U.S. EXERCISES IN HONDURAS

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The
National
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exporter
Winter 1985
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Welcome to
The National Reporter
W ith this issue, The National Reporter makes its debut as the successor to Counterspy magazine. The
National Reporter will incorporate the best of Counterspy while expanding the magazine's vision to
address a wider range of the pressing issues facing the United States and the world at large.
The National Reporter will continue to report on the CIA and the intelligence agencies. These agencies'
demonstrated capabilities to undermine the existence of the U.S. as a constitutional democracy makes such
coverage essential. At the same time, we shall cover U.S. domestic and foreign policies and take on such issues
as nuclear weapons, threats to the environment, the national deficit, the debt crisis, and corporate abuse and
corruption. We shall also suggest with each issue constructive solutions and options. We emphasize the word
"suggest" because we eschew rigid dogmatic philosophies, and we welcome input and criticisms from you, our
readers.
Our coverage will be based on well-documented, in-depth investigations. These raw reports will then be put
into articles which will take into account the human and personal elements in these stories when feasible.
We should mention that our reporters have proven journalistic credentials. They have worked as reporters,
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written for, and/or contributed to, every major publication in the U.S. and Europe including: the New York
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many books and studies, and editor John Kelly is chair of the Intelligence Study Group of the American
Political Science Association and a correspondent for the AfricAsia magazine.
This first issue of The National Reporter takes a special look at South Africa. In recent months, the anti-
apartheid movement in the U.S. has been re-ignited with strong protests cropping up across the country while
divestment campaigns continue. So it is particularly fitting to present Murray Waas' article which exposes
apartheid's agents and operations in the U.S. and even in the media and on Capitol Hill, all aimed at buying a
better public image for South Africa. Awareness of these facts may help prevent the South African govern-
ment from secretly undercutting the anti-apartheid movement.
But despite anti-apartheid activists' best efforts to push the South African government to change, as Robert
Shephard's article reveals, South Africa has an invaluable fallback. Gold, as the article documents, is the lin-
chpin of apartheid, providing 21 percent of state revenues. This fact means it may be necessary to boycott
South Africa's gold or affect its price on the market, before South Africa will give up its racist system of apar-
theid. This possibility, of course, has to be weighed vis-a-vis the price to Black workers in South Africa and the
sacrifices such an action would require.
Also in this first issue, John Kelly - using secret U.S. government documents - reports on the militariza-
tion of Honduras by the Pentagon. Josh Cohen also looks at Central America, pinpointing the warlike and
dehumanizing policies and activities of the U.S. government there. Cohen then presents a concrete, alternative
course for Central America which could benefit the peoples of both Central America and the U.S. But The Na-
tional Reporter does not consider Cohen's presentation the last word on the terrible crisis and suffering in Cen-
tral America. For that reason, we welcome reader responses. These two articles provide a model for The Na-
tional Reporter's exposes: hard documentation (in Kelly's article, the U.S. government's own secret words)
coupled with constructive options for public debate.
We're excited about The National Reporter and hope you check us out and let us know what you think!
A note to our subscribers: The National Reporter will be sent to you for the full term of your subscription
to Counterspy. We would also like to thank those who generously contributed last month in response to our
appeal for financial help.
2 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
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Editor
John Kelly
Board of Advisors
Dr. Walden Bello
Congressional Lobby
Director, Philippine
Support Committee
John Cavanagh
Economist
Dr. Noam Chomsky
Professor at MIT
Peace Activist
Dr. Joshua Cohen
Assistant Professor, MIT
Joan Coxsedge
Member of Parliament
State of Victoria, Australia
Konrad Ege
Journalist
Ruth Fitzpatrick
Member, Steering Committee
of the Religious Task Force
on Central America
Dr. Laurie Kirby
Professor
City University of New York
Tamar Kohns
Political Activist
Annie Makhijani
Chemistry Student
Dr. Arjun Makhijani
Consultant on Energy and
Economic Development
Murray Waas
Journalist
Martha Wenger
Journalist
Design
Rose Marie Audette
The National Reporter
P.O. Box 647
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
Winter 1985
The National Reporter Vol. 9 No. 1
FEATURES
12
24
28
31
36
Destructive Engagement: Apartheid's Secret Propaganda
Campaign against the U.S.
by Murray Waas
South Africa has conducted a secret campaign to buy itself a better image
- through illegal campaign contributions, front organizations, jaunts to
South Africa for U.S. Congress members, and by buying U.S.
newspapers.
South Africa's Golden Armor
by Robert Shepherd
Apartheid has avaluable buffer against worldwide recession and pressure
from other countries to change its ways: gold. South Africa is the world's
largest producer.
Changing Course in Central America
by Josh Cohen
Can we effectively redirect U.S. policy toward Central America? We need
an alternative that states what we think is right, and not just criticisms of
what we know is wrong.
Tufts University: StuOmb C,yer Spies
by John Roosa
Students recently ousted a CIA a4gr,AW, but were then disciplined by the
university. Did CIA ties to the wilversity have anything to do with that?
Launching the U.S.S. Honduras
by John Kelly
Secret U.S. government documents reveal that the military exercises now
taking place in Honduras are really preparations for war.
NEWS NOT IN THE NEWS
A Zap in Every Pot
5 An Offer They Couldn't Refuse?
7 Thumbscrews for Human Rights
7 Canada's New Spies
10- U.S. Nuclear Strategy: Pied Piper to Armageddon
IN REVIEW
40 Inevitable Revolutions: The United States in Central
America, by Walter LaFeber.
41 Communists in Harlem During the Depression, by
Mark Naison.
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A Zap In Every Pot
By Kitty Tucker
T he Department of Energy (DOE)
wants to play the fairy talc Rumple-
stiltskin with a new twist. Rumplestilt-
skin turned straw into gold; the DOE
wants to turn its nuclear weapons waste
into a saleable product by using it for
"food irradiation."
Food irradiation with gamma sources
like Cesium-137 (produced as a by-
product of creating fissionable materials
for nuclear weapons) was first proposed
by the Atomic Energy Commission and
the military in the late 1950s. Initial ef-
forts to sterilize food and preserve it for
years for military use had to be abandon-
ed because of adverse effects on the
flavor, odor, texture and appearance of
foods. At the time, optimistic nuclear
promoters claimed they could build
nuclear powered airplanes and heat
homes with nuclear furnaces that would
even melt snow off the sidewalks.
But at the time, the food processing in-
dustry was not interested, so most
research and development had to be sup-
ported by the military or various atomic
energy agencies.
The recent EDB problems, leading to
the withdrawal of its use as a food preser-
vative, seemed an ideal opportunity to
promote food irradiation as a substitute
for chemical processing. Margaret M.
Heckler, Secretary of Health & Human
Services, approved proposed Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) regulations
for publication on February 14, 1984.
This proposal will eliminate the irradia-
tion labeling requirements for con-
sumers. Apparently, the food industry
fears that the public will not want to buy
foods labeled as irradiated.
The regulations proposed by the FDA
would allow the irradiation of fruits,
vegetables and grains with doses of radia-
tion up to 100,000 rads. A dose of about
400 rads is enough to kill half of the peo-
ple exposed to it. These doses will inhibit
sprouting in onions or potatoes and kill
insects in the foods, though they are not
high enough to sterilize the foods. Critics
of the proposal have raised concerns
about the safety of eating irradiated
foods over a lifetime, potential en-
vironmental impacts, and safety in the
radiation industry.
Under current regulations, food ir-
radiation is treated as a food additive.
Labels are required to state "Treated
with ionizing radiation" or "Treated
with gamma radiation." The FDA pro-
posal would eliminate labeling re-
quirements, legalizing the secret irradia-
tion of our foods. Cautious consumers
would be unable to avoid irradiated
foods.
Questions have been raised about the
Under a proposed Food and Drug Administration regulation, food irradiated in facilities like the
one above will be sold without a label warning consumers they are buying irradiated food.
research on the safety of food irradia-
tion. Some studies, for example, have
shown problems in test animals used in
these studies.
For over 25 years, the U.S. govern-
ment, principally through the U.S. Army
Quartermaster Corps, performed the
bulk of the research on irradiated foods.
In April 1984, Sanford Miller, the food
safety chief of the FDA, told the
Research and Development Association
(a private group which processes food for
the military) that only three studies done
over the past 25 years by the Army on
sterilizing meats met FDA criteria for ac-
ceptable research. Even these three
studies were questionable, according to
Miller.
The credibility of the research on food
irradiation is of particular concern
because many of the studies were done by
the Industrial Bio-Test Laboratories,
Inc. (IBT). In 1983, IBT officials were
found guilty of defrauding the govern-
ment in drug research. The government
uncovered such problems as the lack of
routine analyses, premature deaths of
thousands of rodents due to unsanitary
lab conditions, faulty record keeping,
and suppression of unfavorable findings.
Earlier, on October 7, 1977, the Army
declared two out of three IBT animal
feeding studies in default. At the time,
IBT held contracts totalling more than $8
million for animal feeding studies on
beef, ham, and pork. Thus, the data
from these two studies on the effects of
eating irradiated foods were useless. The
third study which was not held in default
found reduced numbers of offspring,
decreased survival of weaned offspring,
and greater numbers of tumors in
animals fed irradiated foods. Even this
study was flawed with poor record keep-
ing. In effect, this leaves unanswered the
vital question of the deleterious effects of
eating irradiated foods.
At the FDA proposed levels of irradia-
tion, there should be no induced radia-
tion in foods. But irradiating foods at
sufficiently high energy levels with
machine sources of radiation can make
food components radioactive.
Moreover, studies conducted in India
revealed that irradiation of foods
stimulates the production of aflatoxins in
the foods. Some aflatoxins are known to
be up to 1000 times as toxic as EDB and
are potent cancer-causing agents. This
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fording seriously questions the suitability
of replacing EDB with food irradiation.
There is, futhermore, the danger aris-
ing from greatly increasing the volumes
of highly dangerous radioactive
byproducts on U.S. highways near
population centers and food growing
areas. For example, there are plans to
build a food irradiator in Hawaii at the
Honolulu International Airport. One
food irradiation facility using a 3 million
curie radic esium source could have a
radiation through-put every five years of
450,000 curies going in and out of the
plant. This is about five times greater
than the total volume of low-level
radioactive wastes generated in 1981 in
the U.S. from all sources. This is a par-
ticularly critical problem in the absence
of effective regulation by the Nuclear
Regulatory Agency, the Department of
Transportation, and the states. Concern
over this problem has prompted over 200
local communities to ban or restrict
nuclear cargo transportation in defiance
of federal preemption. '
Widespread use of large quantities of
radioactive materials will also increase
the hazards faced by workers in the food
processing industries. ICI worker at
Radiation Technology in New Jersey ac-
cidentally opened the door to a radiation
chamber for sterilization of medical
equipment - in 1977 and _ received a
dangerous dose in excess of 200 rads. The
accident occurred because management
violated license requirements to use in-
terlock _and safety devices. The same
company was cited by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission for dumping
radioactive garbage with the regular
trash, failing to set up access barriers to
protect workers, and allowing radioac-
tive isotopes to leak into pool water.
State officials also charged Radiation
Technology with contaminating local
water supplies with toxic chemicals.
With so many questions about the in-
tegrity of those researching 1fobd irradia-
tion, as well as those who carry out the
actual process, extreme caution in mov-
ing forward on food irradiation is the
most prudent course. But with Secretary
Heckler favoring the food irradiators,
consumers may have to look toward
Congress for protection from the com-
bined efforts of the Reagan administra-
tion, the nuclear weapons producers, and
the radiation industry. ^
y Tucker is the president of the
Kitt
Health and Energy Institute. She testified
before the House Agriculture Subcom-
mittee on Department Operations,
Research and Foreign Agriculture regar-
ding food irradiation on May 9, 1984.
One of the founders of the Karen
Silkwood Fund, she is also an attorney in
the District of Columbia.
An Offer They Couldn't Refuse?
by Angus Mackenzie
An agreement between the Central In-
telligence Agency and the American
Civil Liberties Union has prompted Con-
gress to shield CIA "operational files"
from the release requirements of the
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).
Reagan signed it into law Oct. 15,
1984.
Passage of the CIA Information Act is
the first legislative victory in this ad
ministration's four-year effort to control
embarassing leaks and to limit the FOIA.
Democrats and civil libertarians, in an
eyebrow-raising alliance, supported the
measure that permits CIA boss William
Casey to "designate" which of his
"operational files" will be exempt from
FOIA-mandated search and release.
Congressional staffers voiced surprise at
the strong bipartisan support for CIA
boss Casey's bill, noting that Casey, who
was Pres. Reagan's campaign manager
in 1980 then spied on the Democrats.
Democratic ' support of the measure
also appeared to conflict with the 1984
party platform regarding the FOIA,
which says, "We will rescind Reagan Ad-
ministration directives imposing undue
burdens on citizens seeking information
about their government through the
FOIA."
Democrats and the ACLU said they
support the law because it would cover
up little significant information. But
historians and intelligence-beat reporters
said it will allow the CIA boss to put in
"operational files" those documents he
wishes to hide. Congressional sources
said the proposed law depends on the
good faith, of the CIA for implementa-
A new law will allow the
CIA boss to put in
"operational files"
documents he wishes to
hide from release under
FOIA.
lion because judicial review of agen-
cy's actions are limited.
Democrats put teeth in the FOIA in
1974 after intelligence-agency abuses
came to light in Watergate. That law
makes all federal agencies, including the
CIA, search, review, and release data in
response to requests by individuals.
Intelligence sources, methods, and na-
tional security information have long
been exempted from release.
The 1984 law, drafted by the CIA, ad-
dressed the agency's complaint that it is
required to review requested files even
though the information in them ultimate-
ly was seldom released. This review of
documents to be kept secret wastes CIA
officers' time. And breaks down com-
partmentalization of agency records
which threatens security, according to
the CIA.
The new law exempts CIA_ "opera-
tional files" from that search and review
process which has freed some useful in-
formation to reporters. One investiga-
tion that may be affected by the new law
regards President Kennedy's assassina-
tion, according to Reader's Digest writer
Henry Hurt. Mr. Hurt's concern was
confirmed by a CIA document released
to Senator Leahy and inspected by this
reporter. It listed cases that "may be af-
fected" by this measure, and those linked
to the JFK assassination were included.
Opponents in Congress, led by Rep.
Ted Weiss, (D-N.Y.), said if this bill had
been law, the public would not have
known about CIA abuses that have come
to light in recent years, including the
agency's long-term involvement in the
National Student Association and infor-
mation concerning the 1954 Guatemalan
coup.
In 1979, then-CIA Deputy Director
Frank Carlucci first submitted the
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"operational files" exemption to Con-
gress, dropping the CIA's previous de-
mand for a total FOIA exemption.
He called for exemptions from review
for CIA information ' on
counterintelligence, foreign intelligence,
security liaison arrangements and checks
on potential sources. These were the ex-
emptions enacted this year.
Individuals may still request "opera-
tional files" on themselves. Nonopera-
tional files will still be searched, reviewed
and be considered for release under the
new law.
At first, the ACLU stopped Carlucci's
proposal. The ACLU's legislative direc-
tor told Congress in 1981: "What is the
public to make of this when confronted
with reports of a proposed Executive
Order authorizing the CIA to carry out
broad domestic security functions? Why
should Congress accept this `trust us' ap-
proach to CIA accountability?"
The Executive Order number 12333
authorizing CIA domestic activities was
signed by President Reagan on Dec. 4,
1981: Nevertheless, in 1993, the ACLU
began to change its stand. ACLU at-
torney Mark Lynch told then-CIA Depu-
ty General Counsel Ernest Ma Weld
that the ACLU would "consider" theex-
enption, said both parties to this
reporter. After that agreement, the CIA
submitted its proposal to Congress.
The Deal
In exchange for ACLU support, the
CIA agreed to speed its processing of
FOIA requests, now delayed two-to-
three years. And the agency promised not..
to reduce its FOIA labors for two years.
Further, it would seek no total FOIA ex-
clusion during this administration.
Morton Halperin, who had served
Henry Kissinger on President Nixon's
National Security Council, who now
heads the ACLU National Security Pro-
ject, helped ACLU lawyer Lynch
negotiate the ACLU-CIA deal, accor-
ding to ACLU sources. In September
1983, Halperin- publicly denied cutting
such a deal.
Senate approval. came rapidly, on
Nov. 17, 1983.
On May 10, 1984, in hearings before
the House Governments Operations
Committee, ACLU attorney Lynch for
the first time publicly endorsed the
measure and encouraged its speedy
adoption, and agreed with a CIA
spokesman who said it would result in lit-
tie loss of information.
A retired CIA officer who had handl-
ed Directorate of Operations files said at
that hearing the proposed law would hide
"some 80 to 90 per cent of CIA files,"
and that "major investigations of the
CIA by Congress have been triggered by
media exposes bared by information
released under FOIA."
Medea
The press objected to the proposed
law. It would "seal forever the informa-
tion the public is most interested in," said
the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press. Those sentiments were echoed
by The Newspaper Guild, Society of
Professional Journalists and Radio-TV
News Directors Association.
On May 11, 1984, The New York
7Fmes headlined its report of those May
10 hearings, "CIA and ACLU Support
Curb on Information." This triggered a
split within the ACLU over its support of
the CIA measure.
Aau Split
In the months that followed, ACLU
Northern. and Southern California af-
filiates voted to oppose the national
ACLU's position.
On August 18, at a national ACLU
meeting in New York, Meir Westreich of
the Southern California ACLU said the
proposed law was unconstitutional
because it calls for the selective applica-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, which governs lawsuits. The bill
removes "virtually all discovery tools" in
litigation to be filed under it. (Discovery
Winter 1985 The National Reporter
proceedings in lawsuits are akin to poker
players showing cards before deciding
who wins.)
Westreich told ACLU executives that
by exempting the CIA front discovery,
the proposed law plays into current con-
servative judicial efforts to curb
discovery, to protect the government
from lawsuits. In response to Westreich,
the ACLU had two general counsels
review its support; one approved and one
opposed support, according to ACLU
President Norman Dorsen.
Objections also came from other
,quarters. Jim Lesar, an attorney who
represents President Kennedy assassina-
tion investigators said in a memo to Con-
gress that the proposed law would hide
CIA records examined by Presidential
commissions and the House Select Com-
mittee on Assassinations, and that the
CIA has wanted since 1965 to hide its
files on the Kennedy murder.
The bill was sent to the House
Government Operations Information
Subcommitt a where it was amended to
stop a recent Reagan-team effort to
FOIA-exempt entire systems of records
in many.agencies by using a loophole in
the Privacy Act. Subcommittee Chair-
man Glenn English's amendment was in-
tended to strengthen individuals' rights
to inspect CIA and other agencies'
records on themselves.
On Sept. 10, English's committee
reported the bill to the floor for a vote,
and concluded, "Instead of reviewing
records in operational files on a page-by-
page, line-by-line basis, the CIA. will be
able to deny most requests for records in
these files in a categorical fashion."
In dissenting from thht committee
report, Rep. Weiss said, "This bill grants
a carte blanche exemption from the
FOIA for the CIA, under the guise of
procedural reform."
He said the bill would render "mean-
ingless" the courts' ability to compel the
release of CIA documents.
When the bill came up for House
debate on Sept. 17, Intelligence Commit-
tee Chairman Edward P. Boland,
(D-Mass), said, "The issue that convinc-
ed the ACLU leadership to endorse H.R.
5164 was its judicial review provisions."
In opposition, Rep. John Conyers,
Jr., (D-Mich.), agreed that little CIA
operational data had been FOIA releas-
ed, but said, "the scarcity of information
only makes that information more
valuable."
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As voting began Sept. 19, Weiss
leafletted his colleagues, streaming onto
the House floor, imploring each, "Keep
the CIA honest. Vote no."
Representatives whipped their plastic
cards from their wallets into the
electronic-voting devices. The CIA won
369-36. Outside the House gallery, CIA
official Mayerfeld, who cut the deal with
the ACLU, laughed delightedly and
received congratulations.
Because California ACLU affiliates
opposed the CIA measure, the following
California representatives voted against
the CIA Information Act: Boxer, Bur-
ton, Dellums, Dixon, Dymally, Ed-
wards, Hawking, Stark and Torres. ^
The author testified against this legisla-
tion before the House Government
Operations Information subcommittee
on behalf of the Newspaper Guild.
Thumbscrews
For Human Rights
The Reagan Administration has raised
torturers from the dungeon chamber
to the open market. The June 15, 1984
commodity control list indicates that one
may apply for a license to export
"specially designed implements of tor-
ture."
According to the Commerce Depart-
ment, torture implements were added to
the commodity controls list under the
Administration's "human rights con-
trols program." Prior to the listing,
manufacturers of torture implements
could export them without the
knowledge or control of the government.
However, the obviously correct solu-
tion to this situation was to simply ban
the manufacture and export of torture
implements.
Under the hubris of human rights,
there is a second serious deficiency. A
validated license is not required for ex-
porting implements of torture to
Australia, Japan, New Zealand or
members of NATO. Why? Because these
5999B Saps; specially designed implements of
torture;. straight jackets; police helmets and
shields; and parts and accessories, n.e.s.
Controls for ECCN 5999B
Unit: Report in "S value,"
Validated License Required: Country Groups QS-
TVWYZ. A validated license is not required for
export of these commodities to Australia, Japan,
New Zealand, and members of NATO.
GLV $ Value Limit: $0 for all other destinations.
Processing Code: CM.
Reason for Control: Crime control (foreign policy).
countries are not violators of interna-
tionally recognized human rights.
The glaring exception to this is NATO
member Turkey. According to the
Americas Watch Committee, the
Helsinki Watch Committee, and the
Lawyers Committee for International
Human Rights: "The military junta in
Turkey, since the 1980 coup which
brought it to power, has egregiously
violated the human rights of its citizens."
Including "the arrests and torture of
many thousands of Turkish citizens..."
Moreover, why would any country
want to import implements of torture?
What application do they have other
than the violation of human rights?
The 'Commerce Department claims
that no licenses have been granted for the
export of torture implements.. But, the
Commerce Department would not know
if torture implements had been shipped
to Europe on their way to South
Africa-where the Commerce Depart-
ment recently okayed the shipment of
shock batons to South Africa's police.^
As this item from the
June 1984 commodity
control list shows, the
Reagan administmdon
has made it legal to ex-
port torture in-
struments - supposed-
ly to Improve the
government's ability to
further human rights.
Canada's
New Spies
by George Martin Manz
F or decades, successive royal com-
missions in Canada investigating
security matters have recommended the
establishment of a civilian security agen-
cy. It wasn't until June that the recom-
mendation was passed into legislation.
When the 1969 MacKenzie Royal
Commission on security suggested the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
(RCMP) Security and Intelligence
Branch be divorced from the
RCMP-and run as a civilian security
agency, the RCMP strenuously lobbied
against it. Realizing it was outflanked,
the government compromised. Canada's
spies got a more separate structure, a
civilian director general, and a new
name - the Security Service (SS). A
small but growing number of civilians
entered the SS. The process of
"civilianization" had begun.
The 1981 McDonald Royal Commis-
sion, however, revealed widespread
lawbreaking by members of the SS. It,
too, suggested the establishment of a
civilian security service separate from the
RCMP.
Following the publication of the
McDonald Commission's report, the
federal government decided to act on the
recommendation and put the process in
motion. Security and Intelligence Transi-
tional Group (STIG) was formed in
August 1981 to prepare position and
discussion papers which led to the
preparation and drafting of Bill
C-157 - the bill to establish a civilian
security agency. But the bill was soundly
condemned by almost all sectors of the
Canadian population and eventually it
was withdrawn.
Bill C-9, a slightly altered version of
Bill C-157, establishing the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service
(CSIS - pronounced Ceesis) was pass-
ed by the House of Commons on June
21. It was opposed by groups ranging
from the Vancouver Coalition Against
CSIS, the Canadian Civil Liberties
Association and most churches, to the
provincial Attorneys General, the Cana-
dian Bar Association and the Canadian
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Medical Association. In order to pass Bill
C-9 before the summer recess, the
Liberal government invoked closure, cut
off debate in both the House of Com-
mons and the Justice and Legal Affairs
Committee and opposed opposition
amendments. The long and acrimonious
debate on the bill raged for days in the
House. Shortly after 5 a.m., the morning
of June 21, it was all over. The bill was
passed.
Bill C-9, a 47-page document contain-
ing 96 clauses, will fundamentally affect
the rights and liberties of generations of
Canadians. It constitutes the most
dangerous attack on Canadian civil fiber-
ties since the infamous War Measures
Act was invoked in the fall of 1970. A
few of the main "highlights" from the
bill will illustrate why.
Slft 1* door as dill Nbarliss
Clause 2 defines "threats to the securi-
ty of Canada" in a very vague manner.
2(b) defines it as "foreign influenced ac-
tivities within or relating to Canada that
are detrimental to the interests of Canada
and are clandestine or deceptive or in-
volve a threat to any, person." This
definition can be interpreted in various
ways and therefore allows CSIS to make,
its own mandate. For example, Cana-
dians who seek to halt trade between a
repressive foreign government that has
trading relations with Canada (such as El
Salvador or the Philippines), could be in-
vestigated because the suspension of
trade could be interpreted as being
"detrimental" to Canada's interests. Ac-
tivists planning a demonstration against
a foreign official could be investigated if
they have a private meeting to plan the
demonstration. That could be defined as
"clandestine."
Canadians need not be
afraid of the new spy
agency breaking the law
as the Mounties did in
the 1970s.. Many of
those crimes will now be
legal.
In 2(c), raising funds for South
African or Guatemalan rebels would be
illegal because these funds support "acts
of serious violence... for the purpose of
,achieving a political objective within
Canada or a foreign state."
. In 2(d), a group secretly planning to
occupy a government office in order to
get media coverage for their grievances
could be investigated because they com-
mitted trespass, "a covert ur4lawful act,"
which could undermine "the constitu-
tionally established government in
Canada."
Warren Allmand (former Liberal
Solicitor General) proposed amendments
to clause 2 which would have given it a
more narrow and precise definition. All-
mand was replaced on the Standing
Committee on Justice and Legal Affairs
because the government realized he
would vote with the opposition.
Clause 13(3) allows CSIS to enter into
arrangements with foreign governments
and intelligence agencies and to provide
them "with security assessments." This
has been secretly going on for decades. It
will now be legal for CSIS to share files
and information with foreign intelligence
agencies such as the CIA. Like the SS,
CSIS will primarily be a domestic spy
agency but will retain liaison officers
abroad.
Clause 16 allows CSIS to help the
Department of National Defense, the
Canadian Security Establishment and
the Department of External Affairs to
spy on "any foreign state or group of
foreign states" or any person other than
a Canadian citizen, legal resident or
Canadian corporation. In the future, Bill
C-9 leaves open the possibility to expand
the CSIS mandate or begin a new in-
telligence agency which will dramatically
increase the collection of foreign in-
telligence.
Clause 18 makes it illegal to reveal in-
formation which identifies informants or
"employees engaged in covert opera-
tional activities." This clause is aimed at
stopping leaks such as former SS agent
Robert Samson who revealed SS wrong-
doings during the '1970s. Anyone who
discloses information can be imprisoned
for up to five years. Few, if any,
employees will reveal dirty tricks because
of fear of imprisonment.
Section 21(3) is particularly frighten-
ing. It allows CSIS to obtain judicial war-
rants to gain access to all files and records
such as tax returns, all lawyer, medical,
banking and personal records, to wiretap
telephones and bug rooms, to open mail,
and "to-enter any place." Warrants may
be issued for up to one year and are
renewable. Warrants will not be difficult
to obtain. In 1982, of 1,170 requests for
wiretaps, not one was refused. Accor-
ding to MP Vic Althouse, "On a per
capita basis, there are 20 wiretaps in
Canada for every one in the United
States."
CSIS will not have to obtain a warrant
to plant informants in targetted
organizations that they wish to spy on.
Paid informants will often exaggerate or
8 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
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No Comment
distort information in order to seem wor-
thy of payment. Because informants are
often not trustworthy, more than one is
sometimes sent to obtain more accurate
information. Informants can also
become agent provocateurs such as Andy
Moxley who planned to occupy the
Parliament Hill Peace Tower and then
informed on the participants.
A iool sss pqpw Op
The "review" process consists of two
parts: an Inspector General appointed to
monitor and review the operational
policies and activities of CSIS and the
Security Intelligence Review Committee
(SIRC) consisting of between three and
five members of the Privy Council who
are not members of either the House of
Commons or the Senate. Both the In-
spector General and SIRC must `swear
secrecy oaths and have access to all infor-
mation except cabinet discussions.
Bill C-9's "review" process rejected
the McDonald Commission recommen-
dation for an all-party parliamentary
review committee with the right to see all
documents and evidence including
cabinet documents. Parliamentary ac-
countability will be non-existent. The
The National R{Jle Association Is trying to boost the acceptance of
guns with glossy ads in widely read magazines like Newsweek featur-
ing the "housewife and businesswoman" at right and John Riggins
of the Washington Redskins
.U.S. and West Germany have elected au-
party intelligence review committees.
Why not Canada? Obviously, the
government does not trust elected of-
ficials.
Because of its oath of secrecy, SIRC
can't blow the whistle on illegal CSIS ac-
A new Canadian law,
which sets up a civilian
security agency, will
fundamentally affect the
rights and liberties of
generations of Cana-
dians.
tivities to either parliament or the media.
It has been revealed that the SS withheld
information regarding the surveillance of
former NFU President Roy Atkinson
from then-Solicitor General Warren All-
mand. How can we be assured that CSIS
will not withhold information from
SIRC? No wonder Allan Lawrence,
former Solicitor General in the Joe Clark
government referred to SIRC as a
"toothless paper tiger."
A new era of spying began on July 16
when CSIS took over the cloak and dag-
ger business from the SS. Still, the
"civilian" dimension of the servicere-
mains illusory as approximately 90 per-
cent of the RCMP spies joined the new
service.
CSIS has far-reaching powers which
do not adequately safeguard the
democratic rights and freedoms of Cana-
dians. Canadians need not be afraid of
the CSIS breaking the law in the same
manner as the SS did in the 1970s. May
of their former crimes will now be legal.
The CSIS has far greater powers than the
SS ever had while Canadians now have
fewer safeguards to protect them.
The fact that the new security agency's
"drag net" is so fine indicates the
primary purpose of the "civilian" service
may not be to catch alleged spies and ter-
rorists at all. With the prospect of the
domestic depression deepening and inter-
national Cold War tensions escalating,
the security service's principal goal may
be to stifle all dissent and radical protest
in this country. ^
-Reprinted from BRIARPA TCH with
permission
The National Reporter
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U.S. Nuclear Strategy.
Plea Piper to Ann-A 1Y P. rim.
by Arjun MakbJani
Immediately after World War II and the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff
began a wide-ranging reformulation of
U.S. military strategy to incorporate'
nuclear weapons in a central role. Top
Secret and Secret documents of the Joint
Chiefs, now declassified, reveal that they
considered the gamut of nuclear weapons
uses: from "strike first" against the
Soviet Union, to nuclear threats against
"vulnerable nations," to ter prizing
civilian populations by arousing
"primordial fears" about the unknown
effects of radiation which people could
not see or smell or touch.
The Joint Chiefs sought to establish:
? coordination between "intelli-
gence," conventional forces and nuclear
weapons;
? nuclear strategy for the peitWd of
U.S. nuclear monopoly;
? contingency planning and *r a gy
in the eventthat some adversary acquired
nuclear weapons.
Terror of the power of atomic bombs
and fears of radiation were to be enlisted
in a U.S. military strategy designed to
"break the will of nations and of
peoples$-':
"In the face of.. the bomb's
demonstrated power to deliver death
to tens of thousands, of primary
military concern will be the bomb's
potentiality to break the will of na-
tions and of peoples by the stimula-
tion of man's primordial fears, those
of the unknown, the invisible, the
mysterious. We may deduce from a
wide variety of established facts that
the effective exploitation of the
bomb's psychological implications will
take precedence over the application
of the destructive and lethal effects in
deciding the issue of war."
The use of nuclear threats and ac-
tual- nuclear bombings were therefore
to be integrated with conventional
forces into a -strategy of forcing
"vulnerable nations" into submis-
sion:
"The over-all strategy of major
warfare will be"profoundly affected by
the advent of the atomic bomb and
developments in the field of scientific
warfare. It is conceivable that
vulnerable nations might be forced to
capitulate by, the threat of having their
powers of resistance quickly reduced
by use of the atomic bomb. Never-
theless, conventional forms of warfare
almost certainly will be required in ad-
dition... thus, advanced bases and
areas must be secured for the more ef-
fective projection of our own offen-
sive operations and to deny advan-
tageous areas to the enemy. Such
operations will require amphibious
and airborne forces with naval and air
support and conventional ground
forces to occupy and defend the seized
areas. We must have available the
forces required to carry out these
essential operations."
Now declassified
documents from the
Joint Chiefs of Staffs
reveal that foreign
wry bases were
meant to draw nuclear
fire away from the U.S.
i
This policy of threatening non-
nuclear countries with nuclear
weapons continues to this day. It has
been carried even further with the ad-
dition of neutron bombs to the U.S.
arsenal-bombs which are designed to
maximize killing and radiation effects
while limiting ' property damage (see
Counterspy, Vol. 6, no. 4).
The Joint Chiefs of Staff realized,
of course, that the U.S. monopoly of
nuclear weapons could not continue
indefinitely. Even during World War
JI, when the Soviet Union was an ally
f the U.S. and bore the brunt of the
fighting and casualties to defeat Nazi
forces, General Groves, the director
of the Manhattan Project which built
the atom bomb believed that "Russia
was the enemy and the project was
conducted on that basis." Nuclear
war against the Soviet Union has
therefore always been a principal
aspect of U.S. military strategy. For
this the Joint Chiefs prepared a
strategy of "offensive-defense which
could be waged against any power,
nuclear or non-nuclear."
The first element in this strategy was
"intelligence," officially, to prevent a
surprise attack on the U.S. Nothing
was to be spared in the effort to create
a "thoroughly adequate intelligence
system."
As a second facet of the "offensive-
defense" strategy, the Joint Chiefs
sought to expand the definition of an
"attack" upon the U.S. to include any
military preparations which could
then be interpreted as indications of a
potential attack upon the U.S.:
"If an enemy prepared an attack,
overwhelm him and destroy his will
and ability to make war before he can
inflict significant damage upon us."
Third, the acquisition of military bases
in foreign countries was central to the
strategy of "offensive-defense":
"Offensively, it is essential to
transport the bomb to the internal
vital areas of the enemy nation. The
closer our bases are to these areas the
more effectively can this be done with
a greater chance of success. Defensive-
ly, the farther away from our vital
areas we can hold our enemy through
our possession of advance bases, the
greater our security. Furthermore, if
our enemy is forced to penetrate a
defensive base system in depth, the
greater are our chances of adequate
warning, interception and destruction
of the attacking force. All of this
points to the great importance of ex-
panding our strategic frontiers in the
Atlantic and Pacific oceans and to the
shores of the Arctic."
Five years after that statement, after
the U.S. had acquired bases across the
world from West Germany to the
Philippines, a Joint Chief of Staff docu-
ment declared that their acquisition of
these bases "had been dictated largely by
atomic weapons considerations."
10 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
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U.S. government propaganda after
World War II proclaimed that the U.S.
would protect its allies with a "nuclear
umbrella." This was supposed to mean
that the U.S. would treat any attack upon
its allies as an attack upon itself. While
the policy was literally true, the implica-
tion that the policy was meant to protect
the allies from nuclear attack was false.
Not only that, the documents indicate
that the "nuclear umbrella" might have
been a deliberate deception. -
According to the Joint Chiefs' docu-
ment, the foreign bases were meant to
draw any adversary's nuclear fire away
from the U.S.-at least in the initial
period of the war and perhaps
throughout the war. An implicit but clear
corollary of this strategy was that
destruction on the U. S. "homeland" was
to be minimized by increasing the
likelihood of destruction in the countries
where the U.S. bases and anchorage
areas were located. Far from protecting
its allies, the "nuclear umbrella" was
thus designed to make them the targets of
weapons which would fall onto their ter-
ritories instead of the U.S.
This cynical policy was the result of the
close study by the U.S. military of the
atomic destruction of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki:
"We can form no adequate mental
picture of the multiple disaster which
would befall a modern city, blasted by
one or more atomic bombs and
enveloped by radioactive mists. Of the
survivors in the contaminated areas,
some would be doomed by radiation
sickness in hours, some in days, some in
years. But, these areas, irregular in size
and shape, as wind and topography
might form them, would have no visible
boundaries. No survivor could be certain
he was not among the doomed and so,
added to every terror of the moment,
thousands would be stricken with a fear
of death and the uncertainty of the time
of its arrival."
Thus the same reasoning which led the
Joint Chiefs to believe that other nations
could be terrorized into submission by
nuclear threats gave rise to a basing
policy which was to minimize the bomb-
ing of U.S. cities at the expense of its
allies.
While some aspects of the U.S.
strategy have changed with the introduc-
tion of intercontinental missiles, its spirit
as well as many of its essential details re-
main in place. Counterspy has
documented and extensively analyzed the
recent reformulation of U.S. first strike
policy and the country's renewed quest
for nuclear superiority over the Soviet
Union (Counterspy, Vol. 6, no. 4; Vol. 7,
nos. 1 and 2). It is important to note that
the basing of first-strike Pershing II
missiles in West Germany and the crea-
tion of a first-strike submarine missile
force (including the Trident II and D-5
missiles) are fully consistent with the
policy of using U.S. bases as launching
points for a surprise attack on the Soviet
Union. The U.S. first strike weaponry
fits in well with the following declared
U.S. plans to "prevail" in an all-out
nuclear war:
? the use of Pershing 11's as a
"decapitation" force to eliminate Soviet
command centers (and many cities);
? the nearly simultaneous elimination
of most Soviet landbased missiles using
MX and some Trident II, D-5 missiles;
? the use of forward-based naval
forces in the Northeastern Pacific and in
the Baltic to eliminate much of the Soviet
navy in or close to port.
Since the Soviet Union would still have
considerable nuclear forces left, a policy
of basing other parts of the nuclear war
arsenal such as cruise missiles abroad, as
well as very dispersed naval anchorage
areas and command and intelligence
centers, would force the Soviet Union to
direct much or most of the remaining
weapons to these U.S. foreign bases to
try and reduce the scope of follow-up at-
'Enough Is NOT..nought'
tacks on the Soviet Union.
It is in this context that the Pentagon
apparently seeks to prevent most of the
few remaining Soviet missiles from
reaching the U.S. by using space-based
weapons. Since these "Star Wars"
weapons would not be able to prevent a
substantial proportion of incoming
missiles from breaking through, their in-
stallation is inconsistent with a defensive
strategy: a point that the most ardent
nuclear warriors must admit.
The Soviet leadership is, to be sure,
aware of these possibilities. The Soviet
Union has often said it would go into a
"launch-on-warning" posture if
threatened with a first strike. It has begun
to deploy long range cruise missiles and
will likely develop countermeasures to
the "Star Wars" weapons.
The U.S. government's nuclear
strategy rose from a cynical policy of
making other people targets in an age of
overwhelming U.S. nuclear superiority
and very few nuclear weapons in the
Soviet Union. The U.S. nuclear strategy
has become a suicidal gamble with the
lives of the people of the United States.
Recently, predictions have emerged that
use of nuclear weapons will plunge the
world into a "nuclear winter," even
should a nuclear war employ far fewer
weapons than the Pentagon plans to use
in its "protracted nuclear war" and ir-
respective of the number of bombs that
might fall on any particular country. ^
The National Reporter Winter 1985 11
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DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT:
APARTHEID'S
"TARGET U.S."
CAMPAIGN
While U.S. protestors., utargeted South Africa's
racist system of "apaic~"South Africa has
conducted a secret campaign to buy itself a better image
through illegal campaign contributions, front
organizations, jaunts to South Africa for U.S. Congress
members,. and by buying U .S. newspapers.
ometime in the spring of 1976
four men attended a secret
meeting in Pretoria, the capitol of
South Africa. The four men were
longtime intimates, the most powc4ul
men in South Africa. They included then
South African Prime Minister John
Vorster; Minister of Finance Owen Hor-
wood; and the Minister of Information
and Interior Connie Mulder, then
thought to be Vorster's "heir appareiWw'
the man most likely to succeed him as
of the South African government, the
main topic of discussion ' was then-
Senator John Tunney (D-Cal.), con-
sidered by the South Africans to be one
of their most formidable adversaries on
Capitol Hill.
Baron told the South Africans that if
they inflated his personal salary by
To an outsider, the fourth man atten-
ding the meeting would appear strangely
out of place. He did not learn about
politics in the Afrikaaner meeting halls of
Pretoria and the Transvaal. But rather in
the backrooms of Brooklyn as a one-time
aide to the late Tammany Hall boss Car-
mine Desapio. During the spring 1976
meeting in Pretoria, this fifth man,
Sydney Baron, was the South African
government's 'public relations represen-
tative and political advisor in the United
States. Among the services Barn provid-
ed the South African government was
advising them on the fine art of buying
political influence in the United States.
During the spring 1976 meeting bet-
ween Baron and the most senior officials.
12 Winter 1985
The National Reporter
$200,000 over the following year, he
would see to it that the money would be
secretly funnelled into the campaign of
Tunny's opponent, Republican S.I.
Hayakawa. If his Congressional
influence-buying plans were unsuccessful
and Tunney was reelected, Baron said,
the South African government should
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not renew the contract with his public
relations firm for the following year.
The South African officials agreed to
provide Baron with the extra $200,000. A
short time later, S.E. Hayakawa won a
close Senate race against then-incumbent
John Tunney. And Baron's contract
with South African was renewed.
The ugly realities of apartheid (opposite, top) have roused protest from its black victims (left) and
Americans. The U.S. anti-apartheid movement has been re-ignited in recent months, with pro-
testers picketing the South African embassy in Washington, D. C. every day (above).
Two years later, Baron attended
another meeting in South Africa with
Vorster, Horwood and Mulder. On that
occasion they discussed the political
future of Senator Dick Clark (D-lowa),
whom one South Africa official told me
was "our number one enemy in your
country."
During that second meeting Baron laid
out another proposal: if the South
Africans inflated his salary by $250,000,
the money would be secretly channelled
into the campaign of Clark's opponent,
Republican Rodger Jepsen. The South
African officials approved Baron's pro-
posal. And, he was provided with the ad-
ditional quarter of a million dollars.
In November 1978, Rodger Jepsen
defeated Dick Clark in a close race.
These plans by the South African
government to covertly provide $450,000
in campaign contributions to defeat
former Senators Tunney and
Clark-reported previously by this jour-
nalist-have now been further confirmed
in a series of on-the-record interviews
with a former South African Secretary of
Information, Eschel Rhoodie.
According to Rhoodie, Baron never
told him how the $450,000 had been ac-
tually funnelled into the two U.S. Senate
campaigns. Says Rhoodie:
". . . After the first time [providing the
$20),000 to Baron in 1978 to help elect
Senator Hayakawa (R-Cal.)], I did ask him
specifically [how he funnelled the money
into Hayakawa's campaign] because I
knew the United States better than
anybody else inside South Africa, and
couldn't believe that this could happen. But you know Baron was the sort of guy
who would say, "Look, I told you that if
this guy [did not win] his election, I would
not be sitting [here] talking to you today.
You would have fired me. That was the
deal. Wasn't it? So trust me."
So I said, "Yes, but I am curious as to
how you managed to do it. That's a lot of
money. "
So he said, "I've used various channels."
He said, "I know how to do these things."
In Rhoodie's opinion, the late New
York public relations man was not true to
his word. Says Rhoodie, "I am afraid
that my opinion is that Sydney Baron just
put that money in his pocket."
Rhoodie has no hard evidence to back
up his belief, however. He says that he
simply does not know what happened to
the $450,000 once it was passed to Baron
from the South African government.
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Some evidence suggests, however, that
the $450,000 in South African funds was
indeed funnelled into the two U.S.
Senate campaigns.
According to another South African
official, Rhoodie-who was opposed to
the Congressional influence buying
plans-was purposely kept in the dark by
other South African officials about the
mechanics of the Congressional
influence-buying campaign because of
his outspoken opposition to than.
As Rhoodie himself partly explains:
I said... I said, you know I am op-
posed to this sort of thing. I said I am
doing this because it is an order of the
Prune hfidKa. I said if it had not
been for the orders of the Prime
Minister, I would not have done this
because I think it is wrong. I was dead
set against that right from the begin-
ing. You know it is one thing took
fluence public opinion, and burying in-
to the WaalibWm Star would in-
fluence public opinion, but it is
another thing to be directly involved in
'the electoral proven of another coun-
try. You see... that sort of thing I
consider to be a direct intervention in-
to the election process and I am
against that.
Another former official confirms this
view: "Eschel,[Rhoodiel was opposed to
this whole business right from the.start.
He was quite outspoken [about than. For
that reason, I think Baron and the others
[Vorster, Horwood] purposely kept him
in the dark as the plan progressed." This
official wan on to say that "there's ab-
volutely no way that John Vorster and
Owen Horwood would have given Baron
that kind of money [$450,000] and not
know exactly what was done with it. A
man like Vorster does not like to trust
anyone. ... he's quite cynical, someone
who understands ruthlessness and
power... If he approved the transfer of
such funds, he would have known what
happened to every penny."
It was not uncommon, according to
Rhoodie and others, for former Prime
Minister Vorster to meet with Baron
privately, without Rhoodie or others pre-
sent. Baron also met privately with other
senior South African officialls. And on at
least one occasion, Andrew Hat-
cher-one of Baron's top aides and
previously one of the most senior black
officials in the Kennedy Administra
don-also met privately with John
Votster. Thus, John Vorster could have
been kept fully advised as to what was
happening to his secret funds, while
14 Winter 1985
Topolshttrbnaeabr=4SouthAfdaabroughtU.S. nsrnberstoSouth Afrim
trips; lmnpoonW In this cartoon from the Rand IMF CO" are i under U.S. law.
keeping Rhoodie in the dark.
Another small part of the puzzle might
be provided by a onetime associate of
Baron's. The Baron associate remembers
having lunch with Baron and another of
his top aides, L.E.S. Devilliers, at an ex-
pensive New York hotel in the late
1970's.
Devilliers was no ordinary employee
of the Baron firm. Previously, he had
been Rhoodie's top deputy and right
hand man aae the South African Depart-
ment of Information, the only other in-
dividual at the Department who knew all
the details of theSouth African govern-
ment's influence buying activities.
Devilliers was well qualified when-he
applied to work at Baron's firm, being at
one time one of the top propagandists in
the South African government. It is
unknown, however, if there was another
factor Baron considered when Devilliers
approached him about possible employ-
ment: Devilliers was one of only a hand-
ful of South African officials who knew
about the funnelling of $450,000 in
South African government funds to
Baron to illegally influence the two U.S.
Senate campaigns.
At the lunch he attended with
Devilliers and Baron, remembers the
Baron associate, the firm's connections
on Capitol Hill inadvertently came up in
conversation. The name of Rodger
Jepsen was eventually mentioned.
"He owes us," the Baron associate
remembers Devilliers saying. "We stole
that [his election against former Senator
Dick Clark] for him. That was ours."
At that point, Baron became stonefac-
ed and asked to speak to Devjlliers alone.
When the two men returned to the table,
Baron told his associate, "Discretion is
required in our line of work. You unders-
tand that. 9 9
The Clark-Jepsen election was never
brought up again, least of all by Baron's
younger associate. "I did not think it
would be helpful in furthering my career
there," he wryly told me.
There is additional evidence that
Baron passed along the $450,000 to
Jepsen's and Hayakawa's campaign.
In 1978, after reports surfaced in the
South African press alleging financial ir-
regularities in the Department of Infor-
mation, a, South African government
committee, called "the Kemp Commit-
tee," was set up to evaluate the Depart-
ment's projects and decide if they were
effective enough to be continued.
One project evaluated by the Commis-
sion was the Department of
Information's hiring of the Sydney
Baron Company as its public relations
representative in the U.S. Both Sydney
Baron and L.E.S. Devilliers gave infor-
mal testimony before the Commission
arguing that it would be in the best in-
terest of the South African government
to continue retaining the firm. With tape
recorders running, both Baron and
Devilliers boasted to Commission of-
ficials about their roles in secretly fun-
nelling $450,000 of South African funds
into the campaign coffers of Senators
Hayakawa and Jepsen.
As the former head of the Department
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of Information, Eschel Rhoodie was
allowed to attend those sessions, he
recalls:
They [Baron and Devilliers] in front of
Brigadier Kemp and two other officials of
the Bureau of State Security, [who were]
then evaluating these projects, said that is
what happened [the money was passed
on).
After Baron and Devilliers testified
about their role in passing along the il-
legal campaign contributions, the South
African government renewed Baron's
contract for another year. Continued
Rhoodie:
They [the Kemp Committee] evaluated this
and then sent [a] report up to the South
African Security Council. The Security
tative in the United States.
As a one-time aide to the late Tam-
many hall boss, Carmine Desapio,
Baron had a front row seat to one of
the most corrupt political machines in
this country.
In 1961, Baron's name surfaced in a
report prepared by the New York
State Commission of Investigation,
which was looking into corrupt prac-
tices surrounding the awarding of
New York municipal contracts to elec-
trical firms. The Commission charged
that New York City's water commis-
sioner at the time had attended a
meeting in Baron's office where
representatives of a Chicago electrical
fixture firm were told that city con-
tracts could be obtained if the firm
hired Baron. The Chicago firm declin-
Ecchd Rhoodk (left) vents the chief engineer of South Africa's secret propaganda campaign
under former Prime Mbdster John Vorster (right).
Council was then chaired by the present
Prime Minister and by [the rest of the
ministers, including the ministers of
defense, justice, and foreign affairs]. They
approved Baron's contract again for the
next year and I know [that] for a fact,
because it was tape recorded.
here is no doubt that Sydney
Baron was capable of making il-
legal campaign contributions on
behalf of the South African
government. An examination of his
career shows that he and his firm have
been involved in questionable ac-
tivities before, during, and after he
was South Africa's public represen-
ed the offer. A competitor accepted
the offer and subsequently obtained a
New York City municipal contract.
The Commission also alleged that
Baron's Scarsdale home was rewired
at a very discounted price by another
electrical firm on whose behalf he had
helped obtain contracts with the City
of New York.
Besides representing the South
African government in 'the U.S.,
Baron has also done public relations
work in this country for the repressive
governments of Taiwan and the
Dominican Republic. Among his
responsibilities was white washing
reports of human rights violations in
those countries.
When Baron became South Africa's
public relations representative in the
U.S., he did not leave the lessons he
learned from Tammany Hall behind.
Besides secretly funnelling the
$450,000 into U.S. Senate campaigns,
he also provided a number of other
questionable services for his South
African friends.
Even the Vatican was not beyond
the reach of Baron's activities. Accor-
ding to a former Baron associate,
South African officials asked Baron
to set up meetings between them and
high level Vatican officials as part of a
clamp down on anti-apartheid, South
African Catholic priests operating in
South Africa.
The man who arranged contacts
with Vatican officials was Thomas
Deegan, a New York public relations
man who was one of the Vatican's
most decorated laymen in the United
States. Some of Deegan's activities are
described in an August 17, 1976
memorandum sent from Deegan to
Baron. Wrote Deegan:
My mission to both London and
Brussels relative to the Anglican church
and the Vatican was successful. In both
areas, the ground work is being laid at
high levels before bringing together at
the summit level counterpart chur-
chmen of the Dutch reformed church,
the Vatican and the Anglican church,
separately...
There were three other highly-
placed clerics whom Deegan felt must
be approached-all with a view to set-
ting up a meeting between the Vatican
Secretary of State and leaders of the
Dutch Reformed Church.
As I told you in our long distance
telephone conversation the day after my
return, I think it is indicated that I will
have to go back to both of these bases
before long and, from a political stand-
point, in a visit with the principals in
South Africa.
When shown a copy of the
memorandum, Rhoodie confirmed
that Deegan and Baron set up a
meeting at the Vatican for him in 1976
with Cardinal Casaroli, the Vatican
Secretary of State. Later the same year
when Casaroli was ill, Deegan and
Baron set up another meeting for
Rhoodie with Cardinal Giovanni
Benelli, the Archbishop of Florence
and then Acting Vatican Secretary of
State.
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months, the Congressman who had so
aron died in 1979. The follow- often been successfully lobbied by
B ing year, his firm's contract Baron's firm, joined the company on
with the South African govern- January 5, 1981. According to Justice
ment was terminated but that Department files, Wolff s new salary
did not stop his firm from engaging in was to be $50,000, a year.
questionable activities. - Four months later, the Baron
After losing its'South-African con- firm-with the staff supplemented by
tract, Baron's firm stepped up its the former chairman of the House.
business with two other, foreign Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
clients-Japan and Taiwan. One of Asian and Pacific Affairs- signed a
the members of Congress the firm new $350,000 per year contract to be
often lobbied was then-Representative Taiwan's official lobbyist in this coun-
Lester Wolff (D-N.Y.), Chairman of try. .
the House Foreign Relations Subcom-
mittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs.
According to Justice Department
A Coral Na
records, representatives of the Sydney outh Africa's campaign to in-
S. Baron Company arranged meeting fluence.U.S. policy did not
between Wolff and members of begin-or end- with hiring the
Japan's Parliament, the Diet, in 1979 .Sydney S. Baron Company. In
and 1980, and brought a Japanese fact, during the last decade, the Republic
electronic industry delegation to see of South Africa has engaged in a massive
Wolff and other Representatives in covert war in the United States.
1980. In 1979, Wolff also met with In the past, foreign nations have
Baron representatives and their engaged in wars against the United States
Taiwanese clients during a trip to the with soldiers and on battlefields. The
Island. That same year, according to prices of those wars have'been great. But,
the Justice Department files, Wolff in the end, the United States has come
met on October, 23 and November 8 away with its political sovereignty and
with a Baron official in Washington, rights of self-determination for its
D.C. to discuss the Taiwan Relations citizens.
Act. South Africa, however, has been able
In November 1980, Wolff lost,a bid .. to accomplish what no other foreign na-
for reelection. Within a couple of lion has managed to do against the U.S.
16 Winter 1985
The National Reporter
This memo from prom!
new Catholic Thomas
Deegan to South
Af 's ' publc reb=
dons" consulumt, .
Sidney Baron, reveal, the
Vatican connection to
the apartheid mime.
in a conventional war. While not a single
shot was fired and the American people
never knew such a secret war was even
being waged, the right to self-
determination of millions of Americans
may have been diminished. For if
$450,000 of South African funds were
secretly funnelled into the 1976 Califor-
nia and 1978 Iowa Senate campaigns,
then the South African govern-
ment-and not the people of California
and Iowa-may have determined who
became U.S. Senators.
But the secret transfer of South
African funds into the U.S. electoral pro-
cess is only a small part of the. South
African government's covert war against
the United States.
A two year investigation of that covert
war and the South African government's
influence buying activities in this country
has been conducted by this reporter.
More than a hundred individuals have
been interviewed. Three former South
African government officials have
granted extensive interviews for this arti-
cle. One of those officials, Eschel
Rhoodie, has agreed to talk on the
record.. The result is fourteen hours of
taped interviews.
Also used in this investigation have
been several hundred pages of internal
State Department documents and cables.
Some of those documents were released
under the Freedom of Information Act.
Others remain classified. Reports
prepared by the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) and Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA) and quoted in this story
are still classified. Justice Department
Foreign Agents' Registration files cited in
this story are a matter of public record.
Also reviewed were dozens of pages of
internal records of the South African
Department of Information and internal
files of two South African front
organizations, the Christian League of
Southern Africa and the London-based
Foreign Affairs Research Institute.
Other sources of information were inter-
nal files of the Sydney Baron Company
and the Panax Corporation, a newspaper
firm secretly provided with South
African funds in order to buy U.S.
newspapers on South Africa's behalf.
Among the results of this lengthy in-
vestigation:
? Besides giving $200,000 to Sydney
Baron in an attempt ' to bring about
former Senator S.I. Hayakawa's election
in 1976, the South African government
illegally funnelled a $2,000 gift to the
Senator. The payment was made in the
form of an honorarium in July 1978 to
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As part of its propaganda campaign, South African officials cultivated political leaders such as Paraguayan dictator .Stroessner (shown meeting with
Rhoodie, left). At right, Connie Mulder, head of the propaganda ministry meets with then Governor of California Ronald Reagan.
Hayakawa from the South African
Foreign Affairs Association, a fully-
subsidized front organization for the
South African government: it is illegal
for a member of Congress to accept gifts
or money from a foreign government or
its agents. At the time that Hayakawa
received the illegal $2,000 payment, he
was a member of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee and its Subcom-
mittee on Africa. Both regularly consider
legislation regarding South Africa.
The South African government has
since admitted publicly that it secretly
subsidized the Foreign Affairs Associa-
tion. Hayakawa has refused to return the
$2,000.
? In a blatant violation of established
diplomatic tradition, a South African
government official actively intervened
in Iowa in 1978 to help get Rodger Jepsen
elected to the Senate.
According to a State Department
cable on the matter: "Over the weekend,
the State Department was informed
that... while in Iowa recently, a South
African government official, Jan Van
Rooyen, had publicly made some
disparaging remarks about Senator
Clark.. .
"Van Rooyen misrepresented Senator
Clark's position on American investment
in South Africa, alleging that Senator
Clark had been urging disinvestment.
Van Rooyen also volunteered the opi-
nion that Iowans were getting the wrong
opinion from "Your Senator Clark."'
"In addition," said the cable, "Van
Rooyen asked Iowans why their Senator
finds South Africa such a fine platform
rather than dealing with the problems the
state might face." Then Deputy
Undersecretary of State David Newsom
later sent a strongly worded diplomatic
message to the South African govern-
ment protesting its official's activities as
an unwarranted involvement in the U.S.
electorial process.
? Fifteen California newspapers-
purchased by Michigan newspaper
publisher John McGoff entirely with
secretly provided South African
funds-provided support for Senator
S.I. Hayakawa in his 1976 Senate cam-
paign.
? The South African government
covertly financed more than fifty trips to
South Africa for members of Congress
and their aides despite the fact that since
1974 it has been illegal for a foreign
government to provide such trips for
U.S. officials.
To surreptitiously circumvent U.S.
law, the South African government set
up front organizations and utilized front-
ment who ostensibly paid for trips. In
fact, they were being covertly financed by
the South African government.
Internal State Department files show
that the department knew the South
African government had set up the front
organizations and was providing the fifty
trips to members of Congress and their
aides. Though aware that some of the
organizations were South African fronts,
the State Department did little to warn
members of Congress of the informa-
tion. In some cases, members of Con-
gress were warned by State Department
officials during briefings before the trip
that the trips were being subsidized by the
South African government. But the State
Department made no formal notes of the
meetings, thus eliminating the possibility
of prosecuting members of Congress
who accepted illegal free trips. "Some of
those conversations are best forgotten
any way," one State Department official
said in a cable when queried about his
personal knowledge of such meetings by
another Department official.
? The South African government pro-
vided free travel and secretly funneled
campaign contributions to members of
the House Agriculture Committee in an
effort to have them vote higher sugar
quotas for South Africa.
The South African Sugar Association,
which has been secretly subsidized by the
South African government, provided
more than $8,000 in free transportation
and illegal campaign contributions to
former Representative William Poague
(D-Tex.), then Chairman of the House
Agriculture Committee, which was at the
time considering adoption of higher
sugar quotas for South Africa.
? Former President Gerald Ford was
the recipient of $20,000 in honaria from
frontmen and front organizations of the
South African government.
Ford accepted a $10,000 honorarium
from Senbank, a South African bank,
for speaking at a U.S. conference sup-
porting U.S. investment in South Africa.
According to Eschel Rhoodie and other
authoritative South African sources, the
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Former U. S. President Gerald Ford received an award secretly financed by South Africa. Above,
Ford meets with propaganda official Connie Mulder. Below, Rhoodie (left) and director of
BOSS General Van den Bergh (second from right) meet with Israel's Prime Minister Rabin (se-
cond from left) and Israeli Defense Minister.Shimon Peres (right).
South African government was the real
source of Ford's payment. On another
occasion Ford accepted a $10,000 pay-
ment as the first lecturer to speak at the
John McGoff Distinguished Lecture
Series at Northern Michigan University.
The lecture series was financed with
secretly provided South African funds.
? The South African government paid
bribes to senior officials of the AFL-CIO
and the International Longshoremen's
Union in exchange for their help in work-
ing against a trade boycott proposed by
some union officials, according to a
former South African official. The
money was passed along to the union of-
ficials by Dutch unionists. Says the
former official: "The Dutch union
knew-I won't say that Dutch union, but
the Dutch individuals from that union
knew and they informed [the] American
participants where this came from and
why. "
Eschel Rhoodie refused to talk about
the South African government's bribery
of U.S. union officials. However, when
presented with the former official's ac-
count, he did not deny any of the details
of the bribery scheme as described by
that official. An internal South African
government memorandum, prepared by
Eschel Rhoodie for the then-Minister of
Information and the Interior, Connie
Mulder, refers to the union bribery
scheme:
The labor union attempt of 1972 to stop
the handling of South African goods. With
a few exceptions this attempt failed
worldwide. The key figure was George
Meany in the USA. After appropriate con-
tact he took a stand against the attempt
and when the Americans did not go along
the boycott failed. Two organizations in
the USA and certain individuals had been
in contact with Meany. Money changed
hands.
? A number of senior officials in the
Reagan administration have accepted
money, favors, and free trips from the
South African government.
In 1977, the South African govern-
ment secretly provided some $40,000 to
Miami-based research institute, The In-
stitute of Policy Studies, headed by Ret.
Lt. General Daniel Graham, the former
head of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
The secret funds were provided, accor-
ding to Eschel Rhoodie, for the Institute
to produce an "independent study"
espousing the strategic importance of
South Africa to the west. Graham has
served as advisor on defense policy for
the Reagan administration.
Ernest LeFever, President Reagan's
one-time nominee for the post of
Undersecretary of State for Human
Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, ac-
cepted three all-expense paid trips to
South Africa provided by the South
African government and its front
organizations. LeFever also helped
secure the services of former Senator S. 1.
Hayakawa to appear at a conference
sponsored by the South African Foreign
Affairs Association, a South African
front group, according to internal South
African government files.
William Middendorf, the Reagan ad-
ministration's Ambassador to the
Organization of American States, served
on the board of Directors of the Panax
Corporation, at a time when that cor-
poration was the recipient of $11 million
in laundered South African government
funds to secretly buy the Washington
Star and other U.S. newspapers on South
Africa's behalf. Records of the Securities
and Exchange Commission also show
that Middendorf owned 5,000 shares of
Panax stock at the time of the corpora-
tion's covert dealings with the South
African government.
James Edwards, who once served as
President Reagan's Secretary of Energy,
accepted a free all-expense paid trip to
South Africa provided by the South
African Freedom Foundation, an entire-
ly subsidized front organization for the
South African government.
And Donald Dekeiffer, the one-time
General Counsel to President Reagan's
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
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was once the South African
government's chief paid lobbyist in
Washington, D.C. In late 1982, as an of-
ficial in the Reagan administration
Dekeiffer travelled to South Africa to
discuss with officials there the Reagan
administration's relaxation of the U.S.
trade embargo against South Africa. As
South Africa's paid-- lobbyist in
Washington, according to documents his
firm filed with the Justice Department,
Dekeiffer had lobbied U.S. officials to
relax the U.S. trade embargo. Dekeiffer
later helped implement that policy as
General Counsel to the U.S. Trade
Representative's Office in the Reagan
Administration.
? The South African government pro-
vided more than two hundred U.S. jour-
nalists with free all-expense paid trips to
South Africa. Among those included in
the jaunts were some of the nation's most
powerful and influential reporters, col-
umnists, and newspaper and magazine
editors. In almost all instances, the jour-
nalists returned to the U.S. to provide
favorable news coverage of South
Africa.
? The South African government
secretly purchased a substantial secret in-
terest in a chain of more than sixty
newspapers in the U.S. to use as pro-
paganda outlets in this country.
During 1974 and 1975, the South
African government funnelled $11.3
million to Michigan newspaperman John
McGoff to secretly buy the Washington
Star on South Africa's behalf. When
McGoff's bid to buy the Washington
Star failed, he used the $11.3 million to
set up a South African government front
company, Global Communications, Inc.
McGoff and Global then purchased
(secretly on behalf of the South African
government): the Sacrament Union,
twenty smaller California newspapers; a
40 percent interest in Panax, Inc., a
newspaper chain headed by McGoff
which owned more than sixty
newspapers around the country; and a 50
percent interest in the United Press Inter-
national Television Network (UPITN).
? The South African government
agreed to make five $900,000-a year
payments totalling $4.5 million to the
overseas enterprises of Rev. Sun Myung
Moon. In exchange, the church would
give the South Africans a substantial
secret interest in the church-owned
Washington Times.
After the Unification Church received
the infusion of South African funds, the
Washington Times hired a number of in-
dividuals with close ties to the South
African government. Serving on the
The South African
government agreed to
make payments total-
ling $4.5 million to
Rev. Sun Myung Moon.
In exchange, - the
church would give the
South Africans a
substantial secret in-
terest in the church-
owned Washington
Times.
Editorial Advisory Board of the
Washington Times is John McGoff. The
paper's editor and publisher is James
Whelan, previously the vice President
and editorial director of McGoff s Panax
newspapers while South Africa secretly
owned a substantial interest in the
newspaper chain.
? The Chairman of the Curtis
Publishing Company, Beurt SerVaas
financially benefited from gifts and
business deals engineered by him for the
South African government. During the
time the Saturday Evening Post-owned
by Curtis Publishing and Ser-
Vaas-published more than a dozen pro-
South African articles.
In 1976, SerVaas and his wife, Cort,
the publisher and editor of the Saturday
Evening Post, visited South Africa as the
all-expense paid guests of the South
African government. Later, Beurt Ser-
Vaas was made a large stockholder of a
South African newspaper, the Citizen,
and a director of the South African news
photo agency,Afripix. At the time, those
two enterprises were secretly owned by
the South African government, and Ser-
Vaas was awarded the stock and director
positions though he contributed no
financial investment or work to the two
ventures.
In exchange for the South African
government largesse, SerVaas allowed
the Saturday Evening Post to become lit-
tle more than a covert propaganda organ
for the South African government.
? Besides the activities of Sydney
Baron discussed at the beginning of this
article, a number of the South African
government's paid American lobbyists
and public relations specialists have
engaged in questionable activities. An
employee of Donald Dekeiffer, the
former U.S. lobbyist for the South
African government, for example,
misrepresented herself to gain access to a
restricted Congressional briefing on
South Africa. And former Senator
George Smathers (D-Fla.), who is now
Pretoria's chief lobbyist in Washington,
has engaged in a number of questionable
activities, first as a member of Congress
and then as a lobbyist.
S" bdo Orl
Just days before former South
African Prime Minister John
Vorster told even his closest col-
leagues that he was going to re-
sign from office, he held a tightly-
guarded, secret meeting with his most
trusted cabinet ministers. Sitting to his
left at the meeting was General Hendrik
Van den Bergh, then the Head of Boss,
ft. South African secret police and
foreign intelligence service. Across the
table from Van den Bergh sat Connie
Mulder, then the Minister of Informa-
tion and Interior.
Mulder was known among his col-
leagues as the "Crown Prince," the heir
apparent to succeed Vorster as Prime
Minister. Vorster had stayed on as Prime
Minister longer than anyone had an-
ticipated. But Connie Mulder had a good
reason to be patient: few political
observers in South Africa believed
anyone other than Mulder had a chance
to succeed Vorster as South Africa's next
Prime Minister.
The topic of discussion during the two
hour meeting was the so-called "Depart-
ment of Information" scandal-the
largest and most publicized political
scandal in South Africa's history. The
story of the scandal first began to unravel
when the Johannesburg Sunday Times
ran a story on its front page revealing that
the Secretary of Information at the time,
Eschel Rhoodie, and ten friends had
taken a government-paid trip to the In-
dian Ocean island of the Seychelles. An
internal government audit leaked to the
SundayErpress described the trip as "ex-
travagant" and alleged other financial ir-
regularities within the Department of In-
formation. South Africa's conservative
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Afrikaans community was shocked that
their government officials were wasting
money.
A "confidential" May 1978 State
Department cable sent from the
American embassy in Capetown, South
Africa to the Department in Washington
correctly speculated that South Africa's
political establishment would move
quickly to stop further revelations about
Rhoodie's activities and the Department
of Information from surfacing. Said the
cable in part:
Minister of Information Connie Mulder
told Parliment the afternoon of May 3
that he was requesting the Public Service
Commission to institute a study of the
Department of Information with a view
toward totally reorganizing it into an in-
dependent agency without cabinet status,
similar to the U.S. or British Information
Services. Mulder also announced a tem-
porary reorganization of the Department,
which will involve the 'retirement' of two
top officials, Dennys Rhoodie [Eschel
Rhoodie's brother] and Administration
Officer Waldceck, both of whom have
been named frequently in connection
with the emerging scandals in the Depart-
ment. Mulder indicated that the tem-
porary reorganization would not affect
Eschel Rhoodie, the Department's
Secretary, whose name has also been
closely linked with the scandal.
Comment: Mulder's announcement was
clearly aimed at mitigating the effects of
the spreading Department of Information
scandals prior to the parlimentary debate
on the subject scheduled for May 8...
There is considerable surprise that
Mulder opted not to dismiss Eschel
Rhoodie, against whom there has been
mounting evidence of unethical activities,
if not corruption. Most parliamentary
observers believed that this decision will
haunt Mulder, and result in a continua-
tion of demanding news stories about the
Department.
The cable then added that, at least for
the time being, details of the scandal were
successfully being covered up.
"The Sunday Express has agreed for the
moment, following a meeting with Con-
nie Mulder, not to publish further releva-
tions about the Department's activities,
on the grounds that the information may
be detrimental to national security. At-
torneys for the Express are studying the
possible implications. Meanwhile, press
reports state that General Hendrik Van
den Bergh, head of the Bureau of State
Security (Boss) on May 2 discussed
aspects of the scandal with Mulder and
the Rhoodie brothers. Speculation among
some journalists is that $30 million in
Allegations of corruption in the propaganda
ministry sparked a turbulent political scandai;
from which P. W. Botha (top) emerged a'
Prime Minister. The Erasmus Commission
chaired by Rudolph Erasmus (bottom) in-
vestigated the influence-buying operations.
Defense Ministry funds may have been
secretly transferred to the Department of
Information for use in influence buying
and other overseas activities. This they
say, would explain Van den Bergh's in-
volvement and the national security
aspects of the case which may be invoked
by the South African government to pre-
vent further revelations.
The intelligence information in the
State Department was correct. There
were undiscovered details of South
Africa's influence buying activities
overseas-and South African officials
would do their best to suppress them.
One such official was Eschel Rhoodie,
who sent a secret memorandum to Con-
nie Mulder describing some of his
Department's activities:
Information is involved in a propaganda
war-it is in the first line of defense and
is the Department which has to bear the
brunt of the first attacks-attacks on
South Africa in the press and on televi-
sion. The government is aware of this
The National Reporter
situation and realizes the need for
energetic efforts to counter the attacks.
Later in the memorandum, Rhoodie
described some of his department's
energetic efforts:
The Department of Information controls,
owns or is directly or indirectly involved in
secret with:
5 church organizations in South Africa, the
USA, Britain, and Germany
2 front organizations in the USA and Bri-
tain each with more than 30,000 members
3 news and photo agencies
2 film production companies abroad
12 regular publications in nine different
countries including five in Africa
5 institutes abroad
14 front organizations in thirteen countries
3 book publishing companies
19 fulltime anonymous collaborators in
eleven countries
3 public relations organizations in three
countries
The subsidization of 30 studies and books
every year.
The production of up to 13 motion pictures
in eight countries.
During the cabinet meeting, Vorster
read aloud from a confidential report
prepared for him by Donald Dekeiffer,
South Africa's lobbyist on Capitol Hill.
Dekeiffer wrote that the U.S. Justice
Department was winding up its investiga-
tion of the "Koreagate Scandal"-South
Korea's efforts, with the help of
Tongsun Park to bribe and buy influence
with Congress. In the report Dekeiffer
noted that the disclosures did more to
strain U.S.-South Korean relations
than could ever be repaired. If the full
details of South Africa's U.S. influence-
buying activities were ever known,
Vorster told his cabinet officers, the
results would be even more devastating.
Foremost in his mind were details of
the $450,000 in South African funds
passed along to Sydney Baron to buy in-
fluence in two U.S. Senate campaigns. "I
want every single document, every single
scrap of paper on this subject
destroyed," Vorster told his colleagues
"If there is ever a leak on this subject, the
security of our country will be at stake."
Sweatbeads had started to gather on
Vorster's forehead. As he spoke, one
observer noticed that his hands seemed to
be shaking. It was unusual for anyone to
see him ill at ease. For Vorster-a man
who like Richard Nixon was at his
toughest during crises-was a tough ex-
prosecutor and a one-time Minister of
Justice with a reputation for ruthlessness.
Equally nervous was Connie Mulder.
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As Minister of Information, he was one
of the chief architects- of the U.S.
influence-buying activities. And Mulder
was in close competition with Defense
Minister Botha as to who would become
South Africa's Prime Minister.
Mulder had good reason to be con-
cerned. Forty eight hours before the Na-
tional Party's caucus met to decide who
would be the next Prime Minister of
South Africa, word leaked out that the
government commission looking into
financial irregularities with the Depart-
ment of Information was about to sub-
poena Mulder and question him about a
secret Swiss bank account he maintained.
The leak was devastating.
Explains Rhoodie: "Generally speak-
ing, if you go into a group of politicians
in South Africa and say, 'this judge on
the Supreme Court told me that it was
going to happen and you have my word
of honor that is what he said to me,'
everybody is going to believe you. And
this is what they did. They believed that
Connie Mulder was going to be hauled
before the Commission to testify two
days after he became Prime Minister and
that would have been the biggest scandal
in South African history. So they elected
Botha because-not because they
thought he was the best man, but because
they were scared what would happen if
Mulder were elected. It was fear that
elected him."
By only a few votes in the Nationalist
Party's caucus, Botha was elected Prime
Minister of South Africa. After his in-
auguration, Botha directed two govern-
ment commissions to investigate the
alleged irregularities within the Depart-
ment of Information.
In December, 1978, a report published
by the second investigative commission,
the-Erasmus Commission, found that
between 1974 and 1977, $73 million in
South African government funds were
secretly funnelled into the Information
Department to finance a "secret five year
plan" aimed at "projecting a true
image" of South Africa and "countering
hostile attacks from abroad." "All in
all," said the report, "the covertly pro-
vided funds had gone to finance secret
propaganda and influence-buying pro-
jects abroad. Some fifty to sixty of them
would remain secret and continue to be
carried out."
The end result of the Erasmus Com-
mission's report was that Botha's
political rivals-Vorster, Mulder, Van
den Bergh, and Eschel Rhoodie-would
all be discredited and would retire from
government. Rhoodie would later be ex-
tradited from France to stand trial on
De/auvment of jtote IEEE6E ^a
This "confidential" State Department cable
correctly speculated that the South African
government would move quickly to suppress
the budding "Infomwtion Department scan-
daL "And, the cable reports, the Sunday Ex-
press agreed not to publish further revelations
in the scandal to protect "national security. "
charges of financial fraud in South
Africa. Rhoodie would briefly be im-
prisoned-until a South African appeals
court would unanimously reverse a con-
viction and six year prison sentence im-
posed by a lower court.
The Erasmus Commission made
almost no mention of South African in-
fluence buying activities in the United
States except to confirm an earlier report
by the South African newspaper, the
Rand Daily Mail, that the South African
government had secretly funnelled $11.5
million in secret payments to Michigan
publisher John McGoff to buy the
Washington Star. But for the most part,
most of Rhoodie's secret activities in the
United States would not be disclosed by
the Commission and remained secret.
[hide A Swell
InOppNlce Agency
hen Eschel Rhoodie became
the South African Secretary
of Information in 1974, South
Africa was an outlaw nation
in the international community. For that
situation to change, South Africa's im-
age in the world had to be improved-a
task that seemed almost impossible.
In 1978, the Department of Informa-
tion circulated a report among South
African officials painting a bleak picture
of the way the rest of the world viewed
their regime and its apartheid policies.
Said the report:
South Africa was seen by the foreign
media as a potential Vietnam, a new
Lebanon, another hot spot in the world
about to go up in flames... The govern-
ment's credibility was described as very
low... The continuation of the (secret)
riots and the spread of the riots to other
cities and to rural areas over a period of
months had a devastating effect on South
Africa's image as a politically stable
country... In the United States, it was a
very bad year for the country.
The South African newspaper, The
Citizen, which was secretly owned by the
Department of Information, also ex-
pressed to a degree the view of the world
held by the Nationalist Party:
Moscow obviously does not want to
colonize Southern Africa, but it does
want to impose some form of Marxist
control over the region in an essential
part of its worldwide struggle for com-
munist imperialism...
Theoretically, the U.S. onslaught on
South Africa is conducted in the name of
human rights. The more cynical however,
believe that the U.S. faced with a rising
resources crisis, wants to replace white
democracies with black dictatorships so
as to have no option but to do the west's
bidding.
In fact, some South African officials
tried to sell the South African people on
the concept of "total onslaught"-a
modern day version of the laagar, the en-
circling of Afrikaaner wagon trains in
order to defend themselves from tribal
attacks during their long treks northward
away from their repressive British rulers.
"The concept of total onslaught" says
Rhoodie, "was understood by cer-
tain politicians, notably by Mr. P.W.
Botha [the current Prime Minister of
South Africa] and General Magnus
Malan who was then the Chief of the
Armed Forces and [who] later became
Minister of Defense." "This concept,"
says Rhoodie, "included the belief that
there was an onslaught on the political,
economic, and sporting field on South
Africa and [that] this was worldwide and
continuing... That is why they talk
about total onslaught. The philosophy
was that in order to counter such a total
onslaught you needed a total reaction
and in order to get a total reaction, all of
the potential strong points of South
Africa-all of its defensive mechanisms,
whether it's political, economic, cultural,
social, sporting-should be coordinated
against this total onslaught and in order
to do so you are required to [have] a
government that is closer to a benevolent
dictatorship than anything else."
The National Reporter
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It was against such a background that
Eschel Rhoodie became South Africa's
Secretary of Information.
When Rhoodie became Secretary of
Information, the Department was only a
propaganda ministry--and not a very
good one at that. Its major activity was
producing cultural and tourist films, the
most memorable being "The Rock Art
of the Bushmen."
But Eschel Rhoodie was a more am-
bitious, energetic man than his
predecessors as Secretary of Informa-
tion. He took very seriously the task
given to him by John Vorster: to be the
Prime Minister's chief engineer in a war
against the "worldwide psychological
and propaganda" campaign being wag-
ed against South Africa by the rest of the
world.
Under Rhoodie, the Department of
Information became more than a pro-
paganda ministry. It also became a
diplomatic service (engaging in secret
diplomacy with Israel and Black African
states) and an intelligence agency. The
Department also secretly owned
publishing houses, film companies, news
photo agencies, newspapers, '"arid
magazines around the world. Had it not
been for the Department of Information
scandal, Rhoodie and the Department
might well have controlled one of the
three or four largest publishing houses in
the world.
Rhoodie also directed a covert pro-
gram to secretly subsidize politicians in
Africa and the rest of the world who were
favorable to South Africa. At its height,
the program would resemble that of the
CIA. In fact, the South African govern-
ment intervention in the U.S. electoral
process by secretly funnelling funds into
two Senate campaigns appears, on the
surface at least, to be not much different
than U.S. attempts. in the 1970's to
undermine the democratically elected
government of Chile.
One such recipient of secret Depart-
ment of Information funds was James
Menachem, who served as President of
the Seychelles until June 1977, when he
was deposed in a bloodless coup by
Marxist Albert Rene. According to
Rhoodie, Menanchem was paid $23;000
a year by the South African government
in exchange for maintaining normal
trade relations with South Africa, gran-
ting South African airlines landing rights
on the islands, and providing intelligence
information to the South Africans on the
inner workings of the organization of
African Unity (OAU), of which Menan-
chem as Prime Minister of the Seychelles
was a member. The South African
22 Winter 1985
Eschel Rhoodie took
very seriously the task
given him by Prime
Minister Vorster: to be
the chief engineer in a
war against the
worldwide
psychological and pro-
paganda campaign
being waged against
South Africa by the
rest of the world.
government also provided Menanchem's
political party with a full-color high
speed printing press, according to
Rhoodie, to help him get elected as Prime
Minister of the Seychelles in the first
place.
Another African recipient of secret
Department of Information funds was J.
Resampe, one-time candidate for Prime
Minister of Madasgascar.
But it was on Zimbabwe, at the time
known as Rhodesia, that the South
African government focused its most
ambitious plans to intervene in the inter-
nal affairs of another African state. And,
according to Rhoodie, a U.S. corpora-
tion-Allegheny Ludlum In-
dustries-played a key role in the bribery
and influence-buying scheme in that
country.
In 1977, Andy Andrews, Vice Presi-
dent of Allegheny Ludlum Industries ap-
proached Connie Mulder with a proposi-
tion to secretly subsidize the careers of
two black "moderate" politicians:
Bishop Abel Muzorewa and James
Chirerema. Andrews and Allegheny
Ludlum wanted to support the two black
leaders because top corporate officers
believed them to be the least likely to ban
the export of Rhodesia's chrome. At
the time, Allegheny Ludlum imported
most of its chrome from Rhodesia. .
Andrews told South African officials
The National Reporter
that if the Department of information
would secretly provide $1 million to
Muzorewa and Chirerema, Allegheny
Ludlum would invest $4 million in South
African industries of the South African
government's choosing.
The South Africans did indeed pass
the money along to Chireremh and
Muzorewa, through the the Swiss bank
account of Chris Schofield. Allegheny
Ludlum's representative in Rhodesia.
(Schofield would on a later occasion be
of use to Rhoodie. It was through
Schofreld's Swiss bank account that the
Department of Information would fun-
nel $50,000 to Ret. Lieutenant General
Dan Graham's Miami-based Institute of
Policy Studies.)
In Norway, the Department of Infor-
mation provided secret. funding to
Andaro Lance, a right-wing Norwegian
politician and businessman, to enable
him to launch a new political party in that
country7-which, of course, would have a
favorable disposition towards South
Africa. Much to the surprise of the South
Africans, the new political party won
four seats in the Norwegian parliament.
That would lead Owen Horwood, South
Africa's Finance Minister to joke, accor-
ding to Rhoodie, that if they pumped
enough funds into Lange's political par-
ty, it would become Norway's majority
party, and someday rule the country.
It was in the United States, however,
that the South Africans launched their
most ambitious attempt to influence the
internal affairs of a foreign power, par-
titularly with the funnelling of $430,000
into the Senate campaigns of S.I.
Hayakawa and Rodger Jepsen.
Rhoodie's Department of Informa-
tion also acted as an intelligence agency
in another fashion. It recruited in-
dividuals who later served as intelligence
agents for South Africa. Among those
recruited were two members,of Great
Britain's Parliament. Rhoodie says they
were not paid, "large amounts, I think,
by American standards. The one got
3,000 pounds per year and the [other] one
got 5,000 pounds."
ne of the more interesting
aspects of South Africa
influence-buying program was
the Department of Information's
secret subsidization--sometimes in part
and sometimes in full, of academic
organizations around the world. A
number of those organizations were bas-
ed in the United States, or carried out
operations in the United States.
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Rhoodie later explained his govern-
ment's involvement in such programs:
Connie Mulder was strong on [a] state of
affairs... in which the opinion formers and
decision makers abroad often did not
understand [South Africa]. He realized
that attempts at rationalizing South
Africa's policy in terms of outdated in-
tellectual concepts were generating more
heat among foreign observers when what
was required was not more heat but more
light. Mulder also grasped the fact that the
"eggheads," the academics, wielded as
much influence behind the scenes in
Washington, London, Paris and other
capitols of the western world as
businessmen, the generals of the army, and
the politicians. Over a period of three
presidencies, it was men from the univer-
sities, Sorenson, Rostow, Kissinger,
Brzezinski, and MacNamara who wielded
the most influence. It was studies on South
Africa by experts at various universities
which found their way to Congressional
desks and into the State Department.
One academic organization entirely
subsidized by the South African govern-
ment was the Institute for the Study of
Plural Societies at the University of
Pretoria in South Africa.
From October 23 to 25, 1978, the In-
stitute held a "Conference on Intergroup
Accomodation in Southern Africa" held
in New York City. Among the prominent
American academics who attended the
conference-apparently unaware that it
was being secretly subsidized by the
South African government- were Pro-
fessor Seymour Lipset, Professor of
Political Science at the Hoover Institute
at Standford University, Ralph Barbanti,
a prominent political scientist at Duke
University; Dr. Ray Cline, a former
senior CIA official currently with the
Center for Strategic Studies at
Georgetown University; Dr. William
Schneider of the Hudson Institutes; and
Dr. Richard Segat of the Carnegie En-
dowment.
Another academic organization
secretly subsidized by the South African
government-as confirmed by Rhoodie
and another South African official-was
the London-based Foreign Affairs
Research Institute (FARI).
One of the main activities of FARI was
coordinating attacks among conser-
vatives against the World Council of
Churches-which South Africa con-
sidered to be one of its most effective
adversaries on the international political
scene. Geoffrey Stewart Smith, head of
FARI, published a book in 1979 entitled
"The Fraudulent Gospel," which attack-
ed the World Council of Churches.
Unknown to the public was the fact that
publication of the book was secretly sub-
sidized by the South African govern-
ment.
In June 1978, FARI co-sponsored a
conference in Brighton, England with the
CIA-connected Institute for the Study of
Conflict. Among those who attended
was Richard Mellon Scaife, a conser-
vative Pittsburgh businessman who has
contributed more than $100 million to
conservative political causes in recent
years. Also attending the conference was
William Casey, who would later be ap-
bassadot to the Organization of
American States (and mentioned
previously in this story, as a member of
the Board of Directors of the Panax Cor-
poration, during the time it received
$11.3 million in laundered South African
funds to buy the Washington Star,
Sacramento Union, and other American
newspapers).
The third Reagan advisor to attend the
1981 FARI conference was Ret. Lt.
General Dan Graham, formerly the head
of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Graham has had other longstanding con-
nections to Rhoodie's department.
pointed Director of the CIA by President
Reagan.
From July 30 to August 2, 1981, the
South African-subsidized FARI held a
second major conference in Kent,
England. According to an internal FARI
memorandum, written by Geoffrey
Stewart Smith, conference participants
from 26 countries met:
To consider the need of the entire non-
commmunist world to respond to the
Soviet global political and military
threat... the [conference] certainly
played a useful part in starting to try and
formulate a global security alliance ade-
quate to withstand the power of the
largest military war machine the world
has ever seen.
President Reagan-apparently
unaware that FARI was secretly subsidiz-
ed by South Africa-sent the conference
a "message of good will." Three Reagan
administration officials also attended the
conference; they included Richard Pipes,
then an aide on the National Security
Council and William Middendorf, then
and currently the administration's am-
Earlier he had taken an all-expense paid
trip to South Africa financed by the
South African Freedom Foundation, a
wholly subsidized front group for the
South African government. In 1978,
Graham spoke at and received an
honorarium for speaking at a conference
in Washington, D.C. sponsored by the
South African Foreign Affairs Associa-
tion, another South African front
organization.
More important, however, is the fact
that Graham himself was the recipient of
secret Department of Information funds.
In 1977, according to Rhoodie, the South
African Department of Information
passed along $40,000 to Pat Woop, an
official with the Americans Concerned
with South Africa, a pro-South African
lobbying group, who then passed along
the funds to Graham's Miami-based In-
stitute on Policy Studies to complete an
"independent" study showing the
strategic importance of South Africa.
Rhoodie personally handled the transfer
of funds to Woods, utilizing the Swiss
bank account of Chris Schofield,
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Cnilfh
i
A fr
GOLDEN ARMOR
BY ROBERT SHEPHF,RD In a 1980 Ford Foundation study en-
titled "The Potential Impact of Interna-
tional Trade and Investment Sanctions
ince the achievement of black ma- on the South African Economy,"
jority rule in Zimbabwe, the Richard Porter pointed out that the
Republic of South Africa has stood South African economy's center of
alone: the last bastion of white vulnerability lies in its ability to import,
minority rule on the African continent. '' not in capital flows. As long as the coun-
The country's segregationist racial try can continue to pay for required im-
policies, based on the doctrine of spar- ports, it will remain immune to outside
theid continue in full force despite pressure. And South Africa possesses the
cosmetic changes by the Pretoria govern- one commodity that-next to oil-all in-
ment and well-publicized attempts by dustrialized nations desire: gold.
outside pressure groups to influence the
internal policies of the South African
regime. Resolutions have been passed by he Republic of South Africa is the
the United Nations and individual largest gold producing nation in the
governments calling for a trade embargo world. It is, in fact, the world's on-
against South Africa. Cultural and sports ly gold-based economy. Johan-
links have been severed in the last decade nesburg, the industrial and financial
between the majority of the world's na- center of the country, sits amidst the
tions and South Africa. And concerned Wiwatersrand, the richest gold ore pro-
groups in the United States have ducing area the world has known. South
pressured American corporations to Africa's transportation, communication
withdraw capital invested in South and industrial sectors have grown up
Africa by calling on individuals and in- around the `Rand' in the 20th century.
stitutions to divest themselves of stock in Half the world's annual production of
the approximately 330 corporations do- gold comes from South African mines,
mg business in South Africa. over 70 percent if you exclude Soviet
South Africa remains unchanged. The sources. In 1982, the 21,355,111 troy
real effect of the various attempts to cen- ouncesl mined brought South Africa in
sure South Africa and impose an $8.1 billion in revenues. In contrast, the
economic "embargo" has been nominal second leading producer, the Soviet
at best. In 1982, the total book value of Union, was estimated to have mined 8
American investment in South Africa fell million troy ounces, or just over one-
from $2.6 billion to $2.5 billion-and third south Africa's total.
even this small drop was due to the con- The sale of gold overseas has helped
tinued world recession, not divestment. Pretoria withstand the global recession
Winter 1985 The National Reporter
of recent years, while many other nations
were battered by severe economic pro-
blems. Although, according to the U.S.
Department of Commerce, South Africa
registered its first negative growth rate
from late 1981 through 1983 of between 1
percent and 3 percent, this was primarily
due to a long regional drought which cut
the annual grain harvest by 66 percent,
from 9.9 million to 3.3 million metric
tons. South Africa, normally a grain ex-
porter to the rest of southern Africa, was
forced to import 2 million metric tons of
corn in 1982.
South Africa's manufacturing sector,
which historically has received state pro-
tection from foreign competition, has
had its share of problems, with produc-
tion decreasing between 1981 and 1983.
Because the apartheid laws limit non-
whites' access to job training and educa-
tion opportunities, most industries suffer
from a shortage of skilled labor. Advanc-
ed technology and heavy machinery must
still be imported, draining foreign ex-
change. And since South African
manufactured goods cannot compete in
the world market against better produced
and cheaper foreign goods, large deficits
usually pi le up in South Africa's trade
balance.
The foreign exchange earned by gold
sales is thus critical to the continued sur-
vival of the South African regime, enabl-
ing it to resist attempts from abroad to
limit South African access to the interna-
tional economy. Possessing a commodity
all nations desire, South Africa has been
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able to purchase the technology,
machinery, raw materials, energy sup-
plies and luxury goods needed to defend
the apartheid system and maintain the
whites' high standard of living despite a
disorganized and highly inefficient
economy.
In fact, an economic recession has
been averted in recent years solely
because of export earnings from the gold
industry. In 1982, the South African
economy recorded a trade balance
surplus of R 704 million, followed by a
surplus of approximately R 4 billion in
1983.2 In both years gold accounted for
roughly 50 percent of total exports.
Without gold, the country would have
been in much the same position as most
of the rest of the non-industrial nations:
forced to borrow to pay its bills. For
South Africa is not an industrial state but
a commodity economy, dependent on
agricultural productivity and mineral
production. Unlike other commodity
economies, however, South Africa's
dominant commodity is a valuable
mineral, on which the country holds a
near monopoly.
Gold in South Africa is very big
business. Because of the nature
of gold-bearing ore found in the
Wiwatersrand region, large sums
of capital have been required to develop
and maintain a mine. Gold is found in
layers of quartzite formations, rather
than in the nuggets, veins or alluvial
deposits discovered in California and
Australia during the great gold rushes of
the mid-19th century. This has prevented
the development of Hollywood's
familiar image of gold mining: the
solitary gold miner panning for nuggets
of gold. In Wiwatersrand, tons of ore
must be mined and crushed in order to
produce the smallest amount of gold. In
1982, it took 267.7 million tons of ore to
produce 21.3 million ounces of gold, a
yield of only .32 ounces per ton.
Since gold was first discovered in 1886,
the industry has been organized around a
few large conglomerates. The gold in-
dustry today is controlled by six mining
firing through interlocking directorships,
joint ownerships and a monopoly on the
supply of technological and ad-
ministrative expertise and capital.
The largest company, the Anglo-
American Corporation, is also the big-
gest corporation in South Africa, earning
a net profit of $534.9 million in 1983.
Three of its subsidiaries also rank in the
top twenty-five of South African com-
panies: Anglo-American Gold Invest-
ment Corporation is ninth, Anglo-
American Industrial Corporation ranks
eleventh, and Western Deep Level Mines
is twenty-first. Between them, the three
earned a net profit of $447 million in
1983.
Anglo-American, involved in two-
thirds of total gold production, has direct
control of. 40 percent of South Africa's
annual gold output. Its closet rivals are
Gold Fields of South Africa, the only
firm with a major shareholder outside
the Republic (Consolidated Gold Fields,
of London) and GENCOR, an
amalgamation of the Federale Mynbou
Beperk Investment Company, the Gold
Mining and Finance Corporation and the
Union Corporation. Together, these
three companies control the output of 29
of South Africa's 37 major gold mines.
The remainder are controlled by three
"smaller" mining corporations-Barlow
Rand, Anglovaal and Johannesburg
Consolidated-which are the fifth, nine-
teenth and twentieth largest companies in
South Africa, respectively.
All the gold mining companies work in
Seductive ads
such as these peddle
South African gold to
Americans without mentioning
that the advertiser, International Gold
close cooperation with each other, both
in management and marketing. For ex-
ample, Anglo-American owns 27 percent
of Consolidated Gold Fields, which in
turn controls 48 percent of Gold Fields of
South Africa, Anglo's main rival.
Interlocking directorships are
numerous. J. Olgilvie Thompson, the
deputy chairman of Anglo, is a Director
of Consolidated, as well as Chairman of
Anglo Gold Investment. D.A. Etheredge
is a director of Anglo, Gold Fields of
South Africa and East Driefontein Con-
solidated. Etheredge is also President of
the President Steyn and President Brand
Mining Companies. Robin A Plum-
bridge, chairman of East Driefontein, is
a director of Consolidated Gold Fields
and the Newmont Mining Company.
Newmont, a U.S.-based gold-mining
company with business ties in the South
African industry, owns Palabora Mining
Company in South Africa.
In 1899, the mining companies created
the Chamber of Mines in an attempt to
apply uniform pay rates for native
African workers. The Chamber then
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Winter 1985 The National Reporter
created the Wiwatersrand Native Labor
Association, a recruiting -organization
charged with providing enough African
labor for the mines to prevent "costly"
competition for scarce local labor. To-
day, the Chamber of Mines represents,
besides the gold industry, over 100
uranium, copper, diamond and platinum
mining companies. Although it now lob-
bies on behalf of all the Republic's
mineral interests, the Chamber still takes
a special interest-and plays a powerful
role-in the gold industry.
The Chambers' Gold Producers Com-
mittee, composed of one member from
each of the six mining firms, oversees the
marketing of gold bullion and coins in
close cooperation with the South African
Government. From the mines, gold ore is
sent to the Rand Refinery, Ltd., in Ger-
misten. There it is refined, assayed and
purchased by the Reserve Bank of South
Africa. The Reserve Bank sells the gold
on the international bullion market, ex-
cept for approximately 100 tons each
year, which are supplied to the South
African mint for the striking of Kruger-
rands.
The Chamber of Mines created the
Krugerrand in the mid-1960s as part of
an effort to increase gold sales in the
world market. By a special amendment
to the Mint and Coinage Act, Pretoria
agreed to give the coin, one ounce of fine
gold, legal tender status. In 1971, the
Chamber formed the International Gold
Corporation "to stimulate the use of
gold in industry and especially in
jewelry." Intergold Corporation became
the world marketing outlet for Kruger-
rands in 1973.
Since then, Intergold has spent over
$200 million advertising the pleasures of
gold ownership in the industrialized na-
tions of Europe and North America. In-
tergold's marketing techniques, in-
cluding ads in trendy magazines, have
been quite successful: the Krugerrand is
far and away the best selling gold coin in
the world. By 1980, 33 million fine
ounces of gold, worth over $13 billion at
today's gold price, had been sold.
The impact of the gold industry on the
South African economy is difficylt to
gauge, it is so enormous. Gold is literally
the lifeblood of the country with 21 per-
cent of state revenues coming from the
industry. Hundreds of thousands of jobs
are connected to the gold mines, in
transportation, heavy industry and the
service industry.
Goldls On* rise Ile blood of South Afro,
provJOW black black ndnas are pwamt of srva* S Yet
underp
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The gold mines directly employ
487,000 workers-90 percent of whom
are black migrants on fixed contracts.
These migrants are forced to live in labor
compounds away from their families in
the "homeland" areas or urban shan-
tytowns. White mineworkers earned an
average of $932 per month in 1980 while
blacks received $168, or around 20 per-
cent of white wages. The gap has fallen
since 1973, when black wages averaged
only $23.50 a month, less then 5 percent
of the average $451 per month white
wage.
Both black and white wages have in-
creased since then largely because of the
astronomical rise in the world gold price:
from $42 an ounce in 1973 it rose to a
peak of $800 per ounce in 1979 and settl-
ed at its present level of $375 to $400 an
ounce. Because of this huge increase in
revenues, the mining companies raised
wages at little cost to themselves.
Higher black wages have also been
necessary in order to attract South
African blacks into the mines. Before the
1970s, it was difficult for labor recruiters
to hire blacks from the Republic because
of the low wages and poor working con-
ditions. Instead, the majority of the
migrant workers came from Zimbabwe,
Mozambique and Malawi, where alter-
native labor opportunities were scarce.
But since the withdrawal of the Por-
tuguese from Angola and Mozambique
in 1975 and the subsequent increase in
support of guerrilla activity aimed at
South Africa, labor recruiters have turn-
ed to more politically "stable areas." To-
'day, 88 percent of the black mineworkers
come from South Africa, Lesotho,
Swaziland and Botswana, with the other
12 percent from Mozambique, Malawi
and Zimbabwe.
How has gold retained its
economic power? From the end
of World War II until the late
1960's the monetary role of gold
was generally assumed to be at an end.
The dominant economic power, the
United States, in concert with the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and World
Bank, both post-war creations of the
American reconstruction effort, main-
tained a fixed price of $35 per ounce of
gold. President Franklin Roosevelt had
arbitrarily set the price of gold at this level
in 1935, after gradually raising it from
$20.47 per ounce in hopes of stimulating
economic recovery.
The United States maintained the fix-
ed price through a simple measure: any
government or central bank that wished
The demise of the gold
standard was an enor-
mous boon to the
South African economy.
The price of gold
began to rise, which
naturally benefited its
principal producer.
to purchase gold could do so from the
U.S. Treasury. But this strategy could
work only so long as global confidence in
the American dollar remained intact.
If the dollar was considered "as good
as gold," banks and governments prefer-
red to use it as an international currency,
since it was much easier to transport,
store and exchange than bullion. But by
the late 1960s, the United States was
amassing huge deficits as the government
tried to both fight the Vietnam War and
expand social programs at home. As
confidence in the dollar's stability fell,
purchase of Treasury gold increased, led
by France.
In an attempt to halt the run on
Treasury gold, a two-tiered gold price
was established in 1967: the "official"
price of $35 per ounce and a "free-
market" price, allowed to float on the
open market. Finally, in 1973 President
Nixon took the United States off the gold
standard, devaluing the dollar and allow-
ing the gold price to float on the open
market, much like any other commodity.
The U.S. Treasury no longer sold gold on
demand and in 1974-1975, U.S. restrict
dons on the private ownership of gold
were lifted.
The demise of the gold standard was
an enormous boon to the South African
economy. With the world recession caus-
ed by the oil crisis of 1973, the price of
gold began to rise, which naturally
benefited its principal producer. The
value of annual South African gold out-
put increased from 775 million Rand in
1967, to 2.56 billion Rand in 1974, to
over 10 billion Rand in 1982. The actual
production of gold did not rise ap-
preciably; in fact, in some years it fell
below pre-1967 levels. But the huge in-
crease in price added millions of ounces
of gold to South Africa's demonstrated
reserves, gold that previously had been
unrecoverable due to high costs.
Besides its historic role as a long-term
store of value, gold today has a number
of strategic applications. Gold plays a
small but highly critical part in electronic
devices and computers. Because it never
rusts, corrodes or decays, gold is a vital
component of military electronic equip-
ment and turbine engines, insuring
dependable operations under all condi-
tions.
In the last decade, in part because of
the Chamber of Mines' International
Gold Corporation's publicity campaign,
gold has shed its traditional, non-
speculative role and become an invest-
ment tool for individuals and commer-
cial institutions, much like stocks and
bonds.
Gold has regained its place in the inter-
national monetary system because of the
inability of the United States, the IMF
and the World Bank to convince the rest
of the world to accept either the
American dollar or the IMF's Special
Drawing Right as a replacement for gold.
The Special Drawing Right is a quasi-
currency, its value based on a market-
basket of industrial nations' currencies
and made available to members of the
Fund as loans.
As of 1983, proven and probable
world gold resources, according to the
U.S. Bureau of Mines, total 2.4 billion
troy ounces. South Africa possesses 1.28
billion, over 50 percent of the total. The
Soviet Union controls 450 million troy
ounces, 18.4 percent of resources. With
the two leading producers controlling
two-thirds of the world's gold and enor-
mous initial capital outlays required to
develop a productive gold mine, it will be
extremely difficult to shift to alternative
sources other than South Africa and the
USSR.
For the West, support of the South
African government is an economic
necessity, insuring the uninterrupted sup-
ply of key minerals, particularly gold.
Gold export earnings will continue to
enable Pretoria to ignore economic and
political sanctions aimed at the reform of
the South African economic and social
system. ^
1The troy ounce is equal to 31.1 grams,
or 1.097 avoirdupois ounces.
2At Present, the South African unit of
currency, the Rand, is worth U.S.
$0.7825, or 1 U.S. dollar equals 1.27
Rand.
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CHANGING
COURSE
IN
CENTRAL
AMERICA
A commentary on U.S. policy in the region
by josh Cohen.
28 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
E azlier this' year; PACCA-Policy
Alternatives for the Caribbean and
Central America- published a
report entitled "Changing Course:
Blueprint for Peace in Central America
and the Caribbean." There are two
broad concerns that frame the
background of "Changing Course."
First, like many other
Americans-both North Americans and
Central Americans-we are firmly op-
posed to current U.S. policy in Central
America. We believe that that policy is
immoral and that it is moving on a trajec,
tory leading to further escalation and in-
vasion-a trajectory with increasingly
disastrous human consequences. In an
admittedly conservative accounting of
costs, one group of analysts recently
estimated that an invasion of Nicaragua,
together with continued economic and
military support for other countries in
the region, would cost $16 billion over
the 1984-1989 period, would result in
2,000-5,000 Americans killed,
9,000-19,000 wounded, and would re-
quire U.S. occupational forces of one-
and-one-half divisions to remain in
Nicaragua for at least 5 years. About
Nicaraguans, the analysis says only that
their casualities "are likely to be very
much higher."
Our second concern is that only one
obstacle stands in the way of a continua-
tion of U.S. policies and their escalation,
and that is American public opinion.
Two aspects of this merit attention. First,
the bad news. We are trying to engage in
and encourage others to engage in a
preventive action, to stop the escalation
before it goes any further. And we
recognize that there are considerable dif-
ficulties in mobilizing large numbers of
people under such circumstances. The
good news is that we are certainly far bet-
ter off in this respect than we were in the
early 1960s. In 1962, when 13,000
American troops were in Vietnam, there
was no anti-war movement of significant
size and power. Now, by contrast, there
is a movement, there is broad public
scepticism, and-whatever its shortcom-
ings-Congress is trying to exercise some
independent initiative in the area of
foreign policy.
The question that we face, then, is: can
we consolidate this concern, this scep-
ticism, this opposition, and effectively
redirect U.S. policy toward Centre
America before more damage is done? I
t}.a?k that the answer to this question is:
yes, but that doing so will require more
than just criticism of current policies. As
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in other policy areas, we need an alter-
native that states what we think is right,
and not just criticisms of what we know is
wrong. "Changing Course" presents
such an alternative. It offers an analysis
of the problems that beset Central
America, and makes specific policy
recommendations in the framework of a
set of basic principles that ought to guide
U.S. foreign policy everywhere.
First, then, let's consider the analysis.
There are, I believe, two basic ap-
proaches to understanding Central
America. Neither is correct in every
respect-they are too oversimplified to
be exactly right-but one is basically
right, and the other is basically wrong.
Each can be summarized straightfor-
wardly.
First, there is the approach underlying
Reagan administration policy. Its most
clear statement can be found in Am-
bassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick's 1979 arti-
-le in Commentary magazine, "Dictator-
ships and Double Standards"-the arti-
cle that won her the post of U.N. am-
bassador:
"Because the miseries of traditional
He are familiar, they are bearable to or-
dinary people who, growing up in the
society, learn to cope, . . " In view of this
willingness of those inside "traditional"
societies to tolerate unlimited pain, suf-
fering, and humiliation, it follows, as the
night follows the day, that conflict and
revolution must come from outside these
societies, from "external" forces.
Finally, what is required to handle
conflict is to eliminate the external threat,
thus restoring order. A model of restora-
tion is provided by El Salvador, 1932,
when 30,000 Salvadorean were killed,
and about which Ambassador
Kirkpatrick said: "To many
Salvadoreans the violence of this repres-
sion seems less important than that of the
fact of restored order and the thirteen
years of civil peace that ensued."
That's one view of the problem. PAC-
CA's view is very different. PACCA
agrees with Ambler Moss, U.S. am-
bassador to Panama in 1980, who said
that: "What we see in Central America
today would not be much different if
Castro and the Soviet Union did not ex-
ist." And with the Latin American
bishops who said at Medellin in 1968:
"Latin America faces a situation of in-
justice that can be called institutional
violence. We should not be surprised,
therefore, that the `temptation to
violence' is surfacing in Latin America.
One should not abuse the patience of the
people."
More specifically, PACCA's position
is that:
For most Central Americans, life is
miserable and unfair, or, as Thomas
Hobbes said, "nasty, mean, poor,
brutish, and short." According to a
United Nations study of 1981, nearly half
the population lives in "extreme
poverty." The distribution of income is
grossly unequal: the richest 5 percent of
the population take nearly one third of
national income. In Nicaragua before the
1979 revolution, the bottom 50 percent
of the population had an average per
capita income of $286 per year; one in
eight infants died before they were one
year old; and 80 percent of the rural
population lacked sufficient land
to produce their own means of sub-
sistence.
Like citizens of Poland, Chile, or the
United States, Central Americans will try
to change miserable and unfair condi-
tions. In short, PACCA rejects the cen-
tral premise of the Kirkpatrick posi-
tion-that people in "tradional societies
are willing to tolerate unlimited insults to
their human dignity."
While considerable economic growth
took place in Central America between
1950 and 1978-an average annual in-
crease in real GNP of 5.3 percent-this
growth did little to improve the miserable
and unfair conditions. The reason lies in
the basic model of growth: the produc-
tion of agricultural goods (bananas, cot-
ton, coffee, sugar, etc.) for export, and
not for internal consumption.
The political system and the military
are largely concerned to protect the
privileged beneficiaries of the agro-
export model. The result is that there are
no real avenues of reform open to the
people when, as in the early 1970s, they
do act to change their miserable and un-
fair conditions. Rather, reform efforts
typically lead to repression, and further
efforts lead to terror. This combination
of miserable and unfair conditions, a
model of growth that fails to ameliorate
these conditions, and a political order
closed to reform makes the countries
"ripe for revolution."
Finally, there is the role of the U.S.
Some U.S. interests are the beneficiaries
of these systems of exploitation. In any
case the American government has con-
sistently provided the ultimate
guarantees for regimes of institutional
violence through a variety of programs,
ranging from covert action, to direct
military intervention, to the steady provi-
sion of support and training for the
military-e.g. the 5700 members of
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Somoza's National Guard trained by the
U.S. between 1950 and 1980. Indeed, the
Rockefeller Report of 1969 stated that
U.S. support for Latin American police
and military forces "will bring the best
long-term hope for the improvement of
the quality of life of the people." Of
course, lip service has always been paid to
the importance of reform-from the
Alliance for Progress, to the Kissinger
Commission Report, to the speeches of
President Reagan. But the rhetoric of
reform has always disguised a reality of
repression.
have briefly summarized the PAC-
CA analysis. What does this
analysis suggest about what U.S.
policy in Central America should
be? First of all, PACCA holds that any
policies should embrace the following
general principles: (1) peaceful dispute
resolution; (2) self-determination and
non-intervention; (3) equitable develop-
ment; (4) support for human rights; (5)
encouragement of democratic values; (6)
consistency. with the genuine security in-
terests of the citizens of the United States.
But in stating these principles, we must
be careful to avoid excessive rhetoric.
The central issue is not the statement of
principles, but how they are interpreted
in light, of the analysis of Central
America, and how they are embodied in
policies. The Kissinger Commission
report, for example, agrees with all of
these principles. But its emphasis on
"security interests" ensures the continua-
tion of a policy of subordinating
equitable development and reform to
military support for existing regimes that
have shown no interest in reform. PAC-
CA's recommendations reflect its
analysis of the internal sources of conflict
and revolution. They emphasize
equitable development-the needs of
those at the bottom-and the legitimacy
of diverse, alternative paths of national
development.
To be more specific, our short term
recommendations are.
1. In El Salvador, the Kissinger Com-
mission recommends more military aid
and no power sharing. PACCA recom-
mends no military aid for the current
regime, and calls for power sharing.
2. In Nicaragua, the Kissinger Com-
mission calls for continued covert action,
continued support for the contras, and
continued credit pressures through
multilateral lending agencies. PACCA
calls for an end to covert action, an end
to support for the contras, and an end to
the credit blockade.
Can we effectively
redirect U.S. policy
toward Central
America? We need an
alternative that states
what we think is right,
and not just criticisms
of what we know is
wrong.
3. In Honduras, the Kissinger Com-
mission supports the U.S. military
buildup; PACCA opposes it.
4. In Guatemala, the Kissinger Com-
mission calls for military assistance;
PACCA says no military assistance.
Thus PACCA agrees with a senior
leader of the Salvadoran Christian
Democrats, who complained that the
Kissinger Commission "places too much
emphasis on the military aspect."
What about the longer term? Here I
will briefly review a few of the main
PACCA Proposals for U.S. assistance
for independent, national equitable
development:
1. Debt: PACCA calls for a program
of renegotiation of debt from shorter
term to longer term, and from high in-
terest loans to low interest loans, And, it
calls for a change in IMF policies on con-
ditionality, policies which now effectively
condition the availability of credit of
austerity programs for the poor.
2. Trade Here there are two broad
recommendations. First, that special
duty-free treatment be given to imports
from those countries in the region-for
example, Nicaragua-that are overcom-
ing gross inequality and promoting food
production, rather than just more agro-
exports. Second, that a program of price
stabilization be instituted for basic
agricultural exports, thus reducing
dependency on world market fluctua-
tions.
3. Aid. PACCA recommends that aid be
provided to governments that are respon-
sive-in their policies, not just in their
rhetoric-to the demands of the poor,
that encourage-in deed, and not just in
words-participation by the poor in
defining the terms of the development
process, and that encourage-in fact, not
just in theory-diversification of the
economic base.
hanging Course" provides an
outlook on Central America that
is broad and regional in scope,
.long term in perspective, and
reasonable and realistic in its recommen-
dations. Above all, PACCA's proposals
represent a positive vision and a real
choice for U.S. policy in the region. The
proposals are practical, and they are
principled. They reflect a sound
understanding, and a clear sense of
justice. Their heart is best captured in
remarks made by the Columbian
novelist-author of 100 Years of
Solitude-Gabriel Garcia Marquez. In
accepting his Nobel Prize for Literature,
Garcia Marquez returned to the theme of
Latin American solitude:
The immeasurable violence and pain
of our history are the result of age-"
equities and untold bitterness, and not a
conspiracy plotted 3,000 leagues from
our homes. But many European leaders
and thinkers have thought so, with the
childishness of old-timers who have
forgotten the fruitful excesses of their
youth as if it were impossible to find
another destiny than to live at the mercy
of the two great masters of the world.
This, my friends, is the very scale of our
solitude.
He continued by expressing his belief
in a utopia:
A new and sweeping utopia of life,
where no one will be able to decide for
others how they die, where love will pro-
ve true and happiness be possible, and
where the races condemned to one hun-
dred years of solitude will have, at lest
and forever, a second opportunity on
earth.
By moving forward on the basis of the
alternative course PACCA has propos-
ed, we can begin to overcome our own
one hundred years of solitude from the
people of Central America. ^
This commentary is drawn from
testimony which Josh Cohen, an
associate professor of philosophy and
political scienceat MI T, presented before
the Massachusetts State Democratic
Committee's Commission on Central
America.
30 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
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TUFTS UNIVERSITY:
STUDENTS
COUNTER SPIES
BY JOHN ROOSA
When the director of the CIA's
regional recruiting office
visited Tufts University in
Medford, Mass. the night of
October 3, he received a surprise.
Twenty-five students staged a non-
violent direct action. Stopping him from
speaking at what had been advertised as a
CIA "informational meeting." The pro-
testors formed a human wall between the
CIA recruiter, Stephen L. Conn, and the
students who had come to hear the
presentation. Conn told a Tufts
newspaper reporter that such sessions
had "occasionally" been met with pro-
tests on other campuses, but that this was
the first time that students actually
"prevented us from giving the presenta-
tion."
The Tufts administration reacted by
calling the protestors before a
disciplinary panel. The protestors in turn
defended their action, using the hearing
to publicize CIA crimes and denounce
Tufts' policy of allowing the Agency to
recruit on campus. In arguing before a
supportive audience of about 90 people
that their action was justified, the
students noted that under Tufts'
disciplinary guidelines persons are
punished only when their actions have
breached the "standards of the com-
munity," so that any decision would be a
political judgement on what those stan-
dards are. They argued further that the
administration, not the students, was
violating the "standards of the com-
munity" in allowing the CIA on campus.
Faced with this defense, the
disciplinary panel chose not to discipline
the students but at the same time stated
that the protestors had violated universi-
ty rules.
After the disciplinary process was
over, the protestors met with three deans
and confronted them with specific
university policies violated by the CIA's
campus recruitment activities. The
deans, deciding that some important
points had been raised and knowing that
the CIA was not planning to return to
Tufts until at least the following semester
anyhow, temporarily suspended CIA
recruitment of undergraduates until a
panel of deans could determine if univer-
sity policies were in fact being violated.
After the protestors issued a press
release on the deans' decision and the ac-
tions of October 3, the Associated Press,
National Public Radio and other na-
tional and local media picked up the
story. The Boston Herald, the local
Rupert Murdoch paper, was outraged
enough to run a lead editorial titled:
"Tufts Wimps Out with Its CIA Ban."
The next day Tufts president Jean
Mayer rescinded the temporary suspen-
sion. In a written statement, he denied
that CIA recruitment had ever been ban-
ned, explaining that "any policy on
recruitment must be a University policy,
not policy of an individual school." One
dean told protest leaders that Mayer had
been pressured to take the action after
receiving complaints from Tufts trustees.
Privately Mayer admitted, "It would be
difficult pragmatically and ideologically
for Tufts to ban agencies of the federal
government from its campus."
M ayer's decision is easily explain-
ed. Although a small school,
Tufts sends a large number of
students each year to the CIA.
A 1981 survey by Tufts' student
newspaper reported that twelve
undergraduates had been interviewed by
the Agency during the previous year,
four had received offers, and two had ac-
cepted jobs. Even more recruiting takes
place at the university's Fletcher School
of Law and Diplomacy, an institution
Mayer himself acknowledges to have a
"hawkish reputation." As America's
oldest graduate school of diplomacy,
Fletcher has been an important training
center for future Foreign Service officers.
The last three U.S. ambassadors to El
Salvador-Thomas Pickering, Deane
Hinton and Robert White-are Fletcher
alumni, as are five other current am-
bassadors, several high-level State
Department officials and over 250 other
officers. At the same time, Fletcher is
also an important training center for
potential CIA employees. The most re-
cent Fletcher alumni book lists nineteen
graduates who acknowledge currently
holding positions at the Agency. Pro-
bably an equal number of graduates have
left the CIA over the last decade while
others hold deep cover positions and can-
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not admit their true employer.
Documents obtained under the
Freedom of Information Act show that
there are high-level ties between Fletcher
and the CIA related to recruitment going
back to at least to 1972. In that year, ac-
cording to letters and memos, Fletcher
officials took great pains, in preparing
for the school's annual Washington
"placement trip" for graduating
students, to include the CIA on, the
group's itinerary. Recruiter Harry L.
Russell reported to Langley that Fletcher
Dean Edmond Gullion and Assistant
Dean Larry Griggs "are extremely happy
about having their students invited to the
Agency and are quite honored." Wan-
ting not to pass up such a good oppor-
tunity to cultivate two important univer-
sity administrators (as well as potential
student recruits), the Agency arranged an
unusual two-hour briefing by top-level
officials.
Over the next four years, Fletcher of-
ficials apparently developed ever closer
ties with the CIA-with the CIA
reciprocating by recruiting for Fletcher.
In late 1976 an undergraduate at one
New England college, recruited by the
CIA for its summer intern program, was
encouraged by his Agency contact,
recruiter Charles R. Pecinovsky, to con-
sider attending Fletcher. Pecinovsky then
arranged for Fletcher's Larry Griggs,
whom he described in a letter as a "work-
ing acquaintance," to send the student
admissions material. At the same time,
Griggs and other Tufts personnel were
receiving free research materials from the
Agency. As the Tufts newspaper noted in
reporting these gifts, "the CIA has been
known to provide nonpublic information
to academics for use in their work, in-
creasing their prestige and promotion
prospects, and sometimes their sense of
obligation to the Agency."
It is easy to see why CIA recruiters
would seek ties to Fletcher and encourage
students to go there. Fletcher's faculty in-
cludes a handful of present and former
government officials, some of whom
have held posts requiring high security
clearances. Material from their courses
would be useful in intelligence work,
while their backgrounds could help them
spot students with potential talent for
such work. Such professors include:
pointment at Fletcher. The Flet-
cher catalog reports that he is also
"a consultant to various U.S.
government agencies concerned
with national security affairs" and
that his professional interests in-
clude "U.S. foreign and national
security policy, contemporary
military strategy, intelligence and
national security, unconventional
war and power projection in the
Third World, and propaganda and
political warfare." The CIA's pro-
jection of power into the Third
World formed the basis of the
students' criminal charges against
the Agency. His most recent book,
written with Godson, is Dezinfor-
matsia: Active Measures in Soviet
Strategy, and his contribution to
the national security section of the
Heritage Foundation's blueprint
for the second Reagan term is cur-
rently receiving much press atten-
tion. At this time, Shultz is con-
ducting a Fletcher seminar on in-
telligence methods.
? John Roche came to Fletcher from
Brandeis in 1973. Before that he
had served as a special consultant
to Lyndon Johnson-in part, he
says, "dealing with disinformation
with the great North Vietnamese
'peace offensive"'-and as a
member of Richard Nixon's com-
mission, headed by Milton
Eisenhower to oversee the removal
of Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty from CIA control. During
his first four years at Fletcher, he
served on the Board for Interna-
tional Broadcasting, overseeing
Radio Free Europe and Radio
Liberty operations.
? Leonard Unger, who came to Flet-
cher after retiring from the
Foreign Service, had been deeply
involved in U.S. war planning for
Indochina-as Ambassador to
Laos (1962-64), as chairman of the
State Department's Vietnam coor-
dinating committee (1965-67) and
as Ambassador to Thailand
(1967-73). In Thailand, he is
known to have supervised the
counterinsurgency operations.
? Hewson Ryan was deputy director
at the United States Information
Agency during the Johnson Ad-
ministration, and later, under Nix-
on, became U.S. Ambassador to
Honduras, where he played a
relatively positive role supporting
military reform, according to
knowledgeable sources in
? William Griffith, who also teaches
at M.I.T., was the main CIA
liaison at Radio Free Europe until
1958, when he left to join M.I.T.'s
Center for International Studies,
then sponsored and partially fund-
ed by the CIA. Griffith's Interna-
tional Communism project and his
M.I.T. salary were paid by the
CIA until the mid-1960's. He con-
tinued to be a consultant for the
Agency thereafter. At Fletcher, he
teaches courses on radical and
communist theories and practice.
? Richard Shultz was a research
associate with two CIA-linked
think tanks, the National Strategy
Information Center and Roy God-
son's Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence, before his recent ap-
'That's a good question which demands some real evasion.'
32 Winter 1985 The National Reporter
Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000200790001-9
 Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000200790001-9
n,a R.cnatmant r.~~
.Int
tot
-73" .stt~~t l by
Tegucigalpa. Since leaving the
Foreign Service and coming to
Fletcher in 1977, he has headed the
Murrow Center for Public
Diplomacy and taught courses on
propaganda and on Central
America. At the Murrow Center,
he replaced Philip Horton, a
former CIA Officer and the long-
time editor of the now-defunct
CIA-funded magazine, The
Reporter.
? Theodore Eliot joined Fletcher as
dean in 1979 after retiring from
the Foreign Service, and has since
been appointed Professor of
Diplomacy. Though Eliot had
never published, Tufts officials are
said to have been more interested
in the clout Eliot had accumulated
over his long career, especially as
inspector general of the Foreign
Service from 1978 to 1979. He
replaced Edmond Gullion, who
had also enjoyed a long Foreign
.
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Service career (including a 1961
stint as Ambassador to the
Congo). Gullion had been serving
with Roche on the Eisenhower
Commission at the time of the
1973 Fletcher placement trip to the
CIA.
Another faculty group at Fletcher
consists of those who specialize
in strategic studies and who,
though they have not necessarily
served in government, are nonetheless
well-known in government circles. They
are affiliated with Fletcher's Program in
International Security Studies and with a
think tank associated with the school, the
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis.
Their courses, too, would be useful to
students wanting to enter the intelligence
community. Uri Ra'anen heads the Flet-
cher program, and Robert Pfaltzgraff
heads the Institute. The two, who have
collaborated on several books, served on
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