WAITING FOR UNCLE SAM; WHY CONTRAS ARE FAILING ON HOME FRONT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000201190007-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 54
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 11, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 24, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 24, 1986
SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Pg. 18
LENGTH: 988 words
HEADLINE: WAITING FOR UNCLE SAM;
Why contras are failing on home front
BYLINE: by Carla Anne Robbins
DATELINE: Managua
BODY:
The vendors of the Mercado Oriental market here once risked their lives for
the Sandinistas, hiding them in the maze of stalls from Anastasio Somoza's
troops. But the Sandinistas are now the enemy, denounced by the stall keepers
for betraying their own revolution.
These small merchants presumably should be supporters of the contras, the
U.S.-supported forces in the remote North. Yet they emphatically are not
flocking to the rebels' cause. Most are only dimly aware of the contras. Fewer
still want to help. "Where are they -- why aren't they fighting here?" asks a
vegetable peddler. "The Sandinistas are bastards. But who are the contras?"
In the nearly seven years it has been in power, the Sandinista regime has
squandered most of its popular support. But the contras have picked up little
of what the Sandinistas lost. Even the small but vocal opposition tolerated by
the Sandinistas -- the "Democratic center" parties, unions and professional
groups -- is divided as to whether the contras are advancing, or hurting, the
anti-government cause.
Moreover, there has been no effort at all to organize an internal front to
resist Marxist rule. There are no marches, no strikes, no sabotage, not even
pro-contra scrawlings on Managua's graffiti-splashed walls. Today, just as it
was three years ago when they began, the contras' popular base is limited to the
illiterate and extremely conservative peasants in the isolated villages of rural
Nicaragua.
In any case, building popular resistance is not easy. Veteran guerrillas,
the Sandinistas know all the tricks and have preemptively closed off most
avenues for dissent.
Since last October, almost all civil liberties have been suspended, including
the right to strike, free expression and outdoor assembly. Cardinal Miguel
Obando V Brava, the Sandinistas' most respected critic and primary target of the
October restrictions, says Nicaragua is not "in the strict sense of the word" a
totalitarian society. But he adds: "There are signs we are moving toward
totalitarianism."
Nicaraguans are also restrained by a virtual blackout of critical news. Two
of the three newspapers in Managua are government run. The third, La Prensa, is
scissored daily by government censors vigilant to any perceived slights,
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whether speculation about President Daniel Ortega's latest trip to Cuba or a
photo of poorly maintained water bicycles at a resort. In January, the regime
closed the lane independent radio station -- the church-run Radio Catolica --
for failing to broadcast an Ortega speech.
Yet Sandinista control is, by official decision, not absolute. Opposition
parties and organizations can keep offices, hold indoor meetings, even call
press conferences, although they are unlikely to get more than a few paragraphs
of coverage on the back page of La Prensa. And while opposition leaders have
been jailed, it rarely has been for more than a few days. Few, if any, have
disappeared or been murdered.
The contras themselves, and their supporters inside Nicaragua and in
Washington, share responsibility for the absence of an internal-resistance
front. Part of the problem is the contras' questionable credentials: Many of
them are former Somoza guardsmen. Subsequent links to Argentine death squads
and CIA contractors have made them easy targets for Sandinista propagandists.
The contras' failure, until just a few weeks ago, to come up with a coherent
political program -- the result of infighting within the divided movement -- has
also hampered their ability to rally internal support. Many Nicaraguans say
that they bet an the Sandinistas without really knowing what they stood for. it
is a mistake they will not make twice.
The internal opposition is also doing nothing to promote the contra cause.
Luis H. Guzman, a Popular Social Christian delegate to the Sandinista-controlled
National Assembly, says the contras only make the domestic opposition's job
harder because the rebels are forcing the government to limit all dissent.
"What else can a government at war do?" he says. "What (contra leader Adolfo]
Calero and his friends are doing is easy. Inside, we're the ones who take the
risks."
Erik Ramirez, head of the Social Christian Party, is less certain that the
Sandinistas would restore full individual liberties even if the contras were to
disappear. But tie's willing to test them. "I don't trust anybody," he says.
"But I'm willing to take the chance. If they don't comply, then the whole world
will see that Reagan was right."
The contras do, however, have powerful political allies. The Sandinistas'
strongest internal critics have banded together as the National Democratic
Coordinator, which publicly denies links to the rebels, but in private is said
to be supporting them. Among its members and allies are leading businessmen,
two trade unions, several political parties ranging from centrist to extreme
right wing, and La Prensa. The group, known as the Coordinadora, has done little
internally for the rebels. Most of its efforts remain focused an drumming up
U.S. backing.
Enrique Balanas, who heads the country's largest business association,
rejects any suggestion that his people should do more inside the country to
undermine the Sandinista government. "I have a friend an Costa Rica who asked
why we didn't strike," he says. "I told him he should come here and strike and
that I'd stand right behind him. Corazon Aquino did what she did because it was
possible. Here, it is not."
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Another explanation for the nonaction may be that the Coordinadora and the
rest of the opposition are operating on the assumption that, sooner or later, a
U.S. invasion will occur. "It's frustrating," says a State Department official
in Washington. "But they're sitting on their hands, waiting for us to bail them
out."
GRAPHIC: Picture t, In Nicaragua, the Marxist Sandinista regime tolerates no
criticism from the media. Here the respected newspaper La Prensa is being made
up after the scissors of government censors have excised even the mildest
suggestion of missteps by the Sandinistas, PAOLO BOSIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR
USN≀ Picture 2, Nicaraguan Cardinal Obando y Brava, a leading opposition
figure, with parishioners. The Roman Catholic Church is among the most
persistent Sandinista critics, PAOLO BOSIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR USN≀ Picture
3, A meeting of the opposition Social Christian Party in Managua. While
political parties are allowed to function, media coverage is sharply restricted,
PAOLO BASIO -- GAMMA/LIAISON FOR USN&WR
LEVEL t - 2 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 24, t986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 36
LENGTH: 6427 words
HEADLINE: THE SPY FLIGHT THAT KILLED IKE'S DREAM
SERIES: THE U-2 CRISIS;
PART I
HIGHLIGHT:
On May Day, t960, two weeks before President Eisenhower was to meet Nikita
khrushchev at a Paris summit, the CIA's Francis Gary Powers flew a U-2 spy
plane deep into the Soviet Union and crashed. This mysterious event caused one
of the most serious confrontations of the cold war and may have changed the
course of history. Historian Michael R. Beschloss has written an important new
book on the U-2 crisis. Here is the first of two exclusive excerpts from
Mayday, a Main Selection of the Book-of-the-Month Club. The book draws an
interviews with key Eisenhower and CIA officials as well as private diaries,
letters and heretofore-secret documents. Mayday will be published by Harper &
Row, Publishers, on May 1.
BODY:
April 30, t960. There was no premonition of disaster. On a tranquil
Saturday like this, the President's day began in the First Lady's bedroom on the
second floor of the White House, where the first beams of sunlight pushed
through the floral draperies and fell across the sleeping man and woman.
In the absence of an urgent telephone call, Dwight David Eisenhower was
awakened by his valet, a black sergeant named John Moaney who had laid out the
General of the Army's clothes in Algiers, London, Frankfurt, New York and Paris.
When Moaney knocked, the President usually cried, and reached for a
bathrobe, his cheeks pink and fringe of snowy hair ruffled from sleep. To
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0 1986 U.S.News & World Report, March 24, 1986
avoid waking his wife, Eisenhower slipped into the adjoining President's
bedroom, which he used for changing clothes and naps.
He ordinarily took his morning shower before stirring hot shaving foam in an
old-fashioned mug and moving a safety razor up and down the most famous face in
the Western World. In the spring of 1960, the image in the mirror looked firmer
and graver than the face smiling from the "I LIKE IKE" banners of his first
campaign, as if seven years in the White House had chastened and deepened him.
But the actual reason was his diet.
Since his heart attack in 1955, the President had obeyed his doctor and
forsworn the rich food he loved, to bring himself down to 173 bounds, his
football weight at West Point in 1913. Stripped of the extra layer of fat, his
features were at once more sensitive and more powerful. Years later, on first
meeting Eisenhower, Henry Kissinger was not prepared for the "cold, deep-blue,
extraordinarily penetrating eyes."
After tie dressed and took breakfast, the President walked down the wide hall
that served First families as a private parlor and into the private elevator.
Soon he entered his pale green Oval Office and sat down behind the rosewood
desk.
Gen. Andrew Gaodpaster, his staff secretary, walked in to deliver the morning
intelligence briefing. He remainded the President of something so secret that
it was known only to two other key members of the White House staff: In West
Pakistan, a CIA pilot was waiting to fly for 9 hours to Norway across the
forbidden territory of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Eisenhower had always been reluctant to violate Soviet airspace. He
privately noted that "if they were to do this to us," it might start a nuclear
war. But by 1959, CIA deputy director Richard Bissell, father of the U-2
program, reported that the black planes were fathering a large percentage of
"our hard intelligence information about the Soviet Union."
This spring, the President had been more reluctant than ever. Four years
into the program, there was not only greater risk of downing, but, two weeks
from now, Eisenhower was scheduled to meet Nikita Khrustrctrev at the summit in
Paris along with the leaders of Britain and France. In June, Eisenhower would
go to the Soviet Union, where Khrushchev was planning an extravagant welcome.
Negotiators for both sides had drawn close to reaching a limited
nuclear-test-ban treaty, which, if signed, would be the first major accord of
the cold war. Privately, Eisenhower told aides that he was "determined" to
achieve it. Since becoming President in 1953, his chief aspiration had been to
create a lasting improvement in American-Soviet relations. He told French
President Charles de Gaulle, "What a splendid exit it would be for me to end up
. . . with an agreement between East and West!"
Nevertheless, an April 9, 1960, the President had sent the U-2 back into
Russia. Then the CIA asked for still another flight. Eisenhower approved the
mission but allowed only two weeks in which to fly: "We don't want that thing
flying up there while the summit's on."
For two weeks, clouds and snowstorms condealed much of the route over the
Soviet Union. Bissell pleaded for a few more days. Eisenhower agreed but
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specified that no operation is to be carried out after May t."
By this, the last day of April, the pilot and plane were still waiting in
West Pakistan. if they could riot fly tomorrow on May Day, there would be no
mission at least until after the summit.
Saturday evening. Eisenhower joined his wife Mamie; his son John, who served
as a Presidential aide; John's wife Barbara, and the four grandchildren for
dinner at Camp David. After the meal, they watched "April Showers," starring
Jack Carson and Ann Sothern, a sentimental tale made in 1948 about a vaudeville
family's rise to Broadway.
As the 69-year-old President sat with his family in the darkened room, the
changing brightness of the screen lighting their faces, he looked forward to
nine final months in the White House that would be the capstone of his long
career: A Soviet-American accord at Paris, the grand tour of Russia and, as he
also expected, a Republican victory in November that would be a final
ratification of his Presidency.
He could not know that these expectations largely rested on the fate of a
young former Air Force lieutenant whose name he had never heard, who was tossing
arid turning or; his cot in a noisy, steaming hangar in West Pakistan.
In South Asia, it was now Sunday, the first of May. Inside the pitch-dark
hangar at Peshawar, 2 hours after midnight, Francis Gary Powers rose from his
cot and braced himself for his mission -- 3,788 miles north to Bodo, Norway,
bisecting the Soviet land mass at the Urals.
While squeezing into his flight suit, he was asked, "Do you want the silver
dollar?" It looked like an ordinary coin with a loop attached for fastening onto
a key chain. But inside the two halves of the coin was a tiny pin loaded with a
lethal shellfish toxin perfected by the CIA at a reported cost of $3 million.
As Richard Bissell later said, the ii-2 pilots were "exhorted but not ordered"
to kill themselves if caught by the Russians. If a plane went down and a U-2
pilot was captured, he might well prefer suicide to torture. Powers accepted
the coin and dropped in into the pocket of his flight suit.
The CIA did not think there was much chance that a U-2 pilot would survive
a mishap. The plane was so fragile that it would probably break up under
assault. An escaping pilot could not survive at high altitude. An explosive
was stowed behind the U-2 pilot's seat before each flight into Russia. Each
pilot was informed that in an emergency he must set off the bomb before using
his ejection seat arid parachute. Pilots were told that after flipping the two
switches, they would have 70 seconds to leave the plane before the bomb
exploded.
Some wondered whether the explosive really had a shorter delay. Some
suspected that there was no delay, and that when they flipped the second switch,
the bomb would obliterate riot only the plane and equipment but them too.
At 5:20 a.m., with a package of Kents in his pocket, Powers was strapped into
the scorching cockpit of his plane. To keep the u-2 from being traced to the
U.S. government, the plane's black skin and the pilot's silver suit were both
unmarked.
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At 6:26 the signal came. He locked his plastic canopy from the inside. The
ladder was pulled from his plane. He jerked the throttle. The engine screamed
and the plane shot into the unforgettable parabola so steep that early U-2
pilots feared that their planes would overturn. To his east was China in the
full brilliance of dawn; to the west, Afghanistan, Iran and the Middle East were
emerging from the night.
In to time, he was soaring over 60,000 feet. His underwear was still soaked
from the Peshawar heat, but now he shivered. He switched on the autopilot and
wrote in his flight log, "Delayed one-half hour."
Sixty minutes into his mission, he neared the air frontier of the Soviet
Union. The radio could not be used to let colleagues in Pakistan know; that
could alert the Russians. Instead he broadcasted two clicks. Peshawar sent
back a single click: Proceed as planned.
Nikita Khrushchev was asleep. In the dark, workers in Moscow's Red Square
were tacking up bunting and moving bleachers in preparation for the national
celebration of May Day.
In Ktirustictiev's bedroom, the telephone rang. As tie later recalled, at the
other end of the line was his Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovsky. An
unidentified plane had crossed the Afghan frontier into Soviet airspace. Both
men knew who had sent the plane.
Khrushchev was furious: Bad enough to invade Soviet airspace, but on a
national holiday -- and 15 days before the Paris summit! The plane must be shot
down.
This was easier said than done. Both men knew that for nearly four years
they had failed to strike the American intruder. But Malinovsky said he had
already given the order: "If our antiaircraft units can just keep their eyes
open and stop yawning long enough, I'm sure we'll knock the plane down."
Sealed inside his flight suit, a single soul over a ghostly and menacing
land, frank Powers gazed into the midnight-blue stratosphere that only a small
brotherhood of pilots knew and switched his cameras on and off.
He swept on past the Aral Sea over the long route north to Chelyabinsk. At
this instant, by his later recollection, the plane pitched nose-up; the
autopilot had conked out. Soon it conked out again. If he proceeded, he would
have to fly the airplane manually.
This could be treacherous: Should be turn back? By now tie was roughly 1,300
miles inside Russia. He decided to "go on and accomplish what I had set out to
do."
Next target was Sverdlovsk, which was defended by the Soviet Union's new SA-2
Guideline missiles. As Powers later said, he switched on cameras and other
equipment, and turned 90 degrees, toward the southwestern edge of the city. Now
he was more than halfway into his mission. In Washington, it was 1:53 on Sunday
morning. Moscow time was 8:53 a.m.
He heard a dull "thump." The plane convulsed, and an orange flash lit the
cockpit and sky. Knocked back in his seat, he cried, "My God, I've had it
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He seized the throttle with his left hand, keeping his right on the steering
wheel. The aircraft's nose swung down; when he pulled on the wheel, he found
that the plane had gone out of control. A violent movement shook the plane and
flung him about the cockpit. Wings snapped off. With its nose to the heavens,
the mangled fuselage spun toward earth.
The destructor switches. As he later recalled, he reached for them and then
changed his mind; first he must position himself to eject. Powers was so
sprawled that he feared that during ejection his legs might be sheared off by
the metal canopy rails overhead. Nevertheless, tie forced both heels into the
stirrups of his seat. But he could not force his shoulders back. He was on the
edge of panic when tie realized that he could simply climb out of the cockpit.
He reached up and unfastened the canopy; it sailed into space.
He later testified that he was planning to throw the destructor switches when
centrifugal force threw him halfway out of the cockpit. His face plate frosted
over. Still tied to the plane by oxygen hoses, by his account, tie tried to
climb back into the cockpit to set off the destruction device. But the G-force,
the gravitational force, was overpowering. Unable to thrust his hand under the
windscreen to reach the switches, he later recalled thinking, "I've just got to
try to save myself now." Kicking and squirming, he must have broken the hoses
because suddenly he was free.
The orange-arid-white parachute bloomed overhead. He flicked off his face
plate, and fresh air blasted his lungs. Fragments of his plane fell past him.
What about the silver dollar? He unscrewed the tiny loop, tossed away the two
halves of the coin and slipped the pin into his pocket, just in case.
Plunging fast now, tie dropped fatally close to electric-power lines as the
earth rushed up to greet him and his head slammed hard against the denied
territory of the Soviet Union.
In Red Square, soldiers, students, farmers, athletes marched past the frieze
of Soviet leaders standing atop the Lenin-Stalin Tomb. Marshal S. S. Biryuzov,
chief commander of Soviet antiaircraft forces, spoke into Khrushchev's ear: The
intruder plane had been downed. The pilot had been captured alive and was being
questioned. Khrushchev congratulated the Marshal on "this wonderful news."
Khrushchev's smile may have taxed his considerable dramatic skills, for this
"wonderful news" was unlikely to help him. Despite Western references to the
"absolute ruler of the Soviet Union," Khrushchev had actually almost been
overthrown in t957. Potential rivals remained, waiting for an opportunity.
Now, a fortnight before the summit he had sought for years, this pirate
plane. And on May Day, no less}
Khrushchev knew that it would be almost impossible to conceal American
wreckage and a live pilot, even if he wished. Once word spread through the
party, the Army and the KGB, potential foes might seize the violation as
evidence of how foolish Khrushchev had been, infatuated with Eisenhower and an
Uncle Sam now revealed to be as warlike as ever. The "wonderful news," if riot
deftly managed, could throw Khrushchev into another struggle for his political
life.
Oct"
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At the Waldorf-Astoria in New York, Allen Dulles took Sunday breakfast with
2,500 members of the New York Police Department to be lauded for "distinguished
government service and dedication to Christian ideals.'}
The CIA director did not know yet that the U-2 was down, but his people in
Washington did. Professional eavesdroppers of the National Security Agency had
followed the Powers plane as it soared up the Urals; from listening posts they
heard the babble of frantic Soviet officers demanding its interception. CIA
men at Bodo airfield in Norway flashed word to Washington that the plane was
overdue.
Andrew Goodpaster was spending Sunday with his family in Alexandria when the
CIA man called. Goodpaster called the President, who was skeet shooting at
Camp David: "One of our reconnaissance planes on a scheduled flight is overdue
and possibly lost" -- the news Eisenhower had feared since the start of the U-2
program.
The President boarded his helicopter. As it flew toward the White House, he
looked down on the farms and tract houses of the Maryland countryside. He had
once told his aides that if one of these planes is shot down, this thing is
going to be on my head. I'm going to catch hell. The world will be in a mess."
It would be embarrassing for the United States to rebut Russian charges of
aerial espionage, but he had the satisfaction of knowing that his government
could plausibly deny that the U-2 pilot had deliberately violated Soviet
airspace. The CIA and Joint Chiefs had assured him that it would be
"impossible" for the Soviets to capture a live pilot.
Eisenhower's chopper landed on the south grounds of the White House at 4:26
p.m. At the same hour, in his prison cell in Moscow, Francis Gary Powers fell
asleep for the night.
Monday morning, May 2. Andrew Goodpaster went to the Oval Office and told
the President that the U-2 pilot was still missing. A CIA man had brought
over the agreed-upon draft of the cover story. It would say that a U-2 weather
pilot in Turkey had been lost after reporting oxygen problems by radio.
The President read the document. For years, some of his lieutenants would
deny that he had ever read or approved it. But, in fact, he nodded assent and
handed the sheet back to Goodpaster for distribution by NASA.
At the CIA, a colleague heard Richard Bissell assure Allen Dulles and other
top officials that it was "impossible" for the U-2 pilot to have survived a
crash.
Wednesday, May 4. In Moscow, members of the Central Committee of the Soviet
Communist Party wrangled in secret over how to handle the downing of the
American plane.
For days, khrushchev had been pondering his decision: Should he sweep the U-2
under the rug or reveal it in a propaganda assault that would stir up Soviet and
world opinion against the United States?
If he swept the matter under the rug, the Paris summit and Eisenhower's trip
to Russia might proceed. But this would give Khrushchev's enemies a powerful
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weapon. They would argue that Khrushchev was so timid that tie was willing to
tolerate even such a grave infraction.
Dramatic revelation of the U-2 downing and a propaganda attack an the United
States would satisfy Khrushchev's critics and would put the Americans on the
defensive. But the period of good feeling which began at Camp David would
surely be over. The indignation of Soviet outer circles and the Soviet people
might endanger the Paris summit and compel re-escalation of the cold war.
After Camp David, Khrushchev had extolled the American President and peaceful
co-existence as no Soviet leader had before. Casting Eisenhower and the
Americans as villains now would be a grandiose, humiliating public confession of
how wrong he had been.
Khrushchev proposed a plan. Tomorrow the Supreme Soviet would convene in
Moscow. He would inform the parliament's members that the United States had
sent a spy plane into Soviet territory. He would reveal that the plane had been
shot down, but not that the pilot had been captured alive.
Thursday morning, May 5. In the Great Kremlin Palace, Khrushchev's arrival
on stage touched off resounding applause. The leader grinned, clapped his own
fleshy hands and the room fell quiet: "Comrade deputies! This session of the
Supreme Soviet has convened in the spring -- a wonderful time."
After 3 hours, he turned to the world scene: "As you know, on May t6, a
meeting will take place in Paris involving the leaders of the Soviet Union, the
United States, Great Britain and France." Success was "essential if a solid
basis is to be laid for peaceful coexistence between states with different
social systems."
But there was cause for alarm. "Comrade deputies! On the instructions of the
Soviet government, I must report to you on aggressive actions against the Soviet
Union in the past few weeks by the United States of America.
"The United States has been sending aircraft that have crossed our state
frontiers and intruded upon the airspace of the Soviet Union." The U.S. had sent
such a plane on April 9, 1960. "The American military apparently found this
impunity to their liking and decided to repeat their aggressive act. The day
they chose for this was the most festive day for the working peoples of all
countries -- May Day!
"Ott this day, early in the morning, at 5:36 Moscow time, an American plane
crossed our frontier and continued its flight deep into Soviet territory. . . .
The plane was shot down." Earsplitting applause from the audience. He twisted
his neck to glare up at U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson: "What was this? A
May Day greeting?" Delegates whooped and stamped their feet.
"The question then arises: Who sent this aircraft across the Soviet frontier?
Was it the American Commander in Chief who, as everyone knows, is the President?
Or was this aggressive act performed by Pentagon militarists without the
President's knowledge?" Khrushchev charged that "American aggressive circles"
were trying to "torpedo the Paris summit or, at any rate, prevent an agreement
for which the whole world is waiting."
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Now tie capped off the outrage he had so artfully whipped up. We address the
American people: In spite of these aggressive acts against our country, we have
not forgotten the friendly encounters we had during our visit to America. Even
now, I profoundly believe that the American people -- except for certain
imperialist and monopolist circles -- want peace and friendship with the Soviet
Union. . . . I do not doubt President Eisenhower's sincere desire for peace."
In Washington, it was 7 o'clock an Thursday morning. Members and staff of
the National Security Council were rushing to helicopter pads in the District,
Maryland and Virginia, part of a long-planned Doomsday rehearsal for the day
Washington was destroyed by nuclear attack. They flew to High Point, a
top-secret command post in Virginia's Blue Ridge.
There, two men gave a history of Soviet and American long-range missiles. As
they spoke, Goodpaster was called to a secure telephone to talk to James
Hagerty, the President's press secretary. Hagerty asked about Khrushchev's
allegations; the White House press was already breaking down his door. What
should he tell them? Goodpaster had a quiet word with the President and told
Hagerty to stand by.
Eisenhower asked senior officials of state, Defense and CIA to join him in
an adjoining lounge. Someone said they must refute Khrushechev's charges at
once. The President disagreed; NASA's release had said enough. But others
complained that silence might be taken as tacit admission that Khrushchev's
charges were true. Eisenhower relented and asked Acting Secretary of State
Douglas Dillon to draft a statement.
At tt:23, he returned to the White House. Hagerty walked into the Oval
Office and crisply told Eisenhower and Goodpaster that Khrushchev's charges were
such a major story that the President must speak to the press at once.
This raised Goodpaster's hackles: If the American government was going to
hand out a deliberate lie, tie wanted the President kept as far away from it as
possible. But Goodpaster was handicapped from fully making his case; the U-2
was so secret that Hagerty was not cleared to know. Even at this crucial
moment, as Goodpaster later recalled, he and Eisenhower did not tell him
everything about the real mission of this flight. Hence, Hagerty persisted in
arguing that the President be involved as much as possible with this story.
Eisenhower refused to meet the press but agreed to have both the State
Department and NASA issue statements on the U-2.
On the fifth floor of the State Department, Douglas Dillon pressed the
telephone receiver to his ear and scrawled on a pad. At the other end of the
line was Allen Dulles at the CIA.
The two men felt that the less said, the better. When they finished writing,
Dillon gave the finished draft to Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman.
At 12:45 p.m., White met reporters and read it aloud:
"The Department has been informed by NASA that, as announced May 3, a U-2
weather-research plane based at Adana, Turkey, piloted by a civilian, has been
missing since May 1. . . Mr. Khrushchev has announced that a U.S. plane has
been shot down over theU.S.S.R. on that date. It may be that this was the
missing plane."
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During the past two days, Richard Bissell had given NASA detailed cover
information on the U-2 in question-and-answer form. Now Goodpaster called
NASA's administrator, T. Keith Glenrian: NASA should put some of Bissell's
material in a written memorandum. Goodpaster thought a written statement by
NASA would be better than "turning the press loose on them."
NASA spokesman Walter Bonney worked Bissell's material into a statement. At
1:30 he met the press. Dreading the prospect of lying to reporters who liked
and trusted him, he drew a deep breath and read aloud:
"One of NASA's tt-2 research airplanes, in use since 1956 in a continuing
program to study gust-meteorological conditions found at high altitude, has been
missing since about 9 Sunday morning, local time, when the pilot reported he was
having oxygen difficulties over the Lake Van, Turkey, area." Planned route:
1,400 nautical miles. Flight time: 3 hours, 45 minutes. Pilot was last heard
from flying northeast. Maximum altitude: 45,000 feet. Mission's purpose:
Gathering information an "clear-air turbulence, convective clouds, wind shear,
the jet stream and such widespread weather patterns as typhoons." Bonney
continued with detail after detail.
When Douglas Dillon read the NASA announcement, tie was appalled. He had
known that NASA would be issuing a more detailed statement but had not expected
that the statement would include so much information that the Russians could
disprove: "This statement was absolutely crazy because we knew the Russians
would jump us on it."
It was Thurdsay evening in Moscow. Ambassador Thompson was attending an
Ethiopian Embassy reception at the Sovietskaya Hotel. Within his earshot, the
Swedish ambassador asked Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Jacob Malik under which
article of the U.N. Charter the Soviets would raise the plane incident.
Malik said they didn't know yet: They were still questioning the pilot.
Still questioning the pilot? Thompson rushed back to his embassy and sent a
"MOST URGENT" cable to Dillon in Washington.
Malik's slip of the tongue was the first concrete indication that the
Russians might have captured the tt-2 pilot alive. Had Thompson's cable reached
Washington in time, it might have kept the Americans from releasing the NASA
statement that could be so damningly contradicted by a live U-2 pilot. But the
cable arrived at 1:34 p.m. -- 4 minutes after Walter Bonney began reading his
statement at NASA.
After sending his alert to Washington, Thompson sent another cable to
dissuade colleagues at home from concluding that Khrushchev had given up on the
Paris summit:
AS I LISTENED TO HIS REMARKS ON THE PLANE INCIDENT, IT APPEARED TO ME THAT
THEY HAD BEEN CAREFULLY CONSIDERED IN ORDER NOT -- REPEAT NOT -- TO SLAM ANY
DOORS.
That evening, John Eisenhower called his mother and asked how his fattier
liked the news about the U-2. The President barked, "Do you think I ought to
like it?"
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The next day, Dulles and Bissell wanted Eisenhower to confide "at least
partly" in congressional leaders about the U-2, but he refused: "These
congressional fellows will inevitably spill the beans."
Saturday, May 7. In Moscow, Khrushchev arrived to wind up the meeting of the
Supreme Soviet: "Comrade deputies! The aggressive act committed by the U.S. Air
Force against the Soviet Union has justifiably incensed deputies and all Soviet
people." With a smirk, tie read out the most tantalizing portions of the State
Department and NASA announcements. Then he dropped his bombshell:
"Comrades, I must let you in on a secret. When I made my report two days
ago, I deliberately refrained from mentioning that we have the remnants of the
plane -- and we also have the pilot, who is quite alive and kicking!"
Thunderous applause and laughter.
"Just look how many silly things they have said: Lake Van, scientific
research and so on. Now when they learn that the pilot is alive, they will have
to think up something else. And they will!"
Hoots and more laughter. "First of all, I wish to announce that the pilot of
the downed American plane is alive and in good health. He is now in Moscow.
The pilot's name is Francis Lary Powers."
Khrushchev reported that Powers had testified that he had had "no dizziness"
or faulty oxygen equipment. Following orders, he had been flying along an
assigned route, switching on and off his apparatus for spying on the Soviet
Union "until the very moment his pirate flight into this country was cut short."
Khrushchev pulled out large copies of aerial photographs and waved them.
"Here are some of the pictures showing military airfields. Here -- look at
this! Here are the airfields -- here! Fighters in position on the ground. Two
little white strips. Here they are! Here they are!" More thunderous applause.
(The "t1-2 photographs" Khrushchev held up were counterfeit. Having halted
the mission, he was unwilling to allow even a small sample of its intelligence
product to reach Washington.)
Khrushchev- revealed that the pilot had also carried two gold watches and
seven gold ladies' rings: "Perhaps he was supposed to have flown still higher,
to Mars, and seduced the Martian ladies!" More laughter, and then the fun was
over:
"From the lofty rostrum of the Supreme Soviet, we warn those countries that
make their territory available for launching planes with anti-Soviet intentions:
Do riot play with fire, gentlemen! . . .
"I remember the talks I had with Americans. They impressed me very much. I
still believe that those who met me want peace and friendly relations with the
Soviet Union. But apparently the Pentagon militarists and their monopolist
allies cannot halt their war efforts."
Once again Khrushchev divorced this military clique from Eisenhower: "I am
quite willing to grant that the President knew nothing about the fact that such
a plane was sent into the Soviet Union. . . . But this should put us even
E' X
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more on guard.
"Wtieri the military starts bossing the show, the results can be disastrous.
Such a pirate, prone to dizziness, may in fact drop a hydrogen bomb on foreign
soil. And this means that the peoples of the land where this pirate was born
will unavoidably and immediately get a more destructive hydrogen bomb in
return!"
From Moscow, Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington:
KHRUSHCHEV HAS HIMSELF STATED THE DILEMMA WITH WHICH WE ARE FACED. SHOULD WE
DENY THAT THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF HAD ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OF THIS ACTION?
Andrew Goodpaster called John Eisenhower at Gettysburg, where the President's
son and his family lived a mile from the President's weekend and soon-to-be
retirement home: "They've got the pilot alive."
John climbed into his car and drove to the rambling white house his parents
had built over the frame of an old red farmhouse. He found his father standing
in the glassed-in porch in the rear, looking out on the limegreen Civil War
battlegrounds he cherished.
The President's reaction to the news: "Unbelievable." Now he knew that
Khrushchev had irrefutable evidence that his administration had deliberately
violated Soviet airspace, spied on the Soviet Union and Several times lied about
it to the world.
There must be some response to Ktirushchev's speech -- especially Khrustichev's
"willingness to grant" that the CIA and Pentagon had sent the U-2 into Russia
without the President's knowledge. Evidently Khrustichev was offering him an
escape hatch. If Eisenhower used it, maintaining this fiction, then the Paris
summit might proceed.
But this would create other problems. What would the world think if the
American President had so little control over his own government that minions
could, without his knowledge, send planes into Russia that might conceivably
start a war? And the escape hatch might turn out to be a trap: If Eisenhower
shirked responsibility for the U-2, Khrushchev might then produce new evidence
revealing the President personally to have lied.
Thus, tie had the choice of presenting himself as a leader whose government
was capable of accidental provocation -- or declaring in public that he was the
an behind the U-2, the first time in history that an American President
confessed that his government practiced espionage.
Repeatedly assured that tie would never face such a dilemma, Eisenhower could
fairly wonder how "this goddamned plane" had fallen in Russia and the pilot
survived. Now he faced leaving the White House in the wake of perhaps the
bitterest disappointment of his life, as if the gods who had always loomed so
kindly on him had suddenly decided to exact a price for their gifts of the past.
Tomorrow was the 15th anniversary of victory in Europe.
In Washington, Allen Dulles privately offered his resignation: The President
could tell the world that his CIA director had been fired for exceeding his
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authority.
"That's the last thing the President would want," said Andrew Goodpaster.
"The President isn't in the business of using scapegoats."
Secretary of State Christian Herter had just returned from Europe. Now that
they knew the espionage equipment and U-2 pilot had survived the crash, "we had
to make a decision," as Herter later said. "Were we going to keep an lying
about this, or were we going to tell the truth?"
Herter suggested a statement that was half true, half false. It would admit
that the United States had flown espionage missions for four years along the
Soviet border and that a U-2 had "probably" flown into Soviet airspace, but deny
that the incursion had been authorized in Washington. This might give
Khrushchev the satisfaction tie seemed to be asking for and still protect the
President.
Informed at Gettysburg, Eisenhower thought this "might prove to be a mistake"
but agreed that it was "worth a try." Shortly after 6 p.m., Lincoln White read
the new statement to reporters at the State Department.
Sunday, May 8. The Sunday morning papers evinced astonishment and
indignation. In the New York Herald Tribune, Walter Lippmann wrote, "Denying
that it authorized the flight, the administration has entered a plea of
incompetence."
At Gettysburg, Eisenhower was rebelling against the new statement. It galled
him to keep silent while Khrushchev presented a "passionate but highly distorted
presentation of one particular phase of international espionage."
He was not priggish about lying for his country. But Khrushchev might go on
television again to raise irrefutable evidence that the President had indeed
authorized the May Day mission. Some reporter might exploit a leak from someone
who knew that the President had approved every single U-2 flight. Then
Eisenhower's credibility would be lost forever.
His entire training suggested that the man at the top should take full
responsibility. When Milton Eisenhower told his brother that he must not take
the rap for the U-2, the President snapped that if tie blamed a subordinate, tie
would have to fire him and he would not "be guilty of such hypocrisy." Not only
would this be a "glaring and permanent injustice," but it would confirm that the
President was not in control of his own government. People around the world
would fear that a low-level U.S. officer could start World War III.
The President called Herter and told him to issue a new statement admitting
that for four years the U-2 had been sent under a broad presidential order to
get "adequate knowledge" of the Soviet military-industrial complex and protect
the nation from surprise attack.
He was still not ready to tell the full truth. The statement should say that
while the President knew that sometimes "unusual and unorthodox" means were
required to do this, tie had not been given the details of reconnaissance
missions. He wanted "no specific tie" of the May Day flight to him.
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Monday, May 9. In Moscow, at a Czech Embassy reception, Khrushchev denounced
the State Department's Saturday-night statement: "Here is how they explain the
spy-plane affair -- it is impossible to admit but impossible to deny. Its like
the famous anecdote about the spinster who isn't a spinster because she has a
baby!" All laughed.
He said tie did not want to 'heat up passions" against the U.S. He swung his
open hand in the direction of Llewellyn Thompson: "i respect the U.S. ambassador
and am sure that he had nothing to do with this incursion."
Before Khrushchev left the party, he told Thompson, "I must talk with you,"
and took him into a side room. When the door closed, as Thompson recalled,
Khrushchev said, "This U-2 thing has put me in a terrible spot. You have to get
one off it.,,
Thompson pledged to do everything tie could. But in Washington, the State
Department made the announcement in Christian Herter's name that Eisenhower had
personnaly authorized the U-2 flights. The statement implied that there might
be more.
In Moscow, Khrushchev read this newest statement and he was apoplectic. He
had gone out of his way not to accuse the President of sending the U-2 on May
Day. Now this statement seemed as though Eisenhower was boasting arrogantly
about what the United States could do not would do."
Wednesday, May tt. At Gorky Park in Moscow, the Russians put the U-21s
remains on display in a carnival of agitprop. At 4 o'clock, a black Chaika
limousine pulled up. Khrustchev bounced out and bustled about the hall,
examining the noiseless pistol, ejection seat and destructor unit.
A reporter asked whether the newest American statement changed Khrushchev's
opinion of the President. "it has, of course. I was not aware that this plan
was not the caprice of an irresponsible officer. I was horrified to learn that
the President had endorsed the acts." Khrushchev spared Eisenhower but lambasted
Herter. Shaking his fist, tie cried, "Far from feeling guilty and ashamed of
aggressive actions, he justifies them and says they will continue in the future!
Only countries which are at war with each other can act this way!"
"Do you still want President Eisenhower to come to the Soviet Union?"
Khrushchev knitted his brow for 15 seconds: "What do you want me to say?
Come up here and say it for me. . . . You know my attitude toward the
President. I have often spoken about it. I am a human being, and I have human
feelings. I had hopes and they were betrayed. . . . So how can I now ask our
people to turn out and welcome the dear guest who is coming to us? They will
say, 'Are you nuts? What kind of a dear guest allows a plane to fly over us to
spy? s"
"Wouldn't you prefer President Eisenhower's visit to be postponed?"
"I do not want to answer this question in front of you journalists. I will
discuss this with the President in Paris. We still want to find ways to improve
relations with the U.S.A."
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At that very hour in Washington, the President held his Wednesday press
conference. He had not yet seen the text of i(hrushchev's comments at Gorky
Park. Donning his spectacles, tie read out a declaration that the Russians had
inflated the U-2 incident beyond all proportion.
Thursday, May 12. Llewellyn Thompson cabled Washington that Khrushchev's
Gorky Park fulminations sounded as if the cold war was on again:
ALL SIGNS NOW APPEAR TO POINT TO KHRUSHCHEV'S INTENTION OF TRYING TO EXTORT
MAXIMUM PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE FROM THE SUMMIT RATHER THAN ATTEMPT A SERIOUS
NEGOTIATION.
That afternoon, Goodpaster brought Thompson's message to the Oval Office.
The President read it, put on spiked shoes and whacked out golf balls on the
south grounds of the White House. Then, as his secretary rioted, he departed for
the family quarters, "nervous, tense, said his blood pressure was high."
His showdown with Khrushchev in Paris was four days ahead.
GRAPHIC: Cover Insets 1 and 2, no caption, DOD, Eisenhower Library, AP, W8MG;
Picture 1, MAY-DAY; Picture 2, no caption, DOD
LEVEL 1 - 3 OF 25 STORIES
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March 24, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 36
LENGTH: 115 words
HEADLINE: SECRET MISSIONS OF THE BLACK PLANES
BODY:
In November, 1954, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to spend $35
million to build a high-flying spy plane that could cross the Soviet Union
without being shot down. From July, 1956, through May Day, 1960, he secretly
ordered and oversaw each of the three or four dozen missions on which Francis
Gary Powers and other CIA pilots flew into Russia.
From the program's start, Eisenhower had been worried that the Russians might
misinterpret a U-2 flight as the forerunner of an American military invasion.
Time and time again, he told his aides that ordering a plane to pierce Soviet
airspace in peacetime was "Pone of the most soul-searching questions to come
before a President."
GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, AP
LEVEL 1 - 4 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright Ir 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 24, 1986
LE%(IS NE2KIS LE-11J,
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SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 38
LENGTH: 92 words
HEADLINE: THE PILOT'S JAMES BOND KIT
BODY:
Francis Gary Powers considered himself a pilot, not a spy, but the CIA
supplied him with emergency equipment suitable for the best-prepared James Bond
-- not only the notorious suicide pin and destructor unit, but a hunting knife,
a custom-made pistol with silencer, a life raft, clothing, water, food, a
compass, signal flares, a first-aid kit, hunting gear and a large silk banner in
14 languages:
I BEAR NO MALICE TOWARD YOUR PEOPLE. IF YOU HELP ME, YOU WILL BE REWARDED.
The "rewards" included 7,500 rubles, ladies' rings and gold watches.
GRAPHIC: Pictures t through 3, no caption, NOVOSTI
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March 24, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 38
LENGTH: 170 words
HEADLINE: FOREIGN PARTNERS IN ESPIONAGE
BODY:
CIA Director Allen Dulles once said that one thing he 'never" discussed was
the collaboration of friendly governments with the CIA. The U.S. secretly
persuaded the leaders and intelligence officials of Norway, West Germany,
Turkey, Pakistan and Japan to allow the U-2 to fly into Russia from their
territory.
All did so at high risk. They knew that while the Russians might not
retaliate against the U.S. for an aerial violation, they might strike back at a
weaker U.S. ally. The CIA promised each government that if the spy flights
were ever revealed to the world, the U.S. would claim that it had used its
territory to wage spy flights into Russia without permission. After the U-2
fell on May Day, this promise was kept.
Flight plan: Cross U.S.S.R. from Pakistan to Norway -- 3,788 miles in 9
hours.
Goals: Spy on Tyuratam, the Soviets' Cape Canaveral, and Plesetsk, suspected
site of Soviets' first ICBM's. (Months later, U.S. spy satellite confirmed
missiles in place at Plesetsk.)
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LEVEL 1 - 6 Of 25 STORIES
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March 24, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 44
LENGTH: 186 words
HEADLINE: IKE WAS READY TO SPY WITH "AIR FORCE ONE"
BODY:
In preparation for Eisenhower's planned trip to Russia in June, 1960, spying
equipment was secretly mounted aboard "Air Force One."
In the fall of 1959, Eisenhower wrote Khrushchev asking to use his own plane
inside Russia. Khrushchev told Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson that the Soviet
military feared "Air Force One" might have "secret means of photographing Soviet
territory." Thompson promised to allow a Soviet navigator to ride in the
cockpit. Khrushchev wrote Eisenhower that he had "finally" overcome his
generals' objections.
An air valve in the cockpit was evidently rigged to secretly turn spy
equipment on and off. In an interview quoted in Mayday, CIA deputy director
Richard Bissell told Beschloss, "I think Ike would have taken the position, 'All
right, if you can put some equipment on my aircraft unobtrusively and take what
you get, that's all right.' But I think he would have drawn the line at not
altering the flight path in any shape or manner. . . . If would have been very
unwise to let it be thought that his trip was being made or in any sense
conditioned by intelligence."
GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER LIBRARY
LEVEL 1 - 7 OF 25 STORIES
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March 24, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 44
LENGTH: 236 words
HEADLINE: DID SECRETARY OF STATE HERTER PERJURE HIMSELF?
BODY:
In May and June, 1960, the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
investigated the U-2 affair behind closed doors. Richard Helms, later CIA
director (1966-73), attended the hearings as a CIA censor. In an interview
with Beschloss quoted in Mayday, Helms charged that Secretary of State Christian
Herter and other witnesses perjured themselves.
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Helms said: "They were all sworn. Knowing what they knew and what actually
went on, if it isn't perjury, I don't understand the meaning of the word. And
I'm not against it. I'm simply saying that it's not the first time officials
have perjured themselves in the interest of protecting a President."
In 1977, Helms was himself convicted of perjury for lying to the same
committee about CIA efforts to mount a Chilean military coup.
The full transcript of the secret ti-2 hearings has only recently been
unsealed. It shows that when Chairman J. William Fuibright asked whether there
was "ever a time" when Eisenhower approved each U-2 flight, Herter replied, "It
has never come up to the President."
But, in fact, since the start of the program, Eisenhower had approved the
flights personally. Route maps were spread across his desk as a CIA man
explained to him and the Secretary of State why national security depended on a
new mission into Russia. After a flight, U-2 photographs were often brought to
the White House for viewing by the President.
GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption, UPI/BETTMANN
LEVEL t - 8 OF 25 STORIES
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March 24, 1986
SECTION: VOICES OF AMERICA; Editorial Page; Pg. 84
LENGTH: 731 words
HEADLINE: LESS IS MORE
BYLINE: by MORTIMER B. ZUCKERMAN, Chairman and Editor-in-Chief of U.S.News &
World Report
BODY:
On the very day in 1983 when our group arrived in Managua, the Sandinistas
shut down the leading newspaper, La Prensa. Why? Because La Prensa carried a
news story the Sandinistas wanted to cover up -- the harassment of Violeta
Chamorro, a national heroine and widow of a martyr of the revolution, in
retribution for her break with the Sandinistas to protest their subversion of
revolutionary ideals. So much for freedom of the press. So much for democracy
and tolerance.
Prior to that visit, my sympathies had been with the Sandinistas, who had
fought bravely to rid Nicaragua of the despicable Somoza. But it became clear
that Nicaragua is a revolution gone awry. The Sandinistas have systematically
discarded all the promises made to their countrymen -- freedom, democracy,
neutrality in foreign affairs and a pluralistic society.
Not only is democracy in Nicaragua at issue today. What is also at stake is
the long-term potential for political freedom, and indeed prosperity, in Central
America. Nicaragua represents another base, along with Cuba, from which Central
American countries can be destabilized, witness El Salvador. Let's face it.
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For the most part, these countries have weak economies, low standards of living,
wide disparities of wealth and a culture of violence. They are clearly
susceptible to insurrection.
The Sandinistas have made no secret of their policy of exporting their brand
of revolution -- what they have called "revolution without boundaries." This
would produce a trauma for the American body politic. Nothing is more likely to
lead to direct U.S. military involvement in the region than the emergence of a
militaristic, anti-American (the Sandinista anthem goes "Down with the Yankees,
the enemy of humanity"), aggressive, totalitarian regime in Nicaragua bouncing
around Central America like a loose cannot. This is why the region is so
critical to U.S. security.
We can't allow a second Cuba. So what can we do? We should both talk and
carry a big stick -- what is called a two-track policy. During 1981-83, the
Sandinistas rejected four U.S. proposals based an the principles of mutual
nonintervention. Now, with the military-economic pressure from the contras
preventing the consolidation of one-party rule at home, the Sandinistas are
offering negotiation. We should test them by asking for a withdrawal from the
Soviet sphere of influence and a commitment to peaceful coexistence evidenced by
three things: The eviction of foreign military advisers and the severance of all
other outside military links; a pledge of nonintervention in the affairs of
other countries, and a commitment to the institutions of a pluralistic society
within Nicaragua. The Sandinista record is one of broken promises. But this
test is worth a try -- if only to demonstrate to doubters in our country and
elsewhere the alien nature of the Sandinista regime.
In the meantime, we must support the contras. Less is more if applied early
enough. Objections to that do not stand up. Many claim the contras are a CIA
fabrication, not of democrats but of Somocista5, and that we are in danger of
restoring a discredited dictatorship. Nobody can fault the political record of
contra leaders Arturo Cruz or Alfonso Robelo, who opposed Somoza, but some of
the contra military leadership fought under Somoza. Why this should disqualify
the contras completely is puzzling. No insurgent army fighting and living in
the hills of Nicaragua and Honduras is going to emerge entirely from the Boy
Scouts. Whatever the concern about aspects of the contra campaign, it is not
sufficient to shift the focus from the real problem -- the threat posed by
Nicaragua to its own people and to its neighbors.
Congress should work with the administration on its request for increased
military and economic aid to combat the Sandinistas. The administration cannot
bludgeon Congress into giving it what it wants. But it has a compelling case
that could be made more appealing to the House Democrats if military aid is tied
to an attempt -- a last attempt -- to get the Sandinistas to retreat. The
Democrats should think hard and long about what is at stake. It is more than
simply a semblance of freedom in Nicaragua. It is peace and stability
throughout Central America -- which after all lies in our own back yard.
GRAPHIC: Picture, no caption
LEVEL I - 9 OF 25 STORIES
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0 1986 U.S.News & World Report, March 17, 1986
March 17, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 13
LENGTH: 43 words
BODY:
Now coming out: The real reason influential members of Congress helped to
push Ferdinand Marcos out of power is that the CIA warned lawmakers that,
unless changes were made swiftly, the Philippines would fall to the Communist
rebels within two years.
LEVEL t - 10 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 17, 1986
SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Newsletter: Tomorrow; A took Ahead from the Nation's
Capital; Pg. 29
LENGTH: 1{392 words
BYLINE: by Robert J. Shapiro
BODY:
DEFENSE BUDGET UP FOR GRABS
Budget brinkmanship is the name of the game in Washington. Everyone from the
White House to Capitol Hill will be playing for months ahead.
At the White House--The President still insists that all cuts come from
domestic programs and that Pentagon funds go up 8 percent over inflation,
without a tax increase. He is hanging tough even though the GOP-run Senate
Budget Committee March 6 rejected his 1987 budget. On Capitol Hill--Budget
chairmen Domenici and Gray are convinced Congress won't buy the elimination of
domestic programs such as Urban Development Action Grants or the
soil-conservation service. There's plenty of evidence: Congress already has
passed legislation protecting VA mortgage loans and dairy-price supports from
the March t Gramm-Rudman budget cuts. Nearly a dozen more exemptions from 1986
reductions for social programs are pending in committees.
Behind the scenes, the Senate the House budget committees are
cooperating--that's a first--to try to avoid a Gramm-Rudman vote set for just
before the fall elections on cuts for 1987. Coming up fast: Bipartisan showdown
with the President over Pentagon spending.
The Senate will probably settle on a defense hike just sufficient to offset
inflation. The best the Pentagon can hope for from the House is a freeze with
no adjustment for inflation. Either way or in between, the President will get
billions less than he wants, and major weapons systems could face stretchouts.
That won't shut off the Pentagon spigot: It has $60 billion already appropriated
but not yet spent.
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The resignation of the CIA's No. 2 man, Deputy Director John McMahon, is
just the overt side of the covert turmoil inside the agency. Intelligence
insiders say McMahon was fired and that Director Casey was behind it.
Administration aides accuse McMahon of leaking inside information to Congress
and the press, but behind the accusations is McMation's long resistance to
Casey's plans for more covert aid. McMahon had hoped to survive as the agency's
conscience, but that only put trim at further odds with Casey. Casey's
commitment to Reagan has offended CIA professionals dedicated to
nonpartisanship, but it gave him the leverage to oust McMahon. The new deputy
director, Soviet expert Robert Gates, is more enthusiastic about backing
anti-Marxist "freedom fighters," but he will meet opposition from the agency
pros. Many of them are now expected to leave "the company."
President Reagan's plans to revamp the welfare system, announced in his
state-of-the-union address, are stalling. A task force, led by White House
staff, is looking for ways to insure that the combined benefits from federal
programs don't provide assistance exceeding the poverty level. That's aimed at
the 40 percent of medicaid recipients and 27 percent of food-stamp households
with incomes slightly above the poverty line. Little prospect there: Congress
said on in the past and won't cut programs for the poor this year. A second
task force, led by the Department of Education, is focusing on Family
arrangements among the poor and wants to expand its mandate to evaluate how
hundreds of federal laws and programs affect the American family. That is
leading them straight to social issues such as abortion and family planning that
most Congressmen would rather avoid.
Agreement could come in one area--expanding work requirements for welfare
recipients. Reagan, like Nixon, Ford and Carter before him, accepts the idea
that the place for a poor mother with school-age children is no longer in the
home, but out helping to support her family. The President wants rules
requiring the poor to work in public jobs in exchange for benefits. Others say
the jobs should provide salaries to supplement current welfare benefits.
Either way, mandatory-work requirements can be effective, according to a
recent study. A demonstration program in San Diego cut welfare ourlays 8
percent and raised the average earnings of participants by some $700. But it
doesn't work for everyone. In San Diego, for example, women in mandatory-work
programs stayed employed once the program ended, but men didn't. A Gallup poll
found that two thirds of Americans like the idea. The study showed that among
those who participated in San Diego, 80 percent think the requirements are fair.
Administration aides have been juggling schedules trying to arrange a t986
Reagan-Gorbachev summit--preferably to announce real progress on arms
control--but time is running out. In Geneva last November, the President asked
the General Secretary to come to Washington in June. Soviet and U.S.
negotiators will meet for a fifth round of talks in early May, and that's the
last chance to set the stage for June.
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9 1986 U.S.News & World Report, March 17, 1986
The Kremlin wants to wait until September, but White House aides worry that
an election-eve agreement would look too political. Another serious concern:
The budget battle in Congress could come to a head in September, and setbacks to
the President's defense requests would create the wrong atmosphere for summit
bargaining. August is out, with much of the country on vacation. So is early
July. Nobody wants Gorbachev here during the centennial celebration for the
Statue of Liberty. That leaves late July, but the Kremlin is resisting that
date. Unless there's a breakthrough in the arms talks soon, the summit will
wait until after the election--perhaps until 1987.
Women and minorities have stopped making gains on corporate boards for the
first time in 13 years. According to a study by executive-search firm
Korn/Ferry International, of 600 major companies, only 4 percent of directors
are women. Only 3 percent come from minority groups. Still, 45 percent of the
companies have at least one woman in the board room, and 25 percent of all
boards have a minority member. One of five candidates for board membership
turned down the invitation last year. One factor: Recent court decisions have
made it easier for stockholders to hold directors personally liable for
corporate decisions. Is the pay worth the risk? By most standards, the
compensation is substantial. The average director spends 114 hours a year on
the job, and gets $19,500 a year. That's $1,400 a day.
LEVEL 1 - 11 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright 9 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 17, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 31
HEADLINE: Help for contras, Savimbi at issue as Congress eyes cuts in aid
abroad;
Foreign-policy battles heat up
BYLINE: by Steve Huntley and Andy Plattner with James M. Hildreth and Kathryn
Johnson
BODY:
His bid to wit' expanded aid for Nicaraguan contra rebels may be costing
Ronald Reagan precious political capital needed in future foreign-policy fights
with Congress.
An aggressive effort for the aid is bruising feelings even among Reagan
backers. This could imperil three other items of equal importance -- selling
missiles to Saudi Arabia, avoiding tough new santions abainst South Africa and
continuing covert aid to Angolan rebels.
On each issue, Congress is showing new boldness in efforts to mold specific
foreign policy, a field dominated by the President until the Vietnam War. In
recent months the trend has become more obvious. Congress, for instance, turned
out to be as instrumental as Reagan in the ouster of Philippine President
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The contra campaign appears, in any event, to be a losing gamble. The aid
package was rejected by three House panels March 5-6 and was headed for probable
defeat by the full House March t9. At best, Reagan can expect a compromise that
will give him far less than the $100 million he seeks.
Because time seems to be running out for the contras, the President decided
on what an aide called a "full-court press." No aid means a contra defeat, which
would produce "a second Cuba an the mainland of North America just two days'
driving time from Harlingen, Tex.," Reagan said. "We send money and material
now so well never have to send our own American boys."
As skirmishing continued in Congress, Reagan moved on March 7 to counter
charges that tie has forsaken diplomacy in favor of military action by detailing
Philip Habib to seek a negotiated settlement in Nicaragua. But Reagan said the
troubleshooter, whose latest mission was to the Philippines, must be supported
with "an increasing level of pressure on the Nicaraguan Communists" from the
can tras.
Both sides in the debate launched furious drives for support. Three top
contra leaders -- Adolfo Calera, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo -- flew into
Washington for meetings with Reagan and key lawmakers to dramatize their appeal.
Military pressure, they said, is the only way to force the Sandinistas to
negotiate a more democratic society for Nicaragua.
On the other side, 167 Roman Catholic, Protestant and Jewish leaders charged
that "exaggeration, misinformation and outright falsehood form the heart of the
Reagan administration case."
House Democrats outlined their own plan urging Reagan to apply the kind of
diplomacy that brought a bloodless resolution to the Philippines crisis. "He
should practice the magic of Manila on Managua," said House Speaker Thomas "Tip"
O'Neill (D-Mass.).
Capitol Hill observers are looking to Chairman Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee to salvage the aid program. Frequently a
compromise leader on foreign matters, Lugar helped broker $27 million in
humanitarian funding for the contras last year.
The likely outcome this year, insiders say, will be a compromise approving
about half of the $100 million Reagan wants but putting it on hold until the
various contra factions formulate a united military and political agenda.
Still, compromise won't take away the bitterness left by the finger-pointing
campaign urged on the President by White House Communications Director Patrick
Buchanan. Reagan compared the contras with Hungarian freedom fighters and
American revolutionaries at Valley Forge and said: "If the members of Congress
hide their heads in the sand and pretend the strategic threat in Nicaragua will
go away, they are courting disaster, and history will hold them accountable."
Democrats claimed to be unfazed. Representative Tony Coelho (D-Calif.),
chairman of the House Democratic Campaign Committee, said the party could
counter in 1986 congressional elections that it had helped prevent the U.S. from
becoming mired in "another Vietnam."
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The White House suggestion that a "No" vote amounted to support for the
Sandinistas angered many Republicans. An "emotional case doesn't help, and it
could backfire," Senator Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kans.) said. The approach, added
Senator Dan Evans (R-Wash.), "could lead to bitter divisions" and cost Reagan
support on domestic goals, such as tax reform, as well as foreign issues.
The administration originally wanted $1 billion worth of military hardware,
including missiles and F-t5 fighters, for Saudi Arabia. The request it will
send to Congress is being pared down to $350 million worth of Stinger and
Sidewinder missiles, and even that package is in trouble.
Some suggest that Reagan may have to give up the package just to keep
Congress from blocking delivery this summer of Airborne Warning and Control
System (AWACS) planes committed to Saudi Arabia after a bitter 1981 Capitol Hill
fight.
House hearings later in March on South Africa may cast further doubt on
Reagan's policy of "constructive engagement" as a means to force reforms on the
white-minority government. Opponents of apartheid likely will push for strong
sanctions, perhaps including a measure to ban U.S. investment in South Africa.
Also looming for Reagan is a showdown over $t5 million in covert aid he has
approved for Angola's anti-Marxist rebels. Although his way was cleared by
repeal of a curb an aid, opponents now insist on a new law to control he degree
and nature of any involvement in an African state where the Central
Intelligence Agency was accused of abuses a decade ago. Apart from strategic
interests, the issue for Reagan and conservative supporters is his commitment to
rolling back Soviet influence around the world.
Further confounding Reagan initiatives is growing sentiment to slash foreign
aid generally. Lawmakers would like to relieve the political heat from
domestic-spending cuts forced on them by the Gramm-Rudman deficit-reduction law.
The House Foreign Affairs Committee already has cut $2.4 billion from
Reagan's $17.4 billion proposal, reducing aid to current levels. More trims are
likely. Says Representative David Obey (D-Wis.), head of the Joint Economic
Committee: "if the administration thinks otherwise, then they're smoking
something that isn't legal."
GRAPHIC:: Picture 1, no caption, RON KINNEY -- J. S. PICTURES; Picture 2, Contra
chief Adolfo Calera, with his troops an Honduras border, met with Reagan as
White House pushed for increased aid to anti-Sandinista forces, TIMOTHY A.
MURPHY -- USN&WR; Picture 3, Jonas Savimbi, leader of Angolan guerrillas, is
another who now has Reagan backing, CHICK HARRITY -- USN&WR
LEVEL 1 - 12 Of 25 STORIES
Copyright 9 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 10, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 15
LENGTH: 31 words
NE~~us
LE)IIS
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BODY:
What turned Reagan around so fast on the Philippines? Insiders say it was a
report from the CIA, which closely monitored the vote and reported Marcos
blatantly stole the election.
LEVEL 1 - 13 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
March 3, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; People Making News; Pg. 7
LENGTH: 99 words
HEADLINE: DEATH OF A 'MOLE'
BODY:
The suicide of Larry Wu-Tai Chin wrote an end to a 30-year odyssey of
espionage that provided China with important U.S. secrets and embarrassed the
Central Intelligence Agency. Before his retirement in 1981, the Peking-born
Chin smuggled papers from the CIA's Foreign Broadcast Information Service and
met Chinese agents abroad yet never came under suspicion until fingered by a
defector. Convicted on February 7 and possibly facing two life terms, Chin was
lodged at the county jail in Manassas, Va., awaiting sentencing. He was found
dead on February 21 with a plastic bag over his head.
LEVEL I - 14 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 24, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 15
LENGTH: 5t words
BODY:
William Casey's foes inside the Central Intelligence Agency have thrown up
their hands in surrender. Some veteran CIA officials complained that their
boss in hurting the agency by alienating influential members of Congress, but
the President refuses to hear any criticism of his old campaign chief.
LEVEL t - 15 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright >a 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 24, 1986
SECTION: U.S. NEWS; Miami; Pg. 21
LENGTH: 1621 words
HEADLINE: Miami tackles crime, money, racial woes;
The struggle to regain paradise lost
LEYLIS NE~~U
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BYLINE: by Stewart Powell
DATELINE: Miami
BODY:
Fighting back from hard times, Miami is taking an the future with the gusto
of a city that in less than a century has endured more ups and downs than most
communities twice its age.
What seemed like insoluble problems in the early 1980s finally are easing to
enable some 380,500 Miamians to begin combatting the damaging image of a
tattered tourist haven besieged by drug dealers, lawless immigrants and racial
unrest.
"If you put everything Miami has been through in a textbook, you'd say,
'There ain't no way Miami can survive,'" comments Jesse McCrary, Jr., who served
as Florida's first black assistant attorney general. "What makes me high on
Miami is that we did."
While some residents see a Miami still plagued by the drug trade, ethnic
frictions and uneven economic growth, many others are enthusiastic about the
future. Progress is being made against the multibillion-dollar drug trade. The
alarming number of murders has fallen to the lowest level in six years. Many of
the 125,000 Cuban Marielitos who flooded into South Florida in 1980 have been
here long enough to soon become U.S. citizens. Passions that twice sparked
rioting in black neighborhoods since 1980 have cooled.
"Miami was becoming paradise lost," asserts developer Doran Jason. "Now,
it's paradise found -- again."
A city once known only as a sunny if slightly stuffy tourist resort is being
transformed into a cosmopolitan business and social crossroads for the
Americans, an exotic blend of pastels and promise that serves as the glossy
backdrop for television's popular "Miami Vice" police show. Whites and blacks,
Cubans and Haitians, refugees from Nicaragua, El Salvador and elsewhere all are
vying for a piece of the American dream. Not even a fresh police scandal has
eclipsed the sense of recovery.
The turnabout is typical of a self-reliant boom town that fought the odds
from the start. Pioneer Julia Tuttle transformed swampland into a fortune by
enticing Henry Flagler into extending the East Coast Railroad south in 1896.
Tourists, land speculators and immigrants have been flocking to the shores of
Biscayne Bay ever since.
For the first time, however, immigrants are moving into the Establishment,
replacing the Southern whites who once gathered at the exclusive Miami Club,
called their hometown "Miamah" and thought their hold would last forever. In
barely a generation, a tide of 650,000 Cuban refugees sweeping into South
Florida has turned a sleepy tourist town that discriminated against Jews and
blacks into a teeming metropolis with a Latin flavor that claims to have no time
to discriminate against anyone.
Says Carlos Arboleya, who arrived with $40 and now is vice chairman of the
Barnett Bank of South Florida: "What we are achieving isn't integration; we are
achieving joint success."
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Many of the 19,700 shops, restaurants and businesses run by Cuban Americans
lure tens of thousands of Latin shoppers each year. Local banks are brimming
with an estimated $12 billion in foreign funds. Seventy-one foreign and U.S.
banks operate overseas from here. The seaport and airport handle an estimated
$7.5 billion in Latin American trade annually, helping to drive the area's $23.5
billion economy.
International intrigue adds to the allure, with everything from business
deals to political coups hatched over coffee in cafes. The Central
Intelligence Agency recruited here for the Bay of Pigs invasion in t96t. The
Federal Bureau of investigation cracked a plot against the President of
Honduras.
"Maimi -- the international city -- is a reality," declares J. L. Plummer, a
funeral director and fifth-generation Floridian who has seen control of the city
commission shift over from whites to Cuban Americans in t6 years. "There's
concrete, brick and mortar going up out there to prove it."
Glass-and-steel office towers reach skyward to serve what city fathers
ambitiously label "the New World Center." Construction worth $4.7 billion over
the past decade is providing a subway and 84 downtown projects.
The rebirth of Miami is matched, say many, with a no-nonsense pragmatism for
dealing with ethnic and racial diferences. Business executives learn Spanish
and tailor their advertising to appeal to the multibillion-dollar Hispanic
market. Typical is a television advertisement for Rose Auto Stores that
features a black, a Hispanic and a blond saying: "I do it with Rose."
The city balances neighborhood jealousies by erecting comparable police
substations in the black community of Liberty City and in Little Havana. The
police department, now led by a black chief, has grown by half sine 1979 to
become 58 percent Hispanic and black. Such detailed records are kept by race
that, says Lt. Bill O'Brien, "if someone had an inclination of favor one group,
he couldn't get away with it."
Steps toward cooperation are expected to accelerate in the wake of last
November's runoff victory by Xavier Suarez, 36, the city's first Cuban-born
mayor. The Villanova and Harvard-educated lawyer already has symbolically
reached out by backing the birthday of Martin Luther King, Jr., as a city
holiday and joining Haitians to celebrate over reports of the downfall of the
Duvalier family. "Suarez's election was a sea change for this community," says
Heath Meriwether, executive editor of the Miami Herald. "He represents rejection
of the divide-and-conquer politics of the past."
Suarez already sees progress in a city where politics was so divisive that,
says one veteran, "if you had read the Bill of Rights, no one would have
signed." Observes the mayor: "We've managed to bring dignity and decorum to city
government. There is a perception that the community is under control."
The ascendancy of Hispanics has not been welcomed by all. Many longtime
Miamians felt threatened by the surge in crime and gang wars that came after the
1980 arrival of the Marielitos, several thousand of whom Castro had released
from mental institutions and prisons.
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Others grumble that the main retail artery of Flagler Street was turned into
a seedy marketplace with bargaining for goods in the Latin manner.
An estimated 17,000 Anglas moved to the suburbs in the first who years after
the boatlift -- adding to 23,000 who had left since 1975. And after years of
growing bilingualism, a citizens' group rebelled in 1981 to pass a referendum
establishing English as the lone official language in local government. "A
multiplicity of tongues may add to our cosmopolitan ambiance," writes Sylvan
Meyer in the Miami/South Florida Magazine. "It does not add to the comfort and
security of the natives." Nor has "Latinization" done much for an increasingly
isolated black community that has never recovered the tourist-industry jobs lost
to more-skilled Cuban refugees in the 1960s. Unemployment among black youths
nears 50 percent, with little hope for school dropouts to break into the
service-oriented economy. Problems are doubly acute for the area's estimated
100,000 Creole-speaking Haitians, who face language barriers on top of poverty.
Laments Miller Dawkins, vice mayor and the only black an the city commission:
"Blacks are no better off than during segregation."
As frustration among blacks mounts, fears rise that racial unrest may one day
erode the image of recovery. "Everyone is moving on," says Garth Reeves, Sr.,
editor of the Miami Times, a weekly newspaper that has served Liberty City since
1923. "And here we are standing on the corner watching the parade go by."
Problems beyond Miami's control also pose worries. Political instability in
Haiti and Central America has driven as many as 200,000 illegal immigrants into
Dade County.
Drug smuggling continues despite a crackdown that has pushed operations north
and crowded the waterfront here with vessels displaying the U.S. Customs
Service's orange-red seizure stickers. Miami's murder rate has dropped, but 137
killings were still recorded in 1985. Estimates are that cocaine with a street
value of $27 billion was landed in South Florida in 1985. Notes U.S. Attorney
Leon Kellner: "The area remains the Wall Street of drug trafficking."
Hundreds of millions in illicit money passes through -- to be laundered,
shipped abroad or pumped into the local economy. Almost $12 million in cash was
seized February 7 in an operation against a Venezuelan-run laundering activity.
Real-estate values are inflated. Porsches, BMW's and Ferraris with smoked-glass
windows are nearly as common on the streets as standard Japanese imports.
The appeal of easy money allegedly has penetrated the city police force.
Eight officers face charges in connection with the theft of money or the
skimming of cocaine in drug-arrest cases. Three of them are charged with murder
in the drowning of three drug dealers. Vows Chief Clarence Dixon: "We will wipe
out corruption where we find it."
Prospects for a durable upturn in the Miami economy depend an developments
elsewhere. Tourism is down from 1980 levels. Shopping 'press by Latin visitors
are impeded by currency-exporting restrictions in their debt-ridden nations.
Some 25,000 condominiums go unsold. The area's largest employer, Eastern Air
Lines, is fighting threatened bankruptcy by laying off many of its 30,000 local
employes and cutting pay.
Yet true to its comeback tradition, Miami is buoyed by confidence. "Here, it
is like Chicago at the turn of the century," says Bernardo Fort-Brescia, 34,
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founder of Arguitectonica, the firm that designed the dramatic building seen in
the opening minutes of TV's "Miami Vice." "You feel you can help the place
become something special instead of just building on others` foundations."
GRAPHIC: Picture 1, Changing skyline underscores Miami's role as commercial
crossroads of Americas, REBECCA LOVELESS FOR USN&WR; Picture 2, Born in Cuba,
Suarez now leads city, REBECCA LOVELESS FOR URN&WR; Chart, ETHNIC MIAMI, THEN
AND NOW, USN&WR -- Basic data: City of Miami, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Florida
Bureau of Business and Economic Research; Picture 3, Latin flavor is widely
evident, particularly in Little Havana, RANDY TAYLOR -- SYGMA; Picture 4,
Children of Haitian immgrants now attend school that once was for whites,
REBECCA LOVELESS FOR USN&WR
LEVEL I - 16 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright a 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 24, 1986
SECTION: COVER STORY - EXCLUSIVE; Pg. 30
LENGTH: 4139 words
HEADLINE: An Appeal in his wife's behalf
BYLINE: English translation by Nicholas Bethell and Richard Lourie
BODY:
Anatoly Alexandrov, President, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
Members of the Presidium, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences
Dear Anatoly Petrovich:
I appeal to you at the most tragic moment of my life. I ask you to support
my wife Yeiena Bonner's request for permission to travel abroad to visit her
mother, tier children and her grandchildren and to receive medical treatment for
her eyes and her heart. I shall explain why this trip has become an absolute
necessity for us. Our unprecedented situation, our isolation, the lies and
slander regarding us compel me to write in detail. Please forgive me for the
length of this letter.
The authorities have been greatly annoyed by my public activities -- my
defense of prisoners of conscience and my articles and books on peace, the open
society and human rights. (My fundamental ideas are contained in Progress,
Coexistence and Intellectual Freedom, 1968; My Country and the World, 1975, and
"The Danger of Thermonuclear War," 1983.)
"The KGB adopted a sly and cruel plan"
I do not intend to defend or explain my position here. What I wish to make
clear is that I alone am responsible for all my actions, which are the result of
convictions formed over a lifetime. As soon as Yeiena Bonner married me in
t97t, the KGB adopted a sly and cruel plan to solve the "Sakharov problem." They
have tried to shift responsibility for my actions onto her, to destroy her
morally and physically. They hope to break and bridle me, while portraying me
dolk,
Alm Alm Ar~
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as the innocent victim of the intrigues of my wife -- a " CIA agent," a
"Zionist," a "mercenary adventuress," etc. Any remaining doubts about this have
been dispelled by the mass campaign of slander mounted against my wife in 1983
(attacks against her were printed in publications with a circulation of 11
million copies); by the two 1984 articles about tier in Izvestia, and especially
by two 1984 articles about her in Izvestia, and especially by the KGB's
treatment of us in 1984, which I describe below.
My wife Yelena Bonner was born in 1923. Her parents, who were active
participants in the Revolution and the civil war, became victims of repression
in 1937. Her father, the first secretary of the Armenian Bolshevik Party's
central committee and a member of the Comintern's executive committee, perished.
Her mother spent many years in labor camps and in exile as a "relative of a
traitor to the motherland."
My wife served in the armed forces from the outbreak of World War II until
August, 1945. She began as a first-aid instructor. After she was wounded and
suffered a concussion, she became the head nurse on a hospital train. The
concussion severely damaged her eyes. My wife is classified as a disabled
veteran because of tier loss of vision. She has been seriously ill ever since
the war, but she has managed to lead a productive life -- first studying, then
working as a physician and teacher, raising a family, helping friends and
strangers in need, sustaining her associates with respect and affection.
Her situation changed drastically after our paths merged. Tatiana and
Alexei, my wife's children -- whom I consider my own -- and our grandchildren
were forced to emigrate to the United States in 1977 and 1978 after five years
of harassment and death threats. They had in fact become hostages. The pain of
this tragic separation has been compounded by the absence of normal mail, cable
and phone communications. My wife's 84-year-old mother has been living in the
United States since 1980. It is the inalienable right of all human beings to
see their families -- and that includes my wife!
As long ago as 1974 many events convinced us that no effective medical
treatment was possible for my wife in the U.S.S.R. and, moreover, that such
treatment would be dangerous because of inevitable KGR interference. Now the
organized campaign of slander against her is an added complication. These
misgivings relate to my wife's medical treatment and not to my own, but they
were reinforced by what physicians under KGB command did to me during my
four-month confinement in a Gorky hospital. More about this later.
In 1975, with the support of world public opinion (and I assume on Brezhnev's
order), my wife was allowed to travel to Italy to receive treatment for tier
eyes. My wife visited Italy in 1975, 1977 and 1979 for eye care. In Siena, Dr.
Frezotti twice operated on her for glaucoma, which could not be controlled by
medication. Naturally, the same doctor should continue to treat her. Another
visit became necessary in 1982. She submitted tier application in September,
1982. Such applications are reviewed within five months -- and usually within a
few weeks. Two years have passed, and my wife is still waiting for a reply.
In April, 1983, my wife Yelena Bonner suffered a massive heart attack, as
confirmed by a report of the academy's medical department issued in response to
an in uir~y from the procurator's office. Her condition has not yet returned to
normal. She has had recurrent attacks. (Some of these attacks have been
confirmed by academy physicians who have examined her; one examination took
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place in March, t984.) Her most recent major attack occurred in August, t984.
"I began the hunger strike"
In November, t983, I addressed an appeal to Comrade Yuri Andropov (General
Secretary, 1982 to Feb. 9, 19841, and I addressed a similar appeal to Comrade
Konstantin Chernenko (General Secretary at the time this letter was written] in
February, 1984. 1 asked them to issue instructions permitting my wife to
travel. I wrote: "A trip . . . to see her mother, children and grandchildren
and . to receive medical treatment has become a matter of life and death for
us. The trip has no other purpose. I assure you of that."
By September, 1983, I realized that the question of my wife's trip would be
resolved only if I conducted a hunger strike (as in the earlier case of our
daughter-in-law Liza Alexeeva's departure to join Alexei). My wife understood
how difficult it was for me to do nothing. Nevertheless, she kept putting off
the hunger strike. And, in point of fact, I began the hunger strike only in
direct response to actions of the authorities.
On March 30, 1984, 1 was summoned to the Gorky province visa office. A
representative there announced: "On behalf of the visa department of the
US.S.R., I inform you that your statement is under consideration. The reply
will be communicated to you after May t."
My wife was to fly to Moscow on May 2. 1 watched through the airport window
as she was detained by the aircraft and taken away in a police car. I
immediately returned to the apartment and took a laxative, thereby beginning my
hunger strike for my wife to be allowed to travel.
Two hours later my wife returned, accompanied by the KGB province chief, who
delivered a threatening speech in the course of which he called my wife a CIA
agent. My wife had been subjected to a body search at the airport and charged
under Article t9D-t (of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic (RSFSR)
Criminal Code]. They also made her sign a promise not to leave the city. So
this was my promised reply to my declaration about my wife's trip abroad.
Exile "was camouflaged murder"
During the months that followed, my wife was called in for interrogation
three or four times a week. She was tried on August 9-10 and sentenced to five
years' exile. On September 7 a picked group from the RSFSR Supreme Court made a
special trip to Gorky to hear her appeal. They confirmed the sentence. Gorky
was designated tier place of exile so that she could remain with me, thereby
creating a semblance of humanity. In fact, however, it was camouflaged murder.
The KGB managed the whole enterprise -- from the charges to the sentence --
on order to block my wife's travel abroad. The indictment and the verdict are
typical for Article t90-t cases, although particularly flagrant examples of the
arbitrariness and injustice involved. Article 190-1 makes it a crime to
disseminate slanderous fabrications known to be false that defame the Soviet
state and social system. (Article 190-1 refers to statements that the defendant
knows are false. In my experience, and that includes my wife's case, the
defendants believed their statements to be true beyond a doubt. The real issue
was their opinions.)
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Most of the eight counts in my wife's indictment involve tier repetition of
statements made by me. (To make matters worse, they have been taken out of
context.) All the statements concern secondary issues. For example, in My
Country and the World, I explain what "certificates" are, noting that two or
more types of money exist in the U.S.S.R. My wife repeated this indisputable
statement at a press conference in Italy in 1975, and she was charged with
slander because of it. I -- and not my wife -- should be charged with
statements made by me. My wife acted as my representative in keeping with her
own beliefs.
They are trying to kill us"
One charge in the indictment exploits an emotional outburst of my wife during
the unexpected visit of a French correspondent on May 18, 1983, three days after
her massive myocardial infarct had been diagnosed. (As you know, in t983 we
requested, without success, that we be admitted together to the academy's
hospital.) The correspondent asked, "What will happen to you?" My wife
exclaimed: Of don't know. I think they are trying to kill us." She was clearly
not referring to being killed by a pistol or knife. But she had more than
enough grounds to speak of indirect murder (at least of herself).
My wife's alleged drafting and circulation of a Moscow Helsinki Group
document was a key point in the indictment. It was based on patently false
testimony and was completely refuted by defense counsel's examination of the
chronology of events. A witness testified at the trial that he had been told by
a member of the Helsinki Group that my wife had taken one of the group's
documents with her when she left the country in 1977. But the witness had been
arrested on Aug. t6, t977, and my wife left for Italy on September 5. Thus tie
could not have met anyone "from outside" after my wife's departure. Under
questioning, the witness replied that he had learned of the document's being
carried out of the country in July or August -- that is, before my wife's trip.
Moreover, no proof that the document had been written prior to my wife's
departure was presented in the indictment or during the trial. (The document
was undated. That alone was enough to deprive it of any jurisdical
significance.)
The only "evidence" corroborating the witness's unsubstantiated allegation
was the statement of a person who had emigrated in 1977. In defiance of logic
this count was included in the verdict and in the decision of the appellate
proceeding. If the appellate court had eliminated that count, it would have had
to annul the verdict -- in part because the only directly incriminating
testimony would be lost, in part because of the dated and inconsequential nature
of the t975 episode. Most important of all, none of the charges bore the
slightest juridical relation to Article 190-1, which presupposes intentional
slander.
In practice my wife's exile has led to restrictions much more severe than
those stipulated in the law. The loss of all communication with her mother and
children; complete isolation from tier friends; still less opportunity for
medical care; the virtual confiscation of property left in our Moscow apartment
-- which is now inaccessible to us -- and the potential loss of the apartment
itself. (The apartment was given to my wife's mother in 1956 after she was
rehabilitated and after tier husband was rehabilitated posthumously.)
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"Simply slander for public consumption"
There was no mention during my wife's trial of the accusations made in the
press -- her alleged past crimes, her "immoral character," tier "links" with
foreign intelligence agencies. That is all simply slander for public
consumption -- for the "sheep" held in such contempt by the KGB directors of the
campaign. The most recent article of this sort appeared in Izvestia on May 21.
The article pushes the idea that my wife has always wanted to leave the
U.S.S.R., "even over her husband's dead body." The article claims that as long
ago as t979 she wanted to remain in the United States but had been persuaded to
leave. (The context implies that American intelligence agents did the
persuading.)
My wife's tragic and heroic life with me, which has brought tier so much
suffering, refutes this insinuation. Before marrying me, my wife made several
trips abroad. She worked for a year in Iraq on a vaccination project. She
visited Proland and France. The idea of defecting never entered her mind. It
is the KGB that wants my wife to abandon me: It would provide the best
demonstration that their slander had been true. But they were hardly hoping for
that. They are "psychologists." They carefully hid the May 2t [lzvestia]
article from me. They did not want to strengthen my resolve to win my goal
before seeing my wife. I wanted to protect tier from responsibility for my
hunger strike.
For four months -- from May 7 to September 8 -- my wife and I were separated
from each other and completely isolated from the outside world. My wife was
alone in our apartment. Her "guards" were increased. Apart from the usual
policeman at the entrance to our apartment, observation posts operated around
the clack, and a van with KGB agents on duty was parked beneath our terrace.
Outside the house she was followed by two cars of KGB agents who prevented the
most innocent contact with anyone. She was not allowed into the regional
hospital when I was confined there.
On May 7, while accompanying my wife to the prosecutor's office for her next
bout of questioning, I was seized by KGB men disguised in doctors' white coats.
They took me by force to Gorky Regional Hospital, kept me there by force and
tormented me for four months. My attempts to flee the hospital were always
blocked by KGB men, who were on duty round-the-clock to bar all means of escape.
An "excruciating process"
From May It to May 27 I was subjected to the excruciating and degrading
process of force-feeding. The doctors hypocritically called it "saving my
life," but in fact they were acting under orders from the KGB to create
conditions in which my demand for my wife to be allowed to travel would not have
to be fulfilled. They kept changing the method of force-feeding. They wanted
to maximize my distress in order to make me give up the hunger strike.
From May It to May t5 intravenous feeding was tried. Orderlies would throw
me onto the bed, tie my hands and feet and then hold my shoulders down while the
needle was inserted into a vein. On May It, the first day this was attempted,
one of the hospital aides sat on my legs while some substance was injected with
a small syringe. I passed out and involuntarily urinated. When I came to, the
orderlies had left my bedside. Their bodies seemed strangely distorted as on a
television screen affected by strong interference. I found out later that
&, J's
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this sort of optical illusion is symptomatic of a spasm in a cerebral hemorrhage
or stroke.
I have retained drafts of the letters I wrote to my wife from the hospital.
(Hardly any of the letters, apart from those that were quite empty of
information, were actually delivered to my wife. The same is true with respect
to the notes and books she sent me.)
In my first letter written (May Z0) after force-feeding began and in another
draft written at that time, my writing wavers and is remarkably deformed.
Letters are repeated two or three times in many words (mainly vowels, as in
"haaand"). This is another typical symptom of a cerebral spasm or stroke and
can be used as objective, documentary evidence in attempting a diagnosis. The
repetition of letters does not occur in later drafts, but the symptoms of
trembling persist. My letter of May tO (the ninth day of my hunger strike but
prior to force-feeding) is entirely normal. My recollections from the period of
force-feeding are confused, in contrast to my memory of events from May 2 to May
10. My letter dated May 20 states: "I can barely walk. I am trying to learn."
The spasm or stroke I suffered on May ti was not an accident; it was a direct
result of the medical measures taken in my case on orders from the K158.
From May t6 to May 24 a new means of force-feeding was employed: A tube was
inserted through my nose. This was discontinued on May 25, supposedly because
sores were developing along the nasal passages and esophagus. I believe it was
stopped because this method is bearable, if painful. In labor camps it is used
for months -- even years -- at a time.
OMy jaws were pried open"
From May 25 to May 27 the most excruciating, degrading and barbarous method
was used. I was again pushed down onto the bed without a pillow, and my hands
and feet were tied. A tight clamp was placed on my nose so that I could breathe
only through my mouth. Whenever I opened my mouth to take a breath, a spoonful
of nutriment or a broth containing strained meat would be poured into my mouth.
Sometimes my jaws were pried open by a lever. They would hold my mouth shut
until I swallowed so that I could not spit out the food. When I managed to do
so, it only prolonged the agony. I experienced a continuing feeling of
suffocation, aggravated by the position of my body and head. I had to gasp for
breath. I could feel the veins bulging on my forehead. They seemed on the
verge of bursting.
On May 27 1 asked that the clamp be removed. I promised to swallow
voluntarily. Unfortunately this meant that my hunger strike was over, although
I did not realize it at the time. I intended to resume my hunger strike some
time later -- in July or August -- but kept postponing it. It was
psychologically difficult to condemn myself to another indefinite period of
torture by suffocation. It is easier to continue the struggle than to resume
Much of my strength that summer was dissipated in tedious and futile
"discussions" with other patients in the semiprivate room where I was never left
alone. This, too, was part of the KGB's elaborate tactics. Different patients
occupied the other bed, but each of them tried to convince me what a naive fool
I am -- a political ignoramus -- although they flattered my scientific ability.
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I suffered terrible insomnia from the averstimulatian of these conversations,
from my realization of our tragic situation, from self-reproach for my mistakes
and weakness and from anxiety for my seriously ill wife, who was alone arid, by
ordinary standards, bedridden or almost bedridden much of the time. In June and
July, after the spasm or stroke, I experienced severe headaches.
I could not bring myself to resume the hunger strike, partly from fear that I
would be unable to bring it to a victorious conclusion and would only delay
seeing my wife again. I never would have believed that our separation would
last four months, in any case.
In June I noticed that my hands were trembling severely. A neurologist told
me that it was Parkinson's disease. The doctors tried to convince me that if I
resumed my hunger strike there would be a rapid and catastrophic development of
Parkinson's disease. A doctor gave me a book containing a clinical description
of the diseases final stages. This, too, was a method of exerting
psychological pressure on me. The head doctor, 0. A. Obukhov, explained: We
won't allow you to die. I'll get the women's team out again to feed you with
the clamp. We've got another method up our sleeve as well. However, you will
become a helpless invalid." Another doctor added by way of explanation, "You'll
be incapable of putting on your own trousers." Obukhov intimated that this would
suit the kGB, since it would escape all blame: Parkinson's disease canot be
artificially induced.
What happened to me in a Gorky hospital in the summer of t984 is strikingly
reminiscent of Orwell's famous anti-Utopian novel, even down to the remarkable
coincidence of the book's title -- t984. In the novel and in real life the
torturers sought to make a man betray the woman he loves. The part played by
the threat of the carge full of rats in Orwell's book was played for me in real
life by Parkinson's disease.
I was able to bring myself to resume the hunger strike only on September 7.
On September 8 1 was hastily discharged from the hospital. I was faced with a
difficult choice: End the hunger strike in order to see my wife after a
four-month separation or continue for as long as my strength held out, thereby
indefinitely prolonging our separation and our complete ignorance of each
other's fate. I could not continue.
Now, however, I am tormented by the thought that I may have lost a chance to
save my wife. It was only after our reunion that I first learned about her
trial and she learned about my painful force-feeding.
I am very concerned about my wife's health. I believe that a timely trip
abroad is the only chance of saving tier life. Her death would be mine as well.
I hope for your help, for your appeal to the highest levels seeking
permission for my wife's trip. I am asking for help from the presidium of the
U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences and from you personally, as president of the
academy and as a man who has known me for many years.
Since my wife has been sentenced to exile, her trip will probably require a
decree of the Supreme Soviet's Presidium suspending tier sentence for the period
of her travel. (Precedents for this exist both in Poland and, quite recently,
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in the U.S.S.R.) The Supreme Soviet's Presidium or another body could repeal her
sentence altogether on the grounds that my wife is a disabled veteran of World
War II, that she recently suffered a massive myocardial infarct, that she has no
prior convictions and that she has an irreproachable work record of 32 years.
Those arguments should suffice for the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I will
add, for your information, that my wife was unjustly and illegally convicted
even from a purely formal point of view. In reality she was convicted for being
my wife and to prevent her from traveling abroad.
I repeat my assurance that tier trip has no purpose other than to seek medical
treatment and to visit her mother, children and grandchildren; it is not
Intended to effect any change in my situation. My wife can supply the
appropriate pledges herself. She may also pledge not to disclose the details of
my confinement in the hospital if that is made a condition for her departure.
"My situation is unbearable"
I am the only academician in the history of the Academy of Sciences of the
U.S.S.R. and Russia whose wife has been convicted as a criminal, subjected to a
malicious, vile campaign of public slander and deprived of all communication
with her mother, children and grandchildren. I am the only academician whose
responsibility for his actions and opinions has been shifted onto his wife.
That is my situation, and it is unbearable for me. I hope you will help.
If you and the academy's presidium do not find it possible to support me in
this tragic matter, which is so vital for me, or if your intervention and other
efforts do not lead to resolution of the problem before March t, 1985, I ask
that this letter be regarded as my resignation from the U.S.S.R. Academy of
Sciences. I will renounce my title of full member of the academy -- a proud
title for me in other circumstances. I will renounce all my rights and
privileges connected with that title, including my salary as an academician -- a
significant step since I have no savings.
If my wife is not allowed to travel abroad, I cannot remain a member of the
Academy of Sciences. I will not and should not participate in a great
international deceit in which may academy membership would play a part.
I repeat: I am counting on your help.
Oct. t5, 1984
Gorky
Respectfully,
A. Sakharov
P.S. If this letter is intercepted by the KGB, I will still resign from the
academy and the KGB will be responsible. I should mention that I sent you four
telegrams and a letter during my hunger strike. (He did not resign.]
P.P.S. This letter is written by hand since my typewriter (together with
books, diaries, manuscripts, cameras, a tape recorder and a radio) was seized
during a search.
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P.P.P.S. I ask you to confirm receipt of this letter.
GRAPHIC: Picture 1, An appeal in his wife's behalf; Picture 2, Together in 1985:
Andrei Sakharov and Yelena Banner; Picture 3, The false witness; Picture 4,
Sakharov: With family photos, SIPA -- PRESS; Picture 5, Gasping for breath;
Picture 6, Banner as photographed by Sakharov in the Gorky apartment, SIPA --
PRESS; Picture 7, no caption
LEVEL t - 17 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright 0 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February t7, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Pg. 9
LENGTH: 294 words
HEADLINE: CHINESE SPY AT CIA;
Confessions of a 'male'
BODY:
Another accused double agent stood in the dock, detailing just how easy he
found it to steal and sell the nation's secrets throughout a long career.
Larry Wu-Tai Chin, a retired Central Intelligence Agency analyst, admitted
passing classified documents to China. "He has confessed that, in essence, he
was a male for 30 years," said prosecutor Joseph Aronica.
An Alexandria, Va., jury took less than 4 hours on February 7 to convict the
Peking-born Chin on all t7 counts of espionage and banking violations. He could
face two life sentences and fines of more than $3 million.
Chin testified that tie smuggled papers home from his job at the CIA's
Foreign Broadcast Information Service, where he worked for 11 years. One of the
most important items Chin sold was a private 1970 memo from President Nixon -- a
longtime critic of Communist rule in China -- telling congressmen that he wanted
to improve U.S.-Chinese relations. "I thought if that information could be
brought to the attention of the Chinese leadership it might break the ice," Chin
said. He copied the Nixon memo and passed it to a Chinese agent.
Chin often traveled abroad to meet Chinese agents, but somehow never aroused
the suspicions of his superiors. Chin told interrogators tie was asked to take a
CIA polygraph test only once and passed it because the questions were "vague
and not in Chinese" -- his native language. It is believed that a Chinese
defector unmasked Chin.
in his defense, Chin argued that "legally I was wrong, but morally, I was
right." He insisted that he spied not for profit but to soothe relations between
Washington and Peking. Yet he admitted receiving about $150,000 for his work as
a mole, and experts think his take may have exceeded $1 million.
GRAPHIC: Picture, Chin at time of his arrest, CHARLES TASNADI -- AP
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LEVEL 1 - 18 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 10, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Notes Of The Week; Pg. 5
LENGTH: 444 words
HEADLINE: Spy-spooked an the Potomac
BODY:
Official Washington loves nothing so much as a spy story -- and in late
January there surfaced a new one to chew on, a story that U.S. government
spokesmen called fiction and U.S.News & World Report and the New York Times
called fact. A miniwar of denials and confirmations ensued --
January 25: The news media receive the February 3 issue of U.S.News, which
reports that the U.S. helicoptered a high-level Soviet intelligence agent out of
East Germany last spring, hid him at a U.S. base to prevent the upstaging of the
Geneva summit and then brought the defector to America in late November. The
story says the CIA wants to keep secret the defection of a fifth top
Soviet-bloc spy in 1985. The defector wants it that way, the CIA is under
fire for mishandling defectors and 'another Yurchenko" is feared. t(GB Col.
Vitaly Yurchenko fled to the U.S. last year, then redefected.
January 26: The Sunday New York Times says on its front page that sources in
Congress confirm the U.S.News account and that the defector "may be the most
valuable . . . in recent years." News agencies say unnamed CIA officials
scoffed at the report.
January 27: The New York Times quotes Vice Chairman Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) of
the Senate Intelligence Committee: "I have been told by the CIA that no such
defector exists. If you asked me whether I believe that, I would say, in light
of C CIA Director William Casey's1 public statement of reluctance to follow the
procedures of oversight, then I will have no comment." At the White House, Larry
Speakes says accounts of a fifth defector are "baseless." Asked whether he
denies all or part of the story, he replies, "The whole story."
January 28: The New York Times says again that its "congressional sources
confirm the reports" of the defection. The Washington Post quotes a spokesman
for U.S.News: "We reported the story from multiple sources over several weeks.
Based an the reputations and numbers of these sources, we believe our story is
correct. We were warned by more than one of our sources that we could expect
denials from the CIA and possibly other government agencies."
The Washington Times quotes Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.), an Intelligence
Committee member: "Where there's smoke, there's fire. . . . There's been too
many leaks and here's another." He says the defector accounts are correct. The
senator later repeats this to U.S.News, which did not interview him for its
original article. As to the denials, he declares: "Of course they're denying
it. What did you expect them to do?" The same afternoon, the White House again
denies the story.
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LEVEL 1 - 19 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright @ 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 10, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Current Profile; Pg. 11
LENGTH: 553 words
HEADLINE: JONAS SAVIMBI;
Angola's resilient rebel
BODY:
It is said that you know a man by the company he keeps. Then what manner of
man is it whose mentors have included not only Mao Tse-tung but also Senator
Jesse Helms -- not only Marxist Che Guevara but also South African President P.
W. Botha?
Jonas Savimbi, in 25 years of armed struggle aimed at becoming the leader of
Angola and a major force shaping Africa's future, has accepted a wide range of
political bedfellows. Once a fierce critic of the United States, the burly,
soft-spoken warrior began a two-week visit to the U.S. on January 28. His goal:
To win military aid for a guerrilla movement that seeks to share power with
Angola's Soviet and Cuban-backed Marxist government -- and perhaps to overthrow
it.
Prospects were good as tie met with President Reagan and Secretary of State
Shultz. "We want to be very supportive," Reagan told Savimbi. "We're seeking a
way to be of help." The administration reportedly hopes to channel at least $10
million to him through the Central Intelligence Agency.
Both Savimbi`s friends and foes say the 5t-year-old revolutionary's
persuasive powers should not be underestimated. "He's very charismatic, he's
dynamic, tie exudes confidence and power," remarks James Lucier, chief
legislative assistant to Helms, a North Carolina Republican.
"He is one of the most impressive demagogues to come along in decades," says
a critic, Gerald Bender, professor of international relations at the University
of Southern California. "He may woo the Americans to his cause as tie wooed
others in the past."
Born into the Ovimbundu tribe, Savimbi first impressed Protestant
missionaries, who sent him to Portugal for schooling. After studying at the
University of Lausanne in Switzerland in the 1960s, tie joined the drive to oust
Portugal from Angola. Forming his own faction, Savimbi found an ally in Mao
Tse-tung, who trained the young rebel in guerrilla warfare.
After a rival Marxist group and its Cuban allies took over Angola in 1975 and
his ties with China crumbled, Savimbi turned to South Africa, which is still a
major source of money and equipment. Dismissing the paradox of a black
nationalist taking aid from an apartheid regime, he declares: "Of course I
detest apartheid, but it is no threat to neighboring countries."
It is through neighboring Namibia, controlled by South Africa, that Savimbi
receives most of his supplies. At present, the 30,0013 troops of his National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) control most of
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southeastern Angola.
Though Savimbi's loyalties have often shifted, consistency is seen by John
Marcum, professor of politics at the University of California at Santa Cruz: "He
is the quintessential survivalist whose purpose is still political power against
those he sees as having usurped it."
The country at a glance
Population. 7.9 million.
Language. Portuguese (official) and Bantu languages.
Area. 481,353 sq. Mi., more than California and Texas combined.
Literacy rate. 20 percent.
Chief products. Petroleum, diamonds, coffee, bananas, alcohol, cotton goods,
fish meal, shoes, paper, palm oil.
Per capita income. $500.
Politics. Governed from Luanda by a one-party Marxist regime. The UNITA
insurgents, headquartered in Jamba, control southeastern part of the country.
GRAPHIC: Picture, 'I detest apartheid, but it is no threat to neighboring
countries', CHICK HARRITY -- USN&WR; Clap, ANGOLA, USN&WR
LEVEL I - 20 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright 0 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 10, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Washington Whispers; Pg. 13
LENGTH: 50 words
BODY:
William Casey is an speaking terms with Congress again. The crusty director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, without apologizing for accusing lawmakers
of leaking classified data, has quietly reopened lines of communication with
Capitol Hill and is again listening to advice from key members.
LEVEL f - 21 OF 25 STORIES
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February t0, 1986
SECTION: WORLD REPORT; Pg. 29
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HEADLINE: Philippines: U.S. at risk;
Business, bases, role in Pacific in balance as islands vote
BYLINE: by Robert A. Manning with Robert Baylor in Manila and Robert A. Kittle
in Washington
BODY:
As Washington surveys bleak prospects for the postelection Philippines, it
can find at best continued instability, at worst grave damage to American
interests in the Pacific.
For most of this century, the U.S. viewed the Philippines as a secure
outpost, bought with the blood of American troops during the Spanish-American
War and World War U. Now, with its society in crisis, the island nation poses
strategic problems to the U.S. potentially as great as those presented by the
fall of the Shah of Iran and the government of South Vietnam.
President Ferdinand Marcos, ill and losing control of the political tide, is
besieged by enemies and a growing Communist insurgency. Events unleashed by the
political storm could lead to the loss of American installations at Subic Bay
Naval Base and Clark Air Base, largest in the world. Marcos's opponent, Corazon
Aquino, calls, as Marcos does, for renegotiation of the bases agreement with the
U.S. when it expires in 1991. The greatest long-term danger, however, stems
from uncertainty whether either Marcos or Aquino could control the insurgency
after the February 7 voting. American analysts set out three scenarios for the
future --
* In the most optimistic projection, Aquino wins and begins economic and
military reforms. Business confidence is restored and, with the economy
improving, the insurgency dies. Stability is restored, and U.S. bases are no
longer threatened.
* Less desirable would be a victory by Marcos coupled with the election of
opposition vice-presidential candidate Salvador Laurel, a parlay possible under
the law. If Marcos died, Laurel would serve out his term, pursuing reforms
urged by America.
* In the worst case, which the odds now favor, Marcos wins through election
fraud and rejects reforms. The insurgency might with time topple his government
and install a Communist regime.
The Reagan administration has tried to avoid public favoritism, saying it
could work with whoever is the victor. But some officials in fact have a
preference. They believe U.S. interests would be best served by an Aquino
victory that might restore credibility to the government, undercut the
insurgency and revive business confidence. Other Americans assume that a change
in the Presidency would simply put another self-serving wing of the Philippine
elite in power. But, for the time being, Washington is content to lengthen its
distance from Marcos.
The administration argues that Marcos cannot be brought to heel by using U.S.
aid as a club, although even some Republicans disagree. Senator David
Durenberger (R-Minn.) insists that Washington should withhold some of the $267
million it provides annually. Meanwhile, no one has emerged, apart from Aquino,
as a rallying point for opponents. And within five years, the rebels could well
be more than a match for government forces.
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Historical comparisons are rarely precise. But the position of Marcos is
close enough to that of the ailing and authoritarian Shah to be haunting.
Marcos's government, oblivious to history, plunges ahead on the same
uncompromising course that doomed U.S. interests in South Vietnam.
As in Iran and Vietnam, visible alternatives for the U.S. are unappealing.
Marcos faces a genuine threat in the candidacy of Aquino, widow and political
heiress of Benigno Aquino, the opposition leader murdered at Manila's airport in
1983. While she remains an underdog, Aquino's exuberant campaign receptions
hint that the well-oiled Marcos machine is vulnerable. Crowds of more than
200,000 have turned out to cheer her. Marcos's rallies, by contrast, have been
smaller arid often stocked with government workers. Spectators at one rally in
Manila's port area claimed they were paid to attend.
The end of pro-Western government in Manila -- and the loss of U.S. bases --
would shift traumatically American military deployment in the Western Pacific.
In the last two decades, the Soviet fleet has become capable of projecting its
power around the globe, not least in the Pacific. Airfields and port facilities
at Vietnam's Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay have given Moscow an important strategic
toehold in Southeast Asia.
For the U.S. and its allies, alternatives to the bases in the Philippines
leave much to be desired. Thailand, where America already has a limited
military presence, is judged unsuitable for a greater one, partly because of its
location, partly because of the risks of repeating the Philippine experience.
The islands of Saipan, Tinian and Guam, U.S. controlled, lie t,500 miles east of
the Philippines. Even less attractive for a major installation is the
Micronesian state of Palau, where the U.S. has signed a new agreement providing
access for its military forces. Political considerations rule out expansion of
U.S. bases in Japan or building of new ones in Australia, and the cost to
American taxpayers would be billions.
The political cost could be even greater. Across East Asia, U.S. allies view
the drama here as a test of the limits of American power. Japan, central to
U.S. Interests, looks to the U.S. to guard the strait through which most of its
raw materials flow. Members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) maneuver to contain Vietnamese -- and thus Soviet -- influence in the
region while depending on the U.S. for strategic protection.
There is no talk yet about the collapse of new Asian dominoes beyond the
danger to the Philippines itself. But that idea alone embraces the thought of
Clark Air Base and Subic Bay possibly ending up as Soviet bases, just as the
U.S. bases in Vietnam are now in Soviet hands. So far, there is little evidence
of Soviet support for the NPA. But even the lesser trauma of the U.S. exit from
the Philippines, apart from a soviet role, would be viewed worldwide as a
colossal American failure. And in these matters, the perception of failure is
reality.
it cannot be said for sure when things began to go wrong for the U.S. in the
former colony that it made independent on July 4, 1946. But some analysts argue
that any hope for creating a model of decolonialization was doomed by American
mismanagement. Long before Marcos arrived on the scene, the United States
conferred power on a corrupt elite rather than creating a broad democratic
foundation.
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When Ferdinand Marcos entered Malacanang Palace in t965, he was hailed as an
Asian John F. Kennedy. A bold social reformer, he undertook to modernize the
Philippines through an ambitious public-works program.
Rut as he destroyed the old elite, he began to create a new one in his drive
to consolidate power. His base of support shifted from the masses that chose
him to a network of cronies whom he rewarded with government jobs and lucrative
business monopolies. Democratic institutions were reshaped to his own design.
That produced in turn a clamor among radical youth for a turn to the left,
leading to bloody street riots and inevitable clashes with police. Terrorism
rose.
Marcos responded in 1972 by imposing martial law and refusing to step down,
claiming a national emergency, when his term ended. Burdened by chronic
mismanagement, debt and recession, combined with a stifling concentration of
political power, the Philippines was sinking deeper into crisis as President
Reagan took office in 1981.
But unlike many previous crises around the world -- most notably in Iran --
Washington saw this one coming and tried to adjust its course. Reagan's Asia
hands recognized quickly that the murder of opposition leader Aquino in August,
1983, marked the beginning of the end for a once stable, though harsh, allied
regime. That one act came to symbolize all the abuses, human-rights violations
and unaccountability associated with almost two decades of Marcos's rule. It
also got the attention of the U.S. Congress, an institution acutely sensitive to
any involvement that could tempt a President to use American troops. With that,
any hope within the administration of treating the Philippines as business as
usual evaporated.
As the political fabric of the islands continued to unravel, a steady flow of
high-level U.S. visitors -- including CIA Director William Casey and Senator
Paul Laxalt (R-Nev.I -- delivered repeated warnings to Marcos. The message:
Make sweeping economic, military and political reforms or face ultimate
rejection. There was no direct threat to cut American support or void the
mutual-security treaty that binds the two countries -- at least, Marcos says
there was none. President Reagan kept his distance personally, avoiding
mistakes such as Vice President Bush's overexuberant praise for Philippine
democracy in t983. The U.S. guiding theory now seems to be that, if Marcos
falls, the United States must be in a position to do business with his
successor.
For his part, Marcos has spurned U.S. advice, clinging to his old ways and
making no more than cosmetic changes. Typical of his unyielding behavior was
his handling of the Aquino affair. The outcry at home and abroad finally led
him to appoint an independent commission to investigate the murder. The panel
concluded that Aquino's death resulted from a high-level military conspiracy.
But Armed Forces Chief of Staff Fabian Ver and 25 other soldiers were all
acquitted after key evidence was excluded from their trial. Ignoring U.S.
pressure, Marcos reinstated Ver, his cousin and former driver, as chief of
staff.
Economic conditions alone in the Philippines would be enough to sink most
free-world leaders. Nearly half the country's 56.8 million people live in
poverty. A high birth rate generates 700,000 more potential workers each year
for an economy already beset by massive unemployment. Philippine productivity
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has fallen tO percent in just two years, in part because of competition-stifling
sugar and coconut monopolies that Marcos awarded to friends. These two key
industries employ half the Philippine work force.
The sugar industry has been controlled by Roberto Benedicto, a former
fraternity brother of the President's. The "Coconut King" is Eduardo Cojuanco,
godfather of Marcos's son.
At the heart of the problem, says Asia scholar Lucian Pye, is that unlike
other authoritarian leaders in East Asia, such as those in Indonesia and South
Korea, "Marcos didn't create the sort of institutions that would make the
economy work. He only built a patronage system."
The resulting disaffection of professionals, including top businessmen and
military officers, may have been Marcos's undoing. Laments Jaime Ongpin, head
of the nation's biggest mining-arid-construction conglomerate, "Marcos destroyed
all the checks and balances. He mangled the Constitution, and he's got the
legislature and Supreme Court in his pocket." Ongpin, whose brother Roberto is
Marcos's Minister of Trade and Industry, has become, along with a number of
other business leaders, a tap adviser to Corazon Aquino.
The hope of U.S. officials is that such disaffection someday will congeal
into a third force with the potential to undercut the Marcos system on the one
hand the the Communist guerrillas on the other.
Elections here tend to be decided by what the capital's cynics call the
"three G's" -- guns, goons and gold. The old "vote early and vote often" axiom
advocated in U.S. machine-style politics may be an ironic part of America's
legacy in the Philippines. For Marcos, that legacy may provide one more
victory. But the political tides -- and even his failing health -- now run
against the old strong man. Even if he wins at the polls, Marcos will have lost
his countrymen and, perhaps, his alliance with Washington, at great cost to
everyone concerned.
GRAPHIC: Picture t, Anti-Marcos demonstrators in Manila, a sign of the times as
popular unrest, insurgency grow in the islands, EVRARD -- SIPA/SPECIAL FEATURES;
Picture 2, Campaigning, Marcos seems ill, gets smaller crowds; Aquino's are
livelier, PIERS CAVENDISH -- REFLEX; Picture 3, Campaigning, Marcos seems ill,
gets smaller crowds; Aquino's are livelier, CHRISTOPHER BROWN; Picture 4, The
dancing goes on even while close to half of Filipinos live in poverty, TOM HALEY
-- SIPA/SPECIAL FEATURES
LEVEL t - 22 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright m 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February tO, t986
SECTION: WORlD REPORT; Pg. 33
LENGTH: 598 words
HEADLINE: A SINKING ECONOMY;
Why American companies worry
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BODY:
Once a place where quick riches were to be made, the Philippine Islands these
days are a source of high anxiety for many of the American firms that do
everything from packing pineapples to assembling autos.
Although most U.S. companies are trying to ride out the storm, several major
industries have either cut back or folded in the gloom enveloping Manila. "The
economy is going to hell," is the blunt assessment offered by former CIA
Director Richard Helms.
Money is still to be made here because, on the whole, Filipinos like American
products. But the market is deteriorating rapidly, and a Marcos victory could
spell evert harder times ahead. He shows no inclination to make the reforms that
are badly needed to revive a moribund economy. For that reason, leading
businessmen openly oppose his re-election.
Private enterprise is stifled in part because President Ferdinand Marcos has
given friends and political allies monopolies in most major industries,
including sugar and coconut production. One prominent American banker with long
experience in the Philippines comments.' "There's also a videocassette monopoly,
a cigarette monopoly, an almost-everything monopoly. The result is economic
gridlock."
Many experts suspect a wholesale defection would occur were it not for a
thicket of government rules that make it hard for foreign companies to move cash
out of the Philippines. If the bad times worsen, however, many may pull out no
matter what the cost. As it is, more than 500 U.S. companies remain, partly
because capital risks are low in this laborintensive country. U.S. investment
is about $1.1 billion, less than that in most other Southeast Asian nations and
only 6 percent of U.S. investment in the Pacific.
The U.S. Embassy, a popular first contact for businesses sizing up Philippine
opportunities, now has few requests for information. "The current crisis --
political and economic -- dampens anyone's interest in setting up shop in the
Philippines," says one U.S. official. The figures bear him out. In 1985,
government-approved equity investments fell 27 percent from the previous year to
$223.6 million, lowest in five years.
After a plunge in auto and truck sales, Ford decided to cut its losses -- $25
million over a five-year period -- and pulled out in 1984, dismissing 1,400
workers. General Motors, eying a loss as high as $30 million, shut down plants
last August and is negotiating a takeover by its Japanese partner, Isuzu.
Toyota withdrew in 1984 because its licensee went bankrupt.
Three U.S. drug companies also have thrown in the towel, including recent
arrival Baxter Travenol, besieged by labor problems.
Many companies are surviving by sharply trimming labor forces. Further
economies have been made by postponing long-planned investments unless they are
vital or will produce quick profits. Others are diversifying in an attempt to
shore up profits. A foreign combine that includes B. F. Goodrich, for example,
decided to spend $5 million on cocoa plantations after seeing tire sales in the
islands drop a ruinous 30 percent in two years.
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U.S. fruit growers Dole and Del Monte operate amid risks on southern Mindanao
island, an insurgency hot spot where Philippine-owned plantations are the target
of guerrilla extortion demands. American companies, preferred as employers by
Filipinos, refuse to make shakedown payments.
Says one plantation owner: "ate tell the rebels that the government will throw
us out if we do pay, and then the guerrillas would have to answer to the people
for the loss of jobs.",
GRAPHIC: Picture, Manila's Firestone plant continues to produce, but some U.S.
firms give up on the economy, PIERS CAVENDISH -- REFLEX FOR USN&WR
LEVEL I - 23 OF 25 STORIES
Copyright 0 1986 U.S.News & World Report
February 3, 1986
SECTION: CURRENTS; Pg. 6
LENGTH: 796 words
HEADLINE: Defectors: The 'fifth man' is here
BYLINE: by Charles Fenyvesi and Kathryn Johnson
BODY:
The Central Intelligence Agency faced twin challenges in late January:
Keeping secret the existence of a fifth high-ranking Soviet-bloc intelligence
agent who defected in 1985 and staving off a drive to strip the CIA of the
duty of caring for defectors.
in addition to the four spies that the government acknowledges fled to the
West, a KGB major general -- the highest ranking defector of them all -- was
brought to the U.S. last year, well-informed American intelligence sources told
U.S.News & World Report.
The CIA, stung by last November's redefection to Moscow of KGB Col. Vitaly
Yurchenko, is working behind the scenes to ward off charges that it has bungled
its role as provider and friend to defectors. The White House is considering a
plan to give the job to a rival, the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The CIA refused as a matter of policy to comment on the latest disclosed
defection, and the Kremlin has never acknowledged it.
"Extremely valuable" is how one source termed the Soviet officer, who was
feeding secrets to the U.S. even before he defected. The major general, a
professional with technical expertise, is described as a middle-age Russian who
often traveled to Soviet-bloc countries. He was smuggled out of East Germany in
late April or early May by helicopter and debriefed at a U.S. base in West
Germany. He was hidden to prevent press leaks that might have upstaged the
Geneva summit in November. After the summit, tie was flown to the U.S. and,
because of the Yurchenko fiasco, settled in the Midwest.
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Yurchenko left his CIA handler behind in a Washington restaurant and went
to the Soviet Embassy to redefect.
The newly revealed defector is said to be unlike Yurchenko, who seemed
erratic. The CIA's prize is termed a "strong and steady" personality. One
CIA agent called him a "top-notch guy."
The "fifth man" was among the earliest, if not the first, of 1985's
defectors. Milan Svec, No. 2 officer at the Czechoslovak Embassy in Washington,
defected on May 14; Sergei Bokhan, first secretary at the Soviet Embassy in
Athens, went over to the West an May 25; Oleg Gordievsky,