THE DEBATE OVER OPENNESS IN SOVIET PROPAGANDA AND CULTURE

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• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 14, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence
Secret
The Debate Over "Openness"
in Soviet Propaganda and Culture
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SOV 86-10041 X
August 1986
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Directorate of Secret
Intelligence
The Debate Over "Openness"
in Soviet Propaganda and Culture
Leadership Analysis.
This paper was prepared by I Office of
Soviet Analysis. It was coordinated with the
Directorate of Operations and the Office of
Comments and queries are welcome and may be
directed Chief. Domestic Policy Division
SOVA
Secret
SOV 86-10041 X
August 1986
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Summary
Information available
as of / August 1986
was used in this report.
The Debate Over "Openness"
in Soviet Propaganda and Culture
Since Gorbachev took over, a major campaign has been under way to
improve the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda and culture as instruments
for indoctrinating and mobilizing the population behind his policies.
Gorbachev has pursued this effort-known in the USSR as glasnost
(openness}-on several fronts:
? A number of controversial plays, films, and literary works that deal with
formerly taboo topics and were long held back by censorship have been
released.
? Soviet media have begun to deal more frankly with problems and
shortcomings in Soviet society and the economy. Significantly more
candid coverage of crime, elite corruption, alcoholism, drug abuse,
inefficiencies in the economy, natural disasters, and the war in Afghani-
stan has appeared.
? Increased funding is being made available to the arts. Several new
cultural organizations have been established, and an experimental proce-
dure has been set up to allow many theatres and other arts organizations
more autonomy over programing and finances.
? Skillful use of television interviews and well-publicized informal visits to
work sites are helping Gorbachev to project the image of a leader who is
accessible to the public. Many other high-level officials have followed his
lead.
Gorbachev evidently believes that more media candor in discussing
domestic problems will help marshal public support for his policy initia-
tives-such as the campaigns against alcohol, corruption, and crime-and
legitimize the discussion of economic reform. Gorbachev also is using
publicity of shortcomings within the elite to pressure officials to behave in
accordance with new standards he is setting.
More generally, these measures reflect Gorbachev's recognition that Soviet
propaganda and culture are not meeting the challenge posed by the influx
of Western information and culture in recent years and by the development
of a more critical internal audience. Due in part to Brezhnev's detente
policies of the 1970s and in part to the revolution in media technology, a
mass audience has developed for Western radiobroadcasts. Video movie
iii Secret
SOV 86-10041X
August 1986
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cassettes and rock music tapes are widely available on the black market.
Greater access to information from abroad and strict censorship inside the
USSR have made many Soviet citizens increasingly cynical about official
propaganda and increasingly alienated from the stale offerings of Soviet
culture. While this new openness has not led to any relaxation of the harsh
treatment of dissidents or lessened the jamming of Western broadcasts, it
reflects increased awareness that such repression-to be effective-must
be accompanied by an upgrading of official media and culture.
Under Gorbachev, many propaganda and media officials have been
replaced and new editors named for key publications. With the recent
addition to the Politburo and Secretariat of several men who appear to
share his orientation on propaganda and cultural policy, Gorbachev's
approach probably commands majority support within the top leadership.
Moscow party boss Boris Yel'tsin and, to a lesser extent, "Second Secre-
tary" Yegor Ligachev and propaganda secretary Aleksandr Yakovlev have
been outspoken advocates of glasnost.
But, there are clear limits to Gorbachev's desire for openness; not
surprisingly, no criticism of his leadership has appeared in Soviet media
since his accession. In recent weeks, these limits were made glaringly
evident by initial domestic coverage of the nuclear power plant catastrophe
at Chernobyl'. Because the regime's initial obfuscation produced a public
relations debacle, however, Chernobyl' has moved the issue of information
policy squarely into the center of leadership attention.
Expanding the limits of the permissible in culture and propaganda harbors
major risks for the regime and for Gorbachev personally. Public airing of
social problems could stimulate a process of ferment within the intelligen-
tsia and criticism from below that could get out of hand-as happened
during Khrushchev's "thaw" in the late 1950s. In fact, Gorbachev's partial
relaxation of strictures on cultural life has already encouraged some
intellectuals to press for further liberalization. By casting the public
spotlight on official abuses, moreover, Gorbachev is running the risk of
creating a backlash within the elite. Soviet officials have traditionally
viewed their immunity from public criticism as an inviolable privilege. If
the campaign goes too far, it could strengthen the hand of Politburo
hardliners, produce a swing back to more repressive policies, and perhaps
damage Gorbachev's political position.
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Gorbachev could always lead the retreat if the political pressure becomes
too great. But cracking down, as was done in the past, would risk killing the
esprit he wants to build among the population and might lead to greater
popular cynicism about party propaganda and regime credibility than
existed before. Cutting off media and cultural outlets for the ideas of the
intelligentsia would also disillusion many intellectuals and cause some of
them to circulate their works outside official channels. Already some
individuals who feel frustrated by the current constraints are floating
reform proposals in samizdat.
Gorbachev has not yet made clear exactly what the boundaries of
permissible expression are; this omission suggests that he finds it politically
expedient to maintain tactical flexibility. He is attempting to strike a
balance between his dual priorities for Soviet culture and propaganda-
artistic creativity and media credibility, on the one hand, and ideological
correctness, on the other. These dual goals are, in the final analysis,
irreconcilable. Implementing the process of glasnost will increasingly tax
Gorbachev's political skill. If, in the short run, he continues to resist
defining more precise limits as a way of giving himself room to maneuver,
the demands and hopes of liberal intellectuals will inevitably escalate. In
the long run, he will ultimately have to set firm bounds to prevent a
conservative reaction within the leadership.
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"Stagnant" Propaganda and "Dull" Culture
"Openness" With a Purpose
Chernobyl' and Glasnost: A Case Study
7
Political Forces and Personnel Changes
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The Leadership Alignment: Supporters of Glasnost ...
8
... and Opponents?
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The Bureaucracy: Changes in the Party and
Government Apparatus
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Policy Debate
14
Key Issues
15
The Afanas'yev Incident
17
Debate Over Organizational Change
19
Prospects
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The Debate Over "Openness"
in Soviet Propaganda and Culture
"Stagnant" Propaganda and "Dull" Culture
Propaganda and culture in the USSR have tradition-
ally been key instruments for regime indoctrination
and mobilization of the population, but in recent years
their effectiveness has eroded. Strict censorship in the
years since the Khrushchev "thaw" ' has made Soviet
propaganda increasingly unconvincing and Soviet cul-
ture increasingly stale from the point of view of many
Soviet citizens. Many intellectuals and artists have
been alienated by crude and unimaginative ideologi-
cal and cultural standards.' Boring and unattractive
productions have also turned off an increasingly edu-
cated and sophisticated general populace. Articles in
Sovetskaya Rossiya in late 1985 stated that atten-
dance at films produced by the largest Soviet studios
declined by 50 percent over the past decade, although
viewers eagerly pay premium prices to see foreign film
festivals. According to an article in a December 1985
issue of Knizhnoye Obozreniye, stockpiles of unwant-
ed books collect in publishing houses while popular
young poets find it impossible to get their works
printed.
Young people, in particular, appear to find propagan-
da presentations uninteresting and poorly presented.
According to a recent Soviet sociological survey in
Leningrad, young people prefer public lectures on art
to the current mix of political and ideological themes.
The study, evidently commissioned to guide the pro-
paganda apparatus and published in a tiny edition of
500 copies, also found that only about 5 percent of the
respondents thought officially sponsored public lec-
tures were "very good," and only 29 percent thought
them "good."
After Stalin's death, Khrushchev relaxed the stultifying official
controls on art and literature, which inadvertently encouraged
liberals to go beyond limits considered safe by the regime. The
Brezhnev leadershi repudiated Khrushchev's policy shortly after
his ouster.
3 The stagnation of the Soviet cultural scene has impelled a number
of the USSR's finest artists to emigrate to the West. These include
the innovative director of the avant-garde Taganka Theatre, Yuriy
Lyubimov, and the controversial filmmaker Andrei Tarkovsky,
The increased popular cynicism about regime propa-
ganda and the decreased attractiveness of Soviet
official culture have been exacerbated and to a degree
caused by increased access to Western culture and
news. The regime's detente policies in the 1970s,
along with technological developments in modern
mass communications, have given Soviet citizens
greater access to information from abroad during
Brezhnev's tenure than ever before. In particular,
Western radiobroadcasts developed a mass audience
in the USSR. These broadcasts have weakened the
regime's monopoly over information control, giving
millions of Soviet citizens an alternative source of
news that enables them to evaluate regime propagan-
da more critically.
At the same time, Western popular culture, especially
music, has increasingly challenged the dominance of
official Soviet culture. According to a recent article in
a Soviet sociological journal, a 1985 survey of stu-
dents at a Ukrainian technical institute showed that
over 90 percent of male students preferred rock music
to all other types. The availability of new technol-
ogy-video movie cassettes, music tapes, video cas-
sette recorders-is making it more difficult than in
the past for the regime to prevent the illegal dissemi-
nation of foreign materials (see inset on page 2).
The partial opening of Soviet society to Western
influences has been a matter of growing concern
among Soviet authorities. Since 1980, the regime has
heavily jammed Western radios. Nevertheless, much
broadcasting continues to get through with varying
degrees of audibility, and, monthly, some 30-38 mil-
lion Soviet citizens tune in to Voice of America (VOA)
alone. Radio Liberty (RL) and the Baltic services of
Radio Free Europe have from 17-25 million listeners
monthly (see inset on page 3).
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foreign
videos are easily available through the Soviet under-
ground, and US films are the most popular.
in the Moscow area alone the number
of people involved in the illegal cassette market is in
the thousands, and that hundreds more deal with
technical aspects of conversion of Soviet television
sets to make them compatible with US cassettes. Nor
is foreign video traffic confined to the capital cities.
Embassy officers recently visited a `bar/videotek" in
a Georgian city, where, for a 3-ruble cover charge,
patrons were treated to 90 minutes of Western enter-
tainment video in English with a voice-over in Rus-
sian. They were told that the videotapes came from
tourists who had visited the West and that the club
was crowded at each of the four daily shows.
Soviet media report wide-
spread black-market trafficking for video equipment.
Soviet sailors routinely bring VCR tapes and record-
ers back, and Finnish tourists smuggle Western mov-
ies into the USSR to sell them for inflated prices.
The regime's uncertainty about how to deal with the
information revolution is demonstrated in its contra-
dictory policies toward VCRs. The leadership is
clearly apprehensive that Western video cassettes
could become vehicles of Western ideological pene-
tration. KGB Chief Chebrikov's speech at the party
congress expressed concern about black-market traf-
ficking of VCRs. Nonetheless, the Gorbachev leader-
ship has apparently recognized the futility of at-
tempts to exclude completely the VCR technology
and adopted a competitive approach. The government
has opened 10 video rental stores, which offer over
400 Soviet and foreign films, and there are plans to
expand the VCR industry (according to state cinema
official V. V. Markov). Legal production cannot meet
popular demand, however. Rental VCR machines are
almost unavailable, and only Soviet machines, which
are cheaper than smuggled foreign ones but inferior,
can be purchased legally in state stores. Markov,
implying that Soviet films are unsatisfactory, has
lamented that there are too few foreign films avail-
able. Consequently, the regime itself has apparently
in effect sanctioned unofficial importation.
seamen are authorized to bring into the USSR one
VCR and five blank tapes each year, duty free, which
usually immediately enter the black market.
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Top Kremlin leaders have recognized for some time
that greater candor in the media and increased cultur-
al excellence were needed to make these instruments
more effective. Andropov began a process of selective-
ly releasing more information to the population about
political activities-for example, he initiated the prac-
tice of publishing reports of Politburo meetings-and
Chernenko talked about the need to discuss regime
shortcomings more frankly.
But Gorbachev has begun a much more systematic
and far-reaching implementation of a policy of glas-
nost (openness) and cultural revitalization. He has
described Soviet propaganda as "stagnant," and he
has publicly decried the "dullness" of many cultural
works. He has moved during his first year as General
Secretary to loosen ideological strictures on Soviet
cultural life and to open up a limited discussion of
domestic problems in official propaganda. The media
are carrying more factual accounts of domestic events
and providing coverage of some formerly taboo topics.
Gorbachev has encouraged the media to engage in
investigative reporting to expose a wide array of
"negative" phenomena in the society and in the elite
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Shutting Out Western Voices
In 1980, following the invasion of Afghanistan and
the onset of the crisis in Poland, the USSR resumed
jamming Voice of America, the British Broadcasting
Corporation, and Deutsche Welle. The stations had
not been interfered with during the 1970s. Since 1980,
80 percent of the Russian-language broadcasts into
the Soviet Union have been jammed. The Soviets
have always jammed Radio Liberty (RL), which is
particularly bothersome to them because of its focus
on Soviet internal developments and emigre writings.
Continued high listening rates since 1980 have
prompted new measures to block the broadcasts:
the Soviets have
decided to cut back on the production of shortwave
radios for the domestic retail market.
production would be limited to only a
few, prohibitively expensive models. Shortwave ra-
dios no longer are needed to pick up Soviet stations
in remote parts of the country. Consequently, Soviet
officials conclude that these radios are being used
by Soviet citizens solely to listen to illicit Western
broadcasts.
the KGB is
running an active measures campaign designed to
discredit RL. Letters are now being mailed to the
Department of State, ostensibly from employees,
charging corruption and other irregularities at the
station. Soviet journalists are also being used to
send complaints about RL to various addresses in
Munich, in an effort to turn West German public
opinion against allowing RL to broadcast from that
country.
the
USSR had complained to Finland about radio and
television broadcasts reaching Estonia,
planning to build new television jamming stations
in coastal areas of the republic.
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itself. Editors from central newspapers have recently
been sent to the provinces to instruct local editors to
be more assertive and critical in uncovering problems.
the regime's only
~is that the limits of criticism be recognized.
As a consequence, the Soviet domestic audience now
receives much more information than was previously
available about such social problems as crime, the
black market, alcoholism, drug abuse, and draft
dodging. The media are putting the spotlight on cases
of malfeasance and incompetence within officialdom
and letting out more information about reasons for
removals and transfers of officials. They are also
providing more discussion of Soviet troop activity in
Afghanistan and providing live coverage of such
events as the space launch. An especially striking
example of the new frankness appeared in Moscow
Komsomol (18 April 1986), which presented harrow-
ing portraits of young addicts, after years of media
denial that a drug problem exists in the USSR.
Gorbachev is putting his relative youth and skill in
fielding questions to good political effect by using
carefully televised "walk-arounds" during which he
converses informally with ordinary citizens. These
forays among the people are doubtless orchestrated to
some extent, but they reflect the importance he places
on building a reputation as an accessible leader
willing to speak frankly on the problems facing the
USSR. Other high-level officials previously remote to
the public have-since the appointment in December
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1985 of a new chief for the State Committee for
Television and Radio (Gostelradio)-also appeared on
live television and radio call-in programs to explain
policy and respond to listener criticisms. The press
conference, initiated during Andropov's tenure, has
now become a familiar propaganda device.
a comprehensive program of
modernization of the propaganda machinery will soon
be undertaken, with the help of foreign media experts
and with top priority being accorded television.
The cultural scene in the Soviet Union, particularly
the theatre, is now more lively than at any time since
Khrushchev's cultural "thaw" during the height of
de-Stalinization in the 1950s. The sense of deja vu is
heightened by the reissuance of works by leading
liberal authors of that period. Several literary figures,
active during the 1950s, who were in political disfavor
for years are being featured prominently at cultural
events. These include Yevgeniy Yevtushenko, Andrey
Voznesenskiy, and Bulat Okudzhava.
a new novel by Vladimir Dudintsev, whose
novel Not by Bread Alone ushered in the Khrushchev
"thaw," will be published soon. A number of films,
plays, and literary works dealing with sensitive politi-
cal issues have been released to the public after being
held back many years by censorship, and commissions
have been set up to review unpublished manuscripts
and feature films and documentaries rejected by
censors over the past 20 years. Commissions have also
been formed to honor underground folk singer Vladi-
mir Vysotskiy, whose enormously popular satirical
and earthy songs were suppressed by the Brezhnev
regime, and to study the verse of Osip Mandelshtam,
who died in one of Stalin's labor camps (see inset on
page 5).
Gorbachev and his wife have patronized the arts,
endorsing a number of controversial plays by attend-
in performances.
"Openness" With a Purpose
Gorbachev has a pragmatic motive in moving toward
glasnost in propaganda and culture. He probably
recognizes that propaganda must be credible to be
effective and that Soviet cultural offerings must be 25X1
interesting if they are to compete with Western 25X1
culture for the Soviet audience. Gorbachev appears to 25X1
realize that repression alone cannot solve the problem
of Soviet society's vulnerability to outside influences.
In fact, modernization of the economy will necessitate
further technological innovations, such as computer- 25X1
ization, that will make it impossible for central au-
thorities to regulate information flow, at least to the
extent that they used to.
Gorbachev also seems to think glasnost in propaganda
and culture will marshal public opinion in support of
particular policy initiatives. He probably believes that
franker portrayals of social problems in the media and
in literary works are necessary to raise public aware-
ness of their gravity and to condition people to accept
the need for vigorous remedial measures, such as
strengthening law enforcement, curtailing alcohol
abuse, and tightening worker discipline. The General
Secretary has implicitly linked his new policy on
culture and propaganda to his goals of opening up
debate on economic reform and accelerating economic
production. He has told Soviet media and cultural
workers that they play a critical role in bringing about
the "radical change" in attitudes necessary for eco-
nomic progress.' The decision to release a number of
productions with Russian nationalist themes may
indicate that Gorbachev is attempting to associate the
regime more closely with traditional Russian nation-
alism as a substitute for the waning appeal of ideology
(see inset on page 6).
' Gorbachev's desire to stimulate public concern, rather than to
buttress complaisance, contrasts sharply with Brezhnev's approach
in his later years. Gorbachev is attempting to establish his reputa-
tion by exposing problems he inherited from his predecessor.
Brezhnev, after years in power, had little incentive to allow, much
less encourage, literary or media commentary that raised questions
about his leadership ability by exposing the true dimensions of the
domestic ills that had mounted during his tenure. Moreover, since
Brezhnev placed a higher priority on social tranquillity and the
avoidance of conflict than on vigorous actions to redress societal
problems, he had more reason to conceal information about adverse
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Controversial Films, Books, and Plays
Released Under Gorbachev
Films
? "Agonia "-Released after many years on the shelf,
portrays the 1917 Revolution as a spontaneous
popular rebellion rather than a triumph of Bolshe-
vik organization. Striking for its tones of Russian
nationalism and even monarchism.
? 'Roadblock' -Made in 1971 but never before re-
leased, depicts the persecution of a returning Soviet
partisan who had been forced to join the Nazis.
? "Double Trap"-This realistic crime drama shows
the corruption of a group of Latvian youths and
includes pornography.
Literature
? Publication of the two-volume collected works of
Boris Pasternak, which do not include Doctor
Zhivago.
? Reissuance of a collection of stories by the "Village
Writers" group popular in the 1950s and 1960s,
because of the forthright treatment of rural prob-
lems and overtones of traditional Russian national-
ism in their writings.
? Republication and rehabilitation of several impor-
tant writers of the early 20th century, including
Marina Tsvetaeva, Velimir Khlebnikov, and Mik-
hail Bulgakov.
Theatre
? "Silver Anniversary' -This morality play depicts a
corrupt party official, a muckraking journalist who
is fired for exposing a scandal, and other unsavory
functionaries. Attended by Gorbachev, Yel'tsin,
Ligachev, and reportedly made mandatory viewing
for party congress delegates.
? "40, Sholem Aleichem Street --A frank treatment
of Jewish emigration and its tragic impact on a
family split over the issue.
? "Dictatorship of Conscience' -A mock trial of
Lenin that exposes various tyrannical figures,
drawn from fiction and history, as having distorted
socialist principles by their brutality.
? "Speak Out!"-Based on the 1950s' writings of
Valentin Ovechkin (a popular writer on the rural
scene and a Khrushchev favorite), calls for open
discussion of past party wrongdoings. The action
takes place in front of a gigantic statue of Stalin.
? `Burden of Decision-Adaptation of an article on
the Cuban missile crisis by liberal political com-
mentator Fedor Burlatskii. Appeals for restraint
among leaders and depicts their responsibility for
peace; portrays Kennedy favorably.
? `Brothers and Sisters"-The title taken from Sta-
lin's famous appeal to the people to fight the Nazi
invasion, this play raises the specter of Stalin's
repressions against the backdrop of popular war-
time heroism and suffering.
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Exhibit of Glazunov's Paintings
Depicting Russian Nationalism
A striking example of the attempt to tap nationalist
sentiment is the official backing recently displayed
for the controversial painter Ilya Glazunov, whose
700-canvas show was opened in early June by First
Deputy Minister of Culture Yevgeniy Zaytsev at
Moscow's preeminent exhibit hall adjacent to the
Kremlin. Russian nationalism-depicted by histori-
cal, natural, and religious motifs-is the common
theme of the exhibit, which reportedly was held on
the orders of Moscow party chief Boris Yel'tsin.
Glazunov's huge painting of the prodigal son return-
ing to his Russian heritage was a center of attention.
US Embassy contacts have reported that Raisa
Gorbachev is an admirer of Glazunov's work.
Gorbachev seems to have the political motive of using
glasnost to bring pressure to bear on elites to behave
in accordance with new standards he is setting. Media
exposes of corrupt and incompetent officials serve to
hold officials more strictly accountable both for dis-
charge of their public duties and for their personal
judgment and sobriety. By demonstrating that party
elites are not "outside the pale of criticism," Gorba-
chev is challenging one of the most treasured privi-
leges that have grown up around party membership-
that of immunity from public censure (see inset on
right).
Finally, Gorbachev apparently hopes that glasnost
will impress foreign public opinion with the "cultural
diversity" and "freedom of expression" he is allowing.
He is permitting relatively liberal cultural figures
such as Yevtushenko to travel abroad as goodwill
ambassadors. A closely related goal may be to lure
eminent emigre artists back to the USSR to lend
luster to the cultural scene there and improve the
credibility of claims of artistic freedom. There have
been reports in the Western press lately that promi-
nent artists abroad-such as Yuriy Lyubimov,
Soviet Media Expose Corrupt Officials
? According to Moscow Radio, a former rayon first
secretary of the Uzbek Republic CPSU and the
former director of a cotton ginning plant were
sentenced to death for systematically embezzling
funds and bribing workers at other enterprises to
write out false invoices. (Moscow News Service, 22
July 1986)
? A representative of the Soviet Procuracy narrated a
television documentary that interviewed now con-
trite lawbreakers and featured footage of their ill-
gotten gains. One woman, former head of a consum-
er services directorate, accumulated 20 fur coats,
30 fur hats, more than 200 sets of china, and over
200 tons offood. This same woman had the walls of
her home covered in silk fabric. (Moscow Televi-
sion, 27 June 1986)
? Illegal actions of Ministry of Internal Affairs
(MVD) personnel in one rayon led to a man's death,
according to a January 1986 newspaper article.
However, instead of taking action to bring these
officials to justice, the local MVD tried to defend
them. More recent information adds that the chief
of the local MVD, in fact, bought every copy of the
paper containing the January report to hide the
facts from the public. (Sotsialisticheskaya Indus-
triya, 16 May 1986)
? According to Pravda, top officials of the Moscow
Procurement Administration, to create the appear-
ance of prosperity, have been overreporting receipts.
As a result of their criminal negligence, Pravda
charged, the state lost more than 270,000 rubles.
(Pravda, 26 June 1986)
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Andrey Tarkovsky, sculptor Ernst Neizvestny, and
writer Viktor Nekrasov-have been contacted by
Soviet officials and by visiting Soviet writers
Yevgeniy Yevtushenko and Andrey Voznesenskiy
with the message that if they came home they would
be well treated. US Embassy Paris contacts have
confirmed these approaches.
While encouraging glasnost in regime media, Gorba-
chev has intensified efforts to block news coming into
the country from abroad and to stem the flow of
unauthorized materials at home through such mea-
sures as jamming and cracking down hard on samiz-
dat.` He has adopted a combined strategy of curtail-
ing access to unofficial information and culture where
feasible, attacking and countering foreign information
more aggressively, while relaxing rigid controls on
cultural life to permit more sophisticated works to
appear and releasing more information through
regime-sanctioned channels to preempt foreign
"voices."
Chernobyl' and Glasnost: A Case Study
media for their "shameful" attempts to "whip up
hysteria," culminating in Gorbachev's report to the
nation 15 days after the event.
Whether the regime would in the future react differ-
ently in a situation where other countries are not
involved is open to question. Disaffected Soviet intel-
lectuals have told US Embassy sources they think
that the media have been relatively open about this
disaster, but only because of the need to respond to
Western broadcasts into the USSR and to calm the
population. Even so, the regime's belated, grudging,
and initially sparse release of news, by most accounts,
harmed Gorbachev's attempts to build domestic credi-
bility. It may have reinforced perennial skepticism of
official information among more sophisticated and
intellectual elements of the Soviet populace and fed,
rather than quelled, rumor and fears among the
public at large.
There is evidence of high-level recognition that the
initial attempt to conceal information about Cherno-
byl' was flawed and carried an unacceptable cost of
diminished public confidence:
Both the limits and the purposes of the new informa-
tion policy have been graphically displayed by the
regime's handling of the Chernobyl' nuclear plant
disaster.' When disaster struck, the regime reacted as
it traditionally has in the past, with silence, followed
by minimal and misleading bulletins. Once the regime
realized it could not prevent the general population
from learning about the disaster, however, it shifted
tactics. While continuing to suppress many details,
the propaganda machinery began to release much
information in an effort to persuade the population
that the regime was leveling with them and to counter
alarmist rumors and Western radiobroadcasts into the
USSR. Eventually, the reluctant seepage of informa-
tion became a flood, coupled with attacks on Western
? The new Novosti chief, Valentin Falin, indicated to
Der Spiegel that Soviet media treatment of the
accident was "done offhand" because of a lack of
preparation for such an event. Falin stated that "no
country is in a position to keep such matters secret"
and that, in hindsight, he felt it would have been
"better to publish on Sunday the information we
published Monday."
? Several articles in Pravda have acknowledged that
delayed and incomplete information on the catastro-
phe was a mistake that caused "all kinds of rumors"
and public anxiety, which have been only partially
dealt with by ensuing official statements.
? A reader's letter published in Izvestiya urged that
scientists should be able to discuss ecological issues
"honestly, without avoiding Chernobyl' " (see inset
on page 8).
problems in the plant's construction were very frankly dealt with in
a caustic expose of management inefficiencies and supply s fus
that was published in the Kiev paper Literaturna Ukraina.~
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Secret
Leadership Debate Over Information Control
The inability to control information about Cherno-
byl' may have heightened debate within the Politburo
over information policy in general. A Western busi-
nessman told US Embassy officers that he had heard
from an aide to Ukrainian party Secretary Shcher-
bitsky that Shcherbitsky had asked Gorbachev for
instructions within an hour of the accident, only to
receive a cable an hour and a half later telling him to
"say nothing and avoid panic. "
by the time the Politburo met,
Gorbachev may have decided to advocate greater
openness. The dissident historian Roy Medvedev told
La Repubblica of Rome that the Politburo, except for
Vorotnikov and Chebrikov, opposed Gorbachev when
he proposed a policy of forthright information on
Chernobyl' and that only Western outcry finally
moved the other leaders away from their insistence
on secrecy. If Soviet leaders conclude that the lesson
of Chernobyl' is that total suppression of information
is counterproductive, the incident could give further
impetus to the policy of glasnost.
Political Forces and Personnel Changes
boss Boris Yel'tsin and, to a lesser degree, "Second
Secretary" Yegor Ligachev and propaganda secretary
Aleksandr Yakovlev.
Yel'tsin, who has become a candidate member on the
Politburo since Gorbachev's accession, is an outspo-
ken proponent of the new glasnost policy. He deliv-
ered a stinging attack on party privileges at the 27th
CPSU Congress in February, although his flat de-
mand for the abolition of "unjustified benefits" for
party leaders at all levels was not picked up by other
speakers. Yel'tsin also appeared to act as point man
for Gorbachev by criticizing "stagnation" in the arts
and calling for reorganization of the Central Commit-
tee Culture Department to prevent a "weakening of
party influence."
Yel'tsin has also been more forthcoming than other
leaders in discussing the Chernobyl' disaster. In an
interview published in West Germany, he divulged
more information about the accident than had other
regime spokesmen and directly broached the openness
issue. Acknowledging that a "certain reserve" "for-
merly" existed in Soviet information policy, he main-
tained that "under the new leadership" nothing is
being held back. Yel'tsin's pattern of frank discussion
of problems apparently goes back some years; when
he was oblast first secretary in Sverdlovsk, he report-
edly initiated a weekly, live call-in program that
carried citizen complaints and his own discussion of
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A majority of top leaders appear to support Gorba-
chev's propaganda and cultural policies. Recent
changes in the Politburo and Secretariat brought in
several men closely associated with Gorbachev's ap-
proach. The General Secretary's actions and state-
ments indicate he believes broad restructuring and
restaffing of the relevant bureaucracies to be neces-
sary. So far, he has replaced most key Brezhnev
holdovers in the media and propaganda bureaucracies
with younger and more supportive officials-a process
that was highlighted at the party congress. Conserva-
tives, however, remain in several key posts.
The Leadership Alignment: Supporters of Glasnost ...
Within the top leadership, the most active supporters
and spokesmen for Gorbachev's new direction in
cultural and propaganda policy are Moscow party
problems.
Ligachev appears to be playing a key role in the
management of propaganda and culture. Speaking to
television and radio officials in November 1985, he
stressed that broadcasting must be "wholly and fully
political" but nonetheless expressed concern over the
low artistic quality of much programing. Writing in
the party journal Kommunist the same month, he
called for a deep restructuring of the cultural appara-
tus. According to Roy Medvedev, immediately follow-
ing the congress Ligachev summoned editors of the
leading newspapers and journals and lectured them on
the need to upgrade their work. He publicly praised
Yevtushenko's poem that attacks Stalin's repression
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The Theatre's Special Role in Promoting Glasnost
The theatre apparently is playing a leading role in
breaking down taboos. A number of controversial
plays have recently been revived or premiered, and
policy issues are being debated through the dialogue
of fictional characters on the stage.
The special properties of the theatre may explain its
use as a vehicle for the airing of controversial issues
and floating political trial balloons. As a nonprint
medium, a theatrical production runs less risk of
being held to account for every word, while stage
effects and the actors' craft can silently convey
controversial concepts. Also, audiences are limited to
the number of persons that the theatre can accommo-
date. Moreover, the Soviet repertory theatre can
stage a production faster than an issue of a literary
journal can be published. Gorbachev's reported per-
sonal fascination with the stage may also be a factor
in the choice of medium.
of writers. The Western press has reported that he
authorized the staging of the controversial play "Sil-
ver Anniversary," which dealt with corruption among
party officials. According to US Embassy contacts,
Ligachev approved another new play critical of Sta-
lin's repressions ("Dictatorship of Conscience"), re-
ceived its author in his office, and allowed him access
to party archives for research for a new play about the
period following Lenin's death. At an April confer-
ence of theatre officials, playwrights, and party secre-
taries at the Central Committee, Ligachev stressed
the party's need for "the whole truth"-achieve-
ments, contradictions, successes, and failures. He
voiced support of the contemporary "fight for the new
against the outdated," and urged more rigorous liter-
ary criticism with the objective of raising the quality
of theatrical productions (see inset).
At the same time, there are signs that Ligachev may
differ with Gorbachev over how far to carry glasnost.
he may have objected to the
recent replacement of the ultraorthodox head of the
writers' union and to Pravda's publication of letters to
the editor that attacked the privileges of the party
elite in an unusually pointed fashion.'
Yakovlev has been widely reported to be a close
adviser to Gorbachev on foreign policy and propagan-
da. He was elevated to the Secretariat at the party
congress and appears to have assumed the responsibil-
ities of Mikhail Zimyanin, who had supervised culture
and propaganda since 1976. Yakovlev's appointment
as head of the Propaganda Department in July 1985
was one of the first high-level promotions Gorbachev
made after becoming General Secretary. Yakovlev
reportedly played a key role in the large number of
changes in the media made since he took over the
department. Like Ligachev, Yakovlev has displayed
unusual concern to combat the so-called Western
psychological offensive. Both men probably see
glasnost as a means of limiting the impact of foreign
ideas on the Soviet population.
... and Opponents?
Available evidence is not sufficient to allow a clear
pinpointing of those at the top level who may be
resisting Gorbachev's new cultural and propaganda
policy. The holdouts for a more conservative approach
may include old-guard Politburo members Andrey
Gromyko, Vladimir Shcherbitskiy, and Dinmuk-
hamed Kunayev. Geydar Aliyev was outspoken in his
advocacy of tight party control in a tough speech to
filmmakers shortly before Gorbachev's accession, al-
though while he was party leader in Azerbaijan
(1969-82) he practiced a relatively open leadership
style, meeting with workers and answering their ques-
tions. The functional responsibilities of KGB Chair-
man Viktor Chebrikov may make him wary of any
loosening of controls over the spread of unorthodox
ideas. He stressed the danger of ideological subversion
in his speech to the party congress. However, Chebri-
kov is probably allied with Gorbachev on most politi-
cal and economic questions and is reported to have
been one of two Politburo members to support the
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Key Personnel Shifts in Central Propaganda
and Cultural Bureaucracies Under Gorbachev
Propaganda and Media
? Leading hardliner and vocal opponent of economic
reform Richard Kosolapov was not reelected to the
Central Committee and lost his post as chief editor
of Kommunist, which he had held since 1976.
According to Roy Medvedev, Kosolapov now has
returned to an academic position as head of the
Marxism-Leninism Department at Moscow State
University.
? Outspoken liberal philosopher Ivan Frolov has been
made the new chief editor of Kommunist and
elected to full membership in the Central Commit-
tee, promoting him out of the post in the Academy
of Sciences to which he was relegated in the mid-
1970s after he collided with ideological conserva-
tives. Frolov is reportedly close to Gorbachev's
ideology adviser Georgiy Smirnov, Zagladin, and
Yakovlev. He spoke out forcefully against Trofim
Lysenko, the pseudobiologist who was a favorite of
Stalin, in the 1960s and favors greater tolerance for
cultural and intellectual activity, as well as "mar-
ket socialism" in the economy. According to Med-
vedev, he was chosen to replace Kosolapov at the
last minute at Yakovlev's urging. Although no
other changes in Kommunist's editorial board have
General Secretary's relatively frank information poli-
cy on Chernobyl'. The appointment of former Minis-
ter of Culture Petr Demichev, who reportedly resisted
Gorbachev's initiatives, to first deputy in the Presidi-
um of the Supreme Soviet (under Chairman Gromy-
ko) removed the last Brezhnev holdover at the top
cultural policymaking level.
The Bureaucracy: Changes in the Party
and Government Apparatus
Below the leadership level, there have been a number
of important personnel changes in the propaganda and
cultural bureaucracies, both at the congress and since
been announced, Embassy sources predict that
Frolov will shake up the board.
? Valentin Falin-who was demoted to the position
of Izvestiya political observer in 1983, according to
rumor because of corruption or because of a family
disgrace-returned to political favor as the new
head of Novosti and a candidate member of the
Central Committee.
? Mikhail Nenashev recently left Sovetskaya Ros-
siya's chief editorship to head Goskomizdat. Under
Nenashev's leadership, Sovetskaya Rossiya became
a principal forum for spokesmen for reform initia-
tives and controversial cultural and social notions.
According to the US Embassy in Moscow, he is
reportedly close to Yakovlev. Presumably, he pos-
sesses the energy and innovative managerial style
sought by Gorbachev for the publishing industry.
? Valentin Chikin has been appointed editor in chief
of Sovetskaya Rossiya. While first deputy editor of
this important daily newspaper under Nenashev
early in the decade, he used historical vignettes
from Lenin's life as allegories to press for more
youthful and innovative leadership and adminis-
(see inset on pages 10 and 11). Several Gorbachev
appointees who were advocates of more open media
and cultural policies in the 1960s have now made
dramatic comebacks to replace more cautious officials
installed under Brezhnev. One of these is the poet and
journalist Yuriy Voronov, who, after the congress,
was named to replace veteran hardliner Vasiliy
Shauro as head of the Central Committee Cultural
Department. Voronov, who had campaigned against
rigid orthodoxy while editor of Komsomol'skaya
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trative reform. Removed from the paper in 1984,
Chikin was moved to a less visible position as first
deputy chairman of Goskomizdat.
? New chief editors have been named for nine other
central newspapers and journals:
Boris Vladimirov
Ivan Panov
Alexey P'yanov
Vitaliy Korotich
Nikolay Klepach
Albert Belyayev
Pavel Lapionov
Aleksandr Baranov
Aleksandr Potapov
Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta
Krasnaya Zvezda
Krokodil
Ogonek
Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye
Sovetskaya Kultura
Sovety Narodnykh Deputatov
Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya
Trud
? Aleksandr Aksenov was moved from a diplomatic
post in Poland to replace the long-term chief of the
State Committee for Television and Radio
(Gostelradio).
? The chief of the Soviet Copyright Agency (VAAP)
has resigned amid rumors of corruption throughout
his agency and has been replaced by Nikolay
Chetverikov, a former KGB officer and more recent-
ly a functionary in the Central Committee
apparatus.
Culture
? The innovative film director Elem Klimov, whose
controversial films ' Agonia" and "Go and See"
were only recently issued after years on the shelf,
was elected first secretary of the USSR cinemato-
graphers' union. The official report of the congress
omitted the customary description of the vote as
"unanimous. "
? Vladimir Karpov, editor in chief of the prestigious
literary journal Novyy Mir, has been elected to
replace ultraorthodox Georgiy Markov as first
secretary of the writers' union. Karpov's political
rise was demonstrated by his election to candidate
membership of the Central Committee at the party
congress, the first editor of the journal to be so
honored since 1961. Novyy Mir under his leader-
ship has published a number of controversial
works, including Yevtushenko's poem "Taboo, " de-
spite the opposition of conservative officials to that
work (according to the poet himself). Karpov report-
edly has relinquished the editorship, thus creating
another major new appointment opportunity for the
Gorbachev regime.
Pravda in the early 1960s, had been shunted to
obscure lower ranking posts since 1965. But following
Gorbachev's accession to power, he was brought out
of political obscurity and made chief editor of a
prominent literary journal.
With his appointment to the Secretariat, Yakovlev
apparently retains his post as chief of the Propaganda
Department, and the responsibilities of this depart-
ment are being expanded. The International Informa-
tion Department (responsible for framing internation-
al propaganda) has been disbanded, and control over
both foreign and domestic propaganda consolidated
under Yakovlev.
Gorbachev has also executed a broad purge of editors
of leading newspapers. Several central government
officials with responsibilities for media and publishing
have also been ousted. These changes portend a
further shakeup at lower levels. There has already
been some downward ripple of personnel changes. For
example, we have noted a new deputy chief in the
Propaganda Department. The head of the RSFSR
Goskomizdat was replaced by the first deputy chief
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Press Exposes of Local Officials'Attempts To Squelch Whistleblowers. A number of exposes in the
central press have given details of the serious pressure put on whistleblowing journalists and
newspapers by local party and government officials. For example, the 13 June issue of Pravda reported
that district authorities near Leningrad-criticized by the local party paper for setting up temporary
ice cream stands and stocking usually barren food shops in order to impress visiting food industry of-
cials-ordered the entire edition suppressed and a replacement issue printed. Pravda published
editor of Pravda in mid-March, and retirement of the
deputy chairman of the USSR Goskomizdat has
opened up another post to be filled.
Unfinished Business
There remains unfinished business in restaffing the
cultural and media bureaucracies, however. The
months preceding the congress were rife with rumors
about forthcoming shakeups in the propaganda and
cultural bureaucracies, which were only partially
borne out in fact. Moreover, Zimyanin remains on the
Secretariat-and Demichev on the Politburo-albeit
no longer supervising propaganda and culture.
The central press has published many articles decry-
ing the failure of local and regional newspapers to
expose the corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency of
many provincial editors, unac-
customed to operating without clear-cut central guid-
ance, are reluctant to use their own initiative and
judgment because they fear they will be punished by
resentful superiors.
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Signs of high-level resistance to Gorbachev's house-
cleaning are particularly evident in the organs that
control culture. A case in point is the situation of the
reactionary writer Aleksandr Chakovsky, author of
several pro-Stalin works. He has hung onto his post as
editor in chief of the important cultural newspaper
Literaturnaya Gazeta and was promoted at the con-
gress from candidate to full Central Committee mem-
bership. However, Chakovsky's orthodox views have
not prevented the publication in Literaturnaya Gazeta
of some controversial items, including rather frank
reports of the recent writers' congress that revealed
sharp disputes over the union's leadership and the
policy of glasnost
Gorbachev is not a fan of Chakovsky
and had resisted several proposals that he be promot-
ed. The survival of Chakovsky in the face of removals
of other media conservatives suggests that he has
friends at the top and that his willingness to open
Literaturnaya Gazeta has bought him some time (see
inset).
Ferment in the Cultural Unions
Divisions are crystallizing within the cultural unions,
as the policy of glasnost is apparently providing both
justification and opportunity for liberals to attempt to
take over these organizations from conservative hold-
overs.' A recent meeting of Moscow filmmakers to
select delegates to the forthcoming congress of the
Union of Cinematographers turned into a revolt
against the prepared list of candidates, according to a
US Embassy source who was present. In a tumultuous
session that lasted until 0300 hours, liberal insurgents
nominated 17 colleagues from the floor, insisted on a
secret ballot, and added themselves to the group
tallying the votes. All 17 were elected as Moscow
delegates, at the expense of several top bureaucrats
(including the chairman of the State Committee on
' Unions of Soviet writers, painters, composers, and other artists
are theoretically autonomous collectives that represent the profes-
sional concerns and public positions of their memberships. But,
from the early years of the Soviet regime, when the cultural unions
were brought to heel by the party, the regime has taken pains to
ensure the malleability of their leaders and to bend their agendas to
official goals. Whenever there are signs of loosening in official
policy toward culture, however, the more independent members are
encouraged to speak out, and the cultural unions become arenas for
struggle over the permissible limits of expression, as happened
Gorbachev's line of march and the nature of the
opposition he faces were uniquely displayed at a pair
of unusual press conferences held during the party
congress.
The first featured Yakovlev. Acting as official inter-
preter of Gorbachev's policy to Soviet and foreign
journalists immediately following Gorbachev's
speech, he responded to a request to characterize
Gorbachev's comments on culture as either a
"squeeze" or an expansion of freedom of expression.
His reply, as reported by the US Embassy in Mos-
cow, hewed to Gorbachev's formulation, ruled out a
squeeze, and emphasized that works that considered
problems and elucidated the "truth " would be
supported.
Another press conference held at the end of the
congress, apparently organized by the Central Com-
mittee's International Information Department, was
in sharp contrast in focus and political orientation.
Chaired by the department head Leonid Zamyatin, it
featured as panelists a battery of conservative cultur-
al bureaucrats, including the Union of Writers first
secretary Markov and Literaturnaya Gazeta editor
Chakovsky. The cultural old guard made a show of
unity against Gorbachev's demand for truthful por-
trayal of Soviet life, warts and all. Without directly
criticizing Gorbachev's policies, but professing not to
understand or twisting the focus of such questions as
the possibility of publication of presently banned
books, they conveyed their absolute determination to
stand for "socialist realist" orthodoxy and strict
party control in the narrowest sense.
Cinematography). Within a few days, however,
"offices connected
to the Central Committee" had managed to engineer
the election of all 17 bumped candidates to represent
other union districts.
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Despite the conservatives' rear-guard efforts to stave
off defeat, the support of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and
Voronov for change in the union led to a decisive
victory for reformers. The congress replaced First
Secretary Kulidzhanov-a noted director who was
one of the 17 not elected by the Moscow member-
ship-at a 15 May session attended by Yakovlev and
Voronov. The new first secretary, Elem Klimov, who
was nominated by Yakovlev, has himself suffered at
the hands of the censors and is a symbol of artistic
talent triumphant over bureaucratic rigidity. Gorba-
chev's personal commitment to a change in the leader-
ship of the union was hinted at during the party
congress when he interrupted Kulidzhanov's speech to
rebuke him for his repeated and fawning flattery.
At the congress of the USSR Union of Writers in late
June, the struggle between conservatives and liberals
broke into open and sometimes bitter argument. Fol-
lowing several days of stormy debate, a strong sup-
porter of Gorbachev's cultural policy, Vladimir Kar-
pov, editor in chief of Novyy Mir, was elected to
replace the orthodox Georgiy Markov, the union first
secretary since 1971. US Embassy sources have re-
ported that, in contrast with traditional party manipu-
lation of such events, the elections did not appear to
have been engineered, and Karpov won, beating two
strong candidates, only at the end.
Karpov's liberal editorial policy at Novyy Mir tripled
the journal's circulation and brought it back to the
status it enjoyed in the 1950s and 1960s as the
premier Soviet literary journal. Markov, on the other
hand, consistently advocated rigid ideological controls
over literature and strict adherence to the party line
during his 15-year leadership of the union.
During the congress, the number of reformers on the
64-member Secretariat of the union was significantly
increased, and the newly created eight-man Bureau is
dominated by writers favoring more openness and
change. Joining those who made various proposals for
democratizing the union's structure, Yevtushenko
called implicitly for a dilution of the power of the
union's first secretary. He proposed that a rotating
panel of five outstanding writers be created, instead of
continuing to give all organizational responsibility to
one person. Voznesenskiy openly challenged union
leadership control of the selection of delegates to the
congress. He accused the chairman of the Moscow
union, Feliks Kuznetsov, of falsifying the balloting for
delegates so that a number of the city's most innova-
tive and independent writers were excluded. After a
reportedly "passionate debate," these writers were
invited to attend as "honored guests" with full discus-
sion rights, and several were elected to office.
Contention within the Politburo may have accounted
for the apparent lack of regime control of the election
process. Gorbachev, addressing leading writers on the
eve of their congress, reportedly spoke of the need for
restructuring, and he praised the cinematographers
for "cleaning their own house." One Soviet source
told the US Embassy that Ligachev, by contrast, had
asked Markov to stay on as first secretary of the
union. However, the 75-year-old Markov's collapse
during his congress speech may well have strength-
ened the arguments of those pressing for his removal.
Markov's appointment to the largely ceremonial
chairmanship of the union, vacant for many years,
and his membership on its new Bureau suggest a
compromise between those leaders who wanted to
clean out the union bureaucracy and those who either
opposed the change or favored a cautious, slower, and
face-saving approach.
Personnel turnover has been accompanied by height-
ened debate pitting ideological and stylistic conserva-
tives against the more liberal and/or innovative media
and cultural spokesmen. Sensing a fresh breeze at the
congress and taking their cues from Gorbachev, the
more liberal artists and commentators have begun to
test the limits of regime tolerance for diversity and
candor in the arts and propaganda. In response,
conservatives have stiffened their resistance, which
has been particularly strong in regional and local
media. Both groups used preparations for the 27th
CPSU Congress, which legitimized public discussion
of policy options in the draft Party Program and
Rules, to air their views.
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The newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya has established
itself as a front-runner in raising controversial issues
and views, including some critical self-analysis of
standards for publishable literature and the problem
of "boring" and uninformative treatment of the news
by Soviet media. A readers' questionnaire circulated
by the newspaper early in 1986-which queried the
level 4f information on party and trade union deci-
sions and asked for ideas on ways to improve public
awareness yielded a "vast amount" of mail, includ-
ing some sharp complaints about official secrecy and
coverup. These were published on 16 February 1986.?
At a Party report-and-election meeting, I decided
to devote my speech to the subject of public
openness and to what its absence can bring. As
long as I reminded people of the negative examples
that had already been cited in the report, every-
thing went smoothly. But as soon as I began to talk
about the fact that keeping quiet about certain
instances of stealing is conducive to mass and
group stealing, I was interrupted by a representa-
tive of the Lenin Borough Party Committee who
was present at the meeting. He not only interrupt-
ed me, he made me stop talking altogether.
1. Ovsyannikov, member of the CPSU
since 1942, Smolensk
I would like to suggest that the decisions adopted
at party meetings be displayed for all to see on a
special stand near the board where orders and
announcements are posted.
V. Glavatskikh, carpenter, Norilsk
When an executive is removed from his post,
precise and clear information should be carried in
the local press: Why was this action taken? The
objective would be to deter conjectures and idle
conversation, to prevent rumors and gossip....
You see, in our district, three chairmen of the
district Soviet executive committee, two vice chair-
men, and a secretary of the district Party commit-
tee have "disappeared" in a short time. I don't
want to believe the idle talk. In this case, public
openness can only be beneficial. But our district
newspaper remains silent.
V. Dorotov, physician,
Leninsky settlement, Tula Province
Unfortunately, it is true that we know much more
news about any faraway African country than
about what's happening under our own noses.
People standing in lines in the stores will be
buzzing, and a trolleybusful of people will listen to
the story of an "eyewitness" about events that,
frankly, are unbelievable.... Rumors spread dis-
cord, keep people from working, and put us in a
bad humor. How important the truth is in such
instances!
Key Issues
The debate over Gorbachev's propaganda and cultural
policy revolves around several key issues. Some that
are staples of public discourse have been given height-
ened significance and immediacy because of Gorba-
chev's initiatives. Other aspects of the debate are
more novel or specific to this regime. The most
important questions are the following.
Does a more open discussion of social problems and
official shortcomings serve to buttress regime legiti-
macy and party authority, or does it weaken the
people's confidence in the party? Some articles have
gone even further than Gorbachev's public statements
in urging an independent watchdog role for the press
to ensure public accountability of officials (see inset).
Mikhail Nenashev, former editor of Sovetskaya
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Rossiya, recently characterized the requirement that
journalists get permission from party officials to
publish criticisms as a violation of journalistic ethics.
And a February Kommunist article proposed that the
CPSU Program require every Communist and "lead-
ers of all ranks" to respond publicly and promptly to
media criticism. Other officials have warned that such
public airing of dirty linen would harm the regime's
reputation. Presumably, the leadership's hesitancy
and. reluctance to reveal facts about the Chernobyl'
nuclear power plant disaster revolved mainly around
this question.
Can public criticism be contained within regime-
designated limits, or will some intellectuals and
artists be encouraged by a policy of glasnost to act as
if there no longer are any bounds to expression of
ideas? Much of the resistance coming from conserva-
tive leaders and old-guard cultural establishment
figures is apparently motivated by fears that discus-
sion, even in fictional form, of the purges and other
tragedies associated with Stalin or too frank treat-
ment of contemporary social and economic problems
will open a Pandora's box. Even the liberal theatre
director Igor Gorbachev (no relation), who has urged
that society's "sorest points" should be dealt with on
the stage, warned the CPSU Congress that although
"we have no right to turn a blind eye to shortcomings
... is it worth going into hysterics when you notice a
scab on a healthy body?" An Izvestiya editorial
(22 March 1986), however, took the position that
"prompt and frank information shows confidence in
people ... and their ability to understand events on
their own."
How far can the public revival of formerly disgraced,
banned, or neglected artists be allowed to proceed
without stimulating the expectations of liberal intel-
lectuals beyond the regime's ability to control them?8
' This issue was discussed both at the 19 June meeting of writers
with Gorbachev, Ligachev, Yakovlev, and Voronin, and at the
subsequent union congress. Soviet sources have told the US Embas-
sy that at the meeting a liberal playwright faced off against a
conservative writer who had asked for a clearer line on culture and
a reaffirmation of Stalin-era decrees such as the one that anathe-
matized the satirist Mikhail Zoshchenko and poet Anna Akhma-
tova. According to the sources, the political leaders present did not
intervene in the argument-thus lending fuel to the liberals' cause.
At the congress, many speakers demanded withdrawal of the bans
Recent controversy over Boris Pasternak's banned
novel Doctor Zhivago illustrates the difficulty of
containing intellectual hopes once the process of
rehabilitating formerly proscribed literary works has
begun. According to US Embassy literary sources,
Voznesenskiy, in a recent article commissioned by
Literaturnaya Gazeta, called for publication of Doc-
tor Zhivago. Editor in Chief Chakovsky reportedly
then rejected the article specifically because of this
appeal. (Voznesenskiy subsequently consented to its
publication by Sovetskaya Rossiya without the Pas-
ternak reference.) Pasternak's son and literary execu-
tor, in response to an emotional question from a
member of the audience at a public lecture he gave
recently, stated that the writers' union had vetoed his
proposal to include the novel in the recent two-volume
edition of his father's work. US Embassy contacts
report an increasing pressure from the Soviet literary
community to publish the novel. Former union chief
Markov, however, had a personal stake in the matter.
He was prominent in the 1958 campaign against the
novel, and at a press conference before the congress he
categorically rejected the possibility of publication. At
the congress, however, publication of Pasternak's
works was a prominent issue, and Yevtushenko's
petition, signed by 40 writers, to open a museum at
the writer's home reportedly was adopted with no
opposing votes.
What is the proper balance offacts versus ideology in
official history? Liberal scholars and commentators
have been urging more neutral treatment of past
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Soviet leaders, especially Stalin, as necessary for the
regime's credibility and for the education of younger
generations about past shortcomings that must be
avoided in the future. Some liberal intellectuals are
boldly denouncing Stalin's crimes. In a recent dra-
matic reading at the Taganka Theatre, for example,
the poet Bulat Okudzhava swore not to forgive the
"generalissimo" for "the blood you made flow like
water, while blissfully twirling your mustache" and
for the death of his father-shot "for nothing" in
1937. Conservatives argue, however, that Soviet his-
tory's primary function must continue to be the openly
political defense of regime legitimacy, which forbids
full disclosure of Stalin's abuses of power.'
Will more open treatment of "negative" as well as
positive news play into the hands offoreign enemies
and give them ammunition with which to undermine
Soviet society? Gorbachev has argued that glossing
over problems "opens up a loophole for hostile propa-
ganda" because the Soviet public no longer accepts
"oversimplified answers to questions and clearly rec-
ognizes falsehood resulting from ... fear of disclosing
... the source of problems." Conservatives fear that
foreign radiobroadcasts will capitalize on any admis-
sion of Soviet domestic shortcomings in an effort to
turn Soviet citizens against the political system.
Will graphic portrayals of societal problems have a
contagious effect, particularly on impressionable
young people? The argument often used in support of
strict controls over the arts has been that weak
members of society imitate explicitly violent and
pornographic films by engaging in criminal and devi-
ant behavior. For example, during the party congress,
Markov registered "alarm" over the increase in recent
years of cheap "entertainment" that panders to "adul-
terous and consumerist passions."
The Afanas'yev Incident
Controversy over propaganda policy surfaced this
spring during the media discussion of proposed
changes in the CPSU Program and Rules. Pravda
published several letters from readers strongly attack-
ing special privileges of party officials and calling for
a reinstitution of "periodic" and "thorough" purges of
the apparatus. According to US Embassy sources, the
article provoked a sharp response in party circles and
Pravda chief editor Viktor Afanas'yev, a Central
Committee member since 1976, was summoned by
Ligachev and reprimanded. Two days later the paper
printed what amounted to a retraction by publishing a
letter from another reader objecting to invidious
generalizations about all party officials. Rumors be-
gan to swirl that Afanas'yev would lose his job and his
Central Committee membership.
The Afanas'yev incident may have reflected a split
within the top leadership over the limits on frank
discussion of sensitive issues.
not clear about whether Gorbachev and Ligachev
initially differed on the wisdom of airing such sharp
criticisms of party privilege nor about whether this
difference continues, but evidently the matter was still
a hot issue among delegates to the party congress
three weeks later. At that point Gorbachev reassured
the apparat, denying that a purge was necessary,
while Ligachev-perhaps reflecting his responsibil-
ities for ideology and party cadres-reproved Pravda
for unspecified lapses in editorial judgment concern-
ing criticism.
Afanas'yev has, in fact, retained both his job and
party status. A senior Pravda correspondent recently
assured a US Embassy officer that the editor's posi-
tion is secure and that he continues to enjoy good
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relations with Gorbachev. And a self-confident Afan-
as'yev was quoted in the Madrid El Pais of 3 April as
mentioning that he uses his direct telephone line to
Gorbachev when Yakovlev and Ligachev cannot settle
a matter for him. He admitted that criticism of party
privileges in the controversial article was "expressed
in an infelicitous manner" and that Gorbachev also
thought it ambiguous, but he added that Gorbachev
had since reiterated, at his meeting with media offi-
cials on 14 March, that editors must take more
responsibility for making criticism of shortcomings
sharper and more thorough.
editors have been instructed not to be discouraged by
the controversy over "a recent Pravda article," but to
be more assertive and critical in their approach to
social problems.
Yevtushenko Tests the Limits
The most outspoken advocate of cultural liberaliza-
tion and among the first to test the limits of glasnost
is the controversial poet Yevgeniy Yevtushenko. Yev-
tushenko-whose poem published in Pravda in 1962
was one of the most famous public attacks on Stalin in
the Khrushchev period-returned to the Stalin issue
after a silence of almost 25 years in a new poem
published in Pravda on 9 September 1985. The poem
indirectly maligned Stalin by mocking his favorite,
Trofim Lysenko (a crackpot geneticist whose ideas
dominated Soviet biology for decades), criticized his
refusal to allow the USSR to enter the computer age,
and condemned his repression of Mikhail Bulgakov's
novel Master and Margarita (which had religious
themes and parodied Soviet officials).
A few months later Yevtushenko, in his speech to the
RSFSR writers' union congress, attacked censorship
and cultural mediocrity, insisting that writers "do not
have the right to be silent" about collectivization and
the purges under Stalin. Yevtushenko argued that
there are pragmatic as well as aesthetic reasons for
looking the truth in the face: "A nation that allows
itself to analyze its own mistakes and tragedies brave-
ly knocks the ideological weapon out of its enemies'
hands." Although the published version of this speech
was heavily edited (as were the other speeches to the
congress), his general message was clear and reported-
ly generated broad sympathy from many fellow writ-
ers. Since December, Yevtushenko has been accorded
broad attention by the Soviet media and has made a
trip to the United States. Pravda has published a
favorable review of his long-banned autobiographical
prose poem "Taboo," which appeared last fall in the
prestigious literary journal Novyy Mir.
Yevtushenko has apparently gained courage from
what he sees as a favorable shift of political forces. He
told a US Embassy officer in early April that he
believed the political climate had become even more
receptive to "bold ideas" since the party congress. His
writings and interviews have grown increasingly sharp
and policy oriented over the past several months. His
latest poem, "Backwardness," hits at the "criminal"
shortages afflicting the Soviet consumer.
Yevtushenko's recent essay, which inaugurates a new
column, in the newspaper Sovetskaya Kultura, whose
chief editor was replaced in January, is even bolder.
In this essay, he drops the cloak of poetry and fiction
to argue forthrightly that resolution of today's prob-
lems requires a frank confrontation of historical ta-
boos and that the achievement of proposed "radical
economic reforms" is impossible without intellectual
honesty and independent thinking. Praising the "fresh
wind of publicity" and other "encouraging signs of the
new time," but evidently unsatisfied with progress to
date, he presses for the "precious right of unpunish-
able personal opinion" and an end to censorship.
Countering Stalin's repressions of scientists and art-
ists with Lenin's supposed "administrative tolerance
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and respect" even for opinions he did not share,
Yevtushenko derides the "threats" of conservatives
that "publicity could turn into anarchy" and their
fears of "losing face." The "incompetent" and "hope-
lessly obsolete dinosaurs" did not disappear with
Stalin, he suggests, but continue to block valuable
inventions and artistic works. By choosing Yevtushen-
ko's audacious call for liberalization to inaugurate a
new series of articles, Sovetskaya Kultura, in effect,
invited editors to take it as a standard of frankness for
future contributions.
Yevtushenko has now come out on behalf of rehabili-
tation of the romantic poet Nikolai Gumilev, who was
accused of counterrevolutionary activity and shot
without a trial in 1921. During the past year, unattri-
buted quotations from his religious and patriotic
poems have appeared in the Soviet press, but Yevtu-
shenko's article in Literaturnaya Gazeta (14 May
1986) makes the discussion explicit. He openly de-
fends Gumilev, charges that there was "no proof at
all" of his "crime," and argues obliquely for publica-
tion of his works by contending that he is part of
today's heritage and that "heritage is a serious word."
Gorbachev and Ligachev may be using Yevtushenko
as a stalking horse to promote glasnost. The fact that
his recent works have been acclaimed in press reviews
and published in prominent journals suggests that he
has high-level backing, and the regime undoubtedly
sees a propaganda advantage in having him travel
abroad to publicize the "fresh wind" in Soviet cultural
life. At the same time, he appears to be pressing at the
outer limits of the glasnost policy, and at some point
Gorbachev may find it politically expedient or neces-
sary to rein him in.
Debate Over Organizational Change
The debate over Gorbachev's new propaganda and
cultural policy has engendered spirited discussion of
the organizational changes needed to carry it out.
Disagreement between Gorbachev's supporters and
the conservative old guard has focused on the inter-
related issues of financial self-management of cultural
institutions and decentralization of controls over
them. Liberals are pressing for greater autonomy for
cultural institutions than Gorbachev has granted thus
far, while conservatives appear to be resisting Gorba-
chev's policy of loosening administrative regulation.
Serious disagreements have developed over a recently
decreed experiment to be conducted in eight republics
for two years beginning January 1987 that gives
theatres, circuses, and concert organizations more
direct control over their repertoire, staffing, and
finances. The exact provisions of the regime decree
are ambiguous, which affords the opportunity of
debating what should be done in the guise of discuss-
ing what has actually been mandated. Capping a
series of articles in the cultural media on lack of
audiences and shallow productions in Soviet theatre, a
lengthy article by Oleg Yefremov in Pravda (21
February 1986) called art the people's "common
memory" and argued for both financial and artistic
reorganization of Soviet theatre to allow for better
quality and more courageous productions. By placing
financial and artistic authority directly in the hands of
the theatre director rather than higher bureaucrats,
he said, the theatres would no longer be rewarded for
"gray, pedestrian art" and would be returned to "at
least the taste of risk." Yefremov noted that the
proposal for autonomy was causing "disputes" in
various quarters.
Similar sentiments were expressed at the party con-
gress by theatre director Igor Gorbachev, who called
for greater independence from central planners and
an end to the practice of funding culture out of the
"leftovers" from other budget items. And the head of
the film workers' union complained that centralized
programing so burdens movie houses with a steady
diet of unappealing films that theatre managers are
forced periodically to show trashy box-office hits and
"vulgar foreign rubbish" in a desperate effort to
recoup their financial losses.
The main source of opposition to liberalizing Soviet
theatre organization appears to be the Ministry of
Culture-which would lose its direct control over
stage repertory and staffing. In addition, Gorbachev's
moves to loosen some stifling central controls may
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unintentionally work against provincial elites of small
cultural institutions and set their managers against
proposed organizational changes. For example, the
director of Kazan's youth theatre expressed his reser-
vations about the impact of the theatrical reorganiza-
tion experiment to US Embassy officers in early
March. He fears that making theatres more self-
sufficient financially could endanger smaller houses,
like his own, that depend heavily on state subsidies.
Probably this resistance to decentralization, which
centers in the Ministry of Culture and the cultural
unions, impelled Gorbachev to create several new
organizations to circumvent the cultural bureaucra-
cies, at least for the short term, until their leaderships
can be replaced with his own supporters. There are
now two new societies, for theatre and music, which
seem to be directed at popular and amateur groups as
well as at more established artists and organizations,
but their duties are not yet well defined.
The Politburo has also approved creation of a new
kind of public organization-the Soviet Culture
Foundation. It appears that the foundation will chan-
nel public funds to give "material and moral support"
to both professional and amateur arts, in accordance
with an already drafted (but unpublished) charter to
be discussed nationwide in the near future. The few
specific examples TASS gave of its activities suggest a
broad mandate that will cut across and take prece-
dence over some functions of existing artistic unions:
the new organization will provide material and intel-
lectual resources to aid young talent, support improve-
ment and creation of cultural facilities in small towns
and new areas, and help to preserve the "national
cultural heritage" and restore "artistic masterpieces
and architectural landmarks."
The new organizations may serve Gorbachev's pur-
poses in several ways. Their creation follows up on
recommendations made at the party congress that
new public bodies should be set up, for such groups as
women and older citizens, apparently to counter
popular alienation by encouraging some voluntarism
in civic and cultural activities. Lacking any informa-
tion on actual membership and operations, we are
uncertain whether the new Culture Foundation will in
fact fulfill these intentions. It does nonetheless provide
a political mechanism for bypassing the conservative
leadership of the cultural unions and for diverting
resources to weaken the stranglehold of mediocrity
emanating from the Ministry of Culture, which was
sharply criticized at the congress.
Having started the process of glasnost, Gorbachev
faces certain difficulties in controlling it. Continuing
and expanding the process would entail major dan-
gers, but attempting to halt or reverse it would also
have significant political disadvantages.
Expanding the limits of permissible criticism and
creativity runs the risk of stirring up popular griev-
ances and demands and encouraging the expectations
of intellectuals beyond the regime's capacity to satisfy
them. It may:
? Undermine popular respect for the system rather
than have the intended effect of enhancing public
support, produce a progressive unraveling of the
party's authority, and lead to runaway criticism-
especially in view of the party's traditional insis-
tence on its own infallibility and the Soviet public's
lack of understanding of the concept of responsible
criticism or "loyal opposition" to the government.
? Create a treadmill effect for Gorbachev where each
step to satisfy intellectual hopes would whet appe-
tites for more. The relaxation of controls is already
leading some intellectuals to press for further liber-
alization-the poet Andrey Voznesenskiy has re-
cently called for the complete elimination of censor-
ship, and US Embassy sources report that some
speakers at the writers' union congress challenged
the need for the official censorship agency, Glavlit.
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? Lead non-Russian intellectuals in some republics to
press for more leeway in cultural expressions of
their national identity, at least partly in response to
the publication of Russian nationalist literature.
Thus, conflict between Russians and non-Russians
would be heightened. US Embassy sources reported
ugly exchanges between some Russians and Geor-
gian, Central Asian, and Jewish writers at the
writers' congress. These sources also said that a
spontaneous alliance developed between Russian
liberals and the non-Russians.
Such developments might increase elite pressure on
Gorbachev to reverse course. Conservative officials
are probably apprehensive that too much glasnost
threatens the stability of the system as a whole; many
of them also fear that Gorbachev's policy threatens
their own privileged positions within that system. By
subjecting elites to increased media criticism of their
performance and by "populist" moves to bypass bu-
reaucrats in the media and cultural apparatus and
create cultural institutions "from below," he may be
raising the specter of popular "voluntarism" and
heightening fears of a purge (see inset). If Gorbachev
does not heed elite concerns about carrying glasnost
too far, at some point opposition to him and his
policies could coalesce within the Politburo itself.
If Gorbachev decides to abandon glasnost and clamp
down, he will create other serious problems for the
regime and for himself:
? Destroying the esprit Gorbachev wants to build
among the people, which might lead to greater
popular cynicism about party propaganda and his
own credibility than existed previously.
? Disillusioning many intellectuals and causing some
of them to circulate their works outside official
channels. Already some persons who feel frustrated
by constraints that remain on what can be published
are floating reform proposals in samizdat. In July,
a docu-
ment purporting to be the manifesto of a "Move-
ment for Socialist Renewal" and calling for sweep-
ing changes to establish political pluralism and
Gorbachev's invitation to Soviet citizens to criticize
officials for abuses has already increased the number
of anonymous denunciatory letters, and it recalls the
Stalin era. Many lower level officials probably are
apprehensive about the possibility of vindictive abuse
by political rivals and personal enemies, in the name
of accountability. Recently the press, legal scholars,
and law-enforcement authorities have begun to speak
out against such poison-pen letters, labeling them as
against the spirit of Gorbachev's glasnost. In mid-
April the USSR Supreme Court instructed lower
courts to crack down on their authors: slanderous
unsigned letters will now be regarded as grounds for
criminal investigations. The court also recommended
that the results of most trials be reported in the
media. But these efforts to reassure elites that they
will be protected from informers bearing.grudges
have probably not fully allayed their concerns.
full-blown civil liberties. A leadership decision to
close off discussion of reform in official forums
would fuel samizdat.
Gorbachev has not yet made the boundaries of per-
missible expression clear, which suggests that he finds
it useful or politically expedient to maintain tactical
flexibility. He has been vigorous in crushing unautho-
rized publications and has not permitted publication
of some of the extreme calls for liberalization made by
those attending the writers' union congress. In a
Pravda interview (8 February 1986), he made an
unprecedented public defense of censorship. But he
justified its role in narrow terms-to prevent publica-
tion of state and military secrets, war propaganda,
and pornography-and he reportedly refused to ac-
cede to a request for a clearer line at his meeting with
writers before the congress.
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Gorbachev is evidently attempting to balance his dual
priorities for Soviet culture and propaganda-artistic
creativity and media credibility, on the one hand, and
ideological correctness, on the other. Presumably, he
believes he can continue this balancing act. This view
was articulated by Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief
of the International Department, in an interview
published in the Prague Tribuna (26 February 1986).
Asked if the fragile line "between criticism and
violent attack" might now have been breached and an
"unstoppable avalanche" unleashed in the USSR,
Zagladin insisted that the "absolute majority" of
people are mature enough for the recent frank discus-
sion of past mistakes and that the "substantial part"
of public criticism is accompanied by constructive
proposals.
Nevertheless, the dual goals of artistic creativity and
political reliability are in the final analysis irreconcil-
able. Managing the process of glasnost will increas-
ingly tax Gorbachev's political skill. If in the short run
he continues to resist defining more precise limits as a
way of giving himself room to maneuver, the demands
and hopes of liberal intellectuals will inevitably esca-
late. In the long run, he will ultimately have to set
firm bounds to prevent a conservative reaction within
the leadership.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP87T00787R000400550001-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP87T00787R000400550001-2
Secret
Secret
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/11/25: CIA-RDP87T00787R000400550001-2