COUNTERSPY: LIBYAN WITCH-HUNT: THE WAR AT HOME

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100140004-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: April 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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COUNTER
The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
Volume 6 Number 2
"WELL YES, hE C.I.A. DID POST
A55A551NATION ATTEMPTS ON
VAR1005 POLITICAL LEADERS,
BUr TURE WA5 CERTAINLY NO
HARM INTENDED."..
XIV CONFERENCE OF
AMERICAN ARMIES
THREATENING
THE SANDINISTAS
AMNESTY FAULTS FBI
$2
Feb. - April 1982
LIBYAN WITCH-HUNT:
THE WAR AT HOME
INSIDE BOSS:
SOUTH AFRICA"S
SECRET POLICE
BRITISH RIGHT CENSORS
FOR SOUTH AFRICA
GREECE: THE LONG
ROAD TO FREEDOM
TURKISH FASCISM
AS NATO DEMOCRACY
INDIA: UNDER
THE IMPS THUMB
GEN. HAIG'S YELLOW RAIN
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Editorial
As a member of the Rockefeller Commis- and Secretary of the Navy, James
Sion to investigate the CIA (set up by Forrestal, one of the creators of the CIA,
President Gerald Ford), Ronald Reagan told Congress under oath that "the pur-
joined in its unanimous recommendation poses of the Central Intelligence Authori-
that: "Presidents should refrain from di- ty are limited definitely to purposes out-
recting the CIA to perform what are es- side of this country...." At almost the
sentiaZZy internal security tasks. The CIA same time, Forrestal secretly initiated a
should resist any efforts, whatever their massive illegal domestic monitoring pro-
origin, to involve it again in such im- gram, Operation Shamrock, which eventually
proper activities." The Commission, which was run by the CIA and the National Secu-
included CIA collaborators, was only ask- rity Agency. Forrestal, who received jour-
ing the President and the CIA to abide by naZistic training at Princeton University,
the National Security Act of 1947. The Act also called in the publishers and editors
prohibits the CIA from having "police, of major U.S. publications and asked them
subpoena, Zaw-enforcement powers, or in- to voluntarily submit to government cen-
ternal security functions." sorship.
On December 4, 1981, President Reagan Forrestal took these actions as part of
signed Executive order 12333 which, while his preparations to open the covert front
purportedly in accord with the National of the first Cold War - which was quite
Security Act of 1947, allows the CIA to hot for the Third WorZd,,thanks to the CIA.
engage in police functions and domestic Then, as Secretary of Defense, Forrestal
covert operations. Aptly described by the asked for, and the CIA conducted, covert
New York Times as the "Son of Operation political and paramilitary operations, de-
CHAOS," the Executive order was denounced spite the opinions of the CIA Director and
by former FBI agent, Representative Don General Counsel that the CIA had no such
Edwards (D.-Ca.): "It still puts the CIA authorization.
smack into secretly operating within the Beginning with the Forrestal-initiated
United States... it permits them to enter covert intervention in the Italian elec-
into arrangements with state and local Lions after World War II, CIA covert oper-
police.., and Americans overseas are wide ations have culminated in coups in Iran
open to surveillance, regardless of any (1953), Guatemala (1954), and Indonesia
connections to foreign governments or (1965); a mass murder program, Operation
criminal activity." Phoenix, in Vietnam; support for counter-
In addition to this major enhancement of revolution in Angola; and destabilization
CIA powers, the administration has initi- efforts in Afghanistan. And at home, Oper-
ated measures severely restricting news- ation CHAOS violated the rights of miZ-
gathering about government operations. Ac- lions of U.S. citizens.
cording to the International Press Insti- As Ronald Reagan sets in motion Cold War
Lute, these restrictions pose a "poten- II, he undoubtedly wants to be unhindered
tiaZZy serious loss of public accountabiZ- by democratic opposition and publicity.
ity." More recently, it has been reported Hence, the flurry of executive orders
that Reagan is set to sign an executive which sidestep even the compliant Con-
order on the Freedom of Information Act gress. For the rest of the world, this
which would all but exempt the CIA from means more Operation Phoenix programs -
compliance with requests for information. and worse. For the U.S., it could mean the
Certainly these measures undermine U.S. realization of the fear expressed by then-
democracy, but the full import of Reagan's Representative Clare L. Hoffman regarding
CIA actions can perhaps best be understood the pending National Security Act of 1947:
by looking at recent history. In 1947, a "The possibilities of dictatorship by the
millionaire WaZZ Street investment banker military are in this legislation."
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Contents
Amnesty Faults FBI .................... 4
General Haig's Yellow Rain ............ 6
Closer to Censorship .................. 7
XIV Conference of American Armies:
Preparing for Intervention .......... 9
Threatening the Sandinistas .......... 12
Greece:
The Long Road to Freedom ........... 15
Jurgen Roth Interview:
Turkish Fascism as NATO Democracy..19
Libyan Witch-Hunt: ?.??.??...?.'..??
The War at Home.. ...
Book Review:
Inside BOSS ........................ 41
British Right Censors for
for South Africa ................... 47
India:
Under the IMF's Thumb .............. 54
IMF Destabilizes ..................... 56
VOA: Short of Hitler ................. 57
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News NOT
in the News
New Assignment
The Senate Intelligence Committee con-
tinues to make a charade of CIA "over-
sight" by such actions as the recent ap-
pointment of 38-year-old Robert Ruhl
Simmons to be staff director. According to
government-released information, Simmons
is a 10-year veteran of the CIA's opera-
tions directorate - "dirty tricks" -
which he joined after serving with Army
intelligence in Vietnam (1965-68).
Simmons has been serving on the intelli-
gence committee staff as the representa-
tive of conservative Senator John H.
Chafee. He is replacing John F. Blake, a
32-year CIA veteran and former president
of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers who left "to take advantage of a
forthcoming opportunity," according to
committee chairperson, Senator Barry
Goldwater.
Exotic Languages
In October, a House post-secondary edu-
cation committee unanimously approved an
$87 million-a-year program to encourage
the teaching of foreign languages in
schools and colleges. This action does not
signal a sudden Congressional interest in
promoting understanding between the U.S.
and citizens of other countries. According
to committee chairperson, Paul Simon (D.-
Ill.), the program is intended to enhance
the capabilities of the defense department
and intelligence agencies and improve the
U.S.'s position in international trade.
Simon said he expects to win approval for
the bill by focusing on its potential to
aid national security. "Where there is a
national need, we have to meet it," he
said in a Washington Post (10/10/81) in-
terview.
CIA Deputy Director Bobby Inman testi-
fied in a July subcommittee hearing, even
though the CIA is prohibited from promot-
ing legislation. Inman bemoaned that the
nation's "rapidly deteriorating" foreign
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language capability was having an "adverse
impact" on intelligence. "We are especial-
ly vulnerable when it comes to the more
exotic languages, such as Urdu, Arabic and
Farsi." These three languages are spoken
in areas of the world where the CIA, the
Pentagon and the multinational corpora-
tions are facing increasing resistance to
their penetration, manipulation and ex-
ploitation.
Casey's Sudan Emergency
Some eight years ago, CIA Director
William Casey's brother-in-law was killed
in a bizarre accident involving a riding
lawn mower owned by Casey. The brother-in-
law's family filed a damage suit for al-
leged negligent maintenance of the lawn
mower. Eight years later, they were having
difficulty getting Casey to court. On Oc-
tober 20, 1981, Casey was scheduled to ap-
pear for trial. A few days before, Casey's
lawyer Robert C. Minion told Judge Howard
E. Levitt that Casey had to be in London
on October 20 to direct the CIA response
to the "Sudan emergency." On October 20,
CIA spokesperson Dale Peterson said: "He's
still here." (Washington Post, 10/26/81),
Asked if Minion had told the judge October
20, Peterson added: "That may not be ex-
actly accurate, but it's pretty close."
Actually, Casey was scheduled to be in
London on October 23, to address a frater-
nal organization of special forces sol-
diers.
Aid for Terrorists
In spite of repeated attempts at unif i-
cation, the Afghan "rebel" groups are as
divided as ever. Infighting was pushed to
a new peak recently by Sayed Ahmad
Gailani, the head of the "National Islamic
Front of Afghanistan." Gailani confirmed
statements made by the Afghan government,
when he told a press conference in London,
England in early November 1981 that it is
"incomprehensible and unforgiveable" that
the West is aiding certain rebel groups
who are "terrorizing the Afghan popula-
tion." Gailani, who likes to style himself
as a moderate and who is asking for West-
ern aid himself, singled out Gulbuddin
Hekmatyar's Islamic Party which has "shot
villagers who had refused to pay them
taxes, and sometimes burnt down villages
which supported other resistance groups."
Hekmatyar received U.S. and Pakistani sup-
port as early as 1973 when Pakistan clan-
destinely trained some 5,000 Afghan "reb-
els" to destabilize the government of
Muhammad Daoud. (For a detailed descrip-
tion of the various rebel groups, see
Mohammed Sarkash, Seamus O'Faolain, "Af-
ghanistan: Foreign Intervention and the
Prospects for Peace," CounterSpy, vol.5,
no.3, pp.24-33).
Amnesty Faults FBI
On October 13, 1981, Amnesty Interna-
tional (AI), after studying thousands of
pages of official transcripts and docu-
ments, called on the U.S. government to
set up an independent commission of inqui-
ry into the influence of the FBI on the
criminal justice system. "Amnesty Interna-
tional," the 144-page report says, "does
not have any views about the need for any
particular domestic intelligence investi-
gation, but it wonders what conclusion
should be drawn when a federal government
agency [the FBI) conducts such an investi-
gation and at the same time appears will-
ing to fabricate evidence against its
'targets' and to withhold information
which, according to law, should have been
disclosed."
Entitled, Proposal for a Commission of
Inquiry into the Effect of Domestic Intel-
ligence Activities on Criminal Trials in
the United States of America, the report
does not comment on juries' decisions or
call for the automatic acquittal of de-
fendants in cases involving FBI miscon-
duct. "But," says AI, "there comes a point
when the number or type of measures taken
against members of a political group sug-
gest that it may be impossible to decide
whether a particular case has been affect-
ed by law enforcement misconduct without
the conducting of a comprehensive inquiry
into. whether or not the individual mea-
sures form part of a pattern."
Commenting on the FBI's COINTELPRO ab-
uses - which, AI charges, continued long
after the program's official termination -
the report says that: "Undoubtedly there
is a clear distinction between the 'chill-
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ing' of constitutional rights and the im- bationary racial informant." Even before
prisonment of individuals on political the trial, according to an FBI document,
grounds. One object of an inquiry would be the FBI had passed information to the Los
to ascertain whether COINTELPRO, which Angeles police identifying an alleged
certainly did the former, also resulted in second suspect in the murder. This piece
the latter." of information was withheld from the de-
In short, the report maintains that the fense. Finally, Pratt's lawyers contend
FBI has violated the legal and political that the jury should have heard evidence
rights of U.S. citizens. Indeed, it quotes showing that a witness who identified
the point-blank assessment of COINTELPRO Pratt at the trial apparently identified
by a U.S. Senate committee: "Domestic in- someone else earlier as the murderer.
telligence activity has threatened and un- Similar documented FBI misconduct oc-
dermined constitutional rights of Ameri- curred in the case of Richard Marshall.
cans to free speech, association and pri- At his trial, Myrtle Poor Bear testified
vacy." What needs to be determined now, that Marshall had confessed the murder
according to AI, is whether the FBI con- to her. According to the Chief Justice of
tinued its violations against defendants, the South Dakota Supreme Court (which re-
thus sabotaging the basis of a fair trial. fused to grant a retrial), Marshall's de-
The report documents the FBI's production fense was not informed of her "apparently
of false evidence, lies about FBI actions, false affidavits;" her "true relationship
harassment, infiltration of legal defense with the FBI;" nor that her medical histo-
teams by FBI informants and failure to ry "would probably have had a substantial
make available information which the de- effect on her credibility." Medical rec-
fense could have used to win acquittal. ords as well as her family's testimony, he
Two cases highlighted by the report are said, "indicate that Poor Bear is a seri-
those of Elmer Pratt of the Black Panther ously disturbed young woman who often fan-
Party (BPP), and Richard Marshall of the tasizes and tells stories and lies."
American Indian Movement (AIM) - both con- Myrtle Poor Bear has since sworn that her
victed of murder after being targeted by testimony against Marshall was false and
the FBI. Pratt, according to FBI docu- was given only after the FBI threatened
ments, was targeted for "neutralization" her life and that of her daughter.
under COINTELPRO. The report attempts to The U.S. government's admission of Poor
answer the separate question of whether Bear's lack of credibility was confirmed
this "neutralization" continued after when the prosecution failed to call her as
Pratt's arrest. The answer appears to be a witness against Leonard Peltier, even
"yes." FBI documents say that arrests and though her testimony had been used by the
prosecutions are neutralization tech- FBI to extradite Peltier from Canada. Com-
niques. menting on Peltier's extradition, a U.S.
As a COINTELPRO target, Pratt was under appeals court admitted that: "What hap-
constant FBI surveillance. Ironically, pened happened in such a way that it gives
this surveillance could have proved some credence to the claim of the... Indi-
Pratt's innocence. His defense attorneys an people that the United States is will-
argued that FBI surveillance records ing to resort to any tactic in order to
would have shown Pratt to be in Oakland bring somebody back to the United States
on December 18, 1968, the day he alleged- from Canada.... And if they are willing to
ly murdered someone in Santa Monica. At do that, they must be willing to fabricate
first, the FBI said
that
it had
no infor-
mation about Pratt
before
1969.
Subse-
other evidence. And it's no wonder that
[Indian people] are unhappy and disbelieve
quently-released documents showed FBI the things that happened in our courts
surveillance of BPP leaders during 1968. when things like this happen."
The FBI then told an appeals judge that The Amnesty International report makes
"the transcripts of the conversations re- the following recommendations:
corded by these telephone taps have been "1) Amnesty International recommends
lost or destroyed." that the United States Government estab-
During Pratt's trial, the FBI planted lish an independent commission of inquiry
informants into his defense team and did to examine thoroughly and impartially the
not disclose that the chief prosecution matters raised in this report.
witness, Julius Butler, was an FBI "pro- 2) The commission of inquiry should ex-
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amine the effect of the FBI's domestic in- charges. (U.S. officials won't say exactly
telligence program 'COINTELPRO' on crimi- where the leaf comes from, who obtained
nal prosecutions of persons who were 'tar- it, and who analyzed the sample.)
geted' under it. Amnesty International In a detailed article, Science magazine
considers that the case of Elmer Pratt, came to a different conclusion. (10/2/81)
including the role and conduct of the FBI, It says that the three mycotoxins are nat-
should form part of the material studied urally "produced by some but not all spe-
by the commission of inquiry. cies of Fusarium, an extremely common fun-
3) The commission of inquiry should con- gus." Science contacted two Fusarium ex-
sider the conjunction of FBI domestic in- perts who "expressed surprise" at the
telligence investigation of members of the State Department's conclusion: "Fusarium
American Indian Movement with the irregu- is found almost everywhere," and there-
lar and inappropriate FBI conduct in pro- fore, there is a very great likelihood
secutions against them. Amnesty Interna- that Fusarium member species which produce
tional considers that the case of Richard the mycotoxins would be found almost ev-
Marshall, including the role and conduct erywhere, as well - including Southeast
of the FBI, should form part of the mate- Asia. When Science asked Frederick Cecil
rial studied by the commission of inquiry. of the State Department's Office of The-
4) The commission of inquiry should con- ater Military Policy about the Depart-
sider whether the political views of any ment's claim that the mycotoxins don't oc-
citizens, or the FBI's attitude toward cur in Southeast Asia, he replied that "a
those views, have been a factor in prose- search of 3,000 literature references to
cutions or the preparations of cases mycotoxins revealed that none had been re-
against them and, if so, seek ways of pre- ported from Southeast Asia." Commented
venting this from occurring in the fu- Science: "The failure to find any litera-
ture." ture references is obviously a less than
To date, the U.S. government has failed conclusive basis for asserting that 'myco-
,to respond to AI's recommendations. At the toxins do not occur naturally in Southeast
same time, the Reagan administration is Asia."'
moving to weaken the Freedom of Informa- The "less than firm" evidence did not
tion Act which made it possible to docu- deter many U.S. newspapers as well as TV
went FBI and COINTELPRO violations, and and radio stations from running stories on
Reagan has signed a new Executive Order on the Soviet use of "yellow rain." Newsweek
intelligence activities which institution- magazine, for example, was quick to repeat
alizes FBI abuses. - by John KeZZy - State Department assertions that tricho-
thecene is "produced by fungi that don't
grow in Southeast Asia," while the poison
General Hai s Yellow Rain "is common in the Soviet Union." (9/28/81)
On November 10, the State Department an-
nounced it had obtained several more sam-
Against a backdrop of mounting European ples of material from Southeast Asia to
opposition to the military policy of the prove that "yellow rain" was indeed being
Reagan administration, Secretary of State used in Southeast Asia. The New York Times
Alexander Haig declared on September 13, was one of the few media outlets that
1981 in West Berlin that he has "firm evi- dared to question the government's story:
dence" of the Soviet use of biological "There's a serious gap between the weight
warfare agents ("yellow rain") in South- of the evidence and the weight of the
east Asia. The State Department said the charges made by the State Department in
next day that the administration believes the 'yellow rain' affair.... On the basis
it has "good evidence that... three po- of four samples the State Department is
tent mycotoxins of the trichothecene accusing Moscow, through its Vietnamese
group" have been used. These mycotoxins, allies, of using Southeast Asia as a test-
according to the Department's fact sheet, ing ground and thus cheating on interna-
"do not occur naturally in Southeast tional treaties." The State Department ad-
Asia." Therefore, they must have been ap- mits that it received one of the samples
plied to the single leaf sample (allegedly from the mercenary magazine Soldier of
from the "Thai-Cambodian border") upon Fortune. Another sample, according to the
which the State Department based its Times, "is said to have been furnished by
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the Cambodian Communists [apparently the
Pol Pot forces fighting in Cambodia with
Chinese aid]. What company is the depart-
ment keeping? With what certainty can it
assure the public that its samples are
genuine?"
The Times pointed out other State De-
partment inconsistencies. "It told a Sen-
ate committee that the symptoms caused by
trichothecenes in animals match perfectly
those reported by the victims of yellow
rain. But they apparently do not. The de-
partment has said yellow rain is so named
because it patters on rooftops; yet it
does not explain how particles large
enough to patter are also small enough to
breathe." Not surprisingly, the Times
urged a continuing investigation but con-
cluded that statements such as, "We now
have the smoking gun," are inappropriate.
"Jumping the gun is more like it." (11/17/
81).
The yellow rain issue is also being ex-
amined by a United Nations panel of four
experts from Egypt, Peru, Kenya and the
Philippines - all close U.S. allies. The
panel submitted its report in late Novem-
ber 1981 saying that "there was no conclu-
sive evidence to support United States
charges that Soviet-made chemical and bio-
logical weapons had been used in Laos,
Cambodia and Afghanistan." (Charges of So-
viet use of chemical weapons in Afghani-
stan date back to the Carter administra-
tion; see "Chemical Warfare in Afghani-
stan," Counterspy, vol.5 no.1, pp.17-22).
Nevertheless, the U.N. General Assembly
voted on December 9 that the panel should
continue its investigation.
Ironically, the biological and chemical
warfare propaganda campaign was launched
by General Haig. The same Haig was
serving in the U.S. Army in Southeast Asia
in the 1960s when the U.S. was dumping
close to 100,000 tons of chemicals such as
Agent Orange, on Vietnam - the only docu-
mented use of chemical warfare in South-
east Asia. Even before that, there was an-
other disturbing chapter in Haig's career,
linked to biological and chemical warfare.
After graduating from West Point in 1947,
Haig was assigned administrative assistant
and aide to General Douglas MacArthur in
Japan. MacArthur's staff at the time was
involved in what probably is history's
biggest cover-up of biological and chemi-
cal warfare atrocities. The Japanese army,
under Lt. Gen. Ishii Shiro, had developed
a vast arsenal of chemical and biological
weapons - and actually used them against
China and the Soviet Union. Knowledge
about the way these weapons worked was ob-
tained from human experiments. Some of
Ishii's victims, who were killed in the
experiments, were U.S. POWs.
The Soviet Union demanded that Ishii be
brought to trial for his war crimes.
MacArthur and his staff stalled. Ishii had
told them he would work with the U.S.,
further developing his chemical and bio-
logical weapons, in exchange for immunity.
A memo prepared for the State Department
in 1947 argued that "the value to U.S. of
Japanese BW [Biological Weapons] data is
of such importance to national security
as to far outweigh the value accruing from
war crimes prosecution." Another memo by
Dr. Edwin Hill of Camp Detrick, Maryland
praised the Japanese research and stated
that their "information could not be ob-
tained in our own laboratories because of
scruples attached to human experimenta-
tion."
Ishii Shiro never went to trial. His
scientific data on biological and chemical
warfare - considered to be "extremely
valuable" military information - was sent
to Fort Detrick, the U.S. Army's center
for biological warfare. The Japanese and
the U.S. governments, including General
Haig, have covered up this incident since
World War II. (For a detailed description
of this cover-up, and subsequent U.S. bio-
logical and chemical warfare efforts, see
John W. Powell, "Japan's Germ Warfare: The
U.S. Cover-up of a War Crime," Bulletin of
Concerned Asian Scholars, vol.12, no.4,
1980, pp.2-17.) - by Konrad Ege -
Closer to Censorship
Less than four hours before the Senate
packed up for its long holiday recess at
10:30 pm on December 16, the so-called In-
telligence Identities Protection Act was
brought to the floor. It was only stopped
when several Senators thteatened to fili-
buster, urging that the bill be considered
at greater length in the second session
beginning January 25, 1982. Reproduced be-
low is HR4, the version of the Act already
passed by the House of Representatives on
September 23, 1981. The Senate version is
very similar.
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H.R. 4
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That this
Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act".
Sac. 2. (a) The National Security Act of
1947 is amended by adding at the end there-
of the following new title:
"TITLE VI-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
"DISCLOSURE OF IDENTITIES OF CERTAIN UNITED
STATES UNDERCOVER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS,
AGENTS, INFORMANTS, AND SOURCES
"Sac. 601. (a) Whoever, having or having
had authorized access to classified informa-
tion that identifies a covert agent, inten-
tionally discloses any information identify-
ing such covert agent to any individual not
authorized to receive classified information,
knowing that the information disclosed so
Identifies such covert agent -and that the
United States is taking affirmative measures
to conceal such covert agent's intelligence
relationship to the United States, shall be
fined not more than $50,000 or imprisoned
not more than ten years, or both.
"(b) Whoever, as a result of having au-
thorized access to classified information,
learns the identity of a covert agent and in-
tentionally discloses any information identi-
fying such covert agent to any individual
not authorized to receive classified informa-
tion, knowing that the information dis-
closed so identifies such covert agent and
that the United States is taking affirmative
measures to conceal such covert agent's in-
telligence relationship to the United States,
shall be fined not more than $25,000 or im-
prisoned not,more than five years, or both.
"(c) Whoever, in the course of a pattern of
activities intended to identify and expose
covert agents and with reason to believe
that such activities would impair or impede
the foreign intelligence activities of the
United States, discloses any information
that Identifies an individual as a covert
agent to any individual not authorized to re-
ceive classified Information, knowing that
the information disclosed so identifies such
individual and that the United States is
taking affirmative measures to conceal such
Individual's classified intelligence relation-
ship to the United States, shall be fined not
more than $15,000 or imprisoned not more
than three years, or both."
"DEFENSES AND EXCEPTIONS
"SEC. 602. (a) It is a defense to a prosecu-
tion under section 601 that before the com-
mission of the offense with which the de-
fendant is charged, the United States had
publicly acknowledged or revealed the intel-
ligence relationship to the United States of
the individual the disclosure of whose intel-
ligence relationship to the United States is
the basis for the prosecution.
"(bXl) Subject to paragraph (2), no
person other than a person committing an
offense under section 601 shall be subject to
prosecution under such section by virtue of
section 2 or 4 of title 18, United States Code,
or shall be subject to prosecution for con-
spiracy to commit an offense under such
section.
"(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply (A) in
the case of a person who acted in the course
of an effort to identify and expose covert
agents with the Intent to impair or. impede
the foreign Intelligence activities of the
United States by the fact of such identifica-
tion and exposure, or (B) in the case of a
person who has authorized access to classi-
fied information.
"(c) It shall not be an offense under sec-
tion 601 to transmit information described
in such section directly to the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence of the Senate or to
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
gence of the House of Representatives.
"PROCEDURES FOR ESTABLISHING COVER FOR
INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES
SEC. 603. (a) The President shall establish
procedures to ensure that any individual
who is an officer or employee of an intelli.
gence agency, or a member of the Armed
Forces assigned to duty with an intelligence
agency. whose identity as such an officer,
employee, or member is classified informa-
tion and which the United States takes af-
firmative measures to conceal is afforded all
appropriate assistance to ensure that the
Identity of such individual as such an offi-
cer, employee, or member is effectively con-
cealed. Such procedures shall provide that
any department or agency designated by the
President for the purposes of this section
shall provide such assistance as may be de-
termined by the President to be necessary
in order to establish and effectively main-
tain the secrecy of the identity of such indi-
vidual as such an officer, employee, or
member.
"(b) Procedures established by the Presi-
dent pursuant to subsection (a) shall be
exempt from any requirement for publica-
tion or disclosure.
"EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION
"Sac. 604. There is Jurisdiction over an of-
fense under section 601 committed outside
the United States if the individual commit-
ting the offense is a citizen of the United
States or an alien lawfully admitted to the
United States for permanent residence (as
defined in section 101(aX20) of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act).
PROVIDING INFORMATION TO CONGRESS
"SEC. 605. Nothing in this title shall be
construed as authority to withhold Informa-
tion from Congress or from a committee of
either House of Congress.
"(1) The term 'classified information'
means information or material designated
and clearly marked or clearly represented,
pursuant to the provisions of a statute or
Executive order (or a regulation or order
issued pursuant to a statute or Executive
order), as requiring a specific degree of pro-
tection against unauthorized disclosure for
reasons of national security.
"(2) The term 'authorized', when used
with respect to access to classified informs-
tion, means having authority, right, or per-
mission pursuant to the provisions of a stat-
ute, Executive order, directive of the head
of any department of agency engaged in for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence ac?
tivities, order of a United States court, or
provisions of any Rule of the House of Rep-
resentatives or resolution of the Senate
which assigns responsibility within the re-
spective House of Congress for the oversight
of intelligence activities.
"(3) The term 'disclose' means to commu-
nicate, provide, Impart, transmit, transfer,
.convey, publish. or otherwise make availa-
ble.
"(4) The term 'eovert agent' means-
"(A) a present or former officer or em-
ployee of an intelligence agency, or a pres-
ent or former member of the Armed Forces
who is or was assigned to duty with an Intel-
ligence agency-
"(I) whose past or present identity as such
an officer, employee, or member L classified
information, and
"(ti) who is serving outside tiMe United
States or has within the last five years
served outside the United States;
"(B) a United States citizen whose past or
present intelligence relationship to the
United States is classified Information and-
"(I) who resides and acts outside the
United States (or who resided and acted
outside the United States) as an agent of, or
informant or source of operational assist-
ance to. an intelligence agency, or
"(ii) who at the time of the disclosure is or
was at any time acting as an agent of, or in-
formant to, the foreign counterintelligence
or foreign counterterrorism components of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation: or
"(C) an Individual, other than a United
States citizen, whose past or present intelli-
gence relationship to the United States Is
classified and who is a present or former.
agent of, or a present or former Informant
or source of operational assistance to, an in-
telligence agency.
"(5) The term 'intelligence agency' means
the Central Intelligence Agency, the foreign
Intelligence components of the Department
of Defense, or the foreign counterintelli-
gence or foreign counterterrorist compo-
nents of the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion.
"(6) The term 'informant' means any Indi-
vidual who furnishes Information to an in-
telligence agency in the course of a confi-
dential relationship protecting the identity
of such individual from public disclosure.
"(7) The terms 'officer' and 'employee'
have the meanings given such terms by sec-
tions 2104 and 2105, respectively, of title 5,
United States Code.
"(8) The term 'Armed Forces' means the
Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and
Coast Guard.
"(9) The term "United States', when used
in a geographic sense, means all areas under
the territorial sovereignty of the United
States and the Trust Territory of the Pacif-
ic Islands.".
(b) The table of contents at the beginning
of such Act is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following:
"TITLE VI-PROTECTION OF CERTAIN
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
"Sec. 601. Disclosure of identities of certain
United States undercover intelligence
officers, agents. Informants, and
sources.
"Sec. 602. Defenses and exceptions.
"Sec. 603. Procedures for establishing cover
for intelligence officers and employ-
ees.
"Sec. 604. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.
"Sec. 605. Providing information to Con-
gress.
"Sec. 606. Definitiona-",
Numerous constitutional scholars includ-
ing Stephen Saltzberg of the University of
Virginia Law School and Philip Kurland of
the University of Chicago Law School have
said that the Act passed by the House is
8 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
unconstitutional because it violates the
First Amendment. The "Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act" presents an obvious
danger to - it in fact censors - publica-
tions such as CounterSpy. But it does
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more. A careful reading of HR4 shows that in "foreign counterintelligence" opera-
the law doesn't stop at preventing "liter- tions inside the U.S. As absurd as it
ary hitmen" - as some Congresspersons de- might sound, this means that if a member
scribed journalists who identify CIA offi- of a legal political group in the U.S.
cers - from writing. It can be used discovers that an FBI informant has pene-
against any journalist, U.S. citizen and trated the organization and reveals that
foreigners working in the U.S. alike, who information to other members, he or she
writes critically about U.S. intelligence could be committing a crime. The FBI can
activities. simply maintain that the informer was en-
Indeed, HR4 does more than criminalize gaged in a "foreign counterintelligence"
the actual naming of CIA names. The key operation.
phrase is "Whoever... discloses... any in- These two examples, touching only a few
formation that identifies a covert agent." aspects of the "Intelligence Identities
Note that it does not say "whoever names a Protection Act," show how widely the gov-
covert agent," but whoever discloses any ernment would be able to stretch that law.
information that identifies an agent. Thus As California Representative Edwards said,
a story about any CIA operation could be I believe this bill is dangerous not
deemed illegal if the information printed only for what it forbids directly but
allows some readers to draw conclusions also for the precedent it creates. Today
about the identities of CIA agents. For we ban the disclosure of identities. To-
example, the story of CIA aid to the Chil- morrow there will be talk of banning
can newspaper El Mercurio to help desta- disclosures of covert actions themselves
bilize the Allende government would be
illegal since a reader might conclude
that its editor knew of the payments and
therefore, would have been a "source of
operational assistance" (one of the defi-
nitions of covert agent) to the CIA, pro-
tected from identification by the bill.
A little-publicized aspect of HR4 is
that it also illegalizes the identifica-
tion of FBI agents and informers engaged
... If the American people are denied
information, they are denied the power
that the Constitution says resides with
them. Preventing that is what the first
amendment is all about."
Edwards concluded that the "Intelligence
Identities Protection Act" creates an "un-
precedented dilution of the notion of what
constitutes freedom of speech and the
press."
XIV Conference of American Armies:
Preparing for Intervention by Konrad Ege
Immediately after taking office, the Reagan administration also charges that
Reagan administration began to study the Grenada is about to become another center
feasibility of U.S. military actions in of "Cuban subversion," and has taken dras-
Central America and the Caribbean (see tic steps to destabilize Grenada's econo-
Washington Post, 11/13/81). Secretary of my. The U.S. is aggressively lobbying
State Alexander Haig has repeatedly ac- against International Monetary Fund (IMF)
cused Nicaragua of becoming a "totalitari- and European Economic Community loans to
an" state, and of funneling Cuban weapons Grenada. In addition, the Grenadan govern-
to the Salvadoran Farabundo Marti National ment says that the August 1981 U.S. maneu-
Liberation Movement. Cuba is described as vers in the Caribbean warn of possible
"the source" of unrest in Central America, U.S. military actions against Grenada.
and is said to be playing a crucial role As with Grenada, the U.S. has been wag-
in aiding the Salvadoran guerrillas. The ing a two- sided war against Cuba and Nica-
(Konrad Ege is co-editor of CounterSpy
and a freelance journalist.)
ragua - with words, and with actions. At
the December 1981 Organization of American
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States meeting, Haig called on the OAS ber that such a blockade would "neutral-
member nations to take "collective action" ize" the guerrillas, but, he said, El Sal-
against "threats to peace and security vador is not asking for a blockade. In-
from Cuba and Nicaragua." The Washington stead, he said, the decision is up to the
Post quoted an unnamed State Department Reagan administration.
official as saying that "joint contingency Due to public opposition in the U.S. and
planning" by the U.S. and some of its warnings by countries such as Mexico, the
"hemispheric allies" might be an aim of Reagan administration appears to be hesi-
future OAS meetings. "Hemispheric allies" tant to take military steps against any
are presumably Latin America's dictator- country unilaterally. As mentioned, ef-
ships in Chile, Argentina, Guatemala, Uru- forts are being made to bring other Latin
guay, and El Salvador along with Honduras
(now "democratic"), Edward Seaga's Jamaica
and the Christian Democratic Venezuela.
There, are very strong indications that
in the case of Cuba the war of words has
already been transformed into a secret ac-
tual war with biological warfare opera-
tions against Cuba. (See "U.S. Biological
Warfare Against Cuba," CounterSpy, vol.6,
no.1). The Pentagon has been studying a
number of options to be used against Cuba,
including large naval exercises, obstruc-
tion of weapons shipments to Cuba, or a
complete blockade of Cuba (an act of war),
as well as "an invasion by American and
possibly Latin American forces." According
to a New York Times article, several
Latin American countries have been con-
tacted "at high levels in government and
the military and asked if they might join
in any kind of military operations."
The Reagan administration's campaign
against Nicaragua, with General Haig in
the forefront, has been especially vola-
tile. In a November 12 Congressional hear-
ing, Haig explicitly refused to rule out
the use of U.S. military force to defeat
the Nicaraguan revolution. Already, in
violation of U.S. neutrality laws (even
according to the State Department), Nica-
raguan exiles are training in Florida for
a possible invasion of Nicaragua, and the
Reagan administration is doing its best to
destabilize the country economically.
Haig's comments led Rep. Michael Barnes
(D-Md.) to say: "Based on your responses,
if I were a Nicaraguan, I'd be'building
my bomb shelter." The Nicaraguans are not
building bomb shelters; instead they are
building up a large army and peoples' mi-
litia, actions which Haig calls signs of
Nicaraguan aggression. Reportedly, the .
Reagan administration is considering a na-
val blockade of Nicaragua, allegedly to
stop the flow of arms to the FMLN in El
Salvador. Salvadoran Defense Minister Jose
Guillermo Garcia predicted in early Novem-
10 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - Anri.Z 1.982
xlv
CONFERENCE OF AMERICAN ARMIES
WASrNGTON. DC 20310
BOLIVIA
BRAZIL
CHILE
COLOMBIA
GEN Fernando Landazabal Reyes
EL SALVADOR
GUATEMALA
HAITI
PANAMA
PARAGUAY
CANADA
CONDECA
LTG Luis V. Queirolo
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American governments into the anti-Cuba use weapons before they do."
and anti-Nicaragua crusades. The strongest Conference participants agreed that they
indication that some sort of joint opera- had to use all their possibilities "to
tion might be in the offing came when the combat communism." There was much discus-
Pentagon hosted the 14th Conference of sion about whether "communism" was a good
American Armies at Fort Lesley J. McNair, term to use. The conclusion was that the
in Washington, D.C. from November 3 to 5, expression "Marxist subversion" was bet-
1981. The conference, which was attended ter; no mention should be made of "revolu-
by military and intelligence officers from tionaries," all are to be called "terror-
20 countries (Argentina, Barbados, Boliv- ists."
ia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Re- Chilean Defense Minister General
public, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Washington Carrasco Fernandez told his
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Panama, Para- fellow generals that they should combat
guay, Peru, Surinam, Uruguay, the United one ideology with another: "So far we've
States, and Venezuela; observers came from used force only, and it has not worked. To
Canada, Costa Rica and Mexico) was held in kill them is no use, for two arise in the
"strict privacy." place of one. What works is to penetrate
Speeches delivered by U.S. Secretary of the people, to organize courses, to im-
Defense Caspar Weinberger and El Salva- prove the living conditions of the poor so
dor's Jose Garcia were not released to the that they become deaf with regard to 'sub-
press because of "the classified nature of versives."' He followed that up with a
the issues to be addressed." The Nicara- concrete example: "Our wives are working
guan government had requested an invita- voluntarily with communities, teaching wo-
tion to the conference, but conference men how to read, how to sow, and how to
secretary U.S. General Peter Dawkins stat- take care of their children." Carrasco
ed that Nicaragua could not attend because said that the idea is to "give," for exam-
"the attendees must share common perspec- ple, land to landless peasants, so that
tives on security and defense issues of "the communists" can no longer force peo-
mutual interest within the boundaries of ple to "earn" with their labor.
the American hemisphere." One conference General Antonio Ferreira Marques read a
participant stated it more bluntly: "Nica- secret document which described how the
ragua is no more an ally, but a Russian Brazilian security forces were able to
surrogate." He also requested that Nicara- eliminate the communist threat through in-
gua be excluded from the Interamerican De- filtration, dismantling of "subversive nu-
fense Board. clei," and imprisonment. The general said
Counterspy has learned that the issue of that they lost many battles with the guer-
Cuba and Nicaragua being "Russian surro- rillas because they didn't do enough to
gates" was indeed the main topic of the separate the population and the guerrilla.
conference. The conference began with a But, he continued, by now Brazil has
speech by General Edward C. Meyer, Chief learned to infiltrate the groups and use
of Staff of the U.S. Army. Meyer has been local people who know the region, and, he
Chief since June 22, 1979 after serving in claimed, thus has destroyed the guerrilla
Korea and in Vietnam as Division Chief of movements. He stressed continuously that
Staff of the 1st Cavalry Division. Accord- the crucial tactic was to infiltrate poli-
ing to his official biography, Meyer is a tical groups, thereby reducing the use of
former Deputy Commander of the Army War violence to a minimum, and, the general
College, and, while Deputy Chief of Staff added, in order to counter the guerrilla,
of the U.S. Army, Europe, he "was involved the government has to improve the income
in Army actions related to the Arab-Israe- distribution in the country.
li conflict." Meyer introduced the sub- Conference participants repeated con-
ject of the gathering: "To study how to cerns about alleged communist infiltration
fight the Cuban-Soviet invasion of the of various organizations. They said that
Americas." Secretary of Defense Weinberger the World Council of Churches, the Jesuit
followed that up with his theory about So- Order, Amnesty International, grassroots
viet military intentions: he said that Christian communities and barrio associa-
3oviet weapons are not only a psychologi- tions were already infiltrated by Marxist
:al warfare tool but exist to be used; subversives. Salvadoran Defense Minister
herefore, "if it is necessary, we will Garcia also accused the "communists" of
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being responsible for the massacre during ment pass laws to make what he called
the funeral of Archbishop Oscar Romero. "terrorism" a common, and not a political,
Other generals at the meeting voiced their crime.
sympathy with the Salvadoran military and In addition, the conference participants
promised that they would not let El Salva- decided that the Interamerican Police
dor "succumb" into "disgrace." Academy should be moved from Panama to
A number of decisions were made during Honduras. The next Conference of American
the conference: A permanent headquarters Armies is scheduled to be held in Brazil
of the Conference of American Armies is to in 1983. In the meantime, the Reagan ad-
be set up as a clearinghouse and a cen- ministration is using other forums - such
ter will be organized to process data and as the December OAS meeting and the Fifth
improve communications between certain Annual Conference on Caribbean Trade, In-
armies of the Americas. One of the cen- vestment and Development in Miami in late
ter's aims is to make it more difficult November, as well as high-level bilateral
for "subversives" to seek refuge in other governmental and military contacts, to
countries. (One intelligence officer at promote the "anti-subversive" unity of
the conference also asked that the govern- the American armies.
Threatening the Sandinistas
The Reagan administration is conducting and disruptions by unions affiliated with
a massive campaign against Nicaragua the American Institute for Free Labor De-
which, while not an open military or velopment (AIFLD). Despite being discred-
paramilitary attack, could be almost as ited for its CIA connections, AIFLD still
dangerous. Public resistance in the U.S. maintains a presence in Nicaragua. Ex-CIA
to overt action has forced the administra- agent Richard Martinez, who was a labor
tion to authorize the use of covert ac- organizer for AIFLD and the CIA in the
tions, supplemented by massive propaganda early 1960s, mostly in Brazil, recently
and a battery of threats. William Beecher identified one AIFLD representative in
reported in the Boston Globe that the Na- Nicaragua as "a conscious agent" of the
tional Security Council (NSC) has decided CIA.2 Nicaraguan unions which were found-
to "press covert action in Nicaragua and ed with the assistance of AIFLD have gone
El Salvador to infiltrate hostile elements out on strike, prompting the government to
both to gain intelligence and try to de- prohibit strikes. Also, several journal-
stabilize their effectiveness." NSC off i- ists might be counted on to cooperate with
cials did not want to talk about details, the CIA, but Nicaraguan officials, aware
but, ironically, pointed out that "one of of the events in Chile, have made plain
the lessons of Vietnam was that the Viet their willingness to close down such news-
Cong thoroughly infiltrated the South papers.
Vietnamese government and armed forces and In November 1981, Managua newspapers
were able to exploit their inside knowl- published 13 names of U.S. Embassy person-
edge and positions."1 nel~identifying them as CIA officers. The
After the Chilean experience in the ear- Reagan administration protested and called
ly 1970s, it is highly appropriate to ex- it an "act of provocation," but did not
amine what types of covert actions the deny the charges. At about the same time,
U.S. might use against Nicaragua. Given Martinez, former CIA officer Philip Agee
the pluralism of the Nicaraguan government and filmmaker Alan Francovich toured Nica-
and the tensions within it, it is easy to ragua at the government's invitation to
imagine various CIA contacts, recruitments educate Nicaraguans about potential U.S.
and payoffs. CIA contacts with Nicaraguan intervention techniques. In Francovich's
opposition groups to coordinate strategy words, they stressed "how important the
for action are likely. The Chilean opera- internal front is: that an invasion could
tion, it should be recalled, featured pay- not succeed without manipulating the in-
offs, subsidies of friendly newspapers, ternal situation." Francovich showed his
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documentary film about the CIA, "On
Compa-
ny Business" throughout the country.
The London Times later wrote
that
the
"Agee visit features on a long
list
of in-
cidents American officials reel
off
to
show that the Nicaraguans have
only
them-
selves to blame for the latest series of
attacks by senior members of the Reagan
administration.... The list also includes
the repeated closing of the opposition
newspaper, La Prensa; the jailing of four
prominent businessmen...; the banning from
radio and television of sermons by...
Archbishop Obando y Bravo; and the curbs
placed on the Free Labor Movement." Cor-
rectly, the Times added, "the fact that
Sandinist police have also been rounding
up members of the Nicaraguan Communist
Party at the same time as arresting busi-
nessmen is not mentioned ...... 4 The article
fails to note that U.S. pressures on Nica-
ragua and the danger of foreign subversion
have forced these actions.
THE ENDERS PROPOSAL
Still, Thomas Enders, in charge of Latin
American affairs at the State Department
made a set of proposals to Nicaragua in
August as a basis for better relations.
The U.S. offered to enter into a non-ag-
gression pact and to assure "control over
Nicaraguan exile groups in Florida" in re-
turn for "a change in the Sandinist re-
gime's behavior and orientation."5(Enders'
proposal is remarkable given the adminis-
tration's public position that it had no
jurisdiction over the exile training
camps.) The Nicaraguans responded by uni-
laterally vowing not to attack the U.S.,6
but this was not enough for Washington.
The Reagan administration reserved the
right to attack Nicaragua and to loosen
the reins on Nicaraguan exiles unless the
government's "behavior and orientation"
changed.?
Planning for an invasion of Nicaragua -
it least a violation of the U.S. Neutrali-
:y Act - is quite public at a Nicaraguan
axile camp called Campamento Libertad near
[iami, for example. Hector Fabian, the
,ublic information officer at the camp,
tated: "You could say these camps have
een one of the biggest helps given the
icaraguans now fighting for their coun-
ry. They've prepared here, they've train-
d here and now they've gone on to fight
rom third countries and also from Nicara-
gua." Moreover, several Americans, "whom
Fabian later identified as former Green
Berets, were assisting in the training."8
Washington Post writer Don Oberdorfer
reported that the Nicaraguan leadership
took the U.S. pledge to "vigorously en-
force" its neutrality laws in relation to
these camps as "a dud." From the Nicara-
guan point of view, the U.S. " was merely
promising to do what it should be doing
already - enforce its law to stop the
paramilitary training of exile groups....
Earlier in the year, Managua had com-
plained about the exiles and received a
cable from Haig citing some of the same
U.S. laws. But nothing was done about the
exiles."
According to the Boston Globe, among the
actions against Nicaragua approved by the
NSC was a plan to intensify "public rela-
tions efforts at home and abroad to pro-
vide hitherto classified details on what
the Soviets, Cubans and Nicaraguans are
doing in Central America to create a cli-
mate of opinion in which stern action
might be supported." U.S. intelligence re-
ports of the extension of three Nicaraguan
airfield runways, of the training of pi-
lots in Bulgaria, of upcoming shipments of
24 MIGs from Cuba and the creation of a
50,000-person military and a 200,000 per-
son militia are being widely publicized by
the administration.
MILITARY OPTIONS
The U.S. is clearly also keeping the
military option open. Through diplomatic
channels the U.S. is cautioning the Nica-
raguans that they are "playing with fire,"
much as Haig did in his December meeting
with Nicaraguan Foreign Minister Miguel
d'Escoto. At the same time, the NSC has
told the Pentagon "to work up very specif-
ic contingency plans on such things as
quarantines, blockades and military exer-
zises in the event future events - such as
the shipment of combat jets [or tanks] to
Nicaragua - might call for consideration
of a military response."
Unilateral blockades and arms quaran-
tines are.thought to be impossible to exe-
cute successfully. What is worse for mili-
tary planners, they are acts of war. A
more likely possibility is said by
Beecher's sources to be a quarantine of
"something vital to Nicaragua's economic
and military operations, such as petro-
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leum. That would be easier to police and 'to prevent a communist takeover of Cen-
potentially more effective. But it would tral America."' U.S. representatives are
require solid support in the United States said to have been absent from the meeting,
and in the hemisphere and perhaps would but "Latin diplomatic sources" are report-
include the ships of other Latin nations." ed to "point out that the United States
A vote at the OAS meeting of early De- has been closely involved in the recent
cember provided a measure of the support past in efforts at coordination...." Among
that might be available for U.S. sanctions these efforts was U.S. pressure behind the
against Nicaragua. The U.S. persuaded 22 Salvadoran-Honduran peace treaty concluded
of the 29 states voting (four abstained, in December 1980, which ended a decade-
and Mexico, Nicaragua and Grenada opposed long technical state of war and makes
the measure) to back the plan for elec- joint operations possible, and U.S.-Hondu-
tions in El Salvador in March 1982 - im- ran cooperation to practice sealing off
plicitly endorsing U.S. support for the the Salvadoran border.10
Duarte regime.9 The NSC hopes to make it As for Nicaragua, thousands of former
possible for Latin American states to re- soldiers of Somoza's National Guard now
present Nicaragua as a danger to the hemi- live in Honduras. The Honduran government
sphere and thus join in future U.S. sanc- has done little to stop their raids into
tions. However, memories of Cyrus Vance's Nicaragua, and the exiles have publicly
June 1979 proposal that an OAS "peacekeep- expressed their hope for covert military
ing force" intervene in Nicaragua against support from Nicaragua's three neigh
the imminent Sandinista victory over bors.11 At the same time, verbal attacks
Somoza probably remain strong and continue from the three countries have intensified.
to produce conflicting sentiments. Thus Reports of U.S. proposals to Nicaragua
U.S. officials speak of the need for "mul- have included no guarantees to Nicaragua
tilateral" action rather than "OAS action" against attacks from its neighbors or from
against Nicaragua. exiles, although this is the most likely
kind of U.S.-sponsored military action.
REGIONAL COOPERATION The U.S. is insisting that Nicaragua's
military buildup would not be effective
Already there is regional military coop- against the United States and will only
eration among Nicaragua's Central American alarm Nicaragua's neighbors,12 but this
neighbors. There have been numerous re- position ignores the threat posed by its
ports of joint Salvadoran-Honduran opera- neighbors with U.S. backing. Meanwhile,
tions along their common border, and Sal- the U.S. has also placed various economic
vadoran refugees in Honduras are continu- pressures on Nicaragua, but Libya and a
ally harassed by Salvadoran and Honduran number of other. nations have offered large
troops. In late October the Guatemalan loans on generous terms to help with the
President and the Honduran Army Chief of reconstruction.
Staff visited San Salvador on the same The Sandinista government appears ready
day. Although the resulting communique did for the U.S. campaign against Nicaragua
not mention cooperation, a few days before and able to anticipate overt and covert
the meeting "the Army staff chiefs of El actions that will be used against it. Its
Salvador and Guatemala publicly called for confidence that it will succeed in fight-
military 'coordination' among the three ing these pressures has kept Nicaragua
countries." Guatemala's General Benedicto from submitting to ultimatums like the one
Lucas, the president's brother, "urged a Enders reportedly delivered in August:
formal fusion of the three armed forces "There is a fork in the road. One way
Please fill and return to :
AFRIQUE-ASIE,13, rue d'Uzia, 76002 PARIS
NAME :..........................................................................
Firstname :....................................................................
Address : .......................................................................
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leads to accomodation, the other to sepa- 3) ibid.
ration. We are afraid you may be too far 4) The Times (London), 11/26/81, p.10.
advanced on the wrong road." As junta 5) Tb-id
Nightline, 12/4/81.
leader Daniel Ortega told the State Legis- 7) For a summary of private U.S.-Nicaraguan talks
lative Council in Nicaragua on December 6: during September and October 1981 see Washington
"We do not accept the door that the Ameri- Post (WP), 12/10/81, pp.A-1, A-12.
cans are opening for us because [it] is 8) Ronnie Lovier, "Training for the Counterrevolu-
too small... so small that in order to tion," The Nation, 9/26/81, pp.265-268.
9) WP, 12/9/81, p.A-18.
pass through it, we would have to do it on 10) WP, 10/27/81, p.A-11; see also New York Times
our knees and we are not going to do (NYT), 10/2/81, p.A-5; 10/8/81, p.A-B; 10 11/81,
that." 13 - J.K. and J.M. - 11) NYT, 4/2/81, p.A-3.
FOOTNOTES 12) c? supra, V.
1) Boston Globe, 12/4/81, p.11. 13) ibid.
2) The Guardian (New York), 12/2/81, p.13.
Greece: The Long Road to Freedom
by Alexis Serreas
The October 18, 1981 parliamentary elec- of Greek society and the shortcomings of
tions in Greece represent more than a rou- the Greek government, together with the
tine change in government: they open the constellation of international relations
prospects for deep political and social in 1946 and 1947, made Communist revolu-
change. The elections gave the Socialist tion possible, indeed probable. But the
Party, PASOK, 48 percent of the vote, and injection of a massive new force, United
the Communist Party, KKE, 11 percent, and States aid, changed the direction of
left the former governing, rightwing party events and prevented that consumation."1
"New Democracy," with only 35 percent. From then on, successive U.S. governments
This sweeping electoral victory of the have intervened unscrupulously in Greece
Left, wishfully branded "surprising" by whenever they saw their interests threat-
the mainstream media in the U.S., was all ened in any way. The new Greek government
but expected in Greece. of Andreas Papandreou has to confront
this legacy, and, it appears, is moving
THE LEGACY OF U.S. INTERVENTION carefully in order to avoid a recurrence
of the defeat of a progressive movement.
It is impossible to understand Greek Greece has been a NATO member since
politics without taking into consideration 1952, and in 1953 the U.S. and Greece
a long history of U.S. intervention in signed the "Agreement Between the U.S. and
Greece. In fact, this intervention has the Kingdom of Greece Concerning Military
been the decisive factor in post-World War Facilities." This neo-colonial agreement
II Greece. The military defeat of the Left and its amendments allowed the U.S. gov-
in the Greek Civil War (1945 to 1949) can ernment to establish military bases on
be attributed directly to a massive infu- Greek territory at its discretion, to use
sion of U.S. economic and military aid un- Greek resources (such as communications
der the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This doc- and transportation facilities) to support
trine, which in fact institutionalized these bases, and to station U.S. military
U.S. intervention, was promulgated by and technical personnel there who enjoy
President Harry Truman even though he ad- extensive privileges such as tax exemp-
mitted that the Greek regime receiving tions, jurisdictional immunity from the
U.S. aid was repressive. Greek legal system, etc.2
The role of the U.S. in the defeat of
the Left was described with cynical can- Al(exis Serreas is a Greek living in the
U. S.
'ism-_
7T C ., .."l....'..r. ""Th'e'
t..r
b
ss
n
e
y
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In 1963, the Center Union (EK) party,
led by George Papandreou (father of the
present Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou)
won 42 percent of the vote, in spite of
widespread electoral fraud and rightwing
terror. New elections were held the fol-
lowing year, and EK won 53 percent and the
absolute majority in the Parliament. Upon
assuming office, the Papandreou government
attempted certain liberal reforms which
did not challenge U.S. military and eco-
nomic interests. The EK didn't even ad-
dress the question of Greece leaving NATO
or U.S. bases being closed. Nevertheless,
the prime minister's attempt to entrust
the Ministry of Defense to a person of his
choice moved the U.S. to initiate destabi-
lization of the centrist government.
In 1965, CIA Chief of Station in Greece,
John Maury became "directly involved in
Greek politics. He was reported to have
helped King Constantine buy Deputies of
the Greek Center Union Party, thus bring-
ing about the downfall of the Government
of George Papandreou" in 1965.3 (Maury is
now president of the Association of Former
Intelligence Officers and one of the main
promoters of the so-called Intelligence
Identities Protection Act. In fact,
Maury's conduct in Greece demonstrates why
the Act should not be made law.) A chain
of King-appointed, short-lived governments
was broken by the military-fascist coup of
April 21, 1967. The direct role of the
U.S. in the establishment and support of
the Greek junta is well-documented. The
dictatorship finally collapsed during the
1974 Cyprus crisis, but only after
eight years of bloody and repressive rule.
"New Democracy," the rightwing party
that controlled an absolute majority in
the Parliament from 1974 to 1981, proved
incapable of solving the tremendous prob-
lems plaguing the working people of
Greece. This is not surprising, as subser-
vience to NATO and U.S. corporate inter-
ests - the very causes of such problems -
was the essence of that party's policy.
"Greece belongs to the West," declared
then-Prime Minister Constantine
Karamanlis, the leader of "New Democracy,"
in his address to the Parliament on Octo-
16, 1975.4 With the defeat of "New Democ-
racy," this submission is now being chal-
lenged.
Three
ernment
main tasks confront the
and the Greek Left: the
a genuinely independent foreign
fundamental changes in the economic struc-
ture designed to benefit the working peo-
ple of the country, and the democratiza-
tion of social life. Of course, these
three tasks cannot be achieved in isola-
tion from each other. Meaningful economic
changes are inconceivable so long as
Greece remains attached to the economic
and strategic role assigned to it by NATO
and the European Common Market. Nor are
such economic changes attainable without
the active participation and involvement
of the working people, i.e. without democ-
ratization of social life.
The first and foremost step in the pur-
suit of an independent foreign policy is
the withdrawal of Greece from NATO and the
dismantling of U.S. military bases. Greece
has been a most "loyal" NATO member until
1974, when troops of Turkey, another NATO
member, invaded the Republic of Cyprus,
occupying almost half of its territory.
(80 percent of the people on Cyprus are
Greek, 20 percent Turkish.) Even the
staunchest Western apologists could not
explain to the Greek people what kind of
"protection" NATO offered their fellow
Greeks in Cyprus. Hence, the rightwing
civilian government that took office imme-
diately after the collapse of the military
junta in 1974 was forced to announce the
withdrawal of Greece from the military
wing of NATO. Greece never withdrew, how-
ever, from the political
the Greek army continued
NATO exercises.
wing of NATO, and
to participate in
In 1980 Greece resumed its previous
"normal" relationship with NATO, formally
rejoining the military wing. Pretenses
aside, the hastiness with which this deal,
the "Rogers Plan," was arranged, the se-
crecy of the terms, and its timing -
shortly before the elections - suggest
that it was designed to present the next
government (whose character was anticipat-
ed) with a set situation and to raise ob-
stacles to total withdrawal of Greece from
NATO.
Although PASOK has in the past called
for the withdrawal of Greece from NATO,
the government program presented to the
Parliament by Papandreou on November 22
contained no such call. The program de-
nounced the Rogers Plan as "harmful to
[the] national interests" of Greece and
pursuit of. that Plan.5 This statement, however, is
policy, quite vague as it rejects the specific
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conditions of the Rogers Plan but does not MAJOR U.S. MILITARY BASES IN GREECE
preclude the acceptance of some other (Source: Congressional Research Service)
plan. Finally, it does not address Greek
participation in the political wing of
NATO. Because of this, KKE abstained from
the vote on the government program.
Papandreou's actions at a NATO defense
ministers' meeting in Brussels in early
December were equally ambiguous. On one
hand, Papandreou blocked the issuing of a
final communique - usually a routine event
- demanding that NATO guarantee the safety
of Greek borders against fellow NATO mem-
ber Turkey. Not surprisingly, the minis-
ters refused to go along with that demand.
On the other hand, Papandreou's announce-
ment of Greece's "partial suspension" of
NATO commitments at the meeting was vague,
so vague that some NATO officials appar-
ently dismissed it as "diplomatic grand-
standing." Meanwhile, almost half a mil-
lion people demonstrated in Greece for
disarmament and against U.S. bases in the
country on December 6.
REMOVE THE BASES
70 :8
BULGARIA?~~ Sea
I aSea
YUGOSLAVIA
~
^
~\
Papandreou's plans to remove U.S. mili-
tary bases are likely to encounter great
obstacles. Most of these are not directly
related to NATO but stem from bilateral
U.S.-Greek agreements. The removal of the
bases will have to be negotiated separate-
ly from Greece's withdrawal from NATO.
Among the numerous U.S. bases in Greece
are: 1) a naval base in Eleusis (Piraeus)
near Athens; 2) Souda Naval Base on Crete;
"a large and convenient anchorage [which]
allows the United States to project the
Sixth Fleet far into the eastern Mediter-
ranean." The Souda base "would be diffi-
cult to replace," and includes a missile
firing installation used by NATO. Nuclear
weapons are also stored at Souda; 3) Hel-
lenikon Air Base, also on Crete, which
serves as a base for U.S. intelligence
surveillance in the eastern Mediterranean]
4) Iraklion Air Station, a "major elec-
tronic surveillance station;" and 5) the
Fleet Communication System Center at Nea
Makri, especially important for the Sixth
Fleet. According to the Athens daily Ta
Nea (February 22 to 24, 1978), the CIA has
also been using Nea Makri as a base of op-
erations.6
The existence of U.S. bases constitutes
a danger to the Greek people for a number
of reasons. These bases were used by the
NaNionW -
-.CRETE
U.S. to intervene in the October 1973 war
in the Middle East. According to a conser-
vative Greek newspaper, the Greek govern-
ment "imperiled the good relations between
Greece and the Arabs, by secretly allowing
the Americans to use... bases in Greece
for transporting equipment to Israel dur-
ing the Arab-Israeli war.... Greece also
allowed U.S. intelligence to use a commu-
nications station outside Athens in order?
to tap Soviet and Arab radio broadcasts."
The bases make the country a military tar-
get even in a conflict in which Greece is
not directly involved. Their existence al-
so requires a Greek government friendly
toward the U.S. Therefore, the bases
might pose a threat to a government such
as PASOK. Finally, they are sources of so-
cial pollution. The areas where the bases
are located have become centers of corrup-
tion, characterized by a rising crime
rate, increased prostitution, drug traffic
etc., involving U.S. military personnel.
Prime Minister Papandreou announced that
base negotiations will begin early in
1982. He said that the negotiations will
set a timetable for the removal of the
bases, but he did not name a deadline. He
added that until the bases are removed,
they will operate under the following re-
strictions:
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a) [Greek] control and supervision of
their activities.
b) Yearly revision and potential termi-
nation of the relevant agreements, so
that the national interests of Greece
are guaranteed.
c) Suspension of the bases' activity
when the security of Greece or the
country's relations with other friend-
ly countries in the region is at stake.8
These are certainly positive measures, but
they are somewhat vague and, most impor-
tantly, their implementation is yet to be
seen. How the Greek government will be
able to control, let alone to suspend, the
activities of the bases is not at all
clear, and Papandreou's speech shed no
light on the question. At the same time,
concrete statements have been made. "Re-
moval of nuclear weapons will be one of
our first demands in the talks on the U.S.
bases," said Dimitri Maroudas, a PASOK
spokesperson in a press conference on No-
vember 11. He also indicated that the
Greek government favors the idea of nucle-
ar-free Balkans. This statement came
shortly after Bulgaria's President Todor
Zhivkov proposed a Balkan summit on the
issue, a proposal that now has some
chances of being implemented.
CYPRUS
prus, Archbishop Makarios, and to over-
throw the legitimate government. Under the
pretext of "restoring the legal order,"
the Turkish army invaded the island, occu-
pying about 40 percent of the land. and
forcing 200,000 Greek Cypriots (almost 40
percent of the island's population) into
refugee camps in the southern, unoccupied
part of the country. Following the col-
lapse of the junta in Greece and their
puppets in Cyprus, the legitimate govern-
ment of Cyprus was restored, but the Turk-
ish army still controls 40 percent of the
island. It seems clear that the objective
of the U.S. and NATO militarists is the de
facto partitioning of Cyprus by the insti-
tutionalization of the Turkish military
presence.
The former Greek government dealt with
this issue as an internal NATO "family"
dispute, diminishing the role of the Unit-
ed Nations in its solution and essentially
refusing to use the support offered by the
socialist and non-aligned countries in re-
solving the Cyprus problem. The main in-
gredients of the solution are: recognition
of the central government as the legiti-
mate political power in Cyprus; withdrawal
of all foreign troops; and return of the
refugees to their homes. These aims were
adopted in the PASOK government program
presented to the Parliament on November
22, 1981.
Another major foreign policy question is
the issue of Cyprus. The Republic of Cy-
prus, a sovereign state since it gained
its independence from Britain in 1953, has
been an active member of the non-aligned
movement. The island of Cyprus, strategi-
cally situated at the conjunction of Eu-
rope, Asia and Africa, is an ideal loca-
tion to base U.S. forces policing the Mid-
dle East. The political orientation of
that country, however, ruled out this pos-
sibility. The U.S. and NATO goal is to
partition the island between Greece and
Turkey. Both of these countries are NATO
members and have agreements with the U.S.
allowing the establishment of military
bases on their territory. Both Greek and
Turkish rightwing terrorists, in line with
this U.S. and NATO policy, have been try-
ing for over twenty years,by-and-large un-
successfully, to divide the two ethnic
communities of the island.
In July 1974, a coup inspired, plotted,
and executed by the Greek military junta,
attempted to murder the president of Cy-
18 -- Counterspy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
GREECE AND EUROPE
Another critical foreign policy issue,
directly affecting domestic economic poli-
cy, is the question of the relations of
Greece to the European Economic Community
(EEC), an organization "uniting" the West-
ern European industrial countries. When
the economic crisis of the mid-1970s hit
the capitalist European countries, the EEC
changed its exclusionist policy. The new
strategy - designed to mellow down the
crisis for the industrially advanced coun-
tries by shifting part of the burden to
others - was to bring in the less develop-
ed capitalist countries: Greece, Turkey,
Spain and Portugal. Greece was the first
(and so far the only) to join, becoming
the tenth member of the EEC in 1980. The
consequences of that move, even in the
short time that has elapsed, have been de-
vastating. Greek industry cannot compete
with the much more developed Western Euro-
pean countries within the framework of the
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EEC. Agriculture is in a state of chaos as
Greek peasants are forced to abandon tra-
ditional crops to conform to the stipula-
tions of the "Common Agricultural Policy"
dictated by the EEC.
Both major Left parties, PASOK and KKE,
are opposed to the participation of Greece
in the EEC and campaigned on anti-EEC
platforms in the recent elections. In his
pronouncement of the government program,
Papandreou stated: "Our goal is to hold a
referendum... for the Greek people to de-
cide on this serious issue. " He pointed
out, however, that calling for a referen-
dum lies within the power of the president
of the country, a position held by the
leader of "New Democracy," Karamanlis. The
president of Greece, an office endowed
with extraordinary constitutional and law-
making powers, is not elected by direct
vote, but through the Parliament.
Karamanlis was elected president in 1980
for a five-year term. It is highly unlike-
ly that Karamanlis - the architect of the
previous government's pro-EEC policy -
would call a referendum.
Greece is facing a critical period. The
electoral victory of the Left and the for-
mation of a progressive government by
PASOK, may be the seeds of much-needed po-
litical and social. change that would end
Western domination and create a society
catering to the needs of the Greek people
and not the greed of multinational corpo-
rations or the strategic interests of the
U.S. and NATO. The meaning of the vote
cast on October 18 is that the Greek peo-
ple desire, indeed demand, a progressive
reorientation of their country. The mili-
tary coup of 1967 and CIA activities to
destabilize the liberal government of
Andreas Papandreou's father demonstrate
that PASOK's task is enormous.
FOOTNOTES
1) W. H. McNeill, Greece: American Aid in Action
1947-1949, The Twentieth Century Fund, New York,
1957, p.32.
2) The full text of these agreements can be found
in: T. A. Couloumbis, Greek Political Reaction to
American and NATO Influences, Yale University Press,
1966, Appendix C, pp.222-227.
3) R. F. Grimmett, Reported Foreign and Domestic
Covert Operations of the United States Central In-
telligence Agency: 1950-1974, Congressional Research
Service, Library of Congress, 2/18/75, p.9.
4) Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, November 1975, p.73.
5) Ta Nea, 11/23/81.
6) Turkey, Greece and NATO: The Strained Alliance,
A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions, U.S. Senate, March 1980, p.9. See also M.
Argyris, "The Bases of Death," Kommounistiki.Ei-
theorisi, January 1975, pp.5-12.
7) Akropolis, 8/27/74.
8) Ta Nea, 11/23/81.
9) ibid.
Jurgen Roth Interview
Turkish Fascism as NATO Democracy
The September 12, 1980 military coup in
NATO member country Turkey, led by General
Kenan Evren got, as the Wall Street Jour-
nal commented, "relatively good" press
coverage in the U.S. and in Western Eu-
rope. The Economist, mouthpiece of Euro-
pean capital, grudgingly conceded that the
coup may be "regrettable" because NATO is
"morally weakened when the democratically
elected government of a member country is
forcibly overthrown," but then praised the
Generals for moving to eliminate "terror-
ism," and giving the country one more
chance to become stable. Newsweek intro-
duced the Generals as "benevolent despots"
and labeled Fvren "Turkey's Father Fig-
ure." Such uncritical coverage by the
Western media is hardly a new phenomenon.
It closely resembles press treatment of
Turkey's two previous coups in 1960 and
1971.
Reality for many Turkish people, as
described in the following interview with
West German journalist, Jiirgen Roth, is
quite different, and has been for some
time. The first military takeover, led by
General Cemal Gursel on May 27, 1960, fol-
lowed a wave of student unrest and econom-
ic instability, partly caused by the de-
valuation of the Turkish lira. One of
Gursel's first post-coup actions was to
dispatch a colonel to U.S. Ambassador
Warren Fletcher with the assurance that he
intended "to build a Turkey on the model
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of the U.S." (A secret 1961 State Depart-
ment report had characterized Gursel as
"strongly pro-Western.")
The Turkish Generals instituted a new
and relatively liberal constitution, but
at the same time, on U.S. advice, they
founded the Mutual Aid Society (OYAK).
OYAK began as an inconspicuous society,
financed by officers' salaries, popular
"donations" and, at times, the U.S. gov-
ernment. It has now developed into one of
Turkey's largest holding companies, tying
the military firmly to the corporate rich
and foreign multinationals. Today, OYAK
controls virtually the entire insurance
sector and much of the armaments and auto
industries. (It owns 42 percent of Renault
Turkey and 87 percent of International
Harvester Co. in Turkey.)
The late 1960s saw an upsurge of opposi-
tion to an economic policy which left ba-
sic needs of many workers and peasants un-
met, and to Turkey's dependence on NATO.
Protests were countered with government
repression and terror from the Right.
During this time, the MHP (see glossary)
founded the first training camps for its
commandos - the-Grey Wolves - while the
CIA and the U.S. Green Berets began to
train the Counter-Guerrilla, a secret ter-
ror organization consisting of members of
the military, police and MIT. The Coun-
ter-Guerrilla was headquartered in Ankara
in the same building that housed the U.S.
military mission.
In collaboration with the Grey Wolves,
the Counter-Guerrilla was responsible for
numerous acts of terrorism which preceded
the March 12, 1971 military takeover.
This coup, accompanied by mass arrests and
torture, was directed against the left
movement which had voiced strong opposi-
tion both to an economic policy devastat-
ing for workers and to the ruling AP's
threats to scuttle certain liberal sec-
tions of the constitution. The coup,
which according to Roth was "basically...
planned by the intelligence agencies CIA
and MIT," was to prevent the Left from
taking power.
The 1973 elections, after two years of
military rule, brought the CHP to power in
a coalition government. Bulent Ecevit's
rule was short-lived. He called for new
elections in 1975 and lost, largely due to
his inability to deliver on economic prom-
ises. A National Front (NF) coalition
government, led by the AP-and MHP, came to
20 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
GLOSSARY
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican
People's Party. Originally a party of
landowners, government employees and
local bourgeoisie, but since 1967 open
to the Left. Member of Socialist Inter-
national; promotes modified capitalism;
favors NATO with reservations; party
base more militant than leadership.
President: BUlent Ecevit.
AP Adalet Partisi, Justice Party. Par-
ty of large landowners; represents in-
terests of rural and urban bourgeoisie.
Favors foreign investment, NATO member-
ship and free enterprise; calls on all
"nationalists" to work against the
Left; before coup advocated stronger
"security measures" and special courts.
President: Suleyman Demirel.
MHP Milliyetci Hareket Partisi, Nation-
alist Movement Party. Nazi-type fascist
party. Members come from the petit
bourgeoisie, some landless peasants,
some unemployed. Managed to infiltrate
many members into government posts and
security services in the 1970s; con-
trols organized death squads (Grey
Wolves) and militant "Idealist Youth."
Advocates "reunification of all Turks"
from Saloniki to Western China.
Leader: Alparslan Turkey.
DISK Confederation of Revolutionary
Unions. Founded in 1967; close to
CHP; influenced by Communist Party
(illegal) and other left organiza-
tions. Approximately one million mem-
bers.
TURK-IS Confederation of Labor Unions.
Founded in 1952 with guidance from
American Federation of Labor official
and CIA agent, Irving Brown; strong
ties with Asian-American Free Labor
Institute. Was not outlawed after
coup. Approximately 1.5 million mem-
bers.
MISK Confederation of Nationalist Labor
Unions. Controlled by MHP; less than
100,000 members.
MIT Milli Istihbarat Teskilati. Turkish
Intelligence Agency.
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power with Siileyman Demirel as Prime Min- of the West], coauthored by Brigitte
ister and Alparslan Tiirkes as his deputy. Heinrich, (Reinbek, West Germany: Rororo
They ruled until June 1977. In those two Verlag, 1973) and Die Turkei - Republik
years, the government openly sanctioned unter Wolf en [Turkey - A Republic Ruled by
the terror of the Grey Wolves and sup- Wolves], coauthored by Kamil Taylan (Born-
pressed the left opposition. Turkes used helm, West Germany: Lamuv Verlag, 1981)-.
his post to infiltrate many MHP members The Turkish daily Cumhuriyet has described
into high positions in the security ser- Roth as the "person most knowledgeable
vices and the military. about Turkish politics." His coauthor,
When it became apparent that the NF gov- Taylan, formerly worked for the Turkish
ernment was unable to improve the living daily, Demokrat, which has been outlawed
conditions in Turkey (foreign debt in 1977 since the 1980 coup. The sidebars in the
was $15 billion, unemployment 20 percent, interview are translated excerpts from
and inflation around 70 percent), and Die Tiirkei - Republik unter W61fen.
therefore would fall sooner or later, the
MHP changed its tactics. The Grey Wolves CounterSpy: It's been more than a year
had previously concentrated their terror since the military coup in Turkey. What
on their political opponents. Now they - has it meant for the everyday lives of the
determined to create a civil war-type sit- people?
uation which would allow the military to Jurgen Roth: One change has been that
seize power again. Ecevit, reelected in the so-called "terrorism" has actually all
1978, could not stop the wave of indis- but stopped. However, what the Turkish
criminate terror, and the number of peo- Generals call terrorism is not what people
ple killed rose from 30 per month in 1977 in other countries would Zabel terrorism.
to 70 per month in 1978. It is not limited to violent actions by
After the by-elections in October 1979, politically motivated, isolated individu-
Demirel was in again. His leadership was ale, but includes, for example, distribut-
backed by the MHP, and he "cleaned out" ing leaflets, putting up posters, partici-
the government, removing suspected left- pating in demonstrations and strikes, or
ists from their posts. He worked with the advocating self-determination for the
Grey Wolves to suppress a rising workers' Kurds. After the military coup all such
movement led by DISK, and bowed to Inter- "terrorist" activities were outlawed, and
national Monetary Fund (IMF) pressure in I think that's the way things will stay
shaping his economic policy. However, it for many years to come. If there is a re-
soon became apparent that popular resis- turn to democracy as promised by the Gen-
tance would not allow Demirel to push eraZs, it will be a very autocratic "de-
through his cutthroat IMF-required pro- mocracy" with at best two political
gram: cuts in social spending, devalua- parties who are in basic agreement with
tion of the lira (which in itself created the Generals. Opposition to the capitalist
a 50 percent inflation rate), elimination economic system in Turkey and to Turkey's
of subsidies to small enterprises, opening close alliance with the United States will
the country to foreign investment, and remain illegal. The Constitutional Assem-
massive layoffs in government-owned facto- bZy, founded in October 1981, is a good
ries. example of the type of "democracy" Turkish
To institute his economic program, people will be allowed to have. It con-
Demirel would have to crush all opposi- sists of politicians and technocrats whose
tion. And that could only be done if an- political ideology, without exception, is
other military coup was staged to trans- right-of-center. And right-of-center in
form Turkey into a country ruled by fas- Turkey would be considered extreme-right
cism. This coup took place on September in Western Europe.
12, 1980, and since then Turkey has been Other regressive changes made possible
ruled by a military dictatorship. by the military coup are in the economic
CounterSpy interviewed Jurgen Roth in field. Presently, the economic model of
Frankfurt in early November 1981. Roth is Milton Friedman is being adopted by Tur-
an independent journalist who has written key. Without the coup this economic model
two books on Turkey: Partner Turkei oder could never have been forced upon the
Foltern fur die Freiheit des Westens [Our country. That was acknowledged even by the
Partner Turkey, or Torture for the Freedom OECD [Organization for Economic Coopera-
CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982 -- 21
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tion and Development] officer in charge of
Europe.
Whose interests does the present govern-
ment represent?
The Generals are not, as is often said,
politically independent. Instead, they are
tied to the capitalist system. The Gener-
als are representatives of monopoly capi-
talism, the faction of capitalists in Tur-
key which works closely with multinational
corporations, especially. from West Germa-
ny, the U.S., and Switzerland. Because of
that they have a strong self-interest in
the, execution of the Milton Friedman eco-
nomic program in spite of the fact that it
benefits only a miniscule sector of soci-
ety.
Wfhy did the coup take place in September
1980? Are there reasons why it came at
that specific time?
The official reason given by the Gener-
als is known: rising terrorism. It's obvi-
ous that the military felt threatened by a
rising leftist movement, and they felt
they couldn't wait much longer. For in-
stance, the Turkish labor federation DISK
was planning a general strike at the time
of the coup, and this strike was a poZiti-
cal one, directed against political re-
pression by the Demirel government and
against high inflation and social injus-
tice.
At the same time there were external
22 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982
factors. One of them, naturally, was Af-
ghanistan and another was Iran, where an
important Western stronghold had fallen.
Turkey, with its geostrategic position,
has been one of the few countries which is
able to represent U.S. and NATO interests
in Third World countries, especially in
the Middle East. The very unstable inter-
nal situation in Turkey presented a prob-
lem for NATO in that respect. Even before
the coup, NATO could no longer count on
Turkey as a reliable ally. A military in-
tervention had become necessary to stabi-
lize the country in the interests of West-
ern imperialism.
Are there any indications that NATO
countries were directly involved in the
coup?
There was certainly an indirect involve-
ment, but it is hard to prove that they
intervened directly in the coup itself.
However, I don't think it is a coincidence
that a high-ranking State Department offi-
cer, John Williams,, (whom I met in Brussels
at a conference of the Friedrich Ebert
Foundation) was in Ankara at the time of
the coup. Before that, he just happened to
be in Athens at the time of the military
coup there, and in Turkey at the time of
the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. More im-
portant, however, is the fact that the
U.S. played a key role in the creation of
a climate that allowed the coup to take
place.
How was that climate created?
Terrorism in Turkey before the coup was
mainly the work of the extreme right and
the so=called Counter-Guerrilla, a mili-
tary organization trained by CIA officers.
This Counter-Guerrilla created instabiZi-
ty, and the Generals, likewise trained in
the U.S., used that terrorism as a reason
for staging a coup.
Actually, it all began well over ten
years ago. There was a military coup in
1971 which had a structure very similar to
the 1980 coup. At that time leading poli-
ticians declared that it had been Zed by
the CIA. There is the statement by a for-
mer Turkish foreign minister, and even the
former Prime Minister, Bulent Ecevit, said
that "foreign powers" played a role in the
coup. The foreign power in Turkey at the
time was, of course, the United States.
The preparation for the 1980 coup began
way back in 1974 and utilized two tools.
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Counter-Guerrilla are attempts at reform within the coun-
try. These camouflaged attacks... are at
times civil wars, at times uprisings, but
The Counter-Guerrilla originated in the also democratic and reformist movements.
Department of Special Warfare of the It is our intention to prevent the rise
Turkish General Staff. Only very loyal of these movements.... For our security
officers belong to this department. Their and the security of other non-communist
training generally begins in the U.S. and countries, we have to support friendly
then continues inside Turkey under the governments... through armed actions."
direction of CIA officers and military (D. Gallula, as quoted in Emin Deger, CIA
"advisors." From 1968 to 1971, U.S. Green Konter-Gerilla ve Turkiye, Ankara, 1977,
Berets trained members of the Counter- p.595.)
Guerrilla in the wooded mountain region Another important training document was
of Bolu. The Kurds in the eastern prov- drafted by Cahit Vural, a member of the
inces were the first victims of these Ankara Counter-Guerrilla and a leading
U.S.-trained commandos. During the early theoretician.... His publication, Intro-
1970s, "special commandos" attacked Kurd- duction to the Guerrilla, is being used
ish villages in remote mountain regions as a guide by the Turkish General Staff
... with increasing frequency. Commandos ... and includes the following chapters:
searched houses, frequently tortured Destruction and Propaganda, Agents, Agent
their inhabitants and then moved on. Provocateurs, Production of Bombs, Guer-
One of the most important educational rilla in the Countryside, Interrogation
materials for Counter-Guerrilla training and Infiltration of a Guerrilla Organiza-
is a book written by CIA officer David tion.... The book is marked, "For Offi-
Gallula, Repression of Popular Uprisings, cial Use Only" and claims that the use of
Theory and Praxis. It was translated by armed provocateurs grew out of experience
the Turkish General Staff in 1965, print- with the urban guerrilla all over the
ed with a press run of 1,750 copies and world. "In large cities agent provoca-
distributed within the military. In this tears are used in the universities, fac
CIA book, Gallula writes [retranslation tories, educational centers and in indus-
into English]: "Our security isn't trial production.... These agents use de-
threatened just by external attacks. In struction, provocations, even assassina-
addition, there are other threats which tions and robberies as tools to achieve
are much more dangerous. These threats their goals."
one was the Counter-Guerrilla which car- from reaching power by any means. They
ried out terrorist actions that were then used the death squads - the arrowhead of
blamed on the Zeft. I don't want to ex- rightwing reaction - the Counter-GuerriZ-
cZude that ultra-left factions were carry- la, and finally repression carried out by
ing out terrorist acts too, but often when the government of Demirel who is known as
bombings and shootings were blamed on the a close friend of the West.
left, it was in reality the Counter-Guer-
rilla that was responsible. But now, at least officially, the mili-
The second tool was the assistance given tary government is moving against the
to the extreme right movement, the MHP of right as well as the left. Alparslan
AZparslan Turkes. It is known that leading Turkes himself is on trial.
MHP members regularly visited the U.S. Em- It is true that for foreign consumption
bassy in Ankara, and a number of Turkish the military is moving against both the
newspapers reported that CIA officers took right and the left. However, according to
part in terrorist activities. The MHP, a the communiques of the military commanders
fascist organization with death squads, in all cities, about eighty percent of all
was the most important factor in the crea- actions are against the left. The simple
tion of the civil war-type atmosphere be- reason for that is that many of the goals
fore the coup. This rightwing terrorism of the rightwing MHP and the military are
was destined to crush the anti-imperialist the same. Before the coup it was Turkes'
movement, or - as the MHP and the Generals greatest desire to establish a military
say - communism. It was in the interests government to fight "communism." Now that
of NATO and the 11. S. to prevent the left is exactly what the Generals did, but, un-
CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982 -- 23
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MHP ... describes the ideology of the MHP and
its commandos: "National Socialism, whose
realization [the MHP] promotes under the
The MHP's philosophy is illustrated cover of Turkism, aims to eliminate de-
best by this excerpt from their party or- mocracy. The Turkish National Socialists
gan, Orta Dogu: ... We want Turkey to be (Turanists) are intensifying their activ-
a country cured from all diseases, a ities in our country daily.... The real
country whose people are increasing in aims of the Turanists can be summed up in
number, and a country with improved mo- three points: 1) to wear out the govern-
rale and industry. We want to save the
or-
brothers of our race abroad. The reunion ment, using commandos and armed youth or-
ganizations as well as propaganda cam-
of the Turkish Nation with its glorious paigns, and then to take power as the Na-
history... is frightening to many other zis did in Germany; 2) to introduce Na-
countries, because this rebuilding is op- tional Socialist ideology to Turkey after
posed not only by small nations which taking power, by using various methods of
will have to disappear, but also by the oppression; 3) after installing a Nation-
live economic powers. Those who want to al Socialist government in Turkey, to re-
live a life without danger should commit unite all Turks in the world in one area.
suicide. ... A nation needs national ... The Turanists plan to remove the mi-
goals. It is not a herd of cattle. Only norities [Kurds, Greeks, Armenians,
with a purpose does it become a nation. Arabs, Bulgarians] from the country...."
So, must we risk war in order to save the The MHP's racism is also evident in the
parts of our nation that have been torn writings of one of its ideologues, Nihal
apart from us? Yes, that is what we must Atsiz, who had accompanied Turkes from
do The. Turkish intelligence agency, MIT, the 1940s on: "If you Kurds continue to
talk in your primitive language..., you
was already following the activities of will be exterminated by the Turks in the
the Grey Wolves back in the late 1960s. very same way they eradicated the Georr
They wanted to find out whether the corn- gians, the Armenians and the Greeks in
mandos of the MHP presented a danger to Turkey. And even if you constituted 100
democracy or whether they were to be seen percent of the population, they would
as agents of U.S. interests. ... A police kick you out. You can ask the U.N. to
report about the investigation by the give you a home in Africa, otherwise the
MIT, leaked to Aydinlik [the paper of the
patient Turkish race will turn into a
Peking-oriented Workers' and Peasants roaring lion that no one can stop."
Party] in November 1978 by an MIT agent,
fortunately for Turkes, they also moved Another contradiction between Evren and
to eliminate their rivals on the right, Tilrkes was that over the last months be-
particularly Turkes who had been trying to fore the coup, Turkes began to say that
style himself as the great leader of Tur- people in Turkey had to fight both U.S.
key. and Soviet imperialism. He realized that
The Generals around Evren had a number foreign corporations, mainly U.S. and
of reasons for moving against Turkes. For Western European, were hurting the small
one, it was discovered that, in order to merchants who were his main backers.
eliminate what the MHP preceived as their
rivals, they were planning to kill some What kind of relations do NATO countries
high military officials. And Evren's name have with the military government now?
was at the very top of the list of people Actually, there are conflicts between
to be killed found in MHP headquarters. the United States and Western European
There is also an economic rivalry between countries as to how to relate to the miii-
Evren and Turkes. They represent different tary government. The U.S. is giving mas-
factions of capitalism - Evren monopoly sive military aid, while western Europe,
capitalism, especially in Istanbul, Anka- most notably the Federal Republic of Ger-
ra and Izmir; Turkes the small merchants, many, is giving military and police aid,
the petit bourgeoisie, most of whom live but focusing much more on economic aid.
in Central Anatolia. Naturally, their eco- This economic aid is not tied to specific
nomic interests are somewhat different. projects which might benefit the general
24 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982
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population. Rather, it is given simply as
grants to the government which is free to
decide how to use it. Recently it has be-
come quite clear how it is being used:
the government is rapidly enlarging its
facilities for production of heavy arma-
ments and weapons, mainly for export to
Islamic markets in the Middle East. For
the pro-Western Islamic countries it's
much easier to buy weapons from Turkey
size businesses is rising fast Thy, only
sector that is benefiting from the econom-
ic aid is the Ha corporations. In addi-
tion, strikes are 17Zegai which means that
the workers aren't even able to fi~7h.t, for
adjustment of their wages to inflation.
That, in turn, leads to a drastic increase
in poverty which could not have taken
place without the a xnge from democracy -
as limited as it was - to a mi hark dic-
than the U.S. since Turkey is a "fellow tatorship. The miZitar2, is abZ,' to sup-
Islamic" country. press protests and t erha,ns i.n one "o two
It has become obvious that neither the years that will create t:he impression for
economic nor the military aid is improving outsiders that economic and. social stabil-
the Turkish economy. On the contrary, the ty has finally arrived in Turkey. You can
number of bankruptcies of small and medium be sure the Western media won't mention
Operation DEV-KURT
There are many documents which prove
that the 1971 coup was a well-prepared
action carried out by the Counter-Guer-
the initial stage of these plans. In a
single night the Generals ordered 4,000
professors, students, teachers and re-
tired officers arrested. In the days
following, they were tortured in the
Counter-Guerrilla offices and then sen-
rilla, the CIA, the Turkish military, and tenced in mass trials by military judges.
the MIT. As former foreign minister, DEV-KURT was headed by General Necip
Caglayangil commented about the 1971 Yusufoglu. First he was responsible for
events: "You should know, America isn't the Istanbul MITT, then he headed MIT in
interested in whether we have a democrat- Ankara. Until his retirement soon after
ic-chauvinist or a fascist government in the coup, he had been one of the most im-
this country.... At the time the CIA was portant Counter-Guerrilla officers. An-
solely interested in protecting American other was Nuri Gundes. He was in a lead-
interests. What .else should we expect, ing MIT position in Istanbul up to 1980.
anyway? Things like that don't happen in ... One of his proteges within the Coun-
the open. ... It was shortly before March ter-Guerrilla was his MIT colleague,
12, I was informed that there would be a Mahir Kaynak. He is a well-known agent
movement in politics. My information came provocateur responsible for many actions
from the American ambassador. One evening in Istanbul which at first were blamed on
he called and asked to come over to have leftists.
a drink. After we exchanged pleasant re- Finally, one of the chief Counter-Guer-
marks and so on, he said, 'Mr.Caglayangil, rilla leaders in Istanbul was Necdet
we as a nation tolerate development in Kucuktaskiner. In the months arter March
Turkey, but not everything. Some people 12, 1971, he was responsible for "inter-
in our government cannot tolerate what is rogation of opponents of the government,"
happening right now.' That was clear which is the same as brutal torture. He
enough. The CIA had its fingers in a num- continued his activities throughout the
ber of events before March 12, and it is 1970s. Fifteen days before the May 1,
generally said that the two intelligence 1977 massacre [34 people were killed when
agencies [MIT and CIA] were collaborating gunmen opened fire on a May: Day demon-
closely." stration of some 500,000], the personnel
In fact, the CIA assisted the MIT, back chief of MIT wrote Kucuktaskiner a check
in the 1960s, in drafting plans for the for TL8.15 million without any indica-
mass arrests of opposition figures,fol- tion for what it was to be used. This
lowing the pattern of CIA-directed events money, the purpose of which was declared
in Thailand, Indonesia and Greece. The "Secret," was in payment of Ku"cuktas-
Greek plan had been code-named "Prone- kiner's services to the MIT for the three
theus;" in Turkey it was "DEV-KURT" (Ac- and a half months before May 1. Such a
tion to Save the Nation). The utave of sum of money far exceeds anything an MIT
mass arrests [after the 1971 coup] was officer normally would receive.
Counterspy -- Feb. - April 1982 -- 25
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that this "stability" was achieved only
because the workers and peasants are being
suppressed with Western-supplied weapons.
The Generals are now facing some pro-
tests from Western Europe because they
outlawed all political parties. Almost all
parties in Europe are advocating that aid
to Turkey should be halted if the Generals
continue that policy. The only resistance,
internationally, is coming from Europe and
not the U.S.
However, I think that to demand a return
to democracy is somewhat illusionary. It
is all too obvious that the political
parties are not able to solve the coun-
try's social and economic problems. There
are strong indications that there's a siz-
able revolutionary movement in Turkey, but
what that's going to achieve one cannot
predict. There are two currents: What hap-
pened in Iran might also happen in Turkey.
At the same time, the left might decide
that things cannot be changed by working
toward the re-introduction of the parlia-
mentary system. Their conclusion could on-
ly be to create an armed liberation move-
ment. And as I see it, that's exactly what
is happening now.
What do the Generals want for Turkey?
They say they want stability, but they
haven't explained what that means. Stabil-
ity, above all, requires more social jus-
tice, and the Generals haven't shown any
interest in passing laws that would en-
hance social justice. Most importantly,
they would have to institute a land re-
form, and there are no signs of that what-
soever. In rural Turkey today, there is a
very small sector of large landowners on
one side, and a huge sector of landless
peasants, often even serfs, on the other
side. This feudal system, especially in
eastern Anatolia, is a natural breeding-
ground for the liberation movements.
To come back to an issue you raised be-
*This difference between the U.S. and Western Euro-
pean attitudes toward Turkey became even more obvi-
ous in early December 1981: All European Economic
Community (EEC) countries suspended aid to Turkey
in response to General Evren's Imprisonment of
Bulent Ecevit. The EEC is openly critical of
Evren's disbanding of all political parties and his
failure to set a timetable for elections. Not so
the Reagan administration. On the very day Ecevit
was imprisoned, Secretary of Defense Caspar Wein-
berger went to Turkey. He announced that the U.S.
and Turkey were setting up a Joint Defense Group to
improve military cooperation between the two coun-
26 -- Counterspy -- Feb. - April 1982
fore, Turkey is of great importance for
NATO and the U.S. as a country that be-
longs to the Third World, a country with a
large percentage of the population being
Muslim and at the same time a country
that is part of NATO.
The strategic importance of Turkey is
obvious. There are countless U.S. and NATO
military facilities, especially in the
eastern part of the country. It is not
just radar facilities, but military facil-
ities which can be used against Third
World countries. And that is very attrac-
tive for the U.S. The Rapid Deployment
Force is using bases in Turkey, and the
nuclear depots in Turkey are not there to
counter the danger of a Soviet invasion -
which is all but nonexistent anyway - but
primarily against the liberation movements
in Africa and Asia. These movements are
already being suppressed from Turkey., a
prime example is the Kurds, and we'll see
it in North Africa.
NATO needs Turkey. I was told by a U.S.
professor, Lawrence Whetten, who identi-
fied himself as a policy advisor of the
U.S. government, that if Turkey wants to
become independent, the U.S. will punish
it. And I don't think there is a better
expression for what is happening in Turkey
right now.
You mentioned the so-called Kurdish
problem. How has the military coup affect-
ed the lives of the people in Turkish Kur-
distan?
First of all, the coup has had the same
effects on the Kurds as on all the other
people. But they got it worse. The Kurdish
area in eastern Anatolia is very rugged
and much more isolated than the rest of
the country, and guerrilla movements have
been organizing there for a long time. In
the past they were able to move freely
across the borders to Iran and Iraq and,
to a certain extent, presented a military
threat to Turkey as a NATO country. Unlike
tries. This strategic partnership appears to go far
beyond the two countries' NATO membership. Comment-
ed the New York Times: "Not since the heyday of the
Baghdad Pact nearly a quarter of a century ago has
there been such a public effusion of warmth and un-
derstanding between Washington and Ankara." U.S.
aid to the Turkish junta will be stepped up. Pres-
ently, Turkey receives some $700 million in U.S.
military and economic aid for the fiscal year that
began on October 1, 1981. For the next year, the
Generals are requesting $900 million in military
aid alone.
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the rest of the country, the guerrilla
movement in Kurdistan is very strong. It
is a national liberation movement with two
basic demands: End the feudal system, and
freedom for Kurdistan. So on one side it
is the struggle for social justice, on the
other the struggle for independence or at
least self-determination.
After the military coup the Kurds began
to be oppressed in a way that is almost
unimaginable. The military and elite units
raided whole villages and tortured every-
body collectively - men, women and child-
ren. The military conducted aerial bomb-
ings of regions where they thought guer-
riZZas might be hiding. Three divisions of
the Turkish army were stationed in Kurdi-
stan. For all practical purposes, Kurdi-
stan is an occupied country.
In addition to the occupation and col-
lective torture, everyone who is arrested
or taken in for questioning is tortured.
Torture is conducted by speciaZZy trained
units.- it has become very sophisticated.
The military also conducts mass trials
against suspected members of Kurdish orga-
nizations, at times as many as 2,000 peo-
ple are tried simultaneously by the same
judge. Naturally, there are no democratic
rights whatsoever and no effective de-
fense.
The number of "indirect death sentences"
is also on the rise. That means people are
not sentenced to death by a judge; they're
simply gunned down in the streets. All
these things are hardly known in Western
Europe and in the United States, but the
only comparison one can make is to the
brutal methods of fascist dictatorships in
Latin America.
The Turkish military is a member of NATO
and NATO officers are stationed in Turkey.
Has the brutality of the Turkish military
brought about any change in the collabora-
tion of NATO officers with them?
I don't think so. Last fall there were
large NATO maneuvers in eastern Anatolia,
and that's a strong symbol for the popula-
tion. They see that it is not only the
Turkish military that is oppressing them,
but it is done with the presence and, at
the very least, the acquiescence of the
foreign troops in the country.
Some people compare Turkey today to
Chile; what are the similarities?
Structurally, the two countries are very
Police
Maps such as this one listing special
police telephone numbers for informants
to call were published in Turkish news-
papers after the September 1980 coup.
The Turkish police can proudly pro-
claim to have one of the highest rates
of solved crimes compared to other coun-
tries. The reason for that, however, is
not a sophisticated crime-solving tech-
nique. An anecdote told in Ankara gives
a hint: Some NATO officers are debating
the best way to hunt bears. Each of them
describes his method, and then the Turk-
ish officer says: "If I want to hunt a
bear, I catch a rabbit." Surprise all
around,."A rabbit?" "Yes, a rabbit, and
then I beat it as long as it takes to
make it confess that it is a bear."
The basis for policework... is a gener-
ous reward system for usable tips. Spy-
ing, especially by conservatives and fas-
cists, leads regularly to mass arrests.
After September 12, the Ankara military
announced a phone number to be called for
anonymous tips. However, the opposition
thwarted that plan when they distributed
handbills listing the same number as one
which people could call to get informa-
tion about cheap housing. ...
Since September 12, anyone can be de-
tained without charge for 90 days. As a
rule, the imprisoned are held incommuni-
cado, and are completely at the disposal
and mercy of the police or military of-
ficers. Torture and beatings during these
days, no matter what the allegation is,
are commonplace. In espionage cases,
treason, or political crimes, the MIT
takes over. The MIT has unlimited powers.
People arrested by the MIT are not taken
to the police station, they disappear,
and their relatives don't know where to.
The MIT has farms and country houses in
remote areas which have been transformed
into prisons and are heavily guarded. . .
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similar. One can say that Turkey is Eu- little more moderate than the "American
rope's Chile in the sense that a military Chile."
coup was used in both countries to push There are no differences between the two
through a certain economic model, the mod- countries regarding the possibility of a
eZ of Milton Friedman. There are no dif- return to democracy. In the near future
ferences between the two countries as far there is no chance of that - even if the
as that is concerned, and there are only a two countries were to have bourgeois par-
few differences regarding the persecution Ziaments, they would be parliaments con-
of the opposition. There are not the mas- trolled by the military. One important
sacres we saw in the first weeks after the difference between Chile and Turkey is
1973 coup in Chile.'In that sense one that the latter has a strategic signifi-
might say that the "European Chile" is a cance that goes far beyond Chile's.
RESOURCES
Konrad Ege, "Turkey:, Torture for
NATO," CounterSpy, vol.5, no.3, pp.44-
46.
"CIA in Turkey," CounterSpy, vol.5,
no.1, p.27.
Konrad Ege, "U.S. and NATO Bases in
Turkey," CounterSpy, vol.4, no.3, pp.
22-25.
John Kelly, "CIA and Labor in Turkey,"
CounterSpy, vol.4, no.2, pp.6-9..
Caglar Keyder, "The Political Economy
of Turkish Democracy," New Left Review,
May 1979, pp.3-44.
Berch Berberoglu, "Turkey: The Crisis
of the Neo-Colonial System," Race and
Class, Winter 1981.
"Turkey: The Generals Take Over,"
MERIP Reports, Jan. 1981 (whole issue).
Newsletters on Turkey:
Turkey Today, 28-29 Parkfield Street,
London Ni, England.
Info-Turk Agency Bulletin, Square Ch.
Wiser, 13/2, 1040 Bruxelles, Belgium.
News from Turkey, publ. by the Commit-
tee for Human Rights and Democracy in
Turkey, GPO Box 2922, New York, NY 11202.
Turkish Kurdistan and NATO
by Mehmet MardHi
The situation of the Kurds may aptly be tioning, between the newly-established
compared with that of the Basques in Spain Turkish Republic and Great Britain, oc-
and France, the Baluchis in Iran and Paki- curred in the wake of World War I, and led
stan, and, certainly, the Indians of North to revolts in 1925, 1927, and 1936. These
and South America. They are all indige- two partitionings left Kurdistan divided
nous peoples who have been arbitrarily di- among what came to be today's Turkey,
vided and displaced by the artificial Iran, Iraq and Syria (see map).
boundaries of colonialist powers. Yet, The national movement of the Kurdish
these peoples have each retained a nation- people has brought them into conflict with
al identity, language and culture. the governments of each of these coun-
Invariably, the colonial governments la- tries. In Iran, the Kurds have been put-
bel the national movements of these peo- ting up a stiff resistance against the
ples as "subversive," "separatist," "com- Iranian Army and Phalangist guards un-
munist," or - the pet phrase of the Reagan leashed by the clergy in a fight for ba-
administration - "terrorist." sic political and economic rights. In
The Kurdish people have been living in Iraq, since the demise of a fourteen-year
the same area for millenia. The first revolt in 1975, nearly 300,000 Kurds have
partitioning of their homeland, Kurdistan,
was between the Ottoman Turks and the Sa- (Mehmet Mardinli is a Kurd from Turkey
favid Persians in 1639. A second parti- presently living in the U.S.)
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been deported to southern Iraq. An equal facilities is in Diyarbakir, the cultural
number are refugees in Iran. At present, center of Turkish Kurdistan. It consists
the Kurdish armed resistance movement in of a NATO Air Defense Ground Environment
Iraq is growing again, this time under Station, a U.S. intelligence facility, and
the control of progressive and democratic a U.S. military airbase.3
forces. The Kurds in Syria make up ten Similar U.S. and NATO facilities, as
percent of the population, yet their ex- well as nuclear missile storage sites, are
istence as a distinct people is denied, located in other cities of Kurdistan such
and thousands of them have been uprooted as Mardin, Erhac, Malatya and Erzurum.4 In
from their land. addition, there are unmanned early-warning
The Kurds in Turkey are the most op- stations on numerous Kurdish mountains.5
pressed of the four Kurdish populations. From these facilities even the walkie-
Kurdish language and culture has been talkies of the Soviet Army can be inter-
banned since the early 1920s. Kurds cannot cepted,6 and the troop movements of the
even openly declare that they are Kurds; Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian armies
the Turkish government calls them "Moun- can be tracked.
tain Turks."
Since the military takeover of September NATO TRAINING FOR REPRESSION
1980, the repression has reached unbear-
able proportions. The Generals have im- Since the early 1950s, the armed forces
prisoned more than 17,000 Kurds.l The of Turkey have been trained by U.S. "ad-
slightest sign of dissent is punished with visors." More sophisticated training is
harsh prison terms. For example, done in the U.S. and Panama. According to
Serafettin Elci, a former Minister of Pub- Pentagon statistics, 3,527 Turkish offi-
lic Works, was imprisoned for stating that cers were trained in the U.S. between
there are Kurds in Turkey and that he him- 1970 and 1979.7 Turkey has received close
self is a Kurd.2 to $4 billion in military aid in the last
At first glance, it seems that the Kurds two decades-8 After the U.S., West Germa-
in Turkey have suffered primarily from the ny is the largest contributor to the Turk-
colonial policies of the Turkish govern- ish armed forces, with German military aid
ment. This observation is true but incom- averaging $20 million annually since
plete, since the U.S. and other NATO coun- 1964.9
tries are also responsible for the repres- For the Kurds, the most damaging aspect
sion of the Kurds. Turkish Kurdistan is of U.S. training of the Turkish military
replete with U.S. and NATO military bases, has been the development of the Gendarmer-
intelligence facilities, nuclear storage ie, a branch of the armed forces primarily
sites, logistics depots and military air- deployed to check the border areas (not to
ports. The largest conglomeration of such be confused with the police function of
Deutsche VoZkszeitung map
the Gendarmerie in other countries, e.g.
France). Thanks to the U.S. and NATO, the
Gendarmerie is today a force of 120,000
men equipped with helicopters, armored ve-
hicles, and complex communication systems.
Four of its district commands are located
in Turkish Kurdistan.10 Gendarmerie forces
have raided Kurdish villages and terror-
ized people again and again. Three infan-
try brigades are devoted to this specific
purpose. Kurds know them as the "Blue Be-
rets" or "commandos": they were trained by
the U.S. Green Berets.-1
In addition to the armed forces, several
types of police and the Counter-Guerrilla
(see Jurgen Roth interview in this issue)
are deployed in Kurdistan. Political po-
lice, trained and equipped by West Germany
and Britain, specialize in tracking down
and defusing "subversive" movements.12 The
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mob-control police, as the name suggests,
are designed to break up mass demonstra-
tions and strikes. Special armored vehi-
cles with water, paint and rubber bullet
spraying devices have been provided by
West Germany for that purpose.13
The Counter-Guerrilla can easily cross
official national boundaries to attack
Kurdish rebels. On February 12, 1980, for
example, three mobile teams attacked
Qamishi, a Kurdish town inside Syrian Kur-
distan, killing fifteen people, three of
them children. 14 Mobile team operations
are backed up by the infamous Blue Berets
and the Turkish National Intelligence
Agency, MIT, which works closely with the
CIA. Most of the MIT's activities are di-
rected against the progressive forces
in the region. The MIT closely collaborat-
ed with SAVAK before the fall of the Shah
of Iran, and with the Mukhabarat, the se-
cret police of Iraq.
THE CIA AND THE KURDS
The CIA itself has committed atrocities
against the Kurdish autonomy movement. As
will be remembered, Kurds in Iraqi Kurdi-
stan waged a guerrilla struggle against
the Ba'ath regime from 1960 to 1975. By
the early 1970s, the number of Kurdish
fighters reached 100,000. The Shah of
Iran, involved in a border dispute with
Iraq, sought to aid the Kurdish rebels to
create trouble for the Ba'ath government.
Kurdish rebel leader Mustafa Barzani, a
feudal chief, lacked confidence in the
Shah, but was willing to accept the offer
if the U.S. could guarantee the future
flow of aid. Following a private meeting
between Henry Kissinger and the Shah, U.S.
aid amounting to $16 million began. De-
tails of this operation, carried out by
the CIA, were released in the Pike Report
to the House of Representatives, which was
reproduced in the February 23, 1976 Vil-
lage Voice, almost a year after Barzani's
movement was defeated.
From the very beginning, "neither the
Shah nor... Dr. Kissinger desired victory"
for the Kurds. "They merely hoped to in-
sure that the insurgents would be capable
of sustaining a high level of hostility,
just high enough to sap [Iraq's] re-
sources." The plan proceeded nicely along
these lines. The feudal leader obtained
some out-of-date anti-aircraft guns and
low-power artillery, and. launched a con-
30 -- Counterspy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
ventional war in which the Kurds were no
match for the sophisticated weaponry of
the Iraqi army. Moreover, the CIA "had
long-standing information indicating that
[the Shah] would abandon [the Kurds] the
moment he reached an agreement with his
enemy [Iraq]."15
That moment arrived on March 6, 1975,
when the Shah and Iraqi leader Saddam
Hussein embraced during the OPEC confer-
ence in Algiers. The Shah made a deal with
Hussein to settle the border conflict and
ordered the Iranian army to cut the supply
lines of the Kurdish fighters. According
to Kurdish refugees, the Iranian army ac-
tually started to bomb some of the Kurdish
positions. Barzani was forced to order his
guerrillas to pull back from the front
lines. An Iraqi offensive caught the Kurds
very badly off guard in one of the coldest
months of the year. The human cost of the
war was very high. Close to 700,000 people
were either displaced, killed, or deported
to forced settlements guarded by Iraqi
soldiers, where many remain to this day.
This is not the first tragedy the U.S.
government has set up in the Middle East.
The Palestinian revolution received a sim-
ilar blow from the Jordanian-CIA joint op-
eration in September 1970. The liberation
war of the Dhofari people in Oman was set
back by the massive invasion of the Shah's
troops backed by the U.S. fleet in the
Indian Ocean. In Pakistan, the Baluchi
uprising of 1973-77 was put down in a
similar manner.
Nevertheless, things are changing.
Kurds, Palestinians, Dhofaris and Baluchis
are increasingly questioning the acts and
intentions of the "bastion of freedom" -
the U.S.A. These days one can hear people
saying: "If America is for freedom, then
how come it helps these corrupt occupiers
kill our children?" They know that the
bullets and the M-16 rifles carried by the
Blue Berets are made in the U.S.A. The
Voice of America radio distributes chills,
not smiles. From a distance, the land of
the oppressed seems to lie under snow and
frost. But does not spring follow winter?
FOOTNOTES
1) Calculated from News from Turkey, no.1-10,
1980-
81; Turkei Information, Hamburg, no.1-6; and
Cum-
huriyet, OCt.1980-Aug.1981._
2) New York Times, 3/27/81.
3) Counterspy, vol.4 no.3, pp.22-25.
4) ibid. (cont. on pg.59)
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Libyan Witch-Hunt:
The War at Home by Jeff McConnell
On December 18, 1981, Attorney General cans are reluctant to let their presidents
William French Smith addressed the Los An- go to war, even after massive campaigns
geles World Affairs Council on the need to such as the fairly successful one waged by
rebuild U.S. intelligence agencies to the Carter administration to create hyste-
counter the "threat to our government and ria against Iran for fourteen months. How-
its citizens from hostile intelligence ever, the campaign against "international
services and international terrorist terrorism" and the effort to build a "stra-
groups." Although he concentrated on what tegic consensus" in the Middle East, which
he said was the growing number of Soviet both center on Libya, must, if they are to
spies in the U.S. he remarked that the succeed, enlist the loyalties of individu-
most serious threat is international ter- al Americans. During the hostage affair,
rorism. "As all of you know from press re- the Carter administration did this in part
ports, the threat is real today. Libya's by manipulating concern over threats to
capability of sponsoring an effort to as- the safety of the hostages, and in part by
sassinate high U.S. government officials mobilizing public anger against Iranians
provides a sobering example." living in the U.S. So far, the Reagan ad-
It was to counter this threat and the ministration has limited itself to the
one from the Soviet Union, Smith said, first kind of effort, portraying Reagan as
that President Reagan had signed Executive a "hostage" to the threat of Libyan "hit
Order 12333, legalizing domestic opera- squads" - unable even to leave the White
tions by the CIA for the first time, and House to light the Christmas tree. This
has supported legislation to increase gov- has been a moderately successful effort,
ernment secrecy by restricting the Freedom apparently assisted and perhaps orches-
of Information Act and criminalizing the trated by the CIA and MOSSAD (Israeli in-
disclosure of the names of CIA agents. The telligence). Now the second kind of effort
executive order, Smith said, does not au-- may be just around the corner.
thorize the surveillance of "purely domes-
tic dissent groups." But where there is a AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT: ORCHESTRATING
"foreign connection," he went on, "efforts HYSTERIA AGAINST IRANIANS
to gather information and affect the ac-
tivities of domestic dissident groups" can One of the "lessons of Iran" was that
proceed without a court order and with on- outrageous actions by the U.S. are more
ly the authorization of the Attorney Gen- acceptable to the American public if they
eral. Already, Smith said, he had made a can be framed as "humanitarian." Jimmy
number of such authorizations.1 Carter learned early on to manipulate con-
On the very day Smith asserted that cern for the safety of the hostages. What-
these extraordinary measures were needed ever policies the government had actually
to counter the "Libyan threat," CBS corre- adopted, the way to sell them to the pub-
spondent Fred Graham reported that federal lic was to portray them as reactions to
investigators had become increasingly some threat menacing the hostages. On each
skeptical about the story of their infor- of the three occasions that the U.S. in-
mant concerning the Libyan "hit squads," creased its military presence in the Per-
because the informant "kept adding to his sian-Arabian Gulf area during this period
story."2 Meanwhile, Philip Taubman of the - late 1979, April 1980, and September
New York Times reported that a "senior Ad- 1980 - Carter falsely represented the hos-
ministration official" had told him that
the administration "was trying to exploit" (Jeff McConnell is a political activist
the Libyan "hit squad" stories to "lay the living in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is
groundwork for imposing sanctions against the author of Libya: U.S. Propaganda and
Libya."3 Covert Operations, published in the Zast
Every war needs an enemy within. Ameri- issue of Counterspy.)
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tages as being in increasing physical dan- U.S. government, sources said."7 Not to be
ger. outdone, the New York Times ran the even
At the same time, and for the first time more sensational story the next day that
since the 1972 crackdown on Arabs living the money was to help "foment civil
in the U.S. and the 1973 oil embargo, the disturbances and recruit imprisoned Ameri-
U.S. government had a chance to "personal- can Muslims as members of terrorist
ize" an international campaign, to involve squads."8
the public at large in its costs and exe- Aside from the suspicious timing of
cution. On the one hand, the hostages and these articles, and the curious shift of
their families were the objects of great blame away from the police and onto the
sympathy. On the other hand, Iranians liv- injured Iranians, the reports are problem-
ing in the U.S. were the objects of great atic on other grounds. It is well-known
anger. Many were intimidated into silence, that substantial Iranian government money
while others were physically and verbally was already in the U.S. to finance legal
assaulted. One episode provides an impor- efforts to regain the impounded Iranian
tant example of how the media and the gov- assets, the operations of Iran Times, cul-
ernment cooperated to exploit this hyste- tural activities, and so forth. It is hard
ria. On July 27, 1980, during demonstra- to see why more money would need to be
tions by both pro- and anti-Khomeini brought into the U.S. if the Iranian gov-
groups in Washington, D.C., 192 Iranians ernment were intent on financing demon-
of the pro-Khomeini group were arrested. strations here. Moreover, most Iranians in
The arrests provoked a chorus of interna- the U.S. did not need to be given travel
tional indignation. News footage shot by expenses out of such a clandestine fund to
local D.C. television stations clearly entice them to take part in demonstra-
showed police brutality against the demon- tions. This is evidenced by the fact that
strators.4 Between 35 and 50 Iranians were the anti-Khomeini Marxist Iranian Students
hurt badly enough to require hospitaliza- Association (ISA) outnumbered the pro-
tion while only two policemen were slight- Khomeini demonstrators two-to-one during
ly injured.5 the July 27 demonstrations, although ISA
For several days after the demonstra- members clearly did not receive money
tions, the press and government officials from Khomeini's government.
engaged in rather incredible speculation Both the Post and the Times subsequently
that the Iranians themselves had conspired printed interviews with Iranians in which
to create an international incident by some of these points were made.9 Still,
provoking a confrontation with the police. both papers concealed what was perhaps the
One report stated: "The Administration has most contrary piece of evidence - an ex
no proof that the Iranian demonstrators plicit denial by State Department spokes-
were directed from Teheran, but several person David Passage: "We've gone about as
officials said circumstantial evidence far and wide as we can and we have nothing
suggested that the Iranians were highly to substantiate it."10 But the damage was
disciplined and that their refusal at done. One U.S. Representative asked for
first to identify themselves and the deci- hearings to investigate "possible subver-
sion of some of them to begin a hunger sive actions" by Iranian students.11 And
strike seemed to be coordinated."6 the Post editorially parroted its report-
Then on August 7, just after the Irani- ers: "For many Americans - maybe all of us
ans had been released, the Washington Post - outrage will be the immediate response
claimed to have evidence "beyond any rea- to any suggestion of Iranian-directed spy-
sonable doubt" to back up-the speculation. ing, 'destabilization' and murder. Fine.
"Law enforcement investigators," the Post But outrage can hardly be the only re-
reported, "say at least $5 million has sponse.... What should be done? The answer
been funneled into the United States from is diligent, effective counterintelligence
Iran to support Iranian Moslem revolu- and police work within the framework of
tionary protest and propaganda efforts the law. Our sense... is that at various
here.... The money sent from Iran is part levels the U.S. government has been slow
of an effort to export Ayatollah... to credit the possibility that the ayatol-
Khomeini's revolutionary Islamic ideology lah may be cranking up something devious
to other Moslems, defend Khomeini's regime and nasty inside the United States.... The
and embarrass his critics, such as the resources of government... have to be con-
32 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
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centrated and focused in particular on the said that they are "fishing."
thousands of Iranians,.. who are in this Shadyac suspects that a Libyan task
country as aliens, and on certain natural- force has been formed in the federal gov-
ized Americans of Iranian origin.... "12 ernment, and that it has been actively
monitoring Libyans in the U.S. since early
LIBYAN WITCH-HUNT November, long before the December hyste-
ria over the alleged "hit squads." ABC
Recall that the story of the govern- News reported on December 4 the existence
ment's informant on the Libyan "hit of such a "secret federal task force."
squads" was that they were trained inside Among the techniques being used by this
Libya and would attempt to infiltrate into task force, according to ABC, are mail
the U.S. through Canada or Mexico. The day openings, vehicle tracking, physical
before it reported the growing skepticism searches, and the use of closed-circuit
toward the informant's story, CBS reported cameras in buildings.17 The New York Post
that since no "hit men" had been seen en- wrote that this task force is -a "rare
tering the U.S. and there in fact was not joint operation of CIA, FBI and Secret
even any concrete evidence that they ex- Service agents."18 The ABC report came the
isted, the investigation was changing same day that Reagan signed Executive Or-
gears on the assumption that Qaddafi might der 12333, which Smith later praised in
be considering using persons already liv- Los Angeles. Whether the new order was
ing in the U.S. Thus, said CBS, the in- signed at this time to facilitate particu-
vestigation was now centering on Qaddafi lar operations of the task force, or to
supporters in the U.S., radical Palestin- capitalize on the press hysteria over Lib-
ians, and radical Islamic groups.13 ya, or whether this was all coincidence is
Already before this CBS report there not clear. But an interview with H. Stuart
were many indications that a "witch-hunt" Knight, retiring director of the Secret
might be underway. Sources told the New Service, in which he stated that legal
York Post in early December that the "hit limitations on the FBI had reduced "the
squad" investigation focused on "radical amount of intelligence we'd like to see
elements in the Libyan student community vis-a-vis domestic security," had re-
here" and claimed that a "well-orchestrat- ceived some publicity the week before.
ed" plan was being carried out involving U.S. citizens are also targeted by the
not just the "hit teams" but "mysterious
'support teams' as well."14 Similarly,
the Hartford Courant reported in late No-
vember that "law enforcement officials
said the [Libyan] agents could count on
substantial assistance from Libyans al-
ready in this country. There is a partic-
ularly large Libyan community in the Dis-
trict of Columbia and, during the past
week, D.C. police have increased their
investigation. "Top federal law-enforce-
ment officials" told the New York Times
that the "nationwide manhunt" was direct-
ed both at "the potential assassins" and
at "Americans to whom they might turn for
assistance." "Intelligence sources" said
their informant told the U.S. that the
"hit squads" may "try to recruit Americans
to help them." FBI officials stated that
federal agents had been sent out to find
"
Americans who have past
surveillance of suspected [ addafi], sup- and question
porters in the nation's capital, according links to Libya," including former Green
to police sources." [Emphasis added.]15 (A Berets who have worked for Edwin Wilson
high-ranking police officer, though, had and "other military veterans who had work-
said of a recent similar investigation ed overseas in mercenary operations and
that: "I am not going to talk about intel- were skilled in the handling of weapons
ligence gathering when we're not supposed and explosives."19 One report, carried on.
to do it."16) CBS, stated (rather incredibly) that there
Richard Shadyac, a lawyer for Libyan was already evidence that "the potential
students in the U.S., claimed that many assassins" had turned to the (now defunct)
Libyans have had their phones bugged since Weather Underground for assistance. CBS
early November 1981. He also said that credited this information to "congressio-
many Libyan students are being approached nal sources" citing "intelligence
by law enforcement officials for question- sources."20
ing. Asked if he thinks these officials The Reagan administration is now also
are after specific information, Shadyac interfering with free movement between the
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U.S. and Libya in much the same way the the FBI and the INS, have been used to
Carter administration did last year with stifle opposition from Arab-Americans to
travel into and out of Iran. In an effort U.S. policies in the Middle East.24
to force Americans working for oil compa- There has also been speculation that the
nies in Libya to return to the U.S., the "hit squad" stories are being exploited to
administration invalidated passports for justify the gathering of intelligence
travel to Libya. Deputy Secretary of State against Arab groups in the U.S. for use at
William Clark, making the announcement,
said there was "an imminent danger to the
physical safety of Americans,"21 echoing
the words of the Carter administration to
justify its ban on travel to Iran several
weeks prior to the unsuccessful military
raid into Iran. Despite Clark's words,
however, many Americans leaving Libya bit-
terly said they felt safer in Libya than
in the U.S.
At the same time, Libyan nationals in
the U.S. are increasingly having immigra-
tion problems, and it has been reported
that one of the options actively consid-
ered against Libya during the NSC deliber-
ations on Libya in early December was the
-expulsion of all Libyan nationals from the
U.S. A strong argument against this ac-
tion reportedly grew out of concern for
anti-Qaddafi Libyans among them. It is
probably true that there is reason to wor-
ry about the freedom and safety of some
Libyans if they were forced back to Lib-
ya.22 But there is also an awareness that
these Libyans are a group that the U.S.
government can work with in overthrowing
Qaddafi. Qaddafi, in fact, recently ac-
cused the CIA of recruiting thirty Libyan
students to return home to spy for the
U.S.23 The CIA has been doing exactly that
with foreign student groups in the U.S.
since its inception.
Many Arab-Americans are convinced that
the "hit squad" stories, like the "big Red
scare" of the 1950s, could "turn into a
witch-hunt - and that it could be directed
against them. From Los Angeles to Detroit
to Washington, Arab-Americans [in mid-De-
cember] were accusing the Reagan Adminis-
tration of cynically creating a climate of
fear that could only increase the isola-
tion felt by many immigrants and Americans
of Middle Eastern descent." One man inter-
viewed, head of a community center in
Michigan, said that the "hit squad"
stories would cause "real problems" in the
Arab-American community: "It strengthens
the preconception that all Arabs are ter-
rorists." Arab-American organizations have
long charged that manipulation of that
preconception as well as harassment from
.64 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982
a later time. Military action by the U.S.
against Libya, for example, could provoke
strong opposition in the U.S. It would
not be surprising that American officials,
if they are contemplating military action,
would want to be well prepared on the home
front, just as Clark's statement that
Americans are not safe in Libya indicates
a concern for the foreign front.25
Memories linger among Arab-Americans of
the "anti-terrorist" campaign ordered by
Richard Nixon in late 1972 in the after-
math of the seizure of Israeli athletes at
the 1972 Munich Olympics by a Black Sep-
tember unit and the failed attempt by Is-
raelis and Germans to rescue them by kill-
ing their captors. The Nixon administra-
tion established a cabinet-level committee
on terrorism, including the directors of
the CIA and the FBI. Nixon also issued an
executive order which included five "anti-
terrorist" measures. The first was "Opera-
tion Boulder," according to scholar
Mohammed Shadid, ordering "the CIA to car-
ry out a security check on any Arab trav-
eling to the United States," leading to
"weeks and months of delay for those seek-
ing visas." The other four measures were:
"Special postal checks of mail from sus-
pect areas, tightening of the anti-hijack-
ing program..., doubling of the number of
wiretaps, and a nationwide surveillance
and. investigation campaign of politically
active Arabs in general and Palestinians
in particular."
Describing activities that bear some re-
semblance to those endured by Iranians af-
ter November 1979, Shadid wrote: "The FBI
and immigration officials frequently ab-
used, intimidated and harassed individuals
investigated.... During the first two
months of this investigating campaign,"
Shadid said, "125 Arab students were de-
ported, most of them without due process.
About seventy students were arrested, but
they were later released and acquitted of.
all charges."26 It remains to be seen if
the present campaign now, or at some fu-
ture time, will take on the dimensions of
the domestic campaign against Iranians
throughout 1980. There is concern among
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some Arab-Americans and Arab nationals in
the U.S. that it will.
PLOTS AND COUNTERPLOTS
There has been great concern inside Lib-
ya over possible plots by Western powers
for a number of months. On several occa-
sions, the Free Unionist Officers (the
progressive group in the military that
overthrew the monarchy in 1969 and brought
Qaddafi to power) in Libya issued threats
that Reagan would be killed if the CIA
caused Qaddafi's death. It is conceivable
that the reports presently circulating re-
flect preparations by Libya for this con-
tingency. The Free Unionist Officers made
their first counterthreat just after News-
week's report in July 1981 that the CIA's
Max Hugel had briefed the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee on a plot to assassinate
Qaddafi. The White House quickly denied
that there was a direct assassination plot
but remained silent about the rest of the
story - that the CIA planned to destabi-
lize Libya and ultimately to overthrow
Qaddafi with the help of Libyan exiles and
Egypt. A Daily News article of May had
earlier reported that "senior Administra-
tion officials" were saying that the U.S.
would "encourage" conservative Arab states
that feel threatened by Qaddafi, "most
notably Egypt, to take action of their
own, either through direct invasion or
sponsorship of a coup."27 The Daily News
item appeared ten days after the State De-
partment ordered Libyan diplomats out of
the U.S. and asked Americans to leave Lib-
ya for the first time, and about a week
before Libya arrested a group-it claimed
was planning a coup. Journalist Claudia
Wright later noted that the U.S. secretly
lent Anwar Sadat an AWACS plane about this
time and speculated that the U.S. might
have done so in order to watch for possi-
ble Soviet and Syrian military moves to
save Qaddafi from a coup attempt against
him.28
During August 1980, French intelligence
allegedly cooperated with Egypt and the
CIA in an unsuccessful plot to overthrow
Qaddafi.29 This failure and the upcoming
now it has been disclosed that "a high-
ranking French official" also "brought an
assassination plan to the Reagan Adminis-
tration last February [1981]." The off i-
cial is said to have been present at a
White House meeting with Richard Allen and
assistant secretaries of state Nicholas
Veliotes and Chester Crocker. The French
official reportedly "proposed that the
killing be done by a group of Libyan ex-
iles and controlled by the French," and
asked for a "general expression of admin-
istration support for the venture and as-
sistance in the aftermath of the coup.
Specifically, he wanted the U.S. to give
quick diplomatic recognition to
[Qaddafi's] successor. He also sought as-
surances that the U.S. would be prepared
to interdict Libyan harbors and airfields
in the event of a move by Moscow to pro-
tect the vast supply of Soviet weapons in
the country." The scheme, the official
explained, would have to await the anti-
cipated re-election of Giscard in May).
"but he suggested that the planning begin.
... U.S. officials agreed to keep the
talks going. The venture came to an abrupt
halt when Giscard was unexpectedly defeat-
ed at the polls by... Mitterrand."30
Mitterrand's inauguration occurred at
about the same time that the alleged plot-
ters were arrested in Libya, and French
intelligence has since reportedly main-
tained a policy toward Libya at odds with
the Mitterrand government. These differ-
ences came to a head in late October when,
unknown to Mitterrand, French intelli-
gence, in an effort perhaps to provoke a
French-Libyan confrontation, fed AFP the
false 'report that Libya was staging a coup
in Chad. The report was publicized world-
wide and caused some of France's 1,700
troops stationed in the Central African
Republic to go on alert.31
The recent U.S. "Bright Star" military
maneuvers in Egypt have caused consider-
able alarm in Libya as well. An indication
of the extent of concern was a Voice of
Arab Homeland broadcast of November 3. It
cited information from diplomatic circles
that an offensive against Libya, to begin
with B-52 raids into Libya, would be
French elections supposedly kept former mounted at the same time as the Bright
French President Giscard from opposing Star maneuvers. The plan was said to be
Libya militarily when it aided the govern- aimed at Qaddafi, targeting "all the
nent of Chad in late 1980. Giscard report- places where the leader of the revolution
edly ordered a batter) of sanctions is believed to be."32 More credible and
against Libya after the assistance; and more frightening is a recent Washington
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Post report that Reagan has given Egypt However, the report was denied by a Secret
assurances that the U.S. would block Sovi- Service spokesperson.42 On October 19,
et involvement if Egypt should attack Lib- Newsweek reported that after the Gulf of
ya.33 The Soviet Union in the meantime is Sidra incident, "U.S. intelligence...
planning maneuvers off Libya to practice picked up evidence that [Qaddafi] had
protecting Libya from external attack.34 hatched yet another assassination plot -
Even Washington's denials have a disturb- this time against President Reagan."43
ing sound to them. One report is that al- This "plot" was perhaps the one reported
though officials assert that it would be by Jack Anderson on October 13. He alleged
illegal for the U.S. directly to assassi- that in a telephone conversation between
nate Qaddafi, they "openly admit that they Qaddafi and Ethiopian leader Mengistu,
would be delighted if someone else killed purportedly intercepted by the U.S. Na-
[him] - and at least one Administration tional Security Agency (NSA) the weekend
insider has been in direct contact with following the Gulf of Sidra incident,
Libyan exiles in Western Europe who are "Qaddafi vowed that he would go ahead with
determined to oust" him.35 There is evi-
dence of other contacts as well, and Haig
has called Qaddafi "a cancer that has to
be removed."36
ALLEGATIONS ABOUT LIBYAN PLOTS AGAINST
U.S. OFFICIALS
Since Sadat's assassination on October
6, there has been an intensive U.S. effort
to pin assassinations and assassination
attempts on Qaddafi. The morning after
Sadat was killed, Henry Kissinger said
that "if Libya had been taken care of two
years ago, last year, this year Sadat
would probably be alive today."~7 General
Haig told a closed briefing that the
promptness and intensity of reaction by
Radio Tripoli after Sadat was shot indi-
cated that Libya at least had advance
warning.38 (One report even claimed that
Hosni Mubarak three days before had
"warned the White House of what he feared
was a Libyan-financed, Soviet-backed plot"
against Sadat.39) Along with increased
military readiness for U.S. forces in the
region, it was announced that Reagan had
responded immediately with "heavier secu-
rity... on U.S. diplomats in the re-
gion. "40
Despite extensive efforts, the U.S.
could find no Libyan link to the assassi-
nation. Egypt, too, later exonerated "out-
side powers." On October 9, however, in
the midst of the tensions on Egypt's bor-
ders after Sadat's death and the propagan-
da campaign against Libya, NBC reported
that the FBI and Secret Service were in-
vestigating the possibility that "hit
squads," trained and manned by ex-Green
Berets and hired by Libya, were plotting
to kill Reagan, and that for that reason
Reagan did not attend Sadat's funeral.'
36 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
plans to have Reagan assassinated."
(Anderson said he had been given the
translation by the NSA,44 but he did not
explain under what conditions he got it.)
In its report, Newsweek stated further
that Maxwell Rabb, U.S. Ambassador to Ita-
ly, was also the target of a Libyan plot -
"a plot that was aborted when Italian po-
lice deported ten suspected Libyan hit
men."45 Nearly two weeks later, the New
York Times reported that Rabb was hastily
flown out of Italy October 21 after the
discovery of "a Libyan plot to assassinate
him," according to "a diplomatic source"
(presumably in Washington). The plot al-
legedly emerged while Rabb was visiting
Milan; "a heavy cordon of police protec-
tion" was promptly thrown around him, and
he was "put on an early flight to Washing-
ton.... The source said that about ten
people, including some top Libyan intelli-
gence officers, were implicated in the
plot and that several had been expelled
from Italy as a result."46
On October 26, however, the Washington
Post reported that Rabb had had lunch with
Senator Larry Pressler in Washington on
October 15, and had been there at least
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since that time. State Department sources and of Middle Eastern origin," and went
reportedly "confirmed" they had reports of on: "We have no other information, except
a threat against Rabb, but said "the prin- to underline once again that we do have
ciple reasons for his return were a combi- repeated reports that come to us from re-
nation of personal business and use of his liable sources that Mr. Qaddafi has been
assistance in lobbying" for approval of funding, sponsoring, training, harboring
the AWACS sale. These Department sources terrorist groups who conduct activities
said the "Newsweek report was the object against the lives and well-being of Ameri-
of extensive attention in the Italian can diplomats."52
press" and believed that this was the ba- As with the Rabb story, the details of
sis of the rumors. They did say, however, this episode are contradictory. Chapman
that the rumors "were being pursued" by claims that he saw the man approach as he
Italian authorities and that Rabb's trip left his home. He heard shots, ran to the
home "was arranged partly as a precaution- back of his car and ducked down. Investi-
ary measure."47 But Newsweek earlier had gators later found that three bullets had
reported that a number of Libyans had al- entered the rear end of the car. The Post
ready been deported, and in another arti- report stated that "the gunman appeared to
cle, that the plotters had been "inter- have drawn his weapon and started firing
cepted" in September.48 before he got close enough to be sure of
A careful analysis of the reporting on hitting his target.... The gunman's action
the threat against Rabb shows - in addi- seemed to suggest a lack of professional-
tion to numerous contradictions - that all ism or training...."53 Richard Eder of
the articles on the issue, even those in the New York Times was even more skepti-
the Italian press, only repeated News- cal: "The fact that the assailant was
week's original story, adding very little alone, was armed only with a pistol, began
new information-49 Later recapitulations firing at perhaps 30 to 40 feet away and
of this story during the period of media had no escape vehicle" - witnesses, in
hysteria about "hit squads" in the U.S. fact, say he "walked off" - led to "sug-
continued to be mutually inconsistent on gestions that something less than an orga-
the crucial points: when Rabb returned to nized assassination attempt might have
the U.S.; when and if any.Libyan plotters been involved."54
were picked up or deported from Italy; the The French Foreign Ministry said that
order of these events; and the strength of Chapman had "informed the government of a
the evidence that there was a plot against threat against U.S. diplomats in Paris."
Rabb.50 Moreover, as of December 22, the His fears allegedly grew from "U.S. intel-
State Department still declined to confirm ligence reports that Libyan agents were
that there actually had been a Libyan plot planning attacks on American diplomats" in
against Rabb. An official stated that so Europe to avenge the Gulf of Sidra inci-
far as the iepartment was concerned the dent. The credibility of Chapman's report,
reports about the plot were "just rumors." however, was somewhat undermined by his
A week after the October 25 Times arti- failure to take up the police protection
cle, a new "threat" report surfaced. "U.S. offered him; protection the former U.S.
intelligence," said Newsweek believes that Ambassador had had until his departure.55
[Qaddafi] is planning terrorist attacks on The day after the Chapman episode, one
four American embassies in Western Europe network reported that customs agents had
.... [Qaddafi] wants to avenge the Gulf of been alerted to watch for Libyan "hit men"
Sidra incident, say senior Washington of- trying to enter the U.S.56 Just over a
ficials, and they claim to have 'credible week later, Newsweek reiterated the Octo-
evidence' that his new targets are not in- her 9 NBC report about a threat to Reagan
dividual ambassadors but the American dip- with slightly different details.57 When
lomatic compounds in London, Paris, Vienna the report surfaced on ABC58 and in the
and Rome."51 Then, on November 12, a gun- Hartford Courant59 several days later, a
man reportedly fired six or seven shots in period of hysteria started that has led to
the vicinity of charge d'affaires the present U.S. campaign against Libya. A
Christian Chapman as he was leaving his number of assassins trained in Libya -
home in Paris. Alexander Haig reported variously reported as from five to around
that he had been told that the gunman was fifteen - were said to be either inside
"a young man in his early 30s, bearded the U.S. or waiting in Canada, Switzerland
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information that "we don't know where it
came from first - the FBI or the CIA."62
But it appears that most of the substan-
tive leaks originated with intelligence
officials. The October 9 report on NBC was
not attributed, but the Newsweek article
several days later said that "U.S. intel-
ligence" had picked up a plot against
Reagan; Jack Anderson stated specifically
that his information came from the NSA. It
was "Washington officials" who talked
about the Rabb affair to Newsweek. "State
Department sources" on October 25 con-
firmed reports of a threat to Rabb but re-
fused comment on Libyan involvement; only
in mid-November did a "U.S. embassy off i-
cial" in Rome allege "evidence" of Libyan
involvement,63 and only in early December
--?........??- .-.
it true without caveat.64
or Mexico to enter the U.S. Their object The campaign against U.S. embassies re-
was to kill Reagan or, if not him, other ported in Newsweek in early November was a
important members of the administration. "belief" of "U.S. intelligence" and was
The information was said to come from an described by "senior Administration off i- I
informant who had heard Qaddafi give the cials." Haig himself insinuated Libya's
order to kill the officials and later "de- involvement in the attack on Chapman. Ten
fected" to authorities outside the U.S. - days later, Newsweek reported "intelli-
the informant that the FBI has reportedly gence officials" confident that Qaddafi
come to doubt. Soon, names and composite was behind the attack. Moreover, it was at
photos of the alleged assassins were post- this time that "U.S. intelligence sources"
ed at ports of entry into the U.S. and also were responsible for reviving talk
President Reagan was saying, "We have the about a plot against Reagan for Newsweek,
evidence...." and "senior American officials" added
Bush, Weinberger and Haig to the hit list.
MOSSAD PROPAGANDA AND OTHER LEAKS There appears also to be a MOSSAD (Is-
raeli intelligence) connection to the re-
There is much speculation that the leaks ports. The Los Angeles Times wrote on De-
about "hit squads" have been orchestrated cember 12 that MOSSAD was the major source
by the government, as if, in the words of of several "dramatic" reports about the
Washington Post columnist Haynes Johnson, "hit squads."65 On December 8, the New
"public opinion were being prepared for York Daily News reported that the ominous
dramatic action - say a strike against Ilich Ramirez Sanchez, known as "Carlos"
Libya or Qaddaf i."60 White House communi- was leading one of the "hit squads." On
cations director David Gergen, responding December 9, CBS reported that the "hit
to Haynes Johnson and others, stated that squads" were waiting in Mexico, and the
he found it "astonishing that people think Los Angeles Times said that "one investi-
we somehow would go through this exercise gative source identified the Israelis as
unless we took it seriously...." He added: the distributor of the Carlos story." The
"The White House has made it very clear to Los Angeles Times also reported that Isra-
the various departments that the president el was cited as the source for reports
condemns these leaks."61 It was not clear about the "hit squads" being in Mexiao.66
whether this was a signal for some orches- Earlier, it had written that a "government
trated campaign to cease (perhaps it was, source" had called the CBS report "whole
becoming counterproductive) or whether the cloth."67 Soon an INS message to Mexican
leaks were actually outside the control of border agents warning of Carlos' possible
the While House. presence and of the possibility that the
One "senior White House aide" told the "hit squads" might be illegally smuggled
Los Angeles Times concerning the leaked into the U.S. became widely publicized.
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About this time, Uri Dan reported from Je- never returned from Libya after a set-to
rusalem that MOSSAD agents said that for- with [Qaddafi]."70 On December 7, in the
mer CIA officers Wilson and Terpil had midst of the hysteria over the Libyan "hit
trained the "hit squads and that Qaddafi squads," three men who claimed to be mem-
had recruited them because of their knowl- bers of the Amal Movement, a Shi'a group,
edge of Western security procedures.68 The hijacked a Boeing 727 en route to Tripoli
Los Angeles Times was told by an "informed from Zurich, demanding an investigation .
source" that Israel has "wanted an excuse
to go in and bash Libya for a long time,"
and other sources said that Israel "might
be trying to build public support in the
United States for a strike" against Libya
The Hartford Courant's U.S. "intelli-
gence sources" also leaked rather sensa-
tional stories. They said that all U.S.-
Canadian border agents had been alerted,
into the disappearance of Mousa Sadr. The
timing of the hijacking and a denial by
Nabih Birri, leader of the Amal Movement,
that it was involved71 along with the
Anderson report, at least make for an in-
teresting coincidence. Libya denounced the
hijacking as a terrorist act of the CIA.
THE CREDIBILITY OF THE "HIT SQUAD" STORY
that Qaddafi was responsible for plots in
Rome and Paris, and that the American plot The sources of the reports; the incon-
was aimed at Reagan, Bush, Haig and sistencies among them; and the increasing
Weinberger. A "ranking intelligence expert doubts about them among federal investiga-
with a background in terrorist tactics"
said: "This would not be a lone gunman-
style assault, the kind we're used to
[sic] in this country. We're talking
about an all-out attack by people who
don't care if they get away." A "high-
ranking CIA official directly involved
with intelligence on international terror-
ism" said: "There is a very strong feeling
that [Qaddaf i] would like to strike be-
fore the end of the year, during the holi-
days. In his mind, assassinating a U.S.
leader during the Thanksgiving-Christmas
season would give it maximum impact." Two
"ranking intelligence officials" said
there was already "substantial" evidence
that "up to six Libyans" had entered the
U.S. One of these officials said: "We're
fairly certain that [the assassins] are
here, but we haven't been able to pick up
their trail."69 The New York Times, how-
ever, claimed a week later that officials
were still skeptically debriefing their
informant.
It is unclear how much mere publicity
there is here and how much outright disin-
formation. In September, Jack Anderson re-
ported that the CIA was preparing a cam-
paign to discredit Qaddafi through disin-
formation. Anderson also reported a plan
that sounded rather unlikely at the time
but sounds less so in light of subsequent
events: "The agency has even considered
arranging the disappearance of a moderate
Moslem leader after a visit to Libya. This
could revive the outrage against Qaddafi
in the Moslem world that followed the dis-
appearance of a holy man, Mousa Sadr. He
tors; all of these undermine the credibil-
ity of the "hit squad" stories. There are
also pieces of counterevidence, although
these are not always made available to the
U.S. public. On December 4, for example, a
UPI story from Beirut quoted "Lebanese se-
curity forces" reporting that U.S. envoy
Philip Habib was being stalked by "hit
squads." The report was printed throughout
the U.S.72 What was not reported, however,
was the denial of the report by Lebanese
Prime Minister Shafiq al-Wazzan, in his
capacity as interior minister.73 Similar
allegations of Libyan plots in Turkey74
and Greece75 cannot be confirmed.
As for the stories about the "hit
squads" allegedly stalking Reagan, there
have been reasons for skepticism from the
very beginning. Many FBI agents assigned
to the case were skeptical even early on
about the "hit squads,"76 and customs of-
ficers at many border crossings treated
the matter in a very low-key fashion.' 7
Canadian Immigration Minister Lloyd
Axworthy said that in late November, at
the time when the U.S. press was reporting
increased vigilance along the U.S.-Canadi-
an border,78 he had not received any
notification of concern from the U.S. gov-
ernment.79
The Washington Post wrote on December 7,
1981 that there were even doubts "within
the global U.S. intelligence and security
network: "some analysts" doubt that
Qaddafi "would put his name to an assassi-
nation plan which, whether [successful or
not], could lead to an incendiary after-
math." If such an assassination plan "ac-
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tually were in effect, it likely would be
a most closely guarded secret, and the
ability of an informant to obtain the kind
of detailed information on each squad mem-
ber, as is now circulating, is viewed as
highly unlikely." Some specialists believe
the reported ten-man squad is too large
and doubt that the team members were
trained in Eastern Europe because of the
"volatility of the mission and the feeling
that no nation in Eastern Europe would
take a chance on being associated with
it."
THE SPECTRE OF TERRORISM
On the home front, intelligence gather-
ing on Libyans and others in the U.S. con-
tinues. Executive Order 12333, unleashing
the CIA domestically, was signed with very
little public reaction. And the spectre of
terrorism in the U.S. has been created. In
the long run, it could be this spectre
that most benefits Reagan administration
plans. The terrorism threat can be mani-
pulated in a variety of ways to intensify
repression at home and militarism abroad.
Only by fighting the administration's
plans on both fronts can this spectre be
destroyed.
FOOTNOTES
Minneapolis.
6) NYT, 8/7/80, p.A-3.
Students Demonstrations in Washington, D.C., July 27-
August 8, 1980, Coalition for U.S.-Iran Understanding,
1) New York Times (NYT), 12/19/81, p.A-32.
2) CBS Evening News, 12/18/81.
3) NYT, 12/18/81, p.B-7.
4) Washi ton Post (WP), 7/30/80, p.B-1.
5) WP, 7/28/80, p.A-1; and Events Stemming from Iranian
8) MT, 8/8/80, p.A-1.
by the administration to
bring the campaign against Libya home to
Americans has not been a huge success as
of late December 1981. Skepticism grows
and the "hit squads" remain as elusive as
ever. Still, the Reagan administration has
obviously exploited the public hue and cry
to take certain actions against Libya and
its opponents here at home. "One senior
White House aide" admitted to Time that
the publicity led the government to "speed
up" its deliberations about sanctions
against Libya.80 It is generally believed
that economic sanctions will follow the
withdrawal of Americans from Libya. Month-
ly U.S. oil purchases from Libya were
halved from April to August, contributing
to the havoc threatening the Libyan econo-
my; the hope is that this disruption can
be increased. The possibility of freezing
Libyan assets in the U.S. has been ex-
plored, but Libya, it was discovered,
keeps little money in U.S. banks.81 Fur-
ther military pressures are also under
.consideration. More maneuvers off the Gulf
of Sidra are likely for early 1982, per-
haps as soon as February.82
40 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April. 1982
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
81,
21)
22)
23)
24)
NYT, 8/10/80, p.E-3.
WP, 8/10/80, p.C-6
8/10/80, p.A-16.
8/8/80, p.8.
CBS Evening News, 12/17/81.
New York Post, 12/5/81, p.2.
Hartford Courant, 11/27/81, p.l.
WP, 7/27/80, p.3-1.
World News Tonight (ABC), 12/4/81.
cf supra, #14.
NYT, 12/4/81, pp.A-1, A-27.
CBS Evening News, 12/9/81. Boston Globe
p.18.
NYT, 12/11/81, p.A-12.
Chicago Tribune (CT), 12/10/81, p.4; 12/13/81, p.13.
Boston Herald American, 12/7/81, p.3
Philadelphia Inquirer (PI), 12/13/81, pp.A-1, A-19.
25) Similar concerns were registered in the planning be-
fore the August 1981 Gulf of Sidra maneuvers; K. 8/20/
81, p.A-16.
26) M. Shadid, The United States and the Palestinians,
New York, 1981, pp.124-125.
27) New York Daily News, 5/17/81, p.2.
28) The Middle East. September 1981, p.16.
29) The Middle East, August 1981, pp.34-36.
30) Time, 11/23/81, p.51.
31) 8 Days, 12/5/81, pp.18-19; Le Monde, 11/18/81,
32)
81,
33)
34)
35)
36)
37)
38)
39)
40)
41)
42)
43)
44)
45)
Foreign Broadcast Information
p.Q-1.
WP, 11/8/81, pp.A-1, A-4.
San Francisco Examiner SFE), 12/10/81, p.10.
Newsweek, 11/30/81, p.51.
New Statesman, 8/28/81, p.11.
Good Morning America (ABC), 10/7/81; BG, 10/7/81,
ibid.
Boston Herald American, 10/7/81, p.4.
New York Post, 1077r8-1, p.3.
NBC Magazine, 10/9/81.
BG 10/10/81, p.12.
Newsweek, 10/19/81, p.43.
WP, 10 13/81, p.D-17.
cf supra. #43.
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46) NYT, 10/25/81, p.A-1.
47) WP, 10/26/81, p.A-5
48) cf supra, #43; and cf supra, #35.
49) Corriere della Sera, 10/12/81, p.1; 10/13/81, p.l.
50) cf supra #15; 1119; #30.
51) Newsweek, 11/19/81, p.29.
52) NYT, 11/13/81, p.3.
53) WP, 11/13/81.
54) cf supra, #52.
55) cf supra, #53.
56) PI, 12/13/81.
57) cf supra, #35,
58) World News Tonight (ABC), 11/26/81; UPI dispatch,
Portland Herald, 11/27/81, p.l.
59) cf supra, #15.
60) WP, 12/8/81, p.A-15.
61) WP, 12/9/81, p.A-6.
62) LAT, 12/10/81, p.l.
63) cf supra, #30.
64) cf supra, #19.
Book Review
Inside BOSS
Gordon Winter, Inside BOSS: South Afri-
ca's Secret Police, Penguin Books, Har-
mondsworth, Middlesex, England (or 2801
John St., Markham, Ont., Canada), 1981,
640 pages, index; -X3.95 (England); $8.95
(Canada).
65) LAT, 12/12/81, p.1
66) ibid.
67) cf supra, #62.
68) New York Post, 12/10/81, p.l.
69) cf supra, 1115.
70) WP, 9/22/81, p.B-17.
71) see FBIS, 12/9/81, p.G-1.
72) BG, 12/5/81, p.l.
73) see FBIS, 12/7/81, p.G-1.
74) LAT, 12/6/81, p.l.
75) Time, 12/21/81, p.18.
76) cf supra, #24; NYT, 12/8/81, p.A-7.
77) Burlington Free Press, 11/28/81, p.1A, 2A.
78) Dallas Morning Herald, 11/28/81, p.A-1.
79) The Gazette (Montreal), 11/28/81, p.l; Globe and
Mail (Toronto) 11/28/81, p.l. 80) cf supra, #75.
81) cf supra, #22.
82) Chicago Tribune, 12/13/81, p.l.
is why he left and wrote Inside BOSS. But
why didn't he leave earlier?
Some aspects of these questions may re-
main unanswered. To his credit, however,
Inside BOSS: South Africa's Secret Police
does not spare Winter (unlike books and
articles by some former U.S. government
and intelligence officials who wrote
"If only a quarter of the facts alleged in about their careers). He takes personal
this book are shown to be true a most responsibility for monstrous actions, for
grave state of affairs is revealed." betrayals, and for his spying on hun-
Former British Prime Minister dreds of opponents of the apartheid regime
Harold Wilson, The Sunday Times, which led to their arrests, torture, and
London, June 7, 1981 in some cases deaths. Winter does not
gloss over his atrocities. Clearly, Inside
"They say once you have dined with the BOSS is not a self-serving book. It gives
devil it is difficult to leave the ban- astounding insights into the workings of
quet. My answer to that is that it's not South African intelligence: its methods,
hard when the people at the table start to its infiltration techniques, its successes
make you vomit. That is how I feel about and failures. Winter also describes BOSS's
South Africa." With these words, Gordon close collaboration with the CIA in spite
Winter begins the story of his service of some tactical differences. For these
with South African intelligence from 1963 reasons, Inside BOSS should be read by op-
to 1979. From the very beginning, he an- ponents of apartheid and other progressive
guishes over important questions: Why.did activists. The BOSS described in Winter's
he defect from BOSS (Bureau of State Secu- book is vicious and frighteningly re-
rity) at the height of his spying career? sourceful, but not invincible, as evi-
Why should we believe him now after a life denced by Winter's defection itself.
of crime, betrayal, lies and spying? . Gordon Winter, a British citizen, went
Winter answers that he was disgusted with to South Africa in January 1960 after a
himself, his work, and with the South Af- short career as a petty thief (in 1955 he
rican apartheid regime. This, he states, was sentenced to 22 months in prison) and
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arms smuggler. As he tells it, he wanted out his career which were intended to
to start a new life and became a crime counter anti-apartheid articles, to
reporter for the anti-apartheid Johannes- praise foreign supporters of South Africa,
burg Sunday Express. Winter's opportunism to create mistrust among opponents of the
("All I really care about is making top regime, or to take the heat off the South
contacts in government that I can get good African government when it found itself
stories....") was clear from the means he attacked by the media.
used to make inroads into South Africa's (Even though Winter wrote these propa-
Justice Department. He informed on a young ganda stories carefully to avoid tarnish-
couple - he Black, she White. The fact ing his liberal image, his dual role pre-
that they were in love constituted a crime vented him from carrying out his spy as-
in racist South Africa. The two were ar- signment to the fullest. For example, dur-
rested, but both managed to jump bail. To ing his stay in London he refused to in-
cover up his role in the arrests, Winter filtrate the South African Communist Party
put out the story that his own woman (SACP) there. "The SACP is the oldest and
friend had informed on the two. He then most important Communist Party in the
wrote a sympathetic story about their es- whole of Africa. ... They were far too
cape to enhance his liberal credentials. disciplined and security conscious for me.
His betrayal of that couple, Winter ... I accidentally discovered that the
writes, "certainly helped to convince se- SACP subscribed to all major newspapers in
nior police officers that I was a valuable South Africa and made a careful analysis
informer who was 'well in' with Blacks and of every political story in them. Clearly,
liberals. That is how I first made'top- then, they would have noticed some of the
level contacts at Police Headquarters in cunningly angled stories I had written for
Pretoria - which started me on the path John Vorster and H.J. van den Bergh and
towards becoming a full time spy for South drawn their own conclusions.")
African intelligence." Winter also managed Winter writes that RI was a great suc-
to build up a close relationship with then cess. At first, RI hired only White jour-
Minister of Justice John Vorster: the Min- nalists since van den Bergh considered all
ister gave Winter valuable tips, and in Blacks to be "very unreliable and mostly
exchange the Sunday Express, usually crit- inveterate liars." Out of necessity, how-
ical of the government, built up Vorster ever, RI was soon forced to hire Blacks as
as a competent man. Winter was hired by well. It was Winter's special assignment
South Africa's Security Police in 1963 af- to "vet Blacks who were being considered
ter he informed Vorster about explosives for recruitment." The method was simple. A
belonging to the African National Congress uniformed Security Police officer would
(ANC). Vorster was so excited about the approach the person to be recruited and
information that he told Winter he had to ask him or her to become a spy. Often the
meet the "Tall Man" - Hendrik J. van den officer would give the recruitee a few
Bergh, the head of the Security Police. days to think about it. Here is where
In June 1963, van den Bergh was prepar- Winter says he came in: "Off I would go
ing to create a top secret special intel- and interview the man under the pretext
ligence force, Republican Intelligence that I was a journalist compiling a big
(RI). Its specific aim, according to story which would expose the fact that the
Winter, was to enlist journalists as se- Security Police were trying to recruit
cret agents. Preferably, these journalists Black spies and informers. Explaining that
were to have liberal credentials. They the editor of my anti-apartheid newspaper
would write anti-apartheid articles to was full of indignation about this, I
build their credibility and to obtain ac- would ask the man if he knew any Blacks
cess to progressive movements. Van den who had been approached and asked to spy.
Bergh and Winter agreed, though, that I would... promise that his name would not
Winter was to have a slightly different be published in the paper."
cover - becoming known as a liberal but at If the person did not tell Winter that
the same time keeping his reputation as an they had just been approached by Security
opportunist ready to use Vorster's tips. Police, he or she was considered trustwor-
This van den Bergh plan allowed Winter to thy. If the recruitee informed Winter
be used as a propagandist. Indeed, Winter about the recruitment effort by the uni-
did occasional propaganda stories through- formed Security Police officer, the person
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would be dropped or, in many cases, van and three men attempted to strangle her.
den Bergh would switch tactics, as in the Eventually, Winnie Mandela was exiled to
case of Richard Triegaardt. the town of Brandfort, which is a five
Triegaardt told Winter that the Security mile drive from Johannesburg, to live in a
Police was trying to recruit him. Winter small concrete house without water or
informed van den Bergh, and soon after- electricity.
wards, Triegaardt was served with a 24- Winter describes all these events in a
hour house arrest order. Another person cold tone - what he did, what van den
van den Bergh tried to recruit was William Bergh did, and what happened to people on
Letlalo, an old ANC activist who lived in whom he spied. As Winter writes it, he was
a tiny house in Soweto. Letlalo's only never committed to the cause of the South
comment was: "They must be mad." He told African regime. His motivations appear to
Winter, and in return was placed under have been opportunism and ambition. No-
house arrest; after eight years of living thing could stop him, even what he calls
in such a confined area he lost the abili- "friendship" between himself and his tar-
ty to use his legs. gets. He says he "liked" Winnie Mandela,
Between 1963 and 1966, Winter checked
out about 30 such Black recruitees. To
maintain his liberal credentials, he aided
families of persons who had been arrested
(sometimes after he had informed on them);
helped one young Black man escape from
South Africa (with van den Bergh's aid);
and wrote anti-apartheid articles. By
leading this double life, Winter developed
his usefulness as a spy and retained the
trust of anti-apartheid activists, includ-
ing even Winnie Mandela. Mandela's husband
- ANC leader Nelson Mandela - is serving
life plus five years on Robben Island, one
of South Africa's most notorious prisons.
In fact, Winter writes, he got so close to
Winnie Mandela that he was able to gather
information that led to show trials or in another instance writes: "I ...
against her and some twenty others in May found out that Peter Magubane, one of
1969 and then again in August 1970. All of South Africa's famous Black photographers,
the defendants were seriously tortured; was helping [Mandela] in her secret anti-
two of them, Caleb Mayekiso and Michael apartheid activities. I knew Peter quite
Shivute, died under torture. One of Winnie well and liked him. But that didn't stop
Mandela's associates, Paulus Mashaba, me betraying him to Pretoria. He spent a
cracked under torture and signed a state- total of 586 days in detention, much of it
ment incriminating her. Despite this "con- in solitary confinement."
fession," all of the accused had to be ac- Eventually, to preserve Winter's cover
quitted in both trials. Mashaba subse- as a liberal, van den Bergh arranged his
quently had a complete nervous breakdown imprisonment (Winter had gotten into a
as an aftereffect of torture, and has sticky situation anyway when his gun was
since been unable to speak coherently. used in a murder) and subsequent deporta-
Shortly afterwards, however, the govern- tion to England in 1966. His cover there
ment placed most of the acquitted under was that of a "freelance journalist spe-
house arrest or banning orders. In addi- cializing in South African affairs" and
tion, van den Bergh unleashed the dirty "Black affairs in Britain." His intelli-
tricks department against Mandela. A rumor gence contact was Piet Schoeman, "who
was planted that she was an agent since posed as a First Secretary [in the Embas-
she had gotten off twice, Security Police sy] but in fact was the head of South Af-
visited her employer, and BOSS launched rica's intelligence network in Britain."
terror attacks against her. A petrol bomb Another contact was Charlotte Hamilton who
was thrown into her apartment, "someone" was officially listed as Schoeman's secre-
broke into her home, her car was stolen, tary.
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(Inside BOSS gives the names of several atives to Pretoria." He also spied on
other South African intelligence officers journalists who were about to travel to
hiding under diplomatic cover: J. Fourie South Africa and informed van den Bergh
(in London in 1976), A.H. "Alf" Bouwer, about their politics. A number of them
one of Winter's superiors in London (today were then barred from entering South Afri-
he is the head of BOSS in the Transkei), ca.
Marie Joubert (now married, Moshoff), One of the organizations Winter was in-
Brian Campbell, Vlok Delport (worked structed not to spy on was Amnesty Inter-
closely with BOSS as Chief Information Of- national (AI). Van den Bergh told him that
ficer at the South African Embassy in Lon- BOSS's "American friends know most of Am-
don), Chris van der Walt, "a BOSS propa- nesty's secrets.... If you think about it,
gandist based at the South African Embassy the CIA would be stupid if they didn't
[in London] as its press attache," and take advantage of an organization like Am-
Carl Noffke, BOSS "resident propaganda man nesty." Through van den Bergh, Winter reg-
in Washington under cover of being an in- ularly received information on AI that the
formation counsellor at the... Embassy CIA was sharing with BOSS. Some of it in-
there in 1978.") cluded "photocopies of documents which had
While in London, among other things, clearly been taken from Amnesty's files in
Winter became a regular contributor to Fo- London."
rum World Features (FWF), a CIA front BOSS was not officially founded until
headed by Cecil Eprile. Winter is certain May 1969. However, Winter writes, from the
that Eprile knew he was a South African beginning it was "just the old Republican
agent. FWF's chairperson was Brian Crozier Intelligence network given a new name and
who, Winter was told by van den Bergh, legalized by parliament." For Winter and
"was a member of British intelligence." the other RI agents, the creation of BOSS
Winter's description of FWF is interest- didn't change much of their work. As in
ing. "A lot of nonsense was published his "journalistic" career in South Africa,
about Forum World.Features" when it was Winter quickly got to know many anti-
uncovered as a CIA front in 1975. "One fa- apartheid activists and South African ex-
mous newspaper claimed that it had been iles in London. He sent hundreds of re-
set up solely to place 'rightwing propa- ports to van den Bergh. One of the move-
ganda' all over the world. Nothing could ments he reported on was the "Stop the
be further from the truth. Such activity Seventy Tour" (STST), an organization set
would have immediately raised suspicion up to stop South Africa's Springboks rugby
from the left and Forum's credibility team from playing in England. It was led
would have dropped to zero. On the con- by Peter Hain, a member of Britain's Young
trary, Forum had sense enough to recruit Liberal Movement, and, as Winter describes
dozens of well-known left-wingers... as it, it was a "phenomenal success" in spite
regular specialist writers, who gave Forum of a disinformation campaign well orches-
a balanced image." According to Winter, trated by BOSS. Winter, who emphasizes the
the CIA used FWF once in a while for anti- tremendous importance White South Africans
Soviet propaganda, or for "articles de- give to events like the Springboks tour,
signed to test the attitudes and reactions went to all the rugby games to take pic-
of governments in various parts of the tures of the demonstrators. To cover up
world." Primarily, FWF was formed "to act his own work, Winter told British newspa-
as an information-gathering network for pers that British intelligence was taking
the CIA and act as a conduit which laun- pictures, thus creating a national outcry
dered money paid to the CIA's journalist against these police state measures.
spies.... Forum was also useful when the Winter drafted a 60-page report on STST
CIA needed to get its top operatives to and Peter Hain for BOSS. Partly due to
political hot-spots in a hurry with a tem- Winter's efforts, Hain was brought to
porary cover." trial in Britain for organizing a disrup-
Winter's task in London was to infil- tion of the Springboks games, but was ac-
trate the anti-apartheid movement and try quitted. Later on, BOSS managed to have
to find information embarrassing to South him arrested on a framed-up bank robbery
Africa's opponents. "While in London from charge. According to Winter, South African
1966 to February 1974 I attended every ma- intelligence also used rightwing Britons
jor demo and submitted at least 4,000 neg- in their propaganda work, including MPs
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Enoch Powell, Harold Soref, John Biggs- says he started-to become aware of the
Davidson, and Patrick Wall, and secretly living conditions of Blacks. It was a de-
funded pro-South Africa groups such as vastating experience. Winter's relation-
the Anti-Communist Movement and the Chris- ship with BOSS came to an end when the
tian League of Southern Africa. daughter of his maid was arrested. Winter
Winter's biggest exploit described in claims he called the Security Police right
Inside BOSS was the Jeremy Thorpe affair. away and was assured the woman would not
Thorpe was the leader of the Liberal Party be tortured. After she was released,
- hated by the South African regime. Winter learned that she had been brutally
Winter ruined Thorpe's career by exposing tortured - at the very same time Winter
his love affair with male model Norman was being assured that she would be well
Scott. Winter first passed the information treated.
to BOSS, and after several months leaked That was the last straw, says Winter. He
it to the British media. The story had was going to defect. However, he almost
wide reverberations, and Winter's work changed his mind about leaving ("Being the
for BOSS was exposed during the revela- kind of opportunist that I am....") when
tions in 1974. Winter had to go back to he got.a chance to enter into a very prom-
South Africa. ising publishing venture, but his wife
In 1976, he joined The Citizen, a daily told him: "Money will never buy you self
created and owned by BOSS. "I was Preto- respect. If you stay, I go." So they left.
ria's number one hatchetman; a character Winter managed to smuggle out eight large
assassin.... Not that I had to write lies filing cabinets with all his notebooks, a
all the time when BOSS instructed me to card index of persons he had spied on, and
smash or smear anyone. The unscrupulous dozens of secret BOSS documents. He set-
journalist... can pervert the truth by tied in Ireland and began to write Inside
concentrating on the negative and di- BOSS.
minishing the positive." Smearing people, By detailing his career and activities,
says Winter, isn't very hard. For example, Winter illustrates the workings of BOSS as
if you want to do in an author of a book a whole. But he does more. Inside BOSS in-
critical of South Africa: "There are so cludes chapters on the CIA, conditions in
many ways a hatchetman can attack a book. South African prisons, torture, Military
If the author had written anything unkind Intelligence, and BOSS's "Z" Squad,
or controversial about anybody I tele- founded in the late 1960s for assassina-
phoned them and got them to call him a tions. ("Z" assassinated Abraham Tiro and
liar. If the author had used unassailable "Boy" Mvemve, among others.)
facts I attacked his grammar to suggest he In his chapter on Military Intelligence
was uneducated.... If the author used dam- Winter writes that South Africa has sent
aging statistics to prove his case con- "demolition experts" into Zambia; in col-
vincingly, I pulled out the old cliche laboration with the CIA, then-Defense Min-
that statistics can be made to lie.... If ister P. W. Botha sent 200 troops to fight
the book was written in a racy style I in the Biafra civil war in 1976; General
called him a crude person.... If the book Magnus Malan (now Defense Minister) set up
was neither vulgar, sexy or racy then it a fake "liberation" movement in Mozam-
was stodgy and heavy to plough through.... bique; and South Africa is deeply involved
If he took a reasonable stance on Russia in aiding Jonas Savimbi in Angola. (After
... he was a crypto-Communist. That meant: the defeat of South African troops in An-
'He's a Communist but I can't prove it ' gola, military intelligence quickly pro-
Any opponent of apartheid who was obvious- duced a "pathetic documentary film" to
ly not a Communist could be tagged 'a Com- show that, of course, South Africa would
munist dupe."' Winter became a propaganda have defeated the MPLA if the U.S. had not
master who, as he had done as a spy, dam- ended its cooperation. According to
aged the lives of numerous people. Winter, this film, "The Angola File," was
At the end of Inside BOSS, Winter de written mainly by Brian Crozier.)
scribes two events that he says made him Winter also describes relations between
leave BOSS. He claims his turnaround agan BOSS (now renamed Department of National
when his son Guy was born in July 1976. Security) and British intelligence. The
Holding his newborn son, he suddenly CIA's working relationship with BOSS (as
thought, "Blacks have babies too." P- evidenced by, for example, their sharing
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Terrorism and Lies
The Mozambican Resistance Movement (MRM) MRM. On June 3, 1980, in a joint operation
set up by South African and Rhodesian in- by Zimbabwean and Mozambican security
teZZigence to fight the Front for the Lib- forces in the Province of Manica (in Mo-
eration of Mozambique (FRELIMO) is still zambique, 30 miles from the Zimbabwean
active today. However, it has not acquired border) MRM headquarters in Mozambique was
a popular base and depends solely on sup- destroyed and some 600 MRM supporters were
port from South Africa and wealthy Portu- either captured or killed in the battle.
guese who left Mozambique after the There are strong indications that South
FRELIMO victory, and on assistance from African aid to the MRM was stepped up af-
remnants of the Portuguese intelligence ter this defeat. MRM training camps and
agency PIDE. Gordon Winter thinks the MRM its radio transmitter were moved into
is the "most successful clandestine opera- South Africa, and the MRM obviously has no
tion ever mounted" by the South African shortage of weapons. It is sabotaging pow-
government: "I know all about this move- er lines and port facilities, but its ac-
ment because I was its number one propa- tivities are largely limited to the south-
gandist from the start.... When I first ernmost part of Manica province, where it
started glorifying its exploits in July is supplied by South Africa from the air.
1977 it existed in name only. The sabotage MRM's terrorism is often aimed at communal
acts it was supposed to have made inside villages because these villages are creat-
Mozambique were secretly carried out by ing a new society and eradicating the rem-
the South African Army's 'Reconnaissance nants of the old colonialist power struc-
Commando,' a crack unit of... specially ture. MRM assassinates and mutilates
trained commandos." FRELIMO supporters and tries to "enforce a
These commandos carried out hit-and-run complete separation between the local pop-
terrorist actions inside Mozambique and uZation and the state trading circuits."
Winter then propagandized that the MRM For example, "use of salt and sugar in
"consisted of many small pockets of six or cooking is punished because these products
seven men who operated from secret... can only be obtained through government
camps in remote areas deep in the Mozambi- channels." (Africa Now, Oct. 1981) This is
can bush." Winter also wrote that the MRM the very scone tactic used by Jonas
had "hundreds of members" who were part of Savimbi's UNITA in southern Angola.
an "ever growing feeling of rebellion South African units still apparently
against President Samora Machel.... That take part in some MRM operations inside
gave the impression that there was wide- Mozambique. On October 14, 1981, for exam-
spread discontent amongst the Black civil- pZe, Mozambican armed forces killed three
ian population." To explain where the MRM South African soldiers along with what Mo-
got their weapons, Winter told his readers zambique radio described as "three...
that they used "Russian AK47 machine guns armed bandits" who were trying to sabotage
and Chinese rocket launchers stolen during a railway line in Manica. The South Afri-
hit-and-run attacks on FRELIMO soldiers." can government denies that its troops are
The BOSS-run newspaper Winter worked for, involved in sabotage and terrorism in Mo-
The Citizen, also published photos of the zambique, but at the same time South Afri-
MRM "training in Mozambique" which in re- can aggression, such as the raid into
aZity were taken by South African inteZZi- Maputo in January 1981, is a matter of
gence a few miles outside Pretoria. public record.
Eventually, MRM was extended to include To counter this aggression, Mozambique
discontented Mozambicans, former PIDE mem- and Zimbabwe have signed a security pact
bers and people opposed to the revolution. and announced that "an attack on Mozam-
MRM was also actively supported by Rhode- -bique shall be an attack on Zimbabwe and
sia's Ian Smith and Abel Muzorewa, and had vice versa." At the same time, FRELIMO is
training camps inside Rhodesia. With the training a people's militia as its most
defeat of the White minority rule in Zim- important weapon against foreign subver-
babwe, things began to Zook worse for the sion.
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of information about Amnesty Internation- investments are concerned."' And this is
al) is a close one, but at the same time where the CIA and BOSS part company: "To
their strategies are somewhat different, ensure there will always be their kind of
as van den Bergh explained to Winter. BOSS stability, [the CIA has] tried to bring
is absolutely committed to the apartheid the government down in a variety of ways -
system and White minority rule, while "the mainly by building up Black leaders in
CIA backs all the dark horses in the race South Africa who will toe the Washington
so that, whichever mount wins, America line should they come to power."
will have a share of the prize money - our The CIA tactic, writes Winter, has had
strategic mineral deposits and, almost as limited success due to the fact that al-
important, our vast and cheap Black labor most all opponents of apartheid refuse to
force." have anything to do with the U.S. So as of
"The only language the moneybags in the now, the BOSS strategy of brutal repres-
West understand," van den Bergh continued, sion is the "going strategy" in South Af-
is for the South African government to rica. And this is where Gordon Winter has
propagandize about the country's mineral performed an important service. As an in-
wealth being threatened by Communist in- sider, he has exposed BOSS and South Afri-
surgency. Therefore, van den Bergh says, can repression as never before.
the "moneybags" are trying hard to get the At the end of Inside BOSS, Winter raises
South African government to change its an obvious question: Are the CIA and other
policy on apartheid "as they could not be intelligence agencies "up to the same kind
seen to be investing in a country which of tricks, smear techniques, lies, distor-
insisted on continuing such a policy. 'But tions, disinformation, and deceit as those
they are hypocrites. They don't give a fig used by BOSS?" Winter answers that with
about apartheid or the so-called plight of the favorite saying of his former "spy-
the Blacks. All they care about is ensur- master and mentor," General H. J. van den
ing political stability in South Africa, Bergh. "They'd be stupid if they didn't."
the land of milk and honey as far as their - K.E. -
British Right Censors for South Africa
by M. Richard Shaw
At a time when the U.S. Congress is threatened libel suit.
passing the so-called Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act to suppress revela- "D" NOTICES
tions of U.S. intelligence operations, it
is of interest to observe how similar, po- "D" Notices were established in 1912 to
litically "unpalatable" items are sup- "guide" the press away from the pitfalls
pressed in Britain. British censorship of the new Official Secrets Act, but they
takes several forms. The chief means to be carry no legal force whatsoever. The pro-
examined in this article are "D" Notices gram is run by a committee of newspaper
("D" stands for Defense), the Official Se- editors and civil servants'(from Minis-
crets Act; and libel laws. In additon, tries connected with defense) out of Room
CounterSpy is printing excerpts from Be- 6370, Ministry of Defense, Whitehall, Lon-
yond the Pale by Derrick Knight,l a book don.2 A "D" Notice begins by covering the
about South African ties to the British distinction between D.I.5 and D.I.6, two
Right, which was censored because of a British intelligence agencies. (D.I.5
(Mark Richard Shaw is a freelance jour-
nalist in Britain. Special thanks to him
also for his assistance in preparing the
book review of inside BOSS.)
deals with "internal subversion" and
"state security;" D.I.6 with "foreign
subversion.") The Notice continues:
Attempts are made by foreign powers to
plant stories in the British Press. A
variation of this technique, which must be
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taken into account where the activities of Independent Television franchises -
foreign intelligence services are con- learned about the matter. It ordered
cerned, is the planting in an overseas
newspaper or other publication of a piece Granada to cut the reference out.4
of information about British Intelligence
matters with an eye to stimulating the THE OFFICIAL SECRETS ACT
British Press not only to repoublish (sic)
the story but also expand on it. You are
requested not to publish anything about: The Act functions both as a powerful de-
a) secret activities of the British in- terrent to investigations of the security
telligence or counter-intelligence ser- services, and as a threat to those em-
vices undertaken inside or outside the UK ployed within the services who could pos-
for the purposes of national security;
b) identities, whereabouts and tasks of sibly reveal information about their work.
persons of whatever status or rank who are After all, in order to get a job, all civ-
or have been employed by either Service; it servants have to sign the Act.
c) addresses and telephone numbers used The first Official Secrets Act, in 1889,
by either Service;
d) organisational structures, communica- dealt with people who passed on State se-
tions networks, numerical strength, secret crets, yet at the same time - unaccount-
methods and training techniques of either ably - imposed no penalties 'on anyone who
Service; received them. The 1911 Act - rushed
e) details of assistance given by the
police forces in Security Service opera- through Parliament during a bout of spy
tions; fever in the run-up to World War I -
f) details of the manner in which well- blocked that loophole and did more be-
known intelligence methods (e.g. telephone sides. The Act prohibits any unofficial
tapping) are actually applied or of their
targets and purposes where these concern disclosure of information about the work-
national security. Reference in general ings of central government. Both the sup-
terms to well-known intelligence methods pliers and the recipients of such informa-
is not precluded by this sub-paragraph; tion are liable to prosecution under Sec-
g) technical advances by the British
Services in relation to their intelligence tion 2 and face up to two years in prison.
and counter-intelligence methods whether Section 1, normally called the "spying"
the basic methods are well-known or not. clause, forbids the disclosure of informa-
You are also requested to use extreme "might ~
discretion in reporting any apparent dis-
closures of information puublished (sic) rectly, useful to an enemy"5 and provides
abroad purporting to come from members or any lawbreaker with a penalty of up to
former employees of either Service. If you fourteen years in jail.
are in any doubt please consult the Secre- An "official secret" need have no mili-
tary.
You are also requested not to elaborate tary connection, need not be of interest
on any information which may be published to a foreign power, need not even be par-
abroad about British intelligence. On all ticularly secret - just as long as it is
these limitations some relaxation may be official information. Anyone holding an
office under the Crown, whether a soldier,
When Granada Television produced a docu- sailor, Cabinet Minister, Social Security
mentary about the Official Secrets Act, official, policeman or postman, could be
the "D" Notice Committee requested that prosecuted for revealing information dis-
the address and function of the Government covered in the course of his or her work
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ, roughly to anyone else - unless specifically au-
equivalent to the U.S. National Security thorized to do so. (This also applies to
Agency) be deleted from the film, as this former government employees, no matter how
revelation was a breach of "D" Notice No. long ago they left their jobs, and to em-
11, information regarding "Cyphers and ployees of any company that has a contract
Communication."(Other sections include in- with any government department).
formation on nuclear weapons, British in- In Britain, it could be a crime for a
telligence services, radio and radar journalist to receive - or try to receive
transmissions, defense plans, weapons sys- - information about river pollution, safe-
tems and aircraft engines). Granada re- ty checks, equipment costs, prison condi-
fused and pointed out that the GCHQ's ad- tions or the amount of tea drunk at the
dress was publicly available in Whitaker's Foreign Office, just to give a few exam-
Almanac. Then the British Independent ples of information that is officially se-
Broadcasting Authority - which monitors cret. To quote a former head of D.I.5,
all TV and radio programs, and allocates "It is an official secret if it's in an
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official file."6 Christian Aid, completed his book in early
If an item is not covered by a "D" No- 1981. A couple of days,prior to publica-
tice or the Official Secrets Act, there tion, his publishers, Kogan Page, received
are "other means" by which censorship can six legal letters. The one from the ISC
be effected: articles by investigative threatened a legal restraining order. It
journalists can be suppressed; courageous charged that Knight's chapter on ISC was
editors can be leaned on by management, or libelous, and initiated a protracted pro-
threatened by the local government, police cess to stop publication of the material.
and companies and promised a future full All copies of the book were withdrawn from
of non-cooperation; and management can be circulation pending receipt of a writ,
threatened by the government with curtail- which was served on July 6, 1981.
ment of lucrative government advertising. Ironically, the text of the writ provid-
These "other means" have even included the ed a highly accurate description of the
threat and actualization of physical vio- ISC. It accused Knight of implying that
lence.7 the ISC is "a covert political organiza-
tion merely masquerading as an objective
LIBEL LAWS and impartial body of educational re-
search, in contravention to the laws of
Libel laws are intended to protect the England and Wales relating to charitable
innocent from inaccurate coverage in the trusts." (The ISC registered as a chari-
media and to provide for redress in a table trust in 1970, and not as a politi-
court of law. Something quite different cal group.) In addition, Knight had, they
occurred in the case of Derrick Knight and claimed, called the ISC "extreme rightwing
hjs book, Beyond the Pale, about links be- and politically subversive" and "directly
tween South Africa and rightwing groups in or indirectly a tool of the South African
Britain. In this case the supposedly "in- government and the CIA." According to
nocent" party was the Institute for the Knight, the ISC "did not object to the
Study of Conflict (ISC - a rightwing think quotations and references used-but to
tank with intelligence links, comparable the overall implication of the ISC being a
to the Georgetown University Center for 'political body,"' and not a charitable
Strategic and International Studies in the trust.
U.S.). Here are excerpts from the material
Knight, an employee of the London-based which the ISC charged was libelous:
THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF CONFLICT Crozier, an Australian journalist who had worked
for Reuters, the News Chronicle and for the Econ-
The Institute for the Study of Conflict was omist's confidential Economic Report, was ap-
founded in 1970 by Brian Crozier. It maintains a pointed to run it. FWF, as it became known, grew
small staff and office at 12 Golden Square in into a large and highly professional news service
London's West End. Its main work is the prepara- which became an accepted news source, especially
tion of research projects and seminars, the pub- for material on Third World countries. FWF also
lication of a monthly journal, and the occasional sponsored books, one of which was Chile's Marxist
commission and publishing of special reports Experiment by Robert Moss, an outright condemna-
called 'conflict studies'. tion of the elected government of President
ISC traces its ancestry to the Congress for Allende.
Cultural Freedom which began in 1949 and was the The nominal owners of Forum were Kern House En-
US Central Intelligence Agency's major Cold War terprises in the United States whose chairman-
cultural effort. The Congress was a grouping of ship devolved on Richard Mellon Scaife in 1973.
mainly European intellectuals which the CIA man- He is an American oil and banking magnate, heir
aged to dominate through its American Founda- to the Gulf Oil family income, director of the
tion's generous budgets. The literary magazine Mellon National Bank in Pittsburgh and thus an
Encounter (not to be confused with the CLSA* En- ideal figure to lend financial respectability to
counter) was the focus of the Congress's activi- Forum. He made reassuring announcements about
ties in Britain. Encounter also ran a small fea- Forum's profitable future but in 1975 suddenly
tune service called the Forum Service. In 1965 closed it down. The links between the CIA and
this became Forwn World Features and Brian the Congress for Cultural Freedom had been re-
* Christian League of Southern Africa, a propa- vealed by the American magazine Ramparts in 1967.
ganda organization funded by the South African After that several journalists started probing
government and, according to Gordon Winter in In- FWF and it was only .a matter of time before its
side BOSS (see book review in this issue), a cover was blown. Scaife appears later in anoth-
front for South African military intelligence. er role, this time as partner to John McGoff in a
South-Africa-financed attempt to buy the American
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newspaper Sacramento Union to give the National-
ist government a voice in the United States
press....
GORDON WINTER - SPY AND REPORTER FOR FWF
Before leaving the subject of FWF, Gordon
Winter should be mentioned. He worked for Forum
for seven years during which time he was, as he
has subsequently confessed, an intelligence agent
for South Africa's Bureau of State Security
(BOSS). Winter first went to South Africa in
1960 and got a job as crime reporter on the Jo-
hannesburg Sunday Express. In an interview on
television in 1979 he said that the country was
good to him and he wanted to do something in re-
turn. He became a spy. He was deported from
South Africa in somewhat mysterious circumstances
and worked as a freelance journalist, which work
included assignments for FWF. He specialized in
stories about South African exiles and attended
many anti-apartheid meetings. He was a familiar
and unwelcome figure. His camera recorded all
personalities attending such meetings and, while
suspected of being a South African agent, no one
had proof. As part of his journalistic work he
became membership secretary of the National Union
of Journalists' London freelance branch and as a
result had access to the files and address lists
of well known opponents of apartheid.
One of Winter's tasks was to discredit such
people and especially the Liberal Party whose
members at the time (1969/70) were dramatically
involved in the boycott of sporting links with
South Africa and other anti-apartheid campaigns.
It was Winter who, in 1971, somehow got hold of
the story about Jeremy Thorpe's relationship with
Norman Scott and tried, unsuccessfully, to sell
it to Fleet Street. The South African covert op-
eration against the Liberals intensified ? ring
the run-up to the 1974 election. There were sus-
picions that the arrest of Peter Hain for an al-
leged bank robbery was an attempted frame-up to
undermine the work of the Young Liberals.* There
was also a broadsheet called The Hidden Face o
the Liberal Party which was wily distributed in
a number of constituencies including that of the
Bodmin Liberal Paul TyZer.# Tyler said that
there was a lot of speculation at the time as to
how the addresses were obtained. This broadsheet
was published by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith's Foreign
Affairs Publishing Co.2 Its content was mainly
concerned with identifying the Liberals with var-
ious forms of political violence and terrorism
and proving that the driving forces behind the
party were politically ultra-left-wing and not
the moderate ones the Liberal manifesto was pro-
moting.
Gordon Winter returned to South Africa the day
before the 1974 British General Election. The
circumstances were as strange as those surround-
ing his deportation from that country in the
1960s. For a time he worked again on the Johan-
nesburg Sunday Express and then left to join The
Citizen, the paper created and funded covertly by
* According to Winter, Hain was indeed framed by
South Africa's intelligence agency BOSS.
50 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - AnrJ.1. 1AR2
the Department of Information. In the wake of
Muldergate, he fled South Africa and went into
hiding. In a television interview on London
Weekend TV on 29 June 1979 he told part of his
story and hinted at more to come.
LINKS BETWEEN THE INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF
CONFLICT AND FWF
The links between the new Institute for the
Study of Conflict and the old Forum World Fea-
tures were strong ones. Not only Brian Crozier
but Forum's managing director lain Hamilton left
to become ISC's Director of Studies and the Forum
Library went with them. ISC has a 10-man Council
which includes Sir Robert Thompson, the counter-
insurgency expert, Vice-Admiral Louis de Bailly,
former Director-General of Intelligence at the
Ministry of Defence 1972-1975, Sir Edward Peck,
former chairman of the Joint Intelligence Commit-
tee, and Professors Max Beloff and Leonard
Schapiro. The Institute's full-time fund-raiser
is another general who is described as a Defence
Services Consultant. He is Major-General Ling,
who has been on the staff since the early days.
According to a background paper prepared by State
Research in October 1977, the ISC operates by of-
fering its 'technical expertise' on 'subversion'
and on 'communist influence' to official bodies -
including the military, the police, other govern-
ment bodies and business. Its contacts in the
public service and business have helped it re-
cruit the 2,000 or so subscribers who make up the
bulk of the t 30,000-plus annual budget which it
uses. However, ISC's technical expertise brings
with it, says State Research, a highly political
line. Its anti-communism extends not only to so-
cialists and radicals, but to all social demo
crats and liberals. Those who favour progressive
changes or seem to be 'soft' on 'communism' are
in their eyes fellow-travellers. In its own pro-
spectus the jargon used is 'the defence of free
industrial societies against totalitarian en-
croachments' and the field covered includes 'sub-
version, particularly in industry and all system-
atic attempts to undermine society, in the uni-
versities, Parliament, government and other
fields'.
One of the ISC's conflict studies in 1979 was
called 'World Council of Churches Programme to
Combat Racism'. It was commissioned from Canon
George Austin, a member of the Church of England
General Synod since 1970. He has made at least
two visits to South Africa as an official guest
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of the government, as he freely admits. In his
essay on the WCC he demands that 'it must turn
with some urgency away from the path of conflict,
confrontation and non-acceptance of dissent and
renew its.. .ministry of reconciliation'. Canon
Austin's analysis seems to have fallen on deaf
ears. It raised no significant debate and its
conclusions have been overtaken by events.
'Conflict Studies' are significant in that vir-
tually a whole edition will find its way onto the
files of dozens of board rooms, ministries and
information-gathering organizations, becoming
perhaps the only reference work consulted. Thus
a set of ready-made opinions or prejudices are
ccnvenier,tly at hand for future decision-makers.
The four-figure print run of each paper is auto-
matically distributed by subscription.
The ISC has close ties with the Freedom Asso-
ciation. Brian Crozier was one of the people who
signed the National Association of Freedom (its
former name) articles of association when it was
founded and he and Sir Robert Thompson are mem-
bers of their Council. Robert Moss, a former
director of NAF, is a close associate of Crozier.
Moss wrote recently in Free Nation that the ISC
was 'the most valuable research centre on subver-
sion and communism in Western Europe'. Crozier
writes regularly for The Free Nation. Both orga-
nizations maintain links with other similar-mind-
ed bodies such as Aims for Freedom and Enterprise
- now Aims,3 the Economic League and Common
Cause.
The Freedom Association is a pressure group
which sets out to campaign on a non-party politi-
cal basis for the 'preservation of freedom in the
United Kingdom' but in effect plays exclusively
on the instruments and with the tunes of the
ultra-right. Its monthly (once fortnightly) pa-
per The Free Nation carries a regular feature
Pulpit Watch and in the issue of 25 May 1979 car-
ried a mud-slinging article attacking Christian
Aid, echoing the phraseology and arguments of the
Christian Affirmation Campaign.
The Free Nation has more than once carried ad-
vertisements for the Christian League of South-
ern Africa and these adverts have been Photo-
statted by the CLSA and circulated in their own
mailings as warranty of their acceptability in
respectable political circles. Earlier issues of
The Free Nation contained articles attacking the
World Council of Churches. The December 1978 is-
sue, for instance, included selected extracts
from the General Synod of the Church of England
headed 'The Church is Condoning Murder'. There
was also a review of The Bear at the Back Door
one of the publications of the Foreign Affairs
Publishing Co., an article on the 'leftwards
leaning' charity war on Want and a puff for the
1979 BBC Reith lectures by Edward Norman which
attacked the politics of compassion.
Previous director of the NAF was Robert Moss,
who has spoken frequently in favour of authori-
tarian dictatorship in Britain,4 is a staunch
supporter of the Chilean Junta Zed by General
Pinochet and a former speech writer for Margaret
Thatcher. He has written several books with anti-
communist themes and contributed 'conflict stud-
ies' for fellow Australian Brian Crozier's ISC.
As a journalist he writes 'Foreign Report' for
the prestigious Economist and also contributes a
Monday morning column to the Daily Telegraph.
Moss and Crozier are members of what the press
have come to regard as the New Right, along with
Edward Norman and other academics of the Peter-
house Set - the group of Cambridge scholars who
urge the virtues of possessive individualism and
the gospel of anti-collectivism across a range of
disciplines, and the Milton Friedman school of
economists known as the Chicago Boys, whose mone-
tary theories General Pinochet applied Zike a
scourge to the problems of post-AZZende Chile and
which are now, in an adapted form, being applied
to Britain.
Another former director of the Freedom Associa-
tion was John Gouriet who, apart from supporting
the management of Grunwick in its struggle with
the unions had previously challenged, in the
courts, a boycott of the South African regime by
the British Postal Workers Union. On 8 February
1977, in the midst of this controversy, the Club
of Ten, a mysterious group of South African busi-
nessmen, placed a quarter-page advertisement in
the London Daily Telegraph which challenged Tom
Jackson, the secretary of the Postal Workers
Union, to announce a boycott of postal and tele-
graphic services to the Soviet Union, East Germa-
ny and Angola. The Club of Ten, which was later
revealed as a front organization of the South Af-
rican Government, occupied a suite of offices
(Suite 66) in the same building as the NAF (Suite
63).
THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION (FARI)
Both the Institute for the Study of Conflict
and the Freedom Association have links with the
Foreign Affairs Research Institute (FARI). This
is the body founded by Geoffrey Stewart-Smith in
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1976 with an office at No.27, Whitehall. Both oration slush funds in the wake of the Muldergate
Brian Crozier and Robert Moss are board members Scandals.
and FARI's chairman is Sir Frederic Bennett, the In the Sunday Telegraph, 25 March 1979,
Conservative MP who was host at the 1977 BiZder- Stewart-Smith said that FARI 'was in contact with
berg Conference in Torquay. Council members in- many similar institutes in other countries' and
elude several other stalwarts from the right wing added: 'Many of the institutes we deal with are
of the Conservative Party such as Julian Amery, a government financed, and you can draw what con-
former junior Minister of Defence and outspoken cZusions you like from that. We do not object to
supporter of the South African status quo. it.,
FARI, like the other Stewart-Smith interests, A conference arranged by the Foreign Affairs
aims 'to inform cabinet ministers, leading poli- Association of South Africa on the strategic role
ticians, senior civil servants and other persons of minerals in Southern Africa was held in Swazi-
of influence' about the dangers to the West. It land in June 1976. Speakers included Peter Janke
mainly publishes abstracts, book reviews and of the ISC and the conference's principal
short papers related to this theme. speeches were published in London by FARI.
FARI has in the past arranged several visits of
prominent people to South Africa on behalf of the
South Africa Freedom Foundation or the Foreign
Affairs Association. According to the Sunday
Telegraph, 25 March 1979, Lord Chalfont was one
of them. Sir Frederic Bennett, talking to Guard-
ian journalists David PaZlister and David
Beresford, 24 March 1979, said he had been asked
many times by the South African Government to
suggest names of MPs who might want to go to
South Africa. He mentioned Dr. Denys Rhoodie as
one of his contacts, and Professor Nic Rhoodie,
who had invited him to lecture in South Africa at
a conference. Both the South African Foreign Af-
fairs Association and the South Africa Freedom
Association were closed down when they were re-
vealed as the recipients of Department of Infor-
THE BRIGHTON CONFERENCE
JUNE 1978
Another and important piece of collaboration
was the conference held at-Brighton in June 1978
jointly sponsored by the ISC, FART, Aims for
Freedom and Enterprise and the American National
Strategy Information Centre. The South African
director of the Foreign Affairs Association, C.F.
de Villiers, was present, as was Admiral James
Johnson, a former head of the South African Navy,
plastic surgeon Dr. Jack Penn and Gideon Roos of
the South African Institute of International Af-
fairs. Another important guest was Richard Mellon
Scaife.
One of the main subjects of the Brighton Con-
ference was a plan to set up a world anti-commu-
inevitably mean the barbarization of the
planet, it will be [the] Western campaign
The Reagan administration has fairly of self-deception and evasion that will
close ties to the Foreign Affairs Re- more than anything else have contribut-
search Institute. When FARI held its ed to that... outcome." Numerous other
"First Annual World Balance of Power Con- speakers, according to the memo, argued
ference" in Kent, England from July 30 to for stepped-up efforts to counter Soviet
August 2, 1981, it received a "message of propaganda, and called on the Reagan ad-
good will" from President Reagan himself. ministration to take the lead.
Reagan and FARI
The conference was sponsored by several
"strategic studies institutes" including
the Heritage Foundation and the National
Strategy Information Center which are
both close to the administration.
According to a memorandum written by
FARI Director Geoffrey Stewart-Smith and
obtained by CounterSpy, the conference
participants from 26 countries met "to
consider the need of the entire non-com-
munist world to respond to the Soviet
Midge Decter of the New York-based Com- former director of the Defense Intelli-
mittee for the Free World, the confer- gence Agency.
ence's "only lady speaker," warned that Stewart-Smith's memo concludes: "The...
"if the Soviets should ever succeed in Conference certainly played a useful part
their openly declared intention to subju- in starting to try and formulate a global
gate the world... for which read: to collective security alliance adequate to
bring to an end for a millennium the pos- withstand the power of the largest mili-
sibility of political liberty... if the tary war machine the world had ever
Soviets should ever succeed in what would seen."
Three representatives of the adminis-
tration were in attendance: Richard Pipes
of the National Security Council (he pro-
claimed that the Soviet Union is a "mis-
begotten experiment based on 19th century
ideas"), J. William Middendorf, U.S. Am-
bassador to the Organization of American
States (who gave a "very authoritative
statement on the U.S. Government's policy
towards its dependence upon external min-
eral and energy resources"), and Reagan's
global political and military threat." troubleshooter General Daniel Graham,
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nist organization to be financed by private com-
panies. The strong participation of the South Af-
ricans and their backina of at least one of the
conference sponsors was aimed at influencing NATO
military personnel and governments to stand by
South Africa and harden their line on the Soviet
Union. In an attempt to make the occasion an his-
toric one, the conference issued The Brighton
Declaration which stated: 'The destruction of
the CIA and other assaults on Western inteZZi-
gence sources make it imperative that the US and
its allies should again take the initiative on
intelligence, information and counter-
intelli-gence.'
THE NATIONAL STRATEGY INFORMATION CENTRE
The American sponsor of the Conference, the Na-
tional Strategy Information Centre (NSIC),* has
since its foundation in 1962 been a key cold war
institution. It has supplied money and expertise
to the extreme right in Britain. For instance, it
provided money to enable the ISC to publish its
Annual of Power and Conflict. In addition, the
minutes of the ISC's council meeting of 21 Janu-
ary 1972 noted that the NSIC was covering the
salary of a research assistant plus advertising
and printing costs of the Annual.
The NSIC committee is closely linked to the
Committee on the Present Danger (CPD),** an
American group of prominent supporters of an in-
terventionist US foreign policy which became ac-
tive very soon after President Carter's election
in 1976. The CPD has strong affiliations with
A background paper titled 'Labour's Transatlan-
tic Links' in State Research Bulletin No.16, Feb-
ruary 1980, shows that these influences have now
been brought to bear on the right wing of the
British Labour Party, as part of a widespread co-
vert campaign for greater arms spending and mili-
tant anti-communism. One of the chosen vehicles
for this is a monthly newsletter, the Labour and
Trade Union Press (LTUPS) which is seen as con-
tinuing the old CIA-backed Congress of Cultural
Freedom and the work of the Forum World Features
in the 1960s.
When State Research wrote its paper on the ISC
in 1978 it concluded that it was easy to over-es-
timate the significance of the ISC since they
were only a small group of individuals, though
with good connections. 'It is also easy', the pa-
per continued, 'to dismiss them simply because
they are not part of the mainstream of the state
and the economy. The ISC is important because of
the present political context. The liberalization
of the sixties has now been overtaken by a gener-
al swing to the right, most clearly visible in
the Conservative Party. The politics of the ISC,
which would have been considered as extreme ten-
years ago, today find a receptive ear.'
In 1980, however, it is clear that organiza-
tions such as the NSIC in America and the people
associated with it can no longer be treated as a
fringe. They play a major role in American poli-
tics and would like to extend their influence to
Britain. The swing to the right has brought them
once more to the centre of power.
American trade unions of the AFL-CIO persuasion, REFERENCES
whose record is one of collaboration with the CIA
in the development of trade unionism, in the 1) Paul Tyler in correspondence with the author.
third world especially, which would co-operate 2) See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the
with capital and provide a stable context for Foreign Affairs Publishing Co.
American investment. Both the CPD and the NSIC 3) AIMS, founded in 1942, is a pressure group
promote a tougher US stance towards the Soviet which organizes press campaigns on behalf of free
Union, and lobby for the build-up of military enterprise, makes awards for 'services to freedom
forces and the rapid development of new arms sys- and enterprise' and is also an information gath-
tems. ering centre. It is funded by block grants from
* CIA Director William Casey is one of NSIC's industry, and individual businessmen. Its direc-
founders. for Michael Ivens is active in many of the relat-
** Paul Nitze, a prominent CPD member is now head ed groups of the political right.
of the U.S. disarmament negotiation team in Gene- 4) See The Collapse 2f Democracy by Robert Moss,
va. Temple-Smith, 1976.
After reading these excerpts one is left By the time the Knight book was ready
with the impression that this chapter is for publication, the ISC apparently had
quite mild, particularly compared to mid- had enough. In an attempt to salvage what
1970s revelations about the ISC's South was left of an already tarnished reputa-
African and intelligence connections in tion, the ISC swiftly took action against
Time Out, Searchlight, and The Guardian. Knight. Knight wanted to take the case to
Journalists Andy Weir, Jonathan Bloch, and court, where he planned to provide his own
Mike Rossiter revealed that their compila- defense. He thought he could win, and
tion of the Guardian articles on the ISC hoped that publicity about the case would
had been "considerably aided" by "less re- prompt an investigation of ISC's charity
actionary members of the Conservative Par- status. Knight estimates that dozens of
ty who [were] anxious to see Mrs. Thatcher "charitable" schemes are killed off every
distance herself from the councils of the year following complaints that they are
extreme right [e.g., the ISC]...." Sur- actually political.9 However, his publish-
prisingly, the ISC took no legal action. ers, faced with sky-high legal fees,
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called a halt and settled out of court. Pale is now being published by Carat Publications.
The ISC initially wanted ?3,500 plus costs 2) See "The 'D' Notice Quangette," New Statesman,
but eventually they settled for ?1,500. 3h.take503.
3) Br) Brian W Whitaker, News Ltd., Minority Press Group
Even though he "lost" the case, Knight is Series, No.5, 1981, London, pp.70-71.
determined to continue to challenge the 4) Ibid.
charitable status of the ISC, with or
without mass media assistance.l0
Had the case gone to court, the ISC
could have counted on bad publicity and
possibly a consequent effect on their
funding. No doubt the ISC is highly
pleased with the outcome. It is a result
that affects all investigative journal-
ists: even if they write fully factual,
referenced articles, an overall article
could be deemed libelous. Such an inhibi-
tion is of great use to rightwing bodies
who want to stifle unfavorable articles
without attracting unwanted publicity.
FOOTNOTES
1) Derrick Knight is a researcher and writer for
Christian Aid in London. He has produced films for
the National Film Board of Canada, the BBC and the
United Nations. He is the co-author of A Long Look
at Short Films (Pergamon Press, 1967), and wrote
Gentlemen of Fortune (F. Muller, 1978), a history
of the exploitation of the West Indies. Beyond the
5) Quoted by Crispin Aubrey, Who's Watching You?,
Penguin Books, London, 1981, p.19.
6) Ibid. See also of supra, #3, pp.66-69.
7) See Geoff Robertson, Reluctant Judas, Temple
Smith, London, 1976; and Geoff Robertson, "Lennon:
A Case to Answer," New Statesman, Nov. 1974, pp.
690-693. Kenneth Lennon had been employed by the
Special Branch as an agent provocateur who tried
to recruit members for a new Provisional Irish Re-
publican Army cell, offered to sell arms to local
Republicans, and encouraged Sinn Fein members to
join a plot to spring the "Luton Three" from jail.
Two days after Lennon's confession to the National
Council for Civil Liberties he was murdered under
"mysterious circumstances." His murderer(s) was/
were never apprehended by the police.
8) See M. Richard Shaw, "The British Right and In-
telligence," CounterSpy, vol.6, no.1, pp.55-59.
9) The Leveller, 8/21-9/3/81, p.3.
10) Only one article of any substance appeared in
the British mass media (David Pallister, "Chari-
ties' Role Before Courts Again," The Guardian,
8/21/81, p.3). Even then, the journalist, David
Pallister, had been highly circumscribed in terms
of what he could write. The legal department of
The Guardian would not allow the ISC writ to be
quoted, according to Pallister. (Conversation with
the author.)
India: Under the IMF's Thumb
by Robin Broad
John Foster Dulles's cold war maneuvers The IMF and the World Bank, created from
of the 1950s are being replayed by the the rubble of World War II, serve transna-
Reagan administration on several levels: tional interests by convincing - often co-
loud threats of armed intervention, even ercing - developing country elites to en-
louder denouncements of any and all popu- act anti-labor, anti-protectionist and
lar movements as Soviet-inspired, domestic pro-corporate legislation. Historically,
witchhunts against leftists, and warm em- the World Bank has accomplished this by
braces for friendly dictators. Behind the advising national economic planners, con-
frontlines of the reemerging cold war tributing to actual development plans and
rages a more subtle economic war -- a war financing projects which create business
fought to subjugate Third World countries
even more deeply to Western economic and (Robin Broad is a doctoral candidate at
transnational corporate interests. The re- Princeton University. She is co-author,
cently,approved, but hotly debated, Inter- with Walden Bello, Victor BieZski, David
national Monetary Fund (IMF) superloan of KinZey and David O'Connor, of the forth-
$5.7 billion for India - the largest loan coming book, Development Debacle: The
in IMF history - is part of this second World Bank in the Philippines., to be pub-
war. The loan will cost India dearly: its lished jointly by the Philippine Solidari-
hefty price tag includes economic surren- ty Network and the Institute for Food and
der to transnational capital. Development Policy.)
54 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982
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for transnational corporations (TNCs). Its most recently incurred public wrath in a
twin institution, the IMF, has exerted its given country can defer to the other.2
pressure through a more short-term role of Both have evolved to the point where their
providing emergency loans to countries loans are accompanied by mirror-like con-
suffering balance of payments deficits - ditions to straitjacket a developing coun-
loans contingent on enactment of pro-TNC try.
"reforms." In recent years, the roles of Capitalizing on its role as donor and
the two have increasingly overlapped and bestower of'the good-housekeeping seal of
merged, with both offering badly-needed approval, without which India would be
loans in exchange for economic dependency. virtually ineligible for Western private
Among developing countries, India's bank loans, the IMF does not give its $5.7
World Bank-IMF dependency is one of the billion lightly. Indeed, the loan comes
longest. "India will... little tolerate replete with all the major caveats of the
blackmail," screamed Indian newspapers transnational corporate-led, export-ori-
back in 1956, the heart of the cold war. ented development recipe that the IMF and
Nor, the papers continued, would it accept World Bank dish out to their clients.
"hidden threats" and "humiliating condi- Paramount among these is that India's
tions" attached to international develop- strict curbs on foreign investments and
ment loans. The outcry was provoked when a monopolies must end, opening the way for
letter to the Indian finance minister from plunder of the economy by large, powerful
the World Bank president, critically as- corporate forces, both foreign and domes-
sessing India's industrial policies, was tic. Subsidies on vital foodstuffs, prin-
leaked. cipally aiding the urban poor (indeed,
once again, I wish to emphasise my con- keeping many from starving) -ill be liq-
viction that India's interest lies in uidated. Accompanying these will be a
giving private enterprise, both Indian shift towards export-led growth, sending
and foreign, every encouragement.... I the benefits of India's development to
have the distinct impression that the Western TNCs and consumers. These are all
potentialities of private enterprise part of the U.S.-dominated institution's
are commonly underestimated in India rules for how to remake a borrower into a
and that its operations are subjected better client state.
to unnecessary restrictions.... [T]he This time, however, the game had a new
respective roles of public and private twist: in the final moments before the
enterprise should not be fixed... not loan's approval, the United States played
by any theoretical concept of the role dumb and took the opportunity of the well-
that each should pZay.1 attended and just as well publicized IMF-
Replete with the World Bank president's World Bank annual meeting in October to
private directives for erasing any social- register shock over the proposed Indian
ist tendencies within the Indian economy, loan, calling for tighter conditions. This
the communication earned the finance min- was clearly a political ploy; a media
ister the epitaph of "India's public enemy event set up to intimidate India's Indira
number one." Gandhi. It was little more than a warning
Twenty-five years have passed since that of what would ensue should India edge
outbreak. But India's current struggle closer to the Soviet Union and socialism,
with Western-dominated international in- and a bit of blackmail to keep Gandhi's
stitutions reveals that little has new international economic order demands
changed. Now, India is suffocating under a muted at global meetings.
current account deficit expected to top $4 The Reagan attack was transparent. To
billion in 1981. This time the loan comes begin with, the U.S. government through
from the coffers of the IMF. But even this its representative on the IMF board, had
switch in chief disciplinarian from the seen the strict loan conditions long be-
Bank to the Fund tends to fade into irrel- fore. Indeed, the U.S. had a full six
evance on deeper analysis. As in almost months before the annual meeting to study
all major current loans, there are strong the loan, as well as to register any pro-
indications of World Bank-IMF collabora- tests.
tion, and even stronger indications that Moreover, the U.S. government knows well
these days it matters little which of the that these days the more controversial
twins is the actual donor. Whichever has conditions - such as currency devaluation
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or lowering of domestic industries' tariff 2) In the Philippines and most other developing
protection - are seldom explicitly writ- countries, it is the IMF which has a history of
domestic intervention. In these countries, the
ten into World Bank or IMF loan contracts. World Bank, capitalizing on its widely perceived
Rather, compliance with such verbally ne- clean slate, has recently assumed the dominant
gotiated (but unwritten) conditions before role. India's case, with the IMF the less sullied
the final loan agreement is even signed of the twins, is somewhat unique.
has become pro forma now for obvious rea-
sons. It enables the recipient government Ill/IF Destabilizes
to display a facade of independence, and
avoid domestic protests about external
control of the economy. At the same time,
it lets the IMF or World Bank keep its Following his participation in'the annu-
hands unsoiled while pulling the purse al International Monetary Fund/World Bank
strings even tighter; there is less oppor- conference in October 1981, Zimbabwean Fi-
tunity for a developing country to receive nance Minister Enos Nkala accused the
the money and then renege on the promised Reagan administration of trying to "dic-
policy changes. So, for instance, one is tate" internal economic policies of other
left to conjecture about the coincidence countries through the IMF and the World
of an 18 percent devaluation in the rupee- Bank. "In many areas, the ugly American
dollar exchange rate during the period hand is being seen as threatening to de-
when the IMF was weighing India's loan ap- stroy the viability of the Third World
plication. Likewise, the mid-1981 clamp- economies and their political institu-
down on strikes was carefully set up to tions," he said.l The IMF's destabilizing
give the illusion of a policy implemented power was attested to by Nkala's Pakistani
on India's own initiative. '
Continuing its charade of displeasure
over the proposed loan up to the last mo-
ments of IMF deliberations, the U.S. ab-
stained on the final vote. Abstinence,
counterpart, Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq
Khan. He told the Wall Street Journal that
if certain conditions had been placed on a
recent IMF loan to Pakistan, there would
have been political turmoil. "This govern-
however, holds little more than symbolic ment - or, at least, I - wouldn't have
value; only a veto has teeth. But the veto been here," said Ishaq.2 Even officials
was avoided since the American rumblings generally supportive of the IMF told the
over the loan were staged to generate Journal that IMF-imposed conditions could
smoke, not fire. While certain Western "cause so much turmoil they might knock a
""3
of India's deficit met by private bank From the other side of the globe, the
borrowing, U.S. state and corporate inter- president of the Bank of Mexico, Gustavo
ests were uniformly behind the conditions Romero Kolbeck said that the IMF/World
imposed via the IMF loan. Bank conference was a "tremendous disap-
Some twenty-odd years ago, Time magazine pointment." "Steps forward at the IMF are
observed that the World Bank had proven seldom large,... but from the perspective
TNCs might have preferred a larger share government out of power.
of the developing countries, this meeting
represented a retreat," he told the New
York Times. Moreover, "at the Fund meeting
the Fund, outlived the cold war as the two it became clear that terms of loan condi-
institutions flourished in the 1960s and tions [to Third World countries] will in-
1970s. Now, as Reagan beats the old drum crease in severity."4
of anti-communism, attention should not be The remarks of Nkala and Kolbeck suggest
diverted from the economic subterfuge of that the IMF has responded to the bally-
the Bank and the Fund. They are as vital hooed Reagan administration charge that
to larger U.S. corporate interests as the the IMF had become "seriously deficient"
billions of dollars of defense contracts in its loan requirements. Just before the
that fuel the cold war. IMF/World Bank conference, Beryl W.
itself one of the most effective weapons
of the cold war. History has demonstrated
that the Bank's usefulness, and that of
FOOTNOTES
1) Quoted in Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher,
The World Bank Since Bretton Woods, Brookings In-
stitute, Washington, D.C., 1973, p.372.
56 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982
Sprinkel, U.S. Under-Secretary of the
Treasury for Monetary Affairs told the
Wall Street Journal: "For various reasons,
there has been slippage in recent years.
We want to push the IMF's conditionality
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back to where it was. ("Where it was," ac- "good faith" on human rights policy in an
cording to the Journal, was demanding attempt to gain Congressional approval for
"economy-wrenching prescriptions" before a $2.5 million sale of helicopter spare
helping countries finance their import parts sought by the Guatemalan military.
bills. ) Around the same time, Treasury On November 13, the IMF approved a $110
Secretary Donald Regan told reporters that million loan to Guatemala without any ad-
the IMF should "be a little more strict"6 ministration criticism about its condi-
in its lending policy. (Both Sprinkel and tions. - by John Kelly -
Regan have also criticized World Bank pol-
icies.) IMF chief executive Jacques de FOOTNOTES
Larosier disagreed: "Rubbish... if any-
thing, the situation is getting tougher, 1) As quoted in Washington Post (WP), 10/10/81,
and our programs reflect this. Even p.A-19.
2) As quoted in Wall Street Journal (WSJ), 9/21/81,
Donald Regan later said that the IMF had p.l.
recently tightened its lending condi- 3) ibid., p.16.
t ions. 4) New York Times (NYT), 10/6/81, p.D-30.
The reason the Reagan administration is 5) cf supra, #2.
badgering the World Bank and the IMF does 7) As supra, #2, p.16/24/81, p.D-3.
not indicate a conflict of interests. It 8) cf supra, #6.
stems from the administration's drive for
even more political adherence from all in-
ternational financial institutions (IFIs) \IOA: Short of Hitler
to U.S. foreign policy goals. For in-
stance, the World Bank has suspended all
new loans to El Salvador, and the IMF has "He can have any ideas he wants short of
indefinitely postponed a $110 million being Hitler," said Voice of America Di-
standby arrangement request from El Salva- rector James B. Conkling of his appointee
dor because of its war-like condition. De- Philip Nicolaides, who recently complained
spite these decisions, the administration that "only about 45 original minutes of
got the Inter-American Development Bank [VOA] programming to the U.S.S.R. is reli-
(IDB) to lend $30.8 million to the Salva- gious in nature and content - and a lop-
doran junta to improve some 200 kilometers sided one-third of that is Jewish."l
of roads in the northwest, an area of ex- Nicolaides is the new deputy program di-
tensive guerrilla activity.** At the same rector for VOA's commentary and news anal-
time, the administration pressured Nicara- ysis section. A former writer for both the
gua into withdrawing its $30 million loan ultra-right Human Events and Conservative
request for a fisheries development pro- Digest, Nicolaides recommended the follow-
ject. ing in a September 21, 1981 memo to
Most telling of the administration's Conkling:
drive to harness the IFIs to its policies In our recent discussions you reviewed a
were its actions around a recent IDB loan number of problems at VOA and asked me
to Guatemala. Because of a 1976 U.S. law to come up with some considered recom-
requiring abstentions or "no" votes on mendations. That is a tall order on a
non-basic human needs loans to consistent basis of my sketchy knowledge of VOA....
human rights violators, U.S. executive di- We must portray the Soviet Union as the
rector Jose Casanova, under orders from last great predatory empire on earth....
General Haig, abstained in the voting on a We must strive to "destabilize" the So-
$45 million loan for Guatemala. Prior to viet Union and its satellites by promot-
the vote, the U.S. organized support for ing disaffection between peoples and
the loan which was approved on November rulers, underscoring the likes and deni-
11, 1981. Subsequently, the administration als of rights, inefficient management of
cited its abstention vote to prove its the economy, suppression of cultural di-
versity, religious persecution, etc.2
*In addition, the IDB is presently con- In summary, Nicolaides said that "we are -
sidering a special loan to the Salvadoran as all the world understands - a propagan-
junta for reconstruction of the Golden da agency. Propaganda is a species of the
Bridge which was destroyed by the libera- genus advertising."3
tion forces in fall 1981. Conkling responded to a Washington Post
CounterSpy -- Feb. - April 1982 -- 57
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reporter's questions about the memo by
saying that VOA is "not a propaganda agen-
cy."4 The day after this denial, however,
Conkling stated that he was considering "a
certain relaxation, or enhancement, of the
foreign speaking activities, so that they
[VOA broadcasters] may have a little more
freedom to reach the people they under-
stand in selecting the items they want to
talk with them about and in 'transcultu-
rizing' the way they talk with them."5
Conkling was advocating a return to the
practice of allowing broadcasters - par-
ticularly Eastern European exiles - to in-
fuse their broadcasts with their own stri-
dent, adversary attitudes. It was precise-
ly to curtail this practice that Congress
legislated in 1976 that the VOA was re-
quired to broadcast "accurate, objective
and comprehensive" news.
Conkling sought to minimize the impor-
tance of the Nicolaides memo, telling the
Post that: "I didn't buy any of that...
that is not the reason I hired him."6 Yet,
it is clear from the memo that Conkling
solicited the recommendations from
Nicolaides, and Conkling did appoint
Nicolaides after receiving and filing the
memo. Conkling also said that the memo was
"stolen" from his office - reflecting the
prevalent attitude in the Reagan adminis-
tration that government information is
private property.
VOA employees are now circulating a pe-
tition asking Conkling to disassociate
himself from Nicolaides' views and to can-
cel his appointment. Recently-fired VOA
Deputy Director William Haratunian circu-
lated a farewell memo saying that "the ab-
sence of mutual trust between political
appointees and professional broadcasters
has created an adverse atmosphere at VOA.
This risks damaging VOA's credibility, and
therefore its ability to serve as a truly
national voice of our country."7
Haratunian is being replaced by Conkling-
appointee Terrence Catherman, a National
War College graduate who served with the
U.S. Information Agency (now the Interna-
tional Communication Agency) at the height
of its Cold War propagandizing. Another
USIA careerist, Charles Courtney, has been
appointed to the newly-created post of De-
puty Director for Policy and Programs.
Courtney's role, according to Conkling, is
to "Judiciously apply the policy that ob-
viously goes with our program." The re-
cently announced plan to change the name
58 -- CounterSpy -- Feb. - ApriZ 1982
of VOA's parent agency from International
Communication Agency back to its Cold War
name, the United States Information Agen-
cy, provides a telling symbol of the VOA's
current reversion to its hard-line past.
Equally telling is the recent creation
of the New Directions Advisory Committee
by ICA Director Charles Wick (whose office
employed Nicolaides just before he went to
VOA)., The new Committee is in addition to
the statutory advisory panel, the U.S. Ad-
visory Commission on Public Diplomacy.
Wick did not consult with the Advisory
Comm ission before creating the new Commit-
tee. Its members are: Norman Podhoretz,
editor of Commentary magazine; Gertrude
Himmelfarb, Commentary contributor whose
husband Irving Kristol is also a Commenta-
_EY contributor; Evron Kirkpatrick, resi-
dent fellow at the conservative American
Enterprise Institute and husband of Jeane
Kirkpatrick; Robert Nisbet; Bayard Rustin;
and Edwin J. Feulner Jr., president of the
ultra-right Heritage Foundation. All Com-
mittee members share a staunch anti-commu-
nism and Podhoretz, Kirkpatrick, and
Rustin, willingly or unwittingly, were in-
volved in CIA-connected propaganda and la-
bor operations. Podhoretz and Kirkpatrick
have been recipients of CIA money and
Kirkpatrick's Operations Policy Research,
Inc. was involved in the improper domestic
dissemination (through USIA) of CIA-con-
nected publications. Podhoretz, Rustin
and Kirkpatrick have never disavowed or
disassociated themselves from this opera-
tion. The purpose of the new Committee,
according to Wick, is to "identify world-
wide intellectual trends" and to evaluate
private research on "long-term intellectu-
al currents in the world."9
FOOTNOTES
1) New York Times (NYT), 11/14/81, p.5.
2) Washington Post (WP), 11/13/81, p.A-2; and NYT,
11/14/81, p.5.
3) WP, 11/13/81, p.A-2.
4) ibid.
5) cf supra, #1.
6) cf supra, #3.
7) cf supra, #1. Clyde G. Hess, a public relations
consultant and former chief of VOA's news and cur-
rent affairs division when he retired in 1973 after
twenty years of service also charged that VOA has
gone "strident" and implied that it was returning
to its McCarthy era format.
8) WP, 12/10/81, p.A-29.
9) ibid.
- by John KeZZy -
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(cont. from pg.30)
5) Richard F. Nyrop, Turkey: A Country Study, De-
partment of Army, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1980, p.276.
6) Ihsan Gurkan, NATO, Turkey, and the Southern
Flank: A Mideast Perspective, National Strategy In-
formation Center, New York, 1980, pp.13,14.
7) The Comptroller General. Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Sta-
tistical Data on Department of Defense Training of
Foreign Military Personnel, U.S. General Accounting
Office, Washington, D.C., 1980, p.85.
8)
cf supra, #5, p.275.
9)
ibid.,
p.280.
10)
ibid.,
p.288.
11)
ibid.,
p.289.
12)
ibid.,
p.286.
13)
ibid.,
pp.287-288.
14)
Rizgariya Kurdistan (Liberation of Kurdistan),
No.13, June 1981.
15) Gerard Chaliand, People Without a Country: The
Kurds and Kurdistan, Zed Press, London, 1980,
p.186.
U,~~..i 55 (10,
SIS(III,
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1111 r....1 1'i ki
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