COUNTERSPY: SECRET DOCUMENTS ON SOUTH AFRICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100130005-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 60
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 1, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sept.- Nov. 1983
Vol. 8 No.1 $2.
THE MAGAZINE FOR PEOPLE WHO NEED TO KNOW
Secret Documents on South Africa
South African soldiers receiving combat training near Johannesburg.
Also in this issue: Atomic Veterans ? Eyewitness Afghanistan ? "Yellow Rain" ?
CIA in Chad ? Pershing II ? U.S. Naval Buildup in Pacific ? Northern Ireland ?
Thatcher Arms Pinochet
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Counterspy Statement of Purpose
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jointly with allied Western European governments, have systematically violated the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of people in this country and the world over. Prominent among
these creations was the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), born in 1947.
Since 1973, Counterspy magazine has exposed and analyzed such intervention in all its
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creating foreign intelligence agencies, multinational corporations-intelligence agency link-
ups, and World Bank assistance for counterinsurgency, to name but a few. Our view is that
while CIA operations have been one of the most infamous forms of intervention, the CIA is
but one strand in a complex web of interference and control.
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U.S. NUCLEAR THREATS:
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Konrad Ege
John Kelly
Dr. Walden Bello
Congressional Lobby
Director, Philippine
Support Committee
Dr. Robin Broad
Economist
John Cavanagh
Economist
Dr. Noam Chomsky
Professor at MIT,
Peace Activist
Dr. Joshua Cohen
.Assistant Professor, MIT
Ruth Fitzpatrick
Member, Steering Commit-
tee of the Religious Task
Force on Central America
Dr. Laurie Kirby
Professor, City University
of New York
Tamar Kohns
Political Activist
Annie Makhijani
Chemistry Student
Dr. Arjun Makhijani
Consultant on energy and
economic development
Martha Wenger
Office Worker,
Counterspy's copy editor
[Organizations for
identification only]
Cover Design:
Johanna Vogelsang
Counterspy magazine
P.O. Box 647
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044
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in
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10
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46
Contents
News NOT in the News
GAO Censors for Israel ... U.S. Army Will Evacuate Pets in Case of
War ... Nuclear Weapons Not All That Dangerous, Army Says .. .
Thatcher Arms Pinochet ... CIA Keeps Its Man in Power in Chad ...
First Strike MX Missiles
CIA War in Central America
DIA Report Shows Reagan Lies About Nicaragua
Eden Pastora Unmasked as Long-Time U.S. Agent
Israeli Militarization of Costa Rica
Features
Atomic Veterans: Victims of U.S. Nuclear War Strategy
by Arjun Makhijani and Annie Makhijani
The Reagan Naval Buildup: Preparing for War in the Pacific
by Walden Bello, Peter Hayes and Lyuba Zarsky
Caution, Yellow Rainmakers at Work by Martha Wenger
Growing Supergrass: The New British Strategy for Northern Ireland
by Kathleen O'Neal
British Intelligence Manipulates the News by Morris Riley
General Claims U.S. Plans for "Limited" Nuclear War
Secret Documents on South Africa
itimate Embraces: The IMF and South Africa by John Kelly
U.S. Consulate: Labor Repression Increasing in South Africa
Eyewitness Afghanistan
The First Two Years: From Revolution to the "Dark Night"
A Political Solution? Rebel Defections and Negotiations
by Konrad Ege
The Reforms
CIA Aid to the Rebels
Who Are the Rebel Leaders?
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News NOT in the News
,GAO Censors for
-I sra e l
The CIA believes that U.S. arms sales to Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries could
"exacerbate Israeli concerns about the Arab
threat and could foster Israeli preemptive attacks
in future crises."
But the CIA apparently didn't want the public
to know that, because its comments and many
other portions of text were deleted from a new
General Accounting Office report, "U.S.
Assistance to the State of Israel." This censored
GAO report was released publicly on June 24,
1983, almost three months after it was completed
and distributed within the government.
Subsequently, the American Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (ADC) in Washington,
D.C. released an uncensored draft of the
document. The uncensored version illustrates
that the deletions were not made to hide U.S.
military secrets, but because they are, in the
words of the ADC, a "damning indictment of both
the United States and Israel."
According to the ADC, the censored segments
of the General Accounting Office report are
significant because "they tell the story of how
the; United States has... allowed Israel to order
whatever mix of economic and military assistance
it chooses at the expense of America's
unemployed, poor and elderly."
The secret segments of the GAO study reveal
that:
? According to the CIA, "Israeli expectations
are that the United States will fund half of its
defense budget. Israeli documents show that U.S.
assistance funded 37 percent of its defense budget
for fiscal year 1982."
? The Pentagon believes that Israel is
"overemphasizing" the Arab threat. The Pentagon
also told the GAO investigators that "Israeli force
modernization can be met at levels of $1.4 billion
annually whereas Israel believes it needs higher
levels of military assistance."
? In spite of their assessment that $1.4
billion is sufficient, the State Department and
the, Pentagon will increase military aid to Israel
because, they say, "it is not politically possible
4'-- CawiteJcapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
to submit to the Congress a lower [ Foreign
Military Sales] figure than that for the previous
fiscal year." The U.S. is also prepared to increase
aid to Israel when significant sales of military
equipment are made to Arab countries, as it did
when the AWACS radar and surveillance planes
were sold to Saudi Arabia.
? U.S. officials acknowledge that although
the Arms Control Act provides for sanctions
against a country which uses U.S. arms for
offensive purposes, it has no intention of applying
them to Israel.
? Israeli officials say "the Lebanon campaign
will not result in any increase in aid requested
from the United States," according to the public
version 'of the GAO report. The next sentence -
deleted - tells a different story: "However,
there is a substantial foreign exchange component
directly related to these activities [Israel's
invasion of Lebanon] which increases Israel's
balance of payments deficit. This increase to
Israel's foreign exchange needs can have an effect
on its request for ESF," or Economic Support
Funds.
? Israeli military strategists have
contingency plans for attacks against all Arab
states, including Israel's "peace treaty" partner,
Egypt.
? The CIA reports that Israel could make up
for its $1.2 billion budget deficit by cutting its
domestic programs and imports or by using
foreign exchange reserves rather than seeking a
further increase in U.S. assistance.
? Israel is facing a severe cash flow problem
because grace periods for repayment of loans are
ending and debt service payments to the United
States will increase sharply over the next ten
years.
? "The gap in Israel's civilian imports over
exports will worsen dramatically in the next few
years...Its military deficit will also grow," and it
will "grow substantially if the Israelis move to
replace equipment lost or damaged during the
Lebanon campaign." The "financial gap," says
the GAO report, "will probably force the Israelis
to press for additional U.S. aid," or, as an
alternative, to implement domestic austerity
programs. But "Israeli policymakers prefer to
make up this difference through increased U.S.
aid."
? Giving money to Israel to alleviate its debt
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problem will not help the U.S. economy. U.S.
officials quoted in the GAO study say that the
U.S. budget deficit will increase if the U.S. seeks
to alleviate Israel's debt repayment problem by
writing off Israel's military sales loans or
increasing the amount of new loans. a
Copies of the uncensored version of the General
Accounting Office report, "U.S. Assistance to the
State of Israel" are available from the American
Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, 1731
Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20009.
$2.00. W
You Can Take Your
Pet in Case of War
"It Will Be Done" proclaims the title of a U.S.
Army pamphlet describing evacuation procedures
for "noncombatant U.S. citizens" in West
Germany in case of war and other "emergency
situations." The "Noncombatant Evacuation
Order" obtained by Counterspy provides for the
evacuation of some 160,000 Americans living in
Central Germany.
The document is not classified, but it
emphasizes that this "pamphlet does contain
sensitive data that should be disseminated on a
NEED TO KNOW basis." Disclosure of evacuation
plans to "unauthorized persons" (such as West
German citizens), "could jeopardize your safety,"
the pamphlet warns. "A sudden surge in
discussion of evacuation plans could make local
national officials and the general public
apprehensive concerning U.S. intent to defend
Europe."
The Noncombatant Evacuation Order (NEO)
tries very hard to strike an optimistic tone.
Everything will be done. The old, the sick, and
pregnant women will be evacuated first. All
families will stay together no matter what.
Transport to the airport will run smoothly; the
West German government will use its traffic
computers to keep the roads open for the
departing Americans. You'll even be able to
evacuate your pet, including, the pamphlet
stresses, your "pet snake" -- if you have a
container. Why? "To some disposition of pets
is an emotional issue.... In case of emergency
evacuation, noncombatants are expected to be
stretched to a highly tense state. They cannot
be allowed to tip over into an uncontrollable
state of hysteria" by not being allowed to take
their pets. So even though it's a hassle from a
"military point of view," you can take your pet.
There is just one condition: "One must understand
that pets will not take a scat away from a
person."
Even the most optimistic Army planners
concede that there are two situations in which
the evacuation procedures might not work: if
all the airports are closed and travel by road and
rail is impossible, or in case of a massive nuclear
strike. What is to be done then? The
Noncombatant Evacuation Order pamphlet has
answers. In the first situation, the "NEO warden
[will] form noncombatants in a column of two's,
order 'follow me,' and lead the families
westward." The NEO pamphlet sternly continues:
"This is not a joke." But, in case of a massive
nuclear strike, the Army runs out of bright ideas:
Stay at' home and "be prepared to weather the
storm." rm
THE ARMY INSTITUTE
FOR PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Fort Eustis,Virginia
NUCLEAR WEAPONS FUNDAMENTALS
Nuclear Weapons Not
All That Dangerous,
Says Army
The U.S. Army wants to make sure that its corps
of officers - any one of whom can initiate the
process which results in nuclear weapons use -
is prepared to deal with nuclear war. To reach
that goal, the Army Institute for Professional
Development in Fort Eustis, Virginia, has
Counterspy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 5
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developed an Army Correspondence Course on
"Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals" (Subcourse
ISO216, 1979).
After completing the course, officers are
tested with a 30-question, multiple choice exam.
Since "to err is human," only 21 correct answers
(70 percent) are required to pass the course.
And, mercifully, there is no time limit for
completing the test. Students are even invited
to re-consult the text before answering a
question.
The "Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals" course
begins with the instruction: "Your greatest
responsibility will be to instill in your
subordinates a sense of confidence in their ability
to survive a nuclear attack." The following 100
pages are geared to instill just that confidence.
A nuclear attack might not be that dangerous
after all:
. ? "Anything that provides protection from
the sun will also provide protection from thermal
radiation."
? "Dense materials, such as lead and iron,
offer excellent protection against gamma rays.
Soil provides fair protection against neutrons."
? "Beta particles are not hazardous unless
they enter the body through ingestion. inhalation
or open wounds."
? After a nuclear attack, due to fallout, "all
dust and dirt must -be removed from under the
fingernails, and from the hair. All exposed skin
surfaces and the head should be washed, or at
least wiped clean with a damp cloth. As soon
as the tactical situation permits, individuals
should bathe thoroughly, and change all clothing."
? "Normally, troops in vehicles may pass
through the point of ground zero [the point of
the nuclear detonation, or in case of airburst,
right below the detonation] and foot troops may
pass within 300 meters of ground zero within
one-half hour after the detonation without undue
risk to personnel."
The "Nuclear Weapons Fundamentals"
correspondence course stresses that it is
important to follow all these and other directives.
"A well-trained individual who observes the
protective measures established can survive on
the nuclear battlefield," it claims.
by Robert Cavanagh
r r r r r r =J r r r r r r f ==i r r r r r-
Thatcher Arms
Pinochet
British Prime Minister 'Margaret Thatcher is
sending thank you notes to Chilean dictator
Augusto Pinochet for the aid he gave Britain
during that country's 1982 war against Argentina
6 -- Couwte hpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. These "thank
you's" include sales of planes, helicopters, a
Magnox nuclear power reactor, and some 300 tons
of natural uranium. With these supplies, Chile
will have sufficient plutonium to build dozens of
nuclear bombs by the end of the decade.
During the war, to ensure that the Chilean
government would allow British surveillance
equipment and aircraft to operate from that
country, Margaret Thatcher struck a deal with
the junta. On April 24, 1982, just as Secretary
of State Alexander Haig's shuttle diplomacy
between London and Buenos Aires was collapsing,
a Flying Tigers Boeing 747 took off from the
British Air Base Brize Norton in Oxfordshire. Its
cargo: six Hawker Hunter fighter planes from
the Royal Air Force for delivery to Chile.
Pinochet was anxious to replenish his Hawker
Hunter contingent which a 1973 British Labor
government-imposed embargo on military goods
to Chile had long prevented. The Hawker Hunters
are of little value in the European high-
technology weapons arsenal, but for Chile, they
are essential for carrying out "ground attack and
close support" maneuvers. It was the Hawker.
Hunters that bombed the Presidential Palace in
September 1973 when Pinochet seized power.
Since the April 24 shipment, British arms sales
to Chile have greatly increased. Said former
Foreign Secretary Francis Pym: "Chile was quite
helpful to us in the Falklands conflict, and we
ought to bear that in mind when we consider our
relations with her now." Britain has sent
additional Hawker Hunters, Canberra
reconnaissance planes, and spare parts. Exactly
what the British government is shipping to Chile
is becoming harder and harder to determine: the
Chilean Air Force has been allotted an exclusive
fenced-in cargo area - free of charge - at the
British Luton airport.
The British troops occupying the
Falklands/Malvinas are linked to Britain only by
aerial and naval transport via Ascension Island,
some 2000 miles distant. Clearly, Britain needs
an ally closer by. Chile is an ideal candidate.
It has a long-standing territorial conflict with
Argentina over the Beagle Channel Islands at the
tip of South America, and the Pinochet regime
wants British equipment to prepare for war
against Argentina. In 1980, such a war seemed
imminent when both the Chilean and Argentinian
dictators moved troops to their common border.
The British government also knows that arming
Pinochet will keep the Argentine military pre-
occupied with the "Chilean threat" and prevent
it from contemplating action against the British
occupation of the Falklands/Malvinas.
Arms sales are only part of Britain's
This article is an expanded version of Dieter Maier,
"Atombombe fuer Pinochet?" which appeared in the West
German monthly, links, May 1983.
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w _
increasingly close relationship with Chile. The
British government is already negotiating with
the Pinochet regime for base rights in Chile.
The Chilean Air Force has also gotten British
pilots to train its crews; this secret arrangement
was revealed only when a British pilot was killed
in a plane crash in Chile in early 1983.
Nor has Margaret Thatcher gone out of her
way to publicize the nuclear deal with Chile. In
September 1982, British trade minister Peter
Rees visited Chile with several British nuclear
industry officials in tow. Rees praised the
Pinochet regime as a "moderating and stabilizing
force" with which Britain was interested in
"strengthening political relations." His visit was
reciprocated several months later, when the
president and executive director of Chile's
Comision Chilena de Energia Nuclear, Lt. Gen.
Herman Brady and Col. Juan Mir arrived in
London. (Brady was one of the leading generals
.involved in the September 1973 coup.) The two
Chilean officers and British government officials
agreed that Britain would sell the Magnox reactor
to Chile, along with 300 tons of natural uranium.
Chilean nuclear engineers and reactor operators
are to be trained in England, and British officials
have assured the Chileans that the reactor could
be completed within five years.
Chile's nuclear energy ambitions go back to
the 1960s, when the Christian Democratic
government bought two experimental reactors
from Britain, one of them under civilian, the
other under military control. The Chilean
military had apparently decided early on that it
wanted to preserve a "nuclear option" for itself
without any interference from civilians.
During the years of the Salvador Allende
government (1970-73), Chile's nuclear program
was virtually at a standstill. But only a year
after the coup, the first controlled chain reaction
took place in one of the reactors, reportedly with
the assistance of West German engineers. Chile's
nuclear scientist Igor Saavedra is said to have
commented that Chile was now in a position to
build nuclear weapons. Saavedra no. doubt had
gotten somewhat carried away by the excitement
- it takes years to move from the first controlled
chain reaction to building a nuclear bomb.
Nevertheless, General Contreras Fischer, then-
chief of the nuclear energy commission, stated
that the ultimate purpose of the nuclear program
was to build nuclear weapons.
Meanwhile, the artificially created economic
"boom years" in the mid-1970s prompted
exaggerated government calculations for Chile's
energy needs, and the construction of a nuclear
reactor was said to be the answer to this energy
problem. These dreams were shortlived: Chile's
"economic boom" of rapid economic growth
turned sour, and the atomic energy commission
declared in 1980 that construction of a nuclear
reactor would not begin before 1985. At the
same time, the government started two large
dam projects in order to take care of Chile's
energy needs. (Some two-thirds of Chile's
electricity is generated through hydro power.)
As the economic justification for a nuclear
reactor evaporated in the late 1970s, the military
desire for atomic weapons grew. Neighboring
Argentina was quite open about its intention to
use its nuclear technology - supplied primarily
by West Germany and Canada - to build nuclear
weapons. Chilean-Argentinian tensions increased
and brought the two countries to the brink of
war. For the Chilean generals, the situation was
clear: in order to keep up their side of the arms
race with Argentina, they had to get their own
nuclear weapons.
The Falklands/Malvinas war provided an
excellent opportunity to advance toward this goal.
Chile was the only country in South America to
side with the British, which resulted in a de facto
military alliance between the two countries.
Today, Britain is supplying arms and nuclear
technology to a junta whose internal problems
could lead it to pursue an aggressive foreign
policy. Pinochet's economic policy has cul-
minated in disaster, popular opposition to the
generals is growing, and Pinochet now faces
opposition even from the rightwing.
Such a government, completely isolated from
its people and unable to stop its own
disintegration might be tempted to drop a nuclear
bomb on its external "enemies." (This holds true
for Chile's adversary, the Argentine junta, as
well.) Once the British reactor in Chile is
Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 7
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completed, the building of nuclear weapons could
proceed fairly rapidly and without any possibility
of outside intervention since the Chilean junta
has an internal uranium supply over which it
exercises complete control: the Chuquicamata
mine produces some 40 to 60 tons of uranium a
year.
r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r r
CIA Keeps its Man in
Power in Chad
The Reagan CIA has helped to bring about at
least one successful coup, and the administration
is now spending millions of dollars to prop up
the ruler it helped bring to power: Hissene Habre
of Chad.
Habre's forces entered the Chadian capital of
N'djamena on June 7, 1982, and overthrew the
National Transition Government of Goukouni
Oueddi. CBS News has now confirmed that
Habre's forces were backed by the CIA, which
supplied at least arms and training. The operation
is reported to have cost the CIA $10 million.
(See Jeff McConnell, "U.S. Responsible for
Famine in Chad," Counterspy, vol. 7, no. 1.)
Reagan authorized yet another $10 million out
of his "discretionary fund" (which requires no
Congressional approval) for an airlift to Habre
in July 1983, to strengthen him against attacks
from exile forces in northern Chad loyal to the
former government. These exile forces have been
receiving help from Libya and would be friendly
to Libya should they be victorious. Reagan
informed Congress that he was supporting Habre
because of "massive" Libyan support for the exile
forces which have captured key northern towns
and are engaging Habre's forces in heavy fighting
8 -- Countet6py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
as they move toward the capital in the south.
Some of the U.S. money will also go to the
more than 1,000 Zairian troops in Chad which
have been there since early July 1983 to back
up Habre. This is the second time the Zairian
military is playing a key role in Chad. In late
1981, troops from Zaire, as well as Senegal and
Nigeria, entered Chad as a "peacekeeping force"
sponsored by France and the United States. Its
stated purpose was to prevent further fighting
between Habre, then trying to overthrow
Goukouni's government, and forces loyal to
Goukouni. It was a strange peacekeeping force:
Prior to their movement into Chad, the Zairian
government had publicly sided with Habre, and
Zairian troops were reported actually to be
assisting Habre's forces. Moreover, in
coordination with the U.S., Zaire's contingent
remained in Chad an extra month after Habre's
victory, and after the Senegalese and Nigerian
troops had left, to help Habre consolidate his
hold over the country.
At the moment, Egypt and Sudan, the other
principal allies of the U.S. in the region,
apparently are not involved directly in the
fighting. There is evidence, though, that the CIA
operation against Chad to overthrow Goukouni
Oueddi was carried out in collaboration with
Egypt. Western diplomats in Africa report that
many of the weapons Habre used in the earlier
fighting were supplied by Egypt, whose arsenals
were then replenished by the United States.
Habre's forces kicked off a major offensive
against Goukouni's National Transition Gov-
ernment in late summer of 1981, soon after they
received a large airlift of supplies from Egypt.
This airlift apparently was carried out in
conjunction with the CIA. President Jaafar
Numeiri of Sudan assisted as well, by permitting
Habre's forces to use Sudanese territory as
sanctuary and by providing logistical support
through Sudanese military officers.
The CIA operation in Chad began early in
1981 just after Ronald Reagan took office.
Libyan troops had entered Chad in December
1980 at the request of Chadian President
Goukouni Oueddi, and stayed there for about one
year. The CIA reportedly told the U.S. Congress
that the purpose of the operation against Chad
was to punish Libya for assisting the National
Transition Government. This CIA operation,
however, was only one small part of a much
larger CIA-sponsored campaign against Libya set
in motion at this time. The purpose of this
campaign was to isolate and destabilize Libya,
thereby either reducing its influence or bringing
to power an entirely different government more
to the liking of Ronald Reagan. Besides the
Chad operation, parts of this campaign included:
? A plan to provide financial support for
anti-Libyan political figures in Mauritius.
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? Collaboration with Libyan exiles to form
a "Libyan Liberation Front" in Somalia and Egypt.
? An Africa-wide anti-Libya propaganda
campaign.
? Increased CIA and Pentagon presence in
North Africa.
? Military pressures on Libya's borders.
? Disruption of Libyan oil sales.
? Fostering divisions within the Organization
of African Unity to thwart Muammar Qaddafi's
succession to the chairpersonship.
? Talks with the French government of
Giscard d'Estaing, reported by Time, over
cooperation in a plot, to be carried out by Libyan
exiles, to assassinate Qaddafi.
Chad was thus a "sideshow" in relation to the
Reagan administration's main event against
Libya. But the costs to the Chadian people were
enormous. Thousands died of starvation after
Habre destroyed the crops and livestock of those
judged to be supporters of Goukouni Oueddi.
Hundreds more were executed after Habre came
to power.
U.S. officials now claim that the CIA did not
intend for Habre to overthrow the National
Transition Government. But this claim is suspect.
CIA support for Habre continued for a time after
the Libyan troops protecting the Goukouni
government had left Chad, and support from
Egypt and Sudan, with whom the CIA had been
working, also continued. And later, once Habre's
victory was assured, Egypt and the U.S.
reportedly airlifted arms into Chad to make sure
he held on to power.
Although they claim it was "unexpected," U.S.
officials were very encouraged by Habre's victory
and are unlikely to allow him to lose power
without another fight. And while fighting
continues in Chad, the CIA is engaged, according
to Newsweek, in paramilitary operations in at
least ten other countries. Chad may have seen
the CIA's first coup under Reagan, but nobody
in his administration intends for it to be the last.
by Je{y{y McConnell
rr-r-rrrrrrrrr-rrr-rrrrr-rr-
First Strike MX
Missiles
Representatives of the peace movement have
argued for years that the MX intercontinental
nuclear missiles (dubbed "peacekeepers" by
Ronald Reagan) are first strike weapons. Support
for that argument that the Reagan
administration's MX deployment plan is geared
towards achieving a first strike capability now
comes from an unexpected source: Brent
hazardous to your planet.
Scowcroft, chairperson of Reagan's Commission
on Strategic Forces.
Scowcroft doesn't admit it publicity. He still
sticks to the administration line, claiming that
by deploying "just" 100 MX missiles -- which is
what Reagan says publicly he wants to do -- the
U.S. will not achieve "a full first strike capability
against Soviet weapons and leadership targets."
Only the deployment of 200 to 250 missiles would
do that, Scowcroft says.
As it turns out, this is exactly what a secret
Air Force document, the Program Objectives
Memorandum proposes. (It is "designed to guide
Air Force budgeting and planning for the five
fiscal years 1985 to 1989.") The memorandum
speaks of the 100 MX slated for deployment now
as only a first stage, and describes a "phase 3
follow-on deployment of the MX." Phase 3 would
involve stationing another 100 MX missiles,
bringing the total to 200 -- the exact number
Scowcroft has said is minimally necessary to
achieve a "full first strike capability." (Sources:
Washington Post, 6/17/83, p.A-18; 7/2/83, p.A-7.)
Coun.teAopy -- Seri.-Ncev. 0. \-
Dritte-Welt-Politik der CDU/CSU (April 1983) ? J- sa`'~ ~-r
die Folgen (Mai 1983)
ElaasibeM 2,00 00; JaIreube 20,- DM;
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Cowiie.n.apy Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 45
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Eyewitness Afghanistan
Ed. note: Konrad Ege is one of the few Western
journalists to travel inside Afghanistan in recent
years without linking up with any of the Pakistan-
based rebel groups. In May 1983, he spent two
weeks in the capital city of Kabul and surrounding
areas. He spoke with many people in the street,
as well as government officials, members of the
People's Democratic Party, people involved in
the women's movement and the youth
organization, and a former rebel commander.
This unique opportunity afforded new insights on
the military situation and the prospects for a
political solution to the conflict.
For those unfamiliar with the history of
Afghanistan and the events of the last few years,
we include both a chronology and the following
explanation of how the present government of
Babrak Karmal came to power. This is followed
by two reports about Konrad Ege's recent trip:
one on the military situation and the prospects
for peace, and one on the government's reforms.
A final article gives a brief overview of the
history of CIA operations in Afghanistan -- the
present CIA campaign to aid the Pakistan-based
rebels certainly rivals the CIA's operations to
overthrow the Sandinista government in Nica-
ragua. a
The First Two Years
From Revolution
to the "Dark Night"
After decades of rule by kings and a few years
of dictatorship, a progressive force took power
in Afghanistan on April 27, 1978: the People's
Democratic Party (PDP). It was a small party
at the time and if not for the extraordinary
events of that month it probably would never
have chosen to stage an uprising at that moment
in history.
These are the events that led up to the PDP
takeover: On April 18, the repressive government
of Mohammed Daoud, working closely with the
then-Shah of Iran's secret police, saw to it that
a prominent PDP leader, Mir Akbar Khyber, was
killed. His funeral turned into a mass
demonstration against the government, and
Daoud's police responded by arresting, all party
leaders. Daoud's move forced the party to choose
between risking long-term imprisonment or death
for its entire leadership, or using party members
in the army to stage an insurrection.
46 -- Coun.tet6py -- Sept.-Nova 1983
by Konrad Ege
The party, which had been organizing since
1965, decided to take power. Party members in
the Army captured the important government
buildings, including the Presidential Palace. The
fighting between the insurrectionists and the
forces loyal to Daoud was brief, but Daoud was
killed when he refused to surrender. Few people
mourned the old regime: when Daoud himself
had overthrown King Zahir Shah in 1973, he had
promised far-reaching reforms which never
materialized and Daoud turned out to be a
repressive one-man ruler. Only a few wealthy
businessmen and feudal landlords felt the loss.
Almost immediately, some of these men moved
to Pakistan and called on people to rise up against
the new "godless regime." Their calls remained
unanswered for months.
From the very beginning, the PDP government
led by President Noor Mohammed Taraki and
Prime Minister Babrak Karmal was confronted
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with formidable problems. It could not rely on
the existing bureaucracy to implement its far-
reaching reforms - land reform, promotion of
equal rights for men and women, abolition of
usury, establishment of trade unions, indus-
trialization of the country, a literacy campaign -
and lacked sufficient cadres of its own to run
the government offices.
In 1978, Afghanistan was one of the poorest
countries on earth. A feudal economic and social
structure kept many peasants dependent on a few
landlords, and the country had no industry to
speak of. Medical care, especially in the
countryside, was almost nonexistent, and some
95 percent of the population was illiterate. Some
areas of the country had never been "governed"
by any central government; tribal leaders there
resisted any government intervention.
Lack of unity in the party compounded the
problems of the PDP government. A longstanding
rift between its factions (Khalq and Parcham)
which had been patched over before the April
takeover, once again split open. The Khalqis,
led by Taraki, advocated a rapid implementation
of reforms, apparently believing that a "socialist"
state could be created within years. The
Parchamis wanted first to establish a national
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democratic government under the leadership of
the PDP to unite the peasants, workers, artisans,
small merchants, clergy and progressive in-
tellectuals. The Parchamis lost out: they were
ousted from responsible government positions in
the summer of 1978, and the Khalqis under
President Taraki and Deputy Prime Minister
Hafizullah Amin, took complete control.
Up to this point, the government had enjoyed
a degree of popular support, or at least could
count on a "wait and see" attitude of many
Afghans. Significant resistance came from the
former elite, namely the landlords whose holdings
were threatened by the land reform. Today,
these people, such as Sayed Ahmad Gailani,
Burhanuddin Rabbani, Sebgatullah Mujadidi and
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar are the leaders of the
"mujahidin" ("holy warriors") in Peshawar,
Pakistan, who are highly praised in the U.S.
media. They are the rebels who have been
receiving millions of dollars from the United
States and other countries to wage their war.
Soon, however, Taraki's methods of conducting
reforms also began to create opposition among
the intended beneficiaries of the reforms. Some
of these mistakes can be attributed to ignorance:
it was a young, inexperienced government. Land
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AWNAR)
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50 100 150 200 MI.
100 260 300 KM
Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 47
CHAKHCHARAN
1O
OAND HAR
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reform officials, for instance, often were not
sufficiently familiar with the local situation and
in some cases expropriated land from tribal
leaders whom they considered to be wealthy
landlords. In reality, these leaders often were
not "feudal" landlords. Instead, they enjoyed a
prominent position based on other social or
religious factors. Taking their land away led to
considerable resentment. At times, land was
given to peasants without sufficiently taking into
account such factors as the availability of seed
and water.
o The government began to resort to force to
push through these reforms, apparently in the
belief that once accomplished, the reforms would
increase popular support. Yet even after it had
become obvious that the strategy was not
working, the Khalq government stuck to its
tactics. This led to disagreements within the
party and to popular resistance - people began
to thke up arms. At the same time, the
Chronology
1919: King Amanullah's rule begins. He tries to
institute liberal reforms, proclaims full
independence and turns to the Soviet Union with
a request for aid. In response, the British invade
Afghanistan; Afghan troops defeat them and force
Britain to sign a truce.
1929: Amanullah is forced to abdicate because of
reactionary resistance to his reforms.
1933: Amanullah's successor is killed; Zahir Shah
becomes king.
1953: Mohammed Daoud, a relative of the royal family,
is appointed prime minister.
1955: Afghanistan refuses to join the U.S.-sponsored
Baghdad Pact.
1963: Daoud resigns.
1964: New constitution is drafted, but political parties
remain outlawed.
1965: The People's Democratic Party (PDP) is formed
as an underground organization.
1965: First general elections, only, scant participation
in the countryside. Both Babrak Karmal (today
President) and Anahita Ratebzad (today President
of the Democratic Women's Organization and a
member of the Revolutionary Council) win seats
in. the parliament. Student demonstrations in
Kabul opposing conservative cabinet. Several
students killed and many wounded as army
soldiers fire into the demonstration.
1966: Noor Mohammed Taraki of the People's
Democratic Party begins publishing the newspaper
KKhhall (Masses); closed down by the government
after six issues.
1966-68: Student demonstrations and workers' strikes
for better pay and working conditions continue.
48 -- Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
government had been pushed into a corner
militarily: the feudal leaders who had gone to
Pakistan now attacked government forces in
earnest, with the active support of the Pakistani
regime, and later China, Egypt and the United
States. Under this dual onslaught the Taraki
regime began to lose control.
Amin Takes Power
This loss of control made it possible for
Hafizullah Amin to stage a coup in September
1979. (Amin, then prime minister, had always
played a prominent role within the Khalq faction:
he had been the driving force behind the ouster
of the Parcham faction from the government and
the government's insistence on rapid transfor-
mation to a "workers' state.") In September 1979
Amin had President Taraki killed, apparently
because Taraki was preparing to move towards
reunification of the party, and took over the
Brutal government repression. Protest movement
develops in the countryside.
1967-68: Increased tensions in People's Democratic
Party, eventually splits into Khalq and Parcham
factions. Parcham advocates establishment of
broad united front against feudal rule; Khalq
pushes for more rapid transition to socialism.
Parcham (Flag) newspaper formed, closed down
after several months.
1969-73: King Zahir Shah refuses to sign many crucial
bills passed by the parliament. Continued student
demonstrations.
1973: Mohammed Daoud overthrows King- Zahir Shah
while the king is vacationing in Italy. Daoud
appoints himself President and Prime Minister,
proclaims Afghanistan a republic,* and promises
far-reaching reforms. Parcham supports his re-
forms.
1975: Daoud nationalizes all banks and promises land
reform.
1974-78: Daoud ousts progressive government officials
and establishes increasingly close ties with the
Shah of Iran. Few reforms are realized.
1975: Pakistani-financed "Afghan rebels" infiltrate the
country from their training camps in Pakistan to
pressure Daoud to make concessions in an
Afghanistan-Pakistan border dispute.
1977-78: Increasing repression, aided, by Iranian secret
police.
April 18, 1978: Police assassinate popular People's
Democratic Party leader Mir Akbar Khyber.
April 20, 1978: Tens of thousands turn Khyber's funeral
into an anti-government demonstration.
April 26, 1978: Daoud has People's Democratic Party
leaders arrested.
April 27, 1978: Uprising by PDP members inside the
army. Daoud is overthrown.
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presidency. Amin filled most important govern-
ment posts with members of his family or others
personally loyal to him.
Under Amin, the government turned into a
dictatorship, though he continued to claim that
he was "implementing reforms." The current
Deputy Minister for Tribal Affairs, Shafi, says
that Amin fulfilled all the propagandistic claims
the old feudal leaders had been making about
socialism ever since the 1917 revolution in the
Soviet Union. "These feudals had said 'socialism'
would mean massacres and torture - Amin acted
that way," he says. Government and party
officials today say that Amin was never
interested in fulfilling the party's program;
instead, he sought to enhance his personal power.
Errors in the "decision-making process of the
party," they say, facilitated Amin's rise to power.
Amin personally controlled the secret police
and a sector of the Army. He set out to crush
all resistance to his rule within the PDP, and a
April 30, 1978: Taraki announces new government of
unified People's Democratic 'Party. Taraki is
President, Babrak Karmal Prime Minister.
1978: Reforms are announced: Usury banned, many
peasants' debts forgiven, equal rights for women
made law, bride price abolished, land reform
announced. Feudal leaders and members of
wealthy families leave for Pakistan.
May-June 1978: First "rebel camps" are set up in
Pakistan.
July-August 1978: Internal party conflicts: Parchamis
are ousted and Taraki takes over Prime Minister
position from Karmal.
1979: Opposition within the country to the way reforms
are being carried out and to government
repression. Mutinies in sectors of the army.
Refugees flee to Pakistan. Foreign-financed,
Pakistan-based "rebels" gain strength.
March 1979: Hafizullah Amin takes over from Taraki
as Prime Minister. Taraki remains President.
July 1979: Amin takes posts of defense and interior min-
ister. He now effectively controls both
government and party.
August 1979: Army mutinies and defections continue;
repression in countryside and within the party
escalates.
September 1979: Taraki is ousted and killed. Amin
takes complete power. Internal resistance to his
rule grows; Amin answers with more repression.
Early December 1979: Amin issues call for Soviet troops
to protect his regime.
December 24, 1979: Airlift of Soviet troops to Kabul.
December 27, 1979: Amin killed. Babrak Karmal be-
comes President.
January 1980: New government announced, members
mainly Parcham, some Khalq. Program includes:
wave of repression, carried out by his secret
police, swept through the party. More than 1500
party members are said to have been killed on
Amin's orders. His attempt to stamp out the
rebellion and regain control in the countryside
was equally brutal - tens of thousands of people
were killed. Two incidents, related to me by
party members who witnessed them personally,
are illustrative of Amin's ruthlessness.
Amin had installed a new governor in the
province of Ghur in central Afghanistan. The
governor assembled the residents of one village
in the village square; the peasants on one side,
the village leaders and landlords on the other
side. The governor claimed he was going to
destroy the respect the peasants had for the
landlords. He therefore told the landlords: "Put
your shoes in your mouths" - one of the most
degrading things an Afghan could be forced to
do. The landlords begged him not-to force them.
"Our children wouldn't be able to walk the streets
abolition of usury, land reform, equal rights for
women, equal rights for all nationalities, respect
for private property and religion. Thousands of
prisoners released. Karmal calls for more Soviet
troops.
January 1980: Carter administration decides to increase
CIA aid to Pakistan-based rebels.
1980: Escalation of foreign support to counter-
revolutionaries. Continued resistance in the
countryside, some urban protests. Government
emphasizes national democratic character of the
revolution. Social organizations are formed and
strengthened.
December 1980: Karmal calls for establishment of Na-
tional Fatherland Front.
January 1981: Following Afghanistan government call
for bilateral Pakistan-Afghanistan talks, the
Pakistani government asks United Nations to
assist in such negotiations. They begin later in
the year.
June 15, 1981: Founding Congress of the National Fa-
therland Front.
1980-81: Major Afghan-Soviet military operations
against resistance.
March 1982: 841 delegates meet for the First National
Conference of the People's Democratic Party.
1982-83: Fighting in countryside decreases. Afghan gov-
ernment negotiates with rebel military
commanders inside the country and with tribal
leaders. Afghanistan-Pakistan talks continue.
June 1983: Reagan administration "leaks" news that
CIA support for rebels has been increased.
July 1983: Secretary of State George Shultz visits
Pakistan; tells Afghan "refugee" leaders that
"they do not fight alone" and pledges continued
?T.S. support.
Countewspy -- Sep-t.-Nov. 1983 -- 49
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for years without being referred to as the children
whose fathers put their shoes into their mouths."
The governor insisted, and most complied. The
governor had one of the landlords who did not
comply whipped. For a long time, that landlord
did not make a sound. Finally, he cried out:
"What in the name of God have I done to deserve
this?" The governor countered: "Fuck your God."
At that, the governor's bodyguard turned against
the governor and gunned him down.
. The other incident: One night an army patrol
was attacked in Wardak province, just west of
Kabul; one soldier was killed, two were wounded.
The next day Amin's governor in Wardak called
together the elders of the region in which the
attack had occurred and told them that such a
thing would never happen again as long as he
was governor. He told the elders that they soon
would see what he would do. The men were
frightened and decided to go to the mountains
for several days to protect themselves. The night
after they had left, government soldiers stormed
the village in question, looted it, and raped some
of the women.
When the men came back, the women told
them what had happened. The men then swore
on the Koran that they would fight "socialism."
Each man whose wife had been raped, killed her
and went to the mountains. These men then
attacked the governor's mansion. He managed
to flee, but his wife and children were captured
and cut into pieces.
(Today, I was told, a truce has been
established between these men and the Karmal
government. I asked how the officials had
managed to explain to these men that the present
Under Amin, the
government turned into a
dictatorship, though he
continued to claim that he
was "implementing
reforms."
government was not the same as the government
of Amin, and that what Amin was promoting was
not socialism. It was not explaining that did it,
I was told, no explaining would have done it: the
party members went to the village and kissed
the feet of the men.)
50 -- Coun teA4 py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
The People Rose Up
By the end of Amin's rule, much of the country
was in open rebellion against him. "The people
rose up," is the way even some party members
now tell the story. The Army crumbled. Amin
had to send party members to the front to fight
the losing battle. In early December 1979, Amin
called on Soviet troops to help; several thousand
arrived in mid-December. But Amin's days were
over. He was overthrown by members of his own
party, the People's Democratic Party, and Babrak
Karmal and the Parcham faction took control of
the government.
Exactly what happened during the final days
of December 1979 remains known to only a few
people. "It was a dark night," says Dr. Zahir
Thani, deputy editor of the party newspaper
Ha i ate-En Labe-Saur (The Truth of the April
Revolution). He says that the party had no choice
but to call for additional Soviet troops. "We had
a revolution," he says - a revolution that had
been severely damaged. "We could have aborted
the revolution, but we remembered what
happened in Indonesia and Chile." The PDP
decided to carry on. And for that it needed the
protection of Soviet troops.
Understanding these events that led up to
Amin's ouster and the mistakes made in the first
phase of the revolution, say Afghan government
officials, is essential to deciphering what is
happening in Afghanistan today. "The first phase
of the revolution" is the period from April 27,
1978 to late December 1979 when Hafizullah
Amin was ousted and killed. The "second phase"
began when Babrak Karmal took over as
President.
The situation the new government faced in
early 1980 was disastrous. Amin's brutal methods
had created hundreds of thousands of internal
enemies, and the government was confronted with
a foreign-backed counter-revolution in Pakistan.
These counterrevolutionary leaders - whose goal
is to recreate the pre-1978 feudal structure -
seized on the popular resistance to Amin as a
means to "legitimize" their own war against the
government.
The new government under President Babrak
Karmal took immediate steps toward recon-
ciliation. It released thousands of prisoners, and
Karmal moved to unify the party. At the same
time, he made clear that the government intended
to make good on the party's program of
establishing a broad national front to promote
reforms and defend against the foreign-backed
counterrevolutionary groups - a very difficult
undertaking given the deep distrust Amin's
repression had created. M
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A Political Solution?
Rebel Defections
and Negotiations
"We engaged in highway banditry. We burned than 200 rebel military commanders have
government-owned vehicles, and killed the drivers surrendered in recent months, bringing with them
of these vehicles. We killed people just for some 20,000 armed men.
wearing Western-type clothes.... We terrorized While these precise figures are impossible to
the population," says a young Afghan named verify, there can be no question that such a trend
Malang. He is describing operations carried out exists. Defections by military commanders in
by some 250 men under his command for more Afghanistan who were affiliated with Pakistan-
than two years: "We forced people to join our based rebel organizations are perhaps the single
group, and then sent them to Pakistan for most important factor that is strengthening the
ideological and military training. We stole money military and political position of the government.
and food."
Malang was then a regional commander for The Military Situation
the "Islamic Party" - perhaps the most important
rebel organization fighting the Afghan The government of the People's Democratic Party
government of Babrak Karmal. Malang joined believes that "the backbone of the counter-
the "Islamic Party" almost immediately after revolution has been broken." At the same time,
Soviet troops entered his country in December officials concede that "the counterrevolution is
1979. "1 believed I was fighting an Islamic war still able to carry out sporadic attacks in most
against the invaders." Malang has changed since of the country." But these attacks do not present
then. Today, he is a lieutenant in the Afghan an immediate military threat. They are largely
Army; committed, as he says, "to make up for limited to hit-and-run raids, attacks against
my crimes." economic targets, and assassinations of individual
Over time, Malang had become disenchanted government supporters.
with the "Islamic Party." While commander in In Kabul City itself there have been no major
Kabul province, close to the Afghan capital, he rebel operations in several months. (After I left
went to Pakistan several times to pick up arms the city in late May, I saw U.S. press reports
and get training - from Egyptian and U.S. claiming that there had been shooting in the city,
advisors, Malang says. In Pakistan, he got to and an attack on Bela Hissar fortress less than
know the political leadership of the "Islamic a mile from downtown Kabul. I have not been
Party," headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. He saw able to independently confirm these reports.) The
that Hekmatyar and his cronies were not area around Kabul has been fairly quiet as well.
interested in fighting any "Islamic" war. They Rebel operations such as an attack on a police
were wealthy, corrupt and greedy for personal station several miles east of Kabul during the
profit. "A good part of the money sent to the night of May 25 to May 26, when artillery and
counterrevolutionaries from abroad goes right machinegun fire could be heard in Kabul
into the pockets of these leaders," according to throughout the night, have become rare.
Malang. But Kabul residents are reminded daily that
At the same time, support for Malang's there is a war going on somewhere in the country:
detachment decreased in Kabul province, and, he the 10 pm to 4 am curfew is still in effect.
says, he began to change his mind about the During the day, Afghan soldiers patrol the city
Afghan government as he saw that it "respects to check the identity papers of men. Relations
Islam," and that its reforms are beneficial to the between these soldiers and the people on the
people. In late 1982, Malang, with many of his street are not visibly tense. Army patrols meet
men and arms, surrendered; the government friends and stop to talk; uniformed soldiers walk
welcomed him, and he joined the armed forces. hand in hand with their male friends (as close
Malang's decision to defect from the "Islamic friends often do). Kabul does not fit the image
Party" and join the government is not an isolated of a wartime capital as it is portrayed in the
incident. According to government figures, more U.S. media. The bazaars are full of goods, and
Cow'te py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 51
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people seem to voice their political opinions
without hesitation.
How things are going in the countryside cannot
be determined with certainty from Kabul. Yet
there are quite a number of signs which
contradict continued rebel claims that they
control the countryside:
? While last year the government was forced
to send self-defense groups from the Trade Unions
and the Democratic Youth Organization to the
front to fight, this year it has not been necessary.
The Afghan Army, contrary to reports in the
Western press, is not continuing to "dwindle" but
is apparently at a strength of some 70,000 men.
? The safety of the highways has improved.
For instance, unlike last year, this year there
have been no problems with the transport of
fertilizer from the country's only fertilizer
factory in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif.
Likewise, last winter the supply of firewood to
Kabul from the northeast was uninterrupted.
? Government ministers, and President
Babrak Karmal himself, have been travelling to
many provinces.
? In May 1983, the government felt confident
enough to release some 1500 men, described as
counterrevolutionaries, from Pole-i-Charki Prison
near Kabul. (The several hundred people I saw
released were well dressed and appeared healthy.
Their families had been brought to the prison in
government buses to meet them.)
Government officials readily concede that
they do not "control" the entire country. The
Deputy Minister for Tribal Affairs, Shafi, for
instance, said that no government administrative
units are in place in Nuristan, a mountainous
region at the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. A
similar problem exists in part of Herat province
on the border with Iran. But, says Shafi, the
government's inability to administer a region such
as Nuristan should not be given too much weight:
"Even the monarchy, King Zahir Shah, was not
able to govern there." Shafi says that the
government is at present negotiating with tribal
leaders in Nuristan. He expects the government
to have an administration functioning in Nuristan
by early 1984.
Negotiations
Afghan government officials, such as Deputy
Minister Shafi and Col. Farooq from the Interior
Ministry, emphasize that a military solution is
impossible for Afghanistan. The country's
geography alone precludes a complete military
victory. Says Col. Farooq: "There is no way
we would be able to protect every village, every
peasants' cooperative, every bridge and all the
52 -- Coun.tenbpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
highways." Furthermore, the rebels can always
retreat to Pakistan, far beyond the reach of
Afghan and Soviet troops.
In order to further strengthen its position, the
government is negotiating on two fronts. There
Defections by military
commanders in
Afghanistan who were
affiliated with Pakistan-
based rebel organizations
are perhaps the single most
important factor that is
strengthening the military
and political position of the
government.
are the talks with Pakistan in which the Afghans
are demanding that General Zia ul-Haq stop
sheltering the counterrevolution and maintaining
their training camps. Pakistan wants the Soviet
troops to withdraw and demands that the Afghan
government allow the hundreds of thousands of
refugees to return to Afghanistan. But that,
counters a spokesperson in the Afghan Foreign
Ministry, is not a problem that was created by
Afghanistan. The official points out that some
250,000 refugees have returned, and says that
they "have been received with open arms" and
given back the land they owned before they left.
The Afghan government claims it is. Gen. Zia's
army and the counterrevolutionaries that are
preventing the rebels from coming back, going
so far as to shoot at them when they try to
cross the border, "The refugees are the best
assets of the counterrevolutionaries," says the
Foreign Ministry official. "They give them
'legitimacy."'
While these bilateral talks have made some
progress and might well eventually lead to an
agreement, the Afghan government does not seem
to be overly optimistic. "The problem is, with
the United States," said one official. "They are
arming the counterrevolutionaries [in Pakistan] .
They have created the problem, and they are not
interested in solving it."
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The second negotiating track the Afghan and to emphasize the "national democratic
government has pursued - talks with former character of the revolution" the government also
military commanders and tribal leaders once stresses its respect for Islam. Important
opposed to the government - is showing much government meetings begin with prayer, and
more progress. In May 1983, for instance, the proclamations are issued "in the name of Allah."
government scored one of its biggest successes The government's extensive program of
to date: Ahmad Shah Massoud, the rebel chief renovating mosques and constructing new ones is
in the Panjsher Valley, agreed to a truce. For making it difficult for the counterrevolutionaries
the government, this valley, just a few miles to claim the government is anti-Islamic. Calls
north of Kabul is probably the single most to prayer are aired on the radio; so are daily
strategic region in the country. Until Massoud religious programs. One of the biggest jobs at
agreed to a truce, it had been one of the most the Government Printing Office is printing copies
secure rebel strongholds. of the Koran.
(Before I left the United States for Kabul, I Planning
read a number of reports in the U.S. media Economic
claiming that the Soviet air force had heavily When the People's Democratic Party took power
bombarded the Panjsher Valley area in early May. in 1978, Afghanistan was among the ranks of the
No one I spoke to in Kabul, including natives of orest countries on earth. Per capita income
the Valley who were openly anti-government, had ~ was around $100 a year; infant mortality 270 per
heard anything about a recent stream of refugees thousand. Many peasants had no land, or less
coming ming into the city.)
The government of Babrak Karmal makes a land than they needed to live. They were
sharp distinction between the foreign-backed absolutely dependent on the large landowners.
opposition in Pakistan. and the resistance that Industry was practically non-existent, and the
grew inside Afghanistan as a response to the monarchy and Mohammed Daoud's regime (1973-
mistakes and repression primarily under the rule 78) had done virtually nothing to prepare the
of Hafizullah Amin in 1979. Upon taking power nation to utilize its rich natural resources.
in December 1979, Karmal emphasized that his Only now is Afghanistan beginning to build
government was about to move forward with a essential industrial facilities, and it will have to
national democratic revolution. To that end, the make up for decades of inaction and neglect.
People's Democratic Party has established a According to the State Planning Committee, the
National Fatherland Front (NFF), described as "a establishment of heavy industry will have to wait.
broad spectrum of mass political and social Instead, government planning concentrates on
organizations whose backbone is the alliance of increasing agricultural production hand in hand
workers and peasants." with the buildup of light industry which is to
Today the Front has 600,000 members and 410 make use of agricultural improvements. For
councils around the country. Besides the People's instance, two textile factories are being
Democratic Party, it includes several social and completed in Herat and Kandahar which will be
professional organizations such as the Union of able to go into operation because of an increase
Agricultural Cooperatives, the Trade Unions, the in cotton production, primarily in the agricultural
Democratic Women's Organization and the cooperatives.
Democratic Youth Organization; representatives The government welcomes private invest-
from the tribes; religious scholars and mullahs; ment. In fact, the State Planning Committee
and individual members. According to PDP has set up a special commission to aid private
Central Committee member Baroq Shafi, the business. Over the last five years, the number
Front's task is to explain government policies to of major private enterprises has increased from
the people and to aid in the practical realization 135 to 235. (According to Babrak Karmal,
of those policies: land reform, water and Afghanistan does not now provide an atmosphere
fertilizer distribution, and construction activities. in which "monopoly capital" and "parasitic
In areas where there is still fighting, the NFF families could come into being" or in which "big
sets up peace committees to resolve the conflict. national capital" could link up with multinational
The present government's approach to corporations to dominate the country. This
promoting reforms differs fundamentally from the unique situation, says Karmal, makes it possible,
hasty and often violent measures of 1978 and at present, for the "small and middle industrialists
1979. Instead of confronting the establishment and merchants who are interested in the progress
power structure at every possible opportunity, of the country" to be part of the national
the current government is attempting to work democratic revolution.)
with it. As many people as possible are drawn The government's economic planning pays
into the reforms. In order to broaden its base special attention to the transportation problem,
Couwte.nbpy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 53
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a weak link in Afghanistan's economy even before
the counterrevolutionaries concentrated their
attacks on trucks rolling on Afghanistan's few
highways. A "Supreme Council on Transportation"
is now coordinating the protection of private and
government trucks. Attacks on the transport
system are said to have decreased during the last
year; the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia are
donating 2,200 heavy trucks to make up for those
which have been destroyed.
The rebels have done considerable economic
damage not only in the field of transportation.
Official statistics put the damage over the last
five years at 28 billion Afghanis - about one-
fifth of one year's Gross National Product. This
figure apparently represents only direct material
damage caused by rebel attacks. Hassan Rashiq,
Deputy President of the Union of Agricultural
Cooperatives, says, for instance, that no complete
survey has been made of the damage done to the
cooperatives. It is very difficult, he says, to
compute damage from 'actions such as the
destruction of irrigation systems. Or, asks Trade
Union President Satar Purdeli, how does one put
a number on the losses incurred by some textile
factories in 1981 which did not receive enough
cotton because the counterrevolutionaries killed
many cotton farmers or threatened retribution if
they grew cotton and other industrial crops?
Economic facilities are a favorite rebel
target. The destruction of power lines has caused
much damage. For instance, says Purdeli, in
early 1983 the production at the Gulbahar textile
factory in Kapisa province dropped by 72. percent
Who Are the Rebel Leaders?
President Reagan considers the
Afghan rebel leaders based in
Pakistan "freedom fighters." And
in fact, they are fighting for very
much the same kind of "freedom"
as are Reagan's Somocista "freedom
fighters," armed by the CIA to
overthrow the government of
Nicaragua. Both are fighting to re-
establish the status quo before the
revolution. The Afghan rebel chiefs
are fighting for the "freedom" to
regain their feudal landholdings in
Afghanistan, the "freedom" to keep
women illiterate and oppressed, and
the "freedom" to overturn other
social reforms brought about by the
People's Democratic Party. A
glance at the careers of some of
these rebel leaders sufficiently
illustrates what interests they
represent and fight for.
Probably the most important
of these counterrevolutionary
leaders is Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the
head of the "Islamic Party." He
was convicted of murdering a
progressive student at Kabul
University in 1972.1 After serving
a short sentence, he went to
Pakistan and became commander of
a 5000-man, Pakistan-sponsored
armed detachment which infiltrated
into Afghanistan in 1975 to create
trouble for the government of
Mohammed Daoud. (See sidebar,
"The CIA and The Rebels.")
Today, the "Islamic Party" uses
extremely cruel methods. It
forcibly recruits young men and
collects "taxes" from villages,
assassinates people who refuse to
aid its cause and makes literacy
campaign teachers a prime target.
Journalist Gerard Chaliand, who
traveled with the rebels and is
generally sympathetic to their fight,
writes that Hekmatyar's group
consists of people "who have no
qualms about torturing or killing
anyone who disagrees with them."
"Quite honestly," said Mangal
Hussain, a spokesperson of the
"Islamic Party," when asked what
his organization would do with the
current government officials if it
took power, "we would kill them."3
? Like Hekmatyar, Burhannudin
Rabbani, the leader of the "Islamic
Society of Afghanistan" was
involved in ' the Pakistan-financed
campaign in the mid-1970s. He is
a former landlord, and an exporter
of carpets and karakul pelts.
? Sayed Ahmad Gailani, a
relative of the royal family through
his wife, portrays himself as a
religious figure. He had large land-
holdings in Afghanistan and also
amassed wealth from tribute paid
to him by nomads and from the
monopoly he held on marketing
Peugeot cars in Afghanistan.
Gailani's "National Front for the
Islamic Revolution of Afghanistan"
has close ties to the Saudi royal
family and advocates the return of
the monarchy to Afghanistan.
? Sebgatullah Mujadidi went to
Pakistan only weeks after the 1978
Afghan revolution, where he set up
his "National Liberation Front of
Afghanistan" with money from Saudi
Arabia. He was a feudal landlord
in Kabul province. Mujadidi now
maintains a U.S. headquarters in
Alexandria, Virginia, which he visits
frequently.
These rebel leaders, along with
about a dozen other counter-
revolutionary chiefs, have set up
fiefdoms in Peshawar, Pakistan,
from which they launch incursions
into Afghanistan. They also run "a
highly efficient and well organized
'mafia' which dominates the export
of hard drugs from Pakistan... to
the West, and with the proceeds
[they] are buying arms for the
struggle and property inside
Pakistan."4 The counter-
revolutionary leaders have also
bought- businesses in Pakistan.
Hekmatyar, for instance, controls
much of the public transportation
in Peshawar and has been buying
real estate in the area, "causing
house prices in Peshawar and
Islamabad to rise steeply in the past
two years."5
For these leaders, the war is just
another profit-making enterprise.
Footnotes:
1) For details, see Mohammed
Sarkash and Seamus O'Faolain,
"Afghanistan: Foreign Intervention
and the Prospects for Peace,"
Counterspy, vol.5, no.3.
2 New Statesman, 12/26/80.
3) Washington Post, 9/2/79.
4) "Afghan Gun-running and Drug
smuggling 'Mafia,!" The Middle East
(London), May 1983. Also see
Konrad Ege, "CIA Rebels Supply
U.S. Heroin," Counterspy, vol.5,
no.1.
5) The Middle East, May 1983.
54 -- Countehepy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
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when the rebels cut the power lines from
Jalalabad to the factory.
The State Planning Committee's Economic
Development Plan for 1982-83 gives ample
evidence of the many failures to reach economic
goals because of the "special conditions" in the
country. Nonetheless, the government in Kabul
is confident. Officials point to a "positive trend"
over the last years. And in spite of all the
internal problems and the subversion from abroad,
the social, political and economic reforms of the
last few years have brought more progress to
Afghanistan than decades under the monarchy.
(See "Reforms.")
Bringing an end to the foreign intervention
carried out by the United States, Pakistan, China,
Egypt and Saudi Arabia is key to peace and
further progress in Afghanistan. These countries
are standing in the way of a negotiated political
settlement to the "Afghan conflict." The Reagan
administration, by providing millions of dollars in
aid to the counterrevolutionaries, is eager to tie
down Soviet troops in Afghanistan and to score
points in its anti-Soviet propaganda crusade.
A political settlement is possible in
Afghanistan - in fact, dramatic steps have been
taken in that direction through the government's
negotiations with rebel military commanders and
with tribal leaders. An overall political
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The Reforms
Literacy Campaign
Of all the reforms promoted by the Afghan
government, the literacy program might hold the
key to the government's overall reform strategy.
People are taught primarily practical things; e.g.
women use books on health care, and peasants
learn to read from books on new methods of
farming. At the same time, the campaign is
used to inform people about the government
programs - for many people, this is probably the
first time they hear in-depth and first-hand
descriptions of what the government stands for.
Before the revolution, Afghanistan had an
illiteracy rate of some 95 percent. According
to Zafar Zai, the president of the literacy
campaign, illiteracy will be wiped out within ten
years. One million people have graduated from
the nine-month literacy course since 1980; some
eight million books have been printed. But these
achievements "have not come easy," says Zai,
settlement which would facilitate the withdrawal
of Soviet troops from Afghanistan is being held
up by the intransigent posture of the Reagan
administration.
The U.S. government, through the CIA and
allied regimes in the Middle East and Asia, is
waging a "secret" war against Afghanistan, just
as it is waging a "secret" war against Nicaragua.
Millions of people oppose that CIA operation.
The CIA's war against Afghanistan, however, has
provoked little organized opposition in the United
States. On the contrary, the names of the very
Senators who have opposed covert operations
against Nicaragua can be found signed onto a
resolution calling for increased CIA aid to the
Afghan rebels.
The parallels between these two operations
are striking, though the countries and their
revolutions are very different. In both cases,
the CIA is trying to overthrow a government
which is committed to rebuilding a country after
decades-long dictatorial rule and exploitation. In
both cases, the CIA is financing military forces
of the extreme right committed to reestablishing
the previous system of government. Therefore,
if one opposes the CIA's war against Nicaragua -
as does the majority of the people in the United
States - it is only consistent to oppose the CIA's
war against Afghanistan. c?
pointing to a poster in his office with photos of
dozens of young literacy teachers who have been
murdered by the counterrevolutionaries. "In
addition, 60 percent of the premises used by the
campaign have been destroyed; the counterrevo-
lutionaries have killed people just for applying
for literacy courses."
The literacy workers have changed their
approach to promoting the campaign. At the
beginning, some teachers and party cadres seemed
to believe that they could advance the campaign
by forcing people to attend. In some instances
women were forced to come - women who might
have lived in situations where they couldn't even
visit their parents without asking their husbands
for permission. To compel these women to attend
a literacy course outside the house, and perhaps
to be taught by a man was considered an insult.
There was also some resistance by rightwing
clergy.
Today, the government is taking a new tack:
it asks the mullahs (religious leaders) themselves
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to teach courses. It is argued that people should
take part in the campaign in order to be able to
read the Koran. Some courses are now taught
in mosques, and mullahs are given training so
they can conduct the classes. Likewise, in areas
where it is necessary, women are told they have
to get permission from their husbands to attend,
and the literacy teachers set up day care centers
so the women can come to the courses. Women
teachers now wear the same clothes as the local
women. The literacy campaign also reaches out
to Afghanistan's 2 to 3 million nomads. The
teachers travel with the nomads for the duration
of the courses.
Land Reform and
Agricultural
Cooperatives
Before the revolution, according to the U.S.
government's Area Handbook on Afghanistan, two
percent of Afghanistan's landowners held 40
percent of the land, while two out of five
peasants owned no land or less than half a
hectare. Afghan government statistics show that
some 300,000 peasants so far have benefitted
from the land reform program (which had ground
to a virtual halt during Amin's rule). At present,
the government is proceeding carefully and
deliberately with the land reform - too many
mistakes have been made, and too many people
have been alienated. According to Deputy
Minister of Tribal Affairs Shafi, -the government
has sent investigative teams to a number of
provinces to examine the progress and prospects
for land reform in these areas.
Of equal importance for the development of
Afghanistan's agriculture, says Hassan Rashiq, the
Deputy President of the Union of' Agricultural
Cooperatives, is the establishment of coopera-
tives. They also serve as "training schools" for
future political leaders, he says. 1300 coops were
created after the revolution. But "because of
the deviations in the first phase, the cooperatives
suffered." Today, explains Rashiq, only 236 coops
are functioning. The others folded during the
purges under Amin, because their leaders were
assassinated by the counterrevolutionaries, or
simply due to mismanagement. Revitalizing these
coops is one of the government's highest
priorities.
In addition to these 236 producer cooperatives
- i.e., peasants working together to grow crops
- there are also consumer cooperatives. These
56 -- Countenapy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
are aided by the government in jointly buying
consumer goods. The government also buys the
cooperatives' harvests at a good price.
Previously, the peasants were forced to sell their
crops, often at low prices, to merchants
immediately after harvest for lack of storage
facilities.
About 9000 coop members also belong to self-
defense groups. Attacks by rebels have been a
serious problem for the cooperatives. Says;
Rashiq: "Because the counterrevolution has
received military setbacks, they are resorting
increasingly to economic destruction. No co-
operative exists that has not suffered from the
attacks of the counterrevolutionaries."
Women's Rights
Probably the biggest challenge the revolution has
presented to the established power structure, says
Jamita Nahid of the Democratic Women's
Organization (DWO), is the law guaranteeing
equal rights for men and women. Life for millions
of Afghan women is harsh; before 1978 there
were virtually no laws giving women legal
protection. Women at times lived no better than
slaves, and could be sold into marriage. Nahid
tells of a friend of hers, a medical student,,who
went to a village near Kabul to see a woman
who had fallen sick. The student told the
woman's husband, a poor peasant, that she needed
a doctor. Said the husband, "my cow is sick,
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too. First I need a doctor for the cow, because
if it dies, I cannot afford to buy a new one. I
depend on it for my living. If my wife dies, I
can get a new one."
Women have been doubly oppressed in
Afghanistan, says Nahid. First they suffered from
Probably the biggest
challenge the revolution
has presented to the
established power
structure ... is the law
guaranteeing equal rights
for men and women.
the literacy campaign. It has also established
Women's Clubs where women meet to produce
handicrafts and talk about their concerns.
"As long as women do not participate fully
in the social and political life of the country,
the revolution will not advance very fast," says
Nahid. The goal of the D W O is not only to help
women liberate themselves, but also to help men
see that without equal rights for women, "there
will be no real progress." But that, Nahid
concedes, "will take a while. The mentality that
women are inferior is centuries old," and even
"some of the more conscious men have problems
putting the principle of women's equality into
practice."
Trade Unions
The government of the People's Democratic Party
is the first government in Afghanistan to allow
workers to form unions and to draft an extensive
labor code. Afghan trade unions, according to
the President of the Central
Satar Purdeli
,
the: poverty, the misery and the feudal rule as Council of the Trade Unions, have 163,000
did the rest of the Afghan population. But in members; 14,000 of them have joined the self-
addition, women suffered, and still suffer, from defense groups which are responsible for the
their special oppression as women: often they hysical security of the factories.
work long hours in the fields and then return p
About 40 percent of the unionists live in
t
home to do the housework; women were no
allowed to participate in the political life; very
few girls used to go to school; women bear eight,
ten, twelve children; and they often suffer from
a reactionary interpretation of Islam which
relegates them to the status of second-class
human beings.
Under the previous regime, there was virtually
no possibility for women to work outside the
house or the fields, or to hold professional jobs.
,
,
g
workers,
the DWO to organize women to push for the great contributions to the revolution, and "it is
implementation of the laws guaranteeing equal always a great step forward in a country's history
rights. Often the DWO attracts women through Cow1_teJu, p y -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 57
The government is now encouraging employers to
hire women. In the Government Printing Office
in Kabul, for instance, more than 200 out of the
700 workers are women. One 22-year-old woman
worker in the bindery said: "Some men still
complain that the women take the jobs from the
men. But it's getting better." Like many of
her unmarried co-workers, she had lived with her
parents doing housework after she had finished
school, and the bindery, she says, "is much more
interesting." A day care center has been
established at the factory, but many women are
still unable to hold industrial jobs for lack of day
care facilities.
In some rural areas, it is very difficult for
Kabul, but, says Purdeli, every province has its
trade union council. Union strongholds are in
Nangarhar, Balkh, Baglan, Kandahar and Herat.
The trade unions participate in all major factory
decisions. They have established health care
centers in the factories as well as child care
centers. The trade unions are also building
recreational facilities for the workers and their
families - often in former royal family palaces.
The trade union headquarters itself used to belong
to a member of the king's family. Workers also
receive food coupons which allow them to buy
essential items - rice, flour, oil, matches, etc. -
at sharply reduced prices; the union also makes
an effort to provide subsidized housing for its
members. Likewise, the government has hiked
the minimum wage to 1410 Afghanis (about $20)
a month, and wages have been increased by 30
to 50 percent over the past three years.
Purdeli concedes that "quantitatively, Afghan
workers have not yet developed into a strong
working class" since for decades, the monarchy
did nothing to develop the country's industrial
potential and had not allowed unions. The
are making
Purdeli goes on
h
thou
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when trade unions are established for the first
time."
Youth and Education
One of the most crushing legacies left by decades
of monarchical rule is the lack of educational
facilities. Many children, especially girls, had
no chance to attend school; only one out of 20
people could read. There was only one university
in the country and it had no consistent
curriculum, no program for doctoral degrees, and
no textbooks for nine out of ten courses.
A second university has now been opened in
Nangarhar province, and even though "Kabul
University is still in somewhat bad shape," says
its director Asadullah Habib (one of Afghanistan's
best known poets) things are improving. Several
new faculties and departments have been opened.
Others, such as the Polytechnical Institute and
the Islamic law department, have been greatly
expanded. There are 7000 students, 2400 of them
are women; some 3000 come from distant
provinces. The university has also opened
facilities for people who could not finish their
education for lack of money. Several hundred
students are now studying in a "workers' and
peasants' faculty" and in Kabul University's night
school.
Many children still do not attend school. The
reasons are often money-related. Families need
the added income their children can earn. In
Kabul City, for instance, hundreds of boys sit at
street corners selling cigarettes -- by the piece,
not the pack - or walk around with buckets full
of cold water which they sell in cups.
The government's education campaign has also
been hindered by the destruction of some 1300
school buildings by the rebels. Disruptions at
Kabul University are a thing of the past, but
during 1979, there was a political purge of
teachers which prevented the university from
58 -- Counteipy -- Sept.-Nov. 1983
functioning normally. Large-scale fighting in the
country in 1979 and 1980 also created problems.
Says Habib: "How can you expect a student to
attend classes and to study when he hears about
fighting in his province, and he has no opportunity
of finding out what is actually happening there?"
According to Habib, psychological warfare is
being waged against the university. For example,
he says, when Kabul University opened last year,
BBC and Voice of America reports claimed that
the university was shut down because of unrest.
Everybody at the university could see that this
was a lie; nonetheless, says Habib, such reports
create a tense atmosphere.
Many of the university students are members
of the Democratic Youth Organization (DYO)
which serves to draw young people into the
revolution. According to Hanif, a DYO secretary,
more than half of the people who joined the party
last year (it has some 100,000 members) had been
DYO activists. The DYO itself has 110,000
members, some of whom also serve in the "social
order brigades," i.e. armed detachments which
function primarily as guards against the rebels.
Hanif says some of the members of the "social
order brigades" are women; all in all, the DYO
has 10,000 women members. In some areas of
the country, Hanif says, DYO members are still
forced to work underground; in these regions,
anyone connected with a revolutionary
organization is a likely rebel target.
Many of the DYO members come from Kabul
but, says Hanif, considerable progress is being
made in the provinces. For instance, in
Nangarhar province there are 5000 members, in
Jowzjan 5000, in Badakshan 4000, and in Kandahar
and Herat more than 3000 each. The DYO now
concentrates on organizing in the countryside.
Members go to the villages to help farmers and
to do guard duty. In addition, the Youth
Organization has artistic brigades which travel
around the country to show films and talk to the
young people. Since the Youth Organization was
founded in 1980, its membership has doubled each
year. @)
NEWS, bnom page 32
17) "Victory for Strauss," Counterspy, Vol. 7, No. 2.
18) Cf. supra, #13.
19) Quoted from a confidential letter from Institute for
the Stpdy of Conflict files. Time Out, 8/29-9/4/75, p. 6.
20) Ibid.
21) Cf. supra, #13.
22) Colin Legum, "Reporting on the 'Liquidation' of the
Empire," The Observer, (London), 1/24/82.
23) Cf. supra, #13.
24) Robert Parker, Rough Justice, Fontana Paperbacks,
London, 1981, p. 162.
25) See Washington Post, 12/22/75.
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/14: CIA-RDP9O-00845ROO0100130005-8
CIA Aid to the Rebels
CIA support for the Afghan rebels
is the largest known CIA
paramilitary campaign since the
mid-1970s when it aided UNITA
forces in Angola in an attempt to
stifle that country's revolution. The
United States and its allies - China,
Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia -
have spent some $200 million to arm
and train the Pakistan-based
counterrevolutionaries.1
The CIA campaign began shortly
after the People's Democratic Party
took power in April 1978, and
escalated after Babrak Karmal
became president in December 1979
and Soviet troops entered the
country. In early January 1980, the
Carter cabinet decided that the
CIA, in conjunction with China and
Egypt, should make a major
commitment to support the Afghan
rebels in Pakistan. The operation
was to be run by a special
committee headed by National
Security Advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski. Brzezinski coordinated
the program with four nations:
Egypt (which delivers Soviet-made
weapons from its warehouses and
supplies military trainers), Pakistan
(which permits and protects the
Afghan rebel military camps on its
soil and allows arms shipments
through), China (which ships arms
and provides training) and Saudi
Arabia (which finances some arms
shipments and props up the
Pakistani government with
economic aid).
President Carter wanted the
operation to be deceptive: "The
Afghan struggle was an 'Islamic
struggle,' President Carter told his
aides, and U.S. assistance should not
disturb that impression.112 The
Afghan rebel leaders in Pakistan
still work hard to keep up this
"indigenous Islamic struggle"
facade. They claim all of their
arms are either locally produced,
were obtained from defecting
Afghan soldiers, or were captured
from Afghan or Soviet army posts.
Ronald Reagan has taken a more
overt approach to aiding the
counterrevolutionaries. Already
during his electoral campaign, he
openly advocated U.S. arms
shipments to the rebels ("freedom
fighters," in his lexicon). Once
president, he stepped up the CIA
program which by now even CIA
Director William Casey has
admitted exists.3 The weapons
supplied by the U.S. and its allies
include rocket-propelled grenade
launchers capable of piercing Soviet
tank armor, plastic-covered land
mines, mortars, recoilless rifles,
bazookas, and shoulder-fired anti-
aircraft guns. These weapons
shipments are very likely to
continue: On his visit to Pakistan
in early July 1983 Secretary of
State George Shultz addressed
Afghan "refugee" leaders as "fellow
fighters for freedom" and assured
them that they "do not fight alone."
"My message from the United States
is simple," said the Secretary, "we
are with you."4
The CIA's current strategy of
stimulating and financing military
operations by feudal, and some
tribal, leaders against the Afghan
government can make use of
experience gained on two previous
occasions when such a strategy was
contemplated or actually carried
out. According to Leon Poullada,
former U.S. ambassador to
Afghanistan, U.S. embassy officials
back in the early 1950s considered
bringing about the overthrow of the
King-appointed Prime Minister
Mohammed Daoud, using exactly the
same tactics. At the time, many
U.S. officials thought Daoud (a
cousin of the king) was moving the
country closer to the Soviet Union.
Then-U.S. ambassador in Kabul,
Angus Ward, discussed his opposition
to Daoud with Pakistani officials
who, "alarmed by Daoud's policies,
...wanted to stir up tribal rebellions
to overthrow Daoud." Poullada
continues: "The CIA station chief
in Kabul had a strong personal
influence on [Ambassador] Ward....
With Pakistani colleagues and royal
family dissenters he dreamed up
plots to 'destabilize' the Daoud
regime."5
Poullada claims that these plans
did not have U.S. government
backing, and, in any case, Daoud
learned through his intelligence
service of the CIA's deliberations.
Ambassador Ward and the CIA chief
were replaced soon thereafter.
A much more serious attempt to
Eyewitness Afghanistan
destabilize Afghanistan was
launched in 1973 after the same
Daoud had overthrown King Zahir
Shah. The Pakistani government
was concerned that Daoud would
reignite a long-standing border
conflict, and in anticipation secretly
trained some 5000 Afghan "rebels."
The Nixon administration, thinking
that Daoud might be a leftist,
reportedly aided that project but
then withdrew support when it
turned out that Daoud and a U.S.
ally, the Shah of Iran, were growing
increasingly close. In July 1975,
these 5000 "rebels" infiltrated into
the Panjsher Valley, where they
fought against the Afghan
government forces.
After planning to create "tribal
rebellions" in the early 1950s and
actually setting up the 5000-
member force in the early 1970s, it
was only a small step for the United
States, Pakistan and their allies to
support "Islamic rebellion" against
the People's Democratic Party from
1978 to the present. C~)
1) Carl Bernstein ("Arms for
Afghanistan," New Republic,
6/18/81) wrote that by mid-1981,
more than $100 million had been
spent to aid the rebels. A New
York Times article (5/4/83) claimed
that $100 to $150 million had been
given to the rebels from 1980 to
1983; while Aernout van Lynden, a
Dutch journalist who traveled with
the rebels and is sympathetic to
their cause, says that the U.S. is
paying $20 to $30 million a year to
Egypt alone to buy up that country's
stockpile of Soviet-made weapons
(Washington Post, 12/19/82).
2) ABC News, "20/20," 6/18/81.
3) See Lou Cannon, "Casey, Who
Can't Remember, Berates Officials
Who Can't Read," Washington Post,
6/27/83.
4) Washington Post, 7/4/83.
5) Leon Poullada, "Afghanistan and
the United States: The Crucial
Years," Middle East Journal, Spring
1981.
6) Far Eastern Economic Review,
1/30/81.
Couwte,t6py -- Sept.-Nov. 1983 -- 59
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