EL SALVADOR: THE OUTLOOK FOR THE DUARTE GOVERNMENT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00495R001201330001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 31
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: NIE

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Director c:f ,~_.'
Central
Intelligence
E1 Salvador: The Outlook
f~r.~the Duarte Government
Secret
NIE 83.1-85
Marcti 1985
Copy 417
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N I E 83.1-85
EL .SALVADOR: THE OUTLOOK
FOR THE DUARTE GOVERNMENT
.Information available as of 27 February 1985
was used in the preparation of this Estimate,
which was approved by the National Foreign
Intelligence Board on 7 March 1985.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 1
DISCUSSION .................................................................. . ..................... 7
Background ....................................................................................... 7
Duarte's Political Strategy ................................................................ r
The Outlook for the March 1985 Elections .................................... 10
Dealing With the Right ................................................................ 10
The Alunicipal Elections .............................................................. 10
The Assembly Elections ............................................................... 10
Key Dangers Associated With the Elections ............................... 11
The Militar~~ Balance ........................................................................ 12
Improving 'Military Performance and Capabilities .................... 12
Continuing 'Military Deficiencies ......:.......................................... 13
The Declining Fortunes of the Guerrillas ................................... 14
Popular Support ............................................................................ 14
Guerrilla Streiigth ......................................................................... 15
Guerrilla Capabilities ................................................................... 15
The Political Outlook ....................................................................... 16
Civil-Militar}~ Relations ................................................................ 19
Dealing With the Extreme Left .................................................. 19
Cuban and Soviet Interests ........................................................... 20
The Economy .................................................................................... 20
Implications for the United States ................................................... 22
Annex B: Key Indicators ...................................................................... 27
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KEY JUDGMENTS
We believe that, on balance, President Jose Napoleon Duarte has
made a viable start toward achieving political stability in El Salvador.
Most important, he has:
- Broadened support for his government and policies in the
United States, and gained additional backing from other govern-
ments while helping to bring about a sharp decrease in guerrilla
credibility and popular support.
- Managed to keep the insurgency and its allies on the extreme
left generally on the defensive; indeed, insurgent prospects are
worse than at any time since the movement was formed in 1980.
- Through his actions accelerated the downward trend in political
violence to the point where it is at the lowest level in over five
years (civilian deaths dropped from about 1,700 in 1983 to 750
in 1984).
- Helped more moderate political forces to gain strength to the
degree that many influential leaders .have moderated their
confrontational behavior of the past. and are participating more
fully in the democratic process.
- Gained the provisional cooperation of most top military officers,
even though they will not allow him to interfere with their
institutional core interests.
- Elevated the hopes of the populace that peace and prosperity
can be brought through the constitutional framework put in
place in 1984.
At the same time, however, Duarte has failed to gain the confi-
dence of the private sector, and has delayed necessary economic
austerity measures unpopular with his political constituency. Further-
more, several actions late last year-especially his attempt to promote a
favored military officer and his unconstitutional veto of an electoral
law-resulted in a backlash. in the military and played into the hands of
his rightist opponents.
Thus, Duarte's efforts to build his political strength by slowly
expanding the moderate political forces will continue to be constrained
by:
- The realization that some military officers would relish any
opportunity or excuse to remove him from office.
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-The continuing strength of rightwing parties and groups, espe-
cially the National Republican Alliance (ARENA) party.
- The military strength and geographic dispersion of the insurgen-
cy and its continuing ability to inflict damage on the economy.
- The control by rightist parties of the Legislative Assembly,
where the Christian Democratic Party (PDC) has only 24 of the
60 seats.
- The need to tailor his policies in order to retain international le-
gitimacy and obtain substantial amounts of US economic and
military assistance.
Finally, Duarte's often personalistic, dogmatic, and sometimes
impulsive leadership has been a major obstacle in improving relations
with opposition groups and the private sector.
The Outlook for the Elections
All the Assembly seats and 261 municipal councils throughout the
country will be contested in the balloting on 31 March, and we believe
it will be another important test of the nascent democratic system in El
Salvador and the ability of the government to continue attracting
international support. Duarte's principal objective will be to win a large
enough vote to gain a personal vote of confidence and, optimally, to
deny the right a majority in the Assembly.
The most likely outcome in the Assembly elections is for a PDC
plurality of the popular vote similar to the one the party won in 1982,
and, at best, it may add a seat or two. The extreme rightist ARENA par-
ty of Roberto D'Aubuisson will probably hold on to at least the 19 seats
it won in 1982. The moderate rightist National Conciliation Party
(PCN) will probably gain enough seats to hold the balance of power in
the 60-seat Assembly. The smaller parties will finish well down the
scale.
Once again, the "quality" of the process and voting will be subject
to scrutiny by international observers. Any military or rightwing
violence or voting irregularities would taint the legitimacy of the results.
In all likelihood the guerrillas will seek to disrupt and devalue the
process by attacking isolated towns and economic targets, and by
intimidating the populace
Barring the assassination of Duarte or some other key official, the
potentially most damaging development could be some spectacular
guerrilla successes immediately preceding or coinciding with the elec-
tions.
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A key test will be the total number of municipalities where the
guerrillas are able to prevent voting. On balance, however, we judge
that the insurgents will not succeed in significantly disrupting the
elections, and that the balloting will be conducted relatively smoothly
and free of fraud:
The Military Balance
We believe that th~e~ decline in popular support for. the insurgency
that has occurred over the last two years or so has accelerated since
Duarte took office last year. This is due to the high levels of
participation in, and enthusiasm for recent national elections, reforms
implemented since .,1980, the sharp decline in rightwing death squad
activities and other abuses, and the growing belief that radical and
violent tactics have only made the country's problems worse. The
insurgents -have also been hurt by reaction against their attacks on
economic targets, by their forcible recruitment of youths, and probably
by a rising perception that they are engaged in a losing cause.
We believe that the total number of armed insurgents peaked
between 9,000 and 11,000 in 1984, and that their strength is likely to
decline over the next year or so. The guerrilla coalition remains a potent
and destructive force, nevertheless, and will undoubtedly be able to
inflict continuing damage on the military and the economy. Insurgent
leaders are shifting their strategy to rely more on small-unit tactics, are
attempting to rebuild their infrastructure in San Salvador to conduct
urban terrorism, and are endeavoring to open a new front in relatively
weakly defended areas of western El Salvador.
On balance, therefore, we conclude that Duarte has inherited an
improving military situation, and many key trends affecting the
military balance of power-including relative manpower strength,
casualties, weapons losses, and foreign and domestic popular support-
now appear to be running in the government's favor. We believe,
furthermore, that the favorable trends will continue, despite the
likelihood of sporadic tactical setbacks and continuing deficiencies in
military performance. These trends will probably lead to only gradual
attrition of the insurgent rank and file over the next years, and will not
threaten the insurgent infrastructure unless Salvadoran strategy and
tactics are changed to achieve that objective.
The support of the United States has been the key element in
holding the democratic process together. US financial support has
underwritten this process and has allowed. a significant, direct input of
US advice and assistance in formulating domestic political, economic,
and military policies. We believe that, if US attention and resources
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continue during Duarte's term as they have for the past fe~v years, the
President has abetter-than-even chance to complete his term in office.
Nevertheless, he will have to continue walking a political tightrope,
seeking on the one hand to retain-and perhaps expand-support in his
traditional constituencies on the left, while compromising with interests
on the right.
The Political Outlook
Assuming that Duarte and his government get through the. Assem-
bly elections without suffering any serious setbacks, they will still face
many powerful forces arrayed against them, and will be severely
constrained in their ability to advance programs or initiatives opposed
by the military, rightist political parties, and other opposition groups.
The President's room for maneuver will continue to be narrow, and, as
in the past, he will be forced to seek tactical alliances on certain issues in
order to make legislative progress
We believe Duarte will continue to press for certain core obiec-
tives-judicial reform, consolidation and extension of agrarian reform,
wage and other benefits for workers-but, if he is to achieve anything
in those areas, he will be forced to make major concessions in order to
win necessary support from more moderate elements in the opposition
parties. Such concessions might include, for instance, placing conserva-
tive and private=sector representatives in his cabinet, allowing business-
men greater freedom to market coffee independently of the govern=
ment monopoly, and undertaking economic and financial reforms
beneficial to private-sector interests.
If Duarte were to adopt a conciliatory stance toward conservative
and business interests, the chances would improve over the next year or
so that a working arrangement between the executive and legislative
branches, and between the public and private sectors, will evolve on
important national issues. Amore likely outcome is for periods of
continuing tension, punctuated by periods of intense strain.
One of the greatest dangers in our view is that Duarte will refuse to
allow conservative and private-sector interests a greater economic and
political role. We are concerned, for instance, that he will not be able
sufficiently to overcome his previously strong populist biases.
Moreover, Duarte remains under considerable pressure from left-
wing members of his party and his traditional constituencies, especially
labor and peasant groups, to adopt activist and demand-side policies like
those he advocated until a few years ago. It -would be impossible,
however, for him to go very far with such approaches over the next two
years because opposition from the military, the Assembly, and the
private sector would be so great.
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Other Factors Affecting Stability
Political institutions and frameworks for peacefully resolving dis-
putes have only recently begun to emerge in El Salvador. Assassination
of the President remains a major danger. If Duarte ~~-ere assassinated;
Vice President Rodolfo Castillo would be unlikely to fill the vacuum for
long, and a period of rising instability would ensue
~~loreover, adding to the potential for instabilit~~ is the state of the
Salvadoran economy. Last year's modest growth .vas achieved primaril~~
because of US aid, and per capita income has continued to stagnate.
Another key factor affecting stability over the next few years is
likely to be the degree to which Duarte and the military leadership
remain united in dealing with the guerrillas. Duarte has emphasized
that he wants to eliminate the insurgency by 1986, and will be likely to
persist in efforts to win miltary backing for a new round of talks, despite
the tensions such efforts will generate. The military leadership, in
contrast, will prefer that new talks be contingent on dramatic progress
in the counterinsurgency and unmistakable evidence that the guerrillas
are in serious trouble.
A key incentive to attract some part of the radical left into the
democratic process would be a broad amnesty la~>>. The rightist factions
in the Assembly probably will insist that any provisions for pardoning
guerrillas also apply to those on the right accused of political crimes.
Nonetheless, we believe some offer of amnesty will be likely this year, if
only because it would probably cause more guerrillas to defect. Most
guerrilla leaders are committed to a prolonged struggle, ho~~ever, and
they are unlikely to accommodate themselves to the Duarte government
without winning major concessions.
Cuban and Soviet Interests
Material support and guidance from Cuba and Nicaragua are key
elements helping to sustain the insurgents, but such support has been
constrained by concern in those countries over a potentially greater US
role in the region and increased military and economic pressure on
Managua. We believe that Cuba and Nicaragua will continue to
facilitate the supply of material aid to the Salvadoran guerrillas,
although Castro's primary concern remains the security of the Sandinis-
ta regime. For their part, the guerrillas are almost certainly concerned
about the reliability of their external support system
The USSR has provided propaganda support and training to the
guerrillas, and has facilitated arms deliveries as well. It probably will
continue to do so. Soviet leaders have become wary, however, of any
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closer identification with the insurgency, and Moscow's earlier confi-
dence that the guerrillas stood a good chance of winning has waned over
the last year or two.
Implications for the United States
Despite the relatively favorable prospects for political, military,
and-to a lesser degree-economic progress in El Salvador over the next
year or so, continuation of these trends will require large amounts of US
military and economic aid. Although the insurgency is likely to decline,
eliminating its root causes will depend on significant economic and
social progress in El Salvador. Furthermore, the country's emerging
democratic institutions are likely to remain fragile for years to come.
Given the entrenched political opposition to Duarte, the stability of his
administration and his success at co-opting more flexible elements of the
opposition will hinge to a large measure on perceptions regarding US
political support.
Ultimately, the role of the military will remain central to the
government's overall prospects. Continued success in the counterinsur-
gency effort could tempt the armed forces to reinsert themselves snore
directly into the political arena and more openly vent resentment
against perceived US interference. Nevertheless, the military's current
dependence on Duarte for continued US assistance is likely to remain a
powerful restraining factor.
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DISCUSSION
Background
1. During his first nine months in office, Jose
Napoleon Duarte has won considerable support as the
popularly chosen president of a nation beginning to
emerge from years of revolutionary trauma. His elec-
tion in May 1984 in the runoff against extreme
rightwing challenger Roberto D'Aubuisson, and the
inauguration in June, were belated vindication for his
reformist efforts to provide a democratic and nonvio-
lent alternative to the warring extremes that have
ravaged El Salvador
2. Duarte's frequently stated objectives are no less
ambitious than to preside over the consolidation of
genuine democratic government and to transform a
violently sundered society into a tranquil, prosperous,
and equitable one. While these goals are probably
beyond his capabilities in a five-year term, he has
made some progress. Most significantly, he has:
- Broadened support for his government and poli-
cies in the United States, and gained additional
backing from other governments.
-Helped to defuse the human rights issue both at
home and abroad.
- Gained the provisional cooperation of most top
military officers, even though they will not allow
him to interfere with their institutional core
interests.
- Managed to keep the insurgency and its allies on
the extreme left generally on the defensive.
- Elevated the hopes of the populace that peace
and participatory government can be wrought
put in
Duarte's Political Strategy
3. On balance, we believe Duarte has ordered and
managed his priorities skillfully, although he recently
has made some serious mistakes. One of his highest
priorities has been to maintain strong and diverse
backing for his government and policies in the United
States, while also gaining wider international legitima-
cy and support. Since his inauguration he has traveled
several times to the United States and has also visited a
number of West European and Latin American coun-
tries, where he has lobbied and impressed a broad
spectrum of leaders and interest groups. He has won
increased support in the United States, and has also
helped persuade the governments in West Germany,
Colombia, and Venezuela to pledge financial assis-
tance. Several countries have upgraded their diplomat-
ic relations with EI Salvador, and more are likely to
follow suit. And, as these trends have reinforced the
Duarte government, the international standing of the
guerrilla coalition has continued to deteriorate. Even
Mexico and France-which in August 1981 (when
Duarte was the junta president) recognized the insur-
gent coalition as a "representative political force"-
have improved relations with the government.
4. Duarte's election and his enhanced personal pop-
ularity seem to have accelerated the cooling of "revo-
lutionary fever" that has gripped El Salvador since the
late 1970s. Most significantly, popular support for the
insurgency has declined since Duarte took office, even
in many remote areas where the guerrillas have long
been entrenched. This is due largely to the growing
perception that the balance of power has tilted in
favor of the government and to the more wanton
tactics the guerrillas have employed-including the
large-scale forced inductions of youths and economic
sabotage. We believe that morale in the guerrilla ranks
has also deteriorated over the last year or so because of
the more aggressive and effective counterinsurgency
operations and their declining international support.
5. Meanwhile, Duarte's actions have accelerated
the downward trend in political violence. US Embassy
statistics show a sharp drop in civilian deaths in
1984-from about 1,700 in 1983 to 750 in 1984. The
level of such violence in recent months has been the
lowest in over five years. Even Salvadoran Catholic
Church and leftwing human rights groups have con-
ceded that abuses of civilians and rightwing death
squad activities have declined. Sustained US pressure
on the military and security forces, highlighted by
Vice President Bush's visit to El Salvador in December
1983, has had a major impact by discouraging abuses
and strengthening Duarte's efforts to increase his
leverage over the military and security forces. Several
important steps have been taken as a result. These
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include the removal of a few of the most notorious
human rights offenders from senior positions in the
uniformed services, the reorganization of internal se-
curity functions under a new deputy defense minister,
and tougher requirements governing the use of artil-
lery and airstrikes in populated areas
6. As violent and antidemocratic forces on leftwing
and rightwing extremes have been weakened, and
more moderate political forces have gained strength,
many influential leaders have moderated the confron-
tational behavior they exhibited in the past and are
participating more fully in the democratic process.
The National Conciliation Party (PCN)-the third-
largest party-has attempted to function as a construc-
tive conservative opposition on several key issues.
With few influential exceptions, moreover, the hierar-
chy of the Catholic Church has muted the liberation
theology that many bishops and priests preached in
the past, and has increasingly supported Duarte's
efforts. Among other indications of the growing desire
to end the polarization and bloodshed of recent years
was the reopening in mid-1984 of the national univer-
sity in San Salvador-previously a center of revolu-
tionary activism. Thus, by capitalizing on and acceler-
ating favorable trends that began gaining strength in
the months before he was sworn in, Duarte has made
significant progress in enhancing the domestic legiti-
macy of his government and of democratic institutions
and practices.
7. Duarte's foremost domestic priority since assum-
ing the presidency has been to gain the confidence and
assuage the fears of opponents in the officer corps. For
two decades after he helped found the Christian
Democratic Party (PDC) in 1960, he was anathema to
them. Within weeks of his inauguration, however, he
began to impress some of his erstwhile adversaries that
he shared their strong commitment to defeating the
Marxist-Leninist insurgency. By acting decisively dur-
ing amajor guerrilla assault on the Cerron Grande
Dam and power plant in June 1984, he was able to
turn what otherwise was the most damaging and
demoralizing insurgent action in months into a politi-
cal gain.
8. Since then, he has also made some progress in
enhancing military support for democratic institutions
and practices by frequently consulting with senior
officers, visiting military units and barracks, and
campaigning energetically to gain the respect and
loyalty of the officer corps. He has had to work hard,
nonetheless-and with mixed results-to persuade top
officers that it is in their best interests to endorse
certain of his initiatives. Though reluctant at first, for
instance, they eventually agreed last October to sup-
port his efforts to promote a dialogue with the guerril-
las. He apparently also was able to persuade Defense
Minister Vides to cashier a junior officer who was
implicated in the murders in 1981 of two US labor
advisers. It works strongly to his advantage, of course,
that in these and other initiatives, Duarte is either
pressing for an issue of strong interest to the United
States or is confident of US backing.
9. On the other hand, the officer corps continues to
distrust Duarte and remains strongly committed to
limit his power and closely monitor his activities. His
most serious and costly mistake thus far in relations
with the military occurred in December 1984 when he
pressed for the promotion of a favorite colonel-Vice
Minister of Defense for Public Security Carlos Reyn-
aldo Lopez Nuila-to general. Lopez Nuila is distrust-
ed by many of his high-ranking peers, who also point
out that promotion to flag rank has traditionally been
restricted to officers with combat experience, whereas
Lopez Nuila is a combat support officer. Duarte's
attempts to promote him over these objections, and
military fears that he might become the next Defense
Minister, provoked strong resistance and rumors of
coup plotting, and forced Duarte to back down.
Whether or not Duarte was in serious danger of being
overthrown, top officers desired to demonstrate dra-
matically to the President-and probably also to the
United States-that, while they will cooperate in
gradually extending democratic rule, they will not in
the foreseeable future allow their core interests to be
threatened.
10. Thus, we believe that regardless of how they
view Duarte and the changes he has brought, officers
are nearly unanimous in their determination to pre-
serve the unity of the military and to uphold many of
its traditional prerogatives. Specifically, they will con-
tinue collectively to wield decisive influence over him
in the following major areas:
-Choosing their own leaders, including the Minis-
ter of Defense, and determining promotion
policies.
- Organizing, disciplining, provisioning, and de-
ploying the armed forces according to their own
standards and maintaining its unity and morale.
- Determining national security priorities and im-
peratives, especially in regard to the guerrillas
and their foreign allies.
ist setting.
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11. The President has also given a high priority to
advancing his more partisan goals of expanding popu-
lar support for himself and the PDC. He would like to
wrest control of the Legislative Assembly away from
the rightist parties that have formed a maiority there
since the elections in March 1982. New Assembly
elections are scheduled for 31 March 1985
12. Duarte is perhaps even more devoted to pro-
moting his own place in history as an international
peacemaker and Salvadoran father figure. Though so
far he has made sure that these goals and impulses
have not overshadowed the bipartisan priorities previ-
ously mentioned, he has recently spurred old fears
among influential opposition groups that he is at heart
a radical demagogue. His well-known penchant for
personalistic, dogmatic, and sometimes impulsive lead-
ership continues to be a divisive element in his
relations with opposition politicians, businessmen, oth-
er conservative leaders, and some military officers.
They fear that Duarte is determined above all to
enhance his and his party's popularity by attracting
additional support from the left, and that he intends
eventually to pursue more populist policies aimed at
redistributing wealth and power at their expense.
13. Important elements of his performance have
given some substance to these concerns. Duarte has not
encouraged the private sector and has measured eco-
nomic policy mainly with an eye on the lower classes.
Although the economy grew by about 1 percent in
1984-after five years of contraction or stagnation-
this was more the result of high levels of foreign
assistance and the sound policies adopted by his
predecessor- interim President Alvaro Magana-than
any enacted by Duarte. In fact, by failing to begin
negotiations with the IMF or adopt policies aimed at
stimulating the private sector, the government has
delayed essential but unpopular economic adiust-
ments. With inflation already at about 15 percent and
unemployment over 30 percent, Duarte is loath to take
actions that, in the short term at least, would most hurt
the poor and urban-working-class groups that have
long been his core constituency. Policies aimed at
attracting foreign investment and providing induce-
ments to local entrepreneurs would probably result in
stronger economic growth, but he has preferred to
postpone such measures at least until after the Assem-
two most competent and experienced in his cabinet
are Minister of the Presidency Julio Rey Prendes and
Planning Minister Fidel Chavez Mena. The latter,
however, has been excluded from the inner circle by a
iealous Duarte, who apparently still resents Chavez
Mena's concerted challenge in 1983 to wrest the
party's presidential nomination from him. Members of
the economic cabinet are widely regarded as weak or
incompetent, and most of the remaining cabinet mem-
bers are also without solid administrative or substan-
tive credentials.
15. If he had been willing to reach out to the
private sector or to conservative opposition figures for
needed administrative and technical talent, Duarte
would have been able to consider a large number of
experienced and highly qualified individuals. Though,
for instance, the PCN continued to seek an alliance
last year with the PDC, Duarte spurned their over-
tures. His refusal provoked PCN leaders to ioin with
D'Aubuisson and other small rightist parties to elect
conservatives to all Supreme Court seats and the
country's top iudicial posts. Furthermore, the PCN has
formed a temporary electoral alliance with the Na-
tional Republican Alliance (ARENA).
16. On balance, nonetheless, we believe that Duarte
has made a viable start toward putting in place the
building blocks of future political stability. He under-
stands that he operates at the volatile center of a still
polarized political culture and can have few illusions
that the centrifugal forces and enmities that have
fueled one of Latin America's most violent and pro-
tracted revolutionary processes are likely to be elimi-
nated during his term in office. Similarly, he knows
that a variety of domestic and external forces will
continue to constrain him. Most important among
them are:
-The realization that some military officers would
relish any opportunity or excuse to remove him
from office.
bly elections.
14. Duarte obviously has concluded that it is more
important to reward his longtime political allies and
constitutents now that they finally can share in the
political spoils, and has relied almost exclusively on
colleagues from the Christian Democratic Party. The
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The continuing strength of rightwing parties and
groups, especially D'Aubuisson's ARENA.
The military strength and geographic dispersion
of the insurgency and its continuing ability to
inflict damage on the economy.
The control by rightist parties of the Legislative
Assembly, where the PDC has only 24 of the 60
seats.
The need to tailor his policies in order to retain a
high degree of international legitimacy for his
government, especially in the United States, and
indefinitely to acquire substantial amounts of
economic and military assistance.
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The Outlook for the March 1985 Elections
17. We believe that over the next month or so,
Duarte's domestic political strategy will reflect a
stronger and more conspicuously partisan and divisive
commitment to increase PDC power through the
elections for the Legislative Assembly and local gov-
ernments. We believe the issues, political dynamics,
and dangers to stability-including leftwing and
rightwing violence-will probably be much like those
that characterized the previous elections since March
1982. Duarte's principal objectives will be to ensure
the greatest possible legitimacy of the elections in local
and international opinion, to win a personal vote of
confidence through increased PDC representation,
and, optimally, to deny the right a majority in the
Assembly
Dealing With the Right
18. As in previous elections, Duarte will confront
the powerful forces of rightist parties determined to
retain or expand their position in the Assembly and to
protect the interests they represent. In the first round
of the presidential balloting in March 1984, the total of
ARENA and PCN votes (the parties ran independent
campaigns) constituted a majority in 13 of the coun-
try's 14 departments. Duarte was only able to carry
San Salvador, which, because of its much greater
population and strong Christian Democratic organiza-
tion, has traditionally been the party's stronghold. In
the May 1984 runoff between Duarte and D'Aubuis-
son, furthermore, the latter carried 10 of the depart-
ments, including all of the northern and eastern areas
of the country that have been most affected by the
military conflict. D'Aubuisson attracted over 46 per-
cent of the national total, reflecting both strong anti-
Christian Democrat sentiment and an endorsement of
his hard line toward the guerrillas.
19. Though ARENA has suffered recently from
organizational and funding problems, D'Aubuisson's
pugnacious and charismatic style and hardline pre-
scriptions for dealing with the guerrillas continue to
have great appeal. The former Army major is already
resorting to his standard style and berating the Duarte
government for being too soft in dealing with the
insurgency, insufficiently nationalistic, and hostile to
business and traditional interests. D'Aubuisson will
also continue to be the preferred candidate of many
military officers, and probably will benefit in a few
parts of the country from their help in persuading
local people to vote for him. In recent months, he has
visited several departmental military commands to
buttress his standing and ridicule the government.
Given his past performance and involvement with
rightwing terrorism, moreover, D'Aubuisson may also
condone or direct assassinations and other acts of
violence during the campaign in order to advance
ARENA's interests and undermine those of the Chris-
tian Democrats.
20. As in recent elections, the conservative PCN
will probably again emerge as the key to the balance
of power between the Christian Democrats and
ARENA. It is the oldest party on the right and during
the 1960s and 1970s was the favored party of the
military. It has maintained a solid base of support and
?organization in many rural areas. It is strongest in the
east, where its presidential candidate Francisco Guer-
rero won a plurality of the vote in his home depart-
ment of La Union in March 1984. The party may be
handicapped in the coming elections because, as the
new Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Guerrero will
be unable to run or campaign actively, and because of
the defections of some of its more rightwing members
who formed the PAISA party in 1982. Nonetheless, the
PCN name and logo are well known throughout the
country, and its new leader, longtime party Secretary
General Raul Molina, has the support of the party
organization and its youth wing. On balance, we
believe the PCN will fare about as well as it did in
1982 and 1984, gaining in the neighborhood of 20
percent of the vote.
The Municipal Elections
21. Duarte is likely to place high importance on the
municipal elections that will be held in cities and
towns throughout the country. He will probably help
select promising and agreeable candidates for major
mayoralties and other local offices, with an eye on
expanding the Christian Democrats' popular support
and low level of official representation in much of the
countryside (it presently controls 72 of 261 municipal-
ities). If the ARENA and PCN alliance holds and they
retain the lion's share of local offices, the government
may find its efforts to implement pacification, civil
defense, or other programs aimed at rebuilding local
infrastructure hampered by partisan squabbling. And,
if the Christian Democratic Party is looking ahead to a
postrevolutionary era in which the guerrillas have
either been defeated, driven into remote areas, or
largely abandoned the armed struggle, it must be
concerned about how little influence and official
representation it is likely to have beyond Metropolitan
San Salvador and the large provincial cities.
The Assembly Elections
22. All 60 National Assembly seats will be contest-
ed, and the outcome will have major consequences for
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Figure 1
1982 Representation
in the Legislative Assembly
reduction in the Christian Democrat's present 24-
member delegation would damage Duarte's credibility
and further inhibit his maneuverability through May
1988, when the three-year terms of the new deputies
Salvadoran Popular Party (PPS)
1
~ Most PCN deputies broke from the party in 1982 and formed [heir own
PAISA party, but the latter will not be a major factor in the 1985 elections.
Duarte's prestige and the balance of power between
the Christian Democrats and the opposition parties.
D'Aubuisson and other conservative and rightwing
leaders can be expected to campaign energetically for
their slates with the hope that-at a minimum-they
can prevent the Christian Democrats from winning
more than the 24 seats they currently have. If the
rightist parties succeed, and if ARENA finishes in a
strong second place, D'Aubuisson may again be elect-
ed Assembly president. He would need the support of
the PCN-which frequently has voted with ARENA-
and any of the small rightist parties that may retain
representation in the new legislature (see figure 1).
23. The most likely outcome in the Assembly elec-
tions is for a Christian Democratic plurality in the
popular vote on the order of those the party Avon in
1982 and 1984, and that at best it will pick up a seat or
two. By campaigning persistently and capitalizing on
his government's accomplishments, Duarte should be
able to retain or slightly expand the party's traditional
constituency. We believe the center-right Democratic
Action party (AD), which has two cabinet posts and is
allied with the Christian Democrats, will be hard
pressed to retain the two seats it won in 1982. Any
will expire.
Key Dangers Associated With the Elections
24. As in the 1982 and 1984 elections, the "quality"
of the process and voting will have major implications
for the legitimacy of the Duarte government. We
expect that once again international observers will be
present at polling places and that any military or
rightwing intimidation or voting irregularities will be
used against the government in the international me-
dia. In all likelihood, the guerrillas will seek to disrupt
and devalue the process by attacking isolated towns
and economic targets, by mounting roadblocks, con-
ducting sabotage, and, through a concerted propagan-
da campaign threatening the populace with death or
injury if they vote. Meanwhile, military forces will be
challenged to keep as many polling places as possible
open
25. A key test of the evolving balance of power,
which will probably receive considerable international
attention will be in the total number of municipalities
where the guerrillas manage to prevent VOtlIlg. Tllat
number rose from 28 in the March 1982 voting to 53
in the May 1984 elections, though most of the affected
places are sparsely populated-or uninhabited-and
in remote regions. The government would be embar-
rassed if it could not guarantee voting in at least as
many towns as in 1984.
26. Finally, the potentially most damaging develop-
ment could be some spectacular guerrilla successes
immediately preceding or coinciding with the elec-
tions. Key insurgent leaders, such as Joaquin Villalobos
of the People's Revolutionary Army (ERP), may gam-
ble on concentrating their forces and firepower in an
effort to accomplish this objective. Despite their weak-
nesses and divisions, and the likelihood that they will
not receive major new infusions of Cuban or Nicara-
guan support prior to the elections, the insurgents
retain the capability to mount selected assaults by
large units on targets in various parts of the country.
Guerrilla units have been moving west in recent
months into northern Santa Ana and Sonsonate depart-
ments, and are also endeavoring to rebuild an urban
infrastructure. Guerrilla operations during the election
campaign may also be characterized by increased
terrorism in San Salvador, with US officials and
installations as potential targets. Nevertheless, we
doubt that even concerted insurgent actions will seri-
ously disrupt the elections. Perhaps the most serious
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Improvements in the Salvadoran Armed Forces Through US Military Assistance
The armed forces' counterinsurgency assets have
expanded dramatically since 1981 to include:
-Troop strength has more than tripled to about
44,000 including 32,000 armed forces and 12,000
public security forces. Five immediate-reaction
battalions, an airborne battalion, an elite long-
range reconnaissance company, and other special
and commando units have been added.
- US-provided modern infantry and artillery weap-
ons and mobile communications gear have further
improved operational capabilities.
- Air assets have expanded rapidly and now include
35 UH-1H "Huey" helicopters (with four others
designated as medevac), two armed Hughes 500 D
helicopters, nine A-37 attack aircraft, two C-47
airborne fire-support platforms, eight O-2A recon-
naissance planes, and 15 fixed-wing transports to
include two C123Ks.
- Navy assets, while still minimal, have been in-
creased by 12 21- to 25-ft patrol boats, three 100-ft
patrol craft, and one 65-ft patrol craft.
This expansion has been accompanied by improved
performance in several areas, resulting in more aggres-
sive prosecution of the war effort. These improvements
include:
- A reorganization of the 350-man hunter, battalions
into 34 larger 390- or 580-man battalions, and the
addition of increased firepower provided im-
proved combat capability against large guerrilla
units.
- At least 19,000 Salvadorans on active duty have
received some US military training in areas rang-
immediate danger associated with the elections is that
Duarte might be assassinated.
The Military Balance
Improving Military Performance and Capabilities
27. Duarte has inherited an improving military
situation, and many key trends affecting the military
balance of power now appear to be running in the
government's favor. This has been a maior factor in
reducing financial support for the guerrillas, contrib-
uting to their recruitment problems and desertions,
and placing added strains on guerrilla unity. The
change in the political environment has complement-
ed improvements within the armed forces in produc-
ing the more favorable military situation.
28. We believe that the favorable military trends
will continue despite the likelihood of sporadic tactical
ing from counterinsurgent operation to equipment
maintenance. This figure includes more than
1,400 junior officers and cadets.
The advancement of younger, more aggressive
officers with field experience to key positions has
helped to shake the lethargy out of some garrison
units.
- More effective use of tactical intelligence has
resulted from expanded training and substantial
US assistance.
Improved recognition of the value and emphasis
on psychological operations through a bounty pro-
gram and other projects has met with some suc-
cess.
Improvements in military capabilities and perfor-
mance are likely to continue and should result in
additional gains on the battlefield this year:
- A 3,000-man increase in troop strength is under
way, to include a new Navy battalion to assist
interdiction operations along the southeastern
coastline. The Navy is also scheduled to receive an
additional 77-ft patrol boat.
- An in-country training facility, the National Basic
Training Center, will become fully operational,
capable of receiving 250 recruits every two weeks
and providing training for two battalions every
eight weeks.
-Air assets are scheduled to be augmented by four
Hughes 500-E and 10 more UH-1H helicopters,
five additional C-47 transports, and new O-2A
reconnaissance aircraft
setbacks and continuing deficiencies in military capa-
bilities and performance. The turning point probably
occurred between November 1983 and January 1984
when, because of strong US pressures, Vides began to
implement some key changes in the armed forces. As a
result, the traditionally weak General Staff was over-
hauled and younger and more aggressive officers were
placed in key field commands. These and other
subsequent reforms in tactics, improved training, and
the infusion of new equipment have helped to trans-
form what long was an antiquated and conventional
military force into one increasingly capable of waging
counterinsurgent war (see inset).
29. As a result of these and other positive develop-
ments, military performance improved markedly in
1984. Units of all sizes, from squads to battalions, have
increasingly operated in guerrilla-infested areas, and
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with greater success at keeping the insurgents on the
defensive. The armed forces have become more effec-
tive at damaging guerrilla infrastructure and compli-
cating guerrilla logistics within El Salvador. Evidence
from numerous sources indicates that the guerrillas
have suffered from mounting shortages of ammuni-
tion, medicine, and other needed goods. Captured
guerrillas and a large number of defectors have de-
scribed deteriorating and Spartan conditions in insur-
gent base areas and camps and complained of harsh
discipline by guerrilla leaders. Some have described
their fear of Air Force attacks that they believe have
contributed to serious morale problems in guerrilla
units. Some have also cited the Army's greater effec-
tiveness and their belief that they can no longer expect
to defeat the military. This has been underscored by
the fact that the insurgents have inflicted significantly
fewer casualties on the armed forces than in preceding
years, and they are capturing less materiel.
30. Unlike in previous years, moreover, when peri-
ods of improved military performance alternated with
cycles of heightened guerrilla effectiveness, the mili-
tary balance appears to have slowly but steadily
shifted in favor of government forces over the last year
or so. Guerrilla efforts in late 1983, culminating in an
assault over the New Year's weekend on a brigade
headquarters and the destruction of a major highway
bridge, were the last major successes that they have
been able to achieve. The insurgents have been able to
conduct a few spectacular attacks on strategic targets,
but none of these has shifted the momentum in their
favor. Furthermore, the insurgents did not mount a
major offensive in 1984, apparently because of their
growing internal difficulties and the greater success of
the military in disrupting their supply lines. Neverthe-
less, on a few occasions during 1984, the insurgents
demonstrated that they can still inflict heavy casualties
on poorly trained and led government units in surprise
attacks.
Continuing Military Deficiencies
31. Many deficiencies and weaknesses persist in the
military, however, and will continue to undermine its
performance and contribute to occasional costly losses.
The deaths in a helicopter crash last October of two of
the Army's best young commanders were probably the
result of continuing poor counterintelligence and secu-
rity. After conducting a study of the helicopter wreck-
age and the crash site, US specialists concluded that a
bomb had probably been planted aboard the aircraft.
The military also continues to suffer from generally
low competence in aircraft maintenance, with the
result that as much as half of the helicopter fleet has
often been inoperative. Security at strategic targets
such as the Ilopango airbase, where nearly the entire
inventory of aircraft is located, .has often been lax.
32. The military is also seriously handicapped by its
general inability and reluctance to conduct night
operations. The only limited progress that has been
made so far in that regard has probably not yet had
much of an impact on denying the guerrillas the
virtually free movement they enioy after dark for
infiltrating and transporting supplies, relocating
troops, and massing forces for surprise attacks. Though
improved, the timely and effective use of intelligence
remains an important deficiency. Though more infor-
mation is available, some commanders are slow or
unwilling to act on it. The military's ability to move
reinforcing units quickly has improved, but troops
continue to fall into ambushes. And, despite the
progress that has been made in centralizing, planning,
and streamlining command and control, leadership
problems persist. This is most evident in the failure of
the military yet to succeed in surrounding or defeating
a sizable guerrilla force in combat. In addition, the
military's inability to interdict a guerrilla resupply
shipment, despite large infusions of information on
guerrilla resupply routes and methods, remains a key
weakness.
33. Finally, civic action and civil defense remain
among the worst deficiencies of the military and the
government. The national plan to rebuild San Vicente
and Usulutan-two agriculturally and strategically
important departments (see figure 2)-and to win "the
hearts and minds" of the people has had only limited
success in San Vicente and virtually none in Usulutan.
Civilians in some rural areas appear enthusiastic to
take up arms to protect their villages and farms once
the guerrillas are driven away, but shortages of weap-
ons and funds, and the Army's inability to provide
adequate support and leadership have impaired pro-
gress. And, in some areas-most critically in Usulu-
tan-military commanders are incompetent and disin-
terested either in mounting civic action and civil
defense programs or in conducting aggressive counter-
insurgency operations. Major new civil defense pro-
grams are under way that are designed to translate the
progress being made by effective field commanders
into permanent pacification and economic develop-
ment in areas where the guerrillas have long been
entrenched. This will require substantial resources,
close cooperation between civilian and military au-
thorities, and a clear and strong commitment-so far
lacking-to civil defense.
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Figure 2
Insurgent Fronts and Areas of Concentration
Santa
Ana
erron Grande
Dam
^r. Cabana
PARA CENTRAL
La Paz
Guerrilla front boundary
ERP (People's Revolutionary Army)
FARN (Armed Forces of National Resistance)
FPL (Farahundo Marti Popular Liberation Forces)
PRTC (Revolutionary Party of Central American
Workers)
FAL/Dthers (Armed Farces of Liheration)
Departamento boundary
Bountlery representation is
not necessarily authoritative
The Declining Fortunes of the Guerrillas
34. We believe that guerrilla prospects are worse
than at any time since the insurgent alliance was
formed in 1980. The five guerrilla groups that com-
prise the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front
(FMLN) (see figure 3) and its political and propaganda
front group, the Revolutionary Democratic Front
(FDR), have been afflicted by considerable and occa-
sionally open stress, including leadership strife and
discord over strategy and methods. These and other
internal problems and deficiencies seemed to increase
in 1984, and we believe they are likely to persist, and
probably get worse.
35. Supply shortages and disruptions to their logis-
tics continue to impair insurgent performance. The.
insurgents have increasingly resorted to small-scale
actions over the last year or so, particularly against
EMALA
Honduras
ro~a
River
Honduras
TEGUCIGALPA
Q Gol/o de
~. Fonseca
civilian targets. The number of maior attacks and
those against military targets has decreased-probably
as a result of the government decision to consolidate
and strengthen its isolated garrisons, improve its quick-
reaction capability, and keep the insurgents on the
defensive. As a result of their inability to regain and
hold the military initiative, insurgent leaders have
resorted to seemingly desperate measures to augrrient
their forces, to keep them in line, and to attack the
country's economic infrastructure.
Popular Support
36. The guerrillas' credibility and popular support
have fallen sharply over the last few years. The
agrarian reform effort (see inset on page 16), the high
voter turnout and levels of enthusiasm for the elections
in 1982 and 1984, the sharp decline in rightwing death
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Figure 3
Components of the Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front (FMLN)
Force Strengths
Total, September 1984=9,000-11,000
FPL _ERP
(2,800- (3,000-
3,500) 3,500)
I
FARN
(1,400-1,550)
Faction
People's Revolutionary
Army (ERP)
Popular Liberation
Forces (FPL)
PRTC Armed Forces of
(700-850) Liberation (FAL)
Armed Forces of
National Resistance
(FARN)
Revolutionary Party
of Central American
Workers (PRTC)
~'rhe five factions [ha[ comprise the FMLN are organized into five
geographic fronts (see figure2).
30.3705 (000410) 10-81
squad activities and human rights abuses, as well as
other positive developments,, have helped to deprive
the extreme left of galvanizing issues that previously
worked strongly to its advantage (see inset on page 17).
In fact, there is growing evidence of rising popular
indignation over the guerrillas' frequent attacks on
civilian targets, their forced inductions, and other
abuse of the population. In some areas where they
have long been entrenched, the local people are
increasingly hostile to them. Isolated rural popula-
tions-many of whom in the past collaborated with
the insurgents-have fled in large numbers to safer
places near military bases or to refugee centers. We
know that the area of Morazan department north of
the Torola River, where numerous guerrilla bases and
training areas have long been concentrated, is now
largely depopulated after more than 6,000 people
evacuated in 1984. These trends leave the guerrillas
much more vulnerable, both to counterinsurgent for-
ays by the military and to betrayal by hostile civilians.
Guerrilla Strength
37. The total number of armed insurgents grew
from about 2,000 in 1978 to a peak of between 9,000
Main Operating Areasa Remarks
Eastern Front Most active militarily;
operates relatively
independently of other
factions.
Northern, Central, Dominant group until
and Paracentral top leaders murdered in
Fronts early 1983. Two small splinter
groups operate in
San Salvador area.
Central and
Paracentral Fronts
Central and
Paracentral Fronts
Paracentral and
Eastern Fronts
Military arm of
Communist Party; forces
becoming increasingly
aligned with the FPL.
Least doctrinaire; also
cooperating more closely
with FPL.
Least influential;
emphasis on urban
operations.
and 11,000 by 1984. This expansion was attributable
mostly to the fuller integration of militia forces into
combat units and the acquisition through capture and
infiltration in 1982 and 1983 of enough modern
weapons-mostly automatic rifles-to arm all combat-
ants. Intent on compensating for the steady expansion
of military capabilities, insurgent leaders endeavored
in 1984 to augment their forces by as many as 4,500
additional personnel. In fact, we estimate that until
September 1984, when they largely abandoned the
practice because it was so counterproductive, the
guerrillas impressed about 3,000 young people
38. We believe that guerrilla strength is likely to
decline over the next year or so based on a number of
negative trends already evident. These include the
lower level of maior insurgent attacks last year, in-
creasing defections, persistent reports of lower guerril-
la morale, serious recruitment problems, and severe
financial difficulties.
Guerrilla Capabilities
39. Despite its mounting problems, the guerrilla
coalition remains a potent and destructive force and
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Duarte's firm support for agrarian reform has kept
the program on track, though problems persist. Nearly
five years of land reform has turned one-fourth of El
Salvador's farmland over to nearly 100,000 peasant
families. Large estates were converted into cooperatives
by 1983. While the time allotted for the transfer of plots
to tenants ended in June 1984, Duarte has pledged to
consider requests from peasants who failed to meet
filing deadlines. El Salvador's new constitution gives
owners of medium-sized farms until the end of 1986 to
reduce their holdings to no more than 605 acres.
During the past year, land reform agencies have used
new leadership and increased funding to step up their
activities. In June, Duarte appointed campesino leaders
as directors of the Salvadoran Institute of Agrarian
Reform (ISTA) and the National Financier of Agricul-
tural Lands (FINATA), replacing the previous ARENA-
controlled management. Because control of most of the
affected land has already been given to peasants and
new cooperatives, program implementation has shifted
to settling titles, providing credit and technical assis-
tance, and compensating former owners. During 1984,
permanent land titles were provided to 6,460 peasant
families, nearly double the number issued in 1983.
Compensation settlements paid by FINATA to former
landowners lumped to $58 million in 1984, a cumula-
tive total of $180 million. In addition, ISTA officials
completed over 13,000 field inspections during 1984
parcels of land.
Local resistance to land reform is easing. The Embas-
sy reports increased cooperation between former land-
owners and agrarian reform officials following the
broad acceptance of land reform compromises in the
new constitution. Illegal evictions of peasants by former
owners are down substantially. Moreover, land reform
officials report that the large maiority of the peasants
who had been removed from their land have been
reinstalled. Nevertheless, bitter feeling over the pro-
gram continues as former landowners complain of
"inadequate" compensation and fear that land reform
bonds will never be fully redeemed.
Consolidation of the land reform program continues
to be undermined by a number of factors. Insurgent
violence remains the key concern, and a large number
of peasants have abandoned their lands, particularly in
the eastern departments. Despite the larger budget, the
needs for extension service to boost meager peasant
skills still exceed the government's capacity. Problems
with peasant credit and financing remain severe. Many
reform beneficiaries are having difficulty coping with
their new debt obligations and peasants lack budget
experience at the same time that poor crop prices have
cut farm earnings.
will undoubtedly inflict new damage on the military
and the economy. During the more than five years
that they have waged large-scale insurgency, guerrilla
leaders have developed a highly mobile and well-
ordered force structure. The combat effectiveness of
the guerrillas continues to be high, and they are
capable of inflicting heavy casualties on poorly trained
or led units. The insurgents continue to dictate the
terms and pace of most tactical encounters, are able to
elude military patrols and operations with little diffi-
culty, and avoid major engagements except at times
and places of their choosing. As already noted, they
excel at ambushing military units and continue to
operate virtually at will after dark. They are well
armed with a variety of mostly Western-manufac-
tured weapons, and continue to receive ammunition
and other supplies from Nicaragua and Cuba.
40. The guerrilla leadership has benefited from the
cumulative experience of the Cuban and Nicaraguan
regimes in all political and military aspects of covert
and guerrilla operations. As a result, they have devel-
oped an ability to collect and use intelligence that
continues to surpass that of the military, and counter-
intelligence skills that severely limit the government's
ability to penetrate their forces. The guerrillas employ
reliable and secure voice communications with ad-
vanced equipment, have used computers in at least
one of their safehouses, and have managed to keep
their principal radiobroadcasting facility-Radio Ven-
ceremos-on the air for more than five years with few
lasting interruptions. The insurgents have maintained
training facilities at base areas in El Salvador and have
even provided troupes of entertainers. Most guerrilla
leaders probably remain determined and tenacious in
their commitment to prolonged struggle, and will be
unlikely to accommodate themselves to the Duarte
government without winning major concessions.
The Political Outlook
41. Assuming that Duarte and his allies get through
the Assembly elections without suffering any serious
setbacks, they will still face many powerful forces
arrayed against them, and will be severely constrained
in their ability to advance programs or initiatives
opposed by the military, rightist political parties, and
other opposition groups. The President's room for
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Revolutionary Fever and the Evolution of the Insurgency
The guerrilla groups all formed during the 1970s,
after a number of years of substantial economic and
demographic growth in El Salvador that was accompa-
nied by rapidly rising, but frustrated, popular expecta-
tions. The fraudulent outcome of the 1972 presidential
elections gave considerable impetus to the revolutionary
fever that steadily rose through the decade. By nearly
all measures-landholding patterns, disparities in the
distribution of wealth and income, human and civil
rights, and opportunities for economic advancement-
El Salvador was one of the most inequitable and
polarized societies in Latin America. The young-
nearly 90 percent of the people were under 40 by the
late 1970s-and restless population was increasingly
alienated in the face of an inflexible and repressive
order
A large percentage of the country's intellectual elite;
many middle-class youth; Catholic clergy; urban-work-
ing-class supporters of the Communist, Christian Demo-
cratic, and other left-of-center political parties; and
even some in the military were radicalized as they
became convinced that only violent methods could
force the military and the small oligarchy to share
political and economic power. Indeed, nearly all of the
conditions associated with revolutionary upheaval grew
steadily worse through the 1970s as revolutionary forces
confronted the unyielding extreme right amid rising
levels of violence
Though many young Marxists and members of the
Communist Party assumed leadership positions in the
revolutionary forces, they were greatly outnumbered by
young idealists, nonideological working-class people,
followers of radical liberation theology, and socialist
professionals. The success of the Sandinista revolution in
Nicaragua in July 1979 further accelerated the rise of
revolutionary fever in El Salvador, and, because Salva-
doran guerrilla units had helped in that conflict, estab-
lished the strong international Marxist-Leninist connec-
tions that since then have increasingly characterized the
revolutionary forces.
The first significant reforms aimed at assuaging
revolutionary sentiments were designed or implement-
maneuver will continue to be narrow, and, as in the
past, he will be forced to seek tactical alliances on
certain issues in order to make legislative progress. He
will continue to press for certain core obiectives-
iudicial reform, consolidation and extension of the
agrarian reform, wage and other benefits for work-
ers-but, if he is to achieve anything in those areas, he
will be forced to make major concessions in order to
win necessary support from more moderate elements
in the opposition parties. Such concessions would
probably have to include, for instance, placing conser-
vative and private-sector representatives in his cabi-
ed by the iunta government that emerged from a coup
in October 1979 that was conducted by progressive
military officers against more than 100 of their seniors.
A sweeping agrarian reform, nationalizations of the
banks and of the export of coffee and other key crops,
and the promise of fair elections were the major steps
taken to redistribute economic and political power. The
economic reforms resulted, however, in a powerful
rightwing backlash and leftwing sabotage that caused
the collapse at the end of the year of the reformist
government and the radicalization of many of its
members.
Many from the iunta and the cabinet-including
Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora, now the two top
figures in the Revolutionary Democratic Front, and
other Social Democrats and Catholic intellectuals-
abandoned the system and allied with the extreme left.
They were ioined, moreover, by elements of the left-
wing and youth branch of the Christian Democratic
Party. Thus, despite the reforms and the emergence in
early 1980 of a new civilian-military regime that
included Duarte and other Christian Democrats, polar-
ization and violence continued to rise. Substantial
amounts of Cuban and Nicaraguan support reinforced
the revolutionary forces, and, at Fidel Castro's urgings,
the several guerrilla groups formed the FMLN that
year.
Guerrilla ranks and their support cadre continued to
swell over the next year or two, elevating the coalition
to what probably became the largest guerrilla move-
ment in modern Latin American history. Large-scale
and savage rightwing retribution during those years
contributed to the highest levels of carnage that have
occurred during the six or seven years of revolutionary
conflict. And, until the March 1982 elections, levels of
violence and popular support for the Marxist-Leninist-
dominated insurgency remained at consistently high
levels. In retrospect, we believe those elections repre-
sented the turning point in guerrilla fortunes, and that
since then the revolutionary fever has steadily declined.
net, allowing businessmen greater freedom to market
coffee independently of the government monopoly,
and undertaking economic and financial reforms ben-
eficial to private-sector interests.
42. We believe, therefore, that Duarte will continue
to walk a political tightrope throughout his term,
seeking on the one hand to retain-and perhaps
expand-support in his traditional constituencies on
the left, while compromising with business and politi-
cal interests on the right. Other factors could help,
nonetheless, to encourage Duarte and opposition ele-
ments to forge constructive compromises. Specifically,
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the next national elections will be three years in the
future, and antidemocratic and extremist forces will
have lost another maior opportunity to undermine
stability and revive their fortunes.
43. There may, therefore, be a greater chance than
in recent years that some key rightist leaders will
reassess the advantages of persisting indefinitely in
violent confrontation or of somehow accommodating
to new political realities. Extreme rightists, including
D'Aubuisson, will probably be more isolated and
expendable, and, if the government were to offer
appropriate inducements to the PCN, D'Aubuisson's
opponents in ARENA, and other rightist elements,
some may be more likely to abandon confrontational
tactics. If Duarte were to adopt a more conciliatory
stance toward conservative and business interests,
moreover, the chances would improve over the next
year or so that a working arrangement between the
executive and legislative branches, and between the
public and private sectors, will evolve on important
national issues.
44. Duarte's strongest asset is the evident support of
the US Government. This, combined with his interna-
tional prestige and affirm-if minority-political base,
should enable him to defend the reforms achieved
thus far and possibly extend them slightly in areas
where new legislation is not required and executive
powers can be employed. He is likely, however, to be
repeatedly frustrated by hostile rightist elements in the
Assembly intent on defending its narrowly defined
interests. Duarte, moreover, will have to increase his
efforts to retain the always tenuous allegiance of the
armed forces. He can probably continue to exert
discreet pressure on the high command to relieve
incompetent commanders and officers connected with
death squads, thereby over time reducing the likeli-
hood of a coup against his government. However,
attempts on his part to assert more than nominal
authority over the military hierarchy or to interfere
directly in internal military affairs are likely to bring a
sharp, and possibly disastrous, reaction.
45. Partisan political bickering will probably persist
and sporadically reach high and destabilizing levels,
prompted at times by Duarte's sometimes mercurial
behavior. One of the greatest dangers in our view is
that he will refuse to allow conservative and private-
sector interests a greater economic and political role.
We are concerned, for instance, that he will not be
able sufficiently to overcome his previously strong
populist biases against the profits and personal spend-
ing and consumption habits that successful business-
men will be likely to consider the minimum benefits
of reinvesting in the economy. By all indications
Duarte shows little understanding of development
strategies, international finance and trade, or the risks
of entrepreneurship. In fact, he often speaks vaguely
but passionately about developing the Salvadoran
economy by encouraging handicrafts, neighborhood
enterprises, and the informal economy-all with an
emphasis on social rather than economic equities.
When he meets with leading and qualified private-
sector representatives, for example, he has the unfortu-
nate tendency to lecture them rather than to explore
alternative approaches to development.
46. Moreover, Duarte remains under considerable
pressure from leftwing members of his party and his
traditional constituencies, especially labor and peasant
groups, to adopt activist and demand side policies like
those he advocated until a few years ago. Labor, which
has provided him solid backing in all of his campaigns
over the years, expects social reforms to continue
under his leadership. Union activity and strikes in-
creased in 1984, and with unemployment and under-
employment affecting about half of the work force,
we expect that their agitation will increase in 1985. It
would be impossible, however, for him to go very far
with such approaches over the next year or so because
opposition from the military, the Assembly, and the
private sector would be so great. But even a leftward
tilt by his administration would dampen prospects for
economic recovery, exacerbate old antagonisms, and
raise the specter of impeachment-which requires
only a maiority in the Assembly and ratification by the
Supreme Court-or a coup. His main motive if he
were to take these risks would probably be to try to
attract Social Democrats, Catholic radicals, former
Christian Democrats, and other non-Marxist members
of the guerrilla coalition back to the legitimate politi-
cal process.
47. Political institutions and frameworks for peace-
fully resolving disputes have only recently begun to
emerge in El Salvador, and the legacy of mistrust and
antipathy will take years to assuage. If Duarte were
assassinated, the constitutional provisions for succes-
sion would probably be adhered to, at least initially.
Vice President Rodolfo Castillo, a lackluster Christian
Democrat who has been in poor health, would be
unlikely to fill the vacuum for long, however, and a
period of rising instability would ensue. We believe
that, if opposition to him reached high levels, Castillo
might be persuaded by Christian Democratic col-
leagues and other influential political figures to resign
the presidency. The next in line constitutionally is
First Alternate Vice President Abraham Rodriguez, a
founding member of the Christian Democratic Party
who was inactive politically for many years until he
was appointed with broad support to his present post
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in 1984. Rodriguez would be acceptable to conserva-
tive and even some extreme rightwing leaders.
Civil-Military Relations
48. Perhaps the key domestic political determinant
of stability will be the state of play between Duarte
and the officer corps. He will endeavor both to allay
their fears and doubts about his leadership while also
gradually attempting to extend his authority over
them. We believe that, if the President continues to
pursue a generally pragmatic approach, and especially
if he moves by mid-1985 to conciliate conservative
interests, he will make progress in both of these
objectives. He has a de facto ally in Minister of
Defense Eugenio Vides, who recognizes Duarte has
strong US backing. He also has won the cooperation
and qualified confidence of Chief of Staff General
Aldolfo Blandon, and the majority of the officer corps
for the same reason.
49. Nonetheless, a minority of officers-perhaps 15
percent-remains largely unreconciled to Duarte's
presidency and constitutes a major and durable threat
to stability. Most have close links to D'Aubuisson, and
probably lend covert support to him and his party.
The potential danger posed by this group was illustrat-
ed by one of its key leaders, Colonel Sigifredo Ochoa.
He led a barracks revolt in early 1983 that resulted in
the resignation of the former defense minister, and has
long been associated with extreme rightwing leaders
and groups. Air Force Commander General Juan
Rafael Bustillo-while not a member of the D'Aubuis-
son clique-remains highly critical of Duarte and
reportedly was the last to ratify the dialogue with the
guerrillas.
50. One of the potentially most dangerous hurdles
the government will have to get by is the installation of
a successor to Vides. Under the military's traditional
promotion and retirement policies, this should occur
sometime this year. The two leading contenders for his
post are Generals Blandon and Bustillo. We believe
Blandon is the most likely successor to Vides, and that,
because of his pragmatism, he would be more inclined
to collaborate closely with Duarte and the United
States than would Bustillo.
Dealing With the Extreme Left
51. A key factor affecting civil-military relations
over the next few years is likely to be the degree to
which Duarte and the military leadership remain
united in dealing with the guerrillas. Thus far, the
trends seem positive, especially in the aftermath of the
second round of discussions in November 1984. By
confronting the government with unacceptable de-
mands in those talks, including the fusion of guerrilla
and military forces and the scrapping of the 1984
constitution, the insurgent leaders gave a boost to the
civil-military relationship. Top officers felt vindicated
in their hard line toward negotiations, and Duarte saw
his paramount goal of consolidating constitutional
government linked to those objectives. He has exploit-
ed this linkage skillfully, even winning snide approval
from D'Aubuisson for the hard line he took in spurn-
ing the guerrillas' demands, and no doubt will contin-
ue publicly to connect the constitution and rule of law
to the integrity of the armed forces. On the other
hand, however, his efforts have prompted some back-
lash by more hardline members of the military
52. By midyear we believe he will be likely either
to urge the military to approve a new round of talks or
to float some new ideas, perhaps in connection with
the Contadora negotiating process. His objectives
would be limited and calculated to minimize military
and opposition party sniping: to divide and weaken
the extreme left; to persuade at least some of its
leaders to abandon violent struggle; and to regain the
initiative and the high moral ground that he seized in
October 1984 when he first challenged the guerrillas to
talk. Duarte has emphasized in meetings with US
officials what he considers the critical importance of
eliminating the insurgency by 1986, and will be
unlikely, in our judgment, to abandon efforts to win
military backing for new efforts at dialogue, despite
the tensions such efforts will generate. The high
command, in contrast, will prefer that new talks be
contingent on dramatic progress in the counterinsur-
gency and unmistakable evidence that the insurgency
is in serious trouble. Though we believe it is unlikely
that Duarte will defy military sensitivities or preroga-
tives in any dealings with the extreme left, most senior
officers will continue to distrust the President in this
regard and monitor him and his Christian Democratic
colleagues carefully.
53. Amnesty for guerrillas will also be a divisive
and difficult issue for Duarte and the military.
Rightwing groups-especially ARENA-will insist
that any provisions pardoning guerrillas also be ex-
tended to those on the right accused or suspected of
human rights abuses and other crimes. Compromise,
therefore, will be difficult, especially if conservative
and rightwing parties work together and retain their
majority in the Assembly. Furthermore, the military
will probably insist on including numerous safeguards
in an amnesty decree to reduce the possibility that
entire groups of subversives would simply relocate to
the cities and take up new forms of aggressive opposi-
tion. Nonetheless, we believe some limited offer of
amnesty will be likely this year, if only because it
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would probably be at least as effective as the one in
mid-1984 that attracted several hundred guerrillas to
defect with their weapons.
54. At least a few guerrilla leaders have probably
already concluded that the rural insurgent strategy
they have pursued for the last four or five years has
run its course, and that their best alternative is to
return to agitation and organizational work in the
cities. One top commander, Ferman Cienfuegos of the
Armed Forces of National Resistance, who participat-
ed in the talks last October, admitted that political
conditions that gave rise to the insurgency no longer
exist and seemed more flexible and willing to compro-
mise than any of his colleagues. We believe, however,
that hardline guerrilla commanders will be able to
keep Cienfuegos and any other leading doubters in
line, at least in the short term, but that their task will
get progressively more difficult as insurgent fortunes
decline.
55. Thus, over the next two years, we believe that
defections by rank-and-file guerrillas-and perhaps by
some of their leaders-will account for some attrition
in their forces. This assumes that the favorable trends
in military leadership and performance will intensify
and that the Army will maintain a high level of
aggressive counterinsurgent activity in guerrilla-infest-
ed areas. It also assumes that Cuba, Nicaragua, and
other external supporters of the insurgency will not
increase their level of support dramatically or provide
the guerrillas with more sophisticated weapons, such
as SA-7 shoulder-fired missiles. Furthermore, any
lengthy lapse in counterinsurgency operations or seri-
ous and protracted disputes at the top levels of the
officer corps may give the guerrillas needed time to
replenish and reassert themselves. And, we wish to
emphasize that, even as the guerrilla forces diminish in
size and strength, they will retain the capability to
concentrate forces and firepower in a manner that
may result in some humiliating military losses. This
would be most likely to occur as a result of military
complacency, poor planning or intelligence, or egre-
gious tactical errors.
Cuban and Soviet Interests
56. Material support and guidance from Cuba and
Nicaragua are key elements helping to sustain the
insurgents, and we have no doubt that Castro and the
Sandinistas will seek to bolster their allies. We know
from several sources, however, that their relations with
the guerrillas have been affected by concerns over a
potential increased US role in the region. Following
the US action in Grenada in October 1983 and the
growing threat posed by anti-Sandinista forces in
Nicaragua, Cuban officials reportedly informed Salva-
doran guerrilla leaders that assistance would be re-
duced because greater resources were needed to en-
sure the survival of the Sandinistas. We believe that
Castro will continue to be more concerned about the
security of the Sandinista regime than about the
Salvadoran insurgency.
57. The guerrillas almost certainly are concerned
that the Cubans and Nicaraguans will so restrict
assistance as to affect the guerrillas' survivability.
Castro undoubtedly is pressuring them to overcome
their rivalries and divisions in order to mount a
stronger and more united challenge to the govern-
ment. We believe, nonetheless, that, if present condi-
tions and trends in Central America continue, Castro
will be reluctant to make a greater commitment to
provide military assistance to the guerrillas. And, if
guerrilla fortunes continue to decline and factionalism
increases, Havana may eventually make its material
assistance contingent on performance requirements. ~
58. We believe that Soviet leaders have become
wary of any closer identification with the insurgency,
and that Moscow's earlier confidence that the guerril-
las stood a good chance of winning has waned over the
last year or two. The USSR has provided worldwide
propaganda backing and some military and political
training to the guerrillas, and through Havana's more
intimate and regular contacts with guerrilla leaders
has facilitated military assistance. We believe the
Soviets will continue to do so. But we also believe
Moscow has refused to provide surface-to-air missiles
and has prohibited Cuba and Nicaragua from transfer-
ring SA-7s to the guerrillas. Moscow apparently wants
to avoid being perceived as responsible for any escala-
tion of the fighting. I~Tevertheless, some guerrilla units
may have a small number of SA-7s, possibly provided
by Libya, the PLO, or other Third World sources. ~
The Economy
59. El Salvador's dependence on the United States
for economic support will continue at high levels in
1985 and beyond. Although there was some economic
growth in 1984, the constraints to full recovery are so
entrenched that we see only a small chance that
Duarte will be able to spur much economic growth
over the next two years. Growth in 1985 and 1986 will
be likely to hover around 1 or 2 percent, while
employment and consumption problems continue to
worsen. We proiect that import constraints, the poor
business climate, and the uncertainties associated with
the continued insurgency will continue to depress the
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economy. Only under the most unlikely circum-
stances, including the virtual collapse of the insurgen-
cy in 1985 and further increases in already unprece-
dented levels of foreign aid, would the economy stand
much chance of growing by more than 3 percent, thus
raising per capita income. (See tables 1 and 2.~
60. To have any chance of achieving greater eco-
nomic growth, moreover, the government would have
to gain the support of the international financial
community and local business and labor leaders. To do
this it would have to adopt the kind of budget, trade,
credit, and foreign exchange policies that the IMF
would endorse. While the international financial com-
munity will expect higher taxes, wage restraints, and a
sharp devaluation of the currency, business leaders
will push for financial concessions as labor demands
for wage increases and other benefits intensify. Thus,
over the next two years, the key factors affecting the
economy will be the private business climate, govern-
ment monetary and other policies, and, of course,
levels of official foreign assistance.
61. We estimate that between $550 million and
$600 million will be needed each year-perhaps even
through the remainder of Duarte's term-to cover
annual trade and service deficits of about $300 million
to $350 million and public debt service obligations and
capital flight projected to average $250 million. For-
eign financial flows from official sources would have
to stay at current levels for the next few years to meet
these requirements and achieve lust 1-percent growth
in the economy. We believe that, as more growth-
oriented policies are adopted by the government,
private capital will begin to return, but any significant
infusion of capital through foreign investment or
commercial bank lending will be unlikely in 1985 and
1986.
Table 1
El Salvador: Foreign Economic Assistance
Inter-American Development 61
Bank
Table 2
El Salvador: Economic Indicators
Real GDP growth
(annual percentage change)
-1.7
-9.0
-9.0
-5.3
0
1.5
1.0
Consumer price inflation
(annual percentage change)
14.8
18.6
11.6
13.4
15.2
13.0
18.0
Central government deficit
excluding foreign grants
(percent of GDP)
1.2
6.2
9.2
8.7
7.4
6.7
6.0
Debt service
6.0
7.0
10.0
12.0
15.0
25.0
30.0
a Preliminary estimate.
b Projected.
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Implications for the United States
62. Despite the relatively favorable prospects for
political, military, and-to a lesser degree-economic
progress in EI Salvador over the next year or so,
continuation of these trends would require large
amounts of US military and economic aid. Although
the insurgency is likely to decline, eliminating its root
causes will depend on significant economic and social
progress in El Salvador. Furthermore, the country's
emerging democratic institutions are likely to remain
fragile for years to come. Given the entrenched politi-
cal opposition to Duarte, the stability of his adminis-
tration and his success at co-opting more flexible
elements of the opposition will hinge to a large
measure on perceptions regarding US political support.
63. We believe that Duarte generally will- continue
to accept the dependence of his government on US
support for the forseeable future. Despite this, we
anticipate that the President will be pressured to
demonstrate a degree of independence from Washing-
ton and the US Embassy and, over time, become much
more sensitive about. anything that might seem to
depict him as a US puppet. In fact, he has already
established one precedent when last October he pub-
licly reproached embassy personnel for issuing a state-
ment condemning an alleged human rights abuse that
later turned out to be a hoax. There is little chance
that he would see advantage in creating a divisive
bilateral issue over the next couple of years, but we
believe he will be looking for opportunities to improve
his somewhat tarnished credentials as a nationalist.
64. Ultimately, the role of the military will remain
central to the government's overall prospects. Contin-
ued success in the counterinsurgency effort could
tempt the armed forces to reinsert themselves more
directly into the political arena and more openly vent
resentment against perceived US interference. Never-
theless, the military's current dependence on Duarte
for continued US assistance is likely to remain a
powerful restraining factor. The support of the United
States has been and will remain the key element in
holding the democratization process together.
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ANNEX B
Key Indicators
Various developments in El Salvador and in levels and types of external
assistance either to the guerrillas or to the Duarte government could affect
substantially the assessments in this Estimate.
Indicators that the outlook would probably be more positive, for
example, include:
- Duarte is able to forge an alliance in the Assembly with moderate
rightists on key issues.
- Businessmen and rightist political leaders join the cabinet, as a result of
concessions by both them and Duarte.
- D'Aubuisson and other leading extreme rightists lose credibility and
support from their traditional constituencies.
- Labor, peasant, and other groups that have long supported Duarte
agree to defer demands for social and economic changes and refrain
from widespread strikes and violence.
- Guerrilla forces suffer significant casualties, rapid depletion of their
forces through defections or an attractive government amnesty pro-
gram, or increased degradation in their fighting ability as a result of
equipment and supply shortages.
- Divisions among leading elements of the guerrilla coalition worsen and
provide the government with new negotiating leverage or military
advantage, and some leaders of the political-military coalition abandon
violent struggle.
- Cuban and Nicaraguan material support for the guerrillas diminishes
significantly, either as a result of more effective interdiction efforts or
a decision by Castro and the Sandinistas.
On the other hand, indicators that the outlook would probably be more
negative include:
- Duarte is incapacitated or impeached and a protracted succession
crisis ensues.
- Duarte fails to reach mutual compromises with businessmen and
rightist political leaders on maior legislation, resulting in repeated
legislative defeats.
- Rightist parties fare better than we expect in the Assembly elections,
the electoral alliance between ARENA and the PCN proves durable,
or D'Aubuisson enhances his position as the leading rightwing oppon-
ennent of the government.
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-Labor, peasant, and other groups of the democratic left press their
demands for changes through widespread strikes, demonstrations, or
by resorting to violence.
- There is a major resurgence in rightwing death squad activities.
- Catholic Church leaders abandon their sympathetic stance toward the
Duarte government and express new support for extreme leftwing
forces.
- The military is split by open factionalism in the officer corps, possibly
over the succession to Vides.
- Hardline officers win control of the military and seek a pretext to
remove Duarte from office.
- The military suffers major defeats at the hands of the guerrillas, is
implicated in an egregious human rights violations, or expands its
powers unconstitutionally.
- The guerrilla coalition enhances its currently low popular support or is
able to mount powerful new military challenges to the government.
- Cuban, Nicaraguan, or Soviet support for the insurgents increases
substantially and includes new equipment such as SA-7s.
- US support to the Duarte government decreases substantially.
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