COUNTERSPY: EL SALVADOR WHITE PAPER?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: July 1, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know ]PIF
Volume 5 Number 3
$2
May-July 1981
El Salvador White Paper?
New Executive Order on CIA and FBI
The Washington Post - Speaking for Whom ?
U.S. Bases in Saudi Arabia
Who Wants Peace in Afghanistan
Turkey: Torture for NATO
Secret World Bank Plan for Indonesia
ASIO: Made in USA
e 1 n s~~
ww w w w ? _ ? _
a0aaDq
'...RAY ()uN
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Editorial
In 1950, the National Security Council eign control or even inspiration. By 1972,
issued a directive (NSC-68) which said MHCHAOS was being severely criticized even
that "a free society is vulnerable in that by some CIA officers because it was in
it is easy for people to lapse into ex- clear violation of the prohibition against
cesses - the excesses of a permanently domestic CIA operations. In response, CIA
open mind..." Taking the directive to Director Richard Helms decreed that: "A
heart, the CIA proceeded to penetrate and clear priority is to be given in this gen-
manipulate the media and academia to spare eral field to the subject of terrorism."
the American people from the danger of More specifically,Helms said that MHCHAOS
having open minds. would not "be stopped simply because some
Now the CIA says that the NSC did not go members of the organization do not like
far enough and that "it is the act of pub- this activity," and that "to a maximum ex-
lishing (per se) without being reviewed tent possible" MHCHAOS director Richard
by the CIA that is detrimental." As CIA Ober "should become identified with the
censor Herbert E. Hetu put it, the CIA's subject of terrorism inside the Agency as
problem is that: "We can't classify his well as in the Intelligence Community."
an author's] head." This brings us to HR4 Within a few months, MHCHAOS (without
and S391, entitlel in Newspeak fashion; changing its functions) became the Inter-
"Intelligence Identities Protection Act." national Terrorism Group (ITG) under
These bills would make it illegal to pub- Richard Ober. Same operation, new cover.
lish information leading to the identifi- In 1974 when MHCHAOS was formally termi-
cation of intelligence officers and nated, the ITG continued under a former
agents, even if the information has been MHCHAOS officer; retained all of the
derived entirely from public sources. MHCHAOS files on U.S. citizens; and con-
Counterspy urges everyone to pressure tinued receiving intelligence from the FBI
Congress and the media to publicize and and other governmental agencies. Ober went
defeat these bills. For further assistance on to the National Security Council as a
one may contact Counterspy or the Campaign CIA employee and was involved with "ter-
for Political Rights (201 Massachusetts rorism" projects there.
Avenue N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; tel. The "unleashing" of the CIA and the FBI
202-547-4705). for counterintelligence operations in the
Another serious assault on our rights is U.S. against suspected "terrorists" is a
President Reagan's move to legalize more hoax. Indeed, the CIA to this day has re-
domestic CIA operations. The CIA might fused to give even the Miami police the
soon be allowed to conduct domestic coun- names of rightwing Cubans - trained by the
terintelligence operations actainst "for- CIA in the use of firearms and explosives
eign controlled suspected terrorists." If
this sounds similar to Operation MHCHAOS,
which began in the early 1960s, there is
good reason. MHCHAOS was also defined as
- who
are
terrorizing the residents of Mi-
ami.
And,
under then CIA Director George
Bush,
the
CIA did not fully cooperate to
solve
the
assassination of Ronnie Moffitt
counterintelligence directed at finding and Orlando Letelier in Washington, D.C at
foreign control over or just foreign in- the hands of the Chilean secret police and
spiration of political dissent in the U.S. CIA-trained rightwing Cubans.
MHCHAOS operatives and even former CIA Di- The people in the U.S. must act quickly
rector William Colby have admitted it was (particularly given former Undersecretary
not counterintelligence but it was placed of State George Ball's public definition
under counterintelligence because that is of striking workers as "paraterrorists")
the most hidden component of the CIA. to stop Reagan's executive order from "un-
MHCHAOS spied on hundreds of thousands leashing" the FBI and CIA on us.
of Americans but found no evidence of for-
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Contents
U.S. Labor Against
Intervention in El Salvador ........ 9
Terrorism in Guatemala ................ 10
Princeton's Psy-War ................... 11
Washington Post -
Speaking for Whom? ................ 13
Secret World Bank Plan
for Indonesia ..................... 19
Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention
and the Prospects for Peace ....... 24
U.S. Bases in Saudi Arabia ............ 33
Turkey: Torture for NATO .............. 44
CIA-Lebanon ........................... 46
MOSSAD Terrorism ...................... 47
ASIO Names ............................ 47
ASIO: Made in USA ..................... 49
RCMP Updates .......................... 50
CIA and FBI:
A New Executive Order ............. 54
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USA. England
El Salvador
White Paper ?by Konrad Ege
(Ed. note: Konrad Ege is an independent
journalist. He has worked with CounterSpy
for over two years.)
In 1964, Lyndon B. Johnson used the Gulf
of Tonkin "incident" as a pretext to jus-
tify bombing North Vietnam "back to the
stone age." Today, the Reagan administra-
tion is using a much less sophisticated
pretext for escalating U.S. military in-
tervention in Central America: According
to the State Department, El Salvador has
become "a textbook case of indirect armed
aggression by Communist powers." To back
up these charges, the State Department re-
leased an inch-thick "White Paper" enti-
tled "Communist Interference in El Salva-
dor" to the press on February 23, 1981
which it claims reveals "a highly disturb-
ing pattern of parallel and coordinated
action by a number of Communist and some
radical countries seeking to impose a mil-
itary solution in a small, Third World
country."
The documents printed in the White Paper
are supposedly part of a larger set of
documents captured from the guerrillas by
Salvadoran soldiers. Some of the docu-
ments, according to Karen de Young in the
Washington Post were seized in
early November 1980. The rest were sup-
posedly discovered by Jon Glassman, a
Foreign Service officer who was sent to
San Salvador on January 16, 1981. His mis-
sion was to "look into foreign interven-
tion." At first, writes Young, Glassman
wasn't too successful and, since he didn't
find anything else to do, he "wandered
around to various security force headquar-
ters." And, according to "U.S. officials
and diplomats in Mexico, Central America
and Washington," this is when he found an-
other set of guerrilla documents - over 18
pounds - which "Salvadoran soldiers... had
blithely stacked... on an unused desk, as-
suming they were useless." The documents
were brought to the U.S., and for two
weeks, "a team of a dozen or more offi-
cials and secretaries worked to bring to-
gether the new documents and collate them
with earlier intelligence." (Washington
Post, 3/14/81)
The White Paper consists of 19 out of
"over 80" captured documents and several
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photos of unexplained origin. It focuses
ed talking about the only P. (party) which
on the role Salvadoran Communist Party
leader Shafik Handal allegedly played in
they began with militarist inclinations
and rejected the P.C. (Communist Party)
obtaining military support for the guer-
rilla movement from Socialist countries.
The Hungarian replied: it is because of
the P. (party) tha* she socialist world
Emphasis is placed on alleged Cuban and
Nicaraguan aid to the guerrillas. A de-
tailed study of the documents printed in
opens the door to you. It was a different
case in Nicaragua. The last meeting was
with the Soviet.
the White Paper raises serious questions
From the German Democratic Republic:
about their validity. Even if they were
Small souvenirs; operation - "Pan de
genuine, the documents do not prove the
Lata" - rocket/launchers
State Department's claims of massive Com-
in addition to (word illegible)
munist intervention.
with CRM they want to agree on a
Document B, for example, consists of
two
party "Pert."
pages which are presented by the State
De-
- also-files = NO
partment as "Excerpts of notes on trip
to
Mexico by member of Political Commission Fair (bazaar)
of Salvadoran Communist Party... (dated
April 26, 1980)." The original Spanish a) Manuel b) Diab and c) Juan Jose
document consists of two undated handwrit- Cassettes are need with the voices of
ten pages which are translated as follows: the coordinating body (greetings or
speeches) and with speeches of (word it-
(Begin Excerpt) legible) F.D. Handkerchiefs with the
It is one thing or another - signature of the Directors of the Coordi-
4th The Program: I agree with it, but nating Body and Stamps Sent
could we have a different one ? 5,000 key rings
Memo: In the political analysis (word FZorecitas
illegible), but the present moment re- (End Excerpt)
quires us to move away from this into the
coordination of our actions. In the inter- Obviously, even if this were a genuine
national arena, not everything is favor- document, the two pages say hardly any-
able. We have to work on it. We have not thing other than that some people met with
gained everything. citizens of several Socialist countries.
Hector: Also in relation to that. Document C, introduced as "Excerpt from
I: I took advantage of the opportunity notes on meeting of Political Commission
to mention the (word illegible) in reZa- of Salvadoran Communist Party, April 28,
tion to the S.I. Hector said that the de- 1980" likewise consists of two handwritten
lay of the invitation sent to Santo Domin- undated pages. It is obviously used in the
go was a result of administrative and not White Paper because it mentions "possibil-
political problems. They talked about the ities of assistance from the socialist
advantage of mentioning everything to camp"\and a suggestion that was made "to
David. Fidel himself" about "involving everyone
Mayorga: I am at your service. If you in the area." Otherwise, Document C is
full of empty sentences with very little
ask me deter. to be a street cleaner or a Zaun- information, e.g., "We acted accordingly.
deter.
Socialist Embassies. I do not look behind, rather, I look ahead
boldness. On the basis of this pan-
Bulgaria, German Democratic Republic, with orama, we should tackle the problems which
Bulgaria, Polish, Vietnam, Hungarians, Cu- are: - focus on the main tasks without
ba, held at the Hungarian Embassy The losing sight of them. - Main tasks: Make
lwas a good one. A lot of ques- meeting
meo adjustments in the Party to carry out the
tions.
He gave them the requests. struggle..."
Then the bilateral meetings: One by one Document D ("Report on trip of 'Eduardo'
of (word illegible) (member of Political Commission of Salva-
Vietnam: good doran Communist Party) from May 5 to June
Bulgarians: good 8, 1980") is comprised of three typed
Polish: We talked very much, 3 hours pages. Most likely, it was not written
with a Spanish model typewriter since all
Hungarian: Very interesting. Gloria start-
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the accents are marked in by hand. (This and doesn't prove anything.
is true for most - probably all - type- Document M, headlined "Report on logis-
written Spanish documents, even the ones tical plans (undated)" - if it were a true
supposedly written inside El Salvador, but document - almost makes one feel sorry for
in some cases the reprints are too bad to the ineptitude of the Salvadoran guerril-
tell.) Document D also refers to "Mili- las. It outlines broad guidelines that
cos" which is translated by the State De- presumably would not need to be stated in
partment as "members of the armed forces." a "report on logistical plans" at this
However, "Milicos" is a term unlikely to stage of the conflict, e.g., "The logisti-
be used by a Salvadoran. Salvadorans use cal plan must go hand-in-hand with a mili-
"chafarotes" as a slang expression for tary plan, i.e. an assessment of exactly
soldier, "milicos" is used in Southern what are our strategic points and how to
Cone countries. guarantee their maintenance and strength-
Document E is a key part of the White ening. The military plan must be in full
Paper since it describes a trip supposedly accord with the political plan and guaran-
made by Shafik Handal to a number of So- tee political objectives in terms of glob-
cialist countries, and the contributions al and current strategy..." Document M
of arms and supplies these countries al- also contains one map which supposedly di-
legedly made. It is four pages long and agrams how weapons are being smuggled into
typed, with the accents marked in by hand. El Salvador. Another map can be found in
According to Document E, Handal was in Document N, "Notes on delivery arrange-
Vietnam from June 9 to 15, 1980 where he ments (undated)." It is reproduced below
was received by "Le Duan, the secretary and appears completely meaningless.
general of the Vietnamese CP .
The document also says that both the
Bulgarian and Hungarian governments are
ready to manufacture 10,000 uniforms each
for the Salvadoran guerrillas as soon as
they receive the patterns and sizes. But,
the document goes on, "the comrades' deci-
sion about the pattern is still pending."
One has to stretch one's imagination con-
siderably to believe that the guerrillas
would be interested in providing Bulgarian
and Hungarian clothing factories with pat-
terns for 20,000 uniforms. The White Paper
several times claims that the guerrilla
arms and ammunition into El Salvador, let There are other questions about the va-
alone 20,000 uniforms. lidity of the documents. Several of them,
Document F consists of two typed pages including some of the minutes and reports
of "weapons commitments" from Vietnam, by members of the Salvadoran guerrilla
Ethiopia, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hunga- groups, are very wordy and contain little
ry and the German Democratic Republic. It specific information. However, most docu-
supposedly details shipments from these ments are very specific when it comes to
countries to the Salvadoran guerrillas via pinpointing alleged outside assistance.
Cuba. Interestingly, Cuba is referred to Surprisingly, only a few code words are
by the code name "Esmeralda," while on the used and many persons (particularly the
same page Havana is mentioned by name. ones the U.S. government wants to pin-
(The Washington Post credits Jon Glassman point, such as Nicaraguan and Cuban gov-
with cracking the "Esmeralda" code.) ernment officials) and localities are re-
Document L, entitled by the State De- ferred to by their real names.
partment "Notes on arms deliveries (un- Most of the code names that are used are
dated)", consists of three handwritten easy to crack, or are well known among the
pages under a headline "First Shipment" Salvadoran population, e.g. that the First
with lists of arms and ammunition, but Officer of the Central Command of the
nothing else. The-document does not give Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
any indication where the arms came from, uses the name of "Marcial." People that
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are referred to by name include Humberto 6, 1981. Quoting extensively from what was
Ortega and Bayardo Arce-of the Sandinista to become Document E, de Onis' article
Directorate, Fidel Castro and Yasir Arafat about Communist aid fit in nicely with on-
(who supposedly met some Salvadoran dele- going U.S. governmental propaganda ef-
gates in Managua; Vice President George . forts. De Onis followed up his first arti-
Bush told Israeli Foreign Minister. Yitzhak cle with a ,second piece, again based on a
Shamir on February 20 that the PLO was "leak," on February 20. In this article de
aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas.) The Onis copies a piece of information from
various political organizations belonging the'document which said that Iraqi aid to
to the Democratic Revolutionary Front the Salvadorans amounted to $500,000 -
(FDR) are almost always mentioned by their however, the Spanish "original" in the
real names. The State Department calls the W'"ite Paper puts the amount at $200,000.
FDR - with purposeful inaccuracy - a "Fed- On February 20, the New York Times also re-
eration of political fronts of armed printed the text of a State Department
groups." In reality it is a political op- memorandum to friendly embassies in Wash-
position organization consisting of a wide ington on Communist interference in El
variety of parties, unions, organizations, Salvador. The State Department was pulling
and associations. the strings, and the Times was playing its
Finally, the White Paper contains two part.
pictures of.a trailer truck allegedly used Several other news organizations were
to smuggle arms into 'El Salvador and given a summary of the White Paper on Fri-
seized by Honduran authorities in January day, February 20, and the weekend editions
1981. Approximately 100 M-16 rifles "some of most dailies were full of reports of
of which are traceable to Vietnam," along Communist aggression in El Salvador based
with mortar rounds and ammunition were on a State Department report - the White
supposedly discovered in the "hollowed-out Paper - even though most journalists, who
insulation on the top of the truck." Pic- wrote the articles, had not even seen it
tures were taken from two sides; one of yet. The Reagan administration's strategy
them shows the back and one side of the of inundating the public with reports
trailer. The side of the trailer has hori- about Communist intervention had worked.
zontal lines and about eleven (the picture In a massive media operation, they had
is blurred) vertical frames reaching al- managed to put out a tremendous amount
most to the trailer's roof. The other pic- of propaganda which they did not have to
ture, supposedly of the same trailer, answer questions about since it had been
shows the exposed top of the trailer in "leaked" to the media.
which the rifles and other equipment are When the complete white Paper was final-
clearly visible. However, the picture is a ly released on February 23, it was hardly
composite of three different photos taken considered newsworthy any more and es-
from a fairly high vantage point which caped serious scrutiny. Indeed, it is evi-
were fitted together so crudely that the dent that the State Department is not in-
original length of the trailer has been terested in having the White Paper ana-
changed. In addition, one can say with al- lyzed. All it wanted - and got - was to
most 100 percent certainty that the two get the message of Communist aggression
pictures are not of the same trailer. The out to the public. The State Department
photos taken from above which reveal the printed only 100 copies of the full docu-
weapons show part of the side of the ment which, of course, were snatched up
trailer. However, this trailer has differ- within minutes. Reporters asking for re-
ent siding than the trailer photographed prints are told that there are no more
from the back - the vertical lines are copies, and additional copies won't be
missing. printed either. The State Department press
An examination of the contents of the office is even refusing to xerox their
White Paper in itself raises severe ques- copy of the White Paper for journalists
tions, but the way in which the paper was who offer to pay for that service.
publicly released makes 'it even more ques- Along with managing the U.S. media cam-
tionable. First, parts of.the White Paper paign, the Reagan administration made a
were leaked to Juan de Onis, who, no ques- concerted effort to convince Latin Ameri-
tions asked, used them for a front page can and Western European governments. about
article in the New York Times on February the need to counter Communist aggression
6 - Counterspy, May-July 1981
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in El Salvador militarily. Special mis- about Stoessel's statement that the level
sions were sent to several Latin American of aid to the Salvadoran military had to
and NATO governments. At best, they re- respond "not only to the present situation
ceived a mixed response, and a State De-, but to the potential of the other side to
partment official acknowledged "that the create further violence... There is, thus,
public response by the allies has not an element of deterrence, built into the
measured up to administration hopes." ' level of our total support." (New York
(Washington Star, 2/26/81) Times, 3/14/81)
Former CIA Deputy Director Vernon A. Consolidation of a broad opposition
Walters was dispatched to Latin America, front to Reagan's El Salvador strategy in
but was not able to find a single govern- the U.S. is hampered by the media which -
ment willing to openly support Reagan's even though it has raised questions about
military strategy in El Salvador. In Mexi- the level of U.S. military involvement -
co, he received a stunning rejection when has accepted the State Department's ver-
he met with President Lopez Portillo on sion of events. Even Acting Assistant Sec-
February 20. The next day, Portillo met retary of State for Inter-American Af-
with a visiting Cuban minister and public- fairs, John Bushnell told some reporters
ly stressed Mexico's warm ties with Cuba, that the press had been "very cooperative"
and, in a reference to U.S. military ac- in publishing "material meant to show So-
tions in El Salvador said in a February 24 viet involvement in El Salvador." Willing-
speech that it is "difficult to defend the ly, most of the corporate owned media is
principle of self-determination in face of going along with State Department propa-
the unscrupulous arrogance of military ganda, as illustrated by its reporting
power." about the White Paper, which, at best, is
Lawrence Eagleburger, now Assistant Sec- a questionable document and would certain-
retary for European Affairs (he has held ly not be the first piece of "evidence"
posts as State Department intelligence forged by the CIA. Former CIA officer
research specialist and economic officer, Philip Agee stated that he himself "wrote
as political officer at NATO headquarters up false documents... for years for the
in Brussels and has been on the staff of CIA in Latin America, in-order to achieve
the National Security Council) was sent the very same political purpose" that the
abroad to win over NATO governments. He White Paper is serving right now. (Guard-
didn't have much luck either. The West ian, 3/11/81)
German government cautioned him on escala-
tion of the U.S. military role; Italian
President Sandro Pertini said publicly
that he had sent messages to President
Reagan urging him not to turn El Salvador
into another Vietnam, and even British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher issued a
statement condemning "violence from every
quarter."
Strong opposition to Reagan's policy is
growing in numerous organizations in the
U.S., including many labor union locals,
the anti-draft movement, progressive po-
litical parties and religious organiza-
tions, especially the Catholic Church, and
has even filtered down to some Republican
members of Congress. After hearing several
administration witnesses, including Under-
secretary of State Walter Stoessel, on
U.S. military aid to the Salvadoran re-
gime, Republican Senator Warren Rudman
commented that he found it "disturbing",
that there "was the lack of a bottom line"
in U.S. military assistance. Rudman and
other Senators were particularly concerned
"When events do not sustain the
claims,... the CIA manufactures the ap-
propriate 'proof'," says former CIA of-
ficer and counterinsurgency expert
Ralph McGehee. In an article for The
Nation, McGehee writes that the CIA is
manipulating public opinion on EZ Sal-
vador as it did in earlier disinforma-
tion campaigns on Indonesia, Iran, and
Chile of which he has personal knowl-
edge. "What the CIA is now attempting
in EZ Salvador is merely a reflection
of what the United States has done in
many countries" of the Third World.
McGehee further says that the 18 pounds
of documents allegedly "discovered" by
Jon Glassman can be "none other than
the product of yet another CIA forgery
operation."
The CIA has already heavily censored
McGehee's article for The Nation. As we
go to press, the outcome of a lawsuit
challenging the censorship is stiZZ
pending.
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Shafik Handal, who is prominently fea- ment displayed a burned-out boat on the
tured in the White Paper (along with the beach of El Cuco. The government claimed
Cuban, Nicaraguan and Soviet governments) that El Salvador had been invaded by some
categorically denies the authenticity of !00 well armed guerrillas and hinted that
the documents printed in the White Paper. they had come from Nicaragua. The report
Handal.stated'that "there is no doubt that received wide publicity in the U.S. media
this is a maneuver to justify the growing and, according to,UPI, "Only hours after
supply of U.S. arms and military personnel the invasion claim was in print, the
to the genocidal Christian Democratic mil'- United States released $5 million in mili-
itary junta and prepare for an eventual tary aid to El Salvador's ruling... junta
military aggression in Central America." citing evidence of foreign support for the
Handal asked: "With what moral right does guerrillas."
[the U.S. government question the right Some time later, however, then U.S. Am-
of the Salvadoran people to arm themselves bassador Robert White had to admit that
and carry out a war of survival...? What the evidence provided by the Salvadoran
is the legal and moral authority of the government "did not support" the junta's
U.S. government to question this right claim of a 100 man invasion. Journalists
being... the largest supplier of arms to went to the site of the alleged invasion -
the bloody dictatorships of Latin Ameri- the Salvadoran military claimed it had
ca...?" State Department spokesperson killed 53 of the guerrillas and seized
William Dyess did not see a need to re- dozens of weapons - but found no sign of
spond to Handal's statement and said he the other boats allegedly used in the
"would not dignify rita with any comment." operation, "no witnesses to an invasion
State Department officials have also and no bodies of dead guerrillas to be
failed to comment on other fairly obvious seen anywhere." UPI quoted one U.S. embas-
questions about the White Paper - e.g. why sy employee commenting on U.S. trust in
the State Department and not the Salvador- the Salvadoran report and the immediate
an government was the one to release the assurance of military aid: "I guess we
documents especially since the first set rushed to believe something we really
of documents had allegedly been discovered wanted to believe." Needless to say,
by Salvadoran officials in November 1980 these challenges to the veracity of the
and why the Department is not printing any story received very little media attention
more copies of the White Paper. ' while the original, false report was fea-
The White Paper would not be the only tured on the front pages of most major
piece of disinformation about El Salvador U.S. dailies.
that has been printed in the U.S. press. In the case of the El Salvador White Pa-
On March 4, 1981 for example, UPI issued a per, the corporate-owned media in the U.S.
bulletin "URGENT" entitled "Guerrillas At- likewise rushed to conclusions about Com-
tack U.S. Embassy with Submachinegun Fire- munist intervention in El Salvador because
San Salvador, El Salvador. Leftist guer- they "really wanted to believe" it. How-
rillas raked the U.S. Embassy with subma- ever, drawing conclusions about the valid-
chinegun fire today as they drove past the ity of the White Paper is not just a mat-
building aboard two vehicles, authorities ter of whom one believes. It has to be
said... The Embassy has been a target of stressed that it is the State Department
leftist guerrilla attacks because of U.S. that wants to sell its version of events
military and economic support for the rul- to the public, and, therefore it has to
ing military-Christian Democratic junta come up with proof for its charges of Com-
they are fighting to topple." Several munist subversion. And that has not been
hours later, UPI was forced to change its done. On the contrary, there are more than
story to "Rightwing gunmen raked the U.S. enough facts to lead one to the conclusion
Embassy in San Salvador with automatic that the White Paper is forged. According
rifle fire..." However, even this report to UPI, even Deputy Salvadoran Foreign
concluded with: "The Embassy has been a Minister Alejandro Gomez "doubted the
target of leftist guerrilla attacks be- truthfulness" of one part of the captured
cause of the U.S.... support for the rul- documents.
ing... junta." It is not surprising that the government
Another incident was even more telling. of Ronald Reagan and General Haig might be
On January 14, 1981 the Salvadoran govern- willing to put out documents of a highly
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questionable validity. However, it is an questioningly going along with the govern-
indictment of U.S. journalists and media ment publicity campaign.
outlets who prostituted themselves by un-
US. Labor Against
Intervention in El Salvador
An increasing number of labor union lo- ated Transit Union, Local 265 is fairly
cals are openly opposing Ronald Reagan's typical of labor opposition to U.S. inter-
military strategy for El Salvador and the vention in El Salvador. The resolution was
assistance the U.S. government and the adopted at the local's January 1981 mem-
Duarte regime have received from the CIA- bership meeting, and sent to Secretary of
connected American Institute for Free La- State Alexander Haig.
bor Development (AIFLD). Over the last few WHEREAS, the Legal Aid Office of the
months, for example, the following labor Archdiocese of San Salvador has documented
organizations in southern California alone over 10,000 assassinations and hundreds of
have joined the growing list: San Jose disappeared persons and illegal detentions
Federation of Teachers, Local 957, AFT; in EZ Salvador in 1980; and
Central Labor Council of Santa Clara Coun- WHEREAS, the Archdiocese has reported
ty AFL-CIO; Cannery Workers Committee of that over 80% of the assassinations have
Teamsters Local 679, San Jose; Social Ser- been committed directly by the Salvadorean
vices Union, Locals 535 and 715, Services Armed Forces and by paramilitary groups
Employees International Union, Oakland and supported by the Armed Forces; and
San Jose; Santa Cruz County Central Labor WHEREAS, a majority of the human rights
Council; International Chemical Workers violations have been directed against the
Union, San Jose; Amalgamated Transit working people of EZ Salvador.;... and the
Union, Local 265, San Jose; Central Coast bombings of union halls and suspension of
District Council 57, American Federation all civil liberties have impeded free
of State, County and Municipal Employees, trade union organizing; and
San Jose, Redwood City and Oakland; and WHEREAS, the U.S. government has sup-
International Molders and Allied Workers, ported the present Salvadorean regime
Local 164, Oakland. since its inception on October 15, 1979,
The Executive Board of the International and has since authorized more economic and
Molders and Allied Workers, Local 164 sent military aid to EZ Salvador than it autho-
the following letter to the Salvadoran rized in the preceding decade; and
Democratic Revolutionary Front (FDR): WHEREAS, the American Institute of Free
Dear Brothers and Sisters: Labor Development, partially sponsored by
We, the International Molders & Allied the AFL-CIO, operates in El Salvador; and
Workers Union, Local No.164, strongly sup- has not condemned the Salvadorean junta
port F.D.R. in their struggle to achieve for its massive violations of human and
equality and better living and working worker's rights; THEREFORE BE IT
conditions for the people in El Salvador. RESOLVED, that Local 265 -- its members
We condemn the present government in El call for the U.S. government to cut-off
Salvador for their open violation of hu- all economic and military aid to the un-
man rights... elected junta government in El Salvador,
We also strongly oppose any U.S. inter- withdraw all advisors and military person-
vention or military aid to the present nel from EZ Salvador and cease all present
government. We strongly feel that the peo- and future forms of intervention in that
pZe of EZ Salvador should be allowed to country; and BE IT FURTHER
resolve their own internal problems with- RESOLVED, that Local 265 -- its members
out interference. request that the AFL-CIO disassociate it-
self from the AIFLD program in El Salva-
The following resolution of the Amalgam- dor.
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Late last year, the International Long-
shoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU)
also decided that it would "refuse to
handle any and all U.S. military cargo
bound for El Salvador." The ILWU's newspa-
per, The Dispatcher, described the deci-
sion:
The announcement came in the wake of
continued reports of systematic executions
of thousands of innocent people by the
current U.S.-supported military govern-
ment, along with kidnapping, torture, and
murder of opponents of the regime, incZ~.~d-
ing numerous church, peasant, and trade
union leaders.
"We do not invoke this boycott weapon
lightly," International President Jim Her-
man told a large group of national and
local media... "We have made a thorough
investigation of the situation in EZ Sal-
vador and find ourselves driven by such
action as the only reasonable and humane
alternative,..
"We take this step in order to express
our profound revulsion at the reign of
terror which has been imposed upon the
people of EZ Salvador by their government.
. If by our action we can stop one buZ-
Zet, loaded by our hands, from killing one
innocent citizen in EZ Salvador, we will
be extremely pleased."
ILWU members, Herman said... will moni-
tor and intercept any military cargo bound
for EZ Salvador on the West Coast. At
least one "substantial shipment" of mili-
tary goods... was taken off the dock imme-
diateZy after the press conference and
hauled over to the Oakland army base for
storage that same day.
Keith W. Johnson, the President of the
International Woodworkers of America con-
gratulated the ILWU on their action by . .
saying that "Your actions are living proof
that American workers can effectively
bring pressure to end the shameful traffic
in weapons which produces only profits to
.corporate merchants of death and death to
Latin American workers."
Terrorism in Guatemala
The recent Amnesty International report*
on Guatemala is an unusually blunt indict-
ment of the military government of Presi-
dent Romeo Lucas Garcia. It states that
between January and November 1980 alone,
"some 3,000 people described by government
representatives as 'subversives' and
'criminals' were either shot on the spot
in political assassinations or seized and
murdered later." Amnesty International
(AI) leaves no doubt as to who is respon-
sible for these killings: "... people who
oppose or are imagined to oppose the gov-
ernment are systematically seized without
wairant, tortured and murdered... these
tortures and murders are part of a delib-
erate and longstanding program of the Gua-
temalanGovernment."
The government has denied "making a sin-
gle arrest or holding a single political
prisoner." It blames independent death
*Copi.es of the full report, which was re-
leased on February 18, 1981 may be ordered
from Al, 204 W. 58th St, New York, NY
10019.
squads for the brutal murders of thousands
of people and calls the murder and torture
victims "criminals" and "subversives." AI,
however, "believes that abuses attributed
by the Government... to independent 'death
squads' are perpetrated by the regular
forces of the civil and military ser-
vices." More specifically, AI says the one
responsible for these operations is Presi-
dent Lucas himself. "The task of coordi-
nating civil and military security opera-
tions in the political sphere is carried
out by a specialized agency under the di-
rect supervision of President Lucas
Garcia. This presidential agency is situ-
ated in the Presidential Guard annex to
the National Palace,... and next to the
Presidential Residence... Known until re-
cently as the Centro Regional de Telecom-
municaciones (Regional Telecommunications
Centre), the agency is... a key installa-
tion in Guatemala's security network."
A 1974 Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) document, Termination Phase-Out
Study, Public Safe Project: Guatemala
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describes the Telecommunications Center as Security Council and Richard Allen, now
"Guatemala's principal presidential level National Security Advisor, visited Guate-
security agency." AI concedes that "de- mala in 1980; and, while still a candi-
tails of the presidential coordinating date, Reagan let the Guatemalan right
agency's operation are not known... but know that, if elected, he would change
that the agency exists and that it serves U.S. policy toward their country.
as the centre of the Guatemalan Govern- In the primitive Republican anti-Commu-
ment's program of 'disappearance' and po nist strategy Guatemala, with the largest
litical murder seem... difficult to dis- army in Central America, is key, and
pute." Reagan's all out support for the Guatema-
Under the Carter administration, mili- lan military dictatorship is assured. The
tary assistance to the Lucas regime was bloodshed will continue but has not been
suspended - only to be taken up by Israel and will not be able to stop the opposi-
and other conservative governments, e.g. tion movement from growing. There is a
Argentina. With Ronald Reagan in office, high level of unity between the different
things look different. Reagan himself has opposition and guerrilla organizations,
met with rightwing, wealthy Guatemalans and their activities have forced the army
over the last few years. According to the to "intensify their troop mobilizations to
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, represen- points across the country and to be in a
tatives of several rightwing groups in- permanent state of alert... which has kept
cluding Young Americans for Freedom, the them from intervening on a broader scale,
Heritage Foundation and the American Con- as they would have liked, against the peo-
servative Union, as well as Generals John ple of El Salvador."
Singlaub and Daniel Graham of the American
Princeton's Psy-War
The following recommendations for a objective - which is probably why Cantril
world-wide anti-Communist propaganda cam- did not want his name attached to them.)
paign (from the Allen Dulles papers at At a time when the Reagan administration
Princeton University) were written almost has launched cold war tirades against So-
twenty years ago, but are of contemporary cialist countries and "international ter-
significance. They were drafted by covert rorism" (increased emphasis is also being
CIA consultant Hadley Cantril, then an placed on the operations of the Voice of
"eminent" social scientist and chairperson America, Radio Free Europe, and Radio Lib-
of the Psychology Department at the pres- erty), it is as important as it was twenty
tigious Princeton University. He sent the years ago to understand the nature of U.S.
recommendations to former CIA Director propaganda operations.
Allen Dulles on March 21, 1962, together
with a short note. RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING U.S. INFORMA-
TION AND PROPAGANDA THEMES
Dear Allen,
Enclosed are the recommendations I Note: While these recommendations may not
worked up some years ago (after my be new and may have been heard before, if
visit to the Soviet union) and which they have any validity, it is essential
might be of some use to you. Please that they be repeated and repeated in ri-
do not bother to acknowledge. fle shot fashion.
As ever, 1) Try to pound home to people everywhere,
/signed/ especially those in uncommitted areas, the
Hadley fact that the Communist Party uses nations
and states and the people who compose them
recommendations (Despite their are neither ssource,cientific the nor as instruments or tools to earrzj out Party
"scientific" policies. In other words, the Party comes
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first and is regarded as "everlasting," of world people want. Quite obviously,
while nations, or states and their people such a statement must avoid platitudes. It
are secondary and are to be organized and should be designed carefully to provide a
reorganized according to Party goals. Ex- moral basis for all our defense and eco-
ampZes of the USSR itself, East Germany, nomic aid measures as well as for our do-
Hungary, China, Tibet, etc. mestic policies. AZZ our information and
2) Make clear to People that the. issue di- propaganda could profit by being put in
vidi the People in developed areas is terms of our moral purposes since the ba-
not ((or "..SOCIALISM") versus sic values people are striving for are
"CAPITALISM" but the dictatorship the similar, universal, and understandable.
Communist Party versus democracy. We We should be able to out-compete the So-
should be able to undercut the effective viet Union in teaching people in underde-
use Soviet leaders now make of the key veloped areas what to want -- what "pro-
words of "Communism," "Socialism," and gress" and "civilization" can and should
"Capitalism" by pointing out how outworn, refer to; showing that an open society can
old-fashioned, oversimplified and mis- offer not only high standards of living
leading these terms are if anyone takes an and security but a whole range and quality
honest Zook at what is going on in differ- of satisfactions impossible in a state
sent countries of the world. Many concrete where freedom and choice are taboo.
examples should be given. 5) Counteract Soviet strateam of minimiz
t/,.v/VG- vv li/mGWLOG /&L/ (/ V/4G Vj lIVl'1L ?1 V1 r1 Ul% differences between modern industrial
versus "CAPITALISM" b
t th
di
t
to
hi
rs
u
e
c
p
a
states. They have many problems in common
of the Communist Party versus the possi- and are ZikeZy to have more. Point out
bility of national development in a free that the basic needs of human beings are
and open way. We should make clear that everywhere pretty much alike and that any
the only real enemy of strong national nation or political system will in the
leaders now guiding some underdeveloped Zong run survive only to the extent that
areas is the Communist Party. (Certainly it fulfills all these needs - both physi-
these leaders are never going to be over- cal and psychological ("spiritual").
thrown by any non-existent "American" par-
ty, etc.) 6) Compliment the Soviet people on the ad-
3) Show that while Soviet leaders talk vances they have made in their standard 2f
? ? Zzyzna and on gaining somewhat more ree-
about co-existence, in reali they seem dom action as a result their hard-
to be afraid it. They object to open shis and sacrifices-The sense of having
,
skies and to an open world. They do not lifted themselves out of Zong centuries of
allow their people to know about democra- backwardness is a source of great pride to
cy, they hem people in with controls and them and we must never say anything that
restrictions concerning what information would injure this pride. On the contrary,
they can have
what travelin
the
can do
,
g
y
,
etc. By contrast, Western democracies are
not at all afraid of "co-existence," and
encourage their people to read anything
they want to, to travel, etc., etc.
4) We should not Zet Soviet leaders set
the standards b means ef which superiori-
ty is to be judged. sho on the con-
trary, quickly and forcefully take the
initiative and try to get in the minds of Get the news-about the right wing, : 0 Yes, send four free issues to:
h
l
f
h
l
Bl
t
e
e
t, t
e strugg
es of
acks,
people everywhere what we regard as the Latinos, women and gays. News of
goaZe worth competing for. For example, liberation movements around the
world. Opinions from individuals and
an increase in standards of living alone groups throughout the progressive
will never reconcile people to a permanent movement.
condition of "unfreedom."
D
hi
l
i
Cl
h
o somet
ng revo
ut
onary
ip t
e
. In this connection, there is a para- coupon at right and start getting the I City side zip
mount need or some ideological statement Guardian today! Clip andrnad t) Guardian,33West I7thSt.
f New York. N Y I(M 1
concerning our American vision of the kind
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by complimenting them in terms of our own goods or restrict further individual par-
standards, our own goals, and our own ways ticipation in decisions.
of doing things, we could further build up 7) Intensify and expand all forms ex-
the U.S. as a model and help continue changes since there seems little doubt
pressure for more consumer goods, more that we have much more to gain from these
freedom of action, etc. in terms of influencing Soviet people than
Indicate our sincere hope that the great Soviet leaders have to gain from what they
strides the Soviet people have made in would learn from us. Dramatic proposals
raising their standard of living and in- (which we would expect Soviet leaders to
creasing somewhat their own freedom of ac- reject) might further bring their censor-
tion will continue and that their govern- ship, controls, and fear of comparison in-
tent will not use recent events as an ex- to bolder relief.
cuse to cut back production of consumer
Washington Post
Speaking for Whom? by AM Kelly
(Ed. note: John Kelly is co-editor of if you could see fit to send us your com-
CounterSp magazine and the author of the ments on the editorial. Since we would
forthca^ring book, The CIA in America.) like to follow up the editorial as quickly
as possible, I would especially appreciate
In 1949 Allen W. Dulles called for a it if you could send your comments by
"commission of internal security" to in- Western Union collect.
vestigate "subversive influences" in the
U.S. and to use "the institutions of de- Sincerely
mocracy to destroy them." Dulles' article,
iL G/
appearing in the CIA-financed New Leader,
did not define these subversive influences Philip L. . Graham
Publisher
nor did it contain any factual evidence
that they existed at all. That didn't seem Dulles responded quickly in a telegram
to bother the Washington Post, which from his Wall Street office (see below).
quickly took up the call-to-arms in a se- He specified that the proposed commission
ries of editorials beginning May 22, 1950. would in fact be a "federal agency" at the
But even before the first editorial was level of, but distinct from, the FBI. Very
printed, publisher Philip L. Graham ( a probably Dulles had the CIA in mind for
former military intelligence officer and the job although he knew well that the
close friend of the CIA's chief psycholog- CIA's own charter prohibited internal se-
ical warfarer, Frank Wisner) and Post curity functions.
owner, Eugene Meyerl sent Dulles a copy 5/23/50
and elicited his comments in an accompany-
ing personal note. PHILIP L. GRAHAM, PUBLISHER
THE WASHINGTON POST
May 21, 1950 WASHINGTON, D. C.
Dear Mr. Dulles: REFERRING YOUR LETTER MAY 21 I THOROUGHLY
AGREE THAT WE SHOULD HAVE A COMMISSION ON
We are devoting our editorial page an NATIONAL SECURITY. IN FACT IN ADDRESSING
Monday to the enclosed editorial, which we THE ANNUAL DINNER OF THE CANADIAN SOCIETY
are also reprinting in advertisement form OVER A YEAR AGO ON JANUARY 28, 1949, I
in New York, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chica- SUGGESTED THAT WE SHOULD HAVE IN THE
go and San Francisco. Because of the im- UNITED STATES SOMETHING COMPARABLE TO THE
portance of the issues involved, Mr. Eu- CANADIAN ROYAL COMMISSION WHICH DID SUCH
gene Meyer and I will both be grateful AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN INVESTIGATING THE
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SOVIET SPY RING IN CANADA AND I ADDED THAT Plan's counterpart fun is to finance early
"THE SUCCESS OF THE COMMISSION'S WORK CIA covert operations. )
POINTS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF HAVING
AVAILABILE HERE IN THE UNITED STATES A
FEDERAL AGENCY WHICH WE MIGHT FOR CONVE-
NIENCE CALL "COMMISSION ON INTERNAL SECU- as unconstitutional.3 Entitled "The Road
RITY". * * * SUCH A COMMISSION COULD IN- Back to America," the editorial did not
VESTIGATE THE PRACTICES AND POLICIES OF oppose the on-going McCarthyite witch-
SOVIET COMMUNISM STEMMING FROM ABROAD BUT hunting per se, but called it inefficient
OPERATING HERE AND FANNING OUT IN VARIOUS at getting "the rats" in America. As the
CHANNELS TO THREATEN OUR DEMOCRATIC INSTI- Post put it: "Witch-hunting thus amounts
TUTIONS. IN FACT, IT COULD SHOW HOW THEY to doing the job of softening and weaken-
USE AND ABUSE THESE VERY INSTITUTIONS OF ing America for Russia... To go further:
LIBERTY TO DESTROY LIBERTY." Witch-hunting is weakening our front-line
AS REGARDS PRECISE FORM OF YOUR'SUGGES- soldiers in the cold war."
TION I FEEL THAT YOU HAVE SO EXPANDED THE The Post fully endorsed the cold war
PROPOSED SCOPE OF THE WORK OF THE COMMIS- both abroad and at home. But speaking, as
SION THAT ITS EFFECTIVENESS MIGHT BE IM- it always does, from the perspective of
PAIRED. PERSONALLY I THINK THE COMMISSION the corporate rich, the Post wanted the
WOULD HAVE PLENTY TO DO IF THEY INVESTI- cold war carried out with an eye to re-
GATED THE MAJOR ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SECU- pressing legitimate domestic dissent while
RITY AND THE INTERNAL MENACE OF FIFTH COL- expanding the military-industrial complex:
UMNS AMD SUBVERSIVE PENETRATION WITHOUT "Witch-hunting will drive out of Govern-
4LS0 GOING INTO THE WHOLE RANGE OF CIVIL- ment the very brains which alone can
ZAN DEFENSE, NEW WEAPONS AND ECONOMIC AID
TO OUR ALLIES. THE LATTER ARE ALL IMPOR-
TANT QUESTIONS BUT EACH IS A MAJOR STUDY
IN ITSELF.
WHILE I JOIN WITH YOU IN DEEPLY DEPRE-
CIATING AND REPUDIATING THE TACTICS WHICH
HAVE BEEN FOLLOWED IN BLACKENING REPUTA-
TIONS WITHOUT EVIDENCE, I AM SURE YOU
WILL APPRECIATE THAT MANY PEOPLE WHO FEEL
AS I DO IN THIS RESPECT, NEVERTHELESS HAVE
AN UNEASY FEELING THAT SUBVERSIVE INFLU-
ENCES MAY HAVE BEEN A CONTRIBUTORY CAUSE
OF SOME OF THE FAILURES OF FAR EASTERN
POLICY AND THAT INCIDENTS SUCH AS THE
AMERASIA CASE DESERVE THE FULLEST INVESTI-
GATION BY A COMPETENT AND IMPARTIAL COM-
MISSION SUCH AS YOU SUGGEST.
ONE FINAL WORD. ANY SUCH COMMISSION AS
PROPOSED SHOULD NOT INTERFERE IN ANY WAY
WITH THE FBI AND SHOULD NOT HAVE OVERLAP-
PING FUNCTIONS WITH THE LATTER AS I FEEL
STRONGLY THAT THE FBI MERITS AND DESERVES
OUR SUPPORT.
ALLEN DULLES
The Post's proposed commission on na-
tional security was a draconian measure
which even President Harry Truman opposed
give us victory in the cold war...
William Allen White and Paul Hoffmann
and Wall Street lawyers and Robert A.
Taft...
"... witch-hunting will defeat the pur-
ported purpose of witch-hunting... the
class bitterness stirred up by those ex-
cesses still hurts our unity...
"It is essential that a 'commission on
national security' be created now to
survey the major aspects of national se-
curity - the internal menace of the
fifth column, civilian defense, develop-
ment of new weapons, the size and use of
military expenditures, economic restora-
tion of our friends and allies..."
The editorial criticized Senator Joseph
McCarthy because he was not one of them,
and his witch-hunting was threatening U.S.
corporate expansion by attacking allegedly
Communist government employees who were
promoting that expansion. As the Post edi-
torialized only three days earlier on May
19, 1950: "For the McCarthy attempts could
easily result... in the paralysis of for-
i
li
J
i
i
i
d
'
e
gn po
-
cy... From Par
s to R
o
e
ane
gram along with one from General Lucius D.
Clay, on its may 25, 1950 front page. The ro, reports are coming in that the soli
Post, of course, did not acknowledge that darity of American influence in the cold
Dulles' comments had been solicited in re- war is being drastically undermined by the
sponse to an advance copy of the editori- efforts to find a scapegoat for past
al. (Clay, a man with wide corporate con- events." Praising the Post for its promo-
nections, was involved in the.Marshall tion of U.S. corporate expansion, Gen..
Plan and illegally used some of the Clay described the editorial as an "approach to the correction of conditions
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which tend to destroy the effectiveness of 1950 was also the year that Wisner's depu-
our international position:'4 ty, Thomas Braden (who is often featured
The Post editorial was significantly in the Post and who considered Wisner "an
timed only weeks after National Security authentic American hero") initiated the
Council directive, NSC-68, written under CIA's International Organization Division
the direction of Paul Nitze (from NSC which eventually fed CIA propaganda to
member James Forrestal's investment bank- some 30 U.S. newspapers, including the
ing house of Dillon, Read). NSC-68 esca- Post.5
Gated the cold war by calling for rapid Fortunately for U.S. democracy, the
expansion of foreign investments, vast in- Post's commission on national security
creases in CIA covert operations (under never became a formal reality. Unfortu-
Frank Wisner) and orchestrating of public nately, for freedom of the press, Graham
opinion in support of the cold war. NSC-68 and Meyer placed the Washington Post at
claimed this was needed because: "A free the service of national security and an-
society is vulnerable in that it is easy
for people to lapse into excesses - the
excesses of a permanently open mind..."
On September 14, 1948, Philip Graham,
at the request of Secretary of Defense
James Forrestal, convened a private
meeting of some 20 newpaper publishers
at his Georgetown home (the former resi-
dence of William "Wild Bill" Donovan,
once director of the OSS). A few months
prior to this meeting, Forrestal had
launched CIA covert operations including
propaganda operations in the U.S.As part
of this operation, Forrestal had previ-
ously asked many of the publishers and
editors who came to Graham's on Septem-
ber 14 to secretly submit to formal gov-
ernment censorship - which they refused.
Besides Forrestal, attending the meet-
ing for the government were George C.
Marshall, Secretary of State; General
Omar N. Bradley; Robert Lovett, Under-
secretary of State; and Charles E.
"Chip" Bohlen, Counselor of the State
Department. The meeting was convened "to
brief them [publishers and editors on
the Berlin crisis...," but Forrestal al-
so inquired whether those present would
support using the atomic bomb in the
event of war. Speaking for the "American
people" those present gave "unanimous
agreement... to the propriety of the use
of the atomic bomb." That same year, the
Post editorialized in favor of the "ap-
pointment of a commission of leading
citizen" (undoubtedly corporate execu-
tives and Wall Street attorneys) to de-
termine when the U.S. should use atomic
weapons. Obviously, the Post owners be-
lieved that decisions potentially af-
fecting the lives of hundreds of mil-
lions of human beings should be examined
and made by a few wealthy Americans.
ti-Communism as defined by the corporate
rich and the CIA. To this end, Philip and
later Katherine Graham hired a number of
people with extensive ties to U.S. intel-
ligence agencies to work for the Post.
They included Philip Geyelin, who was re-
cently replaced as editorial page editor
but still writes frequent commentaries,
staff reporter Walter Pincus; Russell
Warren Howe, who is now retired but still
publishes occasional articles; and
Nicholas de B. Katzepbach, a member of the
Post's Board of Directors.
Geyelin joined the CIA in 1951 while on
leave of absence from the Wall Street
Journal to which he returned after 11
months at the CIA.6 At the Journal,
Geyelin said he "frequently had the sort
of contacts with CIA officials that news
people have with any other sources."7 Dur-
ing this period, CIA memos, of which
there are hundreds, described Geyelin as
"a reliable source," a "CIA resource" and
a "willing collaborator" who provided "in-
telligence" such as two "economic reports"
following his trip to Cuba in 1964.8 La-
ter, Geyelin's book, Lyndon B. Johnson and
the World, was published by the CIA's per-
haps most favorite publisher, Frederick A.
Praeger, who now publishes CIA-authored
books through his Westview Press.
Geyelin has always come to the defense
of the CIA when it was under deserved
criticism. One has to seriously question
the-integrity of the Post management for
assigning a former CIA employee as the
writer of editorials which do not even
carry his name. As even former Post om-
budsman Charles B. Seib once observed:
"The CIA's stock-in-trade includes decep-
tion and covert manipulation. It does the
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nation's undercover dirty work. The press, about Ghana and Guinea. Pincus claims to
on the other hand, has only one justifica- have refused a permanent job with the CIA
tion for its special status in this coun- but three months later attended a politi-
try: its ability to inform the public ful- cal meeting in New Delhi, India at the re-
ly and without bias or restraints... and quest of the CIA. Pincus further claims
the twain can never meet."9 that "thereafter I left the international
A specific example of Geyelin's fending youth world to others."14
for the CIA was his full page article in Like Geyelin, Pincus has subtly support-
the Post of May 21, 1978 when Congress was ed the CIA at crucial moments. His Post
attempting to rid the press of the CIA. article on his CIA work came precisely
Geyelin said that he disagreed with Seib's when the CIA was criticized for its sub-
conclusion that "the twain can never meet" version of the National Student Associa-
and agreed with Ray S. Cline that journal- tion (NSA). Pincus' article presented
ists and CIA agents "all are searching for these operations as if they were honorable
nuggets of truth about thb outside and as natural as rain. Along with Richard
world."10 Geyelin opposed a specific law Harwood, he also published a major article
prohibiting CIA penetration of the press in the Post before former Post reporter,
and said that instead the press should Carl Bernstein's expos d' of the CIA's pene-
just regulate itself. (He proposed this tration and manipulation of the press was
after implying that the CIA had dishonest- even published. Pincus and Harwood down-
ly manipulated him.) Geyelin warned: "In played Bernstein's article (which they
the course of preparing a comprehensive somehow received in advance) even though
charter to govern the future of the CIA, Bernstein let Katherine Graham off the
and in its zeal to restrict the freedom of hook, absolving her from any responsibili-
the agency to subvert the press, it seems ty for Post involvement with the CIA. As
to me entirely possible that Congress Harwood and Pincus concluded: "So there is
could wind up making a law that would in considerable uncertainty as to the accura-
fact abridge - or threaten to abridge - cy of Bernstein's claims and sweeping
some part of the freedom of the press that conclusions."15 Pincus, of course, was no
the First.Amendment was intended to pro- where to be found when the vast majority
tect."11 In short, according to Geyelin, of Bernstein's claims were substantiated
the First Amendment provides for the by others such as former New York Times
press' opportunity to be approached for correspondent, Hairison E. Salisbury.
subversion by the CIA. Undoubtedly to
Geyelin's'relief, Congress passed no law RUSSELL WARREN HOWE
restricting the CIA's use of the press.
Russell W.,Howe recently posed the ques-
WALTER PINCUS tion: "What links between the press and
the CIA are justifiable ?" He-answered:
Pincus worked for the CIA's Independent "Obviously some are - and more were
Research Service (IRS) beginning in 1959 once."16 This was not a surprising re-
when he attended the International Youth sponse since Howe himself has said that in
Festival in Vienna.12 He was one of the 1958 his "days as an asset had begun."17
CIA-financed and trained delegates who He was referring to articles he wrote for
spied on fellow Americans and disrupted the CIA proprietary Information Bulletin
festival proceedings. Following the 1959 Ltd. which he knew at the time was funded
trip, Pincus briefed the CIA, took a CIA by the Congress for Cultural Freedom.18
pledge of secrecy, and agreed to attend From 1958 through 1965, Howe produced some
the 1960 youth festival in Accra, Gha- 30 articles for the Bulletin and its suc-
na for the CIA. cessor, Forum Service. As Howe described
Before leaving for Ghana, the CIA even them: "They were the-same sort of stories
briefed Pincus on his fellow American'del- that I was writing for the Post's 'Out-
egatPs. Pincus was also made privy "in look' section..."19 In 1966, Forum Service
some detail to the extent to which the became Forum World Features (FWF), headed
agency was operating in the field" and was
to join the CIA.13 From Ghana, by CIA officer Robert Gene Gately, former-
asked Pincus went to Guinea at the invitation of ly of Newsweek. In the same year, multi-
the Guinean Youth Committee. Upon return- millionaire John H. Whitney, former pub-
ing to the U.S., Pincus briefed the CIA lisher of the New York Herald Tribune and
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part-owner of the International Herald to the "40 Committee") which lent an air
Tribune bought FWF.2 In 1967, the Con- of legality to CIA covert operations
gress for Cultural Freedom was exposed as through rubber-stamp approval. 28
a CIA front and Whitney as a CIA collabo- Katzenbach, who has stated that no mat-
rator. By then, FWF had become, in the ter what they did in the past, the CIA and
words of Howe, "the principal CIA media the FBI are the "most decent and effec-
effort in the world."~i tive" intelligence agencies in the
Howe continued to write for FWF, al- world,29 was also involved in the FBI's
though he had read Ramparts magazine's ex- operations against Martin Luther King,Jr.
pose of CCF's CIA funding. "The thought According to the Church Committee, "the
itself never occurred" to him, says Howe, sustained use of such tactics by the FBI
to ask Whitney about his CIA connec- as an attempt to destroy Martin Luther
tions. 22 In 1968, when Howe was still King, Jr. violated the law and fundamen-
writing for both the Post and FWF, Whitney tal human decency... There is no question
got the Post to agree to purchase FWF that officials in the White House and
stories. 2T-According to the Church Commit- Justice Department, including President
tee, the Post - along with some four other Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach,
major daily U.S. newspapers - was told knew that the Bureau was taking steps to
that FWF was "CIA controlled."24 This discredit Dr. King..." 30 "Knew", indeed.
means that the Post consciously chose to Katzenbach had told then FBI Director, J.
publish CIA propaganda and knew that one Edgar Hoover that the FBI could undertake
of its full time reporters, Howe, worked various wiretapping operations and come
for a CIA proprietary. Howe ultimately to Katzenbach afterwards for his approv-
wrote some 250 articles for FWF as well as al. The Church Committee produced three
for the CIA-funded Africa Report and Sur- such memos signed by Katzenbach.
vey. (Even before FWF, he had been the
French correspondent for Business Interna- KATHERINE GRAHAM
tional whose founder Eldridge Haynes al-
lowed the CIA to use the magazine as a Earlier this year, Post publisher
cover.) Incredibly, Howe claims that: "I Katherine Graham hosted a dinner party at
was apparently what was known as an unwit- her house for Ronald Reagan and some mem-
ting asset."25 bers of his cabinet, including CIA Direc-
tor William Casey. Even before he was
NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH President, candidate Reagan had been fet-
ed at a Post luncheon where he reportedly
Katherine Graham is said to have invited "impressed" Post executive editor Benja-
Nicholas de B. Katzenbach to join the min Bradlee.
board of directors of the Washington Post; Katherine Graham has been a member of
an invitation which he accepted. Katzen- the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
bach is still on the board despite revela- which acts as an interface between the
tions in the Post itself that, as U.S. corporate rich, the CIA, and their apolo-
Deputy Attorney General, he called James gists. Then-CIA Director William Colby
Russell Wiggins, then Post editorial page highlighted this relationship in a report
editor, and asked him to alter an up-com- on CIA domestic operations to the CFR be-
ing Post editorial.26 It is also well fore his report to Congress.
known that Katzenbach neutralized the 1967 Graham, who hired the CIA-involved
exposes of the CIA's illegal domestic op- Wackenhut Security Corporation during the
erations. Again, the Post itself reported Post's union busting operations, wrote the
that Katzenbach met secretly with then- following note to fellow CFR member and
President of the National Student Associa- former CIA Director Allen Dulles after he
tion (NSA), Eugene Groves, a CIA collabo- had been fired for the CIA's illegal inva-
rator, to develop a strategy to minimize sion of the Bay of Pigs, Cuba. Dulles, at
the up-coming expose about the CIA/NSA op- the time, was an object of worldwide crit-
erations.27 Katzenbach then chaired the icism for his many CIA crimes including
presidential panel which "investigated" his sabotaging of the integrity of the
the CIA/NSA and other domestic operations. press.
Worse yet, Katzenbach at the time was a
member of the "303 Committee" (predecessor
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2920 R Street
Washington 7, D. C.
Wednesday
Dear Allen and Clover,
I have thought of you so many times
since last spring and never had the wits
to write what I was. thinking. So I wanted
to take the chance of your formal resigna-
tion to tell you how marvelous and admira-
ble you both have been always and espe-
ciaZZy recently.
We all know that Allen has done such
wonderful. things for the country for so
extreme right in El Salvador.34) Despite
the bloody history of the CIA's police
programs and their widespread atrocities
in Vietnam, the Post editorial, a la
Ronald Reagan, says the government should
"In due course I learned, by means of
discreet inquiry, that the Post, like
other major news media, maintained
'contacts' with the CIA in order to re-
ceive 'guidance' on 'sensitive'
stories."
Former Post reporter, Erwin Knoll
The Progressive, May 1979
many years. And it must seem such agony to not be held back by the "tiger cage syn-
seem so unappreciated now. I think public drome."
11M47,1-)L but With the likes of General Haig bombard-
things are often tamnnrnril
y
that in the long run the people will un- ing the country with cold war propaganda,
this is a time of great need for an inde-
derstand and be grateful for such unceas- pendent; truthful press. The people in
ing and brilliant devotion. the U.S. will never receive the whole
We both send our love and hopes that
truth, except coincidentially, as long as
we'll see you very soon and often. there is a CIA-press connection. Even long
Kay -time CIA collaborator, Harrison E. Salis-
Katherine Graham and Allen Dulles had a bury recently stated: "Once again - as it
friend in common; the late Shah of Iran had happened so often and was to happen so
whose ambassador used to send them both frequently - it was the truth that the CIA
free gifts such as caviar. Graham paid a feared above all things, truth was what
personal "solidarity" visit to the deposed was so 'frightening' in the Agency's
Shah in his final hideaway in Egypt. words,... its men felt, the truth must be
avoided at all cost."35
Graham later told a gathering of Post The Post management should follow the
workers that her visit with the ex-Shah example of some of its rank-and-file work-
East one of the highlights of her Middle ers who ejected the CIA from the Newspaper
East trip. She said the Shah was a "sad Guild in 1967 and have successfully con-
and lonely" man surrounded by an "air f f tinued to resist all attempts (led by
pathos" and deserted by his friends. Charles Perlik) to allow the CIA to use
The Guild's actions show it can be done,
Meg Greenfield, who recently replaced and until it is done by newspapers such
Philip Geyelin as Post editorial page edi- as the Washington Post, we will not have
tor, accompanied Graham on her Middle East a ftee press.
trip. Greenfield had served for many years
as Geyelin's deputy after having worked FOOTNOTES
for eleven years for Reporter magazine un- 1) Eugene Meyer, a multimillionaire who also championed
der executive editor Philip Horton, the the expansion of U.S. foreign investments later became
CIA's first chief of station in Paris-32 the first president of the World Bank. The Bank under-
Recently, in an editorial, "Can We Help wrote the vast expansion of U.S. corporate foreign in-
vestments with taxpayers' money.
Uganda?, "33 'the Post called for the resur- 2) Fred Hirsch and Richard Fletcher, CIA and the Labour
rection of the CIA's International Police Movement, Spokesman Books, Nottingham, England, 1977, p.
Academy (IPA) which Congress closed in 69. Clay at the time headed the U.S. Military Government
in West Germany. His use of counterpart funds was ille-
1974 in outrage at its activities. Specif- gal since by law they should have been repatriated to
ically, the editorial called for resuming the U.S.
the training of police in Uganda, the very 3) Truman, however, did support the repressive loyalty
oath programs conducted by the American Federation of
country in which the CIA had trained and Laber and the CIA-financed National Education Associ-
equipped the police assassins and tortur- ation against law-abiding teachers across the country.
4) Washington Post (WP), 5/25/50, p.1
ers of Idi Amin. (IPA graduates also in- 5) Saturday Evening Post, 5/20/67, p.12; More, May 78,
clude Roberto d'Abuisson, leader of the p.26.
18 - Counterspy, May-July 1981
the Guild for its international programs.
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6) WP, 5/21/78, p.B-2.
7) ibid.
8) ibid.; Harrison E. Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor,
Times Books, New York, 1980, p.572.
9) WP, 5/21/78, p.B-2.
10) ibid.
11) ibid.
12) WP, 2/17/67, pp.A-1, A-5. In a published account of
the festival disruptions, Pincus and Philip M. Cronin
were commended for their effective approach in disrupt-
ing the "Meeting of Young Journalists" seminar. They
were cited by their fellow participant, Cliff Thompson
(The Harvard Crimson, 10/14/59, p.6).
13) ibid.
14) WP, 9/18/77, pp.B-1, B-4. Richard Harwood wrote a
number of significant CIA exposes until he became Post
deputy managing editor.
15)
ibid.,
p.B-4.
16)
More,
May 78, p.27.
17)
ibid.,
p.22.
18)
ibid.
19)
ibid.
20)
ibid.,
p.23.
21)
ibid.,
p.24.
22)
ibid.,
p.25.
23)
ibid.,
p.26.
24)
ibid.
25)
ibid.,
pp.21,26.
26)
WP, 12/8/77, p.A-3.
27)
WP, 3/9/67; New York Post, 3/9/67, p.P-2.
28)
Washington Star, 5/8/75.
29)
ibid.
30)
Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Gov-
ernment Operations with Respect to Intelligence Ag-
encies, "Intelligence Activities and the Rights of
Americans," Book II, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.,
4/26/76, pp.211, 275.
31) Shop Talk (published by the Communications Depart-
ment of the Post), vol.5, no.26, 6/26/80, p.2.
32) R. Harris Smith, OSS: The Secret History of Ameri-
ca's First Central Intelligence Agency, University of
California Press, Berkeley, 1972, p.209.
33) As printed in: International Herald Tribune,
9/27-28/80.
34) WP, 3/9/81, p.A-19.
35) cf supra, #8, p.521.
Secret World Bank Plan
for Indonesia by Joel Lacamora
(Ed. note: Joel Lacamora is an Associate
of the South East Asia Resource Center and
an Indonesia specialist.)
In a highly confidential study recently
obtained by Counterspy and the Southeast
Asia Resource Center, the World Bank warns
the Suharto government of what it pre-
ceives to be a nationalist drift in cur-
rent economic policy and prescribes dras-
tic measures to facilitate the entry of
foreign capital. These steps, the Bank
asserts, would constitute "strong medicine
for the Indonesian economy..."l The secret
document also highlights the conflicts be-
tween U.S. and Japanese investments in In-
donesia and illustrates that the World
Bank is, in fact, siding with U.S. capital
in this clash.
Together with the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the World Bank has played a
strong directive role in shaping the eco-
nomic policies of the Suharto regime. The
Bank was key in foxmi..iig the Inter-Govern-
mental. Group of Indonesia (IGGI) in 1967,
consisting of itself, the IMF, and 13
creditor nations, which eased the condi-
tions of repayment for the debts incurred
by the previous nationalist Sukarno gov-
ernment in return for an "open-door" poli-
cy toward foreign capital.2 The Bank has
been Indonesia's biggest development do-
nor, and the amount of the loans funnelled
to Suharto - over $4 billion - is greater
than that received by any other Southeast
Asian country. Its creditor role has
translated into enormous programmatic de-
cision-making power, exercised through
front-groups such as the notorious "Berke-
ley Mafia" of West Coast-educated techno-
crats who laid the economic foundations of
Indonesia's "New Order" after the CIA-
backed coup that toppled Sukarno and ini-
tiated a reign of terror that took at
least 600,000 lives (see CounterSpy, Oct.-
Dec. 1979).
RETURN TO THE GOLDEN AGE
In the 600-page secret document titled
"Selected Issues of Industrial Development
and Trade Strategy," a Bank mission that
visited Indonesia in 1979 warns the Indo-
nesians that they must return to the
"Golden Age" characterized by the virtual-
ly unrestricted entry of foreign capital
that prevailed between 1967 and 1974. "The
view that private foreign investment could
play a leading role in the development
process is underlyed by the highly fa-
vorable incentives and guarantees to for-
eign investors... was dominant for only a
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relatively brief period after 1967," be- DECLINE IN NEW INVESTMENT
moans the report. "A series of policy de-
cisions in the mid-1970's significantly Despite the currently strong position of
qualified the 'open door' policy. The most foreign investors, the Bank is worried
important of these were requirements for about the future. Compared to the period
greater and more rapid increases in local 1970 to 1974, it points out, the inflow of
participation in ownership; approved investment fell by 34 per-
p; greater con- cent. Excluding investment going to the
trols on investment including the closing huge Asahan aluminum smelter project, the
of significant areas to private foreign
investment; prohibition on foreign firms decline was even sharper at 77 percent.
engaging in any distribution activities "Many businessmen indicated to the Mis-
(even for their own products); require- s.o that were it not for the regulatory
ments for more rapid promotion of Indone- environment, the cost of producing manu-
sians to high skilled and managerial posi- factored goods in Indonesia could be the
tions; and renegotiations of terms affect- lowest in Southeast Asia," the Bank in-
ing foreign investment in the natural re- forms the government. It continues: "De-
source-based industries." spite recent restrictions, foreign inves-
The Bank does not mention that the key tors still believe that Indonesia with its
large population as potential customers
policy changes it identifies constituted a makes it an attractive place for long-term
defensive response on the part of the investment, but there is less unanimity as
Suharto government to the mass nationalist
sentiment which exploded during the anti- to whether it will remain so if current
Japanese riots of January 1974, while trends continue." It then tells the gov-
then Prime Minister Kakwei Tanaka was vis- ernment that "the incentives for these
iting Indonesia. firms to locate there rather than in some
THE PROFILE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
other Southeast Asian country... must be
provided."
A constant concern in the report is the
institution of ille
al
a
ments "whi
h
g
p
y
c
are
Between 1967 and 1979, approved foreign the most effective way to expedite af-
investment came to $7.1 billion. Imple- fairs." Special concern is evinced over
mented or realized investment totalled the inability of U.S. firms to compete in
$3.4 billion, $2.2 billion or 65 percent this area because they are severely re-
of which went into the rapidly growing stricted from making illegal payments by
manufacturing sector. Among investors, Ja- U.S. law. It notes, however, that to get
pan was clearly in the lead, accounting around the law, American firms have re-
for $2.5 billion or almost 36 percent, sorted to "expediters" or "forwarding
followed by the U.S., with $800 million agents". An interesting example is pro-
or 11 percent. Indicative of the strong vided by the Bank:
position that foreign investors have
gained in the_economy is that they now
outstrip state enterprises in total manu-
facturing output, 21 to 20 percent. For-
eign firms today dominate such sectors as
beverages, leather footwear, derivative
chemical products, glass and glass prod-
ucts, non-ferrous metal, and electrical
machinery. Measured in terms of output per
firm, foreign firms are, on average, more
than twice as large as state firms and
more than seven times as large as domestic
firms. Their productive capacity does not,
however, match their employment capabili-
ty, since they account for only one-tenth
of the 683,000 people employed-in manu-
facturing.
20 - CounterSpy, May-July 1981
"One manager of an American firm com-
plained of the time and effort required
on his part merely for the identifica-
tion of the tariff classifications of
imported items and for assessment of the
applicable rate of duty. As manager of
an American firm, he is unable to use
illegal payments to speed up the clear-
ing time and to have the applicable
.duties on his imports reduced. His in-
ability to produce in Indonesia on equal
terms with his competitors has been par-
ticularly frustrating to him as most of
them have been paying only 30 percent of
the duties and tax for the majority of
the inputs they all import,., inclusive
illegal payments. Consequently, he has
been using expediters to deal with cus-
toms. The expediters serve more than a
single purpose for this manager. First,
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they pay on his. behalf, certain kinds of individuals."
bribes, for example, to reduce the -- 5. Foreign firms should be allowed ac-
clearance time. Second, as the forward- cess to domestic credit. To justify what
ing agents are well-connected with high- is certain to be one of its most contro-
ranking Indonesians, they serve as this versial proposals, the Bank says that "in
manager's contacts with powerful Indone- a country like Indonesia where the cen-
sians." tral problem is the efficient use rather
than the mobilization of resources, there
RADICAL RESTRUCTURING is little justification for imposing re-
The Bank's solution to what it sees as strictions on financing that limit the
an increasingly unfavorable investment process of private foreign investment."
climate is nothing less than a radical re-
structuring of industry through a "compre-
hensive program of deregulation and elimi- These drastic prescriptions for foreign
nation of market interventions." Among the investment are part of a "liberalization
proposals that immediately affect foreign package" that the Bank hopes will estab-_
investment, are the following: lish "a close approximation of free
1. "The DSP (investment priorities list) trade." The abolishment of the quantita-
system should... be significantly amended tive import restrictions as well as pro-
and no prohibition be placed on any prop- tective tariffs that shelter Indonesian
erly registered... foreign firm from en- firms from multinational competition is
tering or expanding any business activity strongly recommended. This is, of course,
producing legal commodities or services." what is popularly known as the "Chilean
2. Exploitation of natural resources Solution," after Chilean dictator
like copper, tin and timber, which is cur- Pinochet's radical dismantling of pro-
rently curbed, should be opened up to for- tective tariffs after the military coup of
eign investors. "The interest of society, 1973. What the Bank doesn't mention are
at large, as opposed to particular indi- the costs of such politics. In the case of
viduals with ownership rights in particu- Chile, for example, a recent study by the
lar firms," says the Bank, "is to have widely respected Chilean economist Ricardo
these resources managed in the most effi- French Davis asserts that the tariff re-
cient way so as to obtain the highest re- form imposed by Pinochet's "Chicago Boys"
turns possible in terms of the resources has led to the bankruptcy of almost 1,600
generated through royalties or taxes on Chilean companies and to. a condition of
firms to exploit these resources." industrial stagnation that has, so far,
3. Restrictions on the use of foreign cost the country about $8.5 billion.3
workers should be relaxed. Indeed, the Being even less secure than Chile's rela-
Bank advocates "a clear policy of unre- tively more established and mature entre-
stricted access to high-level personnel preneurial class, Indonesia's struggling
from abroad..." Even restrictions on lower local bourgeoisie would likely experience
-level foreign personnel should be relaxed a disaster of greater magnitude if liber-
on the following grounds: "While foreign alization were to take place.
firms may rely on foreign workers to fill
high-level positions, this cost tends to EXPORT-LED INDUSTRIALIZATION
be offset by relatively greater expendi-
ture on training local workers at lowed In addition to the free flow of foreign
investment and trade liberalization, the
levels." Bank proposes as the third major prong of
4. Restrictions on ownership, such as
re-
the provision that 51 percent of a firm',s its strategy of industrial reform the re-
equity must pass to Indonesian hands after orientation of industry from "import sub-
equity production for export. Indo-
a specified number of years, should be re-;nesia must specialize in the production
laxed, partly because "foreign firms that and export of labor intensive light manu-
are protecting production or managerial
secrets will not invest in areas where factures, says the Bank, which is in
their control of this knowledge is threat- its "comparative advantage" to do because
it is "well-endowed" with unskilled labor.
ened by forcing controlling ownership Production for the domestic market must
shares to be transferred to local firms or
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be downgraded in the process. The Bank minished growth rate in the OECD countries
provides the following rationale for this: translates very quickly into reduced de-
"...,the domestic market in Indonesia is, mand for those developing nations' ex-
at present, small in terms of purchasing ports, leading in turn to a reduced capac-
power... and is unlikely to support a ity to import, and hence to lower rates of
high growth rate in the manufacturing sec- growth."4 McNamara's fears have become
tor. Indonesia must, therefore, become reality. Indonesia, the Bank itself notes,
more outward-looking than it is at pre- has recently been hit by quotas imposed by
sent." the European Economic Community on its
Again, what the Bank conveniently avoids textile exports to the United Kingdom in
mentioning are the costs of its prescrip 1980.
tion. In most areas where it has been ad- That foreign multinationals will be at
opted as the path to industrial growth, the vanguard of "export-led industrial-
"export-led industrialization" is running ization" is hardly concealed by the Bank.
into severe problems. In the late sixties It is precisely those labor-intensive
and seventies, under the strong ad-vice of sectors, such as textiles, leather foot-
the World Bank, countries like Brazil, wear, and wood products, in which foreign
South Korea, and the Philippines turned firms have gained a strong, if not com-,
away from "import-substitution industrial- manding position that should be encour-
ization," which had been blocked from aged to go into export promotion. More-
further advance by the limits of the in- over, the Bank proposes the establishment
ternal market.. The solution was clear: the of "export-processing zones" similar to
market could only be enlarged by the re- those now existing in South Korea, Hong
distribution of income. Such a solution Kong and the Philippines. These are areas
would, however, have necessitated a social where multinationals can have access to
revolution that would have swept away the
World Bank together with foreign interests The secret World Bank documents on Indo-
and local privileged groups in these nesia (as well as those on the Philip"-
countries. Concentrating on producing la- pines - see the latest issue of Counter-
bor-intensive light manufactures for the Spy) clearly illustrate that the Bank's
markets of advanced industrial. countries primary task is the promotion of U.S.
appeared to provide a way to foster indus- corporate interests in Third World coun-
trial growth without having to redistrib- tries and not, as the Bank likes to say,
assistance to poor countries. This was
ute income. This benefit, however, has now
proven to be illusory, since economic even acknowledged by a high ranking Bank
stagnation and a wave of protectionism in official in a recent interview. He said the advanced capitalist countries are rap- confidentially that the Bank recently
idly reducing opportunities for light man- initiated a major study on how to "re-
ufactures from the Third world and forcing orient itself by 180 degrees back to the
the various "export platforms" into cut- point of assisting the poor of the
throat competition with one another. world." The study is being conducted by
The perils of export-led growth were, ir. William Ascher - the very person who had
fact, articulated by World Bank President drafted the secret World Bank document
Robert McNamara himself in 1974, at the on the means of continuing and expanding
exploitation through Bank programs in
same time that he was proclaiming it "the the Philippines. Ascher is working at
wave of the future" for the developing
world: "The adverse effect on the develop- the World Bank under a Council on For-
ing countries of... a reduction in eco- eign Relations (CFR) pro bono publico
grant which - bless his heart - pays him
nomic growth in their major markets would
be great. There is a strong - almost one- $1 a year. The Council, together with
the CIA, played a major role in the 1965
to-one - relationship between changes in military coup in Indonesia that left
the growth rate of the OECD [Organization over half a million dead. It will be in-
for Economic Cooperation and Development] over half
read
countries and that of the oil-importing g (if they are not clas-
sified) William Ascher's recommendations
nations. This is not surprising. Exports for serving the world's poor and the
to OECD countries constitute 75 percent of public good.
the total exports of those nations. A di-
22 - CounterSpy, May-July 1981
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cheap labor without the burden of import
or export taxes. "The benefits to firms,"
says the Bank, "would arise from the low
cost of available labor, the proposed in-
frastructure and plant facilities, and
the visible assurance to domestic and
foreign investors that they will be free
to export and import without any institu-
tional constraints..."
Though seemingly directed towards pro-
moting foreign capital as a whole, the
document is actually expressing the view-
point of U.S. and other Western firms in
their competition with Japanese capital.
This is obliquely confirmed by one member
of the mission, who informed the Southeast
Asia Resource Center that, "most managers
interviewed were either American or Eti-
ropean. Japanese interviewed tended to be
less forthright and often tended to ex-
press a positive view toward the foreign
investment regime."
Japanese firms have gained an overwhelm-
ing foothold in Indonesia because of their
well-known "flexibility" in dealing with
Indonesian interest groups like the mili-
tary. Joint ventures with Indonesians - a
system in which the Japanese have become
quite adept - draws the fire of the Bank,
which says that "local participation re-
presents little more than a payment to a
local company for acting as a front to ob-
tain a concession. Much of the capital for
these local fronts",asserts the Bank, "is
actually risk capital provided by the for-
eign partner or foreign producer which can
maintain control of the company, even af-
ter it has theoretically passed into do-
mestic Indonesian ownership, through long-
term management or supply contracts."
Local partners, the report states, are
drawn from a narrow circle of high-income
groups. "A study of ownership patterns in
Indonesian industry shows that several
hundred of the largest industrial concerns
are partially owned by high-level Govern-
ment officials or their immediate fami-
lies." Rather than encouraging these Indo-
nesians to make careers in business, joint
ventures, concludes the Bank, push them
into "developing their connections and
maximizing their returns as front men."
Seen in this'light, the World Bank re-
port on Indonesia represents a significant
move in the sharpening conflict between
U.S. and Japanese capital for control of
the biggest national market in what is now
regarded as the world's premier economic
growth area, Southeast Asia.
1) Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations are from
the World Bank document, Selected Issues of Industrial
Development and Trade Strategy, October 29, 1980.
2) Pacific Asia Resource Center, "Japanese Transna-
tional Enterprises in Indonesia", AMPO, vol.12 no.4,
1980, p.4. This excellent resource provides a compre-
hensive look at Japanese investment in Indonesia.
3) Elizabeth Fransworth and Stephen Talbot, "Dis-
patches", The Nation, Jan.31, 1981, p.103.
4) Robert McNamara, Address to Board of Governors,
1974, Washington, D.C., 1974, p.12.
Contemporary Marxism, the ties, j,ntrnat tit 'tic Institute 1,)r the
Studs ul Labor and F.e,numic Crisis, attal\ /cs crucial issues taupe
the socialist and workers' innsement,, of the world tnvn a wurkini
class Marxist penpe,ti,e upl,,,ricd h, riv,,r,,us sch?lanhip.
Editors and authors include:
Marlene Dixon Ruv Mauro Marini
Susanne Jonas Immanuel Wallerstein
John Horton Fernando Claudin
Andre Gunder Frank Samir Amin
Anibal Quijano Eticnnc Balihar, and others
No. I. 1980
Strategies for the Class Struggle in Latin America
Prumnicnt Latin .\tnerican Marxists address ,tit It quc,unns as the
advantages and risks of class allian,cs. ret?rmum .ld ,,,t ial dent,,,
rac\, the labor musemcnt, and the n,lc ?I the state. Sprmq 1080.
No. 2. 1980
On the European Workers' Movement
Guest edited by Immanuel Wallerstein. \\,'l1 k1)?s,1) \1; rsto
intellet tu.de and at tis :,t, e ntitaih rt all ate ;Ise tend'11, k It I'%\ It a,
I.it roc,Ili muit tsm" ami ItsiIn plicaI{?1)s I?1 thr-?','list ,1)d??,tkcn
tn?sctrtcnt, in ali,,nt( ci , apitalist r, ,lntnc,. i!!-IIu,,
1981: On .Marxism and Christianity
On Proletarianization and Class Struggle in Africa
1'1) 'o , tcd: I h booed Nan?tts and I',,,hlcm, ?t \%. Ili :nntcttt
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CounterSpy, May-July 1981 - 23
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140007-5
Af hanistan: Foreign Intervention
the Pros p~e~cts for Peace by Mohammed, sarkash
and Seamus o Faolain
(Ed. note: Mohammed Sarkash and Seamus 1973. Most foreign governments and groups
O'Faolain are pseudonyms for an Afghan and who have sent aid to the rebels, under-
a U.S. writer, respectively.) stand these weaknesses and the futility,
in military terms, of their support. Their
From its beginning in April 1978, the assistance is not motivated by military
Afghan revolution has been under heavy at- goals but rather by political ones. In the
tack from two circles. First, conservative propaganda war against the Soviet Union,
Western regimes - newly alarmed by the up- the United States and its Middle East
heavals in-Iran - were awakened to the re-
allies reap tremendous political capital
ality that revolutionary movements were from keeping Soviet troops in Afghanistan.
gaining strength in other countries of the Some seem determined to continue doing so,
region. Second, reactionary and privileged even if it means fighting to the last Af-
forces (especially the landowners) within ghan.
Afghanistan ware stirred into reaction. At the current level of fighting, how-
The circle of Afghan reaction found sup- ever, "the last Afghan" still has quite a
port in conservative Western circles, and while to go. Even Drew Middleton of the
the two circles quickly became concentric New York Times, with his rebel Afghan news
(with the Afghan revolution the common sources, ventured the estimate that "no
center of their offensive). Counterspy more than 1,000 rebels are in contact with
has analyzed the evolution of external op- the Soviet forces at one time on any day
position to the Afghan government. (See and their effectiveness is limited." 1 Two
Oct.-Dec.,79; Jan.-March 80; and April- Westerners who travelled in Afghanistan in
June 80.) The purpose of this article is late 1980 (Fred Halliday and Gerard
to examine the combined impact of these Challiand)2 reported that the main Afghan
external and internal forces on the revo- towns are secured against any serious reb-
lution and the prospects for peace.
el threat, with military cordons estab-
lished around them. Significantly, the
THE FACES OF WAR rebels' major victories emerge in non-mil-
Of the literally dozens of rebel group- itary arenas, as Halliday reports: "Over
ings clamoring for recognition, only the one hundred schools have been destroyed in
six headquartered in Peshawar, Pakistan Herat province alone, and present diplo-
have succeeded in receiving sizable exter- matic sources confirm that around half of
nal assistance and in infiltrating sub- all the educational and medical facilities
stantial quantities of arms and trained in the Afghan countryside have been de-
fighters into Afghanistan. While the focus stroyed by the rebels this year." Soviet
of this article will be on these groups - casualties are also systematically trumped
their roots, goals, and external support -up by rebel sources and even Challiand,
from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, who was travelling with the rebels, admit-
the U.S., China and Western Europe - men- ted: "Contrary to periodic reports from
tion will also be made of smaller opera- 'diplomatic sources' (usually in New
tions by Iran and other countries. Delhi), the Soviets have suffered remark-
Careful study of the six major Peshawar ably few casualties in the year since the
groupings reveals that these groups stand invasion."
no chance of victory, nor of significant, The Pakistani-based rebels actually com-
unified popular support due to their divi- prise only a very narrow sliver of the
sions, extreme fundamentalist positions million-plus Afghan refugees. Another re-
(even in the eyes of some of their sup- cent visitor to Afghanistan, reporting for
porters) and lack, of logistical sophisti- the Boston Globe, estimated from his ob-
cation. Their prestige is further weak- servations of thriving black markets and
ened by the fact that at least two of the knowledge of embezzled refugee aid that
six were initially created and financed over half of the refugees were "economic
entirely by external forces as early as opportunistsit:3
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"In a 500-mile journey from inside Af- tier Province of Pakistan and also as a
ghanistan through Baluchistan and the pressure ploy to force the Afghan govern-
frontier, most fellow passengers were ment to recognize a British-drawn border
Afghan refugees. But they did not have (known as the Durand line) that was advan-
any tales to tell of Soviet bombings or tageous to Pakistan as the official border
fierce resistance in the hills. They between the two countries.
simply wanted to seek a new life in Pa- These rebels were subsequently used
kistan. At the border town of Qamruddin quite effectively to Pakistan's advantage.
Karez in Baluchistan, local government In July 1975, the 5,000 man force, under
officials were openly skeptical of guer- Hekmatyar's command, was infiltrated into
rilla war efforts and dismissed most of the Panjsher valley north of Kabul for a
the refugees as economic opportunists." major battle against Afghan government
Dotted through the opportunists and black forces. The battle was effective in push-
marketeers, at uneven intervals, are ing Afghanistan onto the defensive in the
training camps of predominantly Sunni, ensuing negotiations. While the Pakistani
Pashto-speaking rebels from the eastern government denied any connection with the
Afghan provinces, loyal to one of the fol- incident at the time, former high offi-
lowing six leaders. cials in the Bhutto government have re-
cently admitted their involvement.4 Even
ISLAMIC PARTY OF GULBUDDIN HEKMATYAR after Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia
Hekmatyar is considered the most uncom- ul-Haq in July 1977, Pakistan continued
promising and fundamentalist of the rebel to supply Hekmatyar with training facili-
ties, such as a camp at Warsack, as well
leaders. While a student in the engineer- as the right to run his own prisons and
ing faculty of the University of Kabul, he military tribunals.
belonged to the Jawanan-i-Musalman (Mili-
tant Hekmatyar's Islamic Party has proclaimed
Muslim Youth), a group with close set of goals, which clearly
links to the pan-Islamic Muslim Brother- a detailed identify it as the most obscurantist and
hood. He was known for his attacks on fe- anti-progressive" of the rebel groups.The
male education and was arrested in the
early 1970s for assassinating a progres- first principle of the party is explicit
sive Afghan student. Gaining notoriety in this respect: "Afghanistan is an exclu-
while in jail, he was released in late sively Islamic state where all non-Islamic
1972. ideas or practices are forbidden."5 A
Hekmatyar's group, now known as the Is- sense of the program is seen in the fol-
lamic Party (Hezb-i Islami), has its roots lowing four proposals: (1) the agrarian
in an earlier era. In 1973, when Muhammad reform launched by the revolutionary gov-
Daud assumed power in Afghanistan in an ernment will be cancelled and all private
anti-royalist coup, the government of property will be returned to its original
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Pakistan launched a owners; (2) women must wear the veil and
"forward policy" against Afghanistan. Out both education and work will be separated
of fear that Daud would reignite the long- by sex; (3) all education will include
standing border dispute over the Pashtuni- military training for jihad (holy war) and
stan regions of the two countries, Paki- the state will undertake massive military
stan clandestinely trained and armed a armament; and (4) (in contrast to present
force of 5,000 Afghan rebels in a series policy of respecting the several national
of secret camps. The Nixon administra- languages) there will be one national lan-
tion, fearful that Daud's regime was too guage and Arabic will be promoted as a
left-leaning, sent in the CIA to help Pa- second language.6
kistan train these rebels. (One CIA train- Despite Hekmatyar's prominence among
ing camp was located in Attock, Pakistan.) Peshawar-based rebels, he has been one of
The CIA later withdrew assistance as it the most divisive forces in the rebel
became clear that Daud wasn't a leftist, movement. He has refused to join any rebel
and the force was put under tight Paki- alliances and his group has been involved
stani control, with Hekmatyar emerging as in outbreaks of fighting-against other
the Afghan "leader". Pakistan hoped to use rebel groups.
the force to counter any Daud attempts to Hekmatyar's major external provider is
militarily push into the North West Fron- still Pakistan, which supplies abundant
aid, facilities and. freedom to move men
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/15: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140007-5
and arms at will. Unlike Bhutto's govern- Stan, and in the mid-1970s was appointed
ment, which helped create the rebel force (under a Saudi grant) to a mosque in Co-
in 1973 principally for anti-Daud govern- penhagen. Prominent members of his family
ment actions, Zia's support comes also earlier became notorious for their exces-
from an ideological affinity with Hekmat sively conservative opposition to the Af-
yar. The joint CIA-Pakistan creation of ghan monarchy from the 1920s onward.? When
the Hekmatyar-led force in 1973 was by no the first Afghan parliament was elected in
means the last instance of close collabo- 1965, the most reactionary block of repre-
ration between the U.S. and Pakistan. sentatives was led by the Mujadidi family.
Counterspy (Jan.- March 80) has extensive- Rabani's modern rebel activities began
ly described Pakistani compliance with the alongside Hekmatyar in the Pakistan-CIA-
CIA's use of the U.S. embassy in Islam- created Afghan rebel group in 1973. The
abad, Pakistan to direct covert assistance others only came to Peshawar after the
to the rebels. More recently, in September 1978 Afghan revolution and subsequent land
1980, the Pakistani government ordered all reform. Even now, the established Muslim
diplomatic missions to stop operating in- group whose principles all of these lead-
formation and publicity sections from cit- ers seem to adhere to most closely is the
ies other than Islamabad. It was no acci- Muslim Brotherhood - an extreme fundamen-
dent that U.S. International Communication talist organization with cells all over
Agency posts in Lahore, Karachi and Pesha- the Middle East which rejects all'forms of
war were not affected by the order. Since "Westernization, secularization and mod-
late 1980, the Islamic Party has also been ernization"(see box).
financially helped by the leader of the
Islamic Society Party of Kuwait, Abdullah Selig Harrison, a senior associate of
al Aqil. the Carnegie Endowment, arguing in For-
Since the April 1978 revolution, four ei n Policy (Winter 80-81) that U.S. aid
major groups have split off from Hekmat- be redirected to rebel groups within Af-
yar, but all continue to espouse basically ghanistan, clearly pointed to the pplit-'
ical liability of the Muslim Brotherhood
the same ideas and programs: Islamic Party Zink: "Most of the Peshawar-based resis-
(Hezb-i-Islami, a direct split from Hek- tance groups espouse the militant, fun-
matyar's party which kept the name) of damentalist variety of pan-Islamism
Younis Khalis; Islamic Society of Afghani- identified with the Muslim Brotherhood..
Stan (Jamiat Islami Afghanistan) of Bur- operating throughout the Islamic world,
hanuddin Rabani; National Liberation Front the brotherhood denies the importance,
of Afghanistan (Jabha-i-Nejat-i-Milli Af- even the validity, of a separate Afghan
ghanistan) of Sebgatullah Mujadidi; and or Pakistani or Arab nationalism, em-
Islamic Revolutionary Movement (Harakat
Ingelabe Islami) of Mohammad Nabi hasizing instead the unity of Islam.
Mohammdi. Along with a fifth group (to be For this reason, among others, Afghan
fundamentalist leaders have been isoZat
detailed later), they formed a flimsy Is ed from the mainstream of Afghan politi-
lamic Alliance for the Liberation of Af- cal life in recent decades and, cone-
ghanistan under the leadership of Abdul quentZy, have had difficulty in winning
Rasoul Sayaf (who was freed from jail by acceptance as resistance leaders."
Karmal in January 1980). Founded in 1928 in Egypt, the Brother-
There are marked differences in the hood rapidly spread throughout Egypt,
leaders' backgrounds. Rabani, Mujadidi and the Sudan, Syria, Palestine, Lebanon an
Sayaf were all educated at the Theological North Africa, and amassed 200,000 mem-
University of Al Azhar (Cairo, Egypt) as bers organized in tight local cells
theologians. All three formed connections within a decade. In demanding "purity"
with the Muslim Brotherhood while in of the IsZamic?world, they have long re-
Egypt. Upon their return to Kabul, each
became involved with the Muslim Brother- Oeeted any foreign influence through
hood-affiliated Militant Muslim Youth (as secularization or modernization. Since
did Hekmatyar and Mohammadi). In contrast being driven underground in Egypt in the
to the engineer Hekmatyar, Rabani was a 19508, the Brotherhood has focused its
landlord and businessman, involved in the activities on terrorist attacks against
export of Karakul (Persian fur). Similar- the less fundamentalist regimes in the
re ion.
ly, Mujadidi was a landlord in Afghani-
26 - CounterSpy, May-July 1981
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As early as January 1980, then-Egyptian new arms -hiprnents from the U.S. In light
Defense Minister, General Kamal Hassan Ali of this dT,h )r,,