr head-
quarters. Roettiger assumed de facto
command, but Wolff was pulling the
strings. Vietinghoff meanwhile had
retired to a retreat for high-officer re-
serves. The telephone circuits to Ger-
many were cut to prevent news of the
insurrection reaching Hitler, Himmler
or Kesselring. When two army com-
manders, Herr and Lemmelsen, de-
dined to go along with the surrender
as long as Schultz and Wentzel were
under detention, Wolff talked with the
arrested officers for two hours. The
most they would concede was their
willingness to intercede with Kessel-
ring in behalf of surrender.
The situation that day was not eased
by the visit of an Allied bombing
squadron. One bomb damaged a build-
ing within a couple hundred yards of
where -Wally was struggling with his
crystals in the marble villa occupied
by Wolff's headquarters. Wolff took
time off from his other labors to prod
Wally into hurrying a message of pro-
test to Caserta, asking air headquar-
ters, if they must bomb Bolzano, to
aim for the other side of town. An SS
officer threatened Wally with extinc-
tion if the visitation was repeated.
When the operator reported the threat
to Wolff, the general ordered the officer
summarily punished.
At 8:30 P.M., when Alexander's per-
emptory note came, Wolff undertook
to force an immediate response from
Kesselring. He had no luck. In the
field marshal's absence from his0bead-
quarters, Wolff demanded by telephone
of his chief of staff that Kesselring at
once appoint a new Oberkommandant
with authority to capitulate. The chief
of staff promised a reply by ten o'clock.
When none arrived, Wolff gained the
consent of all the subordinate com-
manders to send out orders to quit
firing at noon the next day. It was
these signals that Caserta heard.
An hour later, at eleven P.m., the
Berlin radio announced Hitler's death.
Curiously, that event, which had been
counted upon to ease the surrender
situation because it relieved the Reicha-
wehr officers of their personal oath to
the Fdhrer, produced no such effect.
As Wolff and three associates pre-
pared to leave the headquarters, their
way was blocked by a crowd of armed
and threatening officers. The surrender
clique escaped through the air-raid
shelter and, back at his headquarters,
Wolff ordered out seven tanks and
350 SS men with machine guns to ring
the building.
At 1:15 A.M., Keaseh-ing, pursuing
his obstruction to the bitter end, or-
dered the arrest of Vietinghoff, Roet-
tiger, Schweinitz and other Reichswehr
officers. He also recommended similar
action to the Luftwaffe and SS high
commands in Germany. No arrests
were made. Three quarters of an hour
afterward Kesselring telephoned Wolff,
and after more than two hours of
abusive tirades finally yielded at 4:30
A.M. Only seven and a half hours re-
mained in which to effectuate the sur-
render. Fortunately, the orders that
went out at ten P.M. sufficed, except for
two parachute divisions with which
disciplinary action had to be taken
later in the day.
The surrender put an end to twenty
months of fighting-often gallant, al-
ways dreary-spared Northern Italy
the ravages visited on the south, and
brought to Dulles from General Lem-
nitzer, who had supervised the show at
Caserta, a telegram hailing Sunrise as
a "complete and tremendous suc-
cess" . spelling "the end of Nazi
domination in Europe." To General
Donovan came a message from General
Lemnitzer hailing O. S. S. for its "vital
part" in the Northern Italy surrender.
Because of O. S. S.'s operations, Lem-
nitzer wrote, "the war in Europe has
been brought to a successful conclu-
sion much earlier than would other-
wise have been possible, with the con-
sequent saving of many lives and much
treasure."
Editor.' Note-This is the second of two article.
by Mr. Davis.
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