COVERT ACTION INFORMATION BULLETIN: SPECIAL REPORT: SEYCHELLES INVASION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100180006-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: March 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Number 16
March 1982
$2.50
Special Report: SEYCHELLES INVASION
is
INFORMATION BULLETIN
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Editorial
The morality of U.S. foreign policy continues to
plummet. The Reagan administration snuggles up to the
most vicious and repressive regimes in the world. The
brutal junta in El Salvador is in its death throes while the
U.S. stuffs millions into its coffers. With bloody hands, the
government has the effrontery to assert that "progress" is
being made in the field of human rights there. And it
embraces other such regimes, like the racist South African.
Secrecy and Deceit
The political climate can be summed up briefly: secrecy
and deceit both at home and abroad. President Reagan has
issued his Executive Order on United States Intelligence
Activities which, among other evils, unleashes the CIA
within the United States, subjecting people here to the
same surveillance, infiltration, manipulation, and dirty
tricks which have plagued the rest of the world especially
the TAird World for the last 35 years.
In response to objections suggesting that the CIA is far
better trained to break the law than to uphold it, Director
Casey has demanded immunity from prosecution for his
minions. CIA officials brazenly called for the authority to
"maintain our capabilities to do the kinds of things we do
abroad." One Justice Department official called the pro-
posal "harebrained;" we would suggest that "hair-raising"
is more apt.
Along with an upsurge in covert operations, the trend
toward greater secrecy continues. The President issued a
seconJ Executive Order, on classification of documents,
which completely reverses a 25-year trend toward greater
openr.ess in government. The public's right to know has
been sacrificed in the name of national security.
Domestically, decades of social programs are meeting
their deaths at the same altar; every budget is slashed but
that of defense. The administration replaces every helicop-
ter blown up in El Salvador with money taken from the
pockets of the poor.
The Intelligence Identities Protection Act
A word is in order about the so-called "Names of Agents
Act." To our surprise, the bill was not approved by the
Senate in the last session, and has not yet come up in 1982.
Because it is certain to pass in some form soon we have
adhered to our announcement last issue to suspend the
Naming Names column for the time being.
The bulk of this issue is devoted to the themes of mercen-
arism and state repression, both of which are exemplified
by South Africa. Not content to suppress savagely the
aspirations of the vast majority of its own people, it sends
armies into Angola and terrorists into Mozambique, and
connives to invade the Seychelles with a ragtag band of
veteran mercenaries, the dogs of war.
The Reagan administration's open admiration for the
South African regime is matched only by its warmth for
any Latin American dictator with just enough brains to be
able to say "anti-communist." In this issue we look at
institutionalized torture by Argentina and by El Salvador,
the latter with direct U.S. guidance and participation. And
we examine the rabid desire of the administration to
?able of Contents
Editorial
2
Constantine Menges
22
Seychelles Invasion
4
Deceit and Secrecy
24
Warr in Angola
11
CIA Media Operations
32
Mozambique Rebels
13
Klan Koup Attempt Part II
44
Argentina's Death Squads
14
Nugan Hand, The CIA Bank 51
Green Beret Torture
17
Where Are They Now?
56
WhAe Paper II
19
Sources and Methods
60
Cove,tA(tion Information Bulletin Number 16, March 1982, published by Covert Action Publications, Inc., a District of Columbia Nonprofit
Corporation, P.O. Box 50272, Washington, DC 20004. Telephone: [phone]. All rights reserved; copyright ? 1982 by Covert Action Publications,
Inc. Typography by Art for People, Washington, DC; printing by Faculty Press, Brooklyn, NY. Washington Staff: Ellen Ray, William Schaap, Louis
Wolf. Board of Advisors: Philip Agee, Ken Lawrence, Elsie Wilcott, Jim Wilcott. The CovertAction In/ii)rmation Bulletin is available at many bookstores
around the world. Inquiries from distributors and subscription services welcomed. Library subscriptions encouraged. Indexed in the Alternative Press
Index. ISSN 0275-309X.
2 CovertAction Number 16 (March 1982)
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destabilize Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada. Secretary
Haig's "continental approach" could spell disaster for the
people of this hemisphere. Indeed, CA/B has learned that
the CIA has been given a specific order to topple the
Sandinista government of Nicaragua in less than two years.
PAIRIA
LINESMORIR
As we went to press, a report in the February 14
Washington Post confirmed many of the observations
which appear in this issue. "Informed sources" have
disclosed a CIA proposal for "a secret $19 million plan to
build a broad political opposition to the Sandinista rule in
Nicaragua, and to create 'action teams' for paramilitary,
political operations and intelligence gathering in Nicaragua
and elsewhere."
The report also noted that Argentina may be training up
to 1,000 men for these activities. Sources also confirmed
that the U.S. is supporting and advising the anti-Sandinista
forces in Honduras.
We also are pleased to publish an in-depth analysis of
psychological warfare on CIA media operations in Chile,
Jamaica, and Nicaragua. We conclude the report on the
complex plot to invade Dominica. And we present a study
of the machinations of the now defunct Nugan Hand Bank
of Australia, a major financier for CIA-related operations.
Housekeeping Matters
First, we apologize to all our subscribers and supporters
for the lateness of this issue. We hope that its size and
contents will make up for the delay. However, we have
come to realize (after nearly four years) that our intentions
to publish every two months do not allow us to dojustice to
the subjects we cover. We cannot realistically publish issues
as large as this one under our current subscription sche-
dule. and are considering a change to quarterly, double-
issue format. We would like to hear from our readers about
this, and any other suggestions you might have.
One Sad Note
We cannot close without noting, with sadness and anger,
the jailing of David Truong, a staunch opponent of U.S.
intervention in Vietnam who went on to involve himself in
many of the progressive struggles in this country. He was
victimized by a paid CIA/ FBI informant and was subject-
ed to intensive unconstitutional surveillance, telephone
tapping, and mail opening, actions upheld in an unprece-
dented decision.
The Carter administration charged him with being a
"spy;" his real crime was that he had the audacity to think
that the war was over and that relations between the two
countries should be normalized. David is one of the first
but certainly not the last to feel the weight of the Reagan
administration's national security state.
People interested should write to: Vietnam Trial Sup-
port Committee, 1322 18th Street, NW, Washington, DC
About the Cover
Number 16 (March 1982)
U.S. "adviser," circled, instructs Salvadoran sol-
diers in methods of war. (See page 17 for interview
with Salvadoran deserter on Green Beret torture in-
struction.) This photograph was taken secretly and
was first published in Soherania, the magazine ofthe
Central American Anti-Imperalist Tribunal in Man-
agua. Subscriptions, in the U.S. and Europe, are U.S.
$30; write to Soherunia, Apartado 49, Managua, Ni-
caragua Libre.
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The Indian Ocean:
Seychelles Beats Back
Mercenaries
By Ellen Ray
The United States defines the "trouble spots" of the
world through official foreign policy statements. This is
often a U.S. intelligence tactic which allows entire geo-
political areas of the world to escape close scrutiny. The
U.S. media continually fall prey to this maneuver. Thus
events in Poland, for example, become "the news" while
significant covert actions of far more strategic importance
may be employed elsewhere without much risk of
detection.
Such inattention has been the fate of the Indian Ocean,
even t hough it has been described repeatedly as perhaps the
most strategic area in the world. Recent events, culminat-
ing in the abortive invasion of the Republic of the Sey-
chelles in November, suggest that the U.S., South Africa,
and other Western allies are deeply involved in a massive
scheme to manipulate developments covertly throughout
the Indian Ocean area.
The Indian Ocean is bordered by some 40 nations con-
taining the world's richest known deposits of fuel oil and
minerals. It controls the Persian Gulf sea lanes crucial to
the West. At the same time, an increasing number of Indian
Ocean nations are moving toward socialism and are active
members of the Non-Aligned Movement; India, Tanzania,
Mozambique, Madagascar, and the Seychelles have led a
struggle to demilitarize the Indian Ocean and have it de-
clared a nuclear-free zone of peace. There is, however, one
major military installation in the middle of the Indian
Ocean-Diego Garcia-and it is controlled by the U.S.
The Pentagon is committed to expanding its facilities in
Diegc Garcia, making the huge air and naval base under
construction there the largest overseas U.S. base.
For obvious reasons the U.S. is unhappy about the
political trends in the area. Two of Diego Garcia's nearest
neighbors (though they are each more than a thousand
miles away) are the Seychelles, with a socialist government,
and Mauritius, whose pro-Western government is widely
expected to lose to the socialist opposition in elections
which must be held in the first half of 1982. U.S. pre-
occupation with Mauritius is all the more significant be-
cause Diego Garcia is in fact a dependency of that country.
In 1965, three years before Mauritius became independent,
the U iited Kingdom leased Diego Garcia to the United
States, rent-free, for 70 years. The socialist opposition, the
Mauritius Militant Movement (MMM), has relentlessly
attacked this agreement. MMM General-Secretary Paul
Berenger has affirmed that his party, if elected, will chal-
lenge the validity of the lease agreement under which every
Mauritian on Diego Garcia was forcibly removed to the
main islands, all grossly under-compensated for their
MMM's Berenger is seen as threat to U.S. control of Diego
Garcia.
losses. The Seychellois government of President France
Albert Rene has vigorously supported Berenger's position.
Mauritius and the CIA Covert Action Flap
In August 1981 Mauritius was briefly in the U.S. news in
a context which begins to explain the complex scenario
that follows. On July 25 the Washington Post reported that
members of the House Intelligence Committee, in an un-
precedented move, wrote directly to President Reagan ex-
pressing their concern over a plan outlined to them by then
CIA Deputy Director for Operations Max Hugel. Though
the Congressional "oversight" committees do not have the
power on their own to approve or disapprove CIA covert
operations, federal law obliges the CIA to inform them, at
least in broad outline, of major secret proposals. Hugel's
briefing disturbed both Republicans and Democrats on the
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Committee enough to drive them to put their objections in
writing to the President. The plan was described variously
in subsequent leaks as "a covert action in Africa,""a covert
scheme aimed at overthrowing a foreign government," and
"a plot to assassinate a foreign leader in Africa."
On July 26 Newsweek magazine reported that the plan
involved in action perhaps assassination-- against Lib-
yan leader Muammar Qaddafi. Two days later a White
House official, probably then national security adviser
Richard Allen, leaked the information that the plot was
actually directed against Mauritania, not Libya. Finally,
when the government of Mauritania demanded an explan-
ation, U.S. officials "clarified" the matter in an admission
to the Wall Street Journal which went largely unnoticed:
the target of the plan was really Mauritius, not Mauritania.
To underscore this "final word" on the affair, an adminis-
tration source told the Washington Post for its August 15
edition that the confusion had come about because of the
similarity in the two countries' names, and that in any case
the plot "did not involve cloak-and-dagger action but was
mainly a quiet effort to slip money to the government there
to help counteract financial aid being supplied to forces
opposing the government by ... Qaddafi."
CAIB's investigations suggest that the third explanation
was no more valid than the first two, except to pinpoint the
area of the world being targeted. For one thing, it is incon-
ceivable that "slipping" some funds to a friendly leader
facing a difficult election-a commonplace CIA
operation-could generate such unheard of Congressional
objections. Indeed it is unlikely the CIA considers such
routine payments worthy of reporting to the oversight
committees The original leaks indicated that the House
Committee was appalled by a plan, broad in scope, "which
they felt was not properly thought through." Countering
Qaddafi's influence, in fact destabilizing his government,
was already overt U.S. foreign policy.
But the Indian Ocean is another matter. The papers and
the newsmagazines focused on CIA disinformation which
threw them off the scent. None of the media looked beyond
Mauritius; none explained that the M M M is likely to come
to power despite any secret funding to the government and
that the MMM does not need any Libyan financing to
succeed. Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam, 81, Prime Minister
of Mauritius since independence in 1968, is highly unpopu-
lar. In the 1976 elections, the MMM won more seats in
Parliament than any other party, and had 40% of the
popular vote, but Ramgoolam formed a hasty coalition to
stay in power., Now the MMM and the Socialist Party have
formed a coalition for the upcoming elections which most
observers believe cannot be beaten.
Ramgoolam paid an official visit to Washington Octo-
ber 13-16, visiting the World Bank, the IMF, the State
Department, and President Reagan in a quest for overt aid
for his beleaguered government. On the surface, the visit
was a total failure; all funding requests were turned down.
According to the State Department's East Africa desk
officer, many projects were discussed, but nothing was
resolved. Of course, since the White House itself was leak-
ing details of plans for covert funding, it would be impolitic
to announce at the same time plans for open aid. Yet when
Ramgoolam returned to Mauritius, he called President
Reagan "the greatest President of the greatest country,"
high praise indeed for someone who did not give him a
dime. This of course raises the question: What deals were
really made?
U.S. Involvement in the Seychelles Invasion?
Since the Mauritius Militant Movement is not yet in
power and thus cannot be overthrown, the objections of
the House Intelligence Committee must have focused on a
broader plan for the region. What would surely have upset
them was a half-baked scheme involving the CIA, the
South Africans, and a ragtag band of macho mercenaries,
plotting not merely to destabilize the M M M but to over-
throw their most vocal supporters, the government of Pres-
ident Rene of the Seychelles, a chain of tiny islands with a
population of about 62,000.
This would not be the West's first attempt to rid the
Indian Ocean of President Rene and his militantly non-
aligned government. In 1979, in fact, another plot was
President Rene continues to be target of U.S.-and South
African-inspired destabilization.
uncovered, resulting in the expulsion from the Seychelles
of several of the 120 American civilians employed at what
the U.S. Air Force describes as a "satellite tracking sta-
tion." on the main island, Mahe. (For economic reasons,
the Rene government allowed the station to remain, after
renegotiating a more equitable lease last year.) According
to Colin Legum, Africa correspondent for the London
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Observer, the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya and the U.S.
Charge d'Affaires in the Seychelles were also implicated in
the 1979 plot.
In the recent attempted overthrow, a number of sources
indicate that the planned invasion of the Seychelles,
though it did not occur until November, was widely known
at the time the Committee's letter to Reagan was written.
The September 1981 issue (published in August) of
American Relations, the Washington newsletter of the
right-wing Institute of American Relations, carried a brief
item entitled, "A Coup in the Seychelles?" With prophetic
certainty, the story stressed U.S. concern over the
"Marxist-oriented" Seychelles because "the United States
does not want an unfriendly power astride such important
sea lanes."
"Look for trouble in the Seychelles in the coming
months," the magazine concluded.
The Institute of American Relations is a small think tank
created and nurtured by Senator Jesse Helms, acknowl-
edgec leader of the New Right in Congress. The Institute's
Director is Dr. Victor A. Fediay, a Russian emigre who,
according to the November 1978 Boston magazine, spent
twenty years working for a secret Air Force intelligence
program called the Aerospace Technology Division. As an
aide to Senator Strom Thurmond in 1975, Fediay was the
Washington liaison for an international cartel comprising
Azorean businessmen, American Mafia figures, and
French mercenaries who openly lobbied the U.S. govern-
ment and the CIA for military support for a proposed coup
against Portuguese rule in the Azores. The military aspects
of the coup were planned by the right-wing French para-
military Secret Army Organization (OAS). Since the CIA
was, at that time, under intense criticism, President Ford
apparently vetoed the plan. Some months later, however,
in January 1976-according to Mother Jones magazine
(Sept~.mber-October 1980) Richard Allen reintroduced
the plan in a letter to Henry Kissinger. Allen, later Rea-
gan's national security adviser and now a consultant to the
Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, was representing
fugitive financier Robert Vesco at the time.
The Azores coup would have given the U.S. complete
control over its Air Force base there, a benefit not over-
looked by Fediay and his boss Thurmond. In the current
Seychelles situation the stakes are even higher and the
administration not so hesitant.
visit to South Africa two days before the invasion was
purely "coincidental."
The London Sunday Times of the same date noted that
the recruitment had apparently begun some 18 months
before in South Africa, and that "something big became
the gossip of Durban bars." The same day the London
Observer pointed out that "recruitment offers were made
fairly openly in bars." Even Eschel Rhoodie, the former
South African Information secretary, told the Observer
that "he had heard about the planned coup from French
and British sources four weeks ago." Robin Moore, author
of "The Green Beret," and a favorite celebrity of the mer-
cenary magazine crowd, told the Johannesburg Sunday
Times that "shares" in the $5 million Seychelles operation
had been offered around the U.S. for months preceding the
invasion. "I was trying to get people to invest in it," he said.
(Moore did not make this admission to any U.S. media, to
whom he only said he thought the plan was crazy. The
statement to the Johannesburg paper would seem grounds
for prosecution under the U.S. Neutrality Act, although in
recent years that law has almost never been enforced
against mercenary activities in this country.)
Who Paid?
Moore's claim aside, much reportage of the funding for
the Seychelles operation appears riddled with disinforma-
tion, "red herrings" to mask the real sources of financing.
But the respected London Financial Times of November 27
quotes the Johannesburg Star, saying "the mercenaries had
been recruited in Johannesburg with money from the U.S."
The Durban SundaY Tribune, November 29, said, "Despite
a terse, one-sentence denial by the U.S. government yester-
day, separate mercenary sources in South Africa are em-
phatic that funding for the operation originated with the
CIA." Continuing, the Sundae Tribune points out that
"their statement is backed up by former Rhodesian mer-
cenaries, who as recently as a month ago spoke of a
planned CIA-backed operation in the Indian Ocean `like
Bob Denard's invasion of the Comoros Islands."'
This is rather more likely than the story in a London
gossip column (picked up by the Washington Post) quoting
a British socialite who contributed $9,000 for the coup
because the Seychelles "was running out of decent
Chablis."
Recruitment for the Seychelles invasion of November 25
proceeded apace during the summer and fall. Gung Ho, a
mercenary magazine which competes with Soldier of For-
tune, ran an article in its May 1981 issue entitled, "Mercen-
ary Opportunities East of Suez." It extolled the benefits
and possibilities of a "dogs of war" invasion of the Sey-
chellei and Mauritius, noting former Seychelles Prime
Minister James Mancham's support for such an action.
Mancham, who lives the life of a rich playboy exiled in
London, has been implicated deeply in the preparations for
the invasion.
According to the Johannesburg Sunday Times (No-
vember 29, 1981) Jim Graves, managing editor of Soldier
of Fortune told their reporter, "I heard four months ago
from a source in France that something big was going to
blow ip in Africa." Graves assured the reporter that hi?
It is significant that several news sources reported hear-
ing of the plan in France. French mercenaries, most nota-
bly "Colonel" Bob Denard, figure prominently in the Indi-
an Ocean region. Denard led the 1978 invasion which
installed the right-wing government in the Comoros and
was implicated in the 1979 plot to invade the Seychelles, a
plan which was discovered by the Rene government before
the mercenaries were able to leave Durban. Denard today
shuttles back and forth between the Comoros, Kenya,
South Africa, Gabon, and France; he heads Socovia, an air
freight service which ostensibly delivers meat.
As the Seychelles plot unfolds, the Comoros/ Kenya
connection remains one of the biggest mysteries.
Several other incidents in the fall of last year may relate
directly to French involvement, or at least Denard's. In
September, exiles from the Comoros in Paris charged that
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South Africa was behind the planning of a military inva-
sion against either the Seychelles or Madagascar, another
Indian Ocean nation with a progressive government.
Though the charge was vague, a former Congo mercenary,
apparently connected to Renard, was supposedly equip-
ping an expedition to the Comoros, but absconded with the
funds to Mombasa, Kenya when an investigation into the
expedition was launched.
More substantial evidence is found in the October arrest
of Olivier Danet in Paris. Danet, a former French volun-
teer in the Rhodesian army, had taken part in Denard's
invasion of the Comoros, and more recently had been a
bodyguard for then French President Valery Giscard
d'Estaing. He was arrested with Captain Paul Barris, depu-
ty commander of France's elite anti-terrorist group, and six
others, all charged with smuggling light arms into France
from Belgium, "arms believed to be destined for an extreme
right group," according to the October 13, 1981 Rand
Daily Mail.
The Comoros Mercenaries
The Comoros, the only mercenary-run government in
the world, figures prominently in the recent invasion. The
plane which brought the attackers from Swaziland to the
Seychelles had stopped there for half an hour. According
to the Royal Swazi Airline pilot, "there is a bit of mystery
... whether anyone joined the aircraft there and flew to the
Seychelles." The January 1982 issue of Afrique-Asie maga-
zine claims that five Europeans and several crates labelled
"gifts for handicapped children" went on board during the
stopover.
When the Comoros obtained independence from France
in 1975, Ahmed Abdallah ruled briefly as President. He
was deposed and a progressive government under Ali Soi-
lih took power until 1978, when it was ousted in the mer-
cenary invasion led by Denard. The mercenaries reinstalled
Abdallah, but effectively ran the country. Olivier Danet, in
fact, served a few months as Justice Minister; "Major
Charles" heads the Presidential guard; and Christian
Olgater, another mercenary, controls the national shipping
line. Virtually all other aspects of the country's economic
and political life are so controlled. Though Denard has
been forced, by pressures from the Organization of African
Unity (OAU), to spend little time in the Comoros, he owns,
with Abdallah, about 60% of the local posts and tele-
communications monopoly, STICOM. President Abdal-
lah periodically denies that he is under the influence of the
mercenaries, particularly Denard, but all independent re-
ports are to the contrary.
The Comoros have significantly increased their links
with neighboring South Africa recently, reportedly
through negotiations carried out by Denard. In mid-1981
the Comoros signed a secret agreement with the South
African government allowing the latter to construct a
major telecommunications earth station on Grand Como-
ro, in exchange for economic aid. Pretoria is also in charge
of the expansion of Radio Comoro, and reports have circu-
lated that the United States has also installed a radio
communication station there. Additionally, there are re-
ports that a joint U.S.-British deep water research team is
in fact based at a large mercenary camp at Kandaani,
Grand Comoro. (It is known that the Mozambique Chan-
nel includes some very warm currents which pass over very
cold water, a condition which makes it difficult to detect
submarine movements.)
A delegation of French journalists recently visited the
Comoros in an attempt to interview the mercenaries, but
they could not be found. Apparently they are maintaining a
very low profile. The journalists did learn, however, that
Denard was in the Comoros at the time ofthe invasion of
the Seychelles, arriving from South Africa on November
19 and departing on December 8.
The Invasion
Despite minor discrepancies in the many accounts of the
incident, a fairly clear picture of what happened can be
pieced together. Most difficult, however, is a precise ac-
counting of the individuals involved, because of inconsis-
tencies in names on travel documents and uncertainty
whether the South African authorities released the names
of all persons who ultimately escaped to that country.
On November 24 a group of 44 men pretending to be
members of a fictitious drinking club, The Ancient Order
of Foam Blowers, boarded a Swaziland-hound bus at Jo-
hannesburg, en route to a Seychelles vacation. They spent
the night at a Holiday Inn in Transvaal where, according to
some reports, two women also bound for the Seychelles
checked in. The next day the entire group reached the
Swaziland airport and boarded a Royal Swazi Airlines
plane bound for the Seychelles via the Comoros. At the
Comoros the two women left the plane. although the pilot
later recalled that he thought a man and a woman had
disembarked. Moreover, if the unconfirmed reports of five
other men joining the flight at the Comoros are true, it is
possible that the original group numbered 39, rather
than 44.
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South African reports suggested that the two women
"warned" the Seychelles authorities of the impending arri-
val of the mercenaries, but considering the ensuing melee at
the Seychelles airport this seems unlikely, and the precise
role of the two women is unknown.
The plane arrived at the Seychelles in the late afternoon
on November 25. Waiting at the airport were six of at least
eight confederates who had arrived on the island over the
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preceding several weeks to reconnoitre. Some of them were
apparently armed, and all of the arriving mercenaries had
weapons hidden in their luggage, under packages of toys
marked "presents for handicapped children." These in-
cluded rockets and rocket launchers, machine guns, rifles,
and grenades.
It is clear, both from the manner of the entry and from
subsequent investigations and confessions, that the attack
was not planned for the arrival, but for some weeks in the
future, The mercenaries expected to leave the airport with
their arsenal and move in with the advance team which had
rented villas in the mountains neat the U.S. tracking sta-
tion. Indeed many other weapons were subsequently dis-
covered packed up at a villa.
As the new arrivals passed through customs, however, a
sharp-eyed inspector discovered a hidden weapon. Within
a shore. time the others removed weapons from the baggage
and a battle ensued which ultimately destroyed much of the
airport and demolished the Royal Swazi plane. The mer-
cenari es finally took over a large part of the airport, includ-
ing the control tower and some adjoining facilities. They
also took 70 people hostage airport personnel, other pas-
sengers, and some people captured just outside the airport.
Seychellois security forces ringed the airport, and pre-
vented some of the mercenaries from taking over a nearby
military installation: one soldier was killed in the defense of
the fort, and another at the airport. Although the mercen-
aries were surrounded, the authorities refrained from im-
media to action because of the many hostages. Fortunately
for th? invaders, a regularly scheduled Air India plane
approached the airport some five hours after the standoff
began The mercenaries, who were in possession of the
contrcl tower, guided the plane down, pretending that
nothing was amiss. The Seychellois, who controlled one
end of the runway, tried to warn the plane not to land by
setting, off flares, but this was not understood by the Air
India pilot. In landing, one of the plane's wingflaps was
damaged by a vehicle put on the runaway by the Seychel-
lois to discourage him. It is unclear how the Air India pilot
was ccnvinced to land at all.
After some four hours of sporadic shelling and cross-
fire--which further devastated the airport- and negotia-
tions with the Air India pilot, he was forced to agree to fly
to Durban, South Africa. At least 42 of the invaders and 2
members of the advance team, one of them wounded,
entered the plane under cover of darkness, carrying the
body of another invader who had been killed in the initial
shootout. Three heavily armed members of the advance
team remained, guarding the hostages. At this point, one of
the new arrivals and one of the advance team were un-
accounted for.
By sawn, some of the hostages managed to escape and
reported that the ranks of their captors had been drastically
reduced. The Seychellois, until then unaware that almost
all of the invaders had left on the Air India plane, rushed
the facilities and captured the three men guarding the
remaining hostages without incident. Shortly thereafter
the mi!;sing member of the advance team which had come
to the airport was captured. Later the two who had re-
mained at the villa were arrested, but it was only two weeks
later that the one missing mercenary who had arrived on
the Royal Swazi flight crept, half-starved, out of the woods
and was arrested. One local Seychellois contact was also
arrested.
Many days passed before the true identities of the mer-
cenaries came to light from flight manifests, travel docu-
ments, confessions from the captured, and belated state-
ments from the South African government. The South
Africans had held the Air India arrivals incommunicado
and released no details or names for some time.
The leader of the landing force was none other than
Mike Hoare, 62, Irish-born resident of South Africa. "Mad
Mike" Hoare had been a key mercenary in the Congo in the
1960s, leading the forces which suppressed the supporters
of Patrice Lumumba and helping to install Mobutu. Hoare
had worked off and on with both the CIA and the South
Africans for years.
Second in command was "Captain" Peter Duffy, anoth-
er Congo veteran who had served with Hoare. The man
who hid in the woods for two weeks was Jeremiah "Josh"
Puren, who had fought with Hoare in the Congo and had
served as an aide to Katangese secessionist leader Moise
Tshombe. Puren was a South African Air Force veteran,
reported to bean active member of South African military
intelligence.
There were two Americans involved, both of whom
made it to Durban: Barry Gribben and Charles Dukes, the
wounded member of the advance team. But most interest-
ing was the discovery that more than half of the group were
South Africans, most of them active or reserve members of
the "Red Devils," an elite reconnaissance commando
group. According to the Financial Times, the Red Devils
were linked to raids into both Mozambique and Angola
last year.
Number 16 (March 1982)
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The member of the advance team captured shortly after
the hostages were freed turned out to be Martin Dolinchek,
an active-duty member of South African intelligence, NIS
(formerly BOSS). Dolinchek, who subsequently confessed
in great detail and gave numerous interviews to the press,
said he was on leave from NIS, although the South Afri-
cans tersely stated that he had quit. His testimony deeply
implicated the South African government. His false pass-
port had been duly issued by the passport division of the
Durban Department of the Interior. He admitted that he
had arranged for Mike Hoare's false passport through the
same office. Dolinchek also said that he and Robert Sims,
Mike Hoare's brother-in-law, arrested at the villa, had
tested the weapons packed for the operation at a Durban
airport in broad daylight. Dolinchek had been scouting the
island for nearly a month with Sims and his colleague,
Susan Ingles. She had been in charge of finances, apparent-
ly spending large sums throughout the island.
South African Reaction
When, several days after the mercenaries landed at Dur-
ban, the South African authorities finally reacted, to the
astonishment of most of the world, they released 39 of the
44 men with no charges, and charged five, including Hoare,
with the relatively minor offense in South Africa of kid-
napping. They were immediately released on very low bail.
International reaction was swift and vitriolic. South
Africa has been a strident vocal opponent of "terrorism,"
including air piracy, and is a signatory to several interna-
tional conventions on hijacking. The South African law is
very strict, with a mandatory five-year minimum sentence
and possible 30 years' imprisonment. There is no minimum
for kidnapping. International pressure was overwhelming,
and on January 5 the entire group of 44 was charged with
air piracy.
There is an unexplained discrepancy in the figures, how-
ever. South Africa originally announced that 44 mercenar-
ies had been detained upon landing in Durban, but the
January 5 announcement by the provincial Attorney Gen-
eral spoke of 45 warrants.
There are already indications that the new charges may
he a sham. South African legal authorities have comment-
ed that the international conventions, and South African
law, define hijacking as a taking over of a plane after the
doors have been closed for takeoff. If the decision to take
over the plane, even by force, was made before hoarding it,
they say, this would not constitute air piracy, but a "politi-
cal crime" committed on Sevchellois soil. Since South
Africa has no extradition treaty with the Seychelles, se-
rious prosecution of most of the offenders may he illusory.
One of the many loose ends in this affair is the role of
former President James R. M. Mancham, the man deposed
by Albert Rene in 1977. Mancham was on a lecture tour of
the United States when the botched invasion occurred,
speaking on "The Struggle for Power in the Indian Ocean."
When the wreckage ofthe airport was cleared, two partial-
ly burned tape recordings were found, containing messages
from Mancham to the people of the Seychelles in which he
offered to accept an "invitation" to resume the presidency
and "help the country in the national task of restoring
democracy." Faced with this evidence, Mancham admitted
to reporters that he had been approached in September by
"dissident Seychellois" who asked him to make some tapes
for use in an impending coup. However, Martin Dolinchek
told Seychellois authorities that Hoare had described to
him a September meeting with Mancham in London, and
other mercenaries reported that Hoare spoke often of
Mancham, saying that he would be "a figurehead"after the
takeover, suggesting a Comoros-type regime.
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It is impossible to believe that Mancham knew nothing
of the actual plot. He has always been close to South
Africa, and during his presidency was sharply criticized for
providing Seychelles passports for South Africans to aid
their travels in the rest of Africa.
What most strains credulity are the official South Afri-
can assertions of total ignorance. Open recruitment had
been raking place in South Africa for at least eighteen
months. Everyone in mercenary circles in South Africa,
France, and the U.S. seemed to know about it. Rumors
were printed in magazines and newspapers on three conti-
nents. Sims and Dolinchek strongly suggest South African
complicity, and Air India passengers reported that the
mercenaries who took over their plane talked openly on the
trip to Durban of the South African government role.
It is also difficult to believe that the CIA was not aware
of, if not deeply involved in, the plot. Interest in the Indian
Ocean is intense, and, as noted above, the CIA has in the
past manipulated affairs in both the Seychelles and Mauri-
tius. Moreover, the evidence is strong that the House Intel-
ligene? Committee as well as many right-wing organiza-
tions in the U.S.--had some idea of the machinations
under way.
In an ironic twist, Prime Minister Ramgoolam of Mauri-
tius accused the Seychelles on December 5 of seeking to
overtl row his government by "actively promoting de-
stabilisation" there. With the Seychelles still reeling from
the invasion and attempting to shore up defenses against
further threatened attacks, this complaint was surely a
diversion, perhaps part of Ramgoolam's faltering reelection
campaign.
In fact there are recent reports out of South Africa that
Mike Hoare met with Bob Denard in Durban in mid-
December to discuss a second invasion. It is unclear wheth-
er this is only South African disinformation to increase the
justifi~.ble nervousness of the people of the Seychelles.
Was Kenya Involved?
A more difficult question relates to the possible official
involvement of Kenya in the plot. Dolinchek told his cap-
tors: "A new government was to be flown in from Kenya.
The Kenyan government agreed to provide two airplanes
which were to fly in Kenyan soldiers and police to replace
Tanzanian troops which were believed to be in this coun-
try. Colonel Mike Hoare said the whole thing would be a
pushover."
The Kenyan government was silent for 20 hours after
this statement was reported, and then vigorously denied
any involvement and insisted that Dolinchek was lying. It
is impossible at this time to know whether Dolinchek's
claim was anything more than subtle disinformation, an
obvious difficulty in interrogating a trained intelligence
officer, whose mission might well be to sow the seeds of
dissension among other African countries.
But Kenya is not a close friend of the Seychelles. Its
policies are decidedly pro-Western. Huge military facilities
have been granted the U.S. at the Kenyan port of Momba-
sa. Though Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi is current
head of the OAU and claims to abhor mercenarism, he
allows one of the largest CIA stations in Africa to operate
out of Kenya. Moreover, Kenya was implicated in the 1979
plot against the Seychelles.
Several facts emerge from the many reports of this mean
adventure, from which some observations can be made.
They should be viewed in light of the fixation of the United
States with the Indian Ocean and its paranoia over "threat-
ened" sea lanes. As President Rene observed, "Our com-
mitment to socialist development, coupled with the strate-
gic geographical location of our islands in the Indian
Ocean make us prone to such ruthless maneuvers of desta-
bilization and aggression."
Events in the Indian Ocean region raise some parallels
with U.S. activity in the Caribbean Basin. There, too, there
are expressions of concern over sea lanes, and there, too,
mercenary activity is encouraged. Cuban exiles and Somo-
cista fugitives play the role that South Africans fill in
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean. (In fact, U.S. mil-
itary maneuvers were taking place in the Caribbean and in
North Africa during the months and weeks preceding the
Seychelles invasion.)
It seems clear that both South Africa and the United
States knew of, and condoned, the plan. Beyond the admit-
tedly unreliable braggadocio of mercenaries interviewed in
the press, the circumstantial evidence is strong. Most sig-
nificant is financing. Estimates of the cost of the Seychelles
operation range between two and five million dollars, and
it is inconceivable that such a sum was raised by a handful
of dissident Seychellois exiles, or society types looking for
a thrill. The alleged CIA funding of the ruling party in
Mauritius may well have been a cover, in part. for some of
this money.
Moreover, the close relationship between the Reagan
administration and Pretoria cannot be underestimated.
The U.S. and South Africa are openly exchanging infor-
mation and plans, as they connive to block SWAPO's
relentless path to true independence for Namibia, and as
they plot the brutal destabilization of Angola, Mozam-
bique, and Zimbabwe. Toeholds in the Comoros and Mau-
ritius and, they hope, in the Seychelles secure the pe-
rimeter of Southern Africa as they counter socialist devel-
opment in the Indian Ocean.
More information will surely come to light. On De-
cember 15 the U.N. Security Council unanimously agreed
to send a commission of inquiry to the Seychelles to inves-
tigate the invasion and report back. Every member of the
Security Council except the U.S. was enthusiastic in its
condemnation of mercenarism. Jeane Kirkpatrick suggest-
ed that sending the mission was assuming that the "Sey-
chelles affair was not purely internal," which was "prejudg-
ing the situation." This is a preposterous statement, con-
sidering that the 52 armed mercenaries, led by Mad Mike
Hoare, recruited, funded and supplied under the noses of
the South Africans, were hardly a group of dissident
Seychellois.
In addition, although little is expected to come to light
from the trials, if any, in South Africa, those to commence
shortly in the Seychelles may explain much more of this
strange episode.
Whether the House Intelligence Committee or anyone
else will call for greater scrutiny of the U.S. role remains to
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Angola:
Pretoria's Continuing War
Souin Africa's relentless war against Angola has escala-
ted dramatically over the past several months. In August
and again in November, Cunene Province in southwestern
Angola was devastated by massive, weeks-long South Af-
rican attacks. Invading forces advanced over 150 miles into
Angolan territory with more than twice the number of
troops deployed in the 1975-76 South African invasions.
Coverage of these events has removed any lingering
credence given to South Africa's contention that its "raids"
into Angola are limited incursions aimed at military bases
of the South West African People's Organization
(SWAPO). In fact, the scope of the war is vast, the battle is
non-stop, the targets are primarily Angolan towns and
villages, and substantial areas of the Angolan side of the
border with Namibia have been openly occupied by South
Africa. The myth nurtured by Pretoria that much of the
fighting has been conducted by U N ITA forces is no longer
even peddled.
Operation Protea
The first major escalation, Operation Protea, began on
July 28, 1981, and by September 5 most of the southern
part of the province, including the key towns of Xangongo
and Njiva, was occupied by South African Defense Force
(SADF) troops. As in previous major confrontations, the
Angolan army, FAPLA, held its own in the head to head
ground fighting, but was overwhelmed by the massive air
and artillery support which poured in whenever the SADF
advance faltered. Whole towns and villages in the region
were leveled. Journalists who reached the area on Sep-
tember 5 -and were bombed by South African fighter
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planes-confirmed the reports of wide-spread civilian ca-
sualties and the destruction of non-military targets. The
planes, they said, were attacking "anything that moves."
The invasion and occupation were the subject of a Secur-
ity Council debate at the United Nations, and the U.S. veto
was the only vote against condemnation of South Africa.
Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, commented, "The Reagan administration has no
intention of destabilizing South Africa to curry favor else-
where." Crocker defended the veto as an expression of
American "neutrality." The U.S. position, which amount-
ed to open support for naked South African aggression,
was a clear signal to Pretoria. "We are grateful that Ameri-
ca has shown a sense of balance about the Angolan 'inva-
sion' issue," wrote the Citizen, an English-language Johan-
nesburg paper closely linked to South African intelligence.
South Africa insisted that its operations were directed
against SWAPO, but it was obvious that the primary pur-
pose was to bolster the sagging fortunes of UNITA, an
explanation supported by a September 14 London Times
analysis. The Times Johannesburg correspondent noted
that U NITA forces were moving into the territory occupied
by South Africa from their sole stronghold, desolate
Cuando-Cubango Province, to the east of Cunene. "In-
formed observers here," he reported, "believe that the scale
of the South African incursion was part of a longer-term
strategy aimed at developing UNITA into a proxy force
which could police a broad swathe of territory along Ango-
la's southern border."
Operation Daisy
During September and October SADF positions were
shuffle,-d, with some occupied areas abandoned and others
fortified. Then, on October 27, another massive attack was
launched-Operation Daisy. This battle raged for three
weeks, and was reported daily by the Angolan authorities.
It was not until December 7, however, that Pretoria con-
firmed the reports. South African journalists, who were
aware of the operation, were prohibited by law from men-
tioning it until that time.
Operation Daisy involved fighting from 100 to 150 miles
inside Angola. As Joseph Lelyveld reported in the New
York Times (December 8, 1981), "Each subsequent attack
has carried South African forces deeper into Angola."
Finally, on November 30, in a vicious act of sabotage,
the Petrangol oil refinery in Luanda was bombed. South
African equipment was found at the scene, as well as mate-
rial in Afrikaans. Most significantly, the sabotage opera-
tion had been conducted by white mercenaries; several
white bodies were found, apparently the result of a pre-
mature explosion which, fortunately, halted the bombing
before the refinery complex was totally destroyed.
An ecological disaster was narrowly averted through the
heroism of Angolan refinery workers who rolled away
thous~.nds of barrels of lead tetraethyl from blazing storage
buildings. Had this toxic additive been vaporized, a Bel-
gian r,,-finery official noted, "an enormous poison cloud
could have enveloped Luanda, had the wind blown the
wrong way."
who was in New York at the time, claimed credit for the
sabotage. Western diplomatic observers, however, agreed
that the saboteurs were South African mercenaries, and
whether or not they were nominally acting for UNITA, it
was clear that South Africa trained them, supplied them,
and sent them on their mission. Moreover, there was specu-
lation over the manner of arrival of the mercenaries. At a
press conference while the fire was still being fought, the
Angolan oil minister suggested that the mercenaries might
have come by South African submarine. A similar charge
had been leveled by Mozambique at the time of the attemp-
ted mining of Beira harbor. Interestingly, only two days
before the attack on the refinery the South Africans had
relaunched one of the navy's three submarines after a 15-
month overhaul, and it had immediately left port for a "sea
trial."
The U.S. role in the Angolan war has not been limited to
outspoken support for the Pretoria regime. Jonas Savimbi
received VIP treatment on his recent visit in November and
December. [See CAIB Number 7 for details of Savimbi's
November 1979 visit.] It was no coincidence that this visit
came precisely as the House considered the Senate's pro-
posal to repeal the Clark Amendment, prohibiting U.S.
intervention in Angola. Savimbi's meetings with numerous
CIA, National Security Council, and State Department
officials did not prevent the House from upholding the
Clark Amendment, although this victory may be irrele-
vant. On January 22 an interview with Savimbi appeared in
the conservative Portuguese weekly Tempo. He said, refer-
ring to U.S. aid to UNITA, "Material help is not dependent
on, nor limited by, the Clark Amendment. A great country
like the United States has other channels ... The Clark
Amendment means nothing." Knowledgeable observers
point out that the Reagan administration has been known
to offer to increase proportionately aid to countries that
will commence or increase aid to UNITA.
Simultaneously with Savimbi's tour, President Mobutu
of Zaire made a state visit to the U.S. This visit had been
scheduled for early 1982, but was moved up at the urging
of the CIA-for reasons of great concern to Angola. While
Mobutu has his own serious internal problems in Zaire, he
is also providing cover for another front in the U.S.-South
African war against Angola. A group of Zaire-based mer-
cenaries, along with some remnants of Holden Roberto's
defunct FNLA, have established "the Military Committee
of the Angolan Resistance" (COMIRA). This group, with
what appears to be CIA support in direct violation of the
Clark Amendment, is said to be planning attacks against
Angola from the north, while the Luanda government is
preoccupied with the massive South African operations in
the south, a strategy similar to that which failed in 1975-76.
To have Mobutu and Savimbi in Washington together
seemed like an attempt to coordinate puppets.
American press coverage has focused obsessively on the
presence of Cuban troops in Angola, although they were
not involved in the battles against South Africa, but pro-
vided rear guard support for FAPLA. But public opinion
must come to grips with the extent of South African and
CIA operations against Angola and the blatant disregard
of the Clark Amendment. Extensive destruction and grow-
ing civilian casualties can clearly be laid at the doorstep of
the Reagan administration. Chester Crocker's assertion of
The day after the explosion Jonas Savimbi of UNITA,
"neutrality" is a farce.
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Mozambique Rebels Exposed
South African aggression against Mozambique, which
increased in early 1981 (see CA I B N umbers 12 and 13), has
dramatically escalated. A campaign of terrorism and sab-
otage has followed the mid-October speech of South Afri-
can Defense Minister, Gen. Magnus Malan. The speech,
which has been described as a call for a "second `Matola-
type' raid in Mozambique," announced preparations for
the opening of a "second front." While Gen. Malan was not
specific, the first front is Angola, and the second front,
observers agreed, must be Mozambique. Mike Hough, the
director of the Pretoria Institute for Strategic Studies, was
quoted by the Rand Daily Mail (October 16, 1981) as
pointing out that "the Mozambique and Angola situations
were almost identical." Speaking of Gen. Malan, Hough
said, "I have a good idea that he must be referring to
Mozambique."
Even while Gen. Malan was speaking, it now appears, a
band of South African commandos were infiltrating Mo-
zambique for purposes of sabotage. On October 14, a
Mozambican army patrol found a group of men laying
mines along the vital Beira-Umtali railway, which links
Zimbabwe with the major Mozambican port. Six sabo-
teurs were killed; they were discovered to be three South
African demolitions and explosives experts and three
members of the "Mozambique National Resistance," a
small, shadowy group which has been sniping at the Ma-
chel government since 1976.
The MNR was widely believed to be a creation of South
Africa since its first appearance, and the identification of
the bodies by the railroad tracks provided further confir-
mation. Afrikaans writing had been found on crates of
ammunition captured from the MNR. Further and more
detailed confirmation has come from a most unexpected
source, a 16-year BOSS veteran, agent Gordon Winter.
In early October Penguin Books distributed in London
advance copies of "Inside BOSS," Gordon's 640-page con-
fessional of his years as a South African intelligence agent.
The book aroused so much controversy-and dozens of
threatened lawsuits- -that it was withdrawn from sale only
days after it became generally available. Although several
British journalists have questioned Winter's change of
heart and openly speculated that he is still working for
South Africa, the book's details of South African intelli-
gence operations are generally regarded as accurate.
In it, he describes how MNR was created in 1976 by Gen.
Malan, then Chief of Staff of the Army, as "a fake Black
liberation movement in Mozambique." Winter, in his
cover as a journalist, spent much of 1977 writing stories
glorifying the exploits of the non-existent organization. All
of the acts of sabotage and terrorism were, in fact, conduct-
ed by South African commandos. By 1978 the South Afri-
cans recruited "between ten and twenty Blacks from Mo-
zambique" who became a "real" MNR. They were photo-
graphed with weapons and uniforms a few miles from
Pretoria. The pictures were published by Winter and other
journalist-agents as guerrillas "training at secret bases in-
side Mozambique."Over the next few years a small core of
MNR members, assisted by South African weapons, ex-
plosives, experts and financing, sporadically caused exten-
sive damage throughout Mozambique.
The MNR--that is to say, the South Africans stepped
up its activities after the abortive railway episode. That
their cover was fully blown was of no consequence. At the
end of October a series of explosions damaged the
Zimbabwe-Mozambique oil pipeline, and disrupted rail
and road links between the two countries. Two bridges
crossing the Pungue River, 50 km. east of the port ofBeira,
were sabotaged. Mozambican authorities indicated that
those responsible had infiltrated the country with the
group killed at the railway.
On November 12, the channel marker buoys in Beira
harbor were blown up, an action which appeared to have
required the use of a submarine or very fast gunboats,
equipment obviously not available to the MNR. On De-
cember 7 the Mozambican Army overran the main base of
the MNR at Garaguq and discoverd a cache of correspond-
ence and minutes of meetings between MNR leaders and
South African officials, including a colonel in military
intelligence. One document confirmed that the railway mine-
laying plan had been conceived and ordered by the South
Africans. Finally. on December 17, two foreign wildlife
experts and several aides from the Mozambican wildlife
school were kidnapped.
Zimbabwe too has not been immune to South African
instigated violence, to say the least. Small MNR groups
have often camped near the border, and, according to the
October 4, 1981 New York Tmc?s, South African planes
supplying the MNR have on occasion violated Zimbab-
wean airspace. In August a Zimbabwean garrison arms
dump was sabotaged in an action which Prime Minister
Robert Mugabe suggested involved South African collu-
sion. And in mid-December a massive explosion ripped
through his party's headquarters. Mugabe, commenting on
South African adventures in his country, Mozambique,
and the Seychelles. said, "A rabid racist regime has gone
wild in our neighborhood."
On December 28, 1981, the Washington Post revealed
that "Western intelligence sources . . . have confirmed
Mozambican charges that the rebels are receiving South
African armaments and logistical support." This is rather
dramatic understatement. l he MNR is South African. Its
activity is no less an enormity than the sending of merce-
naries to the Seychelles or the raid on Matola.
The Mozambican government has announced that
it is planninga full-length feature film on the CIA spy
ring which operated in Mozambique since independ-
ence in 1975. This ring was described in CAIB
Number 12.
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Argentina Activates
International Death Squads
By Ellen Ray
Argentina, according to a Foreign Ministry official,
wants a "balance of power" in Latin America, seeking a
"modus vivendi" to keep the area "independent from super-
power conflicts." In fact, however, it is working hand in
glove with the United States and some of the most repres-
sive regimes around the world. In particular it is exporting
on a growing scale its well-honed specialties of disappear-
ance, 1 orture, and murder.
Argentina brutally stifled political dissent following the
coup i n which the militaryjunta overthrew Isabel Peron in
1976. Now, in secret agreements between the military re-
gime and the Haig State Department finalized last Sep-
tember, Argentina is activating its torturers around the
world, where they had been marking time since the Carter
administration penalized their gross human rights viola-
tions which left between 15,000 and 30,000 Argentines
dead. Though the junta has slowed down its domestic
killing somewhat, it has never eliminated its heinous poli-
cies of extermination.
It is now apparent that in return for lifting the arms
embargo imposed by Carter, Argentina will lead the way in
the U.S. strategy of outside intervention covertly in Nica-
ragua and overtly in El Salvador by aiding the CIA's
plans to destabilize Nicaragua and by preparing to send
troops into El Salvador after the bogus March elections.
This is part of Haig's "continental" approach to involve
reacticnary Latin American regimes in U.S. inter-
ventionism.
The embargo was lifted on December 14, 1981 after
extensve shuttle diplomacy. U.S. Army Chief of Staff
Gen. Edward C. Meyer visited Buenos Aires in April; Gen.
Leopoldo Galtieri, then Chief of Staff of the Argentine
Army ind now President, visited Washington in August;
Secretary Haig's envoy Gen. Vernon Walters met in Argen-
tina with Galtieri in September; and Galtieri returned to
the U.S. in November, shortly before he forced Gen. Ro-
berto Viola to step down from the Presidency. During this
period significantly, there were several reciprocal visits
between high Salvadoran and Argentinean officials.
The Dutcome was foreordained; Galtieri announced that
he was willing to send troops to El Salvador, though Sal-
vadoran Defense Minister Guillermo Garcia publicly stat-
ed they were "not needed at the moment." In fact, they are
desperately needed, as the Salvadoran regime is on the
verge of complete collapse. Moreover, an unknown
number of Argentinean officers have been in El Salvador,
Guatemala, and Honduras for some time.
On December 2, 1981, the New York Times revealed that
Salvadoran military intelligence officers have been in
Argentina for more than two years, taking courses
"focusing on problems of organization, infiltration, and
interrogation." Other reports indicate that Argentinean
military personnel--described as "experienced foreign
counterinsurgency specialists" are in Guatemala,
Honduras, and El Salvador. In Guatemala they have
helped in the capture of a number of guerrillas through
"network analysis," described by Latin America Regional
Reports as a method "whereby telephone, electricity and
other household bills are scrutinized by computer
for 'abnormalities."' In fact this computer "suspect-
identification system" was U.S.-built and exported to
Argentina, according to intelligence sources.
Computer expertise aside, Argentina's specialty is tor-
ture, and recent exposes in South Africa confirm the scope
of their activities.
A press campaign by liberal South African journalists
recently resulted in the transfer from his "diplomatic" post-
ing in Pretoria of one of the chief torturers of the notorious
Escuela Mechanica de la Armada (Naval Mechanics
School), which operated in Buenos Aires between 1974 and
1978. In a series of articles running from October through
December, the Durban Sunday Tribune identified four
Argentinean naval officers operating out of Pretoria who
had administered the Escuela death camp, including Lieu-
tenant Alfredo Astiz-the "Blond Angel." Astiz left South
Africa in December after more than two years' undercover
work there.
The question of their precise mission was not addressed
in the flurry of press statements about the presence of the
Argentinean torturers in South Africa. Observers outside
South Africa have noted, however, the connection between
the training of Salvadoran and South African intelligence
teams in Argentina. It is possible that Astiz, as an expert in
military repression, is now working in Argentina's expand-
ing military role in El Salvador. If so, it is with the blessing
of Washington.
Number 16 (March 1982)
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The "Blond Angel," Lt. Astiz, infiltrated citizens' groups,
marking countless Argentines for torture and death.
In their series, the Sunder Tribune compiled the follow-
ing documentation:
? Lieutenant Alfredo Astiz headed kidnapping opera-
tions for the Escuela, one of the largest of at least 15 death
camps used as secret detention and torture centers. Over
4,700 men, women, and children thought to oppose the
military junta passed through the Escucla. Fewer than 100
survived the camp, according to Amnesty International.
Astiz also infiltrated what were considered "subversive
groups," for example a church center run by women at-
tempting to petition the Argentine government over the
whereabouts of the "disappeared" children. Under an as-
sumed name and pretending to have a missing relative,
Astiz infiltrated the church group to identify those in-
volved. Then they were kidnapped, tortured, and killed.
Astiz was appointed naval attache in Pretoria on June 20.
1979.
? Rear Admiral Ruben J. Chamorro (the Dolphin) was
commander of the Escuela from 1974 to 1978. There he
supervised the "operating theaters" or torture rooms,
where over 100 people at a time were detained during the
height of the repression. The victims were handcuffed and
hooded, according to survivors, and were systematically
tortured and then finally killed, often flown by helicopter
over the Atlantic and dumped while still alive. As one
survivor recounted, "Chamorro was fond of personally
showing visitors from the naval high command around his
camp, which he would proudly describe as the `best-known
maternity hospital in Buenos Aires,"' because of the facili-
ties for pregnant women sent there. Those women who did
not abort on the torture table were put on display for naval
staff who wanted to adopt babies. After the babies were
born, the women would be murdered and the children
given away. Chamorro was appointed armed forces at-
tache in Pretoria on June 14, 1979.
? Captain Jorge Acosta (the Tiger), one of the most
powerful men in the Escuela, was later responsible for the
placement of himself and the other torturers to senior
"diplomatic" postings throughout the world. Acosta is cre-
dited with refining the use of the naval task force GT
333:2- as the instrument of intelligence collection and
torture. A former naval intelligence officer, Acosta was
said to be the most sadistic of the torturers and the person
who decided, with Chamorro, which of the prisoners
more than 90('(' of them were to be killed. When the
Escuela was dismantled in 1978, Acosta managed to secure
appointments of his men as "diplomats" abroad. I he
South African government would not provide details of his
accreditation there, according to the Sunday Tribune.
? Captain Jorge Perron (the Puma) was a close friend of
Captain Acosta and was one of the torturers. Later, survi-
vors documented the transfer of Perron to Argentina's
counter-propaganda center in Paris, where he was joined
by Lieutenant Astiz. Both were recognized by the Argenti-
nean exile community there and, rendered ineftectivc,
forced to leave France. Perren was appointed to the armed
forces mission at the Argentine Embassy in Pretoria on
October 17, 1979.
the surface connection between South Africa and Ar-
gentina has been the proposed defense pact, the South
Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). Under the proposal
the two countries' navies would pla} main roles, supplied
by the NA 10 powers with sophisticated armaments "to
fight Soviet naval encroachment of the South Atlantic." In
December of 1980 then Argentine President ,Jorge Videla
ruled out the possibility of a South Atlantic pact, saving
that Latin American countries could take no part in any
such organization "which might include South Africa."
But successive military presidents have changed their tune.
Indeed President Galtieri is a virtual client of the Reagan
administration, which has been instrumental in cementing
relations between Argentina and South Africa. When Gal-
tieri visited the U.S. for the Conference of American Ar-
mies, he toasted top U.S. military officials: "Argentina will
march together with the U.S. in the ideological battle."
Pushing this theme is Galtieri's friend, Gen. Meyer. Mev-
er's ideology is exemplified by his public statement that
World War III began when the Soviet Union moved into
Afghanistan.
But perhaps the closest friends South Africa and Argen-
tina have in the Reagan administration are Gen. Walters
and Peter Hannaford, a former Reagan speechwriter who
is a registered lobbyist for Argentina. (See CRIB Number
12 on Hannaford's role, with his then partner Michael
Deaver, the White House aide, as a lobbyist for Guatema-
la.) Hannaford recently visited South Africa and Namibia,
expressing public support for the policies of the South
African government.
In May of 1981 an international conference to promote
the concept of SATO was convened in Buenos Aires,
privately sponsored by the Institute of American Relations
(see the Seychelles article in this issue), the Council for
Inter-American Security, and the Carlos Pellegrini
Foundation of Argentina. The symposium was comprised
of militaryand strategic experts from the U.S., Argentina,
South Africa, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Brazil. Playing a
key role was Gen. Walters, former Deputy Director of the
CIA and a ubiquitous lobbyist for right-wing regimes. The
conference was less than successful, however, in that
Brazil has difficulty getting involved with South Africa
because of its substantial trade with Nigeria, Angola, and
other Black African countries.
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What Is In Store for El Salvador?
As noted above, Argentina's torturers are training mil-
itary officers from many countries, highlighting problems
of "organization, infiltration, and interrogation." A fright-
ening look at some of the methods involved can be found in
an extraordinary article, "How Argentina Won Its War
Against Leftist Terrorism," in the February 13, 1982
Human Events. The piece in the right-wing journal ex-
presses the "hope" of the authors that Argentina can teach
El Salvador the lessons of success. The writers, former
Chicago Sun-Times correspondent Virginia Prewett and
former New York Times reporter William R. Mizelle, now
publish "private intelligence reports on Latin America"
called Hemispheric Hotline. They interviewed the
members of the junta and "respected the entreaties of Ar-
gentines ... as well as warnings of U.S. counterinsurgency
experts to avoid naming . . . the principal architects of
Argentina's victory over leftist terrorism." The high offi-
cials praised the order, in early 1975, which "permitted the
armed forces to move in," and praised the rising "terrorist
body-count."
One of their sources is quoted as follows: "Don't say it
was I who said so, but the victory over the terrorists began
the day my wife said, `There's no way out except to kill
these monsters; we've got to kill them all!"'
The indiscriminate killing of innocent civilians has
plagued El Salvador for 50 years; Argentina's contribution
From August I to October 15, 1981 the U.S. sponsored the largest naval maneuvers ever conducted by Western
forces during peacetime. Codenamed "Ocean Venture 81," the exercises involved over 120,000 troops, 250 ships, and
1,000 aircraft from 14 countries, and ranged from the South Atlantic to the Caribbean to the Baltic Sea. The massive
show of power in the Caribbean was coordinated by Rear Admiral Robert P. McKenzie, Commander of the
Caribbean Contingency Joint Task Force.
Claiming that the maneuvers in the Caribbean were in response to increasing Cuban power in the area, the U.S.
targeted its "fictitous" war game scenario against Cuba, codenamed "Red," and Grenada and the Grenadines,
codenamed "Amber and the Amberdines."
On November 15 the U.S.S. Dwight Eisenhower, a nuclear-powered carrier which the captain claimed was "one of
the most awesome weapons systems in the world," paid an official visit to Barbados. The Barbados Peace Committee
and .he Movement for National Liberation (MONALI) met the ship with banners that proclaimed "Hands Off
Grenada and Cuba" and "Caribbean Must be a Zone of Peace." The two groups sent a letter of protest to Prime
Minister Tom Adams which said in part, "At a time when the Ronald Reagan government is one of the few
governments in the world supporting the racist South African state and its continuing attacks on Angola, your
government is trying to cozy up to the Yankee warmongers."
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Interview:
Salvadoran Deserter Discloses
Green Beret Torture Role
For a long time documented reports of massacres h1' ttte
.Salvadoran armed forces and death squads have been
commonplace. Suggestions that U.S_ "advisers "have been
involved were invariahl y denied h y the Reagan administra-
tion. But readers of the establishment press were shocked
ht' a dispatch from Raymond Bonner in the January 11
New York Times which placed ('.S. Special Forces Green
Berets at classes devised to teach methods of torture to
Salvadoran soldiers. Bonner had interviewed an army de-
serter in Mexico City who described the classes in detail.
The implications 0/ this, shift iron, indiscriminate killing
to deliberate torture are significant. During the 6 ietnanm
war ('. S. troops and CIA "police advisers" regularly en-
gaged in torture to try to obtain information. And, as the
Dan Mitrione incident in Uruguay makes clear, U.S. ad-
visers have in the past shown their clients how effective
torture can he both in obtaining information and in intimi-
dating the population. The role of Argentina in South
Africa and El Salvador, discussed elsewhere in this issue,
also confirms this development in the strategr of the Sal-
vadoran junta.
Moreover, in further taped interviews with other jour-
nalists, Bonnery source, 21-year-old Carlos Antonio
Gomez Montano, implicated some of the Green Berets
directly in the commission of torture. These interviews
were first reported in the January 1982 issue of El Salvador
Alert, the publication of the Committee in Solidarity with
the People of El Salvador. CAIB has obtained the tran-
script of the critical interview, and what follows are the
portions dealing with the participation of the U.S. troops.
Gomez was drafted into the Salvadoran army in De-
cember 1980, and was jailed the following April. In May
some friends helped him escape, and he spent the next
several weeks traveling through El Salvador, Guatemala,
and 114exico, where a refugee aid group has helped him to
settle.
In El Salvador I was cited to report to the barracks. At
the same time, my brother was involved with the guerrilla
struggle. Before I entered into the military, my brother was
a guerrilla fighter. He told me many times, why didn't I
incorporate into the guerrilla struggle, for the people'? I
said, "No, I didn't like those sorts of things." A few months
later I got a citation from the army that I had to report in
February to the barracks. I did not answer the summons in
February, was summoned again and finally had to go in
December of 1980. So I went and presented myself.
After we were there they taught us how to handle the
rifles, different types of formations, working the streets.
They brought us out to the different towns to carry out
searches. After a month, they taught us a course in anti-
guerrilla warfare. Many of my friends went on this course
to Panama but I didn't go. After they returned, there was
another course that I took which was for paratroopers.
After that course, they taught us a lot of tactics
advancing, retreating, military tactics. After that they gave
us uniforms and boots that came from the U.S.,
camouflage uniforms. There they gave us some classes
about the war in Vietnam how we should act on the
battlefield. What they told us was that we shouldn't have
mercy on anyone, whether it be children or women or men,
but you have to kill all of them.
Many times we would go into the mountains. I saw many
things in relation to the officials, the officers. They took the
young men and women from the houses and brought them
to the barracks and afterwards they tortured them and
killed them.
Later we had a welcome for the Green Berets. That day
was the day of the soldier. They formed all of us up in
columns. We had a homage for those who had fallen and
for those still alive, too. They got us up for this to greet
these Green Berets who came from the U.S. The officers
said they would be able to teach you a new tactic. We didn't
have any idea what this new tactic was, we thought it was
something else. The first time they brought us to a volcano
and they brought us to the slopes of the volcano so that we
were going to combat with the guerrilla fighters. The Green
Berets didn't go into combat: they were just behind
teaching us how to do these things. They would criticize us
as to what was good and what was bad. We passed five days
on a volcano. There were 600 of us--in all, 5,000. Of those,
there were many who didn't return. There were lots of
soldiers who were killed.
Six days later we returned to the barracks and then they
began to teach us how to torture. One evening they went
and got nine young people that were accused of being
guerrillas and brought them to where we were. This was
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more or less the last time that I had to see very well the type
of torture they carried out against the guerrillas. The first
one they brought-a young fellow who was around 15 or
16 years old and the first thing they did was to stick the
bayone:s under his fingernails and pulled them out. That
day he was the first one that died under torture. This young
fellow said all sorts of things against them to let him go.
The officers said "We are going to teach you how to
mutilate and how to teach a lesson to these guerrillas." The
officers who were teaching us this were the American
Green Berets. They didn't speak Spanish so they spoke
English and then another officer-Salvadoran-translated
it into Spanish for us. Then they began to torture this
young fellow. They took out their knives and stuck them
under Lis fingernails. After they took his fingernails off,
then they broke his elbows. Afterwards they gouged out his
eyes. Then they took their bayonets and made all sorts of
slices in his skin all around his chest, arms, and legs. They
then took his hair off and the skin of his scalp. When they
saw there was nothing left to do with him, they threw
gasoline on him and burned him. The next day his dead
body wasn't around but was found by people out in the
streets--left in the street.
The r.ext day they started the same thing with a 13-year-
old girl. They did more or less the same, but they did other
things to her, too. First, she was utilized, raped by all the
officers. They stripped her and threw her in a small room,
they went in one by one. Afterwards they took her out tied
and blindfolded. Then they began the same mutilating
pulling her fingernails out and cutting off her fingers,
breaking her arms, gouging out her eyes and all they did to
the other fellow. They cut her legs and stuck an iron rod
into her womb. The last one that they killed that day
suffered more, because they stripped him naked at mid-
day. There they put him on this hot tin and made him lie
there he was like cooking. After about a half-hour, when
they finally took him off, he was all covered with blisters
like wounds. They did different types of torture to him.
Then they threw him out alive at 14,000 feet altitude from a
helicopter. He was alive and tied. They go and they throw
them out over the sea.
Q: Can you give a better description of the Green
Berets? Names, numbers, anything?
A: 13on't know their names, but there were eight. The
officers knew. There was only one of the eight that could
speak Spanish. They were all white there were some
Blacks, but I don't know where they were from. The eight
U.S. Green Berets that were there were all white. They
dressed themselves the same as any soldier. One of them
sort of gave orders but they didn't have any indication of
their rank.
Q: Did they rape the women too?
A: No, they only taught.
Q: Did they do the fingernail pulling?
A: It was one of the Green Berets doing the teaching.
The Green Beret did the torture on the first one and then
the others did the tortures on the others.
Q: Were there any other Americans involved?
A: Some sergeants there spoke English but I never knew
much about them. They arrived to teach classes on how to
use the helicopters.
Q: Are you sure the Green Berets were with the U.S.
Army, or were they mercenaries?
A: I think they belonged to the U.S. Army because our
officers searched us very well and told us not to talk about
the presence of the U.S. Army there; they prohibited us
from speaking about this.
A Luta Continua
Unaffected by the imminent passage of the
Intelligence Identities Protection Act, a group of
European researchers have begun to expose light
cover CIA officers serving in U.S. embassies. The
first public appearance of this group was at a
November press conference in San Jose, Costa Rica,
at which a list of 225 present and former case officers
in Central America and the Caribbean was made
public, complete with extensive biographies.
The material included 13 currently active opera-
tives in Nicaragua: 6 in El Salvador; and 4 in
Honduras. Despite cries of protest from the
Americans, details, including lists of names, were
published in the regional media. The U.S. media were
noticeably silent about the details of the press
conference, except to report unsubstantiated claims
by the U.S. Embassy in Managua that the press
conference must have been linked to a visit by Philip
Agee to Nicaragua some weeks earlier. The
Embassy's wrath was generated by the publication in
the Managua papers of all the names exposed as
present or former CIA operatives in Nicaragua, with,
in several instances, photographs.
White Paper?
Whitewash!
Philip Agee on the CIA
and El Salvador
The CIA's history of document falsifications;
the use of AIFLD as a CIA front; the CIA's work
with paramilitary and terrorist gangs; and a line-
by-line analysis of the State Department "White
Paper" and the "captured" documents. The re-
search which proved the White Paper was a fraud.
Includes complete White Paper with exhibits and
State Department Dissent Pager; 220 pages; paper-
back: $6.50 plus $1.50 postage and handling;
hardcover: $12.95 plus $1.75 postage and hand-
ling.
Order from: Deep Cover Publications, P.O. Box
677, New York, NY 10013.
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White Paper II:
Administration Stonewalls
While Covert Operations Escalate
By Bill Schaap
The Reagan-Haig State Department is nothing if not
persistent. Its February White Paper on communist influ-
ence in El Salvador was demolished last spring and
summer by commentators from the left, right, and center.
Yet by October a new version on the same theme was
launched amid considerable diplomatic fanfare. The re-
port, originally entitled "Cuba's Covert Operations in
Latin America," was first submitted to NATO representa-
tives at the October 14-16 Brussels meeting on Latin Amer-
ican exports. On November 8, in the form of a confidential
cable, it was sent to all major U.S. embassies; on December
14, now slightly revised and entitled "Cuba's Renewed
Support for Violence in the Hemisphere," it was submitted
to the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Shortly thereaf-
ter it was released publicly as a State Department Special
Report.
This "research paper" avoids some of the more egregious
errors of the February White Paper -conclusions unsup-
ported or even contradicted by the supporting"evidence" -
by the simple expedient of providing no evidence what-
soever to support its conclusions. And it did not charge
that Cuban troops or advisors were actually in El Salvador,
ignoring the frequently repeated fabrication that Cuban
forces had blown up a bridge inside El Salvador. As News-
week magazine (December 1, 1981) conceded, "earlier re-
ports of Cuban troops [in El Salvador] were simply untrue,
says one U.S. official."
In attempting to avoid the criticisms which had been
leveled at the White Paper, the charges were "monumental-
ly hollow, and presented without factual or analytical sup-
port."[Latin American Regional Reports Carihbean, Jan-
uary 15, 1982.] Some allegations were so far-fetched that
they were denied by the putative sources. The paper
claimed that in 1978 Guyana had expelled "five or seven"
Cuban diplomats; this was flatly denied by the Guyanese
government. The paper repeated Edward Seaga's preelec-
tion claim that there were as many as 500 Cuban advisors in
Jamaica under the Manley government, but failed to point
out that Seaga himself has now admitted this charge was
untrue.
Psychological Warfare
Despite the unconvincing nature of this new presenta-
tion, however, it was, as Newsweek noted, "an exercise in
psychological warfare" designed to leave the Cubans and
the Nicaraguans wondering what the U.S. will do next. In
that respect it is consistent with the current and dangerous
theme that the United States is maintaining various op-
tions regarding the Caribbean Basin. For many observers
have noted that a strong, coordinated destabilization pro-
gram, aimed in the first instance at Nicaragua, is not an
"option" but a reality.
This thesis is strengthened by the administration's ad-
missions that it wants to keep Cuba and Nicaragua guess-
ing. "Let them worry," said Gen. Vernon Walters, Secre-
tary Haig's roving envoy. "We believe that constructive
ambiguity is a very powerful weapon in American foreign
policy." When Assistant Secretary of State Thomas O.
Enders addressed a foreign policy conference of out-of-
town journalists in Washington October 29, he pointedly
noted, "Our policy towards Cuba is under very active
consideration. You haven't heard the last of this at all."
The policy has kept not only Cuba and Nicaragua but
also Congress guessing. On November 12 Haig appeared
before Rep. Michael Barnes's subcommittee of the House
Foreign Affairs Committee. Despite repeated attempts to
pin him down, Haig would not reject the possibility of
direct involvement in the destabilization or overthrow of
Nicaragua. Barnes was so taken aback he stated, "If I were
a Nicaraguan. I would be building my bomb shelter." A
number of liberal Democrats wrote to the President ex-
pressing "shock" that the administration was "considering
military actions in response to the apparent stalemate in El
Salvador," and a bipartisan group of Committee members,
including Chairman Clement Zablocki, wrote to the Presi-
dent to register their "concern over possible U.S. actions
directed against Nicaragua."
The Numbers Game
To the United States, where the biggest is so often consid-
ered the best, numbers have become an important part of
the psychological war. The new international airport under
construction in Grenada is invariably referred to as "huge"
or "mammoth," even though it is no bigger than several
other Caribbean airports, and the minimum necessary to
accommodate jumbo jet passenger planes. Similarly, there
is being waged a scare campaign over the size of the Cuban
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and Nicaraguan armies. Nicaraguan hopes for a force of
50,000 were described in November by Undersecretary of
State James Buckley as "just huge." And Max Singer, the
reactionary deputy director of the Hudson Institute, said
(Washington Post, December 23, 1981) that the resulting
army will be "overwhelmingly the most powerful military
force between Colombia and Mexico." Singer is the only
well-known academic moronic enough not only to refer to
the Duarte regime as "El Salvador's revolutionary govern-
ment," but also to call its sadistic and barbaric armed
forces "the revolutionary army."
U.S. "adviser," identified as Cpt. Mike Sheehan, at refugee
camp on Honduras-Salvador border.
El Salvador is the United States, which continues to pump
millions of dollars worth of military equipment into the
country.
Sea Lanes, Mexico, and Other Hyperbole
The desperation with which the U.S. views the conflict in
El Salvador has led to some dire predictions, which can
only be thwarted by incessant escalation of U.S. involve-
ment. When Thomas Enders presented the research paper
to Congress on December 14 he was dramatic: "If, after
Nicaragua, El Salvador is captured by a violent minority,
what state in Central America will be able to resist'? How
long would it be before the major strategic U.S. interests--
the canal, sea lanes, oil supplies -were at risk'?" Under
questioning, Enders confirmed that military contingency
planning has been undertaken, but would not say whether
military options had "become policy."
The next day Undersecretary of Defense Fred C. Ikle
appeared before the same subcommittee in a far more
bombastic mood than Enders. "It would be it grave mis-
take," he said, "if we ignored the direct military threat that
this Soviet-Cuban arsenal represents, some 90 miles to the
south of Florida." Ikle, who was making the pitch for
further funding of the war in El Salvador, "far in excess"of
existing authorizations, described at length the shipping
paths and oil refineries of the Caribbean, as well as the
Navy's need for secure maritime operations in the region.
As noted elsewhere in this issue, Constantine Menges
was an early exponent of the new Central American dorm-
no theory. The theory was implicit in the testimony of
Enders and Ikle, and was explicit in the Max Singer col-
umn noted above. Singer predicted that if the government
of El Salvador fell, there would be "little possibility" of
preventing the same results in Guatemala and Honduras.
"Then," he continued, "drastic polarization is likely to be
started in Mexico ... violent conflict ... not likely to be
without serious security implications for the United
States."
Wh .t these critics never discuss is the size of the U.S.
armed forces, or the constant threats of invasion by the
U.S., or the boasts of the bands of mercenaries openly
training throughout the United States and in Honduras
and Guatemala. When Enders asked Nicaragua's Foreign
Minister Miguel D'Escoto why Nicaragua was building up
its army, he replied, "to defend ourselves in case you invade
us." To which Enders responded, "In that case you are
wasting your time, because we are one hundred times
bigger than you."
Somewhat surprisingly the new "research paper" per-
petuates the most discredited theme of the White Paper,
that Cuba and Nicaragua are responsible for a "massive"
flow of arms to the revolutionary forces in El Salvador.
The paper gives no documentation of this charge, except
for a reference to the White Paper itself. The theme was
reiterated by Secretary Haig in his December 4 speech to
the OAS meeting in St. Lucia: "Meanwhile, the principle of
non-intervention is being violated as arms, ammunition,
and other military supplies flow from Nicaragua to the
Salvadoran insurgents." These assertions continue to be
made even though the only proven, admitted intervener in
Plotting in Nicaragua
The U.S. line that Cuba and Nicaragua were destabiliz-
ing Central America was dealt a rude setback in January
when Nicaraguan security forces uncovered plots to sabo-
tage major industrial plants, and bomb Nicaraguan civil
airliners. The bombers, who damaged an AeroNica plane
in Mexico City before it took off, were CIA-trained Cuban
exiles, including some connected to the 1976 Cubana
bombing in Barbados. They were connected to the exile
group CORU, nominally headed by Orlando Bosch.
The plot to sabotage an oil refinery and a cement plant
involved Somocistas and Venezuelan, Honduran, Salva-
doran, and Argentine officials. Two of the would-be sabo-
teurs, captured with hundreds of sticks of dynamite and
other paraphernalia, implicated the diplomats and
soldiers including military intelligence officers in their
confessions, leading to intensive discussions between Nica-
raguan and Venezuelan officials. Nicaraguan Interior Min-
ister Tomas Borge publicly stated that relations between
the two countries should not be disturbed, as the Venezue-
lans involved were clearly working for the CIA, not for
their government.
Other evidence of CIA-style operations emerged. The
leader of the Miskito separatists, Steadman Fagoth, a
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former Somoza agent, had fled his base on the Atlantic
coast region of Nicaragua for Honduras. From there he
frequently broadcasts on a stridently anti-Sandinista clan-
destine radio station. He has denied accusations that the
station is a CIA-Honduran operation, however, on De-
cember 20 he was injured in the crash of a Honduran
military transport plane, near the Nicaraguan border. A
number of Honduran officers were also on board.
The creation of "dissident" groups within Nicaragua,
including those Miskitos taken in by Fagoth's propaganda,
is very important to the would-be destabilizers. An un-
named State Department official quoted by the San Fran-
cisco Examiner said that a naval blockade against Nicara-
gua would be "impractical unless it was connected to some
uprisings in Nicaragua ... unless parts of Nicaragua were
taken by anti-Sandinista guerrillas." A blockade might
then be justified to "prevent outside intervention."
What Does It Mean?
The U.S. campaign and its rhetoric are carefully timed
and coordinated. Despite constant exposures of its med-
dling, the U.S. insists that its plans are undecided and its
options flexible. The impression that the administation is
uncommitted is fraudulent, and can only be aimed at les-
sening the vigilance of the targets of its covert operations.
While open and direct military invasion of either Cuba or
Nicaragua may be politically impractical, the intention is
to prepare public opinion in the U.S. for anything short of
such action. But those operations have already begun,
despite the failure to convince the public, the Congress, or
the media of the viability of the U.S. position.
There is, it seems, an attempt to catch up to the reality
with the propaganda. Critics of U.S. involvement in the
Central American struggles, especially those who see the
striking comparisons to early U.S. involvement in Viet-
nam, must work to assure that the media and the people
will continue to expose the administration's hypocrisy. -
KKK (continued from page 50)
ties might have looked the other way and permitted the
attempt. Some aspects of the plot that are still being kept
secret are suggestive. Why, for example, of the 12, 40, or 80
backers of the coup, depending on which report you choose
to believe, were only two indicted by the grand jury'? Why
are the identities of the others not disclosed? Perhaps be-
cause the U.S. government has something to hide.
Similarly, why was no action taken against the unidenti-
fied "several others" the Los Angeles Times said refused to
answer the grand jury's questions? In this respect David
Duke is a significant figure. He was central to the original
plot and never denied his role in it: he rebuffed the grand
jury, yet no action at all was taken against him. This plus
the highly suspicious fact that Duke sent Perdue to a boat
captain who was an ATF informer lends some credibility to
old charges leveled by Duke's Klan rivals that he's a gov-
ernment agent. 1f so, it would suggest that the U.S. looked
favorably on the intentions of this ragtag band of Klans-
men, Nazis, and gangsters as long as they kept their sights
firmly set on Grenada.
One cannot be certain, however. It seems unlikely that a
group this weak and incompetent could pose a significant
military threat to the Grenada revolution, even if assisted
by Eric Gairy's fifth column on the island. But a failure by
such a group is likely to sharpen the alertness of Grenadi-
ans to the threat their country faces from the U.S. Prime
Minister Maurice Bishop documented the seriousness of
the danger in a letter to then U.N. Secretary General Kurt
Waldheim last August. He pointed out that the U.S.
NATO military manuever called "Ocean Venture 81," the
largest such exercise since World War Iwo, had as its
target a fictional group of Caribbean islands called Amber
and the Amberdines, a thinly disguised reference to Grena-
da and the Grenadines. The practice amphibious landing
took place on the southeastern tip of the Puerto Rican
island Vieques, which corresponds to an area of Grenada
that actually is called Amber. Other equally obvious sim-
ilarities were shown. With an attack of this magnitude
being practiced, it does seem improbable that a small and
inept band of mercenaries would be considered a serious
U.S. option.
Another puzzle the U.S. hasn't answered concerns two
unidentified members of the invading party. Perdue con-
tracted with Howell to transport twelve, yet only ten were
arrested. Who were the other two? One was probably Cana-
dian Klan leader Alex McQuirter. He had originally been
slated to lead one of the mercenary groups, but couldn't
join the group in New Orleans because he was barred from
the U.S. in January 1981. What about number twelve`? No
one has yet identified the missing mercenary.
There remains, finally, the question of what action the
Canadian government will take, if any. At our press time a
representative of the Ontario attorney general's office told
CAIB, "There has been an active investigation for a
number of months. It is rapidly drawing to a close, and
there will either be action or an announcement in the
immediate future. Beyond that we cannot comment."
Americans in Managua demonstrate before U.S. Embassy
for end to covert actions.
FLASH: As CAIB went to press, it was learned that the
Canadian authorities had brought charges against Alex
McQuirter and Charles Yanover.
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Constantine Menges
CIA Ideologue
By David Arthur*
In an almost unprecedented action, three U.S. Senators
have complained to CIA Director William Casey that a
December 10 briefing they received on the Caribbean "se-
riously violated" the Agency's obligation to provide them
with ar objective analysis.
The three Democrats, Paul Tsongas (Mass.), Claiborne
Pell (R.I.), and Christopher Dodd (Conn.), charged in a
December I I letter to Casey that the closed session briefing
for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee "evidenced a
rhetorical tone and selective use of information which bor-
dered on policy prescription rather than a straightforward
analysis; of available intelligence data."
The briefing was to present "evidence" of charges leveled
in the Reagan administration's controversial White Paper
on Cuban influence in Latin America and to assess U.S.
political and military options in Central America and the
Caribbean. Congressional committees often ask the CIA to
provide them with background material on important mat-
ters relating to national security. These briefings, accord-
ing to the letter, should present a "professional, impartial,
and balanced approach to highly controversial and sensi-
tive issues. These vigorous standards insure the separation
of intelligence assessment from foreign policy advocacy ..."
The briefing was delivered by the CIA's National Intelli-
gence Officer for Latin America, Constantine Menges. The
letter characterized Menges's spoken presentation as one
that "undermines his credibility as a National Intelligence
Officer and calls into question his further effectiveness."
Some o iservers believe that Menges's presentation further
encourz.ges the view that the Reagan administration has
politiciu.ed the CIA by bringing in ideological conservatives
to fill sensitive posts.
Menges, 42, officiallyjoined the CIA in September 1981
after se:?ving as a policy analyst at the conservative think
tank, the Hudson Institute, and as an editor of Interna-
tional Strategic Issues, a monthly newsletter published by
SAGE Associates focusing on strategic risk assessment for
U.S. businesses. Over the years Menges's writings have
often borne strong resemblance to the Agency's official
views on matters pertaining to U.S. interests in Latin
America.
Menges received a Ph.D. in government and political
economy from Columbia University and studied at the
school's Russian Institute war and peace studies program
before becoming an assistant professor at the University of
*David Arthur is a freelance writer living in Washington, DC.
Copyright ? 1982 by David Arthur.
Wisconsin in the mid-1960s. In 1967 hejoined the staff of
the RAND Corporation where he authored two studies on
agrarian reform in pre-Allende Chile. During the same
period he served as a consultant to VP,I Films Inc. of Los
Angeles and co-directed a documentary on 'successful"
economic development projects in Latin America.
Between 1970 and 1975 Menges held several posts as a
special assistant in various offices of the then Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. His duties there, ac-
cording to Menges, "included innovative work for [then]
Secretary Caspar Weinberger on linkages between work
and education." Menges joined the Hudson Institute in
1979.
The Hudson Institute is well-connected to the defense
and intelligence complex. Staffed by more than 40 profes-
sional "analysts," several of whom have worked at the
Pentagon or the CIA, the Institute is endowed by more
than 40 major multinational corporations, such as Exxon,
AT&T, Mitsui, the Royal Bank of Canada, and the Bank
of America. Stern magazine (November 13, 1980) reported
that since 1975 the Institute has received contracts primari-
ly from the U.S. defense agencies (up to 40%) and Ameri-
can oil and weapons firms. The Institute performs a wide
range of classified research on national and international
energy and national security issues.
Even before the election of Ronald Reagan, Menges had
worked vigorously to support a more hard-line policy in
Central America. In October 1980 Menges sent a letter
(reprinted in CA lB Number 12) to then Assistant Secretary
of State for Inter-American Affairs William Bowdler urg-
ing him to send "credible, well-informed individuals" to
meet with democratic socialist leaders in Western Europe
in order to begin a "more active and time-urgent effort to
achieve changes in the Socialist International position on
the extreme left in El Salvador and Central America."Two
of the individuals recommended by Menges, Roy
Prosterman and Mike Hammer, were consultants with the
AIFLD program in El Salvador at that time. Hammer and
two other AIFLD officials were gunned down by a right-
wing death squad in a San Salvador coffee shop on Janu-
ary 4, 1981.
The first issue of Menges's International Strategic Issues
was published in April 1980, a few months before the State
Department's controversial White Paper on El Salvador,
"Communist Military Intervention," had received a tho-
rough discrediting in the media. In the newsletter the au-
thor cited a May 1979 CIA report that "Cuba has intensi-
fied its efforts to unify insurgent groups, not only in Nica-
ragua where Cuba has concentrated its efforts, but in
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Guatemala as well." Menges's vision of falling dominoes in
Central America culminated in a "tactical scenario of [the]
destabilization" of Mexico, which Menges ominously calls
the "Iran next door." He warns of the potential that by
1983 "a new revolutionary government in Mexico could
offer non-intervention in American affairs ... if the same is
strictly observed by the United States."
Menges's prescriptions for C.S. policy in the region were
brought out in a discussion held on January 7, 1981 at the
Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars. He
argued that U.S. policy "must find the middle ground
between the unrealistic interventionism of a crusade and
the merely routine diplomatic relations in all situations
short of visible crisis." Between the extremes of normal
diplomatic relations on the one hand and what Menges
called "direct help to counteract externally supported desta-
bilizing forces" on the other, a level of involvement which
might he necessary in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Menges
posits two levels of useful government and private action in
which the U.S. "can support democratic forces and weaken
those seeking to polarize the hemisphere into either com-
munist or authoritarian regimes."
One level would utilize discretionary resources such as
information, communication, and cultural exchange pro-
grams to nurture "democratic groups" systematically. An
example cited by Menges was the AIFLD program. A
second level of activity would be focused on specific coun-
tries of interest and would involve the establishment of
semi-autonomous foundations modeled on the West Ger-
man Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Konrad Adenauer
Stiftung "which would act separately from the official dip-
lomatic presence." The functions of such organizations,
"which could be performed at comparatively modest
costs," were spelled out in detail, and included: increasing
"the sense of solidarity among the existing democratic
governments in Latin America;" building "links between
newly legalized political parties, trade unions, voluntary
associations, and their democratic counterparts in Latin
American nations;" encouraging "democratic opposition
groups through publication and distribution of their writ-
ings and invitations to travel in the democracies;" "com-
municating the facts of successful social and economic
performance in the democracies and the repression, pover-
ty, corruption and elite privilege of communist regimes
such as Cuba;" providing "appropriate accurate informa-
tion to leaders of democratic groups when extremists make
efforts to penetrate and obtain control:" "providing advi-
sorv help in the conduct of fair elections, monitoring servi-
ces, and establishment of independent parties and media:"
and "reaching out to students and workers from Latin
American countries while they are temporarily studying or
residing in the U.S."
These functions read like a detailed list of covert opera-
tions by the CIA in Latin America for decades. It is particu-
larly interesting that the foundations and organizations
cited by Menges have long been suspected of deep links
with the CIA and other western intelligence agencies, and
in the case of AIFLD such charges are well-documented.
In their letter to Casey, the three Senators asked the CIA
Director to review Menges's testimony and inform them of
any actions to be taken by the CIA regarding future brief-
ings by Menges. The CIA, the Senators, and Menges all
declined to comment on the briefing or the letter. But
right-wing Senator Jesse Helms who chaired the session in
question called it "one of the best presentations I've heard.
It wasn't an attempt to brainwash any Senator . . . The
problem for these Senators was that they were hearing
things they didn't want to hear about the communist take-
over in this hemisphere."
Menges now "official" after years of toeing Agency line.
In mid-January Casey replied in writing. While he did
not repudiate any of Menges's remarks, he reportedly ac-
knowledged his "inexperience" and even hinted that the
CIA had been pressured to take Menges on in such a
sensitive position. Though this may have been intended to
mollify the ruffled Senators, it is unlikely to do so.
Despite the flap, however, the administration remained
undaunted in its insistence that Cuba is the "source" (in
Secretary Haig's words) of instability in Central America.
Only four days after the Menges briefing, Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders
appeared before the Subcommittee on Western Hemi-
sphere Affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
He told his audience about several major developments in
the Caribbean Basin that have created, in his words, a
"state of danger." One, he said, "is the new Cuban strategy
for uniting the left in the countries of the region, commit-
ting it to violence, arming it, training it in warfare, and
attempting to use it for the destruction of existing
governments."
Thus advocacy and rhetoric continue to characterize the
administration's presentations to Congress, despite the in-
herent dangers recognized by the Senators who com-
plained.
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Deceit and Secrecy:
Cornerstones of U.S. Policy
By Bill Schaap
It is a political error to practice deceit
i1' deceit is carried
too %ar.
- Frederick the Great, 1740
To dismiss unpleasant truths as lies spread by the oppo-
sition is a political reflex, but the Reagan administration
has elevated this reflex to an obsession. Those who agree
with the government's ideological underpinnings are tell-
ing the truth, those who disagree are lying. They are not
only liars but also, as we shall explain below, foreign
agents.
The current craze centers around the formerly obscure
term, "disinformation." While the U.S. government takes
the position that disinformation is a Soviet invention and
that the Soviets are the major practitioners, in fact dis-
information has been a U.S. specialty since the days of the
World War II OSS, which had an entire branch devoted to
Current estimates of the CIA's budget suggest that earlier
figures were far too low. While studies of materials relating
to the late 1960s and early I970s suggested an annual CIA
budget of one to two billion dollars [see CA/B Numbers 4
and 7]. current conservative estimates, such as that of
Defense Electronics (December 1981), indicate that a fig-
ure of ten billion dollars is more accurate for the CIA, and
"in excess of $70 billion annually" represents "the overall
intelligence budget." Perhaps one-fourth of the CIA's
budget. nearly three billion dollars, is being devoted each
year by the CIA to the spread of disinformation, through
what it terms "deception operations." This is exclusive of
the expenditures in this area by the State Department itself
and its subsidiary, the International Communications
Agency (ICA), parent of the Voice of America (VOA).
The first major disinformation operation of the Reagan
administration was the El Salvador campaign, epitomized
by the State Department's "White Paper."The second was
the Libya campaign, exemplified by the "hit squad" story.
Early in the Reagan administration the State Depart-
ment launched its campaign to "prove" that the Salvador-
an revolutionary forces were creatures of external forces,
most notably the Soviets and the Cubans. The flimsy "evi-
dence" presented in the White Paper was subsequently
demolished, most notably in Philip Agee's "White Paper"
Whitewash!" Within a few months the establishment
media joined in the attack, and despite sporadic attempts
to revive it, the White Paper is no longer taken seriously.
The Libya campaign is another story.
Qaddafi was targeted from first days of Reagan
administration.
The Libyan Hit Squad
In the Spring and Summer of 1981 numerous news re-
ports circulated suggesting various U.S. plots against the
Libyan government, and its leader, Col. Muammar Qad-
dafi. While U.S. hostility to Libya was real to the point of
paranoia, and while many of the reports were undoubtedly
true, most perplexing was the public nature of the disclo-
sures. In light of subsequent events, it now appears that the
threats and plots were publicized in order to argue later
that they formed the "justification" for Libyan actions
against the United States. As early as April 6, 1981, U.S.
News and World Report said that the U.S., with Egyptian
logistical support, funneled arms to anti-Qaddafi forces in
Chad and the Sudan. At the same time, the U.S. openly
made major arms deals with Morocco, another bitter foe of
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Libya. In May the U.S. expelled all Libyan diplomats from
the country, and stories circulated that the U.S. planned to
assist Egypt in a move to overthrow Qaddafi.
On July 8 Assistant Secretary of State for African Af-
fairs Chester Crocker testified before Congress that the
U.S. would "help" any country that opposed Libya, and
announced the sale of weapons to Tunisia "to defend itself"
against Libya.
Then, on July 26, details were leaked of the CIA's plans
to destabilize the Qaddafi government. Although this plot
was denied by the U.S. administration (see article on the
Seychelles in this issue) the complicated plans surely had a
basis in fact. Indeed, as Don Oberdorfer reported in the
Washington Post (August 20, 1981): "The first inter-
departmental foreign policy study ordered by the incoming
Reagan administration early this year considered what the
United States should do to oppose Libya and its militant,
unconventional leader, Col. Muammar Qaddafi. A few
months later, authoritative sources reported that the ad-
ministration had drawn up plans to `make life uncomforta-
ble,' at a minimum, for the leader of radical Libya."
Also in August, U.S. planes shot down two Libyan
aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra, after creating a deliberately
provocative situation--announced two days in advance by
Newsweek magazine.
Jack Anderson elaborated in his August 25 column,
noting that, despite the Mauritania-Mauritius explana-
tion, "the CIA plotters still have Qaddafi in their sights."
There have been, he said, "whispers about slipping an
assassin into Libya to do away with Qaddafi. One scheme
would be to have the hit man pose as a mercenary and join a
ring of mercenaries in Qaddafi's employ."
According to the Oberdorfer article, and the October 4
Parade Magazine, a Libyan group called the Free Unionist
Officers responded to the revelations by issuing a statement
which concluded, "we will physically liquidate anyone who
may even think of harming Qaddafi, beginning with Ron-
ald Reagan and ending with the smallest agent inside Libya
or outside."
Anderson followed the Parade item with a self-described
"bombshell" in his October 8 column. Col. Qaddafi, he
reported, "has placed President Ronald Reagan at the top
of a hit list and is plotting his death." He said that the
National Security Agency had advised the White House
during the summer that Reagan was the target of an assas-
sination, and that this was why the President would not be
attending the upcoming funeral of Anwar Sadat.
It took nearly two months for the bombshell to have any
real repercussions, some of them instigated by Anderson
himself. In late November both NBC News and Newsweek
reported unusual security precautions involving President
Reagan and Vice-President Bush, and linked the precau-
tions to intelligence reports that a Libyan hit squad was on
its way. On November 22 the Secret Service--whose re-
sponsibilities include protection of top officials- reported
that it was "aware" of the reports, and investigating them.
On November 27, the FBI confirmed the heightened securi-
ty measures, but said they were "a precaution, not a reac-
tion to specific information that a band of foreign terrorists
is roaming the countryside."
On November 28 the Washington Post reported that
Middle East intelligence sources had provided a list of six
names, comprising a hit team entering, or already inside,
the U.S. On December 4 the New York Times reported that
the team was made up of five people, and the same day
ABC News reported that the government had "names and
pictures." Shortly thereafter, Jack Anderson released the
pictures- rough drawings- which were being circulated to
police and immigration authorities.
Although the Libyan government vigorously denied the
reports, the U.S. insisted it had detailed evidence of what
was now described as a "10-man squad." The government
refused, and has continued to refuse, to reveal any of the
details.
The first real skepticism in the establishment media was
found in a December 7 Washington Post article by Michael
Getter. The reports, he said, were "a source of puzzlement."
Some analysts doubted, he pointed out, that Libya would
back such a scheme which, if discovered, could lead to
massive retaliation by the United States. Moreover, Getler
continued, "if such an assassination plan actually were in
effect, it likely would be a most closely guarded secret, and
the ability of an informant to obtain the kind of detailed
information on each squad member, as is now circulating,
is viewed as highly unlikely. Furthermore, a 10-man team is
viewed by some specialists as too large, offering too great a
chance for slip-ups by one or two members." It was also
pointed out that the reliability of the informant, who was
allegedly in CIA custody and asking for both asylum and
money, was questionable.
Doubts were so widespread now that the December 8
Washington Post carried a page-one commentary by
Haynes Johnson entitled, "The Believe It or Not Show."
The hit squad stories, Johnson noted, "are setting a new
standard of incredibility." He was most concerned about a
possible U.S. military action against Libya: "It's almost as
if public opinion were being prepared for dramatic
action say a strike against Libya or Qaddafi himself...
the U.S. rhetoric about the threats emanating from Qadda-
fi's Libya has been increasing in volume and severity. It is
reminiscent of the talk about Castro in the days when the
United States was planning the Bay of Pigs invasion, and,
in fact, commissioning assassination schemes against
Castro."
Editorials varied; some applauded the precautions, some
thought they were overdone; but none would dismiss the
allegations, because as Haynes Johnson had put it, "we in
the press are hardly capable of proving or disproving the
case." The government asserted that the mysterious Carlos
was a member of the hit squad. In Robert Ludlum's 1980
best-seller, "The Bourne Identity," a captured terrorist
bargains for his life by promising information about Car-
los. And disinformation master Robert Moss's new book
includes a Libyan plan to send a hit squad into the U.S. But
truth is stranger than fiction, as a December 14 Los An-
geles Times story demonstrated. The initial leaks about the
hit squad had not come from the administration directly,
but from Mossad, Israeli intelligence. As Robert Toth
and Ronald Ostrow reported, "among the possible expla-
nations for the tips to the news media was that the Israelis
wanted to intensify the U.S. public's concern about Col.
Qaddafi so that Americans would support a strike at
Libya."
On December 10 President Reagan invalidated U.S.
passports for travel to Libya and ordered all Americans
there to leave, knowing, according to Secretary of State
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Haig, :hat U.S. allies would not go along with similar
actions.
As Lite as December 17, the President insisted at a news
conference that the intelligence information on the hit
squad was solid while still refusing to reveal any of it. He
denied any overreaction by the U.S.
Now You See Them, Now You Don't
Only one week after the President's news conference, the
December 25 Washington Post carried this headline: "Li-
byan I-lit Men Are Reported to Suspend Activity." The
article said that "U.S. analysts with access to the latest
top-secret intelligence now say the alleged Libyan hit
squads two of them, with five members each- have sus-
pended their operations, at least temporarily." Secretary of
State Haig refused to comment on the report, but said that
"if such reports are true, it underlines the validity of the
steps taken by the President." Abracadabra!
It be:ame fashionable to brag if you had never believed
the hit !quad was here at all. FBI Director William Webster
told A13C News that it was "a possibility" that the entire
story was a plant, and stressed that the FBI had never
confirmed it. White House officials tried, unsuccessfully,
to fenc off further press skepticism: "This was not an
artificial affair created by the White House to justify puni-
tive action against Libya. We believed the threat was real
when it first appeared, and we now believe it has receded."
However, they still refused to release any evidence of the
threat or of its "receding." They simply stated that the new
information came from another source.
Jack Anderson, who was responsible for more of the
hysteria than any other individual, was understandably
miffed, and in his January 7, 1982 column described how
everyone had been duped failing, of course, to mention
his owr, role. He gave six reasons why the credibility of the
threat had diminished. The source of the allegation had
demanded $500,000 for his information; he gave the names
of others who also had information for the CIA and they
turned out to be "hustlers who had been peddling phony
documents for years;" two of the names on the list of the hit
squad members were members of a Lebanese Shiite Mos-
lem see: who were sworn enemies of Qaddafi; some of the
informers had connections with Israeli intelligence "which
would have its own reasons to encourage a U.S.-Libyan
rift;" the original reports said that more detailed informa-
tion was forthcoming and nothing materialized; and, sig-
nificantly, the government's allies found the CIA findings
"unconvincing in a class with the white paper on El Sal-
vador earlier last year, which was later shown to have relied
on highly questionable and probably forged documents."
But is is the close of Anderson's column which is most
enlightening: "Footnote: There is a possibility that the CIA
was played for a sucker by its own `disinformation' cam-
paign d.rected at Qaddafi. The campaign, ordered by CIA
Director William J. Casey last May, used foreign nationals
for the dirty work. Knowing what the CIA wanted, and
without proper supervision by American agents, it's possi-
ble the CIA's foreign hirelings cooked up the `hit squad' on
their own. It fit neatly into the Reagan administration's
political scheme of things, and -voila! a full-blown inter-
national incident was born."
There are rumors that the disinformation was "con-
firmed" by Mossad and by Frank Terpil, who is reportedly
in their custody now.
Whose Disinformation?
Readers of this magazine need no elaboration of the
proposition that the U.S., and particularly the CIA, have
been masters of disinformation. Abundant detail is re-
corded in the books of Agee, Corson, Marchetti, Marks.
Stockwell, and others. But the ideologues of the Reagan
administration and their more wild-eyed supporters have
taken to spreading the line that disinformation is a tactic
Casey ordered Qaddafi destabilized-then "discovered"
hit squad.
Were Terpil and Mossad mysterious hit squad source?
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exclusive to the Soviets and their allies. For example, Reed
Irvine, chairman of perhaps the most falsely-labeled organ-
ization in Washington, Accuracy in Media (AIM), began a
recent column: "By now a lot of Americans have heard
about disinformation the measures taken by the Soviet
Union to deceive and confuse public opinion in was that
benefit Soviet foreign policy objectives." As CA . Hanson
pointed out in the Columbia Journalism Reeieo'
(September-October 1981): "According to AIM. virtually
every story that seems to slant leftwards, or is critical of the
military or of business, amounts to disinformation."
The Bible of those who foster this line is "The Spike," by
Robert Moss and Arnaud de Borchgrave (see CRIB
Numbers 10 and 12). A similar theme is found in "Target
America," by James L. Tyson, a "non-fiction" version of
"The Spike." These works and the daily outpourings of
right-wing columnists hammer the message: virtually all
media workers in the U.S. are witting agents or at best
unwitting dupes of the KGB. (Since hundreds of news-
papers carry the syndicated columns of these right-wing
journalists, the charge is a bit silly on its face.) A comment
by Adam Hochschild in the Netr York Tines (October 14,
1981) noted that when de Borchgrave accuses virtually
every liberal publication in the U.S. of disseminating KG B
disinformation, he provides "no specific examples of facts
or articles." And when he "accuses skeptical journalists of
being unwitting purveyors of disinformation, the accusa-
tion is more slippery, less easy to definitely disprove, and
less subject to libel law than if he were to accuse them of
being conscious Communist agents."
Indeed, the accusations of de Borchgrave, Moss, et al.,
are singularly lacking in any up-to-date support. Most of
the "evidence" is ten to twenty years old. De Borchgrave
and AIM continually cite the testimony of Ladislav Ritt-
man, a former Czech intelligence officer who defected
many years ago. Bittman gives no specifics, simply claim-
ing that the Soviet Union had "many"agents of influence in
the Western media. "Target America" stresses the revela-
tions of Alexander Kaznecheev, an alleged KGB officer
who defected in 1959, and spoke only of trying to get
articles friendly to the Soviet Union in the press. And
Secretary of State Haig, in his fulminations about Soviet
support for international terrorism, evidently relied on the
testimonyof Jan Sejna, a Czech army officer who fled to the
U.S. in 1968. According to the October 18, 1981 New York
Times, even the CIA criticized Haig for relying on "I0-year
old testimony." "There is no substantial new evidence," an
Agency official said.
Some of the ardent proponents of this thesis are the
"former" CIA officers turned journalists, such as Cord
Meyer and Jack Maury. One former CIA officer who did
not toe the line, Harry Rositzke, had the temerity to ques-
tion the message of Claire Sterling's turbid book. "The
Terror Network." He did not believe that the Soviet Union
was behind all the terrorism in the world. For this he was
harshly attacked by Reed Irvine and Jack Maury, among
others. Maury's response, in the September 23, 1981 Wash-
ington Post, contained some bold disinformation of his
own. He detailed the confessions of a "defector" from the
Cuban Mission to the United States; only the person about
whom he spoke, Nestor Garcia, never defected and remains
an official in the Cuban Foreign Ministry.
Newspapers, large and small, have been running features
with headlines such as "Soviets Embark on New Campaign
of Anti-American Lies" (N or'ich, Connecticut Bulletin,
April 14, 1981) Aeurswreek devoted its cover and mans
pages (November 23, 1981) to "The KGB in America."
Both the State Department and the Congress fanned the
flames. The State Department, which periodically produ-
ces reports on what it considers Soviet disinformation,
most recently issued Special Report No. 88. "Soviet 'Active
Measures:' Forgery, Disinformation, Political Opera-
tions."The Soviets, the Report pointed out. "use the bland
term 'active measures'(aktivnyyc meroprivativa) to refer to
operations intended to affect other nations policies."(W by
this is more "bland" than "special activities," the term the
United States uses for covert actions, is unclear.) Among
the active measures attributed to Sovict disinformation are
the opposition to the NATO theater nuclear force in Eu-
rope, opposition to the neutron bomb, and opposition to
"U.S. efforts to assist the Government of El Salvador."
That the U.S. government ~iews these positions, held by
millions of people around the world, as Soviet dis-
information would be humorous, were the stakes not so
high, and the Reaganites not so serious. It was President
Reagan, after all, who saw an international conspiracy to
oppose U.S. policy on El Salvador because demonstrators
in Canada carried "the same signs"as demonstrators in the
U.S.: "U.S. Out of El Salvador."
Reports of it similar nature appear periodically in the
Congressional Record: right-wing legislators such as Larry
McDonald, John Ashbrook, and John Porter insert copies
of the more lurid columns into the pages of the Record as
well as the publications on this theme from the Inter-
national Communications Agency publications which by
law the ICA cannot circulate within the United States.
Tensions between the administration and Congress arc
also growing. On December 10 Constantine Menges, the
CIA's national intelligence officer for Latin America, gave
a "briefing" to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
which so incensed some of the members that they com-
plained in writing to Director Casey. They called the ses-
sion "a policy statement" which "seriously violated" the
Agency's obligation to provide them with objective analy-
sis. Senator Paul Tsongas of Massachusetts was so angry
that he called the presentation "an insult" and walked out
on the briefing.
The Voice of America and Radio Marti
A major concern of the Reagan supporters is the Voice
of America. During the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson administrations, the Voice of America had be-
come such a blatant propaganda machine that efforts had
been undertaken to "reform" it, to make the news some-
what more impartial, and even to report. albeit gently, on
matters of some embarrassment to the U.S., in the interests
of establishing credibility. Although these reforms were
minimal, they were clearly too much for the new adminis-
tration. Reagan appointed as head of the International
Communications Agency (ICA), the Voice of America's
parent organization, his close friend Charles Z. Wick, it
California nursing home magnate whose main qualifica-
tions appeared to be the fifteen million dollars he had
raised for the Reagan presidential campaign. By mid-year,
Wick moved into high gear, vowing to make the VOA a
weapon in the campaign to counter Soviet propaganda. He
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accused the VOA of "erring on the side of imbalance
against our Government."
Congress, at the urging of Senator Jesse Helms, insisted
that pro paganda aimed at Cuba was insufficient. Although
the VOA had been beaming Spanish-language broadcasts
on both medium wave and short wave to Cuba for over
twenty years, this was not enough for Helms and his sup-
porters. They urged the creation of a special Cuban service,
to be named "Radio Marti." (Commentators pointed out
that, ironically, Jose Marti is venerated by the present
Cuban government as an intractable foe of U.S. imperial-
ism who coined the phrase, "the belly of the beast.")
As plans for Radio Marti developed, the ICA inaugurat-
ed, in November, "Project Truth." Project Truth is a pro-
gram designed "to provide a fast reply service to posts
abroad when rumors or news reports about American
activity thought to be untrue begin to circulate." (New
York Times, November 4, 1981.) Under the project, a
monthly bulletin, "Soviet Propaganda Alert," is sent to all
ICA posts overseas. Another feature of Project Truth is a
"news feature service" called "Dateline America," which
will be disseminated through the ICA to foreign media
willing to run it. The National Security Council has direct-
ed all government agencies to "cooperate" with Project
Truth.
Wick, apparently subject to emotional outbursts, creat-
ed some media incidents of his own. At an October 23
meeting of the National Council of Community World
Affairs Organizations Wick announced, "We are at war."
This startled participants so much that Wick was later
forced to explain that he only meant a "war of ideas." At
the same meeting, a participant questioned the accuracy of
the White Paper on El Salvador, and Wick exploded,
suggesting that the questioner was spreading Soviet dis-
information. When someone at the meeting asked Wick
about plans to cut drastically the ICA's budget for scholar-
ships and student exchanges while keeping all the funds for
propaganda, Wick called the question a "crypto-
communist remark" and refused to answer. According to
the Washington Post (November 10, 1981), Wick later
apologized for the outburst.
Fears that academic programs may be subject to politi-
cal tests also increased. On November 7 the ICA cancelled
an Africa n lecture tour it was to sponsor because the speak-
er, John Seiler, had published an article critical of Reagan's
policy toward South Africa.
Editorials questioned Wick's "zeal," and suggested that
he has a "weakness for simplistic approaches to complicat-
ed subjects like Soviet 'disinformation."' Wick simply es-
calated the battle. On November 10 his subordinate, VOA
chief James B. Conkling, announced the appointment of
Philip Nicolaides as VOA coordinator for commentary
and news analysis. Nicolaides was the author of a Sep-
tember 2 memorandum to Conkling, circulated within the
VOA, which described the VOA as "a propaganda agency"
which should function like an advertising agency selling
soap. It called for the VOA to become more "hard-hitting"
and to abandon the contention that VOA is a "journalistic
enterprise."Conckling and Wick defended the appointment,
praising Nicolaides as a "creative writer." They insisted
that the recommendations of the memorandum which
Nicolaides said had been "stolen" from his office had not
been followed. The memorandum clearly stated that the
"Crypto-communist" and "disinformation" new buzz-
words for Wick's ICA.
goal of the VOA should be "to destabilize" the Soviet
Union and its allies, to "portray the Soviet Union as the last
great predatory empire on earth."
VOA staff were dismayed by the controversy, but those
most concerned were eased out. Conkling's deputy, M.
William Haratunian, was replaced, and said in his farewell
memorandum that the was "deeply troubled by recent
personnel actions." Rumors circulated that there was a "hit
list"at VOA of personnel who would not toe the Wick line.
On December 21 the VOA's chief news editor, Bernard H.
Kamenske, announced that he was quitting, after more
than 28 years. The New York Times editorially grieved his
departure and the program of "over-eager ideologues."
On December 9 Wick announced "the formation of the
first of four advisory committees of private citizens to
provide advice and expertise to the agency." This first
group, the "New Directions Committee," is comprised of
individuals who run the gamut of political persuasion from
right-wing to extreme right-wing. They include Norman
Podhoretz, the neo-conservative editor of Commentary
magazine; Michael Novak, the rabidly right-wing colum-
nist who most recently promoted the hoax that Cuban
soldiers had blown up a bridge in El Salvador; Evron
Kirkpatrick, husband of U.N. Ambassador Jeane
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Kirkpatrick, and long suspected of having been a CIA
agent; and Edwin J. Fuelner, Jr., the president of the
Heritage Foundation.
The Attorney General and the Executive Order
Two significant events in December together help ex-
plain the dangerous direction in which the administration
is really heading and underscore the preoccupation with
disinformation. On December 4 the President signed Ex-
ecutive Order 12333 on United States Intelligence Activi-
ties; and in a December 18 speech in Los Angeles Attorney
General William French Smith delivered what the New
York Times described as "the first comprehensive discus-
sion" of the order.
The Executive Order itself, repealing President Carter's
1978 order on the same subject, makes profound changes in
the scope of authorized intelligence activities. [See sidebar
for details.] As we have noted previously ( CA 113 Numbers
12, 14-15), the Reagan administration always intended to
replace Carter's order, which it viewed as overly restrictive.
Drafts were leaked in March and again in August; Carter,
the Justice Department insisted, "had set up a burdensome
The Executive Order
From a civil liberties standpoint, the Carter Executive
Order of 1978 was far from exemplary, and contained a
number of unconstitutional authorizations. In brief, it
allowed extensive spying on, and intrusions into the
lives of, people who were not suspected of engaging in,
or attempting to engage in, any crime. But the Reagan
Executive Order of December 4, 1981 (E.O. 12333)
authorizes much activity which was prohibited under
the Carter version and, more importantly, sets an entire-
Iv different tone and philosophy for intelligence
activities.
For example, the old Order was "intended to achieve
the proper balance between protection of individual
rights and acquisition of essential information." The
new Order says that "collection of such information is a
priority objective," and calls for "the proper balance
between the acquisition of essential information and
protection of individual interests." The old Order al-
lowed such activities "as permitted h r this Order." while
the new version allows activities "consistent with " the
Order.
The Carter Order stated that senior officials must
ensure that activities "are carried out in accordance with
applicable law," a provision deleted from the new ver-
sion. It also required reporting of activities "which raise
questions of legalitI, or propriei_v," while the new Order
requires reporting of activities "they have reason to
believe may be unlawful."
The Carter Order also required that collection of
information "must be conducted in a manner that pre-
serves and respects established concepts of privacy and
civil liberties." While it can be shown that the spirit of
this provision was often ignored, the Reagan Order
eliminates it entirely.
These differences are subtle indeed compared to the
substantive changes in Part 2 of the Reagan Order,
"Conduct of Intelligence Activities." For example, while
the Carter Order also allowed the CIA to engage in
collection of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
within the U.S., the latter was "subject to the approval of
the Attorney General." Under the new order, such col-
lection is to be conducted "as required by procedures
agreed upon by the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Attorney General." Thus specific CIA activities will
not be subject to particularized scrutiny.
Most significantly the new Order allows the CIA for
the first time to engage in covert operations in the U.S.,
so long as they are "not intended to influence United
States political processes, public opinion, policies, or
media." How this qualification can ever be enforced is
unclear.
The Carter Order allowed physical surveillance by the
CIA of a U.S. person abroad only if the person "is
reasonably believed to be acting on behalt of a foreign
power, engaging in international terrorist activities, or
engaging in narcotics production or trafficking." I'he
Reagan Order allows such surveillance merely to obtain
"significant" foreign intelligence. Since foreign intelli-
gence is defined to include "information relating to the
capabilities. intentions and activities of foreign powers,
organizations or persons." it is obsious that virtually
any American overseas, dealing with any foreigners. ~yill
be subject to such surveillance.
The Reagan Order nosy allows warrantless uncon-
sented physical searches, mail surveillance, monitoring,
and similar techiques, if "there is probable cause to
believe that the technique is c/irerted against a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign pots er." The former
version of the Order required "probable cause to believe
that the United States person is an agent of a foreign
power." It is unclear what the Reagan administration
means by a technique "directed against a foreign
power." One cannot search, follow, or monitor it "for-
eign power." The new language would seem to authorize
such intrusive techniques to be used against a person
who is not suspected of being a foreign agent, merely if
the person is in contact with foreigners.
The provisions relating to undisclosed participation
in domestic organizations have also been substantially
modified. The agency heads, rather than the Attorney
General, may now approve such tactics, and they deter-
mine whether "lawful purposes" are to be achieved.
Finally, it has been reported that 30 pages of secret
guidelines are being prepared to implement the new
Executive Order. It is likely that here, under cover of
secrecy, the dangerous orientation of the new adminis-
tration will be given effect.
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array of requirements" which had to be changed.
During October and November there was an open de-
bate, primarily through newspapers, over the most egre-
gious aspect of the original drafts, provisions to allow the
CIA to engage in "special activities" in the United States.
As we suggested in our April issue, this appears to have
been a tactic quite a successful one to deflect attention
from the many other evils of the proposed Executive
Order.
Cong-ess and most commentators focused on two as-
pects of the proposed Executive Order. These were the
provisions allowing the CIA, as well as the FBI, to infiltrate
and manipulate domestic organizations, and those allow-
ing the CIA a free hand to "collect foreign intelligence or
counterintelligence information" within the United States.
Controversy raged. No less an authority than former
CIA Director Stansfield Turner wrote, in a November I
Washington Post commentary: "Why should we be con-
cerned about [authorizing the CIA to look into the activi-
ties of Americans]? Because CIA officers are not trained to
operate n the domestic environment, where regard for law
is a primary consideration. The ethic of intelligence is to get
thejob done in spite of local laws. It is unwise and unfair to
force CIA operations into the domestic arena. It isn't ne-
cessary either, for that is exactly where FBI officers are
trained to operate."
Turner pondered "the risks that the CIA would be overly
zealous in the domestic arena,"and worried that "informa-
tion gained about Americans might he utilized for domes-
tic political purposes." He feared "the politicization of
intelligence." Critics of the CIA have worried about that, of
course, s nce the Agency's inception, with activities such as
Operation CHAOS justifying such concerns.
According to Ronald J. Ostrow of the Los Angeles
Times, the CIA insisted that the change would give the
Agency no greater latitude than it has at present, but that it
wanted only to "maintain our capabilities to do the kinds of
things wt do abroad." However, as Admiral Turner point-
ed out, what the CIA does abroad is break the law
constantly.
AlthotghJustice Department officials belittled Turner's
fears, real cause for concern became apparent in late Janu-
ary. At that time CIA Director Casey wrote to the Attorney
General ~.sking that the federal criminal code be amended
to provide complete immunity for intelligence operatives'
conduct while on the job. This startling request, which was
barely reported in the media, has ominous implications. As
it is, there is little control over CIA operatives; if they also
are given immunity from prosecution there will be no limit
to the enormity of the crimes they could commit, at home
as well as overseas.
The ou.come of informal negotiations between Congress
and the administration was minimal. The CIA cannot con-
duct domestic operations to collect foreign intelligence
unless it is "significant foreign intelligence." "Significant"
is not defined, and would seem to include anything the CIA
desires. The CIA was given approval to infiltrate domestic
organizations, but not, as contrasted to the FBI, the au-
thorization to manipulate them, unless the organization is
"composed primarily of individuals who are not United
States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on
behalf of a foreign power."This provides little consolation
to exile groups and various international solidarity organi-
zations. Moreover, the express authority given the FBI not
merely to infiltrate but also to influence domestic organiza-
tions is a frightening break with precedent. Not that it
hasn't happened all along; but now it has been legitimized
by the President. In addition, the distinction that the CIA
can infiltrate, but not influence is specious. It is impossi-
ble to infiltrate an organization without influencing it to
some degree. Otherwise the infiltrator would be obvious.
The Spreaders of Disinformation
But it is the gloss given the Executive Order by the
Attorney General's speech which highlights the adminis-
tration's focus on "disinformation." A connection with
"foreign intelligence or counterintelligence information" is
enough to subject one to CIA domestic action. Counterin-
telligence is defined as "information gathered and activities
conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence
activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on
behalf of foreign powers." And foreign intelligence means
"information relating to the capabilities, intentions and
activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons."
When the Attorney General made his speech, on De-
cember 18, he discussed the threat of foreign agents. He
talked about international terrorism and he spoke of the
theft of technological secrets. But then he went on: "Per-
haps even more insidious is the threat posed by hostile
'active measures' in this country, which are aimed at in-
fluencing public opinion and the political process through
'disinformation' and 'agents of influence."'
The implications of this remark are staggering. Spread-
ing disinformation is tantamount to espionage; those who
spread disinformation are fair game for the CIA; and, as we
have noted above, the administration's ideologues believe
that everyone who disagrees with U.S. foreign policy is
spreading Soviet disinformation. Most critics of the Exec-
utive Order have focused on the threat to the Fourth
Amendment freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures. They must contemplate also the threat to the First
Amendment freedom of expression.
The Clampdown
The clampdown has already begun. In our last issue we
described "the return to super-secrecy," and outlined a
number of steps taken and proposed by the administration
to make it more difficult for the American people, and of
course the rest of the world, to learn of the activities of the
government.
Three major developments occurred in January 1982.
First, on January 6 the administration announced that it
was ready to brief Congress on its new proposed Executive
Order on classification, versions of which had been circu-
lating since October. Almost immediately, the briefing was
cancelled, and the draft was circulated to government
agencies for comment. Here too the plan is to replace, by
executive fiat, a Carter Executive Order on the same sub-
ject. The move, in the words of the Associated Press,
"would reverse a 25-year-old trend toward restricting the
power of government officials to shelter information from
public view." The new proposal reverses the presumptions
of the Carter Order and specifies that when there is"reason-
able doubt" about the need to classify a document, it
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should be done.
Moreover, while the Carter order had spoken of the need
to balance government secrecy against the public's right to
know, the new draft makes "national security" the sole
basis for classification decisions. It may also have the effect
of exempting completely the CIA and the entire intelli-
gence complex from the requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act, since it mandates the withholding of
"information relating to intelligence sources and meth-
ods." As critics noted, the CIA can claim that virtually all
of its material relates to "intelligence sources and meth-
ods." Since the FOIA itself exempts from disclosure mate-
rial which has been properly classified according to law,
this provision would allow the CIA and the other agencies
to remove themselves from the coverage of the FOIA with-
out specifically amending that law, something the Agency
has called for, but until now been unable to obtain.
A second draft was discussed in an Associated Press
bulletin January 21. The revised version, just submitted to
Congress, still contains all of the objectionable provisions
noted above.
On January 7 the CIA launched an unprecedented at-
tack on the scientific community. Deputy Director Admi-
ral Bobby Ray Inman addressed the annual meeting of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science and
demanded that scientists submit their research papers for
CIA review prior to publication to curb Soviet acquisition
of technological developments. If scientists would not
submit to censorship voluntarily, Inman noted, they face a
government crackdown, and will be "washed away by the
tidal wave of public outrage."
Representatives of the scientific community called the
proposal "disastrous," "a nightmare." As one university
spokesman observed, if scientists do not publish, "we
would lose the science ourselves. We would be the bigger
loser."
able to prevent leaks any better than previous ones is
far-fetched. But that it is serious is clear. The Pentagon, for
example, is planning to reverse a 1965 ruling that its em-
ployees could not be forced to take lie detector tests. Poly-
graph examinations, highly suspect by almost every agency
except the CIA, are already under way. Deputy Secretary
of Defense Frank C. Carlucci, a former Deputy CIA Direc-
tor, was reportedly "enraged" when details of a January 7
meeting of the Defense Resources Board appeared in the
press. He magnanimously took a lie detector test and "of-
fered" one to others with knowledge of the meeting. A
Defense spokesman acknowledged that no national securi-
ty information was involved in the leak, but went on, "It's
the principle of the thing that we strenuously object to the
expression of minority opinion via leaks to the news media
designed to influence the course of events."
There have been a few other developments in this area.
Last issue we noted that the CIA was "curtailing" the
extent of its publication of reports and analyses. On No-
vember 10 the Agency announced that it will stop such
publication completely, because "they take too much time
to prepare and draw too much attention to the agency."
Among publications to be discontinued are the CIA's stu-
dies of international terrorism and estimates of' future So-
viet oil production, two sources of extensive embar-
rassment to the Agency last year.
Finally, there is a bizarre and little-noticed provision in a
proposed revision of the immigration laws submitted by
the administration to Congress in October. fhe hill would
allow the President to declare "immigration emergencies,"
such as uncontrollable influxes of immigrants from Cuba
or Haiti, for example. These emergencies could last up to
an entire year and would activate various emergency pow-
ers. Among these powers would be the right of the Presi-
dent to restrict the domestic travel of Americans, previous-
ly unknown in peacetime.
Plugging Leaks
Then, in mid-January, reports circulated indicating that
the administration was incensed over leaks to the media,
and intended to "use all legal methods" to stop the prob-
lem. The irony is that for decades the biggest leaker in this
country has always been the administration in power.
Leaking proposed government plans is often the best way
to gauge public reaction and allow for changes before final
action is taken.
The new requirements were extremely sweeping. All gov-
ernment departments were told that every major interview
must be cleared with the White House, and those involving
national security issues would require detailed advance
information on the substance of the proposed interview,
and if approved, a comprehensive memorandum of the
interview afterwards. Following extensive press criticism,
the administration dropped these provisions but instituted
a new form for keeping track of every individual's access to
all classified documents. Each reader will have to sign a
cover sheet acknowledging that it is against the law for
them to discuss the contents of the item with any unautho-
rized person.
The concept that government employees must get ad-
vance approval to leak information is of course self-con-
tradictory, and the notion that this administration will be
Conclusion
What does it all mean? There is little hope that the trends
of the new administration discussed in previous issues have
lost any momentum. On the contrary, the Reagan team
seems bent on overreaching, overreacting, and infusing an
ideological narrowness into all aspects of government.
Clearly, national security has become a shibboleth by
which all manner of unprecedented restrictions on the
democratic rights of Americans, such as they are, will he
imposed.
It is not rhetoric to claim that "thought control" is on its
way. The massive campaign to equate dissent with disinfor-
mation has ominous overtones when taken in conjunction
with the Executive Order as interpreted by the Attorney
General. COINTELPRO and Operation CHAOS are alive
and well. The government wants, on the one hand, a blank
check to spread its disinformation, and on the other, utst
powers to prevent anyone from accusing it of doing so.
Clearly, truth is the first casualty of cold wars as well as hot
wars.
Massive resistance to this trend is necessary. Journalists,
scientists, whistleblowers, everyone must continue to fight
to expose the government's lies. People cannot accept the
proposition that telling the truth is a crime. If they do, the
country and the world are in big trouble.
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CIA Media Operations in Chile,
Jamaica, and Nicaragua
By Fred Landis*
In the last decade, four American nations have chosen a
socialist road to development Chile, Jamaica, Nicaragua,
and Grenada. In the first three cases the CIA responded,
among other actions, by virtually taking over the major
newspaper in that country and using it as an instrument of
destabilization. (Grenada closed the opposition newspaper
shortly after the revolution for failure to comply with local
ownership laws.)
The appropriation of newspapers by the CIA proceeds
through certain discrete, identifiable stages. These include:
using an international press association, firing many of the
staff, modernizing the physical plant, changing the format
of the front page, using subliminal propaganda, assas-
sinating the character of government ministers, promoting
a courter-elite to replace the socialist government, spread-
ing disinformation, using divisive propaganda to create
artifical conflicts within the society, dusting off stock CIA
stories and themes, coordinating the propaganda effort
with an economic, diplomatic, and paramilitary offensive,
and generally following the blueprint for psychological
warfare as outlined in the U.S. Army Field Manual of
Psl?cho/ogical Operations.
The stages the CIA embarks upon in taking over a
newspaper, combined with the drastic changes of the front
page, are so specific that it is possible to identify the
Agency's hand in the effort. When the propaganda offen-
sive is coordinated with economic sabotage, paramilitary
terrorism, and other psychological activities using known
*Fred Landis, a Chilean-born American psychologist, received his Ph.D.
from the University of Illinois based upon his thesis, "Psychological
Warfare and Media Operations in Chile, 1970-1973." He served as a
consultant for the Subcommittee on CIA Covert Action in Chile of the
Church Committee. He is the co-author, with Donald Freed of"Death in
Washington: The Assassination of Orlando Letelier" (Lawrence Hill &
Co.: 1980), and has contributed articles to many magazines, including the
CovertAction Information Bulletin.
This article reflects the content of a 311-minute color video movie
produced by Landis entitled: "CIA Media Operations, A Study in Imagi-
nation and Perversity." Organizations interested in showing this film,
together with a lecture by Dr. Landis, should contact him at 1'. 0. Box
3068, Anaheim, CA 92803.
Arturo Cruz, who was the Nicaraguan Ambassador to the U.S. when
this article was written, has since resigned, but continues to support the
Sandinista government.
CIA fronts, one can state positively that a covert operation
is underway.
The CIA has access to over 200 newspapers, advised by
its World-Wide Propaganda Guidance Desk, which issues
a "Bi-Weekly Propaganda Guidance" to every CIA
station, for use in dealing with local media contacts. There
is a continuing propaganda effort precisely to avoid crises
like Chile, Jamaica, and Nicaragua. The purpose of this
article is to describe what a CIA newspaper looks like
during a crisis.
I first learned about the CIA's propaganda methodology
in Chile in 1973 while I was working on a Ph.D. disserta-
tion on changes in the mass media during the Allende
period, especially the newspaper El Mercurio. About a
year later, the Senate Intelligence Committee chose Chile
as a case study of CIA covert action. For the first time, the
U.S. government would give official status to a report on
CIA covert activity. Also for the first time there were
several former CIA analysts on the Congressional investi-
gative staff familiar with CIA methods, who knew exactly
the right questions to ask. With copies of my dissertation in
hand, they went to CIA Headquarters to ask about Chile.
Subsequent studies of CIA covert operations make fre-
quent reference to Chile, and articles on the CIA and the
media rely heavily on the case of E/ Mercurio.
During subsequent years I monitored several Latin
American newspapers but saw nothing like the El Mercurio
of 1970-1973. Then in 1980, the Jamaica Daily Gleaner
underwent the same metamorphosis. The Jamaican Press
Association launched an investigation focusing on tradi-
tional areas of journalistic concern: the firing ofjournalists
from the Daili, Gleaner, the systematic appearance of fab-
ricated stories, and the violation of traditional ethics of the
profession. I was invited to testify before a Commission
of Inquiry and explained that these changes were a by-pro-
duct of the CIA taking over the newspaper. The Press
Association issued a 32-page summary of my testimony in
booklet form entitled "Psychological Warfare
in the Media: The Case of Jamaica."
In May 1981 I helped the Union de Periodistas de
Nicaragua with a similar report which appeared in install-
ments in the newspaper Barricada July 8-22. The method-
ology to be discussed here can also be found in my disserta-
tion, "Psychological Warfare and Media Operations in
Chile: 1970-1973;" "Covert Action," Volume 7 of the 1975
Hearings of the Senate Church Committee; "The CIA and
the Media," 1977-1978 Hearings of the House Intelligence
Number 16 (March 1982)
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Committee; and the above-cited reports of the Jamaican
and Nicaraguan Press Associations.
nation is followed by physical assassination, as was the
case with three successive Chilean Ministers of Defense,
Rene Schneider, Carlos Prats, and Orlando Letelier.
The Methodology
The first step of the process is to elevate the owner of the
target newspaper to the Board of Directors of the CIA-
influenced Inter American Press Association. The
December 26, 1977 New York Tinies quoted a high CIA
official referring to IAPA as "a covert action resource" of
the Agency. Next, IAPA lists the country in question as
one in which freedom of the press is threatened. The Tech-
nical Services Division of IAPA is sent to "modernize"
the newspaper. These "technical" improvements nearly al-
ways include getting rid of the typesetters, whose union is
usually leftist in Latin America. Most of the editorial staff,
even including some conservatives, is fired.
The style of the front page of the newspaper is changed
dramatically, from that of the conservative London Times
to that of, for example, the sensationalist New York Post.
Screaming headlines and huge photos on related themes
replace the previous randomness of unrelated news stories.
The usual conservative newspaper in the Third World em-
phasizes what is happening in Europe and the United
States. But in a media operation, local news suddenly takes
over. Local catastrophes become the only image of the
worlda dark, frightening, and claustrophobic place.
Headlines in a newly CIA-influenced newspaper have an
exclusively negative nature, blaming the socialist govern-
ment for all the ills which suddenly befall the country.
Where sufficient local problems cannot be manufactured,
stories from other times or other countries are made into
"news" in order to further a given theme: "Economic
Collapse in Cuba;" "Economic Collapse in Poland;"
"Economic Collapse in Nicaragua." The front page looks
more like a political poster than a newspaper. The "news" is
a carefully selected collage pushing a few simple themes,
aimed at discrediting the government and creating div-
isions among the population.
The first theme is economic chaos, because this is the
easiest for the U.S. to create. Foreign aid is cut off; the
Inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank
cut off loans; private U.S. banks cut off loans; spare parts
for U.S.-manufactured machinery are denied.
The next theme is social chaos. In almost every country
there are bizarre incidents which a conservative newspaper
normally will not touch. Suddenly this National Enquirer-
type material fills the front page: Violence, chaos, perman-
ent crisis, unnatural events, omens from heaven, death,
gruesome food stories, household pets who eat their mas-
ters, children who inform on their parents, servants who
turn on their employers, etc. The difference is that after
creating a climate of tensions, this situation is blamed on
the government: First on the ideology that the government
represents (socialism) and then on the government itself;
first by insinuation and then explicitly; first with humor
and then with terror; first with character assassination and
then with physical assassination.
Strategically, the attack on government ministers pro-
ceeds like a chess game in which one eliminates the pawns
and works up to the king. In Chile, there were no direct
attacks on President Allende until all his Cabinet ministers
had been individually ridiculed, isolated, discredited, and
often forced to resign. In extreme cases, character assassi-
Subliminal Propaganda
Indirect attacks on government ministers employ the
juxtaposition of photos of the targeted official with unre-
lated headlines, subliminal propaganda, and pre-selected
word associations.
In the December 5, 1980 La Prensa in Nicaragua, a
photo of FSLN leader Humberto Ortega is adjacent to a
photo of a mutilated body. Connecting them is an official
Sandinista police badge allegedly found near the body.
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La Prensa, December 5, 1980: Photo of Humberto Ortega
by mutilated body.
During the 1980 election campaign in Jamaica, the Dade
Gleaner placed the photos of three cabinet ministers over
the headline "23 Men Rape 15-Year-Old Girl." The entire
page was carefully laid out to produce shock effect. Read-
ing the story carefully it becomes clear that the photos have
nothing to do with the headline; but the emotional shock
effect has been accomplished.
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EH
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.ONES
By cc
CANE OF 21 M(N Wtt0 1W night
rep.d a (S~yeoi old shoot piFl on
the
grounds of the All Saints Ali,nge
school at Studley Pock Rood vans shot
and killr-d b than police this morning
end his gun found on his body
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