COUNTERSPY: NOTES ON: PRINCTON - CIA - MIDDLE EAST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 48
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
Volume 4, Number 1 $2
LHS/cpf
NOTES ON:
PRINCETON--CIA-o
MIDDLE EAST p. 3
JOAN BAEZ-TOM
DOOLEY OF
THE 7
TH30 s .......... p. 4
TRANSAFRICA???
.......................... p. 5
US INTERVENTION IN AFGHANISTAN ................................. P. 3
CIA: PLOWSHARES INTO SWORDS? .................................. p. 19
CIA IN INDONESIA: 1935 .................................................... p. 23
US INTELLIGENCE IN NORWAY ......................................... p. 33
US INTELLIGENCE:
GUATEMALA ............:....... p. 42
HAITI .... .............................................. ..............:......... p. 43
FRANCE ..........................................................................
p.43
JAPAN ................. ............. .. ..........................................
p.44
ENGLAND .......................................................................
p.45
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EDrrORUL
Unique, indeed. Obviously, this
depot could serve as a secret staging
area for the Shah. loyalists led by the
Shah's son who trained with these same
officers in Texas and who is'also in the
US. The American and Iranian peoples
have a right and a need-to-know why
this dangerous situation continues.
Carlos Anzaldua Edinburgh, Texas
The response to our "alert and plea"
for public support has given us the
courage and strength to continue and
affirmed' the need for CounterSpy. The
range of persons endorsing Counterspy
include: Bob Moore (National Secretary
of the Mobilization for Survival *),
Sister Mary O'Keefe (Chicago), 'Kathie
Sarachild (New York City), Jose
Buckland (farmer/Oklahoma), Rev, H.
C. Mulholland (North Carolina), Allen
Fisher (England), John Cavanagh (fellow/
Princeton University), Rev. Richard
Preston (Michigan), and others listed
below. We are, of course, grateful for
the expression of grassroots support
and urge others to do the same and, if
possible, contribute financially to
Counterspy.
Since our last issue, we have pre-
sented papers at several conferences
and completed special reports on the
CIA in Nicaragua and US universities.
CounterSpy presented a paper, "The CIA
Goes To Work" at the VIII Conference
of the International Peace Research
.Association in Koenigstein, West Ger-
many; and editor, John Kelly, organized
and chaired a panel on the CIA in aca-
demia for the 1979 Annual Convention of
American Political Science Association
in Washington, D.C. and presented a
paper, "CIA and Academia". A catalogue
of these papers and the special reports
is available upon-request.
Finally, we mentioned in our last
issue, and the Pentagon has now con-
firmed that Iranian military personnel,
who came here as members of the Shah's
military forces, are still receiving mili-
tary training from the Pentagon in the US.
The Pentagon has also confirmed our re-
velation of an Imperial Iranian Air Force
(IIAF) depot at McGuire Air Force Base in
New Jersey which USAF Colonel, E.
Arcene McSmith, Jr, has described as
,a "unique arrangement". between the
US .Air Force and the IIAF.
Ricardo'Anzaldua U. San Diego/Ca.
Jane Barry Philadelphia, Pa:.
Robin Broad Princeton U.
Fred Clarkson CALC=**
Ellen Davidson Guardian*
Ruth'M; Fitzpatrick Fairfax, Va.
Sally Hanlon Big Cove Tannery
(Pennsylvania)
Carol Hanisch% New Paltz, N. Y.
Ruth Heiss Rockford, Illinois
Janet Higgins Manchester, Eng.
Flo Littell Kelly San Francisco
Dr. Lawrence Kirby Princeton U.*
Lee Miller Washington, DC
Stu Ozer Guardian*
Colette Price New York City
REDSTOCKINGS New York City
Claire Schub Princeton U.
Prof. Steve Slaby Princeton U. *
Curt Wands Washington, DC
-Martha Wenger CALC*
-Scott Wright Washington, DC
*for identification only
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14 ,so A
L EAST
The SD,was the elitist intelligence
agency of academics that became a
branch of the SS under the command
of Reinhard Heydrich. According to a
1975 study by George C .Browder of the
State University of New York, the SD's
Nazi academicians considered them-
selves an "idealistic intelligence ser-
vice" separate "from the unpleasant
and distasteful activities of the Ge-
stapo and from. much of what the total
SD implied". Indeed, the SD offered
this separateness as its defense at
the tribunals at Nuremberg. The tribu-
nal rejected this defense for as
Browder observed "try as they might,
they were members of the total SS"
Publicly, the CIA also claims a.
separation between its "dirty tricks"
and its research and analysis. CIA
academic recruiter, John F.Devlin,told
the American Historical Association
CIA research " begins and ends with .
a piece of paper". In a secret meeting,
CIA criminal Richard M. Bissell, Jr. ,
came closer to the truth when he noted
that the objective of CIA analysis is
to provide- "timely knowledge" of
"tactical significance". Furthermore,
"intelligence collection and covert
action interact and overlap... to the
point of being almost indistinguish-
able".
It is patently obvious that the so-
called academic branch of the CIA pro-
vides the ammunition for covert opera-
tions. CIA academician Ray Cline has
admitted that covert operations are un-
dertaken to "try to change the situation
that you analyzed in R+A (research and
analysis)". In short, CIA academi-
cians, researchers, and analysts, like
the SD predecessors, are part of the
total CIA.
In the Middle East, the CIA has ser-
viced and furthered the exploitation by
U.S. corporations and repression of
Zionism and dictatorial regimes such as
that of King-Hussein in Jordan. There is
not a singe instance where the CIA
acted in the true interest of Middle
East peoples. As always, the CIA's
RtA provides the wherewithal for it to
carry out its exploitation, oppression,
and repression.
Given the history and on-going
role of U. S. corporations and the CIA
in the Middle East, it is with outrage
that we report that during October 25-
26, 1979, Princeton University (PU)
hosted a conference "The Middle East
and the Superpowers" which featured
acknowledged member of the CIA and
U. S. corporations. Corporate partici-
pants include: Abraham Almany (The Con-
tinental Group, Inc . ); Bruce C.Anderson
(Ebasco Services, Inc.); C. Andrew
Brauer (New York Life Insurance Co.);
Parker T. Hart (International Business
Consultant); Richard H. Hittle (Conoco
International); Richard A. Macken (Gulf
Oil Corp.); and William A. Stoltzfus, Jr..
(William Sword and Co., Inc.). The
acknowledged CIA presence was Harry
Gelman who spoke in place of Arnold
Horelick. Harold Saunders, a well-
known "former" CIA officer was sche-
duled to speak but was replaced by
Michael S. Sterner from the U. S. State
Department. Monroe Berger (PU), a for-
mer consultant for the CIA's Congress
for Cultural Freedom (1958-61), chaired
the panel.
The conference's rationale noted
righteously that " . , more than ever be-
fore the peoples of the region are seek--
ing to control their destiny and to shape
their political, economic, and social in-
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and values". And, what does this call
for ? "This emerging position of the
Near East calls for examination. F rst,
the view of the region from outside
from Washington, Moscow, and the
financial world as exemplified by Wall
Street - requires comment. " The ratio-
nale concedes that internal views and
interests "must be considered". But ac-
cording to the question: "To what extent
are they compatible with the goals and J0, AN BAZZ
policies of the superpowers ?". (De- 5 701
spite the expressed concern for ,', ?
"Moscow's " view, there were no Soviet y ? '
participants. Harry Gelman presented
"Moscow's" view !)
We feel the aforementioned On May 7, 1954, President Dwight
persons Eisenhower wrote to Bao Dai after the
deserve the "light of. day" particularly
in the Middle East whose peoples de- defeat of the colonialists at Dien Bien serve an explanation. We feel the same Phu to express "admiration"on "behalf
about the following scheduled speakers of the American people" to the Vietnam-
and panelists whose conscious- partici- ese who fought on the side to the French
pation provided a legitimate forum for against their own fellow compatriots.
the U. S. corporations and the CIA, the Eisenhower concluded that: "We of the
exploitative oppressors of the Middle Free World are determined to remain East peoples. Nehama Rezler Bersohn, faithful to the causes for which they
William G. Bowen, L. Dean Brown, have so nobly fought. "
Jerome Clinton, Martin Dickson, Normen Shortly thereafter, Eisenhower dis-
Itzkowiz, Charles Issawi, Bernard Lewis patched CIA operative Colonel Edward
,,
Robert Tignor, Richard Ullman, and John Landsdale to Vietnam. Prior to his Viet-
Waterbur nam assignment, Landsdale, along with
g (all from Princeton University); CIA's Napoleon Valeriano, had directed
Oles Smolansky (Lehigh U.), Bayly the extermination of thQusands of Huks
Winder (NYU), Ernest Dawn (U, of Illi-
nois/Urbana, William B. in the Philippines 'under his so-called
Quandt propaganda campaign of the Filipino
(Brookings institute), 1.0. Hurewitz Civil Affairs Office. Stanley Kamow
(Columbia U.), Ann Lesch (Ford Founda- described a t
tion) , Dankwart Rustovv (City U., New Ypical psychological war-
York), and All Banuazizi (Boston College) fare operation: "When a Huk partol
passed
the
,
ambushers snatched the
last man, punctured his neck vampire-
fashion with two holes, hung his body
until his blood drained out,. and put the
corpse back on the trail.," Landsdale
was sent to Vietnam to undertake a
similar propaganda and psychological
warfare campaign to save Vietnam from
itself and the "communists" and co-
incidentally replace the French colo-
nialism with U. S. neo-colonialism,
such as was imposed in the Philippines.
An integral component of
Landsdele's psychological warfare and
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w ~.
campaign to slip the U. S. into Viet-
nam was a worldwide propaganda cam-
paign about the tremendous food and
medical needs of the Vietnamese (the
propaganda, of course, never men -
tioned the American role in producing
these needs). Spearheading this cam-
paign was CIA agent, Tom Dooley.
Dooley propagandized from one end of
the U. S. to the other about Vietnam.
his image was based, in part, on -
what even Holy Mother Church called
- false CIA reports filed by Dooley.
The ultimate hypocritical conclusion
of all this was the Food-for-Peace
program whose monies were used to
buy weapons and ammunition with the
permission of the U. S. government.
Now we have a latter-day Tom
Dooley, Joan Baez, telling us Vietnam
has to be rescued from itself again and
hymning the CIA's line on Cambodia.
It is like a re-run of the 1950's night-
mare with Baez telling President
Carter: "Either we bluff our way in
there or pretend we didn't hear Phnom
Penh's reaction to distributing food. "
And later at a "Georgetown house
under the Waterfront chandeliers" tell-
ing the like of Edward Kennedy and
Chip Carter that: "We just have to
take our Red Cross and say, 'Here we
come'. It's risky, but I don't think
they want to shoot us. " With Chip
Carter responding: "We support her
wholeheartedly. The President thinks
her work will change world opinion
and help us to proceed. We're going
to go into Cambodia under the pretext
that they will let us. "
We don't know what's happening
in Vietnam and Cambodia. But neither
does"Joan Baez, her ilk and even Ed
Bradley of CBS News, conceded that the
CIA is propagandizing about Cambodia.
We do know, however, that the U. S.
government through the likes of Dooley
and Baez has been lying to us about
Indochina for over 25 years.
Thus, to Baez we say: "Hell No,
We Won't Go" particularly in light of
her saying she is now "comfortable"
with limousines and plush hotels -
the haunts of exploiters and war crim-
inals.
7
M
A
e
The CIA is an ideological institution
whose indoctrinated members seldom
really leave. They do, however, engage
in-"sheep-dipping". This is a process
whereby a CIA member ostensibly
leaves the CIA to join another organiza-
tion while maintaining loyalty to the
CIA, sometimes with no contact with
the CIA for years.
It has been documented that the CIA
has specifically targeted blacks in the
US for cooptation and barring that,
"neutralization". Given these facts,
CounterSpy feels compelled to call at-
tention to a Washington Post article
of May 21, 1978.
"There has for many years been an
informal 'Africa Lobby' consisting
of interested blacks from the State
Department, the CIA, Capitol Hill
and private organizations. Robinson
said TransAfrica includes many of
the same people... ". (Randall
Robinson is Executive Director of.
TransAfrica, a black lobby on Africa
and the Caribbean.)
CounterSpy believes strongly in every-
one's' ability to change else we would
not struggle as we do. It is not Counter -
Spy but the CIA's nature that requires
persons in TransAfrica to come forward
and state whether they were in the CIA
and what is their position on the CIA.
This is particularly essential since Trans-
Africa owes it to itself and persons con-
sidering working with it to be up front
about any relationships, even past, which
its members may have had with the CIA.
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September 6, 1979
Statement
We feel that, we "lust respond to the latest in a series of at tempts
to suppress inquiry into the details and nature of Gloria Stein.
ell) s assouauon with the Central Intelligence Agency. We are
alarmed that the most visible commentary on these events has
come from several well-known figures in the feminist movement
who not only condone but endorse this suppression. Because
feminism's appeal and impact spring from a fundamental intel-
lectual honesty, it is particularly distressing that the suppression
of dissent may be seen as some kind of official feminist position.
In 197S,.after Redstockings researched Gloria Steinem's'
affiliations and raised questions about her political past, Stein-
em published a "Statement" in connection with her activities
on behalf of the Independent Research Service, a CIA-funded
group. Many feminists found this document neither entirely
credible nor to the point, and they have persisted in seeking
more enlightening answers.
Because of the consciously counterrevolutionary role the
CIA has played at home and abroad over the years, it makes
sense to expect a participant in the women's movement-
especially one who has come to symbolize it-to fully discuss
her past relationship to the CIA. We are still waiting to hear
Steinem's opinion of the Agency; the last one she gave charac-
terized the CIA as "liberal" and "farsighted" (The New York
Times, February 21. 1967).
The events that prompted us to send out this letter include:
1) Gloria Steinem, Clay Felker (most recently publisher of
Esquire), and Ford Foundation president Franklin Thomas
were among those who threatened to sue for libel if Random
House allowed the CIA chapters to be published in the Random
edition of Redstockings' Feminist Revolution. At the same
time, Newsweek/Washington Post publisher Katharine Graham
and Warner Communications-a major Ms. stockholder-also
complained. The offending chapters were deleted. Thus,
Steinem and her powerful supporters successfully used the
threat of litigation to exercise prior restraint over publication.
2) When Steinem learned that the Village Voice had assigned
journalist Nancy Borman to prepare an article on the censor-
ship of Feminist Revolution, her attorneys, Greenbaum, Wolff
& Ernst, threatened suit against the Voice if any mention of
Steinem's CIA association appeared in the article. After some
delay to allow the Voice's legal counsel to review the material,
the Voice published the article (May 21, 1979), and in subse-
quent issues several letter-writers responded with attacks on
Borman. and the Voice,
3) In May 1979, when Heights & Natter News, a New York
City neighborhood paper published by the Columbia Tenants
Union; began a series on the material deleted from Feminist
Revolution, Steinem's attorneys again threatened suit. But
instead of threatening the Columbia Tenants Union corpora-
tion-as they had the Random House and Village Voice corpor-
ations-they sent a letter to each of CTU's 32 board members.
Board members cannot be individually sued for a( corporation's
acts, except in a few instances not relevant here (many non-
lawyers may not know this); but Steinem'5 attorneys stated in
their letter to the board members that publication of the
material "could subject [them] to individual liability." Heights
& Valley News stood up to this attempt at intimidation and
is continuing the series.
All this legal harassment was in response not to any actual
instance of false, malicious defamation, but to the potential
raising of embarrassing questions about some feminists' rela-
tions with the power elite.
We think that Steinem and her associates have not made a
convincing case for cutting off discussion. At question is not
just the right to debate one woman's past associations, although
this is often important. There is an urgent need for wide-
ranging debate in the feminist movement on such questions as:
- Do feminists think there are special topics on which it is
defensible, to stifle discussion? Why do we put up with bad-
faith appeals to "sisterhood"?
- How far should feminists go in making compromises?
Which kinds of compromises help us reach our goals? Which
hurt?
- Is there a conflict-of-interest problem that our movement
needs to solve-as other movements have tried to solve it -when
movement representatives accept positions on the government
or corporate side of the bargaining table?
- Are "right-wingers" the only reason for the growing num-
ber of setbacks for women? Or is the feminist movement fail-
ing to discuss its own serious mistakes?
- Does dependence on government and corporate funding
and foundation grants increase or decrease the effectiveness of
feminist groups? Does it distort their politics and activities?
- What is to be done about government and corporate spy-
ing and intervention in the feminist movement?
These questions are not personal but political. They are at
the heart of our survival as a movement. We will not be silenced.
Note: Copies of the two articles reviewing Steinem's CIA asso-
ciations, which were in the original edition of Feminist Revolu-
tion, are available for $1 from Redstockings, P.O. Box 1284,
New York, NY 10009; Redstockings' information packet on
the censorship of the book's Random edition is $1. Copies of
the Sept. 6, 1975, Majority Report, containing Steinern's state-
ment and annotations to it, are S.75 each from Majority Report,
49 Perry St., New York, NY 10014. Copies of the Voice arti-
cle and letters of response are S.50, cash or stamps, from the
Statement Group, c/o Nancy S. Erickson, 619 Carroll Street,
Brooklyn, NY 11215.
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Gilda Abramowitz, New York City
Dee Alpert, NYC
R. L. Amrchild. NYC
Marilyn Banzhaf, Washington, DC
Bea Baron, Bronx, NY
Jane Barry, Philadelphia
Pat Barry, Philadelphia
Rosalyn Baxandall, NYC
Frances M. Beal, Brooklyn, NY
Harriet Bernstein, Philadelphia
Louise Billotte, San Francisco
Nancy Borman, NYC'
Gayle M. Brauner, LaGrande, Ore.
Lynne Carlo, NYC
Eileen Casey, Brooklyn
Susan P. Chizeck, Princeton, NJ
Cindy Cisler, NYC
Heather Cottin, Bayville, NY
Coca Crystal, NYC
Agnes Cunningham, NYC
Ann C. Davidson, Philadelphia
Charlotte Dennett, NYC
Carole DeSaram, NYC
Hodee W. Edwards, Oakland, Calif.
Dorothy Englernan, NYC
Nancy S. Erickson, Brooklyn
Lisa Forman, Warrington, Pa.
I-larriet Fraad, New Haven, Conn.
Carol Giardina Freeman, Jacksonville, Fla.
Elizabeth Griggs, NYC
Sara Grusky, Washington, DC
Stephanie Haftel, Rochester, NY
Carol Hanisch, New Paltz, NY
Carole Heath, Rochester
Judith Lewis 1-lerman,_Cambridge, Mass.
Nellie ('{ester, NYC
Jan Hillegas, Jackson, Miss.
Susan-Leigh Jeanchild, West Palm Beach, Fla.
Patricia Korbet, NYC
Janet Kruzik, Jackson Heights, NY
Lavonne Lela, Rochester
Barbara Leon, Gardiner, NY
Sherry Lipsky, Philadelphia
Pamela Lloyd, NYC
Rita Loughlin, NYC
Kathleen Maynard, Gainesville, Fla.
Charlotte J. McEwen, Ottawa
Aurora Levins Morales, Berkeley, Calif.
Janet Mulkeen, NYC
Amina Munoz, NYC
Donna O'Sullivan, Prince Albert, Sask.
Marge Piercy, Wellfleet, Mass.
Sharon Presley, Astoria, NY
Colette Price, NYC
Lynne Randall, Atlanta
Bethany R. Redhn, Lambert, Mont.
Judy Reichier, Callicoon Center, NY
Vickie Richman, Brooklyn
Marlene Rupp, Gainesville
Susan B. Sands, NYC
Kathie Sarachild, NYC
Kathryn Scarbrough, Roch~!ster
Gay Schierholz, Carson City, Nev.
Victoria Schultz, NYC
Judy Seigel, NYC
Ingrid Shaw, Gainesville
Marilyn Skerbeck, Washington, DC
Deborah Smith, Bronx
Susan J. Smith, Washington, DC
Miridi B. Snoparsky, Houston
Deborah Thomas, San Francisco
Page Thompson. San Francisco
Tish Webster, NYC
Nancy A. Whitacre, Lancaster, Pa.
Nancy Wolf, Prince Albert, Sask.
Ellen L. Wooters, Philadelphia
Jean Yanarella, Beacon, NY
Distributed by the Statement Group, rlo Nan(}, S. Erickson, 619 Carroll Street, Brooklyn, NY 11215
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E L I M I N A T I 0 N
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istan over the last few years. In 1973,
the forty year-old dictatorship of King
Mohammad Zaher Shah and two of his
uncles ended in a coup led by his cousin
and brother-in-law, Mohammed Daoud,
who had resigned as Zaher Shah's prime
minister in 1963 and had seemingly re-
Amok U tired from political life. (Zaher Shah was
in Italy on vacation at the time of the
coup, during a famine in his country,
INTERVE j T 3 0,W 341
IN and was later offered asylum by Saudi
Arabia.) There was virtually no one in
Afghanistan prepared to fight for the
4GHANI$TAN FGHAW724STPS
h
Sha
alff, who had led an extremely re-
by onrad Ege pressive and corrupt regime. The
end of the monarchy was welcomed by
"If Henry Kissinger were still around, most of the people. Daoud's coup was
there would be one hell of a temptation to assisted by various sectors of the _
get involved"; 1 was the reaction of a Afghan society, especially the leftist
U. S. "specialist" to recent events in parties,
Afghanistan. But Henry Kissinger is not Soon after the coup, the U.S. be-
"around", and State Department and CIA 'came more "involved" in Afghanistan.
officials keep assuring us (as they did (Adolph "Spike" Dubs, U. S, Ambassador
during the "secret" war in Laos and when to Afghanistan from the summer of 1978
covert aid was being given to the Kurds until he was killed on February 14, 1979,
in Iraq) that the U.S. .is "not interfering and who "had been trying to wean the
in any way"2. in Afghanistan.. Afghans away from Moscow" 4 was
What is happening in -Afghanistan appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of
that might provoke "one hell of a tempta- State for Near Eastern and South Asian
tion to get involved" ? Many factors Affairs in 1975.) ;Iran, "encouraged by
and diverse U.S. interests are involved the United States, made a determined
- all best illuminated in the light of effort to draw Kabul [Afghanistan's cap-
recent Afghan history. ital ] into a western-tilted, Teheran -
Afghanistan is a mountainous country centered, regional economic and secu-
about the size of Texas with a population rity sphere embracing Pakistan, India, and
approaching 18 million of many different the Persian gulf states" 5 and to promote
nationalities, most of them peasants in policies of anti-Communism in Afghan-
the countryside. This landlocked country istan. The Shah of Iran began a massive
borders Iran, the Soviet Union (the bor- $ 2 billion aid program to Afghanistan
der with the Soviet Union-is some 2, 000 under the condition that Daoud crack
miles), China, Pakistan, and India; and down further on the Khalq and Parcham
even though it has no access to the sea parties who had,been the "backbone of
it has strategic significance. The United [Daoud's] 1973 coup" 6 but were con-
Nations rates Afghanistan as one of the sidered "Communist" by the Shah and the
world's poorest countries with an annual U.S. Government. Iran, also pushed for the
per capita income of .$ 160, an infant termination of Afghanistan's traditionally
mortality rate of 50" per cent, and ann friendly relationship with the Soviet
illiteracy rate of some 90 per cent. Union. The.Shah began to exercise more'
Almost all Afghans are Muslims be- and more power in Afghanistan, and SAVAK,
longing to the more traditional of the 'his CIA-trained secret police, got heavily
two branches, the Sunnites. involved in Afghanistan's internal affairs.
.Events have moved rapidly in Afghan- SAVAK went so far as' to pinpoint "sus-
8
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ti'
pected Communist symphathizers through-
out the Afghan Government 'and military" 7
who were then to be purged by Daoud.
In the same years, the government of
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG)
stepped up its program of police aid to
the Daoud government. Two million DM
($ 1 million) were made available "in the
form of equipment supplies and top-level
guidance for the Afghani police by two
German police officers in view of
political developments" .8 In
addition, the West German magazine
Der Spiegel reports that almost all high
ranking Afghan' police officers went to the
FRG for training. 9 Five Afghans were alsc
trained in the U.S. by the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA) or through CIA program:
in the International Police Academy (IPA)
in Washington, DC and the "Bomb
School" (Border Patrol Offices, BPO) in
Los Fresnos, Texas : Abdul Samad Azher
(DEA) ; Qader Abdul Azizi (IPA, BPO, DEA);
Abdul Vaheed Najmi (IPA); Miam Rafiuddin
(IPA); and Khawar Zaman (IPA).
With this improved police force, Daouc
got rid of officers and civilians in his
government, often using brutal tactics.
He handed key positions to aristocrats
and supporters-of the big landowners and
the deposed monarchy. The economic
power stayed in the hands of a few land-
lords - five per cent of the population
owned half of the arable land - and the
corrupt bureaucracy of Zaher Shah' was
only slightly reformed.
The economic situation in Afghanistan
deteriorated quickly in spite of the big
foreign grants. Unemployment increased -
to almost one million, and from an
anticipated development budget of $ 400
million for 1976/77, only one third was.
actually expended by the Daoud govern-
ment; and from the 1977/78 budget, only
one sixth was spent. 10 Da'oud's highly'
proclaimed and badly needed land reform
never took place, and the dissatisfaction-
of the Afghan people mounted. In response
Daoud turned more and more to open re-
pression. In February 1977, he adopted -
a one-party constitution, and issued
laws providing severe penalties in-
cluding the death sentence for opposition
political activities.
At the same time, the Shah of Iran's
policy seemed to succeed: Daoud signed
treaties with Iran and Pakistan and
showed increasing' hostility towards the
Soviet Union. Furthermore, the Shah him-
self planned to visit Kabul in June 1978,
and Mohammed Daoud wanted to meet
President Carter in the fall in Washing-
ton.
But Daoud's alliances with the U. S.
Government,` SAVAK, the feudal land-
lords and the Muslim clergy (often big
landlords themselves), could not main-
tain his reign. On April 17, Daoud's
newly appointed interior minister Abdul
Quadir Nuristani arranged the assassi-
nation of Mir Akbar Khaiber, a popular
leftist leader whom Daoud and Nuristani
considered "Communist". Khaiber's
funeral turned into a massive anti-gov-
ernment demonstration. Daoud, encour-
aged by the Shah, responded with an
attempt to eliminate any and all oppo-
sition. On April 24, seven popular
"Communist". leaders were arrested,
and on April 26, hundreds of suspected
Communist sympathizers were purged
from their governmental posts.
The next day, Daoud was over-
thrown in what the U.S. press usually
calls a "Soviet inspired, bloody mili-
tary coup", but even Selig S. Harrison,
a long time South Asia correspondent
for the Washington Post , saw no Soviet
masterminding behind the "bloody coup"
and wrote that "it is misleading to
depict the coup in the global strategic
chess game". 11 The U. S. Government
obviously did not expect a "coup" at
this time in Kabul. Warnings from SAVAK
,about an unstable internal situation
were not heeded, and in the subsequent
criticism of the CIA's incompetence in
Iran, the Afghanistan intelligence
failure was invariably mentioned.
Mohammed Daoud and some of his
closest advisors were killed on April
27, and a part of the army loyal to
Daoud put up a short but fierce fight
against the rebelling part of the army.
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Hundreds of people were killed.
The "military coup" should prob-
ably be called a "decisive stage of
the Afghan revolution" which had been
advancing rapidly since the end of the
monarchy in 1973. The "coup" grew out
of a "tremendous and acute discon-
tent" 12 of the majority of the Afghan
people which was especially visible
during the widespread anti-government
demonstrations in the days after the
assassination of Khaiber. In addition,
the military, take-over was directed by
civilians in the Khalq and Parcham .
parties, and not by military officers.13
Only a few days after the take-over,
which began the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan, Noor Mohammed Taraki,
a civilian, was elected Chairperson
of the Revolutionary Council and then
appointed Prime Minister. Taraki had
a long history of opposition first to
Zaher Shah and then to the Daoud re-
gime. In fact, during the days of the
take-over, Taraki was in prison. He
was among the founders of the Peoples'
Democratic Party (PDP) in 1965. The
PDP, generally known as Khalq
Party, was involved in numerous
strikes and demonstrations in the
1970's , and it was also instrumental
in the mass protest against the visit
of Richard Nixon's Vice President
Spiro Agnew in Kabul in 1970.
The Khalq government quickly en-
acted drastic-land and water-rights
reforms-in favor of the country's
peasants who make up most of the
population and stepped up an im
mense literacy campaign for men. and
women. In addition,- it abolished the
death penalty for peasants and the
system of usury by which moneylen-
ders exploited peasants who by being
forced to borrow against future crops
were left in perpetual debt . Other.
programs- included,the promotion of
equal rights for men and women, the
separation of state. and religion, im-
provement of health care, increased
taxation,of foreign corporations (some
leave the country after they paid their
tax debts), and the elimination of some
foreign insurance and trade companies.
Not surprisingly, Taraki's- foreign
(he signed a friendship treaty with .the
Soviet Union, and Afghan civilians and
military officers began being trained by
Soviet advisors) and internal programs
("We demand bread, food; we demand
clothing; ... we demand participation of,
all-sectors of society in social and
political affairs; we demand our social
rights; ... " 14) drew comments in the
U.S..press.such as "Afghanistan has
lurched violently to the left",1S "Now?
we have a whole set of leaders who
clearly have ?a Communist backing", 16
and "Afghanistan takes a socialist
road. 7
Taraki and other governmental offi-
cials were portrayed as not 'much more
than Soviet puppets; the Khalq Party-
was labeled "Communist", and Afghan-
J.stan was put in the "Soviet satellite:'
file". Soon, anti-Khalq news began to
appear also in the FRG, England, Egypt,
.and other Muslim countries.
In February 19 79 , Afghanistan was
again in the headlines in the U.S.: ..
the -U. U.S. Ambassador in Kabul, Adolph
Dubs, had been kidnapped on February
14. On the way to work, Dubs' car
stopped at a red traffic light, and a man
dressed as a police sergeant approached
it and asked to inspect the car. Dubs -
agreed and unlocked the doors. The
"police sergeant" and three other men
forced their way into the car, threatened
the chauffeur with a revolver and
ordered him to follow their directions.
To this point, the State Department has
never explained publicly, why Dubs rode
to work without any bodyguards or under
the protection of Afghan police officers
who had been offered by'Afghan.author-
it ies.. Dubs.was virtually unprotected.,,
Adolph Dubs wastaken to one.ofthe the.
biggest hotels in Kabul. According to_, :-;
Newsweek, the kidnappers, who de-
manded the release of several
Muslim leaders, belonged to."one of
corporate officials were only. allowed to - the
10
Islamic
guerilla
bands. that
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have been resisting, with minimal
success, the Marxist regime of Prime
Minister Noor Mohammed Taraki".18
In the hotel where Dubs was being
held, one of the four kidnappers was
arrested by Afghan police; and Afghan,
U. S. , and Soviet officials who were
present debated the possibilities of
freeing Dubs.
Reports on what happened after
that differ widely. Afghan officials in-
sisted that the Muslim leaders the
kidnappers were demanding, were not
at their disposal. Finally, some three
hours after the kidnapping, U.S. Em-
bassy officials were informed about a
1:00 P.M. deadline. 19 At 12:40,
according to the Washington Post ,
Afghan police officers asked Bruce
Flatin, a political officer in the U.S.
Embassy in Kabul who was present at
the hotel, to shout to Dubs in German
(a language both Dubs and Flatin
understood) "to go to the bathroom or
to drop to the floor in ten minutes"20,
but, the Post article goes on, "Flatin
refused, recognizing that the Afghans
were readying an assault".
Newsweek gives another "explana-
tion" of why Flatin refused to give what
could have been a life-saving message
to Dubs: "Flatin refused, reasoning
that the kidnappers may have under-
stood German." 21 Ten minutes later
Afghan police attacked the room where
Dubs was being held. "At exactly
12:50, very heavy gunfire broke out in
the corridor, in the room and from across
the street." 22 When the police and
U.S. officials entered the room, Ambas-
sador Dubs and. his kidnappers were
The U. S. Government was quick to
pin the blame for Dubs' death on Afghan
officials and partly on the "Soviet ad-
visors" at the scene, who, according to
accounts in the Washington Post and
_Newsweek , had disregarded pleas of
U. S. officials who were asking that an
attack on the kidnappers be avoided
in order to save Dubs' life. The fact
that security measures on the part of
the U. S. Embassy were practically non-
existent before the kidnapping, is not
mentioned at all in State Department
reports.
Newsweek correspondent Ron
Moreau, who was in a Muslim rebel
camp in Peshawar, Pakistan, at the time
of the kidnapping came up with an ex-
planation of why the kidnappers chose
Dubs as their victim. "The theory making
the rounds here among Pakistanis and
Afghan exiles is that the kidnapping
and killing of Dubs was a put-up job
by the Kabul regime and the Soviets.
... The Kabul government feared that
the U.S. might start supporting the
rebels through 'a third country.... The
affair may have been a conspiracy to
insure that the U.S. would not heed the
rebels' pleas for aid." 23 The News-
week article goes on quoting unspeci-
fied "U.S. -congressional sources "
that "the Russians had wanted Dubs to
die. The ambassador had been trying to
wean the Afghans away from Moscow,
and his death guaranteed that signifi-
cant inroads would not be made for
months - if ever." 24
In light of the situation in Afghan-
istan before and especially after the
death of Adolph Dubs, theories like the
ones offered by Newsweek and the Cold
War warriors quoted as "U.S. con-
gressional sources" are almost gro -
tesque. According to the Washington
Post , the assassination of Dubs con-
vinced,certain sectors of the Afghan
society "that the counterrevolution had
started"25. For the Khalq government,
the killing of Dubs presented one of the
biggest difficulties in their relations
with the U. S. , and, in fact, "as a
result of the incident, the U. S. con-
siders Afghanistan as a communist
country past recall" 26,
Cynics could say that the U. S.
Government used the death of one of
its ambassadors to make politics. One
could even go so far as to suggest
that the U.S. Government worked
hand-in-glove with the kidnappers; in
exactly the way they had planned. The
11
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U.S. Government did take Dubs'
death as a reason for changing re-
lations with Afghanistan and for de-
nouncing it as a "Communist regime",
controlled by the Soviet Union.
Washington named no replacement for
Dubs, terminated almost all economic
aid agreements and repeatedly charged
the Afghan government with violations
of human rights. Of course, 1 the
the
western press went along
U.S.. Government position, blaming
the Afghan government and "Russian
advisors" for Dubs' death. And, con-
veniently, most press accounts
pointed to the existence of a Muslim
rebel movement as a force fighting
.the government in the name of free-
dom. (It is highly interesting to. com-
pare the descriptions the U.S. press
is giving the Muslim rebels in
Afghanistan and the Muslim oppo
sition movement. to the deps tdnd Shah o
of Iran the Afghan Muslims be described as freedom fighters
while the Iranian Muslims are
labeled often as terrorists, ultra con-
servative , and anti-democratic.)
Dubs' death provided the U.S.
with a reason to begin to change re-
lations with Afghanistan. The Muslim
kidnappers achieved their goal: to
draw attention to the situation in
Afghanistan, to worsen U.S.-Afghan
relations, and to bring the U.S.
Government closer to aiding the
trayed as a struggle of the Afghan people
against a pro-Moscow government. In
December, 1978, the U. S. conservative
mouthpiece U S News and World Report
admitted that although "not directly in-
volved", the U. S. has "big stakes in a struggle pitting Moslem conservatives against Moscow-backed rulers" because
of "far reaching implications for the U.S.
and the West" . 2 7
Since then, the fighting which had
been only sporadic over the summer
(1978) months, has intensified. Attacks
by the,so-'called rebels are mainly
carried out from outside the country: In
fact, thousands of Afghans opposed to
the Khalq government have left Afghanistar
mainly for neighboring Pakistan. At a
press conference in February 1979,
Pakistan's military ruler,Za ul-Haq
stated that there were over 20,?0000
Afghan refugees in the country.
Estimates now range as high as
100,000.
It is from Pakistan that most of the
attacks are launched. A conference.of
rebel leaders was held in Lahore, Pakista
on January 18, 1979, and later meetings
took place in other cities to which cer-
tain foreigners were invited to attend.
rebels.
The activity of the Muslim rebels
had started a few months after the
Khalq Party took power. It was, and is,
mainly inspired and supported by former
landlords, conservative clergy (often
they are orga
ments or organizations which began to run at least 5, 000 people died in Herat in
mid-March. Newsweek reported,
a small scale but constantly escalating noting unspecified but "well placed
war against the army, a war that has in- q
tensified to the point that the U. S. press American officials" (?) that "Soviet
is calling it "Moscow's Vietnam". military advisors were among the casual-
News about heavy fighting in Afghan-, ties" 30. Washington Post writer
Jonathan Randal went to great pains to-
ist'an between rebel forces and the Afghan
military .has been reported in the U.S. ? describe in detail what he thinks
since fall, 1978. The fighting is por happened in Herat. He writes that it
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The fighting has affected almost all
of Afghanistan's 28 provinces, and has
been mainly in the countryside. However,
Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city,
which is only 70 miles from the Iranian
border; Mazar-i-Sharif, jalalabad, and
in a limited way -Kabul have been
affected. At one point, the rebels
captured three towns in the province of
Razmak. They established Islamic
Courts and -killed over 30 Khalq members
29
within a few days.
According to the Washington Post ,
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is a "favorite tactic of the Islamic
tribesmen .. to torture victims by first
cutting off their noses, ears, and
genitals, then removing one slice of
skin after another" . Randal has a
"diplomat" comment that this is "a
slow, very painful death". According
to him, it was the "Russians" living in
Herat who were "hunted down" by
"specially assigned assassination
squads" that went "berserk" and in
dulged in "wholesale slaughter"..
Randal also points out that rebel
groups are carrying out daily "terrorist"
activities against members of the Khalq
Party and soldiers. In retaliation, he
says, the army actions against rebels
have been "barbaric".
But what is really going on in
Afghanistan ? Is this country a Soviet
satellite ? Does the government of the
Soviet Union see the ruling of the Khalq
Party as part of a "gradually closing
pincer movement aimed at Iran and the
oil regions of the Middle East" , as
charged by Robert Neumann, former
U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan and
now senior associate of the Georgetown
Center for Strategic and International
Studies, an institution closely linked
to the CIA ? And, is the "Islamic re-
bellion" an internal affair of conser-
vative religious Muslims fighting a
holy war ("Marx vs. the Mullahs"33)
against a communist, godless govern-
ment ?
The first two questions have been
partly answered: the Soviet Union
was not instrumental in the events of
April, 1978, which led to the ouster-of
Daoud and the beginning of the Demo
cratic Republic of Afghanistan, and
although there are now several thou-
sand Soviet advisors in Afghanistan,
they are not determining what happens
there. This became especially clear-
in the mid-September shake-up in the
Afghan government when Noor
Mohammed Taraki was replaced by
Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin as
President. just a few days before he
was replaced, Taraki was welcomed
in Moscow and assured continued
support from Soviet leaders, who ob-
viously could not predict the rapid
change in Afghanistan following his
visit. (As of now, it is still unclear
whether Taraki resigned for health
reasons, as reported in the Afghan
News Agency, or whether he was
seriously wounded and later died in a
"violent palace revolt ", as claimed in
the U.S. media.)
Charges that the present fighting
in Afghanistan is a "holy war" of
rebel Muslims who are fearful that the
"pro-Russian government" will curtail
their religious freedom have never
been substantiated. In fact, publi-
cations portraying the fighting as
religiously-motivated seldom give
any evidence for their presumptions
and in September 1979, after one.,
and a half years of the "godless"
government, the pro-Western- Econo-
mist reported that "no restrictions
had been imposed on religious prac-
tice" 34..
Obviously, reasons for the
fighting and the terrorism lie else-
where. In Afghanistan, Islam has
always been tied closely to a social,
political, and economic system of
feudalism and semi-feudalism. Hence,
the dissolution of the huge estates
owned by the old aristocrats and
feudal masters, and the partial de-
struction of the prior economic
system by the Khalq Party has been
interpreted as an attack on Islam. In
addition, many of the rich landowners
were in fact Muslim clergy 35 and
financial losses for the mullahs cer-
tainly motivated their propaganda
about the "godless" communists.
Hence, it is not a religious war .
such as the western media is fond of
creating to hide the truth. It is a
struggle between the exploiters and the
exploited. And, in this case, as in
feudal Europe, religious leaders are
largely in the exploiter's class which
"fact facilitates the creation of the re-
ligious war myth.
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There have been cases of poor pea
sants who had been living almost as
slaves on the estates of the landlords re-
fusing to take land given to them or to
go along with other reforms for fear of
retaliation by the landlords.. Having a
long history of dependency on the
mullahs and of being conditioned to
listen to them as religious leaders, some
of the peasants could well be con-
vinced of the need of a "holy war"
against the Khalq Party and the Soviets
living and working in Afghanistan. Some-
times, however; Khalq officials .gave
the mullahs good openings for their pro-
paganda by being insensitive to tradi-
tions and moving too fast with their re-
forms. Commented a conservative Afghan
to CounterSpy: "They [he Khalq Party]
could have done everything they wanted
A U.S. institution which has had
close ties to the CIA in the past
is 'still active in Afghanistan: the
Asia Foundation. According to Joel
W. Scarborough, Asia Foundation's
representative in Afghanistan (box
257, Kabul), the Foundation "has
closely collaborated with other
American governmental agencies
in Afghanistan, especially ICA,
[International Communication
Agency and? AID. . . " . At the same
time, Scarborough complains that
"a favorable environment for accom-
plishing a great deal does not
exist" (in a letter to the author on
6/18/79).-.
In the past, the Asia Foundation
has arranged for numerous Afghans
to visit and to be trained in the U.S.
and has financed various projects
in Afghanistan. One such project
is the Afghan Women's Institute,
headed by "the very capable Ma-
dame Kobra, president of the In - .
stitute and a former Minister of
Public Health" (Asia Foundation
News , Nov.,` Dec. 1977, p. 4) .
if they had done it slower . "
The third question raised above - is
the fighting in Afghanistan an internal
affair ? - seems to be central. In March
1979, State Department spokesperson
Hddding Carter III pointed out that the
U. S. Government "would regard external
involvement in Afghanistan's internal
problems as a serious matter" 36. In his
statement which was interpreted as "one
more sign of sensitivity to the increased
Soviet maneuvering in a wide area
stretching from the Horn of Africa through
Yemen to Afghanistan" 37by-the Washing-
ton Post, Carter directed his "warning"
to the Soviet Union and pointed out that
"the U.S. has not interfered in the in-
ternal situation of Afghanistan". 38
By calling the fighting an "internal
affair" Carter is hiding the U.S.
Asia Foundation money was given
to the institute to organize secre-
tarial training courses for women
and to strengthen its Cultural and
Foreign Relations Department.
Contributions to the Asia Foun-
dation come mainly from U.S. gov-
ernmental grants and, to 'a lesser
degree, from corporations. The
Foundation, a "non-prof it organi-
zation", works to create an infra-
structure favorable to corporate in-
vestments in Asia, and to improve
relations between corporate offi-
cials and Asian governments. For
example, it gave a reception in the
U.S. in'the fall of 1977 for Sayad
Waheed Abdullah, then Minister-in
-charge for Afghan Foreign Affairs,
which was well attended by corpo-
rate and State Department officials.
Whether the Asia Foundation still
works with the CIA or not, it is per-
forming the same functions as in the
past: promoting corporate interests in.
Asia.
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interests in intervention in Afghanistan Afghanistan include statements in the
and is ignoring massive, direct inter- Lebanese weekly, Al Kifah al Arabi 40
vention by U. S. "friends". Further, and in various Eastern European publi-
given the long history of U. S. meddling cations. 41 These statements have been
in Afghan affairs, especially through the denounced as "slanderous and base-
former Shah of Iran, Carter's statements. less" 42 by U.S. Government spokes-
are highly hypocritical. persons.
After the defeat of U. S. economic, Interestingly, two of the Afghan
strategic, and political interests in Iran rebel . leaders, Ziya Nezri and Zia
and the dissolution of CENTO (a military Nassery, are in fact U.S. citlzenc anrd
i
all
ance of Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan
aided by the U.S.), the U.S. Govern-
ment is very sensitive about the Piddle
East and South Asia region. Assistant
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher,
expressed that sensitivity during his
trip to Turkey in spring 1971 where he
negotiated for U.S. intelligence stations Ronald Lorton and other State Department
and explored the possibility of establi- officials as well as with representatives
shing a successor to CENTO. For an of Senators Frank Church and Jacob
alliance like, that, it would be "helpful" Javits, who is known for his friendship
to have a government friendly to the U.S. with the former Shah of Iran. In an
in Afghanistan. Besides that,. Afghanistan interview, Lorton refused to say whether
would be an excellent place for intelli- he and Nezri had discussed arms ship-
gence st
ti
i
a
ons a
med at the Soviet
Union.
Given what is at stake for U.S. long-
term planning in the Middle East and
South Asia region, it is certainly an
illusion to believe that the U. S. is
keeping its hands off Afghanistan. At
this point, it is not clear how much the
CIA is involved in Afghan affairs beyond
the regular monitoring of activities of
military and rebel movements. Although
this is limited right now because
"sophisticated electronic intelligence
gathering is ... useless since there is
little radio communication between
rebel groups that can be intercepted and
analysed".. 39 Another U. S. intelligence
agency which is highly active in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan border area is the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).
Comprised partly of "former" CIA
officers,. the DEA has rarely limited
itself to "pure" prosecution of drug
trafficers.
Evidence in the foreign press that
the CIA is directly involved in the
.training of Afghan rebels in Pakistan
camps and is in contact with them in
the State Department is in touch with at
least one of them. Ziya Nezri, a suppor-
ter of the deposed monarchy, visited
the State Department in early March 1979,
just before the attack on Herat, to ask
for U. S. support. Nezri had lengthy dis-
cussions with Afghanistan Desk Officer
ments to the rebels because "Mr. Nezri
is an American citizen". Church and
Javits also declined to answer in-
quiries about their talks with Nezri.
The other U.S. citizen involved in
-the fighting in Afghanistan, Zia
Nassery, is a member of the Afghan
Islamic and Nationalistic Revolution
Council based in Peshawar, Pakistan.
(Peshawar is of strategic importance
it is the closest city to the Khyber Pass,
the only road over the mountains from
Afghanistan to Pakistan.) Nassery was
interviewed in the New York Times in
April 1979, where he claimed that his
group has "150 000 fighting men in
Afghanistan". 43
In a comment in the Washington
t r , Charles Bartlett noted the ob-
vious, viz., that "the impression is
strong in informed circles [the Washing-
ton Star ? the State Department ? the
CIA ?]that the U.S. Government has
given no arms or substantial [emphasis
added] help to the insurgent Afghans..",
but, "covert aid would of course be
secret". Bartlett goes on to say that the
U. S. will "pay a high price if we refuse
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to be involved in situations like the one military government is aiding the Afghan
in Afghanistan". 44 A similar line is put rebels seeking refuge and operational
forward by General Alexander Haig , the bases in Pakistan. Officially, Pakistan
former Nixon aide and NATO Supreme /, (like the U.S.) is "not interfering in
Allied Commander in Europe, who told Afghanistan's internal affairs", as
the Belgian daily I, oir that it is im
portant to respond to "the emergence of
Afghanistan, South Yemen, and Ethiopia
as states to the Soviet Union". 45
stated in the Pakistani paper Nawa-i-
Wagat . The paper goes on, "if re-
fugees crossing the border are given
food and shelter, that is. from purely
Unlike Afghanistan, Pakistan has de- humanitarian considerations" . 46 How-
veloped into a "paradise" for agents of
foreign governments who want to inter
vene in Afghanistan, and the Pakistani
government is eagerly supporting them.
ever, the Neue Zuericher Zeituna
article documents that the Pakistani
care for the "refugees" goes far beyond
"humanitarian considerations". The
In a revealing article in the Swiss daily Pakistani military rulers gave the re-
Neue Zuericher Zeituna in February 1979, fugees a sum of 20 million rupees,
it is documented that the Pakistani and never publicized this fact. in the
While carefully exploring foreign Another region that has been
intervention in Afghanistan, this ar- seeking independence from Pakistan
ticle - due to the complexity of the is Baluchistan, the largest of Pa
issue and lack of space - does not kistan's four provinces. In 1972,
analyze one important aspect deter- the Baluchs launched a massive re-
minining Pakistan's support for the volt against the regime of then-
Afghan rebels: a long-lasting. con- Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,
flict between Pakistan and Afghan- who answered by crushing the re-
istan caused by the arbitrary bor- volt with 70, 000 Pakistani soldiers
der division set up between these and helicopters and pilots supplied
two countries at the end of British by Iran Time, 1/15/79, p. 32).
colonialism, in the region. Since then, Baluchistan has been
Several times since 1947, when virtually occupied by Pakistani
the British left the area, the Kabul soldiers from the eastern pro-
government has challenged Pakistan vinces.
by claiming that the Pushtuns, a Baluchs also live in Iran and
substantial ethnic group whose mem- Afghanistan,' and the ?Khalq govern-
bers live in northwestern Pakistan ment has been sympathetic to their
as well as in northeastern Afghan fight for independence and has been
istan have the right to decide accused of aiding them militarily. Be-
their own future and that the Afghan,. cause the Marxist Baluchistan
-Pakistani border should not be People's Liberation Front is part of
internationally recognized. In the this independence movement,
1960's, this conflict escalated so "'some . Western analysts fear
far that the Afghan-Pakistani border that future upheaval in Pakistan
was closed for' almost three years could lead to an extension of Soviet
After the loss of Bangladesh, Pa- influence south to the Indian
kistan's government has been very .7 Ocean". ime, 1/15/79, p. 32)
sensitive about any -kind of indepen-
dence movement such as that of the
Pushtuns .
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Pakistani press. At the same time, like Egypt, as well as the Muslim
the Neue Zuericher Zeitung exposed Brothers, an arch-conservative society
a fact which is certainly not news to of Muslims, are highly sympathetic to
the Pakistani government , viz. , that the Afghan Muslim rebels. Leaflets signed
the "rebels use all their money to buy by the Islamic Brotherhood have been dis-
weapons" . 47 tributed in the Pakistan-Afghanistan
U.S. papers and news agencies border area stating that "Iran has agreed
whose reporters have visited the rebel to help the Islamic rebels bels fight against
camps in Pakistan also repeatedly the Communists". 53
carried articles about rebels pleading An article regarding foreign inter-
for help: "Don't send us bread, send vention in Afghanistan which appeared in
us arms and ammunition.','
mmunition. " 48 Accor- the Canadian McLean's magazine reports
ding to the Neue Zu rich r Z it n , that American drug enforcement agents
another important fact about these discovered Chinese men in Pakistan
camps needs to be understood: "It is near the Afghan border. First they sus-
very striking ... that practically all pected that these could be "Hong Kong
of the people who flee to Pakistan Chinese heroin dealers ... planning to
are male adults ." 49 buy up the area's huge poppy crop". But
Beyond all doubt, it is in these camps later what they saw "emerged as one of
in Pakistan that the real strongholds for Pakistan's most dangerous and best kept
the rebels are located, and they are secrets: the presence on Pakistani soil
aided by the Pakistani government in of Chinese army officers and instructors.
many ways. they receive money; they They were here to help train and equip
are allowed to cross the border to right-wing Afghan Muslim guerillas for
Afghanistan freely; they can receive their 'holy war' against the Moscow-
training in the camps (see below); and backed Kabul regime of Noor Mohammed
Pakistan's ruler Zia ul-Haq also pro - Taraki.... The intriguing question now
motes their case internationally. He told is this: Why is Pakistani strongman
the Saudi Arabian paper Ukaz that "Afgha- General Zia ul-Haq risking a fight
nistan is an Islamic country presently with Afghanistan when he already faces
ruled by Communists" and demanded a violent rumblings among his own people
"common strategy of the Islamic nations ? ? ? ? Sources in neighboring India
to counter Communist activity in their believe that it is all part of the tangled
countries" 50. plan Zia has for building his own
Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran agrees and nuclear bomb which recently led to
seems in this respect to be continuing the cancellation of U. S. military aid.
the policies of the former Shah of Iran, They suspect that China has now
who was always willing to help the re- offered to help in return for Pakistani
actionaries of Afghanistan. Khomeini's aid for the Afghan rebels. "
party has a close friendship with the McLean's goes on to report-that the
Afghan Islamic Party which accused rebel's war is partly financed through
Taraki of being "an agent of the KGB' 51 the sale of illegal opium. "Feudal land-
Also Ayatollah Shariat-Madari, "number lords whose holdings are threatened
two in the Shiite hierarchy, has appealed with confiscation by the Taraki govern-
'to all Muslims throughout the world to ment are bringing the produce from
support the Afghan Muslims"' 52. The their poppy crops into Pakistan, and
Afghan Embassy in Teheran has
been attacked by Afghans and Iranians
protesting the Khalq government, which,
in turn, has accused the Iranian
use the proceeds to buy rifles, ex-
plosives, and other weapons. Pakistani
arms merchants report ... that their
new customers come in daily and
mullahs of aiding the Afghan rebels even. business is booming ." 54
militarily. Also, other Islamic states Another report by the Japanese
i 17.E
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KYODO news agency indicates that
"1, 000 Chinese-trained Pakistani
guerillas expert in ultrasubversive
activities have been dispatched to
carry out flash assaults on. Afghan
troops guarding the Pakistan-Afghan
istan border and give protection to
the Afghan rebel forces ". KYODO
also states that, according to Indian
.intelligence sources, "the guerillas
were sent from their training bases
.around Khasgar in Xingjiang Province
Cin China] to the sensitive areas bor-
dering Afghanistan". 55
In the same news dipatch, KYODO
reports that "Indian intelligence
monitored "the movement of Lt. Gen..
F.A. Christi, corps commander in
charge of Pakistan's northern division
... , who recently visited the border
area and said that he had a series of
meetings with Chinese commanders of
the area: 'Lt.Gen. Christi discussed
issues like strategic posting of the
guerillas, supply route of the already
agreed Chinese military hardware, and
exchanged ideas on a joint effort to
keep ready a task force to subvert
possible Soviet military help to
Afghanistan ... ' " . 56 Another high-
ranking Chinese military delegation
headed by the Commander of the Air
Force, Chang Ting Fa, visited Pakistan
in spring 1979. This delegation also
went to the Khyber Pass and a number
of areas directly adjoining the Pakistan
-Afghanistan border.
"In view of America's
(WP),
obvious p. A-43
interest in the security and 'stability, 2) The Afghanistan Desk
5/10/79,
of the whole region, it would seem . State Department in a letter of
5/22/79
desirable that the U.S. Government 3) U.S. News and World Report
consult and work with. both Iran and 12/11/78, p. 56
Pakistan ever more closely. A quiet 4) Newsweek , 2/26/79, p. 27
but visible demonstration of our sharing S)' WP , 4/13/79, p. C-i
of their concerns would reassure them 6) Current History, June 1979, p. 172
while serving as an implied warning if 7) cf supra, # 5, p. C-5
the new Afghan government tries to
make trouble for its neighbors "57
writes a senior associate of the
Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies in July 1978.
By now, it has become clear that
18
Afghanistan is not "making trouble" for
its neighbors. On the contrary, it is
the neighbors who interfere in Afghan
affairs and support a conservative,
religiously covered movement against
the ruling Khalq Party.
As of now it is impossible to
predict when and how the fighting in
Afghanistan will end. The western
media is eagerly painting a gloomy
picture, and for a while they made it
look like the Khalq government would
fall within a few days. However, re-
ports like "15 000 rebels have almost
reached Kabul, and are hiding around
the city. They are just waiting for
the planned offense" 58, proved to be
incorrect - wishful thinking of con-
servative and reactionary journalists.
On the contrary, by now it looks as
if the Kha.iq government is strengthe-
ning its base among the people and also
winning militarily over the rebels. But
given the mountainous landscape, the
on-going military and ideological
support from Pakistan, China, and
Iran for the rebels and the U.S.
Government's "benevolence" towards
them (and possibly more than that),
the Afghan people are in for a long,
costly struggle.
FOOTNOTES
8) Newsletter. on Civil Liberties.and
Police Development (CILIP), West Berlin,
Feb. 1979, p. 33
9) Der Spiegel, no. 12/79, p. 162
10) cf supra #,6, p. 173
11) cf supra #,5., p. C-5
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12) Christian Science Monitor (CSM),
5
47)
cf supra
#
28
/1/78, p, 6
,
13) Kh
b
48)
NYT, 4/16/
79
P
A-4
y
er Mail, 5/7/78, p. 1
14) T
k
,
.
49) cf supra
# 28
ara
i in 1951 (!) in the paper Angar ;
as quoted in Politi
,
50) quoted as in Drit
to ~v It Nlara
i
cal Aff ins , Jan. 1979,
T
z
n,
4/79
p
6
pp - 12, 13
,
.
15) cf supra,# 12
16) a "Carter administration official"
51) WE, 5/2S/79, p. A-1
52) The Guardian Weekly , 5/6/79,
p. 12
quoted in CSM , 5/9/78, p. 5
17) CSA.4, 11/14/78, P. 3
53) quoted as in FBIS, Middle East
18) cf supra,# 4
and North Africa, 4/18/79, p 21
19) WP, 2/22/79
A-13
54)
McLean's
4/30/79
, p.
, p. 24
20) ibid.
~5)
cf supra, #
53
21) cf supra, # 4
56)
ibid.
22) cf supra, 19
57)
cf supra,
32
23) cf supra, # 4
58)
FAZ, 8/14/79, p. 2
24) ibid.
25) WP , 6/11/79, P. A-21
26) The Guardian Weekly, 4/29/79
p
13
,
.
27) cf supra, # 3 , p. 55
28) Neue Zuericher Zeitung 2/7/79,
p. 4
29) Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ
8/21/79, p. 2
30) Newsweek , 4/2/79, p. 47
31) WP , 5/11/79, p. A-23
32) Washington Review of Strategic and
International Studies, July 1978, p. 117
33) Newsweek., 3/5/79, P. 66
34) The Economist , 9/11/79, p. 44
35) Newsweek, 4/16/79, p. 64
36) WP, 3/24/79, p. A-12
37) ibid.
38) ibid.
39) WP-, 4/23/79, p. A-16
40) quoted as in Foreign Broadcast Infor-
mation Service (FBIS), Soviet Union,
4/23/79, p. D-1
41) Pravda even published names of CIA
agents and "masters of subversion", for
example, L. Robinson, R. Brock, and V.
David who are aiding the rebels (4/10/79,
p- 4)
42) WP, 4/3/79, p.. A-12
43) .
New Kor,c Times .i
P. A-4
44) Washington Star
P. A-11
45) quoted as in FBIS, Soviet Union,
1/23/79, p. D-1
46) Nawa-i-WaQt, ,"t,b ted as in FBIS,
Soviet Union, 5/30/79, p. D-1
(WS), 4/30/79,
y would never consider
selves to be "agents" , yet the
thousands of analysts, academicians,
and researchers who do "intellectual"
work for the CIA provide the Agency
with all the necessary groundwork for
its, more notorious operations. They
come from the private sector, the
State Department, the Agency for
International Development, corporations,
"think tanks", and research centers of
every description. The CIA depends on
them, and they often become an in-
tegral part of the CIA machinery. Rand
Corporation, for example, listed the
CIA, the Office of the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Defense
Intelligence Agency under the category
of "Major Sponsors of Rand Research"
in its 1977/78 report.
The document excerpted below is an
example of a CIA solicitation for this
kind of research. (A full-length copy
of the origincal CIA paper is available
from CounterSpy.)
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Subject: Request for Proposal for a Study on Nutrition, Health and
Food Science and Technology Capabilities of Key Countries
(RFP-6-78N)
Gentlemen:
Your technical and cost proposal is solicited for a study in accordance
with the Statement of Work set forth herein.
This letter and the matters addressed are unclassified, however,
access to this material should be restricted to those judged to have a
need-to-know.
Your proposal should be in accordance with the requirements of this
Request for Proposal No. RFP-6-78N, which are contained in the following
sections:
Section I - Solicitation Instructions and Conditions
Section II - Statement of Work (Under Separate Cover)
Section III - Evaluation Criteria
Section IV Contractor's Certifications and Acknowledgements
Offers will be received until 5:00 PM, prevailing Washington, D. C.
time 26 May 1978. Your attention is invited to the Late Offers and
Modifications or Withdrawel, Provisions set forth in the Solicitation
Instructions and Conditions;. Paragraph 7. The address for receipt of
offers is:
William P. Yeatman
Post Office Box 2034
Main Post Office
Washington, D. C. 20013
The proposal must be submitted in the format described in this RFP.
Offerors are requested to furnish four (4) copies of all proposals to
facilitate the evaluation effort.
The type of information available to intelligence analysis will be
described in detail by the Sponsor's Project Officer.
A final report presenting the results of this analysis will be required.
A draft copy of the final report will be submitted to the sponsor for approval-
and comments prior to the submission of the final report.
It is anticipated that this effort will take approximately twelve (12) man-
months of effort. Contractor may propose any type of contract for
bidding purposes.
Requests for additional information or guidance concerning technical
matters are to be addressed to, the COTR, Dr. Julian Hoptman, who may
be reached on [phone], and administrative contractual questions are
to be 'addressed to the Contract Negotiator, Mr. Brian MacDonald, who
maybe .reached on [phone].
Very truly yours,
(signed)
William P. Yeatman
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SECTION II
STATEMENT OF WORK
Nutrition and Health, and Food Science and Technology
Capabilities of Key Countries
Studies will evaluate national nutrition and health problems and
strengths and determine the potential limits for S&T, as they affect
food availability and consumption requirements of key less developed
countries and regions. Countries to be studied are Mexico, Cuba,
Brazil, Nigeria, and the Philippines. Each country study will
answer the following terms of reference:
1. What are the nutrition and disease factors related to food
availability and utilization ? What is the impact of the biological/
ecological/cultural environment on nutrition, health and disease
What is the impact of illness related to dietary deficiency diseases ?
What is the impact of national food needs and demands which result
in parallel incidence of debilitation and crippling diseases in the
labor force ? What is the nutritional status of the population as com-
pared with its requirements ?
2. What conventional and unconventional food systems are
available which apply to its problems ? Which alternative or
substitute food could be developed and utilized ?
3. With scientific -technical input what would be the increment
in food production, availability and utilization of current types of
food ? What modern technologies are needed to upgrade present
food resources or to achieve self-sufficiency in major foods ? What
national or international research and development would be
applicable to its food problems ? What are the food quality control
and assurance requirements-and the capabilities for processing,
preservation and storage ?
4. On the basis of the preceding terms of reference, for each
country make qualitative projections of the balance between future
needs and capabilities in the light of government policies and pre-
vailing issues. Estimate the extent to which problems are solvable
on a.national or regional scale. Estimate potential demands or
competitive pressures on US or foreign S&T resources.
5. The contractor will deliver 5 final country reports, using the
terms of reference outlined above, over a period not to exceed 12
calendar months. Progress reports will be submitted every two months
and a final report will be submitted at the end of the contract period.
The level of effort should total one (1) man-year. The data base for this
contract will be-unclassified and will be derived from public and
professional sources.
21
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When asked about the result of this
solicitation for research, CIA officer
Dr. Julian Hoptman, the man respon-
sible for the technical aspects of the
study, refused to answer any questions.
A second officer, Brian MacDonald, ad-
mitted that the solicitation CounterSpy
had obtained was initiated by the CIA's
program office. However, MacDonald
stated, "they never went ahead with
the thing".
Whether this-is true or not, the
solicitation shows how far the analysts
of the CIA's program office are willing
to go in planning to control other
countries. In the cases of Mexico and
Nigeria, such a- study could con-
ceivably provide data for a strategy of
withholding food aid and taking eco-
nomic 'measures harmful to the national
food system as a form of blackmail to
procure oil resources. In Brazil and the
Philippines the threat that popular
movements pose to the present
"favorable climates" for multi-
national exploitation would be- a moti-
vation for researching use of the food
weapon. A study of Cuba would give
information. about the effects of the US
blockade and suggest future options
for continued US subversion of the
Cuban revolution.
The solicitation takes on even
more ominous implications when placed
in the context.of a previous CIA Report
entitled "Potential Implications of Trends
in World Population, Food Production,
and Climate" (discussed in CounterSoy,
Winter 1976, pp. 8,' 9). The report
states that serious world food shortages
could "give the US a measure of power
it had never had before - possibly an
economic and political dominance
greater than that of the immediate
post World War Two years" . The re-
port continues. "Washington could ac-
quire virtual life and death power over
the fate of multitudes of the needy.
Without indulging in blackmail in any,
sense, the US would gain extra-
ordinary political and economic in-
fluence...".
As incredible as it seems, there can
be no doubt that people exist who are
willing to contemplate such inhumanity
as the use of food as a weapon. Already
corporations import food from dozens of
countries where the masses are mal-
nourished without so much as a second
thought about whether their actions are
- at the very least - irresponsible.
From such corporate practices to delib-
erate use of food as a weapon it is only
a very small step.
THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS AND THE C ..I. A.
by George N. Schmidt
Available for $ 2 from:
SUBSTITUTES UNITED FOR BETTER SCHOOLS
343 S. Dearborn St.
Room 1503
Chicago, Ill. 60604.
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It may be that the true story of
what happened in Indonesia on the
night of September 30-October 1, 1965
(commonly referred to as "Gestapu")
will never be told. The abortive coup
by junior military officers was de -
signed to prevent another preceived
coup that the CIA-backed "Generals
Council" was planning against the
Sukarno government. In the early
hours of October 1, six of the mem-
..hers of this council were abducted
from their homes, taken to the rebels'
headquarters outside Djakarta (Indo-
nesia's capital), and then murdered
later that morning. The mistakes these
junior officers made: letting one Gen-
eral Nasution escape, and leaving an-
other General Suharto off their list
completely, proved their undoing. In
the following months, Nasution,
using the pretext of the aborted coup
would direct the extermination of- the In-
donesian Communist Party (PKI), and
Suharto would take over control of the
government from President Sukarno.
The exact motives of these junior offi-
cers, their political allegiance and
goals are unclear.
What is established fact, however,
is that within twelve hours their coup
had failed. The Army, led by Suharto,
was able to regain control of those in-
stallations seized by the coup-makers,
root out the dissident units who had
participated, and apprehend their lead-
ers. What is also established fact is
that, following the events of the Ges-
to u , the powers and ability of Presi-
dent Sukarno to govern were curbed
(within six months he had ceded all
control to General Suharto), a US-
trained military-civilian elite took
over the day-to-day affairs of the coun-
try, the PKI leadership was wiped out,
and there began a mass murder of
close to one million people.
CIA involvement in the events of
the Gestapu has never been documen-
ted. Some of their machinations before
and after October 1, 1965, however, are
well known. CIA participation in the
formulation of an American policy of
"nation building" in Southeast Asia is
extensive. 1 There is also evidence of
the CIA's infiltration of right-wing stu-
dent groups and anti-Communist trade,
union federations which laid The ground-
work for the massacres before October
1965. In a way, then, the question of
what role the CIA played in those 48
hours of the Gestapu is peripheral. For,
whatever it may have been, it pales be-
fore their behavior during the coup's
bloody aftermath."
To the vicious murder of one million
innocent Indonesian workers, students
and peasants, the CIA never objected.
Instead, it concentrates its efforts (and
US taxes) on analysis of the coup whose
main aim is to implicate the PKI in the
murder of the six generals and to justify
the Army's purge of the Indonesian Left.
To speak out against the atrocities of
1965-67 in' Indonesia would put the CIA
in a hypocritical and untenable position.
For the beneficiaries of the new status
uo in Indonesia are the very class
interests which the CIA serves faith-
fully. It would be surprising to read a
"dog bites man" story where the CIA and
the corporate class in America are con-
cerned.
Any discussion of CIA involvement
in the September/October 1965 coup
must begin by mentioning the CIA's own
analysis of the events contained in its
Indonesia-1965? The Coup That Back-
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Rai (1968). The book is important, not (C FR) Study Group'on Southeast Asia
for its command of facts and events in US Policy all argued that the offi--
(in which respect it is a jumble of half-
truths and contradictions), but for the
circumstances which surround its publi-
cation: Indonesia-1965 is the only
study of Indonesian politics ever re-
leased to the public on the Agency's
own initiative. Further, it is the only
study ever released by the CIA of a
coup for "which there was reason to
doubt the CIA's
cence. The CIA
own initiative a
own proclaimed inno-
never released of its
study of its involve-
ment in the overthrow of Salvador
Allende in Chile, for example. One has
to ask the question, then, why the
CIA went to the trouble to publish a
history of the Gestapu affair, as it
perceived it ?
Related to the CIA's White Paper on
the events surrounding Gestapu is its
effort to quash the release of any
study which questioned the CIA's con-
clusion. In January 1966, members of
the Modem Indonesia Project at
Cornell University (originally set up in
1954 with a grant from the Ford Foun-
dation) circulated a confidential paper
pointing out the inconsistencies of the
version of events coming out of Indo-
nesian trials of PKI leaders and other
"official". sources in Djakarta. Caught
by surprise, the CIA was able to hold
up publication of the Cornell Paper,
for .five years; time enough to concoct
its own study and allow it to become
accepted history.
NATION BUILDING VIA MILITARY ELITES
US plans for so called "nation
-building" in Southeast Asia through the
creation of Western-trained military, elites grew out of a series of reports
drawn up between 1958-60. 2 The
Draper Report of 1959 (named after
former Ambassador William H. Draper,
Jr.) and its annexes written one year
earlier, the Rockefeller Brothers Spe-
cial Study Project'of-December 1959;
and the Council on Foreign Relations'
24 .
cer corps of under-developed countries,
and Indonesia in particular, consti-
tuted a naturally selected and morally
superior elite best suited to lead their
country's process of economic develop-
ment. Each of the reports urged the
US government to make use of the
supposed organizational strength and
leadership capabilities of the military
to achieve American economic objec-
tives. From the beginning, these blue-
prints envisioned a scenario whose
ultimate beneficiary would be US trade
and investment.
CIA -participation was evident
throughout the gestation of this policy.
One of the annexes to the Draper Report
was written by the Foreign_ Policy Re-
search Institute (FPRI) of the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania. The FPRI was -ad-
vised in its report by Guy Pauker who,
since joining the Rand Corporation in
1958 had worked closely with the CIA,
and the Indonesian civilian; and mili-
tary elite of which he spoke so highly.
The FPRI, itself, was funded by the
Catherwood Foundation of oil financier
Cummins Catherwood. In 1967 it was
revealed that the Catherwood Foun-
dation "served as a CIA conduit to pay
the salary of the National Student
Association's (NSA) International
Vice President. 3
A cursory glance at the participants
of these study groups would turn up
names such as retired (nominally,
anyway) CIA-Colonel William Kintner,
Admiral,Felix B. Strump (board chair-
man of CIA's Ai'r America), CIA's
Edward Land.sdale (responsible for the
liquidation of the Huk people in the
Philippines and the rigging of elec-
tions in favor of Diem in- "South
Vietnam in the late`1950's), Kenneth
Todd Young (a Stanvac oil company
official who, in October 1960 would
become an "advisor" to Diem and
later the US Ambassador to Thailand),
and many others with CIA/corporate
credentials.
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The culmination of the thoughts
and recommendations put forth by
these four reports took the form of a
book written by Russell H. Fifield,
Southeast Asia in United States Policy
(New York, Praeger, for the Council on
Foreign Relations, 1963). The book was
the final version of the CFR's study
group on Southeast Asia. Reflecting
the CFR's domination of foreign policy
formulation, the study group "coun-
seled" Washington "to provide
assistance to President Sukarno but at
the same time to build up non- Com-
munist and anti-Communist forces". 4
The ensuing five years in Indone-
sia caused great consternation for the
self-anointed nation builders. The
military's inability to stem the rising
popularity of the PKI caused Pauker and
others to publicly rescind their pre-
vious praise of the officers corps as
"the best human material"to be found
in Third World countries. By November
1964, Pauker's skepticism was full
blown. He doubted whether Indonesia's
anti-Communist forces '(i. e . , the mili--.
tary) could summon up "the ruthless-
ness that made it possible for the Nazis
to suppress the Communist Party of
Germany ... even though the enemies
of the PKI ... are weaker than the
Nazis, not only in numbers and in
mass support, but also in unity, dis-
cipline, and leadership" .5
ECONOMIC FRONT
As with Chile eight years later,
while relations between Washington and
Sukarno continued to deteriorate, US
military aid to the Indonesian armed
forces was increasing greatly. From
1949-61, $29.5 million in military
grants were extended. The four years
1962-65 saw $38.5 million in military
aid. And, while the number of Indone-
sian officers trained in the. US before
1962 was around 700, by 1965 that
figure had jumped to 4, 000. 6
US oil companies, meanwhile, were
forging stronger links with the nomi-
25
nally independent, state-run Indone-
sian oil industry. Following the lead
of smaller American oil companies,
the majors, Stanvac (the Far East
subsidiary of Standard Oil of New
Jersey and Socony Mobil) and Caltex
(a subsidiary of Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia and Texaco) signed a 60-40
production-sharing formula with Per-
mina, the Army-run Indonesian oil
company. Given the attitude of
Sukarno and the Indonesian people
toward foreign investment during this
period, these ventures were risky to
say the least, and could only be con-
solidated by a total transformation of
the Indonesian status auo .
In both.these instances, the des-
tination of US dollars, public and pri-
vate, was not to Sukarno and the Indo-
nesian government, but to forces
allayed against him which were thus
able to strengthen their control over the
key sectors of Indonesian society: the
military and the economy.
Caltex officials. had a particular re-
venge in seeking a turnaround in Indo-
nesia. In 1958, it had financed, along
with the CIA, the Outer Islands rebel-
lion in which members of the pro-US
Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and the
modern Islamic Masjumi Party tried to
get the islands of Sumatra and the
Celebes to secede from Indonesia in
response to the nationalizations of
Dutch holdings by Sukarno. At the time,
Caltex accounted for seventy per cent
of Sumatran oil production , and future
CIA Director John McCone owned $1
million worth of stock in Caltex's par-
ent company, Standard Oil of Cali-
fornia. The '58 Sumatran fiasco had led
to the exposure of the CIA when its
pilot, Allen Pope was shot down and
captured by the Indonesians. McCone,
Caltex and the CIA had all suffered igno-
minious exposure and defeat in 1958. 7
Any threat, now, to their new investment
in Permina would be protected with
a vengeance. Hence, when oil workers
seized the refineries of Caltex, Stanvac,
and two other companies in March 1965,
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it marked the beginning of the end for
Sukarno.
LABOR OPERATIONS
For US governmental labor policy in
Indonesia, the '65 coup constituted a
qualitative success over previous set-
backs. During the late '50's and early
'60's, AFL-CIO attempts to create one
national, unified, pro-Western labor
federation in Indonesia had repeatedly
failed, in part, because the AFL-CIO
lacked a 'regional Asian labor center of
its own such as the American Institute
for'Free Labor Development (AIFLD) in
Latin America. In one of the early
attempts, the CIA-affiliated Interna-
tional Ladies' Garment Workers Union
(ILGWU) set up a program to train Indo-
nesian labor leaders from various trade
unions. Funded by a grant from the
Rockefeller Foundation, between 1956
-58 the ILGWU brought some 30 Indo-
nesians to their US training institute.
Five years later, close to twenty of
these people were still active in the
labor movement in Indonesia.8
In another campaign in October
1962, Dr. Kusna Purardiridja, chair-
person of the PSI-affiliated labor feder-
ation, the All Indonesia Congress of
Workers (KBSI), visited the US under a
State Department Leadership Program.
Because he was also head of the Na-
tional Railway Workers Union, Dr.
Kusna met with Lester Zosel, Inter-
national Representative of the Brother-.
hood of Railway and Airline Clerks
(BRAC). joining the talks was Donald
Beattie, executive secretary of the
Railway Executives Association (RLEA).
Kusna "hailed the feeling of responsi-
bility" shown by the US labor movement
for world developments. He especially
praised the training of young Asian
trade unionists in US union methods,
saying that upon their return home they
had "used this training seriously" . 9
Although Zosel, himself,. has never
been shown to- have worked for the CIA,
?the.BRAC was heavily. involved in CIA
activities at the time. Through BRAC's
International Trade Secretariats (ITS),
the International Transport Workers
Federation (ITF), BRAC's Jack Otero
worked as a "CIA agent for labor oper-
ations" in Latin America.10
The ITS of the Communication Work-
ers of America (CWA), which was also
collaborating with the CIA at the time,
the Postal, Telegraph and Telephone
International (PTTI) helped to train mem-
bers of the Indonesian telephone and
telegraph workers union, the SSPTT.
When Jack Sessions, who ran the ILGWU
training institute in the 1950's, travelled
to Indonesia in 1962, the stigma of
.having trained in the US was already
being seen. "Communists, he recalled,
denounced the SSPTT as an American
socialist union.
The man most responsible for forging
links between Indonesian and AFL-CIO
trade unionism was Harry Goldberg. Re
cruited by Jay Love stone, who had worked
with the CIA throughout his career as
head of the Education Department of
the ILGWU and as Foreign Affairs Chief
of the AFL-CIO, Goldberg helped estab-
lish the Asian Regional Organization of
the ICFTU in 1951. Although he denies
ever having worked for the CIA, Gold
berg persistently tried to get the US
government to support members of the
PSI and Masjumi Party in their Outer
Islands rebellion/fiasco. When leaders
of these parties were exiled irr 1959,
Goldberg served as a courier between
them and Indonesian trade unionists.
Following the 1965 coup,, Goldberg
was the first Western trade unionist to
visit Indonesia. And although he had mis-
givings about the massacres, he urged
student groups, "trade unions Anr1 ntharc
to step up their purge of the PKI.12
Upon his return to the US, Goldberg
lobbied the Johnson Administration to
increase aid to the new regime.
As. contradictions in Indonesian so-
ciety increased during the 1963's-65's,
the role of US-trained trade unionists be-
came more significant. Gathering the
names of workers who were-members or
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even sympathizers of unions affiliated posed to their natural incompabilities.
with the national labor federation SOBSI, From its inception, SOKSI was viewed by
these trade unionist spies laid the the PKI as an attempt to liquidate in-
throu h the in-
g
d
groundwork for the massacres of 1965-
66 before the Gestapu ever occurred. 13
Goldberg, himself, has admitted that
the military-backed United Workers
Action Front (KABI) was undoubtedly in-
volved in any "excesses" committed
against members of SOBSI.14
which
i
a
In the orchestrated hyster
followed the Gestapu massacres of the attempting to cloud over the reality of
the exploitation of workers by asser-
"left" ended up being directed against
the majority of Indonesian workers, peas- ting the unity o` interest between cap-
ant "squatters" on estates, local PKI ital and labor, sowed the seeds of an
Indonesian fascism. 17
members and most active trade unionists. In all of this, SOKSI spread
The presidential decree of May 1966
In-
AFL-CIO's company unionism to the In-
banning all mass organizations -- speci- donesian masses. Trade unionism
fically the PKI, BAPERKI (an organization according to George Meany has always
of Indonesians of Chinese descent
which was accused of having ties to the sought to de-politicize the demands of
workers, to portray the production pro-
Chinese communists), and SOBSI with its joint harmonious endeavour.
62 trade union affiliates -- effected some cess as a In Indonesia., this line of thinking in-
ten million people. Any former members directly justified the murder of hun -
of these groups were also subject to
arrest and indefinite detention at any dreds of thousands of trade unionists;
time. No specific charges needed to be as in the US it has resulted in the re-
made against them and a trial was not peated selling-out of rank and file by
guaranteed. Further, members and their their union leadership, a fact not lost
families were ineligible for the "certi- on American workers.
ficate of non-involvement" required for
jobs and housing.15
The military's previous formation in
1962 of anti-SOBSI groupings of workers,
students, and soldiers culminated in the
creation of the national labor federation,
SOKSI. With the help of the International
Division of the AFL-CIO (a longtime CIA
haunt) and the International Confedera-
tion of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), the
army formed SOKSI in order to under-
mine legitimate political groupings and
ultimately cause a split in SOBSI.16 Its
success in causing this break was due
in large part to its ability to distribute
government-subsidized commodities in
short supply to its members.
The corporate ideology of SOKSI. was
directly opposed to the. militant trade
unionism in SOBSI. It stressed the mu-
tual interest that both worker and man-
agement had in the production as op-
e unions
dependent tra
timidation of workers. By making para-
mount Indonesia's "national aim" of de-
velopment along capitalist lines with an
emphasis on foreign investment, SOKSI
tried to smash the trade union move-
ment as part of an ongoing class strug-
gle. The concept of karva% an , in
STUDENT AND CULTURAL OPERATIONS
Efforts by the CIA, the Ford Founda-
tion and others to coopt Indonesian
intellectuals and the student movement
in particular took ten years and were
not realized until the coup. The cre-
ation of an Indonesian elite 'whichwould
one day steer the country's economy
in a solidly pro-West direction began
in the mid-1950's with the launching of
field projects by American professors at
the Massachusetts Institute of Tech o-
logy (MIT) and Cornell University.
These efforts culminated in courses'at
the Army Staff and-Command School,
SESK.OAD, in Bandung, Indonesia.
These courses were taught by A`nerican
-educated civilian economists. The
students, by and large, were generals
and senior officers who had been
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trained in counterinsurgency at Fort rising), Sumitro kept in touch with his
Leavenworth and Fort Bragg in the US.
In 1954; the Ford Foundation funded
a series of field projects at MIT and
Cornell which "edpcated" a cadre of
American scholars in Indonesian
studies who have since dominated the
field in this country. One of the first
students through Harry Goldberg. During
his six years in exile, he remained
"chairman in absentia" of the school.21
Student organizations in Indonesia
are closely tied to their sponsoring polit-
-ical parties which, in some cases,
exert a paternalistic control over their
people to go through this program was students. Upon graduation from univer-
the irrepressible Guy Pauker. Although sity, student leaders often go on to po-
Pauker denies having worked for the sitions of power in their respective par-
CIA before 1958, the Center for Inter-
national Studies at MIT -- from where
these field projects were run -- was a
CIA think tank of-Max Millikan and W.
W. Rostow, literally created and fi-
nanced by the CIA in the early 1950's.
After training this core: team of
American scholars, Ford began re
cruiting screened Indonesian intellec-
tuals and sent them to the University
of California to study under Pauker at
the newly-created Center for South
and Southeast Asian Studies at Berkeley,
another recipient of CIA funds. Mean-
while, American professors were back
in Djakarta transforming the Faculty of
Economics into an "American-style
school of economics, statistics and
business administration". One team
member, recalls that when Sukarno
complained of there being too much
-emphasis on Schumpeter and Keynes,
ties. 22 The ability of the CIA to in- .
fluence student politics is, thus,neatly
the staff "put 'socialism' into as many
course titles as we could... but basi-
cally Cwe] tried to preserve the aca-19
demic integrity of the place".
The"integrity" of Indonesia's
"best human material" (see above) was
put on international display in 1958 dur-
ing the CIA-backed Sumatra fiasco. One
of the leaders of the rebellion, Sumitro
accomplished through the infiltration and
cooptation of the students' party-spon-
sors. The history of the Islamic Student
Association (HMI) is a case in point.
The HMI was.closely associated with
the Masjumi Party, which was involved
in the CIA's Outer Islands rebellion. De-.
spite the banning of Masjumi in 1959, its.
contacts with HMI were never broken.
Leaders of Masjumi, PSI (many of whose
members had taken .up faculty posts after.
their Berkeley training), and the. orthodox
Islamic Nahdatul Ulama (NU) party fed
their students to a steady diet of anti-
communism. Most of this propaganda
was directed against members of the PKI
-led CGMI, the. most popular student
federation with over 30, 000 student- r',I
members by mid-1964.23 ;sm
Two weeks before the Gestapu , lead-_
ers of the CGMI were able to get the
internationally recognized Federation of
Indonesian Student Associations (PPMI)
to issue a statement demanding the dis-
solution of HMI for its associations with
the CIA. 74 But, as in the case of the oil
workers' demands for nationalization of
the oil industry, this move came too late.
Following Gestapu, these right-wing
Djojohadikusomo, had contacts with MIT student groups burnt down the PKI head-
and the CIA dating back to 1954 when he quarters and the home of Party c'hairper-
"participated in the [American] team's son D.N. Aidit; in the following days,
briefings before they left Cambridge"20 they also burnt down the central offices
for Indonesia.* At the time of the 1958 re- of the Communist Movement of Indone-
bellion, Sumitro was minister of finance sian Women (GERWANI) and, the People's
in Sukarno's cabinet and dean of the Youth (Permuda Rakj at) , both of whom
Faculty of Economics at the University of they accused of murdering the six gener-
Djakarta. During his exile to Singapore' als on the night of October 1; and final-
In 19 59 (for his part in the Sumatran up-
28- ~
_ly, they laid siege to the SOBSI head`,_
quarters.
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test the US-Belgian joint "rescue opera-
tion" in Stanleyville which resulted in
the killings of thousands of innocent
Congolese citizens. In March of 1965,
students occupied the US Embassy in
Djakarta to protest the murder of Mal-
colm X in New York City. They read a
petition which demanded the ouster of
Ambassador Howard Jones, the closing
of all remaining USIS libraries, and the
departure of all Peace Corps Zrolunteers
from Indonesia.28
It was the actions of Indonesian work-
ers, however, which brought home to the
CIA the need for some kind of immediate
action in Indonesia. In March of 1965,
unions cut off gas and electricity to the
US embassy appartment building, the
communist hysteria and accusations home of the American naval attache, Lt.
were given substantial support by the 'Col. Victor A. Armstrong, and the offices
military. The Army frequently lent KAMI of both the Indonesian-American Friend-
On October 25, 1965, these right-
wing student groups met at the home of
the Minister of Higher Education and
Science, Major General Sjarif Thajeb, to
form a new student organization, the
Action Command of Indonesian Students,
KAMI. 25 (KAMI leaders had previously
participated in American Field Service
exchange programs and "Foreign Student
Leadership Projects" sponsored by the
CIA-financed National Student Associa-
tion . 26) KAMI demonstrations accused
the PKI of participation in the unsuc-.
cessful coup, and they provided the
ideal method for circumventing govern-
ment-controlled means of communica -
tion, which, at the time, had not im-
plicated the PKI. KAMI's spread of anti-
ship Society and the Associated Press 29
Although emergency generators soon re-
stored power to the facilities, the
afternoon and evening English classes
for three thousand Indonesians had to
The CIA's Congress for Cultural Free- be cancelled. The symbolic effect of
dom was also active in Indonesia ,forging isolating embassy personnel from their
links with PSI and Masjumi Party mem- US contacts (the Friendship Societywas
bers. In May 1964, the congress pub-' a well-known meeting place for Ameri-
lished a pamphlet entitled "Indonesia in can intelligence officers and their Indo-
Travail" which spoke of Indonesia's im- nesian assets) angered the US and frus-
pending "crisis" .27 The pamphlet was trated their efforts to vein over a seg-
written by 25 PSI and Masjumi anti- ment of Indonesian society.
Sukarno intellectuals. One of the authors . During the same month, the Indo-
Mochtar Lubis, was Harry Goldberg's nesian postal union imposed a mail
loudspeakers and transportation. And,
students in KAMI could count on Army
protection if they were attacked by hos-
tile groups -- frequently members of
the military itself.
favorite Indonesian journalist. At one
point, Goldberg even tried, unsuccess-
fully, to help Lubis import a printing
press.
and telegraph boycott on the US Em-
bassy and refused to handle traffic for
American news agencies.30 This sec-
ond action represented a greater dan-
The purpose of the CIA's efforts in ger to American plans. At a time of
this regard was to counter a rising anti- growing anti-Americanism and with the
Americanism on the part of the Indonesian visit of presidential representative
people which was evidenced by the suc- Ellsworth Bunker approaching, the pros-
cessive sackings and closings of three pect of not being able to present events
US Information Service (USIS) libraries in Indonesia in a "favorable" light
in late 1964 and early 1965. These at'- threatened to derail a US scenario for
tacks on centers of US propaganda dis- intervention. News management re-
semination reflected the rising conscious- quires more than the reporting of
ness of Indonesians, workers in particu- events. It demands the creation of a
lar. The seizure of the USIS library in consumable commodity. In the case of
Surabaya in December 1964, was to. pro- Indonesia, packaging anti-American
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Y was a prerequisite for
gaining the American people's counte-
nance of covert actions by their govern
.ment.
CONCLUSION
tnis clay -- the CIA and its apologists
have never deviated from their "offi-
cial" portrayal of the carnage which
followed the coup as a spontaneous,
mystical act, a Holy War carried out
against godless Communists.37 But the
on-going tragedy, the continued op-
pression of an entire people by a local
elite sponsored, financed and made in
the USA speaks to a different madness;
one which is systematic, planned,. and
an automatic corollary of a "healthy"
investment climate for US corpora -
tions. `'
The CIA and its clien`s have hidden
behind their Indonesian "smoke-
screen" for too long. To the deterrence
of future massacres, CounterSpv is
publishing the names of those CIA
agents, Public Safety Advisors and
other involved persons who were in
Indonesia at the time of the Ge,
and who acquiesced the bloodbath and
helped to consolidate its grizzlygains.
With the coming-to-power of
Suharto and the US-trained military-
civilian elite, the Indonesian "miracle"
was achieved. The country. was
launched on a pro-Western course of
development. The CIA, whet ier it chose
to or not, could claim another "success"
American unfettered access to Indone-
sia's vast mineral wealth was restored.
The island-nation was once a again an
imperialist- El Dorado.
The hubris of American officials and
their propagandists echoed the propi-
tious turn of events. Scholar Richard
Nixon (still a year out of office) used
the Council on Foreign Relation's pub-
lication, Foreign Affa r , to speak to.
"the test prize in the Southeast Asian
area" being rescued from. "the Chinese
orbit".32 Then-Secretary of Defense,
Robert McNamara, testified to the
Senate that, in retrospect, US military
aid during the 1965-66 period had been
"well jtified" and had paid divi --
dends. US Ambassador to Indonesia,
Marshall Green, repeatedly told audi-
ences in Australia -- where he was the
Ambassador from March 1973 to August
1975 -- that "we did what we had to
do and you'd better be glad we did be-
cause if we hadn't Asia would be a
different place today". 34
The reaction of the American press
to the turnaround in Indonesia was
equally self-serving. Making no men-
tion of the bloodbath which followed,
CIA mouthpiece, C.L. Sulzberger
greeted the coup as a "positive
achievement". 35 -Another -New York
T' es columnist, James Reston,
made no mention of the mass murders,
referring, Instead, to the.changes
which occurred as "significant" and
"hopeful". 36
Throughout the massacres -- and to.
30
BREWSTER, Robert G.
(born: 10/24/26)
Brewster has been stationed in Indone-
sia from 6/65-5/67. He is a CIA offi-
cer. ( other known assignments: Thai-
land, Malaysia)
DAYTON, John Winthrop
(born: 10/22/2 )
Dayton.is a CIA officer who served in
Indonesia daring the Gestapu.( Jordan,
.Somalia, Japan) -
EMORY', Orville J.
(born: 2/27/33)
Emory was in Indonesia from 11/63-
12/67. He is a CIA officer. (Philippines,
Thailand)
ICHIKAWA, Grant H.
(born: 4/17/19)
Ichikawa is a CIA officer. He served in
Indonesia from 1963-68.
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LAZARSKY, Joseph E.
(born: 10/21/71)
Lazarsky, who is a CIA officer, was in
Indonesia from 12/64-7/67. (Burma,
India, South Korea)
LEVY, Frank A.
(born: 1/24/19)
Levy was assigned to Surabaya in 7/64.
He is a CIA officer.
MASTERS, Edward Eugene
(born: 6/21/24)
Masters, head of the political section of
the US Embassy at the time of the coup,
has an extensive background of intelli-
gence work, including that of intelligence
research analyst and Deputy Chief of the
Indonesia-Malaya Branch in the Office of
Intelligence Research-Analysis in the
State Department.
McAVOY, Clyde Richard
(born: 3/2 7/2 6)
McAvoy served in Indonesia from 7/61-
4/66. He is a CIA officer. (Laos,Burma)
NICOL, Donald J.
(born: 7/17/31)
Nicol is a CIA officer who has worked in
Indonesia (2/65-4/68) and South Korea.
SNYDER, Royce W., Jr.
(born: 4/25/32)
Snyder served twice in Indonesia: at
the time of the coup and in the early
1970's. He is a CIA officer. (Malaysia,
Vietnam)
STEIN, Arthur
(born: 11/2/26)
Stein has worked as police advisor in
a university and as "public safety
advisor" in Cambodia and Indonesia
(1/64-8/65).
STRONG, Henry
(born: 10/6/23)
Strong is a CIA officer who was in Indo-
nesia during the coup. (Belgium, Nether-
lands, Denmark)
TOVAR, Bernardo Hugh
(born: 12/2 7/2 2)
Tovar was CIA Chief of Station in'Indo-
nesia from 5/64-9/66. Peter Dale Scott
calls him "a clearly activist Chief of
Station... who has spent years in the
Philippines with the CIA's Edward
Landsdale in the early 1950's '. (Ten
Years Military Terror in Indonesia ,
Spokesman Books, London, 1975, p*. 243),
Subsequently, Tovar became Chief of
Station in Laos (1970) and Thailand (1973).
WATERS, Hugh Richard
(born: 9/17/29) . ,
Waters was assigned to Surabaya in 8/65..
He is a CIA officer.
YU, David C. L.
(born: 6/29/24)
Yu is a CIA officer who was in Indonesia
during the coup.
1) See Peter Dale Scott, "The Vietnam
War and the CIA-Financial Establish-
ment" in Mark Selden (e.d.), Remakiqa
Asia: Essays on the American Uses of
Power, Pantheon, New York, 1971 .
2) Peter Dale Scott, "Exporting Military
-Economic Development: America and the
Overthrow of Sukarno, 1965-67", in
Malcolm Caldwell (ed.), Ten Years'
Military Terror in Indonesia, Spokes-
man Books, London, 197 .
3) Ibid. , p. 253
4) Russell H. Fifield, Southeast Asia
in United States-.Policy I Praeger, for the
Council on Foreign Relations, NewYork,
1963, p. 308
5) Guy J. Pauker, -Communist Prospects
in Indonesia , the RAND Corporation,
RM-4135-PR, November 1964, p. 22
6) cf supra, # 2, p. 236
7) See David Wise and Thomas B.
Ross, The Invisible Government
Bantam Books, 1964, pp. 145-156. Also,
L. Fletcher Prouty, The Secret Team ,
Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ ,
1973, pp. 323-328
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8) Lenny Siegel, "Asian Labor: The Amer-
ican Connection", Pacific Research and
World Emoire Telegram , July-August
1975, p. 8
9) Citation unavailable at press time.
10) Philip Agee, Inside the Company :
CIA Diary-, Stone Hill, New York, 1975,
p. 616
11) Jack Sessions, "Indonesia: the Fight
for Democratic Unions", American Feder-
ationist-, February 1963
12) cf supra, # 8, p. 9
13) Philippe Gavi, "Contre-Revolution
en Indoriesie", Les Temps Modernes,
January 1969, pp. 1179, 1183, 1203
14) cf supra? # 8, p. 8
15) Elaine Capizzi, ".Trade Unions
Under the New Order", Repression and
Exploitation in Indonesia , Spokesman
Books, Nottingham , 1974, p. 37
16) Daniel S. Lev, "The Political Role
of the Army in Indonesia", Pacific
Affairs , Winter 1963-64, p. 361
17) cf supra, # 15, p. 40
18) See David Ransom, "Ford Country:
Building an Elite for Indonesia", in
Stephen R. Weissman (ed.), The Troian
Horse: A Radical Look at Foreign Aid,
Ramparts, Palo Alto, 1974.
19) Ibid., p. 99
20) Ibid. , P. 97 -
21) Ibid., p. 99
22) See W. Bachtiar, "Indonesia", in
Donald K. Emmerson (ed.), Students
and Politics in Developing Nations ,
Praeger, New York, 1968
23) Ibid., p. 189
24) Ibid.
25) Ibid. , p. 192
26) cf supra, # 18, p. 106
27) Robert Shopler, Time Out of Hand:
Revolution and Reaction in Southeast
Asia , Harper, New York, 1969, p. 73
28) New York Times , 3/1/65, p. 1:8
29) New York Times , 3/19/65, p.1:7
30) Newyork Times, 3/23/65, p.1:3
31) John Taylor, ."The Economic Strategy
of the 'New Order"', Repression and
Exploitation in Indon sia Spokesman,
Nottingham, 1974, p. 18
32.) Richard Nixon, "Asia After Vietnam",
Foreign Affairs , October 1967, p. 11
33) see Peter Britton, "Indonesia's Neo-
colonial Armed Forces", Bulletin of Con-
cerned Asian Scholars, July-September
1975.
34) Ibid.
35) C.L. Sulzberger, "As the Shadow
Lengthens", New York Times , 12/3/65,
cited in Noam Chomsky and Edward S.
Hermann, The Washington Connection
and Third World Fascism , South End
Press, Boston, 1979, p. 205
36) James Reston, "A Gleam of Light",
NewYork Times, 6/19/66, cited in
Chomsky and Hermann, ibid, p.403
37) cf supra, # 13, p. 1161
38) See Noam Chomsky and Edward S.
Hermann,-The Washington Connestion
and Third World Fascism , South End
Press, Boston, 1979, p. 205-218
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AI aft
ra age
Norway to Americans is an "iceberg
of the mind"; a small, frozen country in
fore the NATO Treaty went into effect. Two
years later, it was qualified by the Nor-
wegian Minister of Defense, Hauge.
He stated that in spite of the "no foreign
bases policy", Norway would open up
bases for allied forces in case of an
armed attack or threat of armed attack.
Hauge also made clear that Norway would
participate in NATO exercises, would allow
allied forces brief visits, and that Norway
would even construct "such military facil-
ities which may be necessary to receive
..and support the allied forces which are
necessary to assist the defense of the
country" .3
In the late 1950's, the Norwegian
Government added another restriction to
its military policies: no nuclear wea-
northern Europe without any political, pons could be stationed in Norway.
economic or military significance. How- (The main reason for the "no nuclear
ever, for NATO and the CIA, Norway is the weapons" and the "no foreign bases"
most important part of NATO's northern policies is simple: Norway wanted to
flank because of its 196 km. borderwith avoid any provocation of the.Soviet
the Soviet Union and its potential is a Union.) Despite the flexibility of Nor-
new source of oil and natural gas. way's policies, they still have been
Based on recent revelations, the violated by the US military and intelli-
following' article examines this'growing gence, sometimes without the know-
interest of the US Government in Norway. ledge of the Storting (Norwegian par-
It documents cases of US intervention liament) and always without the know-
which violated Norwegian law and en- ledge of the Norwegian people. Nuclear
dangered the lives and security of the weapons have been transported through
four million people living there. Norway; US Navy vessels with nuclear
Very little was known by the Nor- delivery vehicles have surreptitiously
wegian public about operations of the CIA, visited the country. Nuclear powered
the US Navy and the National Security submarines, like the "hunter-killer"
Agency (NSA) in Norway until very re- USS Seahorrse ("hunter-killers" are
cently - more precisely, the summer of used for attacks on ships and other
1977, which could be called today "a submarines) have also passed through,
summer of leaks". 2 In that summer, gov- as in April , 1976, when a visit was 4
ernmental documents dealing with "secret" made to a naval facility near Bergen.
US installations in Norway were revealed As for foreign bases, although none
and the true functions of some US mili-- officially exist at this point, certain
tary and intelligence stations were made facilities have been used almost ex-
known. clusively for US military and intelli-
Revelations about these installations gence purposes and US intelligence
which serve primarily foreign (US) military operations continue to be run out of
and intelligence interests caused a public these bases.
furor because according to Norwegian The history of US intelligence in
policy, foreign bases are not permitted Norway begins as early as 1943 with
to exist on Norwegian soil.' This strict the Office of Strategic Services'(OSS)
"no foreign bases" policy was estab- support of the Norwegian resistance
lished in February 1949, six months be- against the Nazi.occupation. The early
33
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contacts were problematic, and it took
the OSS a long time until they were able
to get involved in Norwegian operations
because "the British had determined to
keep the American amateurs from up-
setting their own? difficult relations with
the Norwegian resistance" 5.
At the end of 1944, the OSS sent a
mission to impede German railroad
movements. The command of the opera-
,tion was given to William Colby, a
"short, wiry Minnesotan and pre-law
graduate of Princeton who had dis-
tinguished himself as a Jedburgh in
France".6 The operation was almost a
complete. failure with 10 people. killed
and two planes destroyed..
Unlike the Soviet Union, which
took its troops out of Norway after the
war, the US moved in and stayed. From
that point on, Norway's dependence on
the,US increased tremendously, and.
it has been freely used as a base for
intelligence and military operations.
As an important indication of this
growth of US involvement,' it is inter-
esting to note the increase of personnel
and budget of the Norwegian police
force, its technical modernization, and
,the change in its structure from extreme
.,decentralization to more and more
centralization since World War II. The
reasons for the development of the Nor-
wegian police force are very complex,
but a main reason certainly is the need
to- protect US. interests in Norway' and
to -suppress opposition. against Nor-
way's .present' pro-US and pro-NATO
policies.
While Norwegian police expendi-
tures in 1950/51 were 30, 026 million
Crowns-per year (0.22 % of-the GNP),
they increased to 178, 772 million in
1965 : (0. 32% of the GNP),, and to
463,772 million in 1973 (0.42 % of the
GNP).. 7 Since 1950, there has also.
been, a remarkable shift of police con-,
centration into the urban areas "which
corresponded to actual population
shifts only in exceptional cases" 8.
For example, in Oslo, the capital, the
number of police increased by 47. 6 %
from 1950 to 1976, while the population
increased only by 6.9 % to 464, 900.9
There has also been a tremendous in-
crease in funding for "transportation
and material" (including billy clubs,
pistols, gas grenades, and machine
guns). From 1975 to 1977 alone, the
budget for "transportation and material
increased by 122%.10
In addition, "Anti-Terror Squads"
have now been established in Norway,
in spite of the fact that no "terrorist
incidents" have occured in Norway be-
sides the assassination of an alleged
PLO member by Israelis in the so-called
"Lillehammer Affair". These squads
exist in every major city and number
several hundred persons. The Norwe-
gian Minister of justice has issued
directives, that the Anti-Terror Squads
may also be used against persons who
are "dangerous to public safely" as well,
as to quell "domestic- unrest" . The
task of "quelling domestic unrest" may
also be carried out by the Norwegian
army. Norwegian military officers have
been trained since 1969 in the Schule
fuer Nachrichtenwesen der Bundeswehr
(school for military intelligence) in Bad
Ems, West Germany. In courses re-
commended by the Pentagon and the
CIA, Norwegian officers have been
trained in psychological warfare, mass
psychology, fighting mass demonstra-
tions, and internal surveillance.
Like every other NATO member, Nor-.
way has several intelligence agencies
which keep files on more than 250, 000
persons and constantly-surveil some
7, 500 persons 12 Norwegian intelli
gence agencies illegally spy on legal
activities of various political organiza-
tions and parties. Information about
Norwegians is also passed on to the
CIA. The former head of Norwegian
intelligence, Vilhelm Evang, confirmed
that there has always been very _
close cooperation between the CIA and
the Norwegian intelligence 13. Invari-
ably, Norwegian military and intelli-
gence operations have been targeted
against Norwegians opposed to US.and.
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NATO interference in Norway.
Other examples in Norwegian history
reveal that the police and intelligence
are not the only sectors of Norwegian
society serving US governmental
interests. There have been several
cases where the University of Oslo
collaborated with the US Air Force. In
1954, the University's Institute of
Theoretical Astrophysics signed a con-
tract with the USAF for solar research.
It is clear that the interest of the USAF
in this research was not academic but
mainly military. Between 1959 and 1968,
the University of Oslo also operated a
Baker-Nunn Satellite Tracking Camera"
which is part of the Space Detection
and Tracking System (SPADATS) of the
USAF. SPADATS has several functions
including "that of generating targeting
data about non-US satellites for US
satellite weapon systems" 14. It is also
a principal source of "intelligence on
Soviet space programs" and "is the only
body of US compiled information about
the total population of orbiting ob -
jects" . (When this program ended at
the University of Oslo, a Baker-Nunn
camera was installed on Mount John,
New Zealand, and operated by the USAF
under the auspices of the University of
Canterbury. Unlike Norway, a public
debate began in New Zealand, and the
University of Canterbury had to re=
nounce its contract - however, this did
not prevent the USAF from continuing
to operate the station at the same place.)
Another case where the US used Nor-
wegian facilities for military and intelli-
gence purposes was dramatically re-
vealed in May,, 19 60 , when CIA pilot
Gary Powers was shot down during a
spy flight over the Soviet Union: the CIA
had used Bod9S airport (near Narvik)
for its spy flights over eastern Europe
for years.
The CIA and the Pentagon have also
shown their "concern" for the Norwe-
gian Air Force. In 1967, then Secretary
of Defense, Robert McNamara, promised
Norwegian officials that the US Govern-
ment would "provide them with some
new air defense equipment costing
several million dollars"16. Since the
US was heavily "involved" in Viet Nam
at the time, and the equipment was not
available in the Pentagon inventory,
McNamara ran into financial problems
with his generous promise. It was de-
cided that the Pentagon would ask the
CIA for the money needed to purchase
the equipment. The White House agreed,
and the CIA transferred the funds secretly.
Amidst all these covert and overt
operations of the CIA and the US military,
there are two which are outstanding= the
establishing of two Loran C and one
Omega navigation stations in Norway.
Both Omega and Loran C are naviga-
tion systems for aircrafts, ships, and
submarines. According to the Navigation
Dictionary of the US Navy, Loran C
(Loran= LOng RAnge Navigation) is a
"medium frequency radio navigation
system by which hyperbolid lines of
position are determined by measuring the
difference in the times of reception and
synchronized pulse signals from two
fixed transmitters" 17. In the 1950's and
early 1960's, Loran C was the most ad -
vanced navigation system.
On May 19, 1958, the US Government
contacted the Norwegian Foreign Ministry
to explore the possibility of establishing
a Loran C installation on Norwegian soil.
A few days later, Councillor Raynor from
the US Embassy in Oslo made clear that
this Loran C station would serve "special
and for the time being purely American
needs" 18. Later on, he added that the
establishment of Loran C "must be
treated strictly on a 'need to know'
basis" and that "NATO [was] not to be
informed about the plan'.'. The real mili-
tary nature of the Loran C station was to
be kept secret from the public, as US
Embassy official Fisher Howe (who is a
former OSS officer and has maintained
close contacts to the CIA) stated: "The
US desires that any answers Cto
questions about Loran C] should avoid
references to the military nature of the
facility. "
In 1959, the US Embassy in Norway
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also raised the question of a second
Loran C facility on Jan Mayen Island.
In debating the need for this second
station, the US Ambassador had to admit
that the Jan Mayen Loran C station was to
be built "with a view to deploying Polaris
submarines [nuclear missile carrying sub-
marines j from ['the Norwegian Sea] ". At
the time, there was already a monitoring
station for Loran C on Jan Mayen. It
was quite difficult for the Norwegian
Government to construct an additional
Loran C station-"serving purely Ameri-
needs" on Jan Mayen without ques-
can
tions from the public, and on July 6, 1960,
then Deputy Minister of Defense, Erik
Himle, stated to the Foreign Ministry
that "it. would be difficult to hide the
direct US involvement and interest in the
construction of this station ". However,
eventually the Storting approved both
Loran C stations and an additional moni--
toring station in Bjugn without any major
public discussion about the military use
of these installations As the US Govern-
ment had requested, "references to the
military nature of the facility" were.
avoided.
The Norwegian Government had
hardly. given its approval to the two
Loran C stations, when the US Navy
asked them to agree to the installation
of yet another navigation station -
Omega, which is a "world wide 'radio
.navigation system providing moderate
accuracy by phase comparison of very
low frequency continuous wave radio sig-
nals"-19; it transmits radio waves of 10
-14 kHz in. 10 second intervals. The
research on Omega was started in the
middle 1940's under conditions of
absolute secrecy. Several reports were
not declassified until-the-late 1960's
or early 1970's, one of the first reports
,being published in 1966..20
A .comparison of the abilities of
Loran C and Omega indicates the ad-
vanced sophistication of Omega. The
very low frequencies, employed make
"Omega usable by completely submerged
submarines.. It is the. only radio navi-
gation. system of which ' this' is true .
_36
Omega is therefore unique in a number of
respects"21. In addition, only eight
Omega stations, planned for Japan,
Liberia, North Dakota, Argentina, the
La Reunion Islands,Hawaii, Australia,
and Norway are necessary for global
coverage compared to 90 Loran C
stations. 22 By 1976, only about one
seventh of the earth's surface could
be covered by Loran C , which is also
used for strategic nuclear submarines23
In all submarines, the basic navi-
gation is pe rformed by the Ship's In-
ternal Navigation System (SINS), a
"self-contained dead-reckoning de-
vice. A set of gyroscopes and accele-
rometers measures changes in the sub-
marine's velocity and-direction. This
"information is supplied to computers
which continuosly plot the course and
the position of the vessel"24. Since
errors accumulate in SINS, on-land
radio navigation aids like Loran or
Omega are used as correctors.
The nature of Omega indicates
clearly that it is, of particular impor-
tance to submarines, especially since
Omega signals can be.reached up to
50 feet below the water surface,
and. "one of the primary motivating
forces behind the development and the.
implementation of the Omega system is .
the requirement of a navigational
system for the [nuclear missile
carrying] Polaris submarine" 25.
Precisely this fact - that Omega
will be used by submarines carrying-
nuclear missiles like Polaris or the
more advance Poseidon submarine -
was denied by the US Navy, because
it makes every country hosting an
Omega transmitter a very likely first-
strike target in case of a nuclear war.
Destroying the land-based Omega
navigation station is the only way - .
if it can be done at all - to hamper the-7
effectiveness of nuclear missile.
carrying submarines, as Albert Langer
states in an article in "the Tourna 1 of
Peace Research: "By striking the very
low frequency navigation and communi-.,
cation facilities, an enemy would sub
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stantially increase the vulnerability of prevention of the thesis' distribution be-
missile carrying submarines (from near cause it "could harm relations to
zero to a small but finite vulnerability). foreign powers and provide foreign intelli-
...Such a strike would be very likely gence sources with useful information"30.
for this purpose, since there is very The University refused, and Hellebust
little else that can be done to increase replied that his thesis was based exclu-
the vulnerability of these submarines26". sively on public sources.
Otherwise, submarines like Polaris and After several correspondences, Gundersen
Poseidon are virtually "invulnerable to instituted a criminal investigation. Police
detection and constitute one of the main- interrogated Hellebust and a journalist in-
stays of America's nuclear 'deterrent' volved in the case. They discovered that the
force "27,
publication of material from the thesis had
US officials have also tried to play been cleared by the Ministry for Defense and
down the military significance of Omega the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Thus, they
by stating that it could be used by dropped the case, but not without advising
civilian vessels and vessels of other the journalist, not to write about the inves-
countries as well. This might be true in tigation. But the. journalist did write.,
peacetime, but there is nothing which and also filed a complaint with the Norwe-
technically prevents the transmission of gian Union of Journalists. The police action,
end-to-end coded messages to selected coupled with publication of Gundersen's
vessels in case of a war. 28 And it is letters to the University, added to the credi-
more than obvious that in a crisis situa- bility of the thesis. Hellebust's image of
tion the navigation stations would send integrity was further improved by an attempt
out coded messages which could only be to transfer him to the Northern Finmark
decoded by US vessels. (Norway's "Siberia") which was prevented
Until recently, there were two ver- by a military Ombudsman.
sions about how. then Omega navigation News of the thesis also prompted the
stations were established -a public one, appointment on April 4, 1975 of a Royal
in which the real military purpose of Commission to begin an investigation of
Omega was not mentioned, and a secret the establishment of Omega and Loran C
one, which contained all the "interesting stations in Norway. Supreme Court Judge
details". During "the summer of leaks" Andreas Schei was appointed as its chair-
(1977), the secret version was finally person. (The commission is generally re-
made public. ferred to as the "Schei Commission") In De-
However, a public debate about the cember, 1975, its report was released. It
Omega station in Norway had already be- turned out to be an almost complete white-
gun earlier, when Anders Hellebust,: a wash, playing down the whole affair. Not
Norwegian military intelligence Captain, released to the public was a classified ver-
wrote his thesis on Omega and came to sion of the Royal Commission Report con-
the conclusion that it was built "to pro- taining secret documents. This report was,
vide American nuclear submarines with however, reviewed and- approved by members
navigational data"29. Hellebust also of the Storting in a secret session of June,
criticised the lack of openness in the de- 1976, even though it contradicts the. public
fense policy decision-making of the Nor- version. _
wegian Government and the way that de- Two members of the Storting, Berge Furre,
visions about Norway's integration into a well-known historian at the University of
NATO and into the US gobal military Oslo, and Finn Gustavsen, both of the So-
system were made. Hellebust's -thesis cialist Left Party (SV) did not want to be a
prompted the Norwegian Chief of De- part of this "secret and silent" Storting,
fense Staff, General Zeiner H..F. Gun- and released the secret report to the public.,
dersen to write to the University of In the course of their action, they publicly
Oslo.on April 17, 1975 demanding the defended the peoples' right to know. ' (After
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5
releasing the secret documents, Furre and Norwegian Foreign Ministry repor-
Gustavsen were threatened with impeach- ted in a memo on October 19, 1964, that
ment, and only a few months ago, the Odel? Colonel R$ rholt had told him explicitly
sting, a very large subcommittee of the that "Omega cannot be said to have any
Storting, voted not to start an impeachment
trial. Interestingly, the SV members of the
Odelsting voted in favor of the impeachmen
trial, in order to provide Furre and Gustav-
sen with a chance to defend themselves.)
Almost all major Norwegian newspapers
and wireservices refused to publish classi-
fied parts of the report. The full report,
however, has been printed by the Norwe-
gian publishing house PAX, and some
15, 000 copies were sold despite a ban on
its distribution by many bookstores.
The classified parts of the Schei report
make clear that some Norwegians, and,
of course, US officials, were fully aware
of Omega's function and withheld this in-
specific importance for the Polaris
submarine".
The same lie was repeated later,
on November 20, 1969 - after intensive
discussions and the publication of
articles proving the contrary - by
First Secretary Sellin of the US Em-
bassy in Oslo: "... the Omega Naviga-
tion System was not designed for and
is not adequate for use by Polaris sub-
marines. The US Navy does not have
Omega receivers on any of these sub-
marines, and does not intend to pro-
cure or put Omega receivers on them.
This also applies for the Poseidon sub-
marine. "
formation from the public. One of the classi In the following months, while
fied parts of the report is, for example, a
memo of Secretary stern of the Norwegian
Foreign Ministry, dated October 8, 1964,
which states that there is no specific
interest for Norway in Omega: "As I under-
stand it is intended that Omega will
serve purely American needs, and NATO
consequently will not enter into the pic-
ture ".0stern also concluded that "an-
other important aspect is that the Omega
system is to be used by the Polaris sub-
marines". In a memo dated October 14,
1969, from the Norwegian Foreign
concern is expressed as to whether or
not an Omega station would harm rela-
tions with the Soviet Union, pointing out
that "any agreement to operate such a
station lOmegaJ for the 'US Navy will
place a considerable stress on our re-
lations with the Soviet Union".
Al ready at this time the US was
pushing to hide the use of Omega for
Polaris submarines. This was done main-
ly through Colonel Rq'rholt, then head of
the Norwegian Defense Communication
Agency (NODECA). Rq/rholt himself had
a history of personal involvement with
Omega. From 1948 to 1949, he worked as
a research assistant to J-.A. Pierce, the
inventor of Omega, at Harvard Univer-
sity. A high ranking officer from the
38
Omega trial operations were going on in
Norway, the Norwegian Foreign and De-
fense Ministry had extensive discussions
about Omega and its actual use. Although
it was agreed that Omega was of negli-
gible application to Norwegian ships
and aircraft, and that it could be used
for submarines, many Norwegian officials
believed the US Embassy and the US
Navy that Omega was not to be used for,
Polaris or other nuclear submarines, disi-
regarding the extensive literature proving
Ministry,, the contrary. Finally, on November 2,
1971, Omega was approved by the'Storting
after more than five years of trial opera-
tions in Norway.
In the same year, the Norwegian
Government allowed another US. installa-
tion to begin to operate in Norway. This
facility, called NORSAR (Norwegian
Seismic Array) is a large seismic array
which is designed to register under-
ground nuclear explosions. NORSAR
is financed by the US Department of
Defense, and its operation is mainly
undertaken for intelligence reasons. It
is connected to the National Security
Agency's (NSA) Seismic Data Analysis
Center in Alexandria, Virginia. "Nor-
wegian seismic data can thus only be
analyzed together with other seismic
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data (some derived from US military
stations in secret locations) ... "31.
Besides revelations about the US
Navy stations, 1977 brought more care-
fully guarded secrets to the Nor-
wegian public. These included a story
about Norwegian training of Finnish
agents "to penetrate the Soviet Union
for intelligence and sabotage pur-
poses in the early 1950's " 32, material
collected by a Norwegian investigative
reporter about the Norwegian secret
service and its connections to US
intelligence stations, and detailed in-
formation about CIA personnel in Oslo.
Enraged about the Norwegian
Government's denial of the fact that
Norwegian intelligence had trained
Finnish agents for operations in the So-
viet Union in the 1950's, Major Svein
Blindheim, then an intelligence officer
and working in a secret mission to train
the agents, revealed detailed infor-
mation about his work which was part of
a program controlled by the CIA and
British intelligence, and masterminded by
Nazi spy chief Reinhard Gehlen, who had
joined with the CIA after World War II.
When the New. Zealand Christchurch
Press reported on June 14, 1968, that the
US Navy planned to build an Omega
station in New Zealand, it created a
storm. This news provoked the
biggest demonstrations in New Zea-
land's recent history, and even
though New Zealand was an ideal lo-
cation for Omega, the US Navy was
forced to abandon its hopes for such a
navigation station in New Zealand.
Since New Zealand did not work out
the US.Navy decided to build its
Omega station in the state of Victoria,
Australia. In spite of massive protest
there and statements like "anyone who
believes;that.Omega is just a civilian
navigation system does not understand
what is happening... Victoria will be
one of the major targets of the Soviets
During this time, at least five bases in
Norway were used for these penetration
operations. 33 Blindheim's exposure, of
what was one of the most unpleasant
parts of Norway's history, led to
criminal proceedings against him -
rather than the involved Norwegian
officials - , and finally, to a suspended
prison sentence and a fine.
Publications of information on Nor-
wegian intelligence and its collaboration
with US intelligence also led to the
arrest of several persons. Ivor Johan-
sen, a publishing executive, had done
a lot of research on intelligence in his
spare time - using telephone direc-
tories, official public documents, and
ingenious phone calls to military and
intelligence officers; he also visited
several listening sites in Norway.
Finally, Johansen,with only public in-
formation, suceeded in piecing together
a list of spy bases in Norway, mainly
ran by Norwegians but with US "liaison"
officers. Johansen also obtained infor-
mation on the little known Norwegian
military intelligence FO/E.
Johansen's work led other resear-
in the event of a nuclear attack...
(US Rear Admiral LaRocque, as quoted
in Stop Omega . Omega at Woodside ),
the Australian Government approved the
Omega station.
The lies that were told to the Austra-
lian people almost outdo the ones told
to the Norwegians: "Omega has no mili-
tary functions (US Ambassador Mar-
shall Green on June 26, 1973 in Sydney),
and "there is nothing secret or classi-
fied about Omega" (Australian Ministe r
for Shipping and Transportation, Nixon,
on July 25, 1977); Dr. Frank Barnaby
of the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute summarizes. the pro-
cess of Omega's installation in Austra-
lia: "... there is. a prima facie case
that the Australian public has been
seriously misled".
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chers to examine the nature of US. faci- wegian journalists, who had been sen-
lities in Norway, for example, the
undersea tracking of Soviet subma-
rines sailing from Murmansk past the
Norwegian coast, which tracking is
now so good that "Western intelligence
can consistently pinpoint the wherea-
bouts of individual .Soviet submarines
in the northern ' seas.. "34.
Some of the stations Johansen found
were in northern Norway, extremely
close to the Soviet Union and not ne-
cessarily purely for Norwegian defense
needs. All of these eavesdropping
stations in northern Norway are
supposed to be secret - even though
they: are certainly known to the g.:)vern-
.ment of the Soviet Union. Obviously,'
the reason for their secrecy is not
related to security. Duncan Campbell
of the New Statesman comments that
"it is inconvertible that the secrecy
serves' only to avoid embarassing `
officials and some politicians whose
tenced for their "activities" in publi-
shing information on intelligence
stations in Norway are appealing their
verdicts.
. The "summer of leaks" (1977) was
followed by a "fall of revelations" of
the CIA in Norway. On November 24,
1977, the daily NY Tid named five CIA
agents who were in the country at the
time: Quentin C. Johnson, David P.
Hunt, Eugene S. Poteat, Charles L.
Kindl, and Harry M. Zschack. On the
same day, Ny Tid also published the
"Key Intelligence Questions" (KIQ's),
written under the auspices of Henry
Kissinger and William Colby, and
approved by the National Security
Council. The KIQ's are a directive for
CIA agents, and outline the type of.
intelligence agents are supposed to
gather. The KIQ's documented the
interest of the CIA in Norway, parti-
cularly in Norway's economic situation
dishonesty is revealed by the lack of and its possibilities as an oil expor-
accord between secret procurements and ting country. (Norway has. been expor-
secret activities" . 35 ting oil since May, 1975, and by 1980,
Claims by the Norwegian Government "estimated oil and gas production is ex-
that the intelligence and navigation pected to be some 60 million tons of
stations in Norway serve mainly Nor- oil equivalent, or more than six times
wegian defense purposes have been dis-
proved. In a first draft of a study on
the intelligence stations in Norway
the don estic consumption of petro -
leum" ) Ny Tid also. reported that
the CIA provided US and multinational
(which include facilities to intercept corporations with information about
High Frequency and Very High Frequency Norway's economic situation, and that
communications), Owen Wilkes and the CIA uses multinational corporations
Nils Petter Gleditsch came to the con- as covers.
clusion that "not a single intelligence The CIA has revealed. its interest in
installation Lin Norway] to be described Norway in other ways as well. In 1977/
[in the studya can be judged clearly de- 78 the Center for Strategic and Inter-'
fensive on the basis of its technical
capability alone" 36.
The same Nils Petter Gleditsch of
the Peace Research Institute in Oslo
national Studies of Georgetown Univer-
sity in Washington, DC hosted several
events dealing with Norway, .s'ince
."Nordic security perspectives are
(PRIO) has been indicted by a Norwegian troubled by rising levels of anxiety
court for his revelation of the "secrets" . without corresponding latitude for ad-
of some of the intelligence stations in
Norway. -Like others before him,
Gleditsch had obtained all'his informa-
tion from public sources. Gleditsch is
not the only one in. court. over these
matters.. Ivar Johansen and two Nor-
40
justment" 38.
As widely documented, CSIS has
extremely strong CIA ties -,it might
even be called a CIA front. 39 CSIS
printed a booklet on Norway's base
policy; and in May, 1978, it published
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a report entitled "Allied Interdependency
Trade and Cooperation in Military
Equipment"-. This report "grew out of a
meeting of the CSIS Transatlantic
Policy Panel in January, 1978" 40;
Paul Thyne s s , a member of the
Storting, was part of this "Transatlan-
tic Policy Panel". Other Norwegian
participants in CSIS activities are
Deputy Minister of Defense Johan
Holst, and Torsten Stoltenberg, Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The
question should be raised as to
whether a CIA-linked institution, fa-
mous for its Cold War theories and pro-
paganda, is an appropriate place for
Norwegian Ministers and a member of
the Storting.
In Norway, the people often are not
informed about actions and decisions
of governmental officials that suppo-
sedly represent the people. Further-
more, the examples of the installation
of US intelligence and navigation
stations in Norway shows that the Nor-
wegian Government is often not serving
its own people but the interests of the
According to the New Statesman,
former CIA Director William Colby
said in a recent interview that "the
Norwegian Government was as much
'in the know' about the CIA as it
wished to be". 41 Given the change-.
able nature of "truth according to
Colby" this may or may not be the case
What's unquestionably certain is that
until the Norwegian Government has
knowledge of all CIA activities in Nor-
way it cannot fulfill its grave respon-
sibility to protect the very people it
has been elected to represent. Ironi-
cally, rather than perform its duty,
the Norwegian Government is re-
pressing courageous Norwegians
trying to expose harmful intelligence
operations. Perhaps,- the Nor-
wegian people- will re-examine its
government in light of these facts.
FOOTNOTES
1) During his visit to Norway in
April, 1979; US Vice President Walter
Mondale asked the Norwegian Govern-
ment whether it would be willing to
ship oil to Israel on a regular basis
- a request that was denied by the Nor-
wegians.
2) Gleditsch, Wilkes, Lodgaard, and
Botnen: Norge i atomstrategien (English
summary), publ. by PRIG, July, 1978,
p. 1
3) Sverre Lodgaard, Nils Petter
Gleditsch, "Norway, the Not So Re-
luctant Ally", Cooperation and Conflict,
vol. XII, 1977, p. 210
4) ibid. , p.2134
5) R. Harris Smith, " OSS" , University
of California Press, 1972, p. 200
6) ibid., p. 201
7) Hakon Lorentzen, "Some D :1 the
Development of the Norwegian l'6 ice"
CILIP , Aug. , Sept. 1978, p. 15
8) ibid. , p. 14
9) ibid. , P. 14
10) ibid. , p. 16
11) ibid. , p. 16
12) New Statesman, 6/15/79, p. 851
13) Ny Tid , 11/24/77 1
14) Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter
Gleditsch, "Optical Satellite Tracking:
A Case of University Participati'r-n in
Preparation for Space Warfare", Journal
of Peace Research , no. 3, 1978, p. 204
15) ibid., p. 212
16) John Marks, Victor Marcher ?e
CIA and the Cult of Inte1.ligencr >f,
New York, 1974, pp. 63,64
17) Navigation Dictiong_QL pubs. by US
Naval Oceanographic Office, Dept. of
Navy, 1969
18) All the following quotes are, unless
otherwise noted, as in: Nils Petter
Gleditsch, "The Schei Report on Loran C
and Omega", PRIO Pabl. , no. P-6/78
19) cf supra, 17
20) NITS Accession Number AD630900,
May 1, 1966
41
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5
21) "Navigation System, a Survey of
Modern Electronic Aids", ed. by. G.F.
Beck, Van Nostrum Reinhold Corp. ,
Ltd. , Lyndon, 1971, p. 118
22) ibid. , p. 121
23) New Scientist, 3/25/76, p. 672
24) ibid
25) C.S. Samek and.H.S. Price, "A
Precise Electronic Navigation System
Using Omega and a Synchronous Sa-
tellite Network", Navigator, vol. 13
no. 2
26) Albert Langer, "Accurate Submarine
Launched Ballistic Missiles and
Nuclear Strategy", Lournal of Peace Re-
search, no. 1, vol. XIV, 1977, p. 47
27) "Missile Submarines and National
Security", Scientific. American , June
72
28) cf supra, # 3, p. 115
29) Arbeiterbladet , 2/8/75
30) cf supra, # 18
31) cf supra, # 2, p. 3
32) ibid., p. 1
33) Steve Weissman, "Norwegian Spy
War", Inquiry, 9/18/78, p. 12
34) ibid., p. 13
35) Duncan Campbell, "Sabotage,
Submarines, and the Secret Norway
Connection", New Statesman ,
6/2/78, p. 730
36) Owen Wilkes and Nils Petter
Gleditsch, "Intelligence Installations
in Norway: Their Number, Location,
Function, and Legality", PRIO publ. ,
S-4 79, First Draft
37) The Banker, May 1977, p. 91
38) CSIS: Annual Report 77/78, p.91
39) Ray S. Cline, the Director of
World Power Studies at CSIS, is a
former Deputy Director of Intelligence
for the CIA who has served for more
than 25 years. CSIS's Director of Af-
rican Studies is Chester A. Crocker,
another former CIA employee; John
Richardson, Jr. is CSIS Director for
Public Diplomacy Studies. He ran Radio
Fred Europe when it was a CIA propa -
ganda operation. Two consultants for
CSIS are Henry Kissinger and Walter
Laquer, who worked for the Informa-
tion Bulletin, ? Ltd., a now-defunct CIA
operation. In addition, CSIS is con-
stantly featuring past and present CIA
employees.
40) cf supra, # 38, p. 22
41) cf supra, # 35, p. 732
0 ITELLGENCE:
Guatemala
%42
BLOCKER, V. Harwood
Blocker is a CIA officer who.served in
the Dominican Republic at the time of
the US military intervention, in Brazil
(Recife and Rio de Janeiro), and Peru.
(born: 10/19/3 6)
First Secretary
Avenida La Reform a
Zona 10
Guatemala City
tel . 311541
FISCHER, Forrest
(born: 1/2/2 5)
Fischer has participated in CIA connect-
ed propaganda operations in Mexico,
Argentina, and during the US war in
Vietnam (6/70-12/71).
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 ? q r
tai I i
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HARRISON, Lawrence E.
(born: 3/11/32)
Montagne Noire, Port-au-Prince
tel. 7-0665
Harrison worked,in mihitary intelligence
before he joined AID in 1962.
HOLSEY, Leonard J.
(born: 6/2 5/ 21)
Pacot, Port-au-Prince
tel. 2-1983
Holey is a CIA officer who served in
Vietnam during the late 1960's.
MEADE, Frazier
(born: 7/17/28)
Counsellor
Debussy, Port-au-Prince
tel. 2-4341
Meade has served as an intelligence
research specialist,in the State De-
partment and attended the Naval War
College from 1971-72.
France
BURGSTALLER, Eugen F.
(born: 12/2 2/2 0)
Attache
Widely publicised, Burgstaller is the
CIA Chief of Station in France. He
has served in Austria and Lebanon.
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CERRA, Ronald L.
3/6/43)
Second Secretary
Before he was assigned to France,
Cerra worked in Switzerland. He is a
CIA officer.
COPP, Jean Tremere
(born: 1/6/22)
Second Secretary
Copp has participated in CIA connect-
ed propaganda operations in Vietnam
from 1972-75.
GIBSON, Barry R.
(born: 10/28/39)
Attache
Gibson is a CIA officer. He also
served in Brazil.
JETON, Francis John
(born: 4/1/2 6)
Attache
Teton is o CI ; officer who has been
tattn in Syria, Senegal, Zaire,
Tunisia., end South Africa. In August
1957, Jeton was expelled from Syria
because of his participation in anti-
government work.
KELLY, John H.
(born: 7/20/39)
Firs t_ Secre tary)
Kelly has an extensive background
in military and intelligence related
work. He has attended the Armed
Forces Staff College.
MONCZEWSKI, Matthew E
(born: 12/9/34)
Attache
Monczewski is a CIA officer. He has
worked in the CIA's "secret war" in
Laos, in the Central African Republic,
and in Ethiopia.
43
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CLARK, Robert D.
(born: 7/2 3/3 2)
Attache
19-5, Sendagi-cho, 5-chome,
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Clark has an extensive record of
intelligence and intelligence related
work in Italy and in the US.
COALE, George L., Jr.
(born: 3/14/2 6)
Attache
Grew Apt., 4427
1-1, Roppongi, 2-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]' ext. 427
Coale is a CIA officer who has served
in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia,
Tokyo (1969-72) and in Vietnam at the
end of the war.
FLOYD, Walter I., Jr.
(born: 4/4/39)
Second Secretary
Grew Apt., 3421
tel. [phone] ext. 428
Floyd is a CIA officer who attended the
Foreign Service Institute in Yokohama
in 1971 and has been in Tokyo since
then.
GRIMSLEY, William C . ,
(born: 4/2 0/2 7)
Attache
Connodor Apt. No. 610,
13-28, Roppongi, 5-chome
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Grimsley is a high ranking CIA officer
who was Chief of Station in India. -He
has also served in Afghanistan and
Nepal.
44
I-IERPY, David W. , Jr.
(born: 3/10/38)
Second Secretary
14-7; Ebisu, 2- chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Herpy's biography in the State Depart-
ment's Biographic Registers (incom-
plete previous history, starting with
R-6, political officer) indicates that he
is a CIA officer. He served in Thailand
before being transferred to Japan.
SELIGMANN,. Albert L.
(born: 5/26/25)
Counsellor for Political Affairs
20-1 a, Hiroo, 2-chome
Shibuya-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Seligmann, the highest ranking political
officer in the US Embassy in Tokyo, has
an extensive background of intelligence
-related assignments.
SHERMAN, William Courtney
(born: 9/2 7/2 3)
Minister-Counsellor
1, Azabu, Nagasakacho,
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Sherman has been an officer in the US
military government in South Korea (1946
-48), and has worked as an intelligence
research specialist in the State Depart-
ment and has attended the National
War College.
SHIMA, Terry T.
(born: 1/20123)
Attache
7-11,. Minami Azabu, 4-chome,
Minato-ku, Tokyo
tel. [phone]
Shima is a CIA officer, who has served
in Singapore and the Philippines. ' .
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HANNON, John C .
(born: 3/2/38)
Second Secretary (Political Affairs)
Hannon, who is a CIA officer, has served
iliKenya and Tanzania.
ANDERSON, Burnett F.
(born: 7/13/19)
Counsellor for Public Affairs
Hereford Lodge
139 Gloucester Road
London S.W. 7
tel. [phone]
Anderson is a propaganda specialist who
has served in the Mutual Security
Agency, Iran, Sweden, Spain and France.
He also attended the National War
College in 1960.
ASCHER, James Martin
(born: 3/18/31)
First Secretary (Public Affairs)
20 Croons Hill
London S .E . 10
tel. [phone]
Ascher has served in CIA connected pro-
paganda operations in Vietnam and India.
BLACKSHEAR, Tho:nas R.
(born: 8/11/29)
Assistant Political Attache
37 Circus Road
St. John's Wood
London N. W. 8
01-286-1684
Blackshear is a CIA officer who has been
stationed in the Federal Republic of
Germany, Bulgaria and India.
EDDY, Condit N.
(born: 10/14/2 7)
First Secretary (Political Affairs)
Eddy has served in Jordan, Lebanon,
and Turkey. He is a CIA officer.
KEANE, Robert A.
Assistant Legal Attache
Keane is the FBI's liaison officer in
London.
KIMBALL, John W.
(born: 9/2 3/ 3 3)
First Secretary (Political/Military Affairs)
8 Edwardes Square
London W.8
tel: [phone]
Kimball is a CIA officer who has worked
in India, Liberia, and the F.R. Germany.
McGHEE, William M.
(born: 7/8/22)
Political Attache
11 Chester Square
London S.W. 1
tel: [phone]
McGhee has served in the Philippines,
Ethiopia, Hong Kong and Singapore. He
is a CIA officer.
NIBLO, Peter B.
(born: 3/2 0/2 5)
Narcotics Attache
30 Eaton Place
London S.W. 1
tel: [phone]
Niblo served in Vietnam for over five
years. He was a "public safety advisor",
a "program officer" and a "special
assistant" with AID. Niblo is responsible
for US war crimes in Vietnam.
Syria
ENGLE, Gerald Lloyd
(born: 12/10/3 5)
Assistant Political Attache
Engle is a CIA officer. He has been sta-
tioned in Switzerland, Bulgaria, and the
USSR,
PERLMAN, Alvin
(born-..S/5/34)
First Secretary (Public Affairs)
89 Camberwell Grove
London S.E. 5
tel: [phone]
Perlman has participated in CIA con -
nected propaganda operations in India,.
Vietnam, and Indonesia.
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45
 PROCTG Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5 ,
1xi
(born: 12/30/20)
Political Attache
Proctor is the CIA Chief of Station in
England. He has been employed by
the CIA since 1953, first as an econo-
mist, and from 1971-76 as Deputy
Director for Intelligence.
STEVENSON, Rufus
(born: 11/26/39)
Stevenson is a CIA officer. He, has
worked in Madagascar and Mali.
ZASLOW, Milton S.
Political Attache.
Flat 5, Bryanston
London ' W . l
tel: [phone]
Square
Zaslow is an intelligence officer, prob-
ably working for the National Security
Agency.
There is no sense 'in. asking the
British government to, at a minimum,
control the activities, of these US em-
ployees. In addition to having anti-labor
and,pro-corporate interests, Britain's
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has
foreign policy views that fit right into the
CIA's cold war program. In fact, a person
who has a long history of participation in
CIA propaganda operations has been 7 and
perhaps still is - one of her speech-
writers. A "British Conservative" com-
mented to the New Leader "Even those
of us who agree with the Americans on
most things don't like to feel the CIA
considers us-coolies. When Margaret
made her tough foreign policy speech, I
applauded., But when I learned that it had
been drafted by that fellow Moss I
sniffed a bit. " (New Leader, 12/4/78,
P., 13)
"That fellow Moss" who wrote
Thatcher's speech is also the author of
the CIA financed book Chile's Marxist
Experiment , in which he comes to the
.conclusion that the 1973.military coup in
Chile was necessary to preserve "the pos-
that General Pinochet saved Chile from
"what may well have been an impending
'night of the long knives"' . (Robert
Moss, Chile's 1\4 rxist Experimnt,
David & Charles, Ltd. , Newton Abbot,
England, 1973, pp. ii, vi) . Pinochet's
military junta was delighted about the
book: they bought the complete second
printing for use in their propaganda.
Chile's Marxist Experiment is more
than "just" a demagogic piece by a
right-wing journalist. The idea to write
the book was conceived by the CIA.
They paid Moss an advance and "super-
vised the content and progress of the
manuscript" ,In ui , 9/30/79), p.9).
Perhaps the CIA also thought it
necessary to "supervise" the content
of Moss' manuscript for Thatcher's
speech.
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5
KELLY, JOHN
T -HE CIS. IN AMERICA
Much has been written and published about the clandestine and
illegal work of the CIA in foreign countries. This book describes
and documents the extent to which the CIA has penetrated and
attempted to influence the institutions of American society, and
its widespread program of surveillance of American citizens. It
presents biographical sketches of CIA directors and high offi-
cials involved in this work, and it names and describes. the
magazines, newspapers, publishers, educational institutions,
trade unions, churches and prominent journalists, writers and
politicians who have wittingly or unwittingly aided the- work of
the CIA.
256 pages
Fall
24 Burr Farms Road
Westport, Connecticut 06880
(203/226-9392)
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ISBN: 102-0 cloth: $12.95
ISBN: 103-9 paper: $5.95
 Approved For Release 2010/06/03: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150006-5
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